



MT. ST. MARY'S COLLEGE LIBRARY
EMMITSBURG, MARYLAND 21727




3 0852 00163696 6









Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024

14-7-3
HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN 1789,

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN 1815.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.,

ADVOCATE.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

NEW-YORK:

PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS,

NO. 82 CLIFF-STREET

1844.

"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum ; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gesserè. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit : et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello ; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus ; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt"—LIV., lib. 21.

CONTENTS OF VOL. III.

CHAPTER XLIX.

PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

Early formation of ambitious Designs by Napoleon against the Monarchs of the Peninsula.—Which are approved of by Alexander at Tilsit.—Commencement of the French Intrigues at Madrid and Lisbon, as soon as Napoleon returns to Paris.—Character of the leading Political Characters in the Peninsula.—Secret Treaty of Fontainebleau between Napoleon and Charles IV.—Napoleon's perfidious Designs against both the Peninsular Thrones.—Expedition of Junot into Portugal.—Seizure of Lisbon, and Embarcation of the Royal Family there for the Brazils.—Occupation of the whole Country by Napoleon, in defiance of the Treaty of Fontainebleau.—Progress of the Intrigues in Spain.—Arrest of Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias.—Entrance of the French Troops into Spain, and Seizure of its Frontier Fortresses.—The Prince of Peace, seeing himself outwitted, prepares for War.—Tumult at Aranjuez and Abdication of Charles IV.—Continued Advance of the French Troops, and their Entry into Madrid.—Napoleon comes to Bayonne.—Whither, by his Advice, the Prince of Asturias also comes, and is followed by Charles IV., the Queen, and the Prince of Peace.—Treacherous Conduct of the French Emperor to all these Parties.—Ferdinand is forced and Charles IV. induced to resign their Rights to the Spanish Crown.—Tumult at Madrid.—Prodigious Sensation which it excites throughout the Peninsula.—Napoleon confers the Crown of Spain on his Brother Joseph.—Assembly of Notables at Bayonne.—Reflections on the unparalleled Fraud and Duplicity of the French Emperor in these Proceedings.

CHAPTER L.

CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

Political Character and Situation of the Spanish and Portuguese Nations, and physical Conformation of the Country they inhabit.—Causes which have led to this peculiar and durable Character.—Church.—Army and Civil Government.—Strength, Discipline, and Character of the French Army at this Period, and of the British.—Spanish and Portuguese.—Commencement of the Insurrection in Spain.—Its universal Character, and partial sanguinary Excesses.—Constitution of Bayonne, and Proceedings of the Spanish Grandees there.—Arrival of Joseph at Madrid.—Debates on the Spanish War in the British Parliament, and universal Joy in the British Isles.—Operations of the French in Castile and Arragon.—Battle of Rio-Seco.—Unsuccessful Siege of Saragossa.—Defeat of Moncey at Valencia.—Surrender of Dupont in Andalusia.—Defeats of the French in Catalonia and at Gerona.—Retreat of Joseph and the French Troops from Madrid and all Parts of Spain behind the Ebro.—Insurrection in Portugal.—Operations of Junot there.—Expedition of Sir A. Wellesley to its Shores.—Action at Rolicia.—Battle of Vimeiro and Convention of Cintra.—Senseless Clamour in Great Britain on the Subject.—Advance of the English Army under Sir John Moore into Spain.—Interview of Napoleon and Alexander at Erfurth.—Its secret Objects.—Vast Forces which he sends into the Peninsula.—Great Conspiration in France.—Arrival of Napoleon on the Ebro.—Win-

ter Campaign in the North of Spain.—Battles of Espinosa, Burgos, Tudela, and Dispersion of the Spanish Armies.—Forcing of the Somo-Sierra Pass and Fall of Madrid.—Napoleon's Arrival there.—Advance of Sir John Moore to Sahagun.—Rapid March of Napoleon to Surround him.—Important Effects of this Movement.—Retreat to Corunna, and Hardships undergone by the Troops during it.—Battle of Corunna and Death of Sir John Moore.—Reflections on the Campaign, and the important Consequence of his Operations.

CHAPTER LI.

BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA PRIOR TO LORD WELLESLEY'S ADMINISTRATION.

Geographical, Physical, Moral, and Political State of the British Empire in India.—Character and Qualities of the Sepoy Force.—Early Settlement of the British at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay.—Early Wars with Hyder Ali.—Impeachment of Hastings.—Mr. Fox's India Bill.—Mr. Pitt's India Bill.—Lord Cornwallis's first Campaign with Tippoo Sultan.

CHAPTER LII.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY, AND FIRST APPEARANCE OF WELLINGTON IN INDIA.

Early History and Character of Wellington and Marquis Wellesley.—Principles of Marquis Wellesley's Government in India.—War with Tippoo Sultan and Storming of Seringapatam.—Wellington's first Campaign in India.—Mahratta War and Victories of Lord Blake in Bengal.—Battle of Assaye, and Conquests of Wellington in the Deccan.—War with Holker.—Its early Disasters and ultimate Triumphs.—Causes of the extraordinary Growth of the British Power in India.

CHAPTER LIII.

CAMPAIGN OF ABENSBERG, LANDSHUT, AND ECK MUHL.

Commencement of the Austrian War, and State of Germany at this Period.—Vast Efforts of the Imperial Government.—Commencement of the Campaign.—Battles of Abensberg, Landshut, and Eckmuhl.—Retreat of the Archduke Charles to Bohemia.—Campaign of the Archduke John in Italy.—His early Success and ultimate Discomfiture.

CHAPTER LIV.

CAMPAIGN OF ASPERN.

Advance of Napoleon to Vienna.—Desperate Battle at Ebersberg.—Retreat of the Archduke John from Italy into Hungary.—Battle of Aspern, and Retreat of the French into the Island of Lobau.—Extreme Peril of their Situation there.

CHAPTER LV.

WAR IN TYROL, NORTHERN GERMANY, AND POLAND.

Moral, Political, and Physical Character of the Tyrol.—Character of its Leaders.—Their early and astonishing Success.—Insurrection in the North of Germany, and Suppression of Schill's Revolt.—Operations in Poland.—Early Success of the Archduke Ferdinand.—General Situation of Napoleon at this Period.

CHAPTER LVI.

CAMPAIGN OF WAGRAM.

Vast Forces which Napoleon had collected at Vienna for the Prosecution of the War.—Extraordinary Ability of his Designs for the Preparation for the Passage of the River.—Battle of Raab, and Operations in Hungary.—Advance of Marmont from Illyria, and Actions in Croatia and Carniola.—Recapture of Warsaw by the Poles.—Preparations for the Passage of the Danube at Vienna.—Passage of the River, and Battle of Wagram.—Its varied Successes, and ultimate Retreat of the Austrians.—Tardy Approach of the Archduke John makes them lose the Battle.—Retreat to Znaim, and Armistice there.

CHAPTER LVII.

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION—PEACE OF VIENNA—SECOND WAR IN TYROL—DETHRONEMENT OF THE POPE.

Vast Importance of the Scheldt as a Point of Attack against England.—Walcheren Expedition.—Its early Success, and ultimate Failure.—Causes of these Disappointments.—Characters of Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Perceval.—Negotiations between France and Austria.—Peace of Vienna.—Continuance of the War in Tyrol, and extraordinary Successes of the Peasants in that Province.—Their ultimate Subjugation, and Conclusion of the Contest.—Rupture between France and the Holy See.—Successive Aggressions of the Pope.—His Excommunication of Napoleon, and subsequent Dethronement.—Incorporation of the Roman States with the French Empire.

CHAPTER LVIII.

MARITIME WAR, AND CAMPAIGN OF 1809 IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.

War in the Peninsula, and Resolution of the British Government to continue the Contest there.—Battle of Basque Roads, and Character of Lord Cochrane.—Naval Operations in the Mediterranean.—Siege and Fall of Saragossa.—Operations in Catalonia and Arragon.—Siege and Fall of Gerona.—Operations in Galicia and Asturias.—Expedition of Soult into Portugal, and fall of Oporto.—Landing of Wellington, and Expulsion of the French from Portugal.—Advance to Madrid.—Battle of Talavera, and subsequent Retreat of Wellington.—Defeat of the Spaniards at Almonacid and Ocana.

CHAPTER LIX.

CAMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS, AND YEAR 1810.

Divorce of Napoleon, and his Marriage to Marie Louise.—Resignation of Louis Bonaparte, and Annexation of Holland to the French Empire.—Difficult Task of Government in England in conducting the War.—Conquest of Andalusia by Soult.—Wellington's Preparations for the Defence of Portugal.—Invasion of Massena, and Battle of Busaco.—Position of Torres Vedras, and ultimate Retreat of the French.—Capture of Badajoz by Soult.—Battles of Barrosa and Fuentes D'Onoro, and Fall of Almeida.

CHAPTER LX.

DOMESTIC HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1809 TO 1812.

Character of the Age of George the Third.—Character of the English, French, and German Literature during that Period.—Character of George the Third.—His Mental Alienation.—Proceedings in Parliament on that Event.—Arguments for and against Proceeding by a Bill or by Address.—Ministers are continued in Power.—Negotiation with Lords Grey and Grenville in January, 1812.—Assassination of Mr. Perceval.—Causes which prevented the Return of the Whigs to Office.—Characters of George the Fourth, Lord Liverpool, and Sir Francis Burdett.—Committal of the latter to the Tower, and Riots

on that Event.—General Commercial Distress in 1811.—State of the English Criminal Law, and Character of Sir Samuel Romilly.—Monetary Changes during 1809 and 1810.—Bullion Report, and Debates upon it in the British Parliament.—Character of Mr. Huskisson, and Tendency of his Commercial System.—Debates on the Orders in Council, and their Repeal.—Character of Lord Brougham as a Statesman and an Orator.—Debates in Parliament on the Continuance of the Spanish War.—Budget of 1811 and 1812.—Negotiation for an Exchange of Prisoners with France.—Causes of its Failure.—Expedition against Java, and Completion of the Destruction of the Colonial Possessions of France.

CHAPTER LXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CORTES—WAR IN SPAIN, JANUARY, 1810—FEBRUARY, 1812.

Proceedings in Spain for the Formation of the Cortes.—Causes which led to its extreme Democratic Character.—Constitution of 1812.—Vast Effects which it has had on the South of Europe, and in the New World.—Wellington's Opinion of, and Predictions regarding it.—Negotiations between Napoleon and Joseph for the Partition of Spain.—Forces of France in the Peninsula in Spring, 1811.—Commencement of the Siege of Cadiz, and Operations in Catalonia.—Siege and Fall of Tortosa.—Capture of Figueras by the Spaniards.—Commencement of the Siege of Taragona.—Long-continued and desperate Defence of the Besieged.—It is carried by Assault.—Blockade and Recapture of Figueras by the Spaniards.—Suchet's Advance into Valencia.—Siege of Saguntum.—Battle of Saguntum, and Fall of that Fortress.—Attack on Valencia.—Its Surrender, with the whole Army of Blake.—Reflections on Suchet's Campaigns.

CHAPTER LXII.

CAMPAIGN OF WELLINGTON ON THE PORTUGUESE FRONTIER—1811.

First Siege of Badajoz.—General Description of the relative Forces in the Peninsula at this Period.—Advantages which the English enjoyed.—Immense Forces which were at the Disposal of the French General.—Causes which led to their Want of Success against Wellington.—The precarious and destitute Condition of the King.—Jealousy of the Marshals against each other.—Absurd Division of the Resources of the Country by Napoleon among his Marshals.—Dreadful Severity of the French Military Decrees.—General Spirit of Resistance which they produce throughout Spain.—Wellington's Difficulties.—Imbecility of the Regency at Lisbon, and of the Portuguese Authorities.—Jealousy and Weakness of the Spanish Government.—Extreme Difficulty of getting Supplies in Specie from England.—Battle of Albuera.—Its great moral Results.—Raising of the Siege of Badajoz by Wellington.—Transfer of the Seat of War to the Frontier of Beira.—Operations in the East and North of Spain at this Period.—Wellington's Investment of Ciudad Rodrigo.—Approach of the French Armies to raise the Siege.—Retreat of Wellington, and Action of Elbodon.—Both Armies go into Cantonnements.—Surprise of Gerard at Aroyos di Molinos.—Defeat of the French at Tariffa.—Important ultimate Effects of this Campaign.

CHAPTER LXIII.

FIRST INVASION OF SPAIN BY WELLINGTON—JANUARY TO NOVEMBER, 1812.

Siege and Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo.—Siege of Badajoz.—Dreadful Assault by which it is carried.—Irruption of Marmont into Beira.—Incorporation of Catalonia with the French Empire.—Destruction of the Bridge of Almaraz by General Hill.—Advance of Wellington to Salamanca.—Siege and Capture of the Forts there.—Wellington advances to the Dou

CONTENTS.

ro.—Movements on both Sides.—Retreat of Wellington to Salamanca.—Battle there, and total Defeat of Marshal Marmont.—Advance of Wellington to Madrid.—Raising of the Siege of Cadiz, and Evacuation of Andalusia by Marshal Soult.—Wellington moves towards Burgos.—Unsuccessful Assault of the Castle there.—Retreat of Wellington and Hill to Salamanca, and thence to Ciudad Rodrigo.—Severe Losses sustained during the Retreat.—Reflections on the great Results of this Campaign.

CHAPTER LXIV.

SKETCH OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE—WAR BETWEEN THE OTTOMANS AND RUSSIANS, FROM 1808 TO 1812.

Distinguishing Features of Oriental and European Civilization.—System of Oriental Government.—Manners, Habits, Virtues, and Vices of the East.—Causes which have counteracted the manifold Evils of their Civil Institutions.—Physical Description and Statistical Details of the Turkish Empire.—Ottoman Mode of carrying on War, and Natural Strength of their Frontier towards Russia.—Dethronement and Death of Sultaun Selim, and Accession of Mustapha to the Throne at Constantinople.—A Second Revolution, and Deposition of Mustapha.—A Third Revolution, and Accession of Sultaun Mahmoud.—Negotiations between the Russians and Turks in 1808.—Campaign of 1809, and Annexation of Wallachia and Moldavia to the Russian Empire.—Campaign of 1810, and Advance of the Russians to Schumla.—Their unsuccessful Operations before that Place.—Siege of Roudschouck.—Dreadful Repulse of the Assault on that Place.—Battle of Battin, and Capture of the Turkish Camp.—Capitulation of Roudschouck, and Conclusion of the Campaign.—Draught of half of the Russian Army from the Danube into Poland.—Campaign of 1811 on the Danube.—Battle of Roudschouck, and Evacuation of that Fortress by the Russians.—Blockade of the Turkish Army near that Place.—Its Surrender.—Treaty of Bucharest.—Character of Sultaun Mahmoud, and Reflections on the Possibility of Regenerating the Turkish Empire.

CHAPTER LXV.

ELEVATION OF BERNADOTTE TO THE THRONE OF SWEDEN, AND CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE WAR BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA IN 1812.

Description of the Swedish Peninsula.—Character and Institutions of the Swedes.—Invasion of Finland by the Russians.—Fall of Sweaborg.—Dethronement of Gustavus, and Appointment of the Duke of Sudermania as his Successor.—Renewal of the War with Russia.—Disasters of the Swedes, and Peace with that Power.—Character and early History of Bernadotte.—Continued Encroachments of Napoleon in the Centre of Europe.—Commencement of the Differences between France and Russia.—Mutual Grievances and Recriminations on both Sides.—Birth of the King of Rome.—Tyrannical Conduct of Napoleon towards Sweden.—Consequent Alienation of Bernadotte, and his Secret Treaty with Russia.—Ultimatum of that

Power towards France.—Treaties between France, Prussia, and Austria, and Reflections on the Dreadful Contest that was approaching.

CHAPTER LXVI.

ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON TO MOSCOW, JUNE—OCTOBER, 1812.

Immense Preparations of Napoleon for the Russian War.—Forces which he had collected for that Purpose.—Forces of the Russians.—Passage of the Niemen, and Commencement of the Campaign.—Advance of Napoleon to Wilna, and Great Losses sustained by him in the March there.—Operations of Napoleon against Bagrathion's Army.—Operations of Wittgenstein on the Dwina.—Retreat of Barclay de Tolly to the Dwina, and thence to Smolensko.—Junction of the Russian Armies there.—Battle of Smolensko, and Dreadful Losses of the French.—Battle of Valentina.—Continued Retreat of the Russians towards Moscow.—Appointment of Kutusoff to the Supreme Command.—Battle of Borodino, in which the Russians are worsted.—Their continued Retreat to Moscow.—Description of that Capital, and Preparations for Burning it.—Conflagration of Moscow, and Effect it produced on the Russian Army.

CHAPTER LXVII.

RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.

Reflections on the General Conquest of the Southern by Northern Nations.—Admirable Position acquired by Kutusoff on the Road to Kaluga.—Increasing Difficulties of the French at Moscow.—Unsuccessful Attempt at a Negotiation with the Court of St. Petersburg.—Napoleon Resolves to Retreat.—Defeat of Murat at Winkowo.—Commencement of the French Retreat, and Battle of Malo-Jaroslawitz.—The French fall back on the Smolensko Road.—Disasters of the Retreat, and Commencement of the Great Frosts.—Arrival of the French at Smolensko.—Parallel March of Kutusoff with the main Russian Army.—Napoleon Continues the Retreat from Smolensko.—Operations of Wittgenstein on the Dwina.—Storming of Polotsk.—Arrival of Tchichagoff on the Beresina.—Capture of Minsk and Bridge of Borisow.—Battles at Krasnoi, and immense Losses of the French.—Imminent Danger of Napoleon as he approaches the Beresina.—Arrival of Wittgenstein and Tchichagoff.—Napoleon's admirable Plan of Passing the River.—Dreadful Horrors of the Passage, and Losses of the French.—Departure of Napoleon for Paris.—Increase of the Cold, and Destruction of the greater Part of the French Army.—Napoleon's Arrival at Wilna, and Interview with the Abbé de Pradt.—Retreat of the French to the Niemen.—Heroic Conduct of Marshal Ney.—Generous Conduct of the Emperor Alexander at Wilna.—Termination of the Campaign, and Reflections on it.—Errors of the French in ascribing Napoleon's Disasters to the Burning of Moscow or the Severity of the Cold.—Real Causes of his Overthrow.

HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XLIX.

PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

ARGUMENT.

Ambitious Views of Napoleon on the Spanish Peninsula.—His early Designs against Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy in July, 1806.—The Discovery of these Designs rouses Spain to break with France.—Premature Proclamation by the Prince of Peace, announcing his Designs, in October, 1806.—Napoleon resolves on the Detronement of the Spanish and Portuguese Monarchs.—Measures arranged at Tilsit for this Purpose.—Proofs of the secret Conferences there regarding it.—Steps taken by the Portuguese Government in Consequence.—Origin of the Spanish Intrigues.—Character of the leading Persons there.—The Prince of Peace, Charles IV.—The Queen.—Sketch of the Life of the Prince of Peace.—The Prince of Escoiquiz and his confidential Advisers.—Escoiquiz opens a Negotiation with the Spanish Ambassador, and the Prince of Asturias writes to Napoleon.—Treaty of Fontainebleau between Charles IV. and the French Emperor.—Convention at the same Place by which it was followed.—Napoleon's perfidious Designs both towards Spain and Portugal in acceding to it.—His secret Instructions to Junot in the Invasion of Portugal.—Extreme Difficulties of that General's March across the Peninsula.—Conduct of the Portuguese Government, and Situation of Lisbon at this Crisis.—After great Hesitation, the Court of Lisbon determine to set sail from Brazil.—Proclamation of the Prince Regent on the Subject.—Embarkation of the Royal Family for the Brazils.—Arrival of the French at Lisbon.—The Country is occupied by them in Name of the Emperor, and enormous Contributions levied by their Troops.—The Portuguese Regency is at length dissolved by Junot, and the whole Kingdom seized by the French.—Complete Occupation of the Provinces by their Forces, and Despair of the Inhabitants.—Arrest of Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias, at the Escorial, and Seizure of his Papers.—Proclamation of the King of Spain on the Subject, and Correspondence with Napoleon regarding it.—Letter of Charles IV. to Napoleon.—Cautious Conduct of the latter on receiving it, which leads to the Pardoning of the Prince of Asturias.—Entrance of the French Troops into Spain.—The Prince of Peace does not venture to Remonstrate against this Invasion.—New Levy in France, and treacherous Seizure of Pampeluna by the French, and of Barcelona.—Figueraes and St. Sebastian.—The Emperor speedily Improves upon his Success, and covers the North of Spain with his Troops.—The Prince of Peace at length sees through the real Designs of Napoleon.—His secret Despatch to Isquierdo at this Period.—Napoleon demands the Cession of the Provinces to the North of the Ebro.—Godoy, at length made aware of the Designs of Napoleon, prepares the Flight of the Court to Seville.—Tumult at Arranjuez, and Overthrow of that Minister.—His Fall, and consequent Abdication of Charles IV.—His Proclamation and secret Opinions on the Subject.—Universal Joy of the Spanish People at these Events.—Continued Advance of the French Troops, and Entry of Murat into Madrid.—He declines to recognise Ferdinand, and takes Military Possession of the Capital.—Napoleon offers the Crown of Spain to Louis Bonaparte, who declines it.—His Letter to that Monarch on this Effect.—Savary is sent to Madrid.—His secret Instruction and Object of his Journey.—He arrives at Madrid, and persuades Ferdinand to go to Bayonne.—Journey of Ferdinand to Burgos at that Officer's earnest Desire.—Secret Motives of his Councillors in agreeing to that Step, but it is strongly resisted, and his Council become divided.—At length he prolongs his Advance to Bayonne, in consequence of a Letter from Napoleon.—Guarded, but deceitful Expressions in that Letter.—Energetic Efforts of the Spanish Authorities at Biscay to stop the King.—Godoy, Charles IV., and the Queen, are sent by Murat to Bayonne.—Great Embarrassment experienced at this Time by Napoleon in regard to the Peninsular Affairs.—His admirable Letter to Murat, portraying his Views on the Subject.—Extreme Agitation in Madrid at the approaching Departure of the Rest of the Royal Family.—Commotion and Tumult at that Capital on the 2d of May.—Barbarous Massacre subsequently committed by Murat.—Prodigious

Effect which it produced throughout the Peninsula.—Ferdinand arrives at Bayonne, and is told he must surrender the Crown of Spain.—Subsequent Negotiation between his Councillors and Napoleon.—He sends for Charles IV., and has a private Conference with Escoiquiz.—Its most striking Passages.—The Arrival of Charles IV. solves the Difficulty.—His Reception by Napoleon.—Ferdinand is forced to Resign the Crown in a qualified Manner, but still refuses to make an unconditional Surrender.—Charles IV.'s Letter to his Son.—Napoleon obtains an unconditional Surrender from Charles IV.—Secret Instructions of Ferdinand at this Time to the Regency at Madrid.—The Intelligence of the Events there on the 2d of May extorts an unconditional Surrender from Ferdinand.—Napoleon creates Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain, and convokes an Assembly of Notables at Bayonne.—His Proclamation to the Spaniards.—Reflections on the unparalleled chain of Fraud and Perfidy by which this was accomplished.—His perfidious Conduct towards the Spanish Princes.—Ultimate Consequences of this treacherous Conduct to Napoleon and his House.—Its apparent Wisdom, so far as mere Human Wisdom is concerned.—The Passions of the Revolution were the real Cause of the Disasters both to Europe and France.

No sooner had Napoleon returned to Paris than he began to turn his eyes towards the Spanish Peninsula, and the means of bringing the resources of both its monarchies more immediately under the control of France than they had hitherto been brought, Ambitious views of Napoleon in the Spanish Peninsula. His design on Portugal. even by the abject submission of both courts to his commands. His designs against Portugal had been of very long standing: Lord Yarmouth gained a clew to them while conducting the negotiations at Paris in July, 1806, for the conclusion of a general peace; and so July, 1806 pressing did the danger at that time appear, that government despatched Earl St. Vincent with a powerful squadron to the Tagus, to watch over British interests in that quarter, and afford to the Portuguese government every assistance in his power in warding off the danger with which they were threatened; Lord Rosslyn accompanied the expedition in a political character, and was authorized to offer the Portuguese government assistance in men and money to aid them in repelling the threatened invasion. Nor were these measures of precaution uncalled for; a corps of thirty thousand men, under the name of the "army of the Gironde," was assembling at Bayonne, under the command of Junot, and it was ascertained, by undoubted information, that their destination was Lisbon.* The presence of the British fleet, under Earl St. Vincent, in the Tagus for a period of several months, revived the drooping spirits of the Portuguese government; but after the battle of Jena, their

* "Switzerland," said Talleyrand to Lord Yarmouth at Paris, on the 27th of July, 1806, "is on the eve of undergoing a great change. This cannot be averted but by a peace with England; but still less can we alter for any other consideration our intention of invading Portugal. The army destined for that purpose is already assembled at Bayonne. This is for the consideration of Great Britain."—Lord Yarmouth's Despatch, July 30, 1806; *Parl. Deb.*, viii., 134.

terror of France so far prevailed as to induce them to solicit their dismissal. The march, however, of the French armies to Prussia, postponed, for a considerable period at least, the threatened invasion.*†

At the same period when these preparations, avowedly directed against Portugal, and against Spain, were going forward on the Pyrenean frontier, the cabinet of Madrid discovered, through their ambassador at Paris, that Napoleon was offering to bestow on others, without their knowledge or consent, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. It has been already noticed that, in his anxiety for peace with England, he offered to cede the Spanish settlement of Puerto Rico; and to obtain Sicily from the British government for his brother Joseph, he proposed to give up the Balearic Isles as a compensation to the dispossessed family of Naples‡. Nor was this all: to make up the measure of indemnity, it was seriously proposed that a large annuity, imposed as a burden forever on the Spanish crown, should be settled on the dislodged family, and stipulations to this effect were inserted in the secret articles of the peace, which M. d'Oubril signed with France on July 19, 1806.§ Nor were these diplomatic arrangements unsupported by warlike demonstrations; on the contrary, the most active measures were taken to put the army on the Pyrenean frontier on the most efficient footing; and on the 19th of July Earl Yarmouth wrote to Mr. Secretary Fox, "There is a considerable army already forming at Bayonne; thirty thousand men are there already; this army is ostensibly directed against Portugal, but it will take Spain also."||

The alarming discovery of the manner in which the French emperor was thus disposing of portions of the Spanish monarchy, with which he was in a state of close alliance at the

time, without ever going through the form of asking their consent to the cessions they were required to make, added to the irritation which the court of Madrid already felt at the dethronement of the Neapolitan branch of the house of Bourbon. It produced the same impression on the cabinet of Madrid which a similar discovery, made at the same time, of the offer of Napoleon to cede Hanover, recently bestowed on Prussia by himself, to Great Britain, as an inducement to that power to enter into a maritime peace did on that of Berlin. Both these powers had for ten years cordially supported France; Spain, in particular, had placed her fleets and treasures at its disposal, and not only annually paid an enormous tribute (£2,800,000) to the expenses of the war, but submitted for its prosecution to the destruction of her marine, and the entire stoppage of her foreign and colonial trade. When, therefore, in return for so many sacrifices, made in a cause foreign to the real interests of Spain, her ministers found not only that the interests of the Peninsula were now regarded by Napoleon in his negotiation with England and Russia, but that he had actually offered the dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy, his tried and faithful ally, to appease the jealousy or satisfy the demands of these his old and inveterate enemies, their indignation knew no bounds. The veil which had so long hung before their eyes was at once violently rent asunder; they saw clearly that fidelity in alliance and long-continued national service afforded no guarantee whatever for the continued support of the French monarch, and that, when it suited his purpose, he had no scruples in purchasing a temporary respite from the hostility of an enemy by the permanent spoliation of a friend. The Prince of Peace, also, was personally mortified at the exclusion of the Spanish minister at Paris from all share in the conferences going on with D'Oubril and Lord Yarmouth for the conclusion of a general peace. Under the influence of such pressing public and private causes of irritation, the Spanish minister lent a willing ear to the advances of the Russian ambassador at Madrid, Baron Strogonoff, who strongly represented the impolicy of continuing any longer the alliance with a conqueror who sacrificed his allies to propitiate his enemies; and a convention was secretly concluded at Madrid between the Span- Aug. 28, 1806.

ish government and the Russian ambassador, to which the court of Lisbon was also a party, by which it was agreed that, as soon as the favourable opportunity was arrived, by the French armies being far advanced on their road to Berlin, the Spanish government should commence hostilities on the Pyrenees, and invite the English to co-operate in averting the dangers with which it was menaced from the Spanish Peninsula.*

The whole of this secret negotiation was made known to Napoleon by the activity of his ambassador at Madrid, and by the intercepting of some of the correspondence in cipher, in which it was carried on. But he dissembled

The discovery of these designs rouses Spain to break with France.

Premature proclamation of Peace.

* Hard., x., 79. Parl. Deb., viii., 134.

† Even so early as this period, the project of partitioning Portugal, and conferring a portion of it on the Prince of Peace, afterward carried into effect by the treaty of Fontainebleau, was formed.* "Lord Rosalyn," says General Foy, "was no sooner admitted to the council of Lisbon, than he announced that it was all over with Portugal; that a French army, assembled at the foot of the Pyrenees, was ready to invade it, and that its conquest was already arranged between the King of Spain and the Prince of Peace. That great project," added he, "has been confided by Talleyrand to Lord Lauderdale during the negotiations at Paris. The ministers of the King of England could not see without uneasiness the peril of their ancient allies; they have flown to their succour. A corps of 12,000 men at this moment is embarking at Portsmouth, and will shortly arrive at Lisbon; meanwhile, the court of Lisbon may draw at pleasure on the treasury of England for the charges consequent on the war."—Foy, ii., 123. The English expedition sailed, but afterward went on to Sicily, as the Portuguese government, relieved of their present danger by the Prussian war, and desirous not to embroil themselves farther with France, not only declined their aid, but prevailed on the English government to withdraw their squadron from the Tagus.

‡ Ante, ii., 432.

§ "M. D'Oubril and Talleyrand have fixed upon Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica for his Sicilian majesty, if they cannot prevail on us to evacuate Sicily."—Lord Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox, July 19 and 20, 1806; Parl. Deb., viii., 122. And again, on the 26th of September, Champagny proposed to Lord Lauderdale "that his Sicilian majesty should have the Balearic Isles, and an annuity from the court of Spain, to enable him to maintain his dignity."—Lord LAUDERDALE'S Despatch to Earl SPENCER, Paris, the 26th of September, 1806; Parl. Deb., viii., 193, 194.

|| Torano, i., 6. Bign., v., 345, 352. Lord Yarmouth's Despatch, Paris, July 19, 1806. Parl. Deb., viii., 122.

* Ante, ii., 430.

* Lord Londonderry, i., 19. Hard., x., 80, 81. Torano, i., 6, 7.

his resentment, and resolved to strike a decisive blow in the north of Germany before he carried into effect the views which he now began to entertain for the total conquest and appropriation of both kingdoms in the Peninsula. The imprudence of the Prince of Peace, however, publicly revealed the designs which were in agitation before the proper season had arrived; for, in a proclamation published in the beginning of October at Madrid, he invited "all Spaniards to unite themselves under the national standards; the rich to make sacrifices for the charges of a war which will soon be called for by the common good; the magistrates to do all in their power to rouse the public enthusiasm, in order to enable the nation to enter with glory in the lists which were preparing." This proclamation reached Napoleon on the field of Jena the evening after the battle. He was not prepared for so vigorous a step on the part of one who had so long been the obsequious minister of his will; and it may be conceived what his feelings were on receiving accounts of so decided a demonstration in such a moment of unexemplified triumph. Too skilled in dissembling, however, to give any premature vent to his feelings, he contented himself with instructing his ambassador at Madrid to demand explanation of so extraordinary a measure, and feigned entire satisfaction with the flimsy pretence that it was directed against an anticipated descent of the Moors. Nay, he had the address to render this perilous step the means of forwarding his ultimate designs against the Peninsula; for, by threatening the Prince of Peace with the utmost consequences of his resentment, if the most unequivocal proofs of devotion to the cause of France were not speedily given, he succeeded in obtaining the consent of the cabinet of Madrid to the march of the Marquis Romana, with the flower of the Spanish army, from the banks of the Ebro to the shores of the Baltic, thereby denuding the Peninsula of its best defenders, and leaving it, as he supposed, an easy prey to his ambitious designs.*† At the same time, the court of Lisbon, justly alarmed at the perilous situation in which they were placed by this ill-timed revelation of their secret designs, lost no time in disavowing all participation in a project which all concerned pretended now equally to condemn; and to propitiate the conqueror by an act which they were well aware would be well received, compelled Earl St. Vincent to withdraw with his squadron from the Tagus.

This meditated though abortive resistance of

Spain, however, to the projects of spoliation which he had in contemplation, produced a very great impression on Napoleon. He perceived, in the clearest manner, the risk to which he was exposed, if, while actively engaged in a German or Russian war in front, he were to be suddenly assailed by the monarchies of the Peninsula in rear: a quarter where the French frontier was in a great measure defenceless, and from which the armies of England might find an easy entrance into the heart of his dominions. He felt, with Louis XIV., that it was necessary there should be no longer any Pyrenees; and as the Revolution had changed the reigning family on the throne of France, it appeared indispensable that a similar change should take place in the Peninsular monarchies. By effecting that object, he thought, apparently with reason, that not only would the resources of the kingdoms it contained be more completely placed at his disposal, but his rear would be secured by the co-operation of princes whose existence depended on the maintenance of his authority; and a new family compact, founded on the same reasons of blood connexion and state policy which had rendered it so important to the Bourbon, would, in like manner, secure the perpetuity of the Napoleon dynasty. From the people, either of Spain or Portugal, he anticipated little or no opposition, deeming them, like the Italians, indifferent to political changes, provided that no diminution were made in their private enjoyments. Although, therefore, he dissembled his intentions as long as the war continued in the North of Europe, he had already taken his resolution, and the determination was irrevocable, that the houses of Bourbon and Braganza should cease to reign.*

The peace of Tilsit, however, placed Napoleon in a very different situation, and gave him at once the means of providing in the most effectual manner for the concurrence of Alexander in the dethronement of the Peninsular monarchs, by merely conniving at his advances against the Turkish Empire. It has already been stated, accordingly, that the invasion of Spain was settled at this period, and that the consideration given for that act of injustice was permission to the Czar to drive the Turks out of Europe.† In regard to Portugal,

Napoleon resolves on the dethronement of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs.

* Las Cas., iv., 200, 201. Londond., i., 22. Hard., x., 81, 82. Thib., vi., 276. † *Ante*, ii., 545.

‡ "I have strong reasons to believe," says Savary, "that the affair of Spain was arranged at Tilsit."

Subsequently, at St. Petersburg, when the troubles in the Peninsula commenced, the emperor seemed no ways surprised at them, and not only expressed no jealousy at the entrance of the French troops into Spain, but never once mentioned the subject. And although Napoleon wrote to me every week from Paris, he never alluded to the subject: a silence which he certainly would not have preserved had everything not been previously arranged, especially considering how much he had at heart at that period to draw closer the bonds of the Russian alliance."—SAVARY, iii., 99: see also THIBAudeau, *Hist. de l'Empire*, vi., 276; ABBE DE PRADT, *Revolutions d'Espagne*, i., 7; and Escoiquiz has preserved a precious conversation which he had with Napoleon himself on that subject: "There is but one power," said he, "which can disturb my views, and I have no fears in that quarter. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I have communicated my projects on Spain, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour that he would throw no obstacles in their way. The other pow-

* Hard., x., 79, 81. Southey's *Pen. War*, i., 83. De Pradt, *Sur la Rev. d'Espagne*, 15. Londonderry, i., 21, 22.

† The details now given on the spoliation of Spain, which had been contemplated by Napoleon in the diplomatic conferences with the English government at Paris in July, 1806, and the actual conclusion of a treaty for that spoliation with Russia in that month, are of the highest importance in the development of the remote causes of the Peninsular war, as they demonstrate that the celebrated proclamation of the Prince of Peace on the 5th of October was not, as the French panegyrists of Napoleon represent, an uncalculated act of original hostility on the part of the Spanish government, but a defensive measure merely, rendered necessary by the discovery of Napoleon's previous declared intention of bestowing on strangers, without their consent, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. This important fact, demonstrated beyond dispute by the State Papers above quoted, appears to be entirely unknown to Southey (*Penins. War*, i., 83); Napier (*Penins. War*); and even Lord Londonderry (*Londond.*, i., 21, 22).

and so desirous of enjoying on a throne the tranquillity of private life, that he surrendered himself on ordinary occasions, without scruple, to the direction of the queen and the Prince of Peace. She was a woman of spirit and capacity, but sensual, intriguing, and almost entirely governed by Don Manuel Godoy, a minister whom her criminal favour had raised from the humblest station to be the supreme director of affairs in the Peninsula. He was not by nature a bad man, and, being endowed with considerable talents, might, under a free constitution, and in a country where greatness was to be attained by integrity of conduct and capacity for the direction of affairs, have preserved an unblemished reputation. Even as it was, his administration, among many grievous evils, conferred some important benefits on his country. But elevated to power by the partiality of a woman, ambitious, vain, and ostentatious, surrounded by a jealous nobility, who regarded his extraordinary influence with undisguised aversion, he had no resource for the preservation of his power but in the same arts to which he had owed his rise; and an inordinate ambition, unsatiated even by the long tenure which he had held of absolute power in the Peninsula, now aspired to a throne, and aimed at the formation of a dynasty which might take its place among the crowned heads of Europe.*†

* Hard., x., 85, 87. Thib., vi., 277, 278. Toreno, i., 9, 12. Nell., i., 3, 4.

† Don Manuel Godoy, born at Badajoz in 1767, of a noble Sketch of the life but obscure family, affords as singular an example of sudden elevation as the history of Europe or the East has recorded. A mere private in the body-guard, he owed the first favour of the queen to the skill with which he sung and touched the lute, so favourite an instrument in that land of love and romance. Rapidly advanced by the royal favour in that dissolute court, he had the singular art, ever since 1793, not merely to lead captive his royal mistress, but to acquire an unlimited sway over the mind of the king, and at the same time live publicly with another mistress (Dona Pepa Tudo), by whom he had several children. His education had been neglected, but he had considerable natural talents, which appeared in an especial manner in the numerous and successful intrigues which he carried on with the ladies of the court, whose rivalry for his favours increased with every additional title he acquired. He was not, however, naturally bad, and never disgraced his administration by acts of cruelty. In five years he rose from being a private in the guards to absolute power, and was already loaded with honours and titles before the treaty of Bâle, in 1795, which procured for him the title of Prince of the Peace. From that time down to the period of the French invasion his ascendancy at court was unbroken, and his influence, both over the king and queen, unbounded. At the special desire of the king, he at length espoused the daughter of Don Louis, brother to that monarch, and his daughter was destined in marriage to the young King of Etruria. He had all the passion for show and splendour which usually belongs to those who are elevated to a rank which they have not held from their infancy; this prodigality occasioned a perpetual want of money, which was supplied by the sale of offices and the receipt of bribes of every description, and under his administration a frightful system of corruption overspread every branch of the public service. Many public improvements, however, also signalized it. The impulse given by the Bourbons to the sciences and arts was continued and increased; greater benefits were conferred on public industry during the fifteen years of his government than during the three preceding reigns. Schools were established for the encouragement of agriculture, the spread of medical information, and the diffusion of knowledge in the mechanical arts. He braved the Inquisition, and snatched more than one victim from its jaws. He arrested the progress of estates held in mortmain, which threatened to swallow up half the land of the kingdom. But he was unfit for the guidance of the state in the trying periods of the Revolutionary wars, and drew on Spain the contempt of foreign powers by the subserviency and degradation of his foreign administration.—See Godoy's *Memoirs*, i., 1, 217; and Fox, ii., 250, 262.

The Prince of Asturias, afterward so well known in Europe under the title of Ferdinand VII., was born on the 14th of October, 1784, and was, consequently, twenty-four years of age when the troubles of Spain commenced. Facile and indolent in general, though at the same time irascible and impetuous on particular occasions, he had fallen entirely under the guidance of those by whom he was surrounded. They were all creatures of the Prince of Peace, with the exception of the virtuous Count Alvarez, whose principles were too unbending to allow him to remain long in the corrupted atmosphere of a despotic court, and the Canon Escoiquiz, an ecclesiastic of remarkable talents, extensive knowledge, and profound dissimulation, who, by his capacity and zeal in his service, had at length acquired the absolute direction of his affairs. The Prince of Asturias had been formerly married to a princess of the Neapolitan house of Bourbon, whose talents, high spirit, and jealousy of the exorbitant influence of the Prince of Peace had fomented the divisions almost inseparable from the relative situations of heir-apparent and ruling monarch in an absolute government. Two parties, as usual on such occasions, formed themselves at the Spanish court: the one paying their court to the ruling power, the other worshipping the rising sun. The Prince of Peace was the object of universal idolatry to the first: Escoiquiz was the soul of the last. The Princess of Asturias, after four years of a brilliant existence, died, universally regretted, in May 21, 1806, leaving the Spanish monarchy, at the approaching crisis of its fate, exposed, in addition to the divisions of a distracted court, to the intrigues consequent on the competition for the hand of the heir-apparent to the throne.*

Godoy saw the advantage which his future rival was likely to derive from his ascendancy over the mind of Ferdinand, and therefore he had long before taken the decisive step of exiling him from Madrid to the place of his ecclesiastical preferment at Toledo. He afterward adopted the design of extending the influence he held over the reigning monarch to the heir-apparent by marrying him to Doña Maria Louisa de Bourbon, sister of his own wife, and even went so far as to propose that alliance to the prince. This project, however, miscarried, and Godoy again returned to his ambitious designs, independent of the heir-apparent, who resumed his relations with Escoiquiz and the malecontent party among the nobility. No sooner, therefore, did Napoleon turn his eyes towards Spain in the spring of 1807, than he opened secret negotiations with him; while, at the same time, Escoiquiz, who, though banished to Toledo, was still the soul of the prince's party, commenced underhand intrigues in the same quarter, and came privately to Madrid to arrange with the Duke del Infantado, the Duke de San Carlos, and the other leaders of the prince's party, the means of permanently emancipating him from the thralldom of the ruling favourite. It was in order to foment and take advantage

* Hard., x., 88, 89. Thib., vi., 277, 278. Cevallos, 12, 13.

The Prince of Asturias, and Escoiquiz, his confidential adviser.

Escoiquiz opens a negotiation with the French ambassador, and the Prince of Asturias writes to Napoleon.

of these divisions that Napoleon sent Beauharnois as his ambassador to Madrid in July, 1807; and that skilful diplomatist was not long of opening secret conferences with the Duke del Infantado, in which it was mutually agreed that, both for the security of the Spanish monarchy and to form a counterpoise to the enormous power and ambitious projects of the Prince of Peace, it was indispensable that the Prince of Asturias should espouse a princess

Sept. 30. of the imperial family of Bonaparte. Beauharnois afterward wrote to Escoiquiz, calling on him to "give a specific guarantee, and something more than vague promises on the subject." Thus encouraged, the

Oct. 11. Prince of Asturias wrote directly to Napoleon a letter, in which, after the most exaggerated flattery, and a declaration that his father was surrounded by evil counsellors who misled his better judgment, he implored him to permit him the honour of an alliance with his imperial family.*†

Beauharnois had warmly entered into these views of the Prince of Asturias, in the hope that, if the proposed alliance took place, the choice of the prince would be directed to a niece of the empress and relation of his own, who was afterward bestowed on the Duke d'Arenberg. But when the letter reached Napoleon he had other views for the disposal of the Spanish throne. By means of Isquierdo, a Spanish agent at Paris, who was a mere creature of the Prince of Peace, he had for some time been negotiating a treaty with Charles IV., the object of which was at once to secure the partition of Portugal, and bestow such a share of the spoils on the Prince of Peace as might secure him to the French interest, and prevent him from opposing any serious obstacle to the total dethronement of the Spanish royal family. This negotiation took place, and the treaty in which it terminated was signed by Isquierdo, in virtue of full powers from Charles IV., without the knowledge of the Prince of Masserano, the Spanish ambassador at Paris: a sufficient proof of the secret and sinister designs it was intended to serve, and of the dark, crooked policy which the Emperor Napoleon had already adopted in regard to Spanish affairs.

By this treaty it was stipulated that, in exchange for Tuscany, which was ceded to France, the province of Entre Douro e Minho, the northern part of Portugal, comprehending the city of

* *Thib.*, vi., 280, 282. *Tor.*, i., 12, 13. *Hard.*, x., 89, 90. *Ceval.*, 13. *Moniteur*, Feb. 5, 1810.

† "The world daily," said he, "more and more admired the goodness of the emperor; and he might rest assured he would ever find in the Prince of Asturias the most faithful and devoted son. He implored, then, with the utmost confidence, the paternal protection of the emperor, not only to permit him the honour of an alliance with his family, but that he would smooth away all difficulties, and cause all obstacles to disappear before the accomplishment of so long-cherished a wish. That effort on the part of the emperor was the more necessary, that the prince was incapable of making the smallest exertion on his own part, as it would infallibly be represented as an insult to the royal authority of his father; and all that he could do was to refuse, as he engaged to do with invincible constancy, any proposals for an alliance which had not the consent of the emperor, to whom the prince looked exclusively for the choice of his future queen."—FERDINAND to NAPOLEON, the 11th of October, 1807; *Thib.*, vi., 281, 282; *Moniteur*, the 5th of February, 1810.

Oporto, should be given to the King of Etruria, with the title of King of Northern Lusitania, to revert, in default of heirs, to his most Catholic majesty, who, however, was not to unite it to the crown of Spain; that the province of Alentejo and Algarves, forming the southern part of the kingdom, should be conferred on the Prince of Peace, with the title of Prince of Algarves; and in default of heirs male, in like manner, and on the like conditions, revert to the crown of Spain; that the sovereigns of these two new principalities should not make war or peace without the consent of the King of Spain; that the central parts of Portugal, comprehending the provinces of Beira, Traz-oz-Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura, should remain in sequestration in the hands of the French till a general peace, to be then exchanged for Gibraltar, La Trinite, and the other Spanish colonies conquered by the English; that the sovereign of these central provinces should hold them on the same tenure and conditions as the King of Northern Lusitania; and that the Emperor Napoleon "should guaranty to his most Catholic majesty the possession of all his states on the Continent of Europe, to the south of the Pyrenees."*

To this secret treaty of spoliation was annexed a convention, prescribing the mode in which the designs of the contracting powers should be carried into effect. By this it was agreed that a corps of 25,000 French infantry and 3000 cavalry should forthwith enter Spain, and march across that country, at the charge of the King of Spain, to Lisbon; while one Spanish corps of 10,000 men should enter the province of Entre Douro e Minho, and march upon Oporto, and another of the like force take possession of the Alentejo and the Algarves. The contributions in the central provinces, which were to be placed in sequestration, were all to be levied for the behoof of France; those in Northern Lusitania and the principality of Algarves for that of Spain. Finally, another French corps of 40,000 men was to assemble at Bayonne by the 20th of November at latest, in order to be ready to enter Portugal and support the first corps, in case the English should send troops to the assistance of Portugal, or menace it with an attack; but this last corps was on no account to enter Spain without the consent of both the contracting parties. As the principal object of this treaty was to give France possession of Lisbon and the maritime forces of Portugal, it was communicated in substance to the Emperor of Russia, and a Russian squadron of eight ships of the line, under Admiral Siniavin, passed the Dardanelles and steered for Lisbon, to support the French army, and prevent the escape of the Portuguese fleet, a short time before Junot broke up from Bayonne for the Portuguese frontier, and long before any rupture had taken place between England and the cabinet of St. Petersburg.†‡

* See the treaty in Foy, ii., 406. *Tor.*, i., 384.

† See the convention in Foy, ii., 411, 412. *Sav.*, iii., 145.

‡ "On reaching Lisbon," says Thiebault, "we found there eight sail of the line and a frigate, under Admiral Siniavin's orders. This fleet, which, in consequence of the alliance between France and Russia, and the war of the latter with England, was to afford us an additional guarantee for the protection of the harbour, gave us in the sequel far more apprehension than security."—THIEBAULT, *Exp. de l'Armée Franc. en Portugal*, 86, 87. The presence of

These treaties were not merely a flagrant act of iniquity on the part of both the contracting powers, by providing for the partition of a neutral and unoffending power, which had even gone so far as to yield implicit obedience by the proclamation of the

20th of October, eight days before they were signed, to all the demands of the partitioning cabinets, but they were yet more detestable from involving a double perfidy towards the very parties who were in this manner made the instruments of the ambitious designs of the French emperor. While Godoy was amused and for the time secured in the French interest by the pretended gift of a principality, his downfall had in reality been resolved on by Napoleon, who had never forgiven the proclamation of the 5th of October, 1806; and this specious lure was held out without any design of really conferring it upon that powerful favourite, merely in order to remove him from the Spanish court, and make way for the great designs of the French emperor in both parts of the Peninsula; while the French force, which was provided for at Bayonne in the end of November, was not intended to act against either the English or Portugal, but to secure the frontier fortresses of Spain for Napoleon himself; and the Spanish forces, which were to be marched into the northern and southern provinces of Portugal, were not designed to secure any benefit for his most Catholic majesty, but to strip his dominions of the few regular troops which, after the departure of Romana, still remained for the defence of the monarchy. So little care was taken to

disguise this intention, that, by a decree soon after from Milan, Junot, the commander of the French invading force, was appointed governor of Portugal, and he was ordered to carry on the administration of the whole in the emperor's name, which was accordingly done.* History contains many examples of powerful monarchs combining iniquitously together to rob their weaker neighbours; but this is perhaps the first instance on record in which the greater of the partitioning powers, in addition to the spoliation of a neutral and unoffending state, bought the consent of its inferior coadjutors in the scheme of iniquity by the perfidious promise of some of those spoils which it exclusively destined for its own aggrandizement.†

It may easily be believed that, when such were the views entertained at this period by the French emperor, the letter of the Prince of Asturias, written at the suggestion of Beaumont, offering his hand to a princess of the imperial family, was not likely to receive a very cordial reception. It was per-

His secret instructions to Junot in his invasion of Portugal.

the Russian fleet, however, is stated by Lord Londonderry, whose means of information were far superior to those of the French military historian, to have been purely accidental.—LONDONDERRY, i., 37.

* By Junot's proclamation, dated the 1st of February, 1808, proceeding on the Milan decree of the 23d of December, 1807, it was declared, "The house of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; and the Emperor Napoleon, having taken under his protection the beautiful kingdom of Portugal, wishes that it should be administered and governed over its whole extent in the name of his majesty, and by the general-in-chief of his army."—See TORENO, i., 49, and Fox, iii., 343.

† Godoy's Mem., i., 55. Introduction, Sav., iii., 246, 247. Hard., x., 91, 92. Tor., i., 19.

mitted, accordingly, to remain without an answer; and meanwhile the march of Junot across the Peninsula was pressed by the most urgent orders from the imperial headquarters. Early in November, General Clarke, the minister of war, wrote, by Napoleon's command, a letter to that marshal, in which he was ordered to advance as far as Ciudad Rodrigo from the 1st to the 15th November, and at latest to reach Lisbon by the 30th. His orders were to proclaim peace to Portugal, and alliance and friendship to its prince regent; but meanwhile to press on with ceaseless activity, and at all hazards get possession of the fleet and fortresses at Lisbon, before they could be reached by the English forces.*† Junot was not backward in acting upon the perfidious policy thus prescribed to him; but in the execution of it he encountered the most serious difficulties; and such was the rapidity of his march, and the state of disorganization to which his corps was reduced by the severity of the weather and the frightful state of the roads, that if any resistance whatever had been attempted by the Portuguese government, he must infallibly have been destroyed. At first he proceeded, by easy marches and in good order, through the north of Spain; but when he reached Ciudad Rodrigo, the orders he received to hasten his march and seize upon the fleet were so urgent,‡ that he deemed it necessary to press his march with the most extraordinary expedition, and disregard everything but the one grand object in view. He accordingly issued a proclamation to the inhabitants,§ in which he disclaimed any hostile

* D'Abr., xi., 27. Hard., x., 97, 98.

† He was specially ordered, "on no account to stop, whether the prince regent did or did not declare war against England; to move on rapidly towards the capital, receiving the propositions of the Portuguese government, without returning any written answer, and to use every possible effort to arrive there as quickly as possible, as a friend, in order to effect the seizure of the Portuguese fleet. Should the Portuguese government have already declared war against England, you are to answer, 'My instructions are to march straight on Lisbon, without halting a single day; my mission is to close that great harbour against England. I would be entitled to attack you by main force, but it is repugnant to the great soul of Napoleon, and to the French character, to occasion the effusion of blood. If you make no assemblages of troops; if you dispose them so as to cause me no disgust; if you admit no auxiliary till the negotiations set on foot at Paris are terminated, I have orders to consent to it.' This is the footing on which you must represent matters; you must hold out that you are arriving merely as an auxiliary; meanwhile, a courier, despatched twenty-four hours after the arrival of the main body of the army at Lisbon, will transmit the real intentions of the emperor, which will be, that the propositions made are not accepted, and that the country must be treated as a conquered territory. It is on this principle that we have acted in Italy, where the property of all Portuguese subjects has already been put under sequestration. By proceeding in this manner, you will, without firing a shot, make yourself master of ten sail of the line and valuable arsenals; that is the grand object, and to arrive at it you must never cease to hold out that you come, not to make war, but to conciliate."‡ The secret instructions of Junot, written by the emperor with his own hand, were of the same tenour: "They enjoined Junot," says the Duches of Abrantes, "to do everything, in order to gain possession, not of the person of the Prince of Brazil, but of certain other persons therein named, and, above all, of the city, forts, and fleet of Lisbon."—D'Abr., xi., 27.

‡ "On no account halt in your march even for a day. The want of provisions could be no reason for doing so, still less the state of the roads. Twenty thousand men can march and live anywhere, even in a desert."—NAPOLEON to JUNOT, Nov. 2, 1807; TORENO, i., 35.

§ "The Emperor Napoleon sends me into your country at

* Hard., x., 97, 98.

intentions, and declared he came only as an ally, and to save them from the hostility of the English.* Two days afterward the army
 Nov. 19. entered Portugal, where they soon gave convincing proofs how little their declared resolution of protecting property and abstaining from every species of outrage was to be relied on. Pillage of every sort was systematically practised by all grades, from the commander-in-chief to the common soldier. Junot faithfully acted up to his instructions to employ the language of conciliation, but act upon the principle of the most decided hostility. Such conduct naturally made the inhabitants fly their approach; and this circumstance, joined to the forced marches the soldiers were compelled to make, the excessive severity of the rains, which fall in that country at that period of the year with all the violence of the tropics; and the rugged, impracticable nature of the roads, or rather mountain paths, which they were obliged to traverse, destitute of bridges and almost impassable for carriages, produced such an effect upon the French army, that in a few days it was as much disorganized as it would have been by the most disastrous defeat. No words can do justice to the hardships which were undergone, and the disorder which ensued, during the march from the frontier to Abrantes; the firmness of the oldest officers, even in the leading column, was shaken by it, and those which followed hurried along without any order, like a confused horde of robbers.† Many battalions subsisted for days together on nothing but chestnuts, and the quantity even of that humble fare was so scanty that they lost several hundred men a day: whole companies and squadrons were washed away in the ravines by the
 Nov. 28. swollen mountain torrents. At length, after undergoing incredible privations, the leading bands of the French army, two thousand strong, approached Lisbon in the end of November, but straggling in such small numbers, and in such deplorable condition, that they resembled rather the fugitives who had escaped from a disastrous retreat than the proud array which was to overturn a dynasty and subdue a kingdom.‡

the head of an army, to make common cause with your well-beloved sovereign against the tyrant of the seas, and save your beautiful capital from the fate of Copenhagen. Discipline will be rigidly preserved, I give you my word of honour for it; but the smallest resistance will draw down the utmost severity of military execution. The Portuguese, I am persuaded, will discover their true interests, and, seconding the pacific views of your prince, receive us as friends; and that the city of Lisbon, in an especial manner, will behold us with pleasure within its walls, at the head of such an army as can alone preserve it from the eternal enemies of the Continent."

* Hard., x., 106, 110. Foy, ii., 335. South., i., 100. Lond., i., 31, 32. Nevis, 190, 200.

† "It is impossible," says Thiebault, an eyewitness, "to give an idea of the sufferings of the army before reaching Sobreira. In truth, if the leading columns were a prey to these horrors, which nothing could alleviate, it may easily be imagined what must have been the situation of those which succeeded them. The army, in truth, was on the verge of dissolution; it was on the point of disbanding altogether; the general-in-chief was within a hair's breadth of being left without an army. Nevertheless, it was indispensable not to halt for a moment; everything required to be risked; we were obliged to succeed, or bury ourselves in the mountains with the whole army."—THIEBAULT, *Campagne en Portugal*, 45.

‡ Thib., 32, 69. Foy, ii., 335, 367. Tor., i., 35, 36. Napier, i., 141. Lond., i., 33. Abr., xi., 25, 26. Nevis, 190, 200.

The elements of glorious resistance were not wanting in the Portuguese capital. Its inhabitants were three hundred thousand; its forts strong, covered with a numerous artillery, and garrisoned by fourteen thousand men; an English squadron lay in the Tagus, with Sir Sydney Smith at its head, whose versatile genius was peculiarly fitted for such an undertaking, and who had shown at Acre what vigour he could infuse into a besieged population. The English sailors longed to see the work of defence begin: Sir Sydney offered to bring his ships abreast of the quay, and there, seconded by the indignant populace, dispute every inch of ground with the invader. But the destitute condition of the French army was unknown; and even if it had been fully understood, both the Portuguese government and the English ambassador, Lord Strangford, were aware that Junot's was but the advanced guard of a great army, which would speedily follow if the first were discomfited; and that any resistance would only serve to give the French emperor an excuse for measures of extraordinary rigour to the Portuguese nation, without affording any reasonable prospect of ultimate success. The great object was to withdraw the royal family and the fleet from the grasp of the invaders, and secure for them a refuge in Brazil till the present calamitous season was overpast. As soon as they saw the danger approaching, therefore, the Portuguese government took every imaginable precaution to disarm the conqueror by anticipating all his requisitions: a proclamation, as
 Oct. 20. already mentioned, was issued, closing the harbours against English vessels, and adopting the Continental system; and as the march of the invaders still continued, this was followed a few days afterward by an-

other, in which the more rigorous step
 Nov. 8. of sequestrating the property, and arresting the persons of such of the English as still remained in Portugal, was adopted; though with the secret design of indemnifying the sufferers as soon as the means of doing so were at the disposal of government. Though this last measure was known to be exceedingly painful to the Portuguese government, and was evidently adopted under the mere pressure of ne-
 Nov. 9. cessity, yet it was a step of such decided hostility, that it compelled Lord Strangford to take down the arms of Great Britain from his house and demand his passports; and soon after, amid the tears of the inhabitants, he followed the English factory to Sir Sydney Smith's fleet.*

Although, however, the relations between the two countries were thus formally broken, yet, as it was well known that the cabinet of Lisbon had yielded only to unavoidable necessity, and as their tardiness in acceding to the demand of Napoleon for the instant seizure of British property had sufficiently demonstrated the reluctance with which measures of severity had been adopted by them, the British ambassador still remained on board the English fleet, ready to take advantage of the

Conduct of the Portuguese government, and situation of Lisbon at this crisis.

After great hesitation, the court of Lisbon resolved to depart for Brazil.

* Ann. Reg., 1807, 280. South., i., 96, 97. Foy, ii., 377, 379.

first opening which should occur for the resumption of more amicable correspondence. Meanwhile everything at Lisbon was vacillation and chaos, and the prince and his council, distracted between terror at the unceasing advance of Junot and anxiety about the loss of their colonies and commerce by a rupture with England, hesitated between the bold counsels of Don Rodrigo de Lousa and the Count Linarès, who strenuously recommended determined resistance to the invaders, and the natural timidity of a court surrounded with dangers and debilitated by the pacific habits of successive reigns. At length, however, such information was received as determined the irresolution of the cabinet. An ominous line appeared in

the *Moniteur*, "The House of Braganza has ceased to reign;" and with the paper containing that announcement of the fate which awaited them, Lord Strangford transmitted to the prince regent copies of the secret treaty and convention of Fontainebleau, by which the portions assigned to each of the partitioning powers were arranged. Intelligence received shortly after of the entrance of the Spanish troops into the Alenteijo and the northern provinces of the kingdom, left no room for doubt that the copies were correct, and that

the treaty was immediately to be acted upon. At the same time, Lord Strangford landed, and promised his royal highness, on the honour of the King of England, that the measures hitherto adopted by the Portuguese court were regarded as mere acts of compulsion, and had noways abated the friendship of her old ally, if he would still avail himself of it. These representations, seconded by the efforts of Sir Sydney Smith, who brought his squadron to the mouth of the harbour, ready alike for hostile operations or pacific assistance, gave such support to Don Rodrigo and the patriotic party, that the court resolved, if the messenger despatched to obtain a stoppage of

Junot's advance were not successful, to embark for the Brazils. He entirely failed in arresting the march of the French general, and orders were therefore given that the fleet should, as speedily as possible, be got ready for sea, and

Nov. 26. Proclamation of the Prince of Peace on the subject.

the prince regent published a dignified proclamation on the following day, in which he announced a resolution worthy of the heroic House of Braganza, and prepared to seek in transatlantic climes "that freedom of which Europe had become unworthy."*†

* *Hard*, x., 108, 111. *South*, i., 103, 110. *Foy*, ii., 380, 383. *Tor.*, i., 37, 39. *Neu.*, i., 165, 180. *Lord Strangford's Pamphlet*, 52, 75.

† "Having tried, by all possible means, to preserve the neutrality hitherto enjoyed by my faithful and beloved subjects; having exhausted my royal treasury, and made innumerable other sacrifices, even going to the extremity of shutting the ports of my dominions to the subjects of my ancient and royal ally, the King of Great Britain, thus exposing the commerce of my people to total ruin, and, consequently, suffering the greatest losses in the collection of the royal revenue, I find that troops of the Emperor of France, to whom I had united myself on the Continent, in the hope of being no more disturbed, are actually marching into the interior of my dominions, and are far on their way to this capital. Desirous to avoid the fatal consequence of a defence, which would be far more dangerous than profitable, serving only to create a boundless effusion of blood, dreadful to humanity, and to inflame the animosity of the troops which have entered this kingdom, with the declaration and promise of not committing any, the smallest hostility; and

The fleet, at first, was in a state but little prepared for crossing the Atlantic, and still less for conveying the motley and helpless crowd of old men, women, and children, who were preparing to follow the court in their migration to South America. By great exertions, however, and the active aid of the British sailors, who, overjoyed at this extraordinary emergency on the part of the prince regent, exerted themselves with unheard-of vigour in their assistance, eight sail of the line, three frigates, five sloops, and a number of merchant vessels, in all six-and-thirty sail, were got ready on the following day, when the royal family prepared to carry their mournful, but magnanimous, resolution into execution. Preceded by the archives, treasure, plate, and most valuable effects, the royal exiles proceeded in a long train of carriages to the water's edge. Never had been seen a more melancholy procession, or one more calculated to impress on the minds even of the most inconsiderate the magnitude of the calamities which the unbounded ambition of France had brought on the other nations of Europe. The insane queen came in the first carriage: for sixteen years she had lived in seclusion, but a ray of light had penetrated her reason in this extremity, and she understood and approved the courageous act; the widowed princess and the Infanta Maria were in the next, with the Princess of Brazil, bathed in tears; after them came the prince regent, pale and weeping at thus leaving, apparently forever, the land of his fathers. In the magnitude of the royal distress, the multitude forgot their own dangers; their commiseration was all for the august fugitives, thus driven by ruthless violence to a distant shore, with the descendants of a long line of kings, forced to seek, in mournful exile, an asylum from the hand of the spoiler. Such was the crowd which assembled round the place of embarkation, that the prince was compelled to force his way through with his own hand. There was not a dry eye among all the countless multitude when they stepped on board; uncovered and weeping, the people beheld, in speechless sorrow, the departure of their ancient rulers. In the general confusion of the embarkation, parents were separated from children, husbands from wives, and both remained ignorant of each other's safety till they landed in the Brazils; while the shore resounded with the lamentations of those who were thus severed, probably forever, from those whom they most loved. It was some consolation to the crowd, who watched with aching eyes the receding sails, to see the royal fleet, as it passed through the British squadron, received with a royal salute from all the vessels: emblematic of the protection of Great Britain now extended to her ancient ally, and an earnest of that heroic support which, through all the desperate conflict which followed, England was destined to afford to her courageous inhabitants. Numbers, however, observed, with su-

Embarcation of the royal family for Brazil, 27th Nov.

knowing, also, that they are more particularly directed against my royal person, and that my faithful subjects would be less exposed to danger if I were absent from the kingdom, I have resolved to retire, with the queen and royal family, to my dominions in America, and establish myself in the city of Rio Janeiro till a general peace."—*Ann. Reg.*, 1807, 776, *State Papers*.

perstitious dread, that at the moment of the salute the sun became eclipsed, and mournfully repeated the words, "The House of Braganza has ceased to reign." Never had a city been penetrated with a more unanimous feeling of grief: the royal family, kindly and warm-hearted, had long enjoyed the affections of the people; the bitterness of conquest was felt without its excitement. In mournful silence the people lingered on the quay from whence the royal party had taken their departure; every one, in returning to his home, felt as if he had lost a parent or a child. The embarkation took place from the Quay of Belem, on the same spot from whence, three centuries before, Vasco de Gama had sailed upon that immortal voyage which first opened to European enterprise the regions of Oriental commerce, and whence Cabral set forth upon that expedition which gave Portugal an empire in the West, and had provided for her an asylum, in the future wreck of her fortune, in the Old World.*

Hardly had the royal squadron, amid tempestuous gales, cleared the bar French at Lisbon. Nov. 30. and disappeared from the shores of Europe, when the advanced guard of Junot's army, reduced to sixteen hundred men and a few horsemen, arrived on the towers of Belem. He came just in time to see the fleet receding in the distance, and in the ebullition of his passion himself discharged a piece of ordnance at a merchant vessel which, long retarded by the multitude who were thronging on board, was hastening, under the walls of that fortress, to join the fleet which had preceded it. Although, however, the French troops were so few and in such deplorable condition as to excite pity rather than apprehension, yet no resistance was attempted; the regency, to whom the prince royal had on his departure intrusted the administration of affairs, wisely deeming a contest hopeless from which the government itself shrank, and regarding their first duty as the negotiating favourable terms for the inhabitants with the invaders. Resistance, therefore, was not attempted, and Europe beheld with astonishment a capital, containing three hundred thousand inhabitants and fourteen thousand regular soldiers, open its gates to a wretched file of soldiers without a single piece of cannon, the vanguard of which, worn out and extenuated, not fifteen hundred strong, could hardly bear their muskets on their shoulders, while the succeeding columns were scattered in deplorable confusion over mountain paths two hundred miles in length. Such was their state of starvation, that, on entering the city, many of the soldiers dropped down in the streets or sunk exhausted in the porches of the houses, being unable to ascend the stairs, until the Portuguese humanely brought them sustenance. It received its new masters on the anniversary of the very day (30th of November) on which, a hundred and sixty-seven years before, the Portuguese had overturned the tyranny of the Spaniards, and re-established, amid universal transport, the national independence †

* Nevis, 175, 180. South., i., 107, 113. Hard., x., 108, 111, 112. Foy, vi., 383, 390. Tor., i., 39, 40. Ann. Reg., 1807, 281.

† Thib., vi., 271. Thieb., 68, 69, 72. Nevis, i., 185, 213. South., i., 116, 117. Foy, ii., 400, 403.

Junot immediately took military possession of the country; the French troops were cantoned chiefly in the capital and the strongholds in its vicinity, while Elvas surrendered to the Spanish general, Salano, and Taranco, with the northern corps of the troops of that nation, took peaceable possession of the important and opulent city of Oporto. The strict discipline maintained by these Peninsular corps afforded a striking contrast to the license indulged to the French soldiers, whose march, albeit through a friendly state, which had as yet committed no act of hostility, was marked by plunder, devastation, and ruin, and hopes began to be entertained by those in the French interest that the independence of their country might still be preserved. But these hopes were of short duration, and Portugal soon experienced, in all its bitterness, the fate of all the countries which, from the commencement of the war, had received, whether as friends or enemies, the tricolour flag. Heavy contributions, both in money, subsistence, and clothing, had from the first been levied by the French troops, and Junot, with almost regal state, was lodged in the now deserted palace; but the first was ascribed by their deluded friends to the necessities and destitute condition of the French troops, and the last was forgiven in an officer whose head, never equal to his valour, appeared to have been altogether carried away by the novelty and importance of the situation in which he was now placed. All uncertainty, however, was soon at an end. A fortnight after Dec. 13. their arrival, a review of six thousand troops in the capital took place; the soldiers were assembled in the principal streets and squares: the infantry in battalions, the cavalry in squadrons, the artillery limbered up and in order for service, and the whole population of the neighbourhood crowded together to witness the spectacle. Suddenly the thunder of cannon from the Moorish fort attracted their attention: all eyes were instantly turned in that direction, and they beheld the ancient flag of Portugal torn from the staff, upon which the tricolour standard was mounted. The magnitude of the calamity now became apparent: Portugal, seized by a perfidious foe, was to be reduced to a province of France. At first a solemn silence prevailed; but soon a hoarse murmur, like the distant roar of the ocean, arose, and the cries "Portugal forever, death to the French!" were heard on all sides. But the principal persons of the city were secured, the populace were unarmed, and the forts and batteries were all in the hands of the invaders. The evening was spent in feverish agitation, but the people, destitute of leaders, were unable to turn the general indignation to any account, and the day closed without any convulsion having occurred.*

This measure, however significant as to the ultimate designs of the conqueror, was yet only a demonstration; and as the police of Lisbon was rigidly enforced by the French, and no other change made in the government but the introduction of two

The country is occupied by Junot in the name of the French, and enormous contributions levied by their troops.

The regency is at length dissolved by Junot, and the whole country seized by the French.

* Nevis, i., 250, 273. Lond., i., 45, 46. Thib., vi., 278, 274. South., i., 123, 125. Foy, iii., 11, 14.

or three of his creatures into the regency, which still administered the laws in the name of the prince regent, hopes began to be again entertained that it would prove only a temporary occupation. But events, which rapidly succeeded, demonstrated that Portugal was destined to drain to the dregs the cup of humiliation before the day of its political resurrection arose. A forced loan of 2,000,000 cruzados (£200,000) was exacted from the merchants, though their fortunes were seriously affected

Dec. 5. by the blockade of the harbour and the entire stoppage of foreign commerce and public credit. The entire confiscation of English goods was next proclaimed, and ordered to be enforced by tenfold penalties and corporeal punishment, while the carrying of arms of any

Dec. 6. sort was strictly prohibited, under the pain of death, over the whole kingdom. Meanwhile, fresh troops daily poured into the capital, and, to accommodate them, the monks were all turned out of the convents, which were forthwith converted into military barracks. Still no indication of a permanent partition of the kingdom had appeared at Lisbon, and Junot

Jan., 1808. seemed chiefly intent on a small squadron which he was fitting out with great expedition in the harbour, apparently against the English, although the Spanish officers at Oporto and in the Alenteijo made no secret of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and had already begun to levy the revenue collected there in the name of the King of Spain. But

Feb. 1. on the 1st of February the mask was at once thrown aside, and it appeared that Napoleon was resolved to appropriate the whole monarchy to himself, without allotting any portion to his confederate in iniquity. On that day Junot went in state to the palace of the Inquisition, where the regency was assembled, and, after a studied harangue, read a proclamation of Napoleon, dated from Milan in the

December preceding, followed by a proclamation of his own, which at once dissolved the

Dec. 23. regency—appointed Junot governor of the whole kingdom, with instructions to govern it all in the name of the Emperor

Feb. 1, 1808. Napoleon—ordained a large body of Portuguese troops to be forthwith

marched out of the Peninsula—and for the support of the Army of Occupation, now termed the Army of Portugal, imposed a contribution of a hundred millions of francs (£4,000,000), above double the annual revenue of the monarchy, upon its inhabitants, besides confiscating the whole property of the royal family, and of all who had attended them in their flight.*†

* Foy, iii., 15, 23. Lond., i., 47, 49. Tor., i., 41, 42, 49, 50. Neva, i., 263, 288.

† "Inhabitants of Portugal," said Junot's proclamation, "your interests have engaged the attention of the emperor; it is time that all uncertainty as to your fate should cease; the fate of Portugal is fixed, and its future prosperity secured, by being taken under the all-powerful protection of Napoleon the Great. The Prince of Brazil, by abandoning Portugal, has renounced all his rights to the sovereignty of that kingdom; the House of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; the Emperor Napoleon has determined that that beautiful country, governed over its whole extent in his name, should be administered by the general-in-chief of his army." Thus did Napoleon first sign a treaty at Fontainebleau for the entire spoliation of the Portuguese dominions; next, by his perfidious invasion, drive the ruling sovereign into exile, and then assign that very compulsory departure as a reason for the previously concerted appropriation of the whole of his territories to himself.—See both

These orders were instantly carried into effect. The Portuguese arms were everywhere taken down from the public offices and buildings, and those of imperial France substituted in their room. Justice was administered in the name of the French emperor, and by the Code Napoleon; the whole revenue was collected by the French authorities, and the regiments assigned for the foreign army moved towards the frontiers. A universal despair seized all classes at this clear manifestation of the subjugation of their country. The peasants, heartbroken and desperate, refused to sow their fields with grain; the soldiers, wherever they were not overawed by a superior force of the French army, disbanded and returned home, or betook themselves to the mountains as robbers; the higher classes almost all fled from Lisbon, as from a city visited by the plague; and, notwithstanding the presence and influence of the invaders, only three houses were lighted on occasion of the general illumination ordered by the French in honour of the change of government. In the provinces, the general indignation was manifested in still more unequivocal colours: the growing insolence and rapacity of the French soldiers led them into frequent conflicts with the now aroused population; tumults, massacres, and military executions occurred in almost every city, village, and hamlet of Portugal; and Junot, alarmed at the increasing ferment, formally disbanded the whole of the army which had not been ordered to proceed to France.* Meanwhile, plunder was universal, from the highest rank to the lowest, and the general-in-chief set the example of general spoliation by appropriating to himself plate and valuable articles of every description, collected from the churches and royal palaces.†

While the fate of Portugal was thus, to all appearance, sealed by the usurpation of Napoleon, events of still greater importance were in progress in relation to the Spanish monarchy, which, in their immediate effects, precipitated the explosion of the Peninsular war.

What care soever the advisers of Ferdinand may have taken to conceal from the reigning monarch his letter of the 11th of October, proposing, without his father's knowledge, an alliance with the imperial family, so important a step did not long remain unknown to the Prince of Peace. The numerous spies in his employment, who surrounded the heir-apparent, both in the French capital and his palace of the Escorial, got scent of the secret; and Isquierdo transmit-

Complete occupation of the kingdom by the French, and despair of the inhabitants

March 13.

Arrest of Ferdinand, and seizure of his papers.

the Milan Decree and JUNOT'S Proclamation, in Foy, iii., 313, 345. *Pièces Just.*

* The Portuguese legion thus draughted off for France was at first 9000 strong; but five thousand deserted or died on the march through Spain, and not four thousand reached Bayonne. Napoleon, however, who there reviewed them, said to Prince Wolkowski, "These are the men of the South; they are of an impassioned temperament; I will make them excellent soldiers." They served with distinction, both in Austria and Russia, and were particularly noticed for their good conduct at Wagram in 1809, and Smolensko in 1812. They were faithful to their colours and oaths, though still in their hearts attached to their country, and bore on their standards this striking device,

"Vadimus immixti Danais; haud numine nostro."

—Foy, iii., 40, 41, note.

† Lond., i., 50, 54. South., i., 152, 162. Nevis, i., 240, 249. Foy, ii., 5, 38.

ted from Paris intelligence that some negotiation of importance was in progress, in consequence of which the prince was more narrowly watched; and as the evident anxiety and pre-occupation of his mind seemed to justify the suspicions which were entertained, he was at length arrested by orders of his father, and a seal put on all his papers. He was privately

examined before the Privy Council, and Oct. 29. afterward reconducted as a prisoner, by the king himself, in great state at the head of his guards, to the palace of the Escorial, whose walls, still melancholy from the tragic catastrophe of the unfortunate Don Carlos in a preceding reign, were fraught with the most sinister presages. Among his private papers were found one written entirely by the hand of the prince, blank in date, and with a black seal, bestowing on the Duke del Infantado the office of Governor-general of New Castile, and all the forces within its bounds, in the event of the king's death; a key to the correspondence in cipher formerly carried on by the late Princess of Asturias and the Queen of Naples, her mother; and a memorial of twelve pages to the king, filled with bitter complaints of the long-continued persecution of which the prince had been the object, denouncing the Prince of Peace as guilty of the most wicked designs, even that of mounting the throne by the death of his royal master, and which proposed a variety of steps to secure the arrest of that powerful favourite. A writing of five pages was also discovered, written, like the preceding, by Escoiquiz, detailing the measures adopted by the Prince of Peace to bring about a marriage between the heir-apparent and his wife's sister, the best mode of avoiding it, and hinting at the prospect of an alliance between the Prince of Asturias and a member of the imperial family. In these papers, thus laid open without reserve to the royal scrutiny, there was nothing, with the exception of the first, which had the appearance even of implicating the prince in any design against his father's life or authority, though much descriptive of that envenomed rancour between his confidants and those of the reigning monarch, which the long ascendancy of the Prince of Peace, and the animosity which had prevailed between him and the heir-apparent, were so well calculated to produce. Even the first, though it indicated an obvious preparation for the contemplated event of the king's decease, and fairly inferred an anxiety for that event, could not, when taken by itself without any other evidence, be considered as a legitimate ground for concluding that so atrocious an act as the murder or deposition of the king was in contemplation, since it was equally referable to the anxiety of the heir-apparent, who had given no indications of so depraved a disposition, to secure the succession, menaced, as he conceived it to be, upon his natural demise.*

Revealed, however, to a corrupted court, and falling into the hands of persons actuated by the worst suspicions, because themselves capable of the most nefarious designs, these papers afforded too fair an opportunity to Godoy and his party of ruining the

prince, and at the same time gave a clear indication of the danger which they would themselves run upon his accession to the throne, to be laid aside without being made the foundation of decisive measures. On the very next Oct. 30. day, accordingly, a proclamation was issued from the Escorial by the king, in which the Prince of Asturias was openly charged with having engaged in a conspiracy for the dethronement and death of his father, and the immediate prosecution and trial of all his advisers was announced to the bewildered public.† At the same time, despatches were forwarded to Napoleon, reiterating the same charges, and earnestly imploring his counsel and assistance in extricating his unfortunate ally from the difficulties with which he was surrounded.‡

When Napoleon, however, received this letter, he was no ways disposed to lend any assistance to Charles IV., Cautious conduct of the latter on whose dethronement he was fully resolved, though he was as it yet uncertain as to the particular means or course to be followed in order to effect that object. He determined immediately to keep himself entirely clear from these domestic dissensions, took the utmost care that his name should not in any way be mixed up with them, and resolved only to take advantage of them, if possible, to get quit of both father and son. He said, therefore, on receipt of the letter, "These are domestic concerns of the King of Spain; I will have nothing to do with them;" at the same time Champagny, minister of foreign affairs, wrote to the Prince of Peace, that on no account was his name to be implicated in this affair; § and Talleyrand gave the same

* Tor., i., 23, 24. Nell., i., 4, 5. Thib., vi., 284, 285.

† It was stated in this proclamation, "I was living persuaded that I was surrounded with the love due to a parent by his offspring, when an unknown hand suddenly revealed to me the monstrous and unheard-of conspiracy which had been formed against my life. That life, so often endangered, had become a burden to my successor, who, preoccupied, blinded, and forgetful of all the Christian principles which my care and paternal love have taught him, had engaged in a conspiracy for my dethronement. I was anxious myself to ascertain the fact, and, surprising him in his own apartment, I discovered the cipher which enabled him to correspond with his companions in iniquity. Everything necessary has been done, and the proper orders given for the trial of these guilty associates, whom I have ordered to be put under arrest, as well as the confinement of my son to his own apartments."—*Proclamation, 30th of October, 1807.* TORENO, i., 24.

‡ "Sir, my brother—At the moment when I was exclusively occupied with the means of destroying our common enemy, and fondly hoped that all the plots of the late Queen of Naples were buried with her daughter, I discovered with horror that the spirit of intrigue had penetrated the interior of my palace, and that my eldest son, the heir-presumptive to the throne, had not only formed the design to dethrone, but even to attempt the life of myself and his mother. Such an atrocious attempt merits the most exemplary punishment; the law which calls him to the succession should be repealed; one of my brothers will be more worthy to replace him in my heart and on the throne. I pray your majesty to aid me by your lights and counsel."—CHARLES IV. to NAPOLEON. St. Lorenzo, 30th of October, 1807. SAVARY, iii., 143.

§ "The emperor insists that on no account should anything be said or published in relation to this affair which involves him or his ambassador. He has done nothing which could justify a suspicion that either he himself or his minister has known or encouraged any domestic intrigue of Spain. He declares positively that he never has, and never will, intermeddle with it. He never intended that the Prince of Asturias should marry a princess of France, or Mademoiselle Tascher, long since affianced to another; he will oppose no marriage of the Prince of Asturias with any person he pleases; his ambassador Beauharnois has instructions to take no part in the affairs of Spain."—CHAM-

* Tor., i., 22, 23. Thib., vi., 283, 284. Foy, ii., 99. South., i., 157, 158.

assurances in the strongest terms to Isquierdo, protesting, at the same time, the emperor's fixed resolution to carry into execution the whole provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau.* Meantime, the storm which threatened such serious consequences blew over in Spain, from a discovery of the party who was at the bottom of the intrigue. The Prince of Asturias, justly alarmed for his life, revealed, in a private intercourse with his father and mother, the letter he had written to Napoleon, proposing his hand to one of his relations, and at the same time disclosed all the parties, not excluding the French ambassador, who were privy to that proceeding. This disclosure operated like a charm in stilling the fury of the faction opposed to the prince: ignorant of the extent or intimacy of his relations with the French emperor, they recoiled at the idea of driving to extremities the heir of the throne, who might possibly have engaged so powerful a protector to espouse his cause. The matter was therefore hushed up; the prince wrote penitential letters to his father and mother, avowing "that he had failed in his duty, inasmuch as he should have taken no step without their concurrence," and throwing himself on their mercy. Upon

Nov. 5. this a decree of the king was issued, declaring, "The voice of nature has disarmed the arm of vengeance: when a guilty party solicits pardon, the heart of a father cannot refuse it to a son. My son has disclosed the authors of the horrible plan which some wretches have put into his head; I pardon him, and shall receive him to favour when he has given proofs of sincere amendment." The trial of the prince's confidants went on, but terminated three months after in their entire acquittal, to the great joy of the nation, who had never attached any credit to this alleged conspiracy, but considered it as a got-up device of the Prince of Peace to ruin his rival Escoiquiz. Nevertheless, that acute counsellor, as well as the dukes of Infantado and St. Carlos, with several others, were kept in confinement or sent into exile; and Napoleon, who, in truth, had not instigated this intrigue, but saw the advantage it would give him in his designs against the Peninsula, was secretly rejoiced to see the father and son thus envenomed against each other, and resolved to dispossess them both.*†

Jan. 20, 1808. It was not long before this resolution to appropriate to himself a part, at least, of the Spanish dominions, without the slightest regard to his recent and solemn guarantee of their integrity in the treaty of Fontainebleau, was acted upon by the French emperor. The force

Entrance of the French troops into Spain. November 22.

properly to himself a part, at least, of the Spanish dominions, without the slightest regard to his recent and solemn guarantee of their integrity in the treaty of Fontainebleau, was acted upon by the French emperor. The force

FAGNY TO THE PRINCE OF PEACE, the 15th of November, 1807. THIBAUDEAU, vi., 291, 292.

* "What chiefly shocked the emperor," said Talleyrand to Isquierdo, on the 15th of November, "was, after the treaty of the 17th of October, to see himself apparently implicated, in the face of Europe, in intrigues and treasons. He has expressed a natural indignation at it, because it affects his honour and probity. The emperor desires only the strict execution of the treaty of Fontainebleau."—THIBAUDEAU, vi., 291.

† O'Meara, ii., 160. Tor., i., 26, 33. Nell., i., 5, 6. Thib., vi., 285, 297. South., i., 187, 191.

‡ "I never," said Napoleon, "excited the King of Spain against his son. I saw them envenomed against each other, and thence conceived the design of deriving advantage to myself, and dispossessing both."—O'MEARA, ii., 160.

of forty thousand men, which had been provided for at Bayonne by that treaty, but which was not to enter Spain except with the consent of the King of Spain, was now increased to sixty thousand; and without any authority from the Spanish government, and though the situation of Portugal noways called for their advance, began to cross the frontier, and take the road, not towards Lisbon, but Madrid. Twenty-four thousand infantry and four thousand horse, with forty guns, under Dupont, first passed the Bidassoa, and moved towards Valladolid, where headquarters were established in the beginning of January. A second army, under Monecy, consisting of twenty-five thousand foot, three thousand horse, and forty pieces of artillery, soon followed; and such was the haste with which they were forwarded to their destination, that they were conveyed across France by post, and rapidly defiled towards the Ebro; while, on the other extremity of the Pyrenees, Duhesme, with twelve thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and twenty cannon, entered Catalonia, and took the road to Barcelona.*

Although the operations in Portugal afforded no sort of reason for this formidable invasion, yet so much were the inhabitants of the country in the habit of yielding implicit obedience to the French authorities, in consequence of the submissive attitude of their government for so long a period, that it excited very little attention either in Spain or over the rest of Europe, to the greater part of which it was almost unknown. Public attention followed the progress of the emperor in Italy, and, dazzled by the splendid pageants and important changes which were there going forward, paid little regard to the progress of obscure corps on the Pyrenean frontier. Notwithstanding all their infatuation, however, the cabinet of Madrid were not without anxiety at this uncalled-for and suspicious invasion of their frontiers; but they were deceived by the repeated assurances which they received, both verbally and in writing, from the French ministers, of the determination of the emperor to execute all the provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau;† and the Prince of Peace was fearful lest, by starting ill-timed suspicions, he might put in hazard the brilliant prospects which he conceived were opening both to the Spanish monarchy and himself from the spoils of Portugal. They were involved in the meshes of guilty ambition, and could not extricate themselves from its toils till they had themselves become its prey.‡

The time, however, was now rapidly approaching when Napoleon deemed it safe to throw off the mask. No sooner had he returned from Italy to Paris than the minister of war transmitted a message to the Senate, requiring the levy of 80,000 conscripts out of those who should become liable to serve in 1809: a requisition which that obsequious body forthwith voted by acclamation, though the peace of Tilsit had, to all appearance, closed the Temple of Janus for a very long period, at least in regard to Continental wars. This war-

The Prince of Peace does not venture to remonstrate against this invasion.

New levy in France. Treacherous seizure of Pampeluna.

* Foy, iii., 72, 74. Tor., i., 46, 47. Lond., i., 55, 56.

† Ante, iii., p. 19.

‡ Tor., i., 47, 48. Nell., i., 9, 10. South., i., 195.

like demonstration, though levelled ostensibly at England, yet contained ambiguous expressions which pointed not unequivocally to projects of aggrandizement on the side of the

Spanish Peninsula.* Shortly after, Jan. 14, 1808.

the French forces began, by fraud and false pretences, to make themselves masters of the frontier fortresses of Spain; and the success with which their dishonourable stratagems were crowned was such as almost to exceed belief, and which could not have occurred but in a monarchy debilitated by a long period of despotic misrule. Pampeluna was the first to be surprised. Early in February, General d'Armagnac directed his steps on this perfidious mission through Roncesvalles, the fabled scene of heroic achievement. He first requested leave from the governor of that fortress to lodge two battalions with the Spanish troops in

the citadel; and when this was refused, Feb. 9. remained for some days in the town on the most friendly terms with the Spanish garrison, until they were so completely thrown off their guard that he succeeded in surprising the principal gate of the citadel by means of three hundred men, admitted, one by one, with arms under their cloaks, during the night, into his house, which was within the walls, while the attention of the Spanish sentinels was taken off by his soldiers playing in sport at snowballs with each other close to the drawbridge of the citadel. Next morning a proclamation appeared, beseeching the inhabitants to "consider this as only a trifling change, incapable of disturbing the harmony which ought to subsist between two faithful allies."[†]

Duhesme's instructions were, in like manner, to make himself master of Barcelona; and he was not long of effecting that object. Boldly advancing towards that fortress, under the pretence of pursuing his march to Valencia, he totally disregarded the summons of Conde de Espeleta, the captain-general of the province, who required him to suspend his march till advices were received from Madrid, and so intimidated the governor, by threatening to throw upon him the whole responsibility of any differences which might arise between the two nations from the refusal to admit the French soldiers within the walls, that he succeeded in getting possession of the town. Still, however, Fort Montjuic and the citadel were in the hands of the Spaniards; but the same system of audacious treachery shortly

after made the invaders masters of these strongholds. Count Theodore Lecchi, the commander of the Italian division, assembled his troops as for a parade on the glacis of the citadel.

After the inspection was over, the Italian general came with his staff, on horse-

back, to converse with the Spanish officers, and Feb. 29. insensibly moved forward to the drawbridge; and while still there, so as to prevent its being drawn up, a company of grenadiers stole unperceived round the palisades, and rushing in, disarmed the Spanish guard at the gate, and introduced four battalions, who got possession of the place. Montjuic fell still more easily: Feb. 29.

the governor, though a man of courage and honour, was unable to withstand the peremptory summons of the French general, who audaciously demanded the surrender of that impregnable fortress, with the menace to render him responsible for the whole consequences of a war with France, which would inevitably result from a refusal.* San Fernando de Figueras next fell into the hands of the French. The

governor, on his guard against sur- March 18. prise, was cajoled into permitting two hundred conscripts to be lodged in the citadel, the finest fortification in Spain, under pretence that there was not accommodation for them in the town. Instead of conscripts, chosen soldiers were introduced, who in the night overpowered the sentinels, and admitted four regiments, who lay in the neighbourhood. Finally, St. Sebastians, the key to the great road from Bayonne to Madrid, and the destined theatre of such desperate struggles between the French and English, was obtained on still more easy terms.

By permission of the Spaniards, it had become the dépôt for the hospital of the French regiments which had passed through; but the governor, conceiving disquietude at the visible increase in the number of these pretended patients, and having learned some March 3. indiscreet expressions of Murat as to St. Sebastians being indispensable to the security of the French army, communicated his fears to the captain-general of the province, and also to the Prince of Peace, with an earnest request for instructions.† The prince, too far gone to recede, counselled submission, though his eyes were now open to the treachery of which he had been the victim; and, to his disgrace he it said, the last bulwark of his country was yielded up in consequence of express instructions from him, written with his own hand.‡

* "My soldiers," said he, "are in possession of the citadel; instantly open the gates of Montjuic, for I have the special commands of the Emperor Napoleon to place garrisons in your fortresses. If you hesitate, I will, on the spot, declare war against Spain, and you will be exclusively responsible for all the torrents of blood which your resistance will cause to be shed." The name of Napoleon produced all these marvellous effects; it operated like a charm in paralyzing the resistance even of the most intrepid spirits; many could encounter death; few had the moral courage to undergo the political risk consequent on resistance to his mandates. The Spanish governors at this period also had another excuse: the perfidy with which they were assailed by his orders was so unprecedented as to be inconceivable to men of honour.—See FOX, iii., 80.

† Tor., i., 53, 58. Foy, ii., 78, 85. Nell., i., 10. South., i., 199, 204. Thib., vi., 612.

‡ On the margin of the letter of the Duke de Mahon, captain-general of Guipuscoa, requesting instructions, and fully detailing the danger, was written, in the Prince of Peace's own hand, "Let the governor give up the place, since he has not the means of resisting, but let him do so in an amicable manner, as has been done in other places where

* "There is a necessity," said Clarke and Champagny, "of having considerable forces on all points exposed to attack, in order to be in a situation to take advantage of any favourable circumstances which may occur to carry the war into the bosom of England, to Ireland, or the Indies. Vulgar politicians conceive the emperor should disarm; such a proceeding would be a real scourge to France. It is not enough to have an army in Portugal: Spain is in alarm for Cadiz; Ceuta is menaced; the English have disembarked many troops in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar; they have directed to that quarter those which have been recalled from the Levant or withdrawn from Sicily. The vigilance of their cruisers on the Spanish coast is hourly increasing; they seem disposed to avenge themselves on that kingdom for the reverses they have experienced in the colonies. The whole Peninsula, therefore, in an especial manner calls for the attention of his majesty."—CLARKE and CHAMPAGNY'S Reports, *Moniteur*, 24th Jan., 1808; and FOX, iii., 76, 77.

† Tor., i., 51, 52. South., i., 197, 198. Lond., i., 56. Foy, iii., 81, 84.

Thus were taken, by the treachery and artifices of the French emperor, the four frontier fortresses of Spain; those which command the three great roads by Perpignan, Narbonne, and Biscay, across the Pyrenees, and the possession of which gives an invader the entire command of the only passes practicable for an army from France into the Peninsula. And they were taken not only during a period of profound peace, but close alliance between the two countries, and by a power which, only a few months before, had so solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Spanish dominions! History has few blacker or more disgraceful deeds to commemorate; and, doubtless, the perpetration of them must have been a subject of shame to many of the brave men engaged in the undertaking, how much soever the better feelings of the majority may have been obliterated by that fatal revolutionary principle, which measures the morality of all public actions by no other test but success. Napoleon, however, who never inquired into the means, provided the end were favourable, was overjoyed at this easy acquisition of the keys of Spain, and was led from it to discard all fears of a serious rupture in the course of his projected changes of dynasty in the Peninsula. With his accustomed vigour, he instantly prepared to make the most of his extraordinary good fortune in these important conquests: fresh troops were instantly poured into the newly-acquired fortresses; their ramparts were armed, their ditches scoured, their arsenals filled; the monks in them were all turned adrift, and the monasteries converted into barracks. Several millions of biscuits were baked in the frontier towns of France, and speedily stored in their precious magazines. The whole country from the Bidassoa to the Douro was covered with armed men; the Spanish authorities in all the towns were supplanted by French ones; and before as yet a single shot had been fired, or any angry note interchanged between the cabinets, the whole of Spain north of the Ebro was already wrested from the crown of Castile.*†

How deeply soever Godoy may have been implicated, by long-established intimacy and recent lures, in the meshes of French diplomacy, he could not any longer remain blind to the evident tendency of the designs of Napoleon. The seizure of Pampeluna first drew the veil in part from his eyes; the successive capture of Barcelona, St. Sebastians, and Figueras, next tore it asunder; finally,

there were even fewer reasons or grounds for excuse than in the case of Saint Sebastians."—*March 3, 1808. TORENO, i., 58.* The general answer returned by the Prince of Peace to the repeated demands which he received from the north, for instructions how to act, had previously been, "Receive the French well; they are our allies; they come to us as friends."—*HARDENBERG, x., 122.*

* *Foy, iii., 85, 87, 89. Tor., i., 59, 60. South., i., 195, 205. Lond., i., 57, 60.*

† General Foy, through a liberal writer, and of the Napoleon school, gives a full detail, much to his credit, of these disgraceful transactions, and draws a veil over none of the dishonourable deeds by which they were accomplished.—*See Foy, iii., 75, 85.* This is the true and honourable spirit of history, and withal the most politic, for it gives double weight to the defence of his country on other points when undertaken by such a champion.

ly, the proclamation of Junot, on the 1st of February, at once dashed to the earth all his hopes of national or individual aggrandizement. The portentous announcement that Junot was to administer the affairs of Portugal in its *whole extent* in the name of the emperor, evinced clearly that all the provisions in the treaty of Fontainebleau in favour either of the Spanish family, who had ceded the throne of Tuscany, or the Prince of Peace individually, were blown to the winds. The private correspondence of that ambitious statesman, accordingly, at this period, evinces the utmost uneasiness at the designs of France.* But the uncertainty of which he so bitterly complained was of short duration. A requisition by Napoleon Feb. 6. for the removal of the Spanish fleet to Toulon, which the cabinet of Madrid were weak enough to comply with, though the rapid succession of events prevented its execution, was soon followed by a formal demand of all Spain to the north of the Ebro, to be Feb. 27. incorporated with the French monarchy. In return, he offered to cede to the Spanish monarchy his newly-acquired realm of Portugal;† but it was readily foreseen that the proposal would prove entirely illusory, as Junot had taken possession of the whole country in the name of Napoleon, and it was not to be supposed he would ever relinquish his grasp of a monarchy so important in his maritime designs against Great Britain.‡

Possession of Spain to the north of the Ebro, including, of course, Catalonia, Godoy, at length made aware of the designs of Napoleon, prepares the flight of the court to Seville. Navarre, the whole frontier fortresses, and passes through the Pyrenees, was, in a military point of view, possession of Spain itself; not a fort existed to arrest the French between that river and the

* On February 9, Godoy wrote to his agent Isquierdo at Paris the following secret despatch: "I receive no news; I live in uncertainty; the treaty is already a dead letter; this kingdom is covered with troops; the harbours of Portugal are about to be occupied by them; Junot governs the whole of that country. We have just received a demand for the remainder of our fleets to co-operate with the French, which must be complied with. Everything is uncertainty, intrigue, and distrust; public opinion is divided; the heir-apparent to the throne was lately involved in a treasonable conspiracy; the French troops live at free quarters on the country; the people are exhausted by their requisitions. You yourself have been to little purpose at Paris; the ambassador there is useless. What the devil is to come of all this? what will be the end of this uncertainty? If you know anything, for God's sake let me know it; anything is better than this uncertainty."—*GODOY to ISQUIERDO, 9th February, 1808; THIBAUDEAU, vi., 311, 313.*

† *Thib., vi., 312, 313. Hard., x., 122, 123. Tor., i., 58, 59. Foy, iii., 109.*

‡ The proposition for the cession of the provinces north of the Ebro was brought to Madrid by Isquierdo, in the form of a procès-verbal of the import of long conferences held at Paris between himself, Duroc, and Talleyrand; they bore: "The emperor is desirous of exchanging Portugal with the Spanish provinces to the north of the Ebro, to avoid the inconvenience of a military road across Castile. A new treaty, offensive and defensive, appears necessary to bind Spain more closely to the Continental system. The repose of his empire requires that the succession to the crown of Castile should be fixed in an irrevocable manner. His majesty is willing to grant permission to the king to bear the title of *Emperor of the Indies*, and to grant his niece in marriage to the Prince of Asturias." Such was the procès-verbal; but Isquierdo, says Foy, was too acute a diplomatist not to see that Napoleon was deceiving all the world; and that he was bent upon getting the entire command of the whole Peninsula, and disposing of it at his pleasure.—*Foy, iii., 109, 110; and ISQUIERDO'S Despatch to PRINCE OF PEACE, 24th March, 1800; SAVARY, iii., 142.*

capital. The intelligence communicated by Isquierdo revealed the alarming fact, that the title of Emperor of the *Indies* was to be given to Ferdinand, and that Napoleon continually reverted to the dependance of the tranquillity of France on the succession to the crown of Spain. In the course of the conferences, the Spanish diplomatist had penetrated the real secret, and distinctly warned the Prince of Peace that the total dethronement of the house of Bourbon was resolved on. The arrival of the Queen of Etruria at Madrid at this juncture, who had been forced to renounce one throne by the French emperor, and since insidiously deprived of the compensation promised her instead in Portugal, enhanced the general embarrassments; and at length the arrival of Murat at Burgos, with the title

March 11. of "Lieutenant of the Emperor," and an immense staff, both civil and military, left no room for doubt that Napoleon was determined to appropriate to himself the whole Peninsula. In this extremity the Prince of Peace, roused to more manly feelings by the near approach of danger, both to the monarchy and his own person, recalled a letter which he had despatched to Paris, consenting to the cession of the provinces north of the Ebro, and counselled the king to imitate the example of the Prince Regent of Portugal, and depart for Seville, with a view to embark for America. Preparations were immediately made

March 15. for the journey; the guards were assembled at Aranjuez, then the royal residence; thirty pieces of cannon were brought from Segovia, and messengers despatched to Gibraltar to bespeak an asylum for the fugitive monarch within its impregnable walls. Meanwhile Napoleon, keeping up to the last his detestable system of hypocrisy, sent the king a present of twelve beautiful horses, with a letter announcing "his approaching visit to his friend and ally the King of Spain, in order to cement their friendship by personal intercourse, and arrange the affairs of the Peninsula without the restraint of diplomatic forms;" while the passage of the Bidassoa by six thousand of the imperial guard, the formation of a new French army, nineteen thousand strong, in Biscay, under Marshal Bessieres, and the increase of the forces in Catalonia to fifteen thousand men,* told but too clearly that if he did arrive, it would be with the pomp and authority of a conqueror.

The Prince of Asturias was offered by the king, either to share the flight of the royal family, or remain at home with the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom. He at first preferred the former alternative, though his confidants, not yet convinced of the total overthrow of the dynasty contemplated by Napoleon, dissuaded him from the step, and strongly recommended him to throw himself into the arms of Napoleon. Meanwhile, the preparations for a journey by the court, and certain vague rumours of their approaching departure from the kingdom, which had transpired, collected an unusual crowd to Aranjuez, and increased to the very highest pitch the anxiety of

Tumult at Aranjuez and overthrow of the Prince of Peace. The Prince of Peace had escaped by a back passage with a single roll, which was lying on the table, in his hand, and, flying up to the garrets, hid

the people at Madrid, who, notwithstanding the ignorance in which they were kept, had still learned, with dismay, the seizure of the frontier fortresses, and occupation of the northern provinces by the French troops. The French ambassador openly and loudly condemned the projected departure to the south as uncalled for, imprudent, and calculated only to disturb the existing state of amity between the two nations; while Murat, at Burgos, issued a proclamation, which arrived at this period at the capital, in which he enjoined his soldiers "to treat the Spaniards, a nation estimable in so many respects, as they would treat their French compatriots, as the emperor wished nothing but happiness and felicity to Spain." Still the general effervescence continued, and the king, to calm it, issued a proclamation, in which he earnestly counselled peace and submission: an advice which had a precisely opposite effect. As the period of departure approached, the reluctance of Ferdinand to accompany the fugitive monarch became hourly stronger, and his friends gave out that he was resolved to remain at home and stand by his country: a resolution which was loudly applauded by the people, who regarded him as the only hope of the nation, and were worked up to a pitch of perfect fury against the Prince of Peace, whom they regarded as, more than he really was, the author of all the public calamities. A casual expression which dropped from the prince on the morning of the 17th, "This night the court sets out, but I will not accompany them," increased the general ferment, by spreading the belief he might possibly be reluctantly torn away from the kingdom of his fathers. At length, when the royal carriages drew up to the door of the royal palace, and preparations for an immediate departure were made, matters came to a crisis; the people rose in tumultuous masses; a large body took post at the palace, cut the traces of the carriages, and put an entire stop to the intended journey, while a furious mob, composed, in great part, of disbanded soldiers, surrounded the hotel of the Prince of Peace, from whose guards they experienced no resistance, forced open the doors, ransacked the most private apartments in searching for the object of their indignation, who, however, for the time escaped, but, still observing some moderation in their excesses, brought the princess, with all the respect due to her rank, to the royal palace.*†

In the first moment of alarm, the Prince of Peace had escaped by a back passage with a single roll, which was lying on the table, in his hand, and, flying up to the garrets, hid

* Tor., i., 69, 75. Foy, iii., 113, 117. Thib., vi., 321, 322. Lond., i., 64, 65.

† The tumult at the Prince of Peace's palace first commenced from the mob recognising, in the person of a veiled lady who left the palace at dusk on the evening of the 17th, surrounded by the guards, Dona Josefa Tudo, who had so long been the mistress of the favourite. His marriage with the niece of the king no more disturbed their relations than either the one or the other excited any jealousy in the breast of the queen, whose criminal partiality had been the sole cause of his original elevation; and the tumult at Aranjuez found them both residing quietly under the same roof.—Toreno, i., 74; Foy, iii., 116. This is a clear proof that, in some cases at least, the ardour of the sun in a warm climate does not inflame the passion of the green-eyed monster.

* Tor., i., 60, 64. Thib., vi., 313, 318. Foy, iii., 108, 113. Lond., i., 60, 64.

Fall of the Prince of Peace, and abdication of Charles IV. March 18.

himself under a quantity of mats until the first violence of the tumult had subsided. To appease the people, the king issued a decree the following morning, by which he was deprived of his functions as generalissimo and high admiral, and banished from court, with liberty only to choose his place of retreat. This measure, however, was far from restoring general tranquillity; the violence of the public feeling was manifested by the seizure of Don Diego Godoy, a relation of the prince, who was conducted with every mark of ignominy, by his own troop of dragoons, to his barracks, and secret information was received that a new and more serious tumult was preparing for the succeeding night, having for its object a more important change than the overthrow of the ruling favourite. At the same time, intelligence arrived that the guards, when sounded as to whether they would repel an attack upon the palace, answered, "that the Prince of Asturias could alone ensure the public safety;" and, at the same time, that prince waited on the king, and offered, by sending the officers of his household through the crowd, to disperse the assemblage: a proposal which was gladly accepted, but necessarily led to the suspicion that he who could so easily appease, had not been a stranger to the origin of the tumult. The night passed quietly over, but next morning, at ten o'clock, a frightful disturbance arose in consequence of the discovery of Godoy in his own palace. The unhappy victim of popular fury had remained for thirty-six hours undiscovered in his place of concealment; but at length the pangs of thirst became so intolerable as to overcome the fear of death, and he ventured down stairs to get a glass of water. He was recognised by a Walloon sentinel at the foot of the steps, who immediately gave the alarm. A crowd instantly collected: he was seized by a furious multitude, and with difficulty rescued from instant death by some guards who collected around him, and, at the imminent risk of their own lives, dragged him, suspended from their saddles almost in the air, covered with contusions and half dead with terror, at a rapid rate across the Place San Antonio to the nearest prison, amid the most dreadful cries and imprecations. Prevented from wreaking their vengeance on the chief object of their hatred, the mob divided into separate parties, and, traversing the streets in different directions, sacked and levelled with the ground the houses of the principal friends and dependants of Godoy. At length, Ferdinand, to whom all eyes were now turned as the only person capable of arresting the public disorders, at the earnest entreaty of the king and queen, whose anxiety, amid all the perils with which they were themselves surrounded, was chiefly for the life of their fallen favourite, flew to the prison at the head of his guards, and prevailed on the menacing mob by which it was surrounded to retire. "Are you as yet king?" inquired the Prince of Peace, when Ferdinand first presented himself before him. "Not as yet, but I shall soon be so." In effect, Charles IV., deserted by the whole court, overwhelmed by the opprobrium heaped on his obnoxious minister, unable to trust his own guards, and in hourly apprehen-

sion for the life, not only of Godoy, but of himself and the queen, deemed a resignation of the crown the only mode of securing the personal safety of any of the three, and in the evening a proclamation appeared, in which he relinquished the throne to the Prince of Asturias.*†

The prince was proclaimed king under the title of Ferdinand VII., on the day of his father's abdication, and this auspicious event, coupled with the fall of Godoy, diffused universal joy and transport. All ranks and classes of the people shared in it: the surrender of the frontier fortresses; the hundred thousand men in the northern provinces; the approach of Napoleon with his guards, were forgotten, now that the traitors who had betrayed the nation were fallen; the houses in Madrid were decorated, during the day, with flowers and green boughs; at night, a vast illumination burst forth spontaneously in every part of the city. Ferdinand VII. was hailed with enthusiastic applause as the saviour of his country, whenever he appeared in public; while the public fury against the Prince of Peace rose to such a height that the people, in many parts of the kingdom, destroyed the institutions which he had established for the promotion even of agriculture, manufactures, and the arts, from which nothing but unmixed good could have been anticipated.‡

While the Spanish people were thus abandoning themselves to transports of joy at the accession of a new monarch to the throne, Murat, at the head of the French troops, was rapidly approaching Madrid. On

Continued advance of the French troops, and entry of Murat into Madrid.

* Lond., i., 65, 66. Tor., i., 73, 79. Foy, iii., 118, 122. Nell., i., 15, 30. Thib., vi., 321, 323.

† "As my habitual infirmities no longer permit me to bear the weight of the government of my kingdom, and standing in need, for the re-establishment of my health, of a milder climate and a private life, I have determined, after the most mature deliberation, to abdicate the crown in favour of my heir and well-beloved son, the Prince of Asturias, and desire that, my free and spontaneous abdication, should be fully carried into execution in all points."—*Decree, 16th of March, 1808*; Foy, iii., 371. On the day following the king informed Murat of his resignation, with full details of his reasons for so doing, but without alleging any others than those set forth in the public instrument; but on the 21st he wrote a secret despatch to Napoleon, in which he asserted, "I have not resigned in favour of my son, but from the force of circumstances, and when the din of arms and the clamours of my insurgent guards left me no alternative but resignation or death, which would speedily have been followed by that of the queen. I have been forced to abdicate, and have no longer any hope but in the aid and support of my magnanimous ally, the Emperor Napoleon." On the same day he drew up a secret protest, which sets forth, "I declare that my decree of the 19th of March, by which I abdicated the crown in favour of my son, is an act to which I was forced, to prevent the effusion of blood in my beloved subjects. It should, therefore, be regarded as null."—See both documents in Foy, iii., 392, 393; *Pièces Just.* On the other hand, the day after his abdication, Charles IV. said to the diplomatic body assembled at the Escorial, "I never performed an action in my life with more pleasure." The truth appears to be that the abdication, in the first instance, was prompted chiefly by terror for the life of the Prince of Peace, for whose safety throughout the royal pair manifested more solicitude than for their own concerns; and it was an after-thought to protest against it as null, or attempt to recede from the act. Thibaudeau seems to incline to the opinion that the protest on the 21st of March was drawn out subsequent to its date, and after the arrival of Murat, though, doubtless, the resignation of the crown, even if suggested only by terrors for Godoy's life, cannot be considered as a voluntary deed.—See *TORRES*, i., 85, 86. THIBAUDEAU, vi., 328.

‡ Tor., i., 84, 85. Lond., i., 66. South., i., 200, 218. Nell., i., 21, 22.

March 15. the 15th of March, he set out at the head of the corps of Moncey, the Imperial Guard, and the artillery from Burgos, taking the road of the Somo-Sierra. On the same day, Dupont, with two divisions of his corps and the cavalry, broke up for the Guadarama pass; the third division of Dupont's corps remained at Valladolid to observe the Spanish troops which occupied Galicia. No sooner had these forces advanced on the road towards Madrid than their place at Burgos was supplied by the army of reserve under Bessieres. The whole body moved on by brigades, taking with them provisions for fifteen days, and fifty rounds of ball-cartridge each man; they bivouacked at night with patrols set, and all the other precautions usual in an enemy's territory. They everywhere gave out that they were bound for the camp of St. Roque, to act against the English, at the same time belying these pacific declarations by arresting all the Spanish soldiers and posts whom they met on the road, so as to prevent any intelligence of their approach being received. In this way they passed without opposition, and almost without their advance being known, the important range of mountains which separates Old from New Castile; and Murat, having learned at Beytrajo, on their southern side, of the events at Aranjuez, redoubled his speed, and entered Madrid, at the head of the cavalry and Imperial Guards and a brilliant staff, on the day following, and took up his quarters in the hotel of the Prince of Peace. This formidable apparition excited much less attention than it would otherwise have done, in consequence of all

March 23. minds being intent on the preparation for Ferdinand VII. on the following day making his public entry into the capital. He came in, accordingly, accompanied by two hundred thousand citizens of all ranks, in carriages, on foot, and horseback, who had gone out to welcome their sovereign; and Murat, who was an eyewitness to the universal transports which his presence occasioned, failed not instantly to write off to Napoleon intelligence of what he had seen, with many observations on the probable effect of so popular a prince permanently retaining the supreme direction of affairs.*

The first care of Ferdinand, after he ascended the throne, was to transmit to Napoleon a full account of the transactions at Aranjuez, according to his version of the affair; and he anxiously awaited the answer which was to be received from the supreme arbiter of his fate. In the interim, however, he received from the French authorities the utmost reserve; and when he made a visit to Murat, and was announced as King of Spain, he had the mortification of being obliged to return, not only without any of the honours due to his rank, but without having had a single word addressed to him by that officer or his attendants.† As, however, it was of the

utmost importance to the new sovereign that he should be recognised by the French emperor—and his situation without such countenance was not only precarious, but full of danger—no pains were spared to conciliate his favour and win the good-will of the French generals in Madrid. Flattery, caresses, obsequious obedience to every demand, were all tried, but in vain; Murat, aware of the secret designs of his brother-in-law on the throne of Spain, was careful to avoid everything which could have the semblance even of recognising his title to the throne. Meanwhile, Charles IV. and the queen, more and more alarmed for the safety of their fallen favourite, did not let a day pass without reiterating their entreaties to Murat to take him under his protection, and now openly represented the resignation as an involuntary act; while that general, careful, above all, to advance the interests of his master, took military possession of the capital, occupied and fortified the Retiro, reviewed all his forces on the edge of the town, and nominated General Grouchy governor of Madrid. Everything asked by the French authorities was instantly granted; all their requisitions for the support, clothing, or pay of the troops were carefully complied with; and even the ungracious demand for the sword of Francis I., which had hung in the royal armory ever since it had been taken in the battle of Pavia, was also yielded to the desire of Ferdinand to conciliate his much-dreaded ally.* A hint was next given

March 31. that the journey of DON CARLOS, the king's brother, destined to celebrity in future times, to receive the emperor on the frontiers of the kingdom, would be very acceptable: this, too, was instantly acquiesced in, and preparations were made for his departure. Encouraged by such marks of compliance, Beauharnois then insinuated that it would have the best effect upon the future relations of the two potentates if Ferdinand himself were to go at least as far as Burgos to receive his august guest; but the advisers of the Spanish monarch were startled at this demand, especially so soon after the perfidious seizure of the fortresses; and the inhabitants of Madrid, grievously offended at the coldness of the French authorities to their beloved prince, and the unauthorized intrusion of their troops into the capital, were daily becoming more and more exasperated at their imperious allies.†

Napoleon received the account of the events at Aranjuez on the night of the 26th of March at Paris. He instantly took his final resolution, and next morning offered the crown of Spain to his brother Louis. His letter to that prince still exists,

Napoleon offers the crown of Spain to Louis Bonaparte, who declines it.

step to meet him: Ferdinand paused at this unexpected reserve; and the queen, to put an end to so awkward a scene, sat down to the piano and began to play. Neither said a word: at length Ferdinand mechanically drew near to his sister, and stood beside the instrument; Murat never stirred, and soon after, bowing to the queen, retired, without having taken any farther notice of the embarrassed monarch.—Foy, iii., 140, note.

* "It was brought in state from the Armoria Real to the palace of Murat by the Count Altemion. 'It could not,' said he, 'be given up to more worthy hands than those of the illustrious general formed in the school of the hero of the age.'"—Foy, iii., 142.

† Lond., i., 69, 70. Foy, i., 140, 142. Thib., vi., 332. Tor., i., 109.

* Lond., i., 67, 68. South., i., 219, 225. Foy, iii., 128, 130. Tor., i., 93, 97. Thib., vi., 329.

† "The Queen of Etruria had, unknown to Murat, arranged matters for an interview between him and Ferdinand VII., and, accordingly, he made his appearance, and was announced as King of Spain, when the French general was paying a visit to the Ex-Queen of Tuscany. Murat stood up when he entered the room, but did not advance a

and affords decisive evidence of his views on that monarchy, even at that early period, and of the profound dissimulation, as well as thorough perfidy, by which his subsequent conduct, both to Ferdinand and Charles IV., was characterized.* Louis, however, was not deceived by the specious offer thus held out to him: he had felt on the throne of Holland the chains of servitude and the responsibility of command, and he was thinking rather of resigning his onerous charge than accepting another still more burdensome: he therefore refused. At the same time, Napoleon had a long conversation with Isquierdo at St. Cloud as to the state of public opinion in the Peninsula, and the feelings with which they would regard a prince of his family, or even himself, for their sovereign. Isquierdo replied, "The Spaniards would accept your majesty for their sovereign with pleasure, and even enthusiasm, but only in the event of your having previously renounced the crown of France." Struck with this answer, he meditated much on the affairs of Spain, and, without revealing to him his real designs on the Spanish crowns, sent Savary to Madrid, to carry into execution his intrigues in the Spanish capital; and, foreseeing that the crisis of the Peninsula was approaching, and that it was indispensable that he should get both Charles and Ferdinand into his power, set out himself for Bayonne in the beginning of April.†

* Napoleon's letter to his brother Louis was in these terms: "27th of March, 1808.—The King of Spain has just abdicated; the Prince of Peace has been imprisoned; insurrectionary movements have shown themselves at Madrid. At that instant our troops were still forty leagues distant, but on the 23d Murat must have entered that capital at the head of forty thousand men. The people demand me, with loud cries, to fix their destinies. Being convinced that I shall never be able to conclude a solid peace with England till I have given a great movement on the Continent, I have resolved to put a French prince on the throne of Spain. In this state of affairs I have turned my eyes to you for the throne of Spain. Say at once what is your opinion on that subject. You must be aware that this plan is yet in embryo; and that, although I have 100,000 men in Spain, yet, according to circumstances, I may either advance directly to my object, in which case everything will be concluded in a fortnight, or be more circumspect in my advances, and the final result appear only after several months' operations. Answer categorically—if I declare you King of Spain, can I rely on you?"—NAPOLEON TO LOUIS, the 27th of March, 1808. TORENO, i., 100; and THIBAUDEAU, vi., 334.

† Sav., iii., 162. Tor., i., 100, 101. Thib., vi., 334, 335. Poy., iii., 142, 143.

‡ When Savary received his final instructions for Madrid, Napoleon said to him, "Charles IV. has abdicated; his son has succeeded him, and this change has been the result of a revolution, in which the Prince of Peace has fallen, which looks as if these changes were not altogether voluntary. I was fully prepared for some changes in Spain; but I think they are now taking a turn altogether different from what I intended. See our ambassador on the subject; inquire especially why he could not prevent a revolution in which I shall be forced to intervene, and in which I shall be considered as implicated. Before recognising his son, I must be made aware of the sentiments of the father; nothing will induce me to do so till I see the resignation duly legalized, otherwise a troop of traitors may be introduced into my palace during the night, who may force me to abdicate, and overturn the state. When I made peace on the Niemen, I stipulated that, if England did not accept the mediation of Alexander, he should unite his arms to mine to constrain that power to submission. I would be weak, indeed, if, having obtained that single advantage from those whom I have vanquished, I should permit the Spaniards to embroil me afresh on my weak side, and give that power much greater advantages than they had lost by the rupture with Russia. What I fear above everything is a revolution, of which I neither know the direction nor hold the threads; doubt-

No person could be better qualified than Savary to execute the ambiguous, but important mission with which he was now charged. Devoted in his attachment to the emperor, intimately acquainted with his most secret projects, active, insinuating, skilful, a perfect master of finesse and dissimulation, and wholly unscrupulous in the means employed for the execution of his purposes, he was admirably adapted for conducting that dark intrigue which was intended, without a rupture, to terminate in the dethronement of the entire race of the Spanish house of Bourbon. In the most flagitious, as well as important deeds of Napoleon's life, the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, the Russian negotiations succeeding the treaty of Tilsit, and in those which followed the battle of Austerlitz, he had borne a conspicuous part, and his present situation, at the head of the Gendarmerie d'Elite, gave him the direction of the most important part of the state police. Fully possessed of the secret views of the emperor, and entirely regardless of any breach of faith in carrying them into effect, he spared neither menaces, nor flattery, nor assurances of safety to accomplish the grand object of getting Ferdinand into the hands of Napoleon.* No sooner had he arrived at Madrid than he demanded a special audience of the king, which was immediately granted. He there declared, "I have come, at the particular desire of the emperor, solely to offer his compliments to your majesty, and to know if your sentiments in regard to France are in conformity to those of your father. If they are, the emperor will shut his eyes to all that is past; he will not intermeddle in the smallest particular in the internal affairs of the kingdom, and he will instantly recognise you as King of Spain and the Indies."† This gratifying assurance was accompanied with so many flattering expressions and apparent cordiality, that it entirely imposed, not only on Ferdinand, but his most experienced counsellors; and Savary's entreaties that he April 10 would go at least as far as Burgos to meet the emperor, who was already near Bayonne, on the road to Madrid, were so pressing, that their reluctance to his departure from the capital was at length overcome, and he set out from Madrid,

He arrives at Madrid; persuades Ferdinand to go to Bayonne.

less, it would be a great object to avoid a war with Spain; such a contest would be a species of sacrifice, but I would willingly incur all its hazards if the prince who governs that state is disposed to embrace such a policy. I should thus be in the same situation with Louis XIV. when he engaged, in support of his grandson, in the war of the succession: the same political necessity governs both cases. Had Charles IV. reigned, and the Prince of Peace not been overturned, we might have remained at peace, because I could rely on them, but now all is changed. But if Spain is inclined to throw itself into the opposite policy, I should not hesitate to enter the monarchy with all my forces; for that country, if ruled by a warlike prince, inclined to direct against us all the resources of his nation, might perhaps succeed in displacing by his own dynasty my family on the throne of France. You see what might happen in France if I do not prevent it; it is my duty to foresee the danger, and take measures to deprive the enemy of the resources they otherwise might derive from it. If I cannot arrange with either the father or son, I will make a clean sweep of them both; I will reassemble the Cortes, and resume the designs of Louis XIV. I am fully prepared for all that; I am about to set out for Bayonne; I will go on to Madrid, but only if it is absolutely unavoidable."—SAVARY, iii., 162, 166.

* He admitted to the Abbé de Pradt that his mission was to get Ferdinand to Madrid.—DE PRADT, 73

† Cevallos, 28, 29.

in company with the French envoy, to meet his august protector.*†

The king was everywhere received on his route to the northern provinces with the same enthusiastic joy as at Aranjuez and Madrid, though the simple inhabitants of Castile, not involved in the trammels of intrigue, and influenced by the delusions which were practised on their superiors, beheld, with undisguised anxiety, the progress of their sovereign towards the French frontier. At Burgos, however, the uneasiness of the king's counsellors greatly increased, for not only were they now surrounded by the French troops, but the emperor had not arrived, and no advices of his having even crossed the frontier were received. The matter was warmly and anxiously debated in his council, and opinions were much divided as to the course which should be adopted; Don Pedro Cevallos earnestly insisting that the king should go no farther, and portraying in vivid colours the evident peril with which such an inconsiderate surrender of his person into the hands of so ambitious a potentate would be attended. The other counsellors of the king were more undecided, alleging, for their public justification, that it was utterly inconceivable that Napoleon should entertain any sinister designs against the person of the monarch on the throne of Spain, and thus run the risk, not only of lighting up the flames of a frightful war in the Peninsula, but placing the whole resources of its transatlantic possessions at the disposal of the English government.‡ Cevallos still maintained his opinion, and the ultimate determina-

tion appeared still uncertain, when Savary joined the deliberations. He protested loudly against any change in the king's plans as uncalled for and unnecessary, prejudicial alike to the honour of the French emperor and of himself as his envoy, and likely, more than any other step which could be taken, to embroil the two kingdoms, and destroy that good understanding which was just beginning to arise between their respective monarchs. "I April 14. will let you cut off my head," says he, "if, in a quarter of an hour after the arrival of your majesty at Bayonne, he does not recognise you as the King of Spain and of the Indies. To preserve consistency he will, perhaps, in the first instance, address you with the title of your highness; but in a few minutes he will give you that of your majesty. The moment that is done everything is at an end; then your majesty may instantly return into Spain."*

These words were decisive; the king was surrounded by eight thousand of the French troops, without a single guard to his person. The earnest manner and apparent sincerity of Savary disarmed suspicion. If it had still existed, resistance was hardly possible without a battalion to support it; and the fatal resolution to continue the journey to Bayonne was taken almost from necessity, although the people were so alive to the danger that they everywhere manifested the utmost repugnance to the journey being continued, and rose at Vittoria in menacing crowds to prevent it. At that place a faithful counsellor of the king, Don Mariano de Urquijo, arrived from Bilbao, and not only laid before him a memoir, distinctly foretelling the danger which awaited him from the French emperor, but suggested a plan by which escape in disguise was still possible, and mentioned that both the captain-general of Biscay and a faithful battalion would be at hand at Mondragon to conduct him to Durango, and from thence to the fortified town of Bilbao. Hervaz repeated the same advice; the chief of the custom-house made offer of two thousand of his officers to protect his majesty; the Duke of Mahon, Governor of Guipuscoa, offered to pledge his head that he should escape safely into Arragon, and to accompany him in his flight, observing that it should never be said that a great-grandson of the brave Crillon was wanting in the hour of need to a descendant of Henry IV. So many and such concurring efforts would probably have diverted the king from his design, were it not that at that very moment Savary, who had gone on to Bayonne, and seen the emperor, returned, bringing a letter from Napoleon himself to Ferdinand, dated from that town only two days before. This letter was couched in such encouraging terms, and held out such flattering, though equivocal assurances of an immediate recognition, which were strongly repeated by Savary on his word of honour, that it relieved Ferdinand's counsellors of all their perplexities, and it was finally resolved to continue the journey without

But it is strongly resisted and his council becomes divided.

At length he prolongs it to Bayonne, in consequence of a letter from Napoleon.

Energetic efforts of the Spanish authorities in Biscay to stop the king.

April 17.

* Cevallos, 28, 29. Tor., i., 112, 113. Escoiq., 54. Savary, iii., 181, 182. Foy, iii., 145.

† "I asked permission," says Savary, "to accompany the king on his journey to the north, solely for this reason: I had come from Bayonne to Madrid as a common courier, as was the custom of travelling at that time in Spain. I had scarcely arrived when I was under the necessity of retracing my steps in the same fashion in order to meet the emperor, at the same time that Ferdinand was pursuing the same route. I found it much more convenient to request leave for my carriage to join that of his majesty; I did so, and my carriage, accordingly, made part of the royal cortège."—Savary, iii., 185, 186. It is incredible that this was the real reason which induced Savary to accompany the king back to Burgos. Don Pedro Cevallos says, "General Savary made use of the most pressing instances to induce the king to go to meet the emperor, alleging that such a step would appear infinitely flattering to his imperial majesty; and this he repeated so often, and in such insinuating terms, asserting, at the same time, that the emperor might be hourly expected, that it was impossible to withhold credit from the assertion. When the day of departure was fixed, the French general, in like manner, 'solicited the honour of accompanying his majesty in his journey, which could in no event be prolonged beyond Burgos, according to the positive intelligence he had just received of the approach of his majesty.'"—CEVALLOS, 31.

‡ These, however, were not their only nor their real reasons; in truth, they had gone too far to recede; it had already transpired that Charles IV. had denounced the resignation of Aranjuez to that step. as a forced act, and was doing his utmost to engage the French government in his interest. They were all, with the exception of Cevallos, involved in that transaction, and they thus saw the penalties of treason menacing them in rear; the country was overrun by French troops; a national struggle in defence of Ferdinand appeared hopeless, or, at least, there were no preparations for it; and there seemed no safety even to their lives but in advancing rapidly, and by early submission and adroit flattery winning the powerful protection of the French emperor before the partisans of the late monarch had had time to make any impression. This is the true secret of the majority of Ferdinand's counsellors advising him to go on to Bayonne, after the dangers of it had become so evident as to excite tumults even in the humblest ranks of the people.—See Foy, iii., 146, 147.

* Cevallos, 31, 32. Foy, iii., 147, 149. Escoiq., 44, 54. Sav., iii., 186, 187.

delay to Bayonne.* When the Duke de Mahon wished still to remonstrate, Escoiquiz, who entirely directed the king, interrupted him by the words, "The affair is settled; to-morrow we set out for Bayonne; we have received all the assurances which we could desire." Still the public anxiety continued; and when the horses came to the door the following morning, a vast crowd assembled and cut the traces. A proclamation was immediately issued to calm the general effervescence, in which the king declared "that he was assured of the constant and sincere friendship of the Emperor of France, and that, in a few days, the people would return thanks to God for the prudence which dictated the temporary absence of the king, which gave them so much disquietude;" and the carriage, surrounded by a mournful and submissive, but still unconvinced crowd, took its departure, guarded by the French division of Verdier. Two days afterward Ferdinand crossed the Bidassoa, and, proceeding to Bayonne, finally committed himself to the honour of the French emperor.†

Upon his departure from Madrid, Ferdinand had intrusted the government to a regency, of which the Infant Don Antonio was the head. Murat, however, was the real centre of authority; the presence of thirty thousand French troops gave him an influence

* Napoleon said in this letter, "The affair of Aranjuez took place when I was occupied with the affairs of the North. I am not in a situation to form an opinion concerning it, nor of the conduct of the Prince of Peace; but what I am clear about is, that it is dangerous for kings to accustom their subjects to the shedding of blood and to taking justice into their own hands. The king has no longer any friends. Your highness will have none if ever you prove unfortunate. The people willingly take vengeance for the homage which they in general pay us. As to the abdication of Charles IV., it took place at a moment when our armies covered Spain; and in the eyes of Europe and posterity I shall appear to have sent my troops for no other purpose but to precipitate from the throne my friend and ally. As a neighbouring sovereign, I am called on to inquire into before I recognise that abdication. I declare to your royal highness and to the whole world, if the abdication of King Charles was really voluntary, if he was not constrained to it by the revolt and insurrection of Aranjuez, I will, without hesitation and at once, recognise you as King of Spain. I desire much to converse with you on this subject. The circumstance which for some months I have employed in these affairs, should induce you to rely with the more confidence on me if, in your turn, factions of any sort should disturb you on the throne. Your royal highness has now my whole thoughts. You see that I float between different ideas, and have need to be fixed. You may, however, rest assured that, in any event, I shall conduct myself towards you as I have done towards your father. Rely on my desire to conciliate everything, and on my wish to find occasion to give you proofs of my affection and perfect esteem."—NAPOLEON to FERDINAND, Bayonne, April 16, 1808. When he put this insidious epistle into Savary's hands, Napoleon said to him, "If the Prince of Asturias had followed wise counsels, I should have found him here; but, from what you tell me, I suppose he conceived apprehensions from the preparations of the Grand-duke of Berg (Murat). Return and give him this letter from me; allow him to make his reflections on it. You have no need of finesse; he is more interested in it than I am. Let him do as he pleases. According to your answer or your silence I shall take my line, and also adopt such measures as may prevent him from returning elsewhere but to his father. There is the fruit of bad counsels. Here is a prince who perhaps will cease to reign in a few days, or induce a war between France and Spain." At the same time, he wrote to Murat to save the life of the Prince of Peace, but send him immediately to Bayonne.—SAVARY, iii., 206, 212, 213.

† Ter., i., 115, 119. Cevalles, 31, 33. Escoiq., 52, 56. Foy, iii., 148, 151. Thib., vi., 345, 351. De Pradt, 74. Sav., iii., 210, 214.

which was irresistible. No sooner had the king left the capital than he insisted that the Prince of Peace should be immediately given up to him. Don Antonio refused to do so until he received authority from Ferdinand, to whom he instantly despatched a courier for instructions. Meanwhile the French general continued to insist for the delivery of the important prisoner, threatening, at the same time, to put to the sword, in case of refusal, the six hundred provincial guards intrusted with his custody. At length authority arrived from the king for his surrender, which the infant communicated to the officer in command of the guards, with the simple observation, "that on the surrender of Godoy depended the preservation of the crown of Spain to his nephew." On the same day he set out from Madrid under a strong French escort, and six days afterward arrived at Bayonne. Meanwhile Murat April 26 harassed the regency with repeated and vexatious demands, apparently prompted by no other motive than to disgust them with the cares of an unsubstantial command, and accustom the people to regard the French headquarters as the centre from which all real authority emanated. Soon after he repaired in person to the Escorial, and had long and repeated conferences with Charles IV. and the old queen. The result of their deliberations soon appeared in the transmission to Don Antonio of the ante-dated and secret state paper, already noticed,* in which the king protested against his abdication as brought about by constraint and intimidation; and by the earnest advice of Murat he set out immediately after, in company with the queen, surrounded by French guards, for Bayonne, to lay his grievances at the feet of Napoleon, where he arrived four days after April 30 his fallen favourite. Thus did the French emperor, by the influence of his name, the terrors of his armies, and the astuteness of his diplomatists, succeed in inducing the leaders of all the parties which now distracted Spain, including the late and present sovereign, to place their persons at his disposal; while, at the same time, the communications on his part which brought about this extraordinary result were managed with such address, and enveloped in such mystery, that not only could none of them boast of possessing a distinct pledge of what he intended to do, but all had reason to hope that the result would prove entirely conformable to their interests.†

Meanwhile Napoleon, though possessed of such extraordinary influence, and invested with almost absolute power over the affairs of Spain and Portugal, and the interests of the crowned heads which they contained, was extremely embarrassed how to act: not that he swerved in the slightest degree from his intention of making, as he himself said, "a clean sweep of them" (*maison nette*), but that he perceived, in the brightest colours, the abyss on the edge of which he was placed, and anticipated, with just and sagacious foresight, the incalculable consequences which might result from the lighting of

* Ante, iii., 26.

† Ter., i., 124, 127. Foy, iii., 152, 155. Thib., vi., 353, 354. Hard., x., 142, 145.

Great embarrassment experienced by Napoleon in regard to the Peninsular affairs.

the flames of a national war in the Peninsula. Through all the weakness and submission of the last century he still discerned the traces of energy and resolution in the Spanish character. The timidity of its foreign conduct, the abuses of its internal administration, he justly ascribed to the corruption of the nobles or the imbecility of the court. His generals had transmitted daily accounts of the alarming fermentation which seemed to prevail, especially in the lower classes of the community; and he rightly concluded that he would be involved in inextricable embarrassment if, on the side where he had so long been entirely secure, there should arise a contest animated by the indignant feelings of a nation hitherto virgin to revolutionary passions. His instructions to Murat, accordingly, at this period, were to conduct himself with the utmost circumspection; to avoid everything which might excite an angry feeling or provoke a hostile collision; to strengthen his military hold of the country; but do nothing which might disturb the pacific negotiations by which he hoped, without drawing a sword, to obtain, in a few days, the whole objects of his ambition.*†

* Napoleon to Murat, 29th of March, 1808. Say., iii., 168.

† "I fear," said Napoleon, "M. Grand-duke of Berg, that you are deceiving me on the real situation of Spain, and that you deceive yourself also. The events of the 19th of March regarding it, have singularly complicated our affairs; I am in the greatest perplexity; never suppose that you are engaged with a disarmed nation, and that you have only to show yourself, to ensure the submission of Spain. The Revolution of the 20th of March proves that they still have energy. You have to deal with a virgin people; they already have all the courage, and they will soon have all the enthusiasm, which you meet with among men who are not worn out by political passions."

"The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of Spain; if they become seriously alarmed for their privileges and their existence, they will rouse the people and induce an eternal war. At present I have many partisans among them; if I show myself as a conqueror, I will soon cease to have any. The Prince of Peace is detested, because they accuse him of having given up Spain to France; that is the cry which led to the usurpation of Ferdinand; but first, the popular party would have been the least powerful. The Prince of Asturias has none of the qualities essential for the chief of a nation; that want, however, will not prevent them, in order to oppose us, from making him a hero. I have no wish to use violence towards that family; it is never expedient to render one's self odious and inflame hatred. Spain has above 100,000 men in arms; less would suffice to sustain an interior war; scattered over several points, they might succeed in effecting the total overthrow of the monarchy. I have now exhibited to you the difficulties which are insurmountable; there are others which you will not fail soon to discover."

"England will not let slip this opportunity of multiplying our embarrassments; she sends out forces daily while she keeps on the coasts of Portugal and the Mediterranean; she is making enrolments of Sicilians and Portuguese. The royal family having quitted Spain to establish itself in the Indies, nothing but a Revolution can change the state of that country, and that is the event for which, perhaps, Europe is the least prepared. The persons who see the monstrous state of the government in its true light are a small minority; the great majority profit by its abuses. Consistently with the interests of my empire, I can do infinite good to Spain. What are the best means of attaining that object? Should I advance to Madrid and assume the rights of a protector, by declaring for the father against the son? It is difficult to re-establish Charles IV. His rule and his favourite have become so unpopular they could not stand three months. Ferdinand, again, is the enemy of France; it is because he is so that they have put him on the throne. To keep him there would be to promote the factions who, for twenty-five years, have wished the subjugation of France. A family alliance would be a feeble bond; the Queen Elizabeth and other princesses perished miserably when they wished to sacrifice them to atrocious vengeance. I think we should precipitate nothing, and take counsels from future events."

Murat, however, was not a character to execute with skill the delicate mission with which he was intrusted, and he was too much accustomed to make everything bend to military force, to be qualified to assume at once, in circumstances singularly difficult, the foresight and circumspection of an experienced diplomatist. His precipitance and arrogance accordingly accelerated the catastrophe the emperor was so solicitous to avoid. Already an alarming explosion had taken place at Toledo; cries of "Long live Ferdinand VII." had been heard in the streets from countless multitudes; and when General Dupont was despatched, five days afterward, to restore order, it was only by a well-timed and earnest mediation of the archbishop that a serious conflict was avoided. The fermentation in the capital was hourly increasing, especially since it was known that Ferdinand had crossed the frontier to throw himself into the arms of Napoleon, and that his father and the Prince of Peace had since set out in the same direction. Though the French had hitherto observed tolerable discipline, yet the disorders inseparable from the continued passage of such large bodies of men, accustomed to the license of campaigns, had produced repeated conflicts between them and the inhabitants; blood had flowed in several places, and at Burgos the assemblage had been so alarming, that it required to be dispersed by regular platoons of the French infantry. Irritated at these symptoms of resistance, and trusting to nothing but force for its suppression, Murat wrote in the most menacing terms to Don Antonio, stating that he could permit no concourse of men in the streets; that the anarchy which prevailed was intolerable; that his resolution to suppress it was irrevocably taken; and that, if the govern-

Symptoms of resistance in Spain to the invaders. Arrogant conduct of Murat.

April 21.

April 26.

April 23.

"I do not approve of your taking possession so precipitately as you have done of Madrid; you should have kept the army ten leagues from the capital. Your entry into Madrid, by exciting the alarm of the Spaniards, has powerfully supported Ferdinand. I will write to you what part to adopt in regard to the old king; take care you do not commit me to meet with Ferdinand in Spain, unless you deem it expedient for me to recognise him as King of Spain. Above all, take care that the Spaniards do not suspect what I am about to adopt; you can have no difficulty in doing so, for I have not fixed on one myself."

"Impress upon the nobles and clergy that, if France is obliged to interfere in the affairs of Spain, their privileges will be respected. Say to the magistrates and citizens of towns, and to the enlightened persons, that Spain requires to re-create the machine of government; that it has need of institutions which will preserve it from the weight of feudalism, and protect and encourage industry. Paint to them the present condition of France, despite the wars it has undergone; the splendour of its religion; the importance of a political regeneration; the internal security and external respect which it brings in its train. I will attend to your private interests; have no thought of them; Portugal remains at my disposal. Let the French army avoid every encounter, either with the Spanish army or detached bodies; not a cartridge should be burned on either side. Keep the army always some days' march distant from the Spanish corps. *If war break out, all is lost.*"—NAPOLEON TO MURAT, March 29th, 1808. SAYARY, iii., 168, 171. History does not afford a more luminous example of sagacious foresight than this letter presents; and yet the emperor, soon after, fell headlong into the very dangers which he here so clearly depicted, and was so desirous to avoid! It is remarkable, as a proof of his profound habits of dissimulation, even with his most confidential servants, that, in this letter to his lieutenant at Madrid, he makes no mention of the design to place a relation of his own on the throne of Spain, though only three days before he had offered it to Louis, King of Holland.—*Vide ante*, iii., 25.

ment was not sufficiently strong to enforce obedience to its orders, he would take upon himself to maintain the public tranquillity. The regency issued severe proclamations April 24. against seditious assemblages or meetings, and replied in the most submissive manner to the thundering menaces of Murat; but though no public demonstration had yet taken place, the most alarming reports were in circulation; the French officers publicly gave out that Napoleon would reinstate Charles IV. on the throne; the departure of that sovereign with the Prince of Peace for the Pyrenees seemed to countenance that idea,* and reports were circulated, and greedily credited, that thirty thousand armed Biscayans had fallen on Bayonne, and rescued their beloved prince from his oppressors, while Arragon, Catalonia, and Navarre had risen in a body to cut off the retreat of the French army.

At length, in the beginning of May, matters came to extremities. The government were a prey to the most cruel disquietude, being left in the approaching crisis of the monarchy with the responsibility of command, and without its powers: ignorant which sovereign they were ultimately to obey; fearful of betraying their country, and equally so of precipitating it into a hopeless struggle; actuated, at times, by a generous desire to maintain the national independence and throw themselves on public sympathy for their support, and apprehensive, at others, that in so doing they might mar an accommodation when on the point of being concluded, and incur the pains of treason from a government which they had involved in irretrievable embarrassments; unable to determine on any decided course in the midst of such unparalleled difficulties, they adopted, meanwhile, the prudent step of confining the troops to their barracks, and exercising the most rigid vigilance, by means of the police, to prevent the quarrels, often attended with bloodshed, which were perpetually occurring between the French soldiers and the Spanish citizens. The Imperial Guard, with a division of infantry and brigade of cavalry, alone were quartered in Madrid: the artillery was all in the Retiro, but large bodies of troops, amounting, in all, to above thirty thousand men, were in the immediate neighbourhood, ready to pour in on the first signal. The whole population of the capital was in the streets: business was everywhere at a stand, and in the menacing looks and smothered agitation of the groups might be seen decisive proofs that a great explosion was at hand. Agibatur huc illuc urbus vario turbæ fluctuantis impulsu; completis undique basilicis et templis, lugubri prospectu, neque populi neque plebis ulla vox: sed attoniti vultus, et conversæ ad omnia aures: non tumultus non quies: quale magni metus et magnæ iræ, silentium erat.*

April 29. Matters were in this combustible state when Murat demanded that the Queen of Etruria, and the infants Don Francisco and Don Antonio, should forthwith set out for Boyonne. The government hesitated on this demand, which was, in effect, delivering up the whole re-

mainder of the royal family into the hands of the French emperor: Murat insisted, throwing upon them the whole responsibility of a war in case of refusal; and the minister of war, upon being referred to, drew so gloomy a picture of the military resources of the monarchy, that resistance was deemed impossible, and this last requisition was agreed to, and the hour of their departure fixed for the following morning.*

At ten o'clock on that day the royal carriages came to the door of the palace, and preparations for the departure of the princes took place. The Queen of Etruria, who, from her long residence in Italy, had ceased to be an object of interest to the people, set off first, and was allowed to depart without disturbance, though an immense crowd was collected, and the whole city was in violent agitation. Two other carriages remained, and it was known among the by-standers that they were to convey the infants Don Antonio and Don Francisco: a report soon spread that Don Francisco, who was a boy of thirteen, was weeping in the apartments above, and refused to go away: presently an aid-de-camp of Murat arrived on horseback, and, making his way through the throng, ascended the stairs of the palace; the report instantly flew through the crowd that he was come to force the royal youth from the palace of his fathers. Nothing more was requisite to throw the already excited multitude into a combustion: the French officer was violently assailed, and would have been despatched on the spot, if Don Miguel Flores, an officer of the Walloon Guards, had not protected him at the hazard of his own life. Both would, however, in all probability, have fallen a sacrifice to the fury of the populace, had not a French picquet at that moment come up, which withdrew the officer in safety to his comrades. Murat instantly resolved to punish severely this insult to his authority: a detachment of foot soldiers appeared with two pieces of cannon, and by several discharges with grapeshot, within point-blank range, easily dispersed the crowd which was collected round the palace. But the sound of that cannon resounded from one end of the Peninsula to the other; in its ultimate effects it shook the empire of Napoleon to its foundation; it was literally the beginning of the end. Instantly, as if by enchantment, the city was in a tumult; the Spanish vehemence was roused at once into action; all considerations of prudence, consequences, and probabilities of success were forgotten in the intense indignation of the moment. Everywhere the people flew to arms: knives, daggers, bayonets, were seized wherever they could be found; the gunsmiths' shops ransacked for firearms, and all French detachments passing through the streets surrounded, and in many cases cut to pieces. Such a tumultuary effort, however, could not long prevail against the discipline and skill of regular soldiers: the Spanish troops were locked up, by orders of their government, in their barracks, and could render no assistance; and though the rapid concentration of the French, when the firing commenced, induced the people for a time to imagine that they had driven

Commotion and massacre at Madrid on the 2d of May.

* Thib., vi., 369, 371. Tor., i. 124, 127. Foy, iii., 159, 160. Lond., i., 71, 72. † Tac., Hist., i., 40.

* Tor., i., 127, 135. Foy, iii., 159, 163. Nell., i., 49, 55. Lond., i., 72, 73. Thib., vi., 370, 372.

them from the capital, yet they were soon, and cruelly, undeceived. Re-enforced by the numerous battalions which now poured from all quarters into the city, and supported by the artillery, which on the first alarm had been brought from the Retiro, the French returned to the charge: repeated discharges of grape cleared the streets of Alcala and San Geronymo, while the Polish lancers and Mamelukes of the Imperial Guard followed up the advantage, charged repeatedly through the flying masses, and took a bloody revenge for the death of their comrades. Meanwhile, the Spanish troops, agitated by the sound of the tumult and discharges of artillery, but without any orders how to act, were uncertain what to do, when they were decided by an attack of the French on one of their barracks. Determined by this hostile act, the artillerymen drew out their guns, and placing themselves in front of the people, who had retreated to them for support, fired several rounds with fatal effect into the French columns, which were approaching. By a sudden rush, however, the guns were carried, and great part of the artillerymen bayoneted, among whom were the brave Daoiz and Velarde: illustrious as the first distinguished men who fell in the Peninsular war.* At two o'clock in the afternoon the insurrection was suppressed at all points, and the troops on both sides had returned to their barracks: on the side of the French three hundred had fallen; on that of the Spaniards not quite so many.

Hitherto neither party could be said to have been to blame: the tumult, however deplorable in its consequences, was evidently the result of a collision unpremeditated on both sides; the measures of Napoleon had rendered unavoidable an ebullition of indignation on the part of the outraged Spanish nation; they had burst forth, and could not complain if they met with the usual fate or hazards of war. In repelling the violence with which they were assailed, the French had not exceeded the bounds of military duty: the Spanish ministers, especially O'Farril and Azanga, had thrown themselves into the thickest of the tumult, and earnestly imploring a cessation of the strife, and at the hazard of their own lives, saved great numbers of both nations from destruction. Many deeds of generosity had occurred on both sides, and shed a lustre alike on the French and Spanish character. But at this juncture, after the fighting had ceased and the danger was entirely over, Murat commenced a massacre as unprovoked as it was impolitic, as unjustifiable as it was inhuman. Trusting to the amnesty which had been proclaimed by the chiefs on both sides, the Spaniards had resumed in part their ordinary occupations, or were walking about the streets discussing the events of the day, when great numbers of them were seized by the French soldiers, on the charge of having been engaged in the tumult, hurried before a military commission, and forthwith condemned to be shot. Preparations were immediately made to carry the sentence into execution: the mournful intelligence spread like wildfire

through Madrid, and all who missed a relation or friend were seized with the agonizing fear that he was among the victims of military barbarity. While the people were in this state of anxiety, and when the approach of night was beginning to increase the general consternation, the firing began, and the regular discharge of heavy platoons at the Retiro, in the Prado, the Puerto del Sol, and the Church of Señora de la Soledad, told but too plainly that the work of death had begun. The dismal sounds froze every heart with horror: all that had been suffered during the heat of the conflict was as nothing compared to the agonizing feeling of that cold-blooded execution. Nor did the general grief abate when the particulars of the massacre became known: numbers had been put to death, who were merely found in the streets with a knife on their persons, and had never been in the conflict at all; all were denied the consolation of religion in their last moments. Tied two and two, they were massacred by repeated discharges of musketry: the murders were continued on the following morning; and nearly a hundred had perished before, on the earnest intercession of the Spanish ministers, Murat consented to put a stop to the barbarity.†

This atrocious massacre was as impolitic as it was unjustifiable. The Spaniards, who took up arms with such desperate, though hopeless courage, to prevent the last remnant of their royal family from being torn away from their capital, were not the subjects of the French crown, nor could they be regarded, either legally or morally, as rebels to its authority. Deprived as they were by the fraud and artifices of the French emperor of their lawful sovereign, with their capital in the possession of his troops, and their fortresses perfidiously seized by his directions, they had no resource but in national resistance. To treat a nation so situated, when attempting to assert its rights, like rebels against their own government, and put them to death in great numbers, after the conflict was over, in cold blood, was so glaring an act of cruelty and injustice as could not fail to excite the unanimous indignation of man-

Extreme indignation which this massacre excited in Spain.

* Foy, iii., 171, 172. Thib., vi., 374, 375. Tor., i., 141, 142. Lond., i., 74. South., i., 316, 317. Nap., i., 24, 25.

† "Among those who were shot were many who had never been engaged in the conflict, and whose only crime consisted in being found on the streets with large knives or cutting instruments upon their persons. They were put to death without the assistance of a priest to console their last moments: a circumstance which, in that religious country, added to the horror which the executions excited."—Foy, iii., 172. The honesty and candour of General Foy are as admirable as his talent and eloquence.

"At the distance of twenty years," says an eyewitness, the Spanish historian, "our hair still stands on end at the recollection of that mournful and silent night; the calm of which was only interrupted by the cries of the unhappy victims, or the sound of the cannon and musketry discharged at intervals for their destruction. The inhabitants all retired to their homes, deplored the cruel fate which was then befalling a parent, a brother, a child. We, in our family, were bewailing the loss of the unhappy Oviedo, whose release we had been unable to obtain, when he entered, pale and trembling, into the house. He had been saved by the generosity of a French officer, after his hands were bound, and he was drawn up for execution in the court of the Retiro, who was melted by the energy of his address in that awful moment to break his bands, and set him at liberty. He was hardly out of the limits of the palace when he heard the discharges which terminated the agony of his companions in misfortune. Among the victims were many priests, old men, and persons of the most respectable character."—Toreno, i., 142, 143.

* Tor., i., 135, 139. Nell., i., 53, 55. Nap., i., 23, 24. South., i., 310, 315. Lond., i., 74. Thib., vi., 373, 374. Foy, iii., 163, 170.

kind. Of all people in the world, the French had the least right to object to such a popular effort in defence of the national independence, as it was founded on the principle on which their whole resistance to the coalition of the European powers against their Revolution had been founded, and which they had, on numberless occasions, held up to the admiration and imitation of mankind. The indignation, accordingly, which this massacre excited throughout Spain was indescribable. With a rapidity that never could have been anticipated in a country where so little internal communication existed, the intelligence flew from city to city, from province to province, and awakened that universal and energetic feeling of national resentment which, if properly directed, is the certain forerunner of great achievements. With a spirit hitherto unknown in Europe since the commencement of the first triumph of the French Revolutionary armies, the people in all the provinces, without any concert among each other, or any direction from the existing authorities, began to assemble and concert measures for the national defence. Far from being intimidated by the possession of their capital and principal fortresses by the enemy, they were only the more roused, by the sight of such advantages in the hands of a perfidious foe, to the more vigorous exertions to dispossess him. The movement was not that of faction or party, it animated alike men of all ranks, classes, and professions. The flame spread equally in the lonely mountains as in the crowded cities; among the hardy labourers of the Basque provinces as the light-hearted peasantry of the Andalusian slopes; amid the pastoral valleys of Asturias or the rich fields of Valencia, as in the crowded emporiums of Barcelona and Cadiz. The movement was universal, unpremeditated, simultaneous; and within a week after the untoward tidings reached Bayonne, Napoleon was already engaged in a struggle which promised to be of the most sanguinary character with the Spanish people.*

While the perfidious invasion of Napoleon and the cruel massacres of Murat were thus exciting the flames of a national war in the Peninsula, matters were fast approaching to a crisis at Bayonne. Intimidated by the violence of Murat, and no longer able to withstand the commands which he conveyed to them from his imperial master, the infants Don Francisco and Don Antonio set out, the day after the tumult at Madrid was quelled, for Bayonne, leaving the capital without any native government, entirely at the mercy of the French generals. Before they could arrive at the place of their destination, however, matters had arrived at a crisis between Napoleon and the royal family of Spain. No sooner had Ferdinand taken the fatal step of crossing the Bidassoa, and throwing himself upon the generosity of the French emperor, than he perceived, in the manner in which he was received, such symptoms as inspired the most serious disquietude as to his future fate. The customary marks of respect to a crowned head were wanting; the French authorities addressed him only by the title of "your royal highness,"

instead of "your majesty." His first reception at Bayonne, however, was calculated to dispel these sinister presentiments. Shortly after his arrival there, the emperor came in person on horseback, attended by a brilliant staff, to pay him a visit; Ferdinand went to the end of the street to meet him; the emperor embraced him round the neck, and, though he never used the word majesty, yet treated him with such distinction as inspired the most flattering hopes. On the same day he went to dine at the chateau of Marac, where the imperial headquarters were established; Napoleon sent his own carriages to bring him and his suite to his palace, where he was received by the emperor himself at the foot of the staircase, a piece of attention never paid by sovereigns except to crowned heads. During the entertainment the attention of the emperor to his guest was unbounded; and although he still eluded the decisive word "majesty," yet his manner was such as to inspire both Ferdinand and his attendants with the belief that he was their decided friend, and that every difficulty would speedily be adjusted. But this pleasing allusion was of short duration. After sitting a short time at table, Ferdinand returned to his hotel, while Escoiquiz remained, by special desire, to have a private conference with Napoleon. A few minutes after he arrived there, the Spanish king was followed by Savary, who announced, on the part of the emperor, that his resolution was irrevocably taken, that Ferdinand must instantly resign the throne both of Spain and of the Indies, in both of which the family of the Bourbons was to be succeeded by a prince of the Napoleon dynasty. Should he agree amicably to these conditions, hopes were held out that he might obtain the Grand-duchy of Tuscany as an indemnity. It is remarkable that Napoleon should have chosen for the time of this stunning announcement the very moment when Ferdinand had returned from his gracious reception at the imperial residence; and for the person to convey it the very officer who had been despatched by himself to Madrid to induce him to advance to Bayonne to meet him, and who had offered to pledge his head, not five days before, that the moment he arrived there the Prince of Asturias would be recognised as King of Spain.*

This terrible announcement fell with the more force upon Ferdinand and his counsellors, that they were entirely unprepared for it; the assurances held out by Savary and the letters of Napoleon having inspired them with the belief that all that was wanting to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs was, that Ferdinand should show so much deference to Napoleon as to proceed to Bayonne to meet him. Neither the prince nor his council, however, were overwhelmed by the extraordinary disclosure. Without absolutely committing themselves at first to any decided proposition, they continued the negotiations for nearly a week afterward, both by means of Cevallos and Escoiquiz, who had frequent interviews with Napoleon in person, and Champagny, who had now succeeded Talleyrand as his minister for foreign affairs. These conferences, however, came to

Subsequent negotiations between his counsellors and Napoleon.

* South., i., 334, 336. Lud., i., 74, 76. Tor., iii., 173, 175. Foy, i., 189, 192. Thib., vi., 411, 414.

* Cev., 33, 37. Escoiq., 56, 60. Tor., i., 146, 147. Thib., vi., 356, 357. Foy, iii., 151, 152. South., i., 260, 262.

nothing. On the part of Napoleon and his ministers, it was strongly urged that the interests, not merely of France, but of Spain, imperatively required that the two monarchies should be placed under dynasties belonging to the same family; that Napoleon could not submit, any more than Louis XIV., to have a dubious ally or hidden enemy in his rear while engaged with the forces of Europe in front; that the secret hostility of Spain had been clearly evinced by the ill-timed proclamation of the Prince of Peace immediately before the battle of Jena; that the numberless corruptions and abuses of the Spanish internal administration loudly called for an immediate remedy, and that could never be applied with safety by any other authority but that great conqueror who, educated amid the storms and enlightened by the experience of the Revolution, was now the master of such irresistible power as to be able to give to other states the benefits of liberal institutions suited to the spirit of the age, without the risk of those convulsions which had obliterated so many of their beneficial effects in his own country. It was replied to these specious arguments, which came with additional weight from the mouth of the emperor, by Cevallos and Escoiquiz, that it was as impolitic as unjust to compel a sovereign who had left his own dominions to throw himself upon the honour of another, and that, too, at the special request of that other, to renounce the throne which had descended to him from his ancestors; that if anything was deemed illegal in the resignation of Charles IV. at Aranjuez, that might be a good reason for restoring the throne to the deposed monarch, but could be none for transferring it to the French emperor; that the effort, however, now made to obtain a renunciation of the crown from Ferdinand, evidently showed that the transaction was regarded as legal, and that the title to dispose of the crown was vested in its present holder; that the expedience of a close alliance between France and Spain was indeed indisputable for both monarchies, but that France had already enjoyed it ever since the peace of Bâle, and the way to secure it in future was instantly to recognise the Prince of Asturias, whereby both the monarch and his subjects would be bound by such important obligations as would render the future union between the two monarchies indissoluble; whereas, by wresting from him his sceptre, the most imminent risk would be run of exciting a national war in the Peninsula, and giving the English an advantageous base from which to direct their military efforts against Napoleon, besides the certainty of separating the transatlantic colonies from the mother-country, and throwing those vast and rising states, with their important treasures and commerce, into the arms of the inveterate enemy of the French Empire. To this last argument, the justice of which could not be denied, Napoleon replied that he was well aware of that danger, but that he had provided against it by having sent out frigates to the South American States, who were prepared to receive with thankfulness their transfer to a prince of the Napoleon dynasty. These conferences, as might

April 24 have been expected, led to no result; at a secret meeting of the counsellors

of Ferdinand, held at midnight, it was resolved to decline the propositions of the French emperor, and demand passports for their immediate return to Spain. Napoleon was highly indignant at this resistance to his wishes, and refused the passports, under the pretence that, till the Aranjuez affair was cleared up, he could neither issue passports to Ferdinand as King of Spain, nor permit him to depart from a situation where he was liable to answer for his conduct to his justly-offended parent. At the same time, a decisive report was presented by Champany to the emperor, which was, of course, the echo merely of his private instructions. This state paper set out with his favourite maxim, that "*what state policy required justice authorized;*" that the interests of France and Spain indispensably called for identity, both in the dynasty who governed and the institutions which prevailed among them; that to recognise the Prince of Asturias was to surrender Spain to the enemies of France, and deliver it over to English usurpation; to restore Charles IV. was to renew the reign of imbecility and corruption, and occasion a boundless effusion both of French and Spanish blood; no alternative remained, therefore, but for Napoleon to dispossess them both, and establish in Spain a prince of his own family, with institutions analogous to those of the French Empire.*

Napoleon was greatly perplexed at the steady refusal of Ferdinand to surrender the throne. He had not calculated upon such firmness in any prince of the house of Bourbon. Not that he had the slightest hesitation of persisting in his original plan of entirely dethroning that family, but that he attached the greatest weight to the acquisition of a legal title to their possessions. No man knew better that, although force may subjugate the physical strength, a sense of legal right is generally necessary to win the moral consent of nations; and although Spain seemed prostrated with its fortresses and capital in his possession, yet he deemed his acquisitions insecure till he had obtained, in form at least, the consent of the legal inheritors of its throne. Hoping, therefore, to succeed better with the father than he had done with the son, he reiterated his directions to Murat to send on Charles IV. and the queen to Bayonne as quickly as possible; and in the mean while, in private conferences with Escoiquiz, unfolded, with unreserved confidence, from their very commencement, his views upon the Spanish Peninsula. They took their rise, he stated, from the proclamation of the Prince of Peace on the eve of the battle of Jena. Ever since that important revelation he had been able to see nothing in the Spanish government but secret enemies veiled under the mask of friendship; the proposed marriage of the Prince of Asturias to a relation of his own appeared but a feeble bond to hold together nations now actuated by hostile sentiments; he proposed to give to the Prince of Asturias an indemnity in Portugal or Tuscany, and to place one of his brothers on the Spanish throne. He had now divulged to him, and him alone, the

Napoleon sends for Charles IV., and has a private conference with Escoiquiz.

* Moniteur, 7th Sept., 1808. Thib., vi., 356, 359. Cér., 35, 46. Escoiquiz, 26, 62. Sav., iii., 168, 172. Tor., i., 148, 150. Foy, iii., 152.

whole of his designs in regard to the Peninsula. The conversation in which these determinations were expressed by the emperor is given at full length by Escoiquiz, and is one of the most precious historical documents of his reign.* Though doubtless extended and amplified by the Spanish counsellor, it bears all the marks of his original thought; and Thibaudeau, whose long acquaintance with the emperor in the Council of State had rendered the best possible judge both of his ideas and expressions, has declared that it "bears the signet-mark of truth."†

* Thib., vi., 357, 358. Tor., i., 148, 149. Escoiq., 57, 59.

† "I have long desired, Monsieur Escoiquiz," said the emperor, "to speak to you on the affairs of the Peninsula, with the frankness which your talents and your office with the Prince of Asturias deserve. I cannot, in any situation, refuse to interest myself in the fate of the unhappy king who has thrown himself on my protection. The abdication of Charles IV. at Aranjuez, in the midst of seditious guards and a revolted people, was clearly a compulsory act. My troops were then in Spain; some of them were stationed near the court; appearances authorized the belief that I had some share in that act of violence, and my honour requires that I should take immediate steps to dissipate such a suspicion. I cannot recognise, therefore, the abdication of Charles IV. till that monarch, who has transmitted to me a secret protest against it, shall have voluntarily confirmed it by a voluntary deed when freed from restraint.

"I would say farther, that the interests of my empire require that the house of Bourbon, the implacable enemy of mine, should lose the throne of Spain, and the interests of your nation equally call for the same change. The new dynasty which I shall introduce will give it a good constitution, and by its strict alliance with France preserve Spain from any danger on the side of that power, which is alone in a situation seriously to menace its independence. Charles IV. is willing to cede to me his rights, and those of his family, persuaded that his sons, the Infants, are incapable of governing the kingdom in the difficult times which are evidently approaching.

"These, then, are the reasons which have decided me to prevent the dynasty of the Bourbons from reigning any longer in Spain. But I esteem Ferdinand, who has come with so much loyalty to throw himself into my power, and I am anxious to give him some indemnity for the sacrifices which he will be required to make. Propose to him, therefore, to renounce the crown of Spain for himself and his descendants, and I will give him in exchange Etruria, with the title of king, as well as my niece in marriage. If he refuses these conditions, I will come to an understanding with his father, and neither he nor his brother shall receive any indemnity. If, on the other hand, he does what I desire, Spain shall preserve its independence, its laws, usages, and religion. I do not desire a village of Spain for myself."

Escoiquiz then endeavoured in vain to combat the emperor's reasons for holding the matter at Aranjuez as constrained. He then added, "But suppose they were not so, can you deny that the interests of my house require that the Bourbons should cease to reign in Spain? Even if you are right in all that you say, I should answer, bad policy." Having said these words, he took Escoiquiz by the ear, which he pulled in good-humour. "Come, canon, you are amusing me with real *chateaux en Espagne*. Do you really think that, while the Bourbons remain on the throne at Madrid, I could ever have the security which I would have if they were replaced by a branch of my family? The latter, it is true, might have some disputes with me or my descendants; but so far from wishing, like a Bourbon, the ruin of my house, they would cling to it in moments of danger as the only support of their own throne.

"It is in vain to speak to me of the difficulties of the enterprise. I have nothing to apprehend from the only power who could disquiet me in it. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I communicated my designs at Tilsit, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour he would offer no resistance. The other powers of Europe will remain quiet, and the resistance of the Spaniards themselves cannot be formidable. The rich will endeavour to appease the people, instead of exciting them, for fear of losing their own possessions. I will render the monks responsible for any disorder, and that will lead them to employ their influence, which you know is considerable, in suppressing any popular movements. Believe me, canon, I have much experience in these matters; the countries where the monks are numerous are easily subjugated; and that will take place in Spain, especially when the Spaniards shall see that I am providing for the national

From this embarrassment, however, Napoleon was soon relieved by the arrival of Charles IV. and the queen at Bayonne. Such was the impatience of the royal travellers to arrive at the place of their destination, that they wrote from Aranda to Napoleon to inform him of their approach, and testify their anxiety to throw themselves entirely upon his protection. So sensible were the counsellors of Ferdinand of the advantage which the French emperor would derive from the presence of the late monarch, that they were no sooner informed of his approach than they again earnestly solicited passports for Ferdinand to return to Spain, which was refused; and it was soon apparent, from the movements of the police, that he was detained a prisoner in his own hotel. On the 29th there appeared in the Bayonne Gazette the protest of Charles IV. against his abdication, and his letter of the 23d of March to Napoleon: publications which sufficiently evinced the tenour of the reception which he was to experience. On the following day the late king and queen entered Bayonne; ever since passing Burgos they had been received with royal honours; at the Bidassoa they were received by Berthier with great pomp, and at the gates of Bayonne by the whole garrison under arms. Soon after their arrival at the hotel, Napoleon came to visit them in person. The old king met him at the foot of the stair, and threw himself into his arms; Napoleon whispered in his ear, "You will find me always, as you have done, your best and firmest friend." Napoleon supported him under the arm as he returned to the apartments. "See, Louisa," said the old king, "he is carrying me." Never had the emperor's manner appeared more gracious; never did he more completely impose, by the apparent sincerity of his kindness, upon the future victims of his perfidy.*

Immediately after the arrival of Charles IV. Napoleon had a private conference with him, the queen and the Prince of Asturias, in which it was resolved, by the united authority of the emperor and old king, to compel Ferdinand to resign the throne. He rightly judged that, having once overcome that difficulty, it would be a comparatively easy matter to extract the resignation of the crown from the old king when reinstated in his rights. Ferdinand, accordingly, was sent for the next day, and the moment he came into the room, Charles IV. commanded him to deliver to him, before six o'clock on the following morning, a simple and unqualified resignation of the crown, signed by himself and all his brothers. In case of refusal, it was distinctly

independence and benefit of the country, giving them a liberal constitution, and at the same time maintaining their religion and usages. Even if the people were to rise in a mass, I would succeed in conquering them, by sacrificing 200,000 men. I am not blind to the risk of a separation of the colonies; but do not suppose I have been slumbering even on that point. I have long kept up secret communications with Spanish America, and I have lately sent frigates there to obtain certain advices as to what I may expect; and I have every reason to believe that the intelligence which I will receive will prove of the most favourable description."—Escoiquiz, 107, 135. *Pieces Just.*

* De Pradt, 92, 94. Thib., vi., 359, 364. Tor., i., 151, 152. Cev., 50, 51. Escoiq., 61, 64.

intimated that he and all his counsellors would be proceeded against as traitors. Napoleon strongly supported the old king, and concluded with ominous menaces in the event of refusal. Ferdinand endeavoured to speak in his own defence, but he was interrupted by the king, who commanded him to be silent, and the queen soon after broke into the apartment, with such violent and impassionate expressions, that Ferdinand found it impossible to make a word be heard. He retired from the conference overwhelmed with consternation and despair. Similar threats of instant death were conveyed on the same evening by Duroc to the Infants Don Carlos and Don Antonio; and such was the impression produced by these menaces, that it was determined by the counsellors of Ferdinand that no alternative remained but immediate submission. A conditional resignation was

May 1. accordingly written out and signed by them all on the following day, in which Ferdinand renounced the crown, on condition that he and his father should both return to Madrid, where the Cortes should be assembled; and that, if Charles declined to return to Spain to govern himself, he should govern the kingdom in his father's name and as his lieutenant.*

This qualified resignation, however, in which the Prince of Asturias still announced his intention of returning to Madrid as his father's lieutenant, and resuming there, in his name, the royal functions, was far from meeting the views of Napoleon, who was irrevocably set upon obtaining from the young king such an unconditional surrender of his rights as might leave the throne vacant for a prince of his own family. He wrote, therefore, a letter, which was signed by Charles IV. and passed for his own production, though the depth of its thought and the energy of its expression clearly indicated the imperial hand.†

* Cev., 50, 51. Escoiq., 64, 65. Tor., i., 151, 152. Thib., vi., 365, 367.

† "What has been your conduct?" the old king was made to say; "you have spread sedition through my whole palace: you have excited my very bodyguards against me; your own father became your prisoner; my first minister, whom I had raised and adopted into my own family, was dragged, covered with blood, into a dungeon; you have withered my gray hairs and despoiled them of a crown borne with glory by my fathers, and which I have preserved without stain; you have seated yourself on my throne; you have made yourself the instrument of the mob of Madrid, whom your partisans had excited, and of the foreign troops who at the same moment were making their entry. Old, and broken down with infirmities, I was unable to bear this new disgrace; I had recourse to the emperor, not as a king at the head of his troops and surrounded by the pomp of a throne, but as a fugitive, abandoned monarch, broken down by misfortune. I have found protection and refuge in the midst of his camp; I owe him my own life, that of the queen, and that of my prime minister; he is acquainted with all the outrages I have experienced, all the violence I have undergone; he has declared to me that he will never recognise you as king. In tearing from me the crown, it is your own which you have broken; your conduct towards me, your letters, which evince your hatred towards France, have put a wall of brass between you and the throne of Spain. I am king by right of descent; my abdication was the result of force and violence. I can admit the validity of no acts resulting from the assembly of armed mobs; *everything shall be done for the people, nothing by them.* Hitherto I have reigned for the people's good, hereafter I shall still act with the same object; when I am once assured that the religion of Spain, its independence, integrity, and institutions are secured, I shall descend to the grave, imploring pardon for you for the bitterness of my last days. I can agree to no assembly of the Cortes; that is a new idea of the inexperienced persons who surround you."—Letter, CHARLES IV. to FERDINAND, 2d May, 1808.

Ferdinand, however, was still unmoved, and replied, two days afterward, in a letter, in which he vindicated his own May 4, 1808. conduct, and expressed his astonishment at the colour now put upon the Aranjuez resignation, which had not only been uniformly represented by Charles IV. as a voluntary act, but avowedly contemplated for a long time before it took place.* This continued refusal on Ferdinand's part added extremely to the embarrassments of Napoleon, and he was at a loss to perceive any mode by which he could attain his favourite object of gaining possession of the throne of Spain, with the semblance of a conveyance from the legal owner.†

More successful with the father than the son, Napoleon had already obtained Napoleon obtains an unconditional surrender of the throne from Charles IV. May 5. signed on the 5th of May, by Duroc on the part of Napoleon, and the Prince of Peace, in virtue of special powers from their respective masters, contained an unqualified resignation of the crown of Spain, not only for himself and Ferdinand, but all his successors, and a transference of it in absolute sovereignty to the Emperor Napoleon. The only provisions in favour of Spain were, that the integrity of the kingdom should be preserved; that its limits should be unchanged by the prince whom Napoleon might place on the throne; that the Catholic religion should be maintained, and no reformed religion tolerated: the palace of Compeigne was to be assigned to the king, the queen, and the Prince of Peace, during the lifetime of the former, with a pension of thirty millions of reals. At the same time an annuity of 400,000 francs was provided for each of the royal infants of Spain. The only point in this treaty upon which there was any serious discussion was the matter of the pensions; the surrender of the monarchy was agreed to without hesitation by the imbecile old king and his pusillanimous minister. Thus had Charles IV. the disgrace of terminating his domestic dissensions by the surrender of his throne and the liberties of his people into the hands of a stranger; and the Prince of Peace the infamy of affixing his name, as the last act of his ministerial existence, to a deed which deprived his sovereign and benefactor of his crown, and forever disinherited his descendants.‡

Unquestionably it was neither Charles IV. nor the Prince of Peace who penned these vigorous lines. It is curious to observe the sentiment, "everything for the people, nothing by them," in the mouth of the military champion of the Revolution.

* Ferdinand in this letter made the just observation, "that the perpetual exclusion of his dynasty from the throne of Spain could not be effected without the consent of all those who either had or might acquire rights to its succession, nor without the formal consent of the Spanish nation assembled in Cortes, in a situation freed from all restraint, and that any resignation now made would be null, from the obvious restraint under which it was executed."—FERDINAND to CHARLES IV., 4th May, 1808. TORENO, vol. i., App., No. 9. Already the opposing parties had changed sides: Napoleon, the hero of the Revolution, would consent to no assembling of the Cortes; Ferdinand, the heir of the despotic house of Bourbon, appealed for support to that national assembly.

† Tor., i., 152, 153. Thib., vi., 368, 369. Cev., 50, 51. Escoiq., 64, 65.

‡ Tor., i., 404. App., No. 11. Cev., 134, 136.

§ Charles IV. was not destitute of good qualities, but he

On the same day on which this treaty was signed, a secret deputation reached Ferdinand from the provisional government of Madrid, consisting of Zayas, aid-de-camp to the minister of war, and Castro, under-secretary of state. They came to demand instructions chiefly on the points, whether they were at liberty to shift their place of deliberation, as they were subjected to the control of the French army in the capital; whether they should declare war against France, and endeavour to prevent the farther entrance of troops into the Peninsula; and whether, in the event of his return being prevented, they should assemble the Cortes. Ferdinand replied, that "he was deprived of his liberty, and in consequence unable to take any steps in order to save either himself or the monarchy; that he therefore authorized the junta of government to add new members to their number, to remove whoever they thought proper, and to exercise all the functions of sovereignty; that they should stop the entrance of fresh troops, and commence hostilities the moment that he was removed into the interior of France, a step to which he never would consent till forced to it by violence; that the Cortes should be convoked, in the first instance, to take measures for the defence of the kingdom, and then for such ulterior objects as might require consideration." The decrees necessary to carry these instructions into effect were soon after brought to Madrid by an officer destined for distinguished celebrity in future times, DON JOSEPH PALAFOX.*

From the embarrassment arising from the continued resistance of Ferdinand to make the resignation required of him, Napoleon was at length relieved by the receipt of intelligence of the bloody commotion at Madrid, which at once brought to a crisis the affairs of the Peninsula. He received the news of that calamitous event as he was riding out to Bayonne, at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 5th of May, and immediately returned to his chateau, where he sent for Charles IV., the queen, Ferdinand, and the Prince of Peace. The Prince of Asturias was assailed by Charles IV. and the queen with such a torrent of abuse, that Cevallos, who was pres-

ent on the occasion, has declared that he cannot prevail on himself to transcribe it. Napoleon joined in the general vituperation, and the sternness of his manner, and vehemence of his expressions, at once showed that the period had now arrived when submission had become a matter of necessity. He spoke of the outraged honour of the French armies; of the blood of his soldiers, which called aloud for vengeance; of a war of extermination, which he would wage to vindicate his authority.* He concluded with the ominous words, "Prince, you must choose betwixt cession and death." Similar menaces were conveyed by Duroc to the Infants Carlos and Don Antonio, and other members of the royal family. Sensible now that any farther resistance might not only, without any benefit, endanger his own life, but possibly draw after it the destruction of the royal family, Ferdinand resolved upon submission. On the following morning he addressed a letter to his father, in which he announced his intention of unqualified obedience; and four days afterward a treaty was signed, by which he adhered to the resignation by his father of the Spanish crown, and acquired in return the title of most serene highness, with the palace, park, and farms of Navarre, with fifty thousand arpents of woods connected therewith, and an annuity of 600,000 francs a year from the French treasury. The same rank, with an annuity of 400,000 francs, was allotted to the Infants Don Carlos and Antonio. As soon as this treaty was signed Ferdinand and his brothers were removed to Bourdeaux, where these two princes signed a renunciation of their rights to the throne, and Ferdinand was made to affix his name to a proclamation, in which he counselled submission and peace to the Spanish people. The three royal captives were shortly after removed to Valençay, the seat of Talleyrand, in the heart of France, where they continued during the remainder of the war. No indemnity whatever was provided for the Queen of Etruria or her son, who, compelled by Napoleon, in the outset of these transactions, to renounce the crown of Tuscany, had been subsequently amused by the elusory promise of a throne in Lusitania, and was now sent a destitute captive into the interior of France.††

* Napoleon, on this occasion, made it a special subject of reproach to Ferdinand, "that, by flattering the opinion of the multitude, and forgetting the sacred respect due to authority, he had lighted the conflagration now ready to devour the Peninsula."—Foy, iii., 177.

† Cev., 51, 52, 133, 140. Escocq., 64, 65. Thib., vi., 380, 384. Tor., i., 156, 157, 159. Foy, iii., 177.

‡ Napoleon's own account of the Bayonne affair is in all substantial points the same as that above given. "Ferdinand offered, on his own account, to govern entirely at my devotion, as much so as the Prince of Peace had done in the name of Charles IV.; and I must admit that, if I had fallen into their views, I would have acted much more prudently than I have actually done. When I had them all assembled at Bayonne, I found myself in command of much more than I could have ventured to hope for; the same occurred there, as in many other events of my life, which have been ascribed to my policy, but in fact were owing to my good fortune. Here I found the Gordian knot before me; I cut it. I proposed to Charles IV. and the queen that they should cede to me their rights to the throne. They at once agreed to it, I had almost said voluntarily; so deeply were their hearts ulcerated towards their son, and so desirous had they and their favourite now become of security and repose. The Prince of Asturias did not make any extraordinary resistance: neither violence nor menaces were employed against him; and if fear decided him, which I well believe was the case, it concerns him alone."—LAS CASAS, iv., 210, 211

* Thib., i., 377, 378. South., i., 322, 323. Cev., 56, 58. Tor., i., 152, 153.

Having now succeeded in his main object of dispossessing the Bourbon family, and obtaining a semblance of legal title from the ejected owners to the Spanish throne, Napoleon was not long of bringing his other arrangements regarding the Peninsula to an issue. The refusal of his brother Louis to accept the throne had induced him to cast his eyes to Joseph, king of Naples, an arrangement which, besides providing a sovereign, who it was hoped would prove entirely submissive to the views of the emperor in that important situation, was attended with the additional advantages of opening a throne for Murat, who, after holding the almost regal state of lieutenant of the emperor at Madrid, could hardly be expected to descend to any inferior station. To preserve appearances, however, it was deemed advisable that the semblance of popular election should be kept up; and with that view, the moment that the emperor had obtained the consent of Ferdinand to his resignation, he despatched instructions to Murat to obtain a petition from the junta of government and the principal public bodies of Madrid for the conferring of the throne upon the King of Naples. At the same time, to supply any interim defects of title which might be thought to exist in the emperor's lieutenant to act in Spain in civil concerns, a decree was signed by Charles IV. on the very day of his renunciation, and transmitted to Madrid, where it arrived three days afterward, which conferred on Murat the title of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, with the presidency of the junta of government, which in effect put that important body, now reduced merely to the official ministers, entirely at his disposal. This nomination was accompanied by a proclamation of the old king, drawn by Godoy, in which he counselled his former subjects "that they had no chance of safety or prosperity for the Spaniards but in the friendship of the emperor, his ally." This was followed by another, the work of Escoiquiz, from the Prince of Asturias, from Bourdeaux on the 12th, in which he also advised his countrymen "to remain tranquil, and to look for their happiness only in the wise disposition and power of Napoleon." It may easily be believed how readily Murat exerted himself to pave the way for that elevation of Joseph which promised so immediately to promote his own advantage. The most energetic measures were immediately adopted to obtain at Madrid declarations in favour of the new dynasty; and the leading authorities, perplexed and bewildered at the unparalleled situation in which they were placed, and the earnest exhortation to submission which they received from their lawful sovereign, were without difficulty won over to the interest of the rising dynasty. The junta of government, indeed, at first protested against the abdication at Bayonne, and refused to connect themselves in any way with these proceedings: but they were soon given to understand that their lives would be endangered if they continued to uphold the rebel authority of the Prince of Asturias, and at the same time the most flattering prospects were held out to them if they took the lead in recognising the new and inevitable order of things. These ar-

tifices proved successful, and the junta, satisfied with protesting that they in no way recognised the acts of Charles IV. and Ferdinand, and that the designation of a new monarch should in no ways prejudice their rights or those of their successors, concluded with the resolution that the emperor's choice should fall on his elder brother the King of Naples. The municipality of Madrid also presented a petition to the same effect; and Napoleon, satisfied with having thus obtained the colour of public consent to his usurpation, issued a proclamation convoking an assembly of one hundred and fifty notables to meet at Bayonne on the 15th of June following. Joseph, who had no choice but submission, quitted with regret the peaceful and smiling shores of Campania, set out for his new kingdom, and arrived at Bayonne on the 6th of June, where he was magnificently received by Napoleon, and on the same day proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies.*†

Such is a detailed account of the artifices by which Napoleon succeeded in wresting the crowns of Spain and Portugal from their lawful possessors, and placing the first on the head of one of his own brothers, while the second remained at his disposal for the gratification of one of his military lieutenants. Not a shot was fired, not a sword was drawn to effect the vast transfer; the object for which Louis XIV. unsuccessfully struggled during fourteen years was gained in six months; present fraud, the terrors of past victory, had done the work of years of conquest. But these extraordinary successes were stained by as great vices; and perhaps in the whole annals of the world, blackened as they are by deeds of wickedness, there is not to be found a more atrocious system of perfidy, fraud, and dissimulation than that by which Napoleon won the kingdoms of the Spanish Peninsula. He first marched off the flower of its troops into the north of Germany, and by professions of amity and friendship lulled asleep any hostile suspicions which the cabinet of Madrid might have conceived; and then entered into an agreement with Alexander for the dethronement of its sover-

* *Thib.*, vi., 388, 392. *Tor.*, i., 161, 168. *Foy*, iii., 181, 185. *Neill*, 84, 92. *South.*, i., 325, 332.

† On this occasion the emperor addressed the following proclamation to the Spanish people: "Spaniards! After a long agony, your nation was on the point of perishing; I saw your miseries, and hastened to apply a remedy. Your grandeur, your power, form an integral part of my own. Your princes have ceded to me their rights to the crown of Spain. I have no wish to reign over your provinces, but I am desirous of acquiring eternal titles to the love and gratitude of your posterity. Your monarchy is old; my mission is to pour into its veins the blood of youth. I will ameliorate all your institutions, and make you enjoy, if you second my efforts, the blessings of reform, without its collisions, its disorders, its convulsions. I have convoked a general assembly of deputations of your provinces and cities; I am desirous of ascertaining your wants by personal intercourse; I will then lay aside all the titles I have acquired, and place your glorious crown on the head of my second self, after having secured for you a constitution which may establish the sacred and salutary authority of the sovereign, with the liberties and privileges of the people. Spaniards! Reflect on what your fathers were; on what you now are! The fault does not lie in you, but in the constitution by which you have been governed. Conceive the most ardent hopes and confidence in the results of your present situation, for I wish that your latest posterity should preserve the recollection of me, and say, *he was the regenerator of our country.*" —*THIBEAUDEAU*, vi., 390, 391.

eigns, and bought the consent of Russia to that spoliation of the faithful allies of ten years' duration, by surrendering to its ambition the more recent confederates which he had roused into hostility on the banks of the Danube during the desperate struggle of the last six months. He then concluded a treaty with Spain at Fontainebleau, in which he purchased the consent of that power to the partition of his ally Portugal, by promising to the court of Madrid a share of its spoils, and to its minister a princely sovereignty carved out of its dominions; and in return for this forbearance solemnly guaranteed all its possessions. Hardly was the ink of this treaty dry, when he directed his armies across the Pyrenees in such force as to evince an intention not merely of appropriating to himself the whole dominions of his old tributary dependant Portugal, but of seizing upon at least the northern provinces of Spain, while the remaining forces of that monarchy were dissipated in the south and north of Portugal in search of elusory acquisitions at the expense of the cabinet of Lisbon. The sentence, at the same time, goes forth at the Tuileries, "The house of Braganza has ceased to reign," and the royal family at Lisbon are driven into exile to Brazil; while the Queen of Etruria is obliged to resign the throne of Tuscany, on a promise of an indemnity on the northern provinces of Portugal. Scarcely, however, is the resignation elicited under this promise obtained, when that promise, too, is broken; the dispossessed queen, albeit a creation of Napoleon's own, is deprived of her indemnity; the stipulated principality in favour of the Prince of Peace is cast to the winds; and orders are issued to Junot to administer the government of the whole of Portugal in name of the Emperor Napoleon.

Meanwhile, the French armies rapidly inundate the northern provinces of the Peninsula; the frontier fortresses are seized, in the midst of profound peace, by a power in alliance with Spain, and which, only four months before, had formally guaranteed the integrity of its dominions; a hundred thousand men overspread the provinces to the north of the Ebro, and approach the capital. These disastrous events excite the public indignation against the ruling monarch and his unworthy favourite; they are overthrown by an urban insurrection, and the Prince of Asturias, by universal consent, is called to the throne. No sooner is he apprized of this event than Napoleon despatches Savary to induce the new king to come to Bayonne, under a solemn assurance, both verbally and in writing, that he would at once recognise him, if the affair at Aranjuez was explained, and that in a few minutes everything would be satisfactorily adjusted. Agitated between terror and hope, Ferdinand, in an evil hour, and when his capital is occupied by French troops, consents to a step which he had scarcely the means of avoiding, and throws himself on the honour of the French monarch. Napoleon, in the interim, sends for Charles IV. and the Prince of Peace, and between the terror of his authority and the seductions of his promises, contrives to assemble all the royal family of Spain with their confidential counsellors at Bayonne. No sooner are they arrived than he receives and entertains them in

the most hospitable manner, and when they are beginning to indulge the hopes which such flattering conduct was fitted to inspire, suddenly salutes them with the announcement that the house of Bourbon has ceased to reign, and closes this matchless scene of duplicity, fraud, and violence, by extorting, by means of persuasion, menaces, and intimidation, a resignation of the throne from both the father and son, whom he had so recently solemnly bound himself to maintain in their possession! To crown the whole, while alluring, like the serpent, his victims into his power, he is secretly offering their dominions to one of his brothers after another: he is, underhand, holding out promises of support both to the old and the new King of Spain, and he has all the while irrevocably resolved upon the dethronement of both, and the supplanting of the house of Bourbon by that of Napoleon in both the thrones of the Peninsula. He concludes by sending Charles IV. and Ferdinand, with all their family, into state captivity in the interior of France; discarding Godoy without his stipulated principality; cheating the Queen of Etruria out of her promised indemnity; disinheriting at once the regal families of Spain, Portugal, and Etruria, and placing his own brother on the throne of the Peninsula, in virtue of a determination formed, by his own admission, ever since the treaty of Tilsit!

Was, then, such atrocious conduct as successful in the end as it was in the commencement? and did the dynasty of Napoleon reap in its final results benefits or injury from acquisitions obtained by so black a course of perfidy? Let the answer be given in his own words: "*It was that unhappy war in Spain which ruined me.* The results have irrevocably proved that I was in the wrong. There were serious faults in the execution. One of the greatest was that of having attached so much importance to the dethronement of the Bourbons. Charles IV. was worn out; I might have given a liberal constitution to the Spanish nation, and charged Ferdinand with its execution. If he had put it in force in good faith, Spain would have prospered, and put itself in harmony with our new institutions; if he failed in the performance of his engagements, he would have met with his dismissal from the Spaniards themselves. You are about to undertake, said Escoiquiz to me, one of the labours of Hercules, where, if you please, nothing but child's play is to be encountered. The unfortunate war in Spain proved a real wound, the first cause of the misfortunes of France. If I could have foreseen that that affair would have caused me so much vexation and chagrin, I would never have engaged in it. But after the first steps taken in the affair, it was impossible for me to recede. When I saw those imbecilles quarrelling and trying to dethrone each other, I thought I might as well take advantage of it to dispossess an inimical family; but I was not the contriver of their disputes. Had I known at the first that the transaction would have given me so much trouble, I would never have attempted it."*†

Ultimate consequences of this perfidious conduct to Napoleon and his house.

* Las Cas., iv., 204, 205. O'Meara, ii., 167.

† The assertion here made, and which was frequently repeated by Napoleon, that he was not the author of the

The fact thus admitted by Napoleon, and clearly proved by his history, that the Spanish war was the principal cause of his ruin, is one of the most luminous examples which the annals of the world exhibit of the subjection of human affairs to the direction of an overruling power, which makes the passions and vices of men the instruments of their own punishment. So far as mere worldly policy was concerned, and on the supposition that there were no moral feelings in mankind which cannot for a length of time be outraged with impunity, there can be no doubt that he judged wisely in attempting, by any means, the extension of his dynasty over the Peninsula. The reasons of state policy which rendered it essential for Louis XIV. to face the strength of banded Europe to maintain the family compact in the Peninsula, were still more forcibly applicable to Napoleon, as his dynasty was a revolutionary one, and could not hope to obtain lasting support but from sovereigns who rested on a similar foundation. How, then, did it happen that a step recommended by so clear a principle of expedience, and attended by the most unhopèd-for success in the first instance, should ultimately have been attended with such disaster? Simply because it was throughout based on injustice; because it violated the moral feelings of mankind, outraged their national attachments, and roused all classes by the overbearing excitement of the generous emotions into an unreflecting, it may almost be said, an

family disputes between Charles IV. and Ferdinand, but merely stepped in to dispossess them both, was perfectly well founded, and is quite consistent with all the facts stated in the preceding deduction. It is evident, also, that such was the fascination produced by his power and talents, that no difficulty was experienced in getting the royal family of Spain to throw themselves into his hands; nay, that there was rather a race between the father and son which should first arrive at his headquarters to state their case favourably to that supreme arbiter of their fate. That Savary was sent to Madrid and again back to Vittoria to induce Ferdinand to come to Bayonne was admitted by himself,* but he evidently had little difficulty in accomplishing his task. But the real reproach against Napoleon, and from which he has never attempted to exculpate himself, is having first agreed with Alexander at Tilsit to dispossess the house of Braganza and Bourbon; then, to lull asleep the latter power, signed the treaty of Fontainebleau, which guarantied its dominions; then perfidiously seized its fortresses without a shadow of pretext; and finally taken advantage of the family dissensions to attract both the old king and his son to Bayonne, where they were compelled to abdicate.

Long as the preceding narrative of the causes which led to the Peninsular war has proved, it will not by the intelligent reader be deemed misplaced, when the vital importance of the facts it contains, both to the issue of the contest and the character of Napoleon, is taken into view, the more especially as it has hitherto not met with the attention it deserves from English historians. Colonel Napier, in particular, dismisses the whole subject in a few pages, and blames Napoleon, not for attacking Spain, but chiefly, if not entirely, for not attacking it in the interests of Democracy. "There are many reasons," says this energetic and eloquent writer, "why Napoleon should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain; there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. His great error was, that he looked only to the court, and treated the people with contempt. Had he taken care to bring the people and their government into hostile contact first, instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator of a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people."—NAPIER, i., 22, 23. In energy and fire of military description and ability of scientific disquisition, the gallant colonel is above all praise, but he is far from being equally safe as a guide to political events, or as a judge of the measures of government.

* De Pradt, 73.

instinctive resistance. In the final success of that resistance, in the memorable retribution which it at last brought on the principal actors in the drama which began with such apparently undeserved success, is to be discerned the clearest proof of the manner in which Providence works out the moral government of the world, and renders the guilt and long-continued success of the wicked the instruments of their own ultimate and well-deserved punishment. When the Spaniards beheld Napoleon sending their princes into captivity and wresting from them their crown, from themselves their independence; when they saw Murat in triumph drowning the Madrid insurrection in blood, and securely massacring her gallant citizens after the fight was over, they sank and wept in silence, and possibly doubted the reality of the Divine superintendence of human affairs, when such crimes were permitted to bring nothing but increase of power and authority to their perpetrators. But mark the end of these things, and the consequences of these atrocities upon their authors by a series of causes and effects, every one of which now stands forth shining in imperishable light! Napoleon, who then sent an unoffending race of monarchs into captivity, was himself, by its results, driven into a lasting and melancholy exile. France, which then lent its aid to a perfidious and unjust invasion, was itself, from its effects, subjected to a severe and galling subjugation: Murat, who then with impunity massacred the innocent by the mockery of military trial, signed, in the order for their condemnation, the warrant for his own dethronement and execution not seven years afterward!

In authorizing or committing these enormous state crimes, Napoleon and France were, in truth, acting in conformity to that moral law of the universe which dooms outrageous vice, whether in nations or individuals, to prepare, in the efforts which it makes for its present gratification or advancement, the means of its ultimate punishment. Napoleon constantly said, and said truly, that he was not to be blamed for the wars which he undertook; that he was driven on by necessity; that he was always placed in the alternative of farther triumphs or immediate ruin; that he was, in truth, the head of a military republic, which would admit no pause to its dictator in the career of victory.* There is no one who

The passions of this Revolution the real causes of the disasters both of Europe and France.

* "Throughout my whole reign," said Napoleon, "I was the keystone of an edifice entirely new, and resting on the most slender foundations. Its duration depended on the issue of each of my battles. If I had been conquered at Marengo, the disastrous times of 1814 and 1815 would immediately have come on. It was the same at Austerlitz, Jena, and other fields. The vulgar accuse my ambition of all these wars; but they, in truth, arose from the nature of things, and that constant struggle of the past and the present, which placed me continually in the alternative of conquering, under pain of being beaten down. I was never, in truth, master of my own movements; I was never at my own disposal. At the commencement of my elevation, during the consulate, my partisans frequently asked me, with the best intentions, whither I was tending, and I constantly answered, with perfect sincerity, I did not know. They were astonished, but I said no more than the simple truth. My ambition, I admit, was great, but it was of a frigid nature, and caused by the opinion of the masses. During all my reign, the supreme direction of affairs really lay with the people; in fact, the imperial government was a kind of republic."—LAS CASAS, vi., 41; vii., 125. O'MEARA, i., 405.

attentively considers his career but must admit the justice of these observations, and absolve him individually, in consequence, from much of that obloquy which the spectacle of the dreadful and desolating wars in which he was so powerful an agent has naturally produced among mankind. But that just indignation at the profuse and unprofitable effusion of blood, which has been erroneously directed by a large and influential class in France to the single head of Napoleon, should not on that account be supposed to be ill-founded; the feeling is just, the object only of it is mistaken; its true

object is that selfish spirit of revolutionary aggrandizement which merely changed its direction, not its character, under the military dictatorship of the French emperor; which hesitates at no crimes, pauses at no consequences; which, unsatiated by the blood and suffering which it had produced in its own country, sought abroad, under his triumphant banners, the means of still greater gratification; and never ceased to urge on its remorseless career till the world was filled with its devastation, and the unanimous indignation of mankind was aroused for its punishment.

CHAPTER L.

CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

ARGUMENT.

Memorable Events of which the Spanish Peninsula has been the Theatre.—Singular and uniform Character of their Guerilla Warfare.—Physical Conformation of the Country which has led to these Results.—Great Mountain Ranges of Spain and Portugal.—Extraordinary Resolution with which, in every Age, the Spaniards have defended their Cities.—Peculiarities in the civil History of the Peninsula, which have so long rendered its People a divided Community.—Effect of those Circumstances in promoting the Means of internal and separate Defence.—Corruption of the Nobility, and Extent to which Entails were carried.—State of the Peasantry: statistical Details on that Subject.—The Church: its Usefulness, Character, and Sway over the People, and great Influence on the Spanish Contest.—Spain was still unexhausted by revolutionary Passion.—Composition and Character of the French Army at this Period.—Its Discipline, Equipment, and Efficiency; and Numbers.—Force and Character of the British Army.—The Amount of its various Branches.—Admirable Spirit with which it was animated and regarded by the People.—Character and Qualities of the British Soldiers.—Important Effect of their Officers being exclusively taken from the higher Ranks.—Severe Discipline and corporeal Punishments which still subsisted.—General Foy's graphic Contrast of the English and French Soldiers, and of the Officers of their respective Armies.—Difficulty of keeping any considerable Force together in the Interior of the Peninsula.—Military Force of Spain at the Commencement of the Contest.—Military Force and physical Character of Portugal.—Amount, Quality, and Disposition of the French Army at this Period in Spain.—Progress and early Forces of the Spanish Insurrection.—Frightful Disorders which signalized its Commencement in some Cities.—Cruel Massacre with which the Revolution in Valencia began.—Prudent Measures adopted by the Nobles at Seville.—Proceedings of its Junta.—Proclamation which it issued against Napoleon.—Wise Instructions to their Troops.—Capture of the French Fleet at Cadiz.—Insurrections in Asturias, Galicia, Catalonia, and Arragon.—Measures of Napoleon in regard to the Insurrection.—Proceedings of the Notables assembled at Bayonne.—Proclamation of the Grandaes of Spain to their Countrymen.—Degrading Letter of Escociz and the Counsellors of Ferdinand to King Joseph.—Constitution of Bayonne given by Napoleon to the Spaniards.—Proceedings of Napoleon, Joseph, and the Junta of Notables at Bayonne.—Ministry of Joseph.—His Journey to, and arrival and reception at, Madrid.—Honourable Instances of Resistance to the general Torrent of Adulation among the Grandaes in his Favour.—Memorable Answer of the Bishop of Orense to his Summons to Bayonne.—Universal Joy with which the News of the Insurrection is received in England.—Noble Speech of Mr. Sheridan on the Spanish War in Parliament.—Answer of Mr. Canning.—Reflections on this Debate.—English Budget of 1808.—Immense Succours sent out to the Patriots of the Peninsula by the British Government.—Napoleon's first Orders for the Suppression of the Insurrection.—Success of Bessieres over Cuesta in Leon and in Biscay.—Operations of Lefebvre in Arragon.—First Siege of Saragossa.—Its Failure.—Expedition of Moncey against Valencia.—Its Failure.—Progress of the Insurrection, and partial Successes of the Patriots in that Quarter.—Operations of Bessieres against Cuesta and Blake.—Battle of Rio-Secco, and Defeat of the Spaniards.—March of Dupont into Andalusia, and his

early Successes there.—Accumulation of Forces around the Invaders under Castanos.—Battle of Baylen and Surrender of Dupont.—Its prodigious Results both in Spain and over Europe.—Shameful Violation of the Capitulation by the Spaniards.—Departure of Joseph from Madrid, and Concentration of the French Troops behind the Ebro.—Campaign in Catalonia and Siege of Gerona.—Entry of the Spanish Troops into the Capital.—Universal Transports in the Peninsula.—Affairs of Portugal.—Commencement of the Insurrection, and disarming of the Spanish Troops there.—The English Cabinet resolves on sending Succours to that Kingdom.—Sir Arthur Wellesley takes the Command of the Expedition, and arrives off Mondego Bay.—Landing of the British Troops, and Combat of Roliça.—Relative Forces on both Sides.—Battle of Vimeira.—Sir A. Wellesley's Intentions for following up his Success are frustrated by the Arrival of Sir H. Burrard and Sir H. Dalrymple, who supersede him in the Command.—Convention of Cintra.—Its Expediency at that Juncture.—Views with which it was regarded in France by Napoleon.—Senseless Clamour in England on the Subject leads to a Court of Inquiry.—Its Result.—Disgraceful Revelations which are made at Lisbon of the Plunder by all Ranks in the French Army.—British Troops advance into Spain under Sir John Moore.—Deep Impression which these Events make on Napoleon.—His Preparations to meet the Danger.—Interview at Erfurth with Alexander.—Its secret Objects, and Tenour of the Conferences held there.—Conduct of Austria, and Negotiations with that Power and the Princes of the Rhenish Confederacy.—Napoleon's Return to Paris.—Great Levy of Men ordered by the French Government, and Preparations for the Contest.—Forces on both Sides on the Ebro.—Positions and Strength of the English Army.—Napoleon joins the French Army.—Attack on Blake, and his Defeat, at Reynosa and Espinosa.—Battle of Burgos, and Defeat of the Spanish Centre.—Battle of Tudela, and Rout of their Left.—Disorderly and eccentric Retreat of their Troops from the Ebro.—Rapid and concentrated Advance of the French.—Forcing of the Somo-Sierra Pass.—Capture of the Retiro, and prodigious Agitation in Madrid.—Fall of that Capital.—Bold Advance of Sir John Moore to Sahagun on the French Line of Communication.—It instantly paralyzes their farther Advance towards the South.—Rapid March of Napoleon with an overwhelming Force towards the English Troops.—They retreat on the Line of Galicia.—Napoleon returns to Paris.—Gallant Actions of Light Cavalry, and Capture of Lefebvre Desnoettes.—Sir John Moore retires to Lugo.—Offers Battle there, which is declined.—Continues the Retreat to Corunna.—Extreme Severity of the Weather, and Hardships the Troops underwent in the Retreat.—Arrival at Corunna of the Troops and the Transports from Vigo Bay.—Battle of Corunna, and Death of Sir John Moore.—Embarcation of the Troops, and their Return to England.—Extreme Gloom and Despondency which these Events produce in the British Isles.—Reflections on the Campaign.—Its checkered Result, but, on the whole, eminently unfavourable to France.—Reflections on the Effect of Sir John Moore's Movement, and its Consequences on the Issue of the Campaign, and on the Character of the British Soldiers, as now evinced in their first serious Continental Campaign.

THE Spanish Peninsula, in which a frightful war was now commencing, and where the armies of France and England at last found

Memorable events of which the Spanish Peninsula has been the theatre.

a permanent theatre of combat, has been distinguished, from the earliest times, by memorable achievements, and is illustrated by the exploits of the greatest captains who have ever left the impress of their actions on the course of human events. The mighty genius of Hannibal there began its career, and under the walls of Saguntum gave the earliest token of that vast capacity which was soon to shake to its foundation the enduring fabric of Roman power; Scipio Africanus there first revived the almost desperate fortunes of the Republic, and matured those talents which were destined, on a distant shore, to overthrow the fortunes of the inveterate enemy of his country; the talents of Pompey, the genius of Caesar, were exerted on its plains, a severer struggle than that of Pharsalia awaited the founder of the empire on the shores of the Ebro; the desperate contest between Christianity and Mohammedanism raged for centuries amid its mountains, and from their rocks the wave of Mussulman conquest was first permanently repelled. Nor has the Peninsula been the theatre, in modern times, of less memorable exploits: the standards of Charlemagne have waved in its passes; the bugles of Roncesvalles have resounded through the world; the chivalry of the Black Prince, the skill of Gonzalvo, of Cordova, have been displayed in its defence; the genius of Napoleon, the firmness of Wellington, have been exerted on its plains; and, like their great predecessors in the wars of Rome and Carthage, these two illustrious chiefs rolled the chariot of victory over its surface, and, missing each other, severally conquered every other opponent till their mutual renown filled the world, and Europe, in breathless suspense, awaited their conflict on the shore of a distant land.

Uniform and singular character of their guerilla warfare.

From the earliest times the inhabitants of the Peninsula have been distinguished by a peculiarity of military character and mode of conducting war which is very remarkable. Inferior to many other nations in the firmness and discipline with which they withstand the shock of battle, they are superior to them all in the readiness with which they rally after defeat, and the invincible tenacity with which they maintain a contest under circumstances of disaster, when any other people would succumb in despair. In vain are their armies defeated and dispersed, are their fortresses taken, their plains overrun, their capital subdued; singly, or in small bodies, they renew the conflict; they rally and reunite as rapidly as they disperse; the numerous mountain chains which intersect their country afford a refuge for their broken bands; their cities make a desperate though insulated defence; and from the wreck of all regular or organized opposition emerges the redoubtable GUERRILLA warfare. "*Prælio victi Carthaginenses*," says Livy, "in ultimam Hispaniæ oram, ad oceanum, compulsi erant, disparem autem; quod Hispania, non quam Italia modo, sed quam ulla pars terrarum bello reparando aptior erat, locorum, hominumque ingeniis. Gens nata instaurandis, reparandisque bellis, brevi replevit exercitum animosque ad tentandum de integro certa-

men fecit."^{*} It is a singular fact, strikingly illustrative of the durable influence of common descent and physical circumstances on national character, through all the varieties of time, religion, and political condition, that the system of warfare thus deemed peculiar to Spain, of all nations in the world, in the days of Scipio and Sertorius, has continued to distinguish its inhabitants, without any interruption, to the present time; that it was pursued without intermission, for eight hundred years, in their wars with the Moors, formed the leading characteristic of the struggle with Napoleon, and continues, at this hour, to be the leading feature of the savage contest between the aristocratic and Democratic parties which has, for so many years, bathed the Peninsula in blood.

Durable characteristics of this kind attaching for ages to a nation, though its inhabitants have in the course of time become the mixed progeny of many different races of mankind, will invariably be found to arise from some peculiarity in its physical circumstances which has imprinted a lasting impress on all its successive inhabitants. This is in an especial manner the case with Spain and Portugal. Their territory differs in many important particulars from any in Europe. Physically considered, it belongs as much to Africa as Europe: the same burning sun parches the mountains and dries up the valleys of both; no forests clothe their sides; naked they present their arid fronts to the shivering blasts of the north and the scorching rays of a tropical sun. Vegetation, in general, spreads in proportion only as irrigation can be obtained; aided by that powerful auxiliary, the steepest mountain sides of Catalonia and Arragon are cut into terraces and clothed with the most luxuriant vegetation: without it, vast plains, in Leon and the Castiles, are almost entirely destitute both of cultivation and inhabitants. So extensive, in consequence, are the desert tracts of Spain, that the country, viewed from the summit of any of the numerous mountain ridges with which its inland provinces are intersected, in general exhibits only a confused group of barren elevated plains and lofty naked peaks, intersected, here and there, by a few glittering streams flowing in deep valleys, on the margins of which alone are to be seen crops and flocks, and the traces of human habitation. The whole country may be considered as a vast mountainous promontory, which stretches from the Pyrenees to the southward, between the Atlantic and Mediterranean Sea. On the shores of the ridge, to the east and west, are plains of admirable fertility, which, at no distant period, have been submerged by the waves of the sea; but in the interior an elevated assemblage of mountain ridges and lofty desert plains is to be found, in the centre of which Madrid is placed, in an upland basin, at a height of eighteen hundred feet above the level of the sea. The great rivers, in consequence, flow, for the most part, to the east and west in long courses, and are fed by tributary streams which meander at the bottom of ravines of surprising depth, shut in often by precipitous banks or very steep declivities. Three great chaussées only, viz., those

Physical conformation of the country which has led to these effects.

^{*} Liv., xxviii.; c. 13, xxiv., c. 42.

leading from Madrid to Bayonne, by the Somo-Sierra pass, that to Valencia, and that to Barcelona, intersect this great desert central region; in every other quarter the roads are little better than mountain paths, uniting together towns built for the most part on the summit of hills, surrounded by walls environed by superb olive woods, but having little intercourse either with each other or the rest of Europe.*

It may readily be imagined what extraordinary advantages a country of such natural strength and character must afford to insulated and defensive warfare.

In almost every quarter it is intersected by long, rocky, and almost inaccessible mountain chains, which form a barrier between province and province almost as complete, not merely to hostile armies, but even the inhabitants of the country, as that interposed by the Alps or the Pyrenees. Branching out from the great chain which separates France from Spain, one vast mountain ridge runs to the westward, forming in its course the Alpine nests and inaccessible retreats of Asturias and Galicia; while another, stretching to the eastward, covers, with its various ramifications, nearly the whole of Catalonia, and encloses in its bosom the admirable industry and persevering efforts of its hardy cultivators. In the interior of the ridges which descend from the crest of the Pyrenees to the long vale of the Ebro, are formed the beautiful and umbrageous valleys of Navarre and Biscay, where, in mountain fastnesses and amid chestnut forests, liberty has for six hundred years diffused its blessings, and the prodigy has been exhibited of independent privileges and Democratic equality having been preserved untouched, with all their attendant security and general comfort, amid an otherwise despotic monarchy. Beyond the Ebro, one great mountain range, stretching across from the frontiers of Catalonia to the neighbourhood of Lisbon, forms the almost impassable barrier between the valleys of the Tagus and the Douro, and the provinces of Old and New Castile, Leon, and Estremadura: its western extremity has been immortalized in history; it contains the ridge of Busaco, and terminates in the rocks of Torres-Vedras. Another, taking its rise from the high grounds which form the western limit of the plain of Valencia, extends, in a southwesterly direction, to Cape St. Vincent in the south of Portugal, and separates in its course the outlines of the Tagus and Guadiana; a third, also reaching in the same direction across the whole country, forms the boundary between the valleys of the Guadiana and the Guadalquivir, under the name of the Sierra-Morena, divides the province of New Castile from that of Andalusia, and has been immortalized by the wanderings of the hero of Cervantes; while a fourth, detached by itself in the southern extremity of the Peninsula, forms the romantic mountains of Ronda, whose summits, wrapped in perpetual snow, withstand the genial sun which ripens oranges and citrons, and all the productions of Africa on their sides. Two great and rich alluvial plains alone are to be found in Spain, the character of whose inhabitants differs from that

of all the rest of the Peninsula: in the first of which, amid water-melons, luxuriant harvests, and all the richest gifts of nature, the castanets and evening dances of the Valencians recall the unforeseeing gayety of tropical regions; while in the second, the indolent habits, fiery character, and impetuous disposition of the Andalusians, attest, amid myrtle thickets, the perfume of orange groves, and the charms of a delicious climate, the undecaying influence of Moorish blood and Arabian descent.*

Spain has never been remarkable for the number or opulence of its towns: Madrid, Cadiz, Valencia, Barcelona, and Bilbao, the largest of which, after the capital, does not contain above eighty thousand inhabitants, alone deserve the name of cities.† But it has in every age been distinguished, beyond any other country recorded in history, by the unconquerable resolution with which their inhabitants have defended their walls, even under circumstances when more prudent courage would have abandoned the contest in despair. The heart of every classical scholar has thrilled at the fate of Numantia, Saguntum, and Astapa, whose heroic defenders preferred perishing with their wives and children in the flames to surrendering to the hated dominion of the stranger; and the same character has descended to their descendants in modern times.‡ With invincible resolution Barcelona held out for its rights and privileges, after Europe had adjusted its strife at Utrecht, and England with perfidious policy had abandoned her Peninsular allies to the arms of their enemies; the double siege of Saragossa, the heroic defence of Gerona, the obstinate stand at Roses, have put the warriors of Northern Europe to the blush for the facility with which they surrendered fortresses to the invader, incomparably stronger and better provided with arms and garrison; while Cadiz alone of all European towns successfully resisted the utmost efforts of the spoiler, and after a fruitless siege of two years saw the arms even of Napoleon roll back.

The peculiar political constitution of the Spanish monarchy, and the revolutions which its inhabitants have undergone in the course of ages, have been as favourable to the maintenance of a defensive and isolated internal, as they were prejudicial to the prosecution of a vigorous external warfare by its government. Formed by the amalgamation at various times of many different nations of separate descent, habits, and religion, it has never yet attained the vigour and

* Malte Brun, *Art. Espagne*. Humboldt, *Geog. de l'Espagne*, in Laborde, i., 170, 175. Lord Caernarvon's Spain, ii., 234, 270.

† Madrid contained, in 1808, 190,000 inhabitants.—*Edin. Gazetteer*, *Art. Madrid*.

‡ Locum in foro destinant, quo pretiosissima rerum suarum congerent, super eum cumulum, conjuges ac liberos considere quum jussissent, ligna circa exstrunt, fascesque virgultorum conjungunt. Foedior alia in urbe trucidatio erat, quum turbam feminarum puerorumque inbellem inermemque cives sui cederent, et in succensum rogi seminaniam pleraque injicerent corpora, rivique sanguinis flammam orientem restingerent; postremo ipsi cede miseranda suorum fatigati cum armis medio se incendio iniecerunt.—*LIV.*, xxviii., c. 22, 23. Numantia and Saguntum have become household words over the world, but the heroism of ASTAPA here narrated has not received the fame it deserves

* Suchet's Mem., i., 42, 49. Nap., i., 52, 53. Laborde's Spain, i., 163, 169, introd.
VOL. III.—F

unity of a homogeneous monarchy. Its inhabitants are severed from each other, not only by desert ridges or rocky sierras, but by original separation of race and inveterate present animosity. The descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the Spanish soil are there mingled with the children of the Goth, the Vandal, and the Roman; with the faithlessness of Moorish, or the fire of Arabian descent. These different and hostile races have never thoroughly amalgamated with each other; for many centuries they maintained separate and independent governments, and kept up prolonged and bloody warfare with each other; and when at length they all yielded to the arms and the fortune of Ferdinand and Isabella, the central government neither acquired the popular infusion nor the inherent energy which is necessary to mould out of such discordant materials a vigorous state. The example of Great Britain, where the various and hostile races of the Britons, the Saxons, the Danes, Scots, and Normans have been at length blended into one united and powerful monarchy, proves that such an amalgamation is possible; that of Ireland, where the Saxon and the Gael are still in fierce and ruinous hostility with each other, that it is one of the most difficult of political problems. Without the freedom of the English Constitution, which unites them by the powerful bond of experienced benefits and participated power, or the crushing vigour of the Russian despotism, which holds them close in the bands of rising conquest, it is hardly possible to give to such a mixed race the vigour of homogeneous descent. In Spain this had never been attempted: the Arragonese were jealous of the Catalonians; the Castilians despised the Valencians; the Galicians even were at variance with the Asturians; and the freeborn mountaineers of Navarre and Biscay had their local antipathies; while all the inhabitants of the north regarded as an inferior race the natives of Grenada and Andalusia, where Moorish conquest had degraded the character, and Moorish blood contaminated the descent of the people; and where, amid orange groves, evening serenades, and bewitching forms, the whole manly virtues were thought to be fast wearing out under the enervating influence of an African sun.

Effect of these circumstances in promoting the means of internal and separate defence.

But while these circumstances were destructive to the external vigour and consideration of the Spanish monarchy, they were, of all others, those best calculated to enable its inhabitants, when deprived of their central government and left to their own guidance, to oppose a formidable resistance to the invader. When deprived of the directions of their sovereign, the provinces of Spain did not feel themselves powerless, nor did they lose hope because it was abandoned by those who were their natural protectors. Society, when resolved into its pristine elements, still found wherewithal to combat; the provinces, when loosened or severed from each other, separately maintained the contest. Electing juntas of government, and enrolling forces on their own account, they looked as little beyond their own limits as the Swiss peasants in former times did beyond the mountain ridges which formed the barriers of their happy val-

leys. If this singular oblivion of external events and concentration of all their energies on local concerns was destructive in the end to any combined plan of operations, and effectually prevented the national strength from being hurled, in organized and concentrated masses, against the enemy, it was eminently favourable, in the first instance, to the efforts of tumultuary resistance, and led to the assumption of arms, and the continuance of the conflict under circumstances when a well-informed central government would probably have resigned it in despair. Defeats in one quarter did not lead to submission in another; the occupation of the capital, the fortresses, the military lines of communication, was not decisive of the fate of the country; as many victories required to be gained as there were cities to be captured or provinces subdued, and like the Anglo-Saxons, in the days of the English heptarchy, they fought resolutely in their separate districts, and rose up again in arms when the invader had passed on to fresh theatres of conquest.

The nobility in Spain, as in all countries where civilization and wealth have long existed, and the salutary check of popular control has not developed their energy and restrained their corruption, were sunk in the lowest state of selfish degradation. Assembled for the most part in the capital, devoted to the frivolities of fashion, or the vices of a court; taught to look for the means of elevation, not in the energy of a virtuous, but the intrigues of a corrupted life, they were alike unfit for civil or military exertion, and alone of all the nation must, with a few brilliant exceptions, be considered as strangers to the glories of the Peninsular war. Not more than three or four of the higher grandes were in the army when the war broke out in 1808; and the inferior noblesse, almost all destitute alike of education, vigour, or active habits, took hardly any share in its prosecution. The original evil of entails had spread to a greater extent, and produced more pernicious consequences, in Spain than in any other country of Europe; a few great families engrossed more than half the landed property of the kingdom, which was effectually tied up from alienation, and of course remained in a very indifferent state of cultivation; while the domains of the cities, or corporate bodies, held in mortmain, were so extensive, and for the most part uncultivated, that a large portion of the arable land in the kingdom was in a state of nature.*

Notwithstanding these unfavourable circumstances, the elements of great political activity and energetic national conduct existed in the Peninsula.

State of the peasantry.

The peasantry were everywhere an athletic, sober, enduring race; hardy from exercise, abstemious from habit, capable of undergoing incredible fatigue, and of subsisting on fare which to an Englishman would appear absolute starvation. The officers in the Spanish armies during the war, drawn from the ill-educated urban classes, were, for the most part, a most conceited, ignorant, and inefficient body; but the men were almost always excellent, and pos-

* Foy, iii., 151, 152. Jovellanos, 164. Laborde, i., 197, 212.

essed, not only the moral spirit, but the physical qualities calculated to become the basis of an admirable army. Colonel Napier has recorded his opinion that the Catalonian miquelets or smugglers formed the finest materials for light troops in the world, and the Valencian and Andalusian levies presented a physical appearance greatly exceeding that of both the French and English regular armies. The cause of this remarkable peculiarity is to be found in the independent spirit and general well-being of the peasantry. Notwithstanding all the internal defects of their government and institutions, the shepherds and cultivators of the soil enjoyed a most remarkable degree of prosperity: their dress, their houses, their habits of life, demonstrated the long-established comfort which had for ages prevailed among them; vast tracts, particularly in the mountainous regions of the North, were the property of the cultivators, a state of things of all others the most favourable to social happiness, when accompanied with a tolerable degree of mildness in the practical administration of government; and even in those districts where they were merely tenants of the nobility, the cities, or the Church, their condition demonstrated that they were permitted to retain an ample share of the fruits of their toil.*†

But the peasantry, hardy and undaunted as they were, would have been unable to have combined in any effective league for their common defence, destitute as they, for the most part, were of any support from their natural leaders the owners of the soil, if it had not been for the weight and influence of a body which, in every age, has borne a leading part in the contests of the Peninsula. This was the Church, the lasting and inveterate enemy in every country of revolutionary innovation. The ecclesiastics in Spain were very numerous, amounting, according to the census taken in 1787, to 22,480 parish priests, and 47,710 regular clergy belonging to monasteries or other public religious establishments.† The influence

The Church. Its usefulness, character, and influence on the people.

* Lord Caernarvon's Spain, ii., 234, 360. Bourgoigne's Espagne, i., 267; ii., 384.

† The general comfort of the Spanish peasantry, especially in the northern and mountainous provinces, is easily explained by the number of them who were owners of the soil, coupled with the vigour and efficacy of the provincial immunities and privileges which, in Catalonia, Navarre, the Basque Provinces, Asturias, Arragon, and Galicia, effectually restrained the power of the executive, and gave to the inhabitants of those districts the practical enjoyment of almost complete personal freedom. So extensive were their privileges, so little did government venture to disregard them, that in many cases they were to be rather considered as Democratic commonwealths, inserted into that extraordinary assemblage of separate states which formed the Spanish monarchy, than subjects of a despotic government. The classification of the population was as follows, which speaks volumes as to the condition of the people and the causes of their prolonged resistance to the French invasion:

Total inhabitants	10,409,879
“ of whom were families engaged in agriculture	872,000
“ Owners of the soil they cultivated	360,000
“ Farmers holding under landlords	502,000
“ Ecclesiastical proprietors	6,216
“ Mendicant friars	43,149
“ Cities, towns, and villages	25,463
“ of whom are free cities or burghs	12,071
“ “ subject to a feudal superior	9,466
“ “ “ to an ecclesiastical superior	3,926

—See HARD., x., 173, 174.

‡ Laborde, iv., 194.

of this great body was immense. Independent of their spiritual ascendancy in a country more strongly attached than any in Europe to the Romish Church, they possessed, as temporal proprietors, an unbounded sway over their flocks. As in all other countries, it had long been felt that the Church was the best and most indulgent landlord; the ecclesiastical estates, which were very numerous and extensive, were much better cultivated in general than any in the hands of lay proprietors; and the tenantry held their possessions under them for such moderate rents, and by so secure a tenure, that they had long enjoyed almost the advantages and consideration of actual landholders. Nor was this all: the charity and beneficence of the monks had set on foot, in every part of the country, extensive institutions, through which, more than any others by which they could be affected, the distresses of the poor had been relieved. They partook in a great degree of the character of the *hospice*, particularly in the northern provinces. To the peasant they often served as banking establishments, where none other existed in the province, and as such essentially contributed to agricultural improvement. The friars acted as schoolmasters, advocates, physicians, and apothecaries. Besides feeding and clothing the poor, and visiting the sick, they afforded spiritual consolation. They were considerate landlords and indulgent masters; peacemakers in domestic broils, a prop of support in family misfortune; they provided periodical amusements and festivities for the peasants; advanced them funds if assailed with misfortune; furnished them with seed if their harvest had failed. Most of the convents had *fundaciones* or endowments for professors who taught rhetoric and philosophy, besides keeping schools open for the use of the poor; they also supplied parochial ministers when wanted, and their preachers were considered the best in Spain. Superficial or free-thinking travellers, observing that the aged, the sick, and the destitute were always to be found in numbers round the convent gates, supposed that they created the suffering which they were so instrumental in relieving, and, in consequence, that the Church was chargeable with the augmentation of pauperism; forgetting that the poor ever will be assembled together round those establishments where their sufferings are relieved; and that to represent such beneficent institutions as the cause of this distress, is just as absurd as it would be to decry fever hospitals because their wards are generally filled with typhus patients, or poor laws in Ireland because a large proportion of its *two millions* of present destitute inhabitants will hereafter infallibly be found in the neighbourhood of the workhouses where parochial relief is about to be dealt out.*

It is observed with surprise by General Foy, that in every age the king, the Church, and the people have combined together in Spain: an alliance utterly inexplicable on the principles of the French Revolutionary school, but susceptible of an easy solution when the benefits which the ecclesiastical bodies conferred both

Its great influence in the Spanish contest.

* Walton's Revolutions of Spain, ii., 374, 376.

on the crown, in standing between it and the encroachments of the nobility, and the peasantry, in averting from them the evils of poverty, are taken into consideration. The whole course of events during the Peninsular war demonstrated that this influence was established on the most durable foundations; everywhere the parish priests were the chief promoters of the insurrection; it was their powerful voice which roused the people to resistance; and many of the most renowned leaders of the desultory bands who maintained the contest when the regular forces were destroyed, came from the ecclesiastical ranks. The clergy, both regular and parochial, early perceived the total destruction of their interests which would ensue from the triumph of the French invasion; they recollected the decrees of the convention against the clergy, and the horrors of the war in La Vendée; and though Napoleon had to a certain extent restored the altar, yet they were well aware that even his powerful hand had been able to do this only in a very ineffectual manner; that religion was tolerated in France, not re-established; and that the indigent curés, who drew a wretched pittance yearly from the public treasury to the north of the Pyrenees, were very different, both in consideration and influence, from the dignified clergy in possession of their own estates, who formerly constituted so important a part of the French monarchy. It was this body, possessed of such influence, and animated with such feelings, who in Spain proved the real leaders of the people; who, in the absence of the government, the nobility, and the army, boldly threw themselves into the breach; and, organizing out of the strength and affections of the peasantry the means of prolonged resistance, rendered the Peninsula the charnel-house of the French armies, and the grave of Revolutionary power.

Most of all, Spain was still a virgin soil. Her people were not exhausted by revolutionary passions; they had not learned by bitter experience the vanity of all attempts to regenerate mankind by any other means than the improvement of their moral and religious principles. Though the monarchy was gray in years, the nobility corrupt and selfish, the government feeble and incapable, the nation as a whole was still untainted; the debility of the Bourbon reign had passed over the state without either weakening the force of popular passion or destroying the fountains of public virtue. The peasants in the mountains, the shepherds in the plains, still inherited, in unmixed descent, the blood of the Cid and Palajo; still were animated by the spirit which sustained the conflict of seven centuries with the Moorish invader. They were free from that last and worst cause of national corruption, which springs from the people having been themselves admitted to a share of power, participating in its passions, feeling its sweets, profiting by its corruptions; they were exempt from that despair and apathy which results from the experienced impossibility, by changing the class which governs, of eradicating either the vices of the governors or the sufferings of the governed. Hence an intermixture in the Peninsular Revolutionary war of passions the most opposite, and usually ranged in

fierce hostility against each other; and hence the long duration and unexampled obstinacy with which it was conducted. While the rural population, at the voice of their pastors, everywhere took up arms, and rushed with inconsiderate zeal into the conflict, to combat under the banners of the cross for their salvation, the indolent urban multitudes were roused not less by temporal ambition to league their forces under the national colours: the dissolution of government, the resolution of society into its pristine elements, had generally thrown political power and the immediate direction of affairs into their hands; revolutionary passion, Democratic ambition, were called into activity by the very necessity which had everywhere thrown the people upon their own resources; the provincial juntas, chosen in the chief towns, soon became so many centres of revolutionary action and popular intrigue; and thus the two most powerful passions which can agitate the human heart, religious enthusiasm and Democratic ambition, usually seen in opposite ranks, and destined to fierce collision in that very realm in future times, were for a season, by the pressure of common danger, brought to unite cordially with each other.

Such was the country which thereafter became the grand theatre of the contest between France and England, and such the eminently favourable battle-field which the unbounded ambition of the French emperor at length afforded to the British arms. They now descended to the conflict on the popular side; they went forth to combat, not merely for the real interests, but the present desires of the people. The forces, indeed, which the contending parties could bring into this great arena were, to appearance at least, very unequal, and even the most sanguine could not contemplate without alarm the enormous preponderance which weighed down the scale on the side of the Emperor Napoleon. He had 600,000 French soldiers, including seventy thousand horse, and at least a hundred and fifty thousand of the allied states at his disposal; but the magnitude of this force, great as it was, constituted the least part of its formidable character.* It was the quality, experience, and spirit of his soldiers which was the real source of their strength. They stood forth to the conflict, strong in the experience of fifteen years of warfare, terrible from the recollection of a hundred victories. The halo of glory which surrounded, the prestige of victory which preceded them, was more difficult to withstand than either the charges of their cuirassiers or the ravages of their artillery. It fascinated and subdued the minds of men; spread universally that belief of their invincibility which was the surest means of real-

Composition and character of the French army at this period.

* The numbers were as follows, all paid by the French government:

Infantry of the line	380,000	And numbers.
Cavalry	70,000	
Swiss, Germans, Hanoverian, and Irish, in French pay	32,000	
Artillery and engineers	46,000	
Gendarmerie, coast guards, veterans.	92,000	
	620,000	

Besides the forces of the Confederation of the Rhine, Italy, Naples, Holland, and the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, at least 150,000 disposable more.—See Fox, i., 52, 53

izing it; paralyzed alike the statesman who arrayed nations and the generals who marshalled armies for the combat; and spread even in the bravest hearts the dispiriting belief that the contest was hopeless, and that to sink honourably was all that remained to gallant soldiers. This feeling especially prevailed at this juncture, after the hopes of Europe, strongly elevated by the strife of Eylau, had been dashed to the earth by the wreck of Friedland, and the reserve of Christendom, on whom so many eyes had been turned in breathless anxiety,* had abandoned the conflict as one apparently striving against the decrees of fate.

Nor was the actual efficiency of this immense army inferior to its imaginative terrors. Though the wars of Germany and Poland had made frightful chasms in the ranks of the veteran soldiers, yet the officers and non-commissioned officers, the bones and sinews of the army, possessed the immense advantage of tried merit and long experience. Such had been the consumption of human life during the late campaigns, that every conscript who survived a few years was sure of becoming an officer; and while this certainty of promotion to the few survivors kept alive the military spirit of the whole population, it ensured for the direction of the army the inappreciable basis of tried valour and experienced skill. Every military man knows that, if the officers and non-commissioned officers are experienced and brave, it is no difficult matter, even out of the most unpromising materials, to form an effective army; the examples of the Portuguese and Hindoos, under British, and the northern Italians, under French officers, were not required to establish a fact illustrated by the experience of every age from the days of the Romans. This advantage appeared not merely in the field of battle: desperate valour, fortunate accident, can sometimes here supply the wants of experience and organization; but in the long run, in undergoing the fatigues of a campaign, in discharging its multifarious duties, and facing its varied difficulties, the superiority of veteran armies, or even new levies incorporated with a veteran frame, soon becomes conspicuous. The Spaniards never were a match for the French, either in the field of battle or the conduct of a campaign; and although the native courage of the English, even in the outset, uniformly gave them the advantage in pitched battles, yet it was long before they became at all equal to their opponents in the general conduct of a campaign. In marching, throwing up fieldworks, enduring famine, conducting sieges, cooking their victuals, procuring provisions, preserving their spirit during retreat, and abstaining when necessary from intoxication, the English soldiers were for long and painfully inferior to their enemies; and it augments our admiration for the illustrious chief and his able lieutenants who ultimately led them to victory under such disadvantages, that they were compelled, not only to lead, but in a manner to educate their troops in presence of the enemy; and that it was while struggling to maintain their ground against superior bands of a veteran foe, that they im-

bibed in many respects even the rudiments of the military art.*

The English army, however, at this period was far from being in the inefficient state, either with respect to discipline or experience, which was generally supposed on the Continent; and the French government, which judged from recent events, and were ignorant of the vast efforts in the military department which had been made since the commencement of the war, were equally mistaken as to the force and capacity of the regular forces, and the extent to which a warlike spirit had imbued the nation. The British army, in the spring of 1808, consisted of no less than one hundred and eighty thousand men, of whom twenty-six thousand were cavalry, besides nearly eighty thousand of the militia, equal in discipline and equipment to the troops of the line, though not bound to serve beyond the British isles, and two hundred and ninety thousand volunteers, of whom twenty-five thousand were cavalry, in a very considerable state of efficiency.† Great part of this immense force, without doubt, was absorbed in the defence of the numerous and extensive colonies which formed part of the British dominions; but the official returns proved that a hundred thousand men, including twenty thousand cavalry, were disposable in the British isles; and in a minute made out by the Duke of York it was proved that, “in 1808, sixty thousand men could have been provided for the campaign in Spain without detriment to any other service.” Of this force it is not going too far to say, that it was all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; and that not only was it equal in a pitched battle to any force of similar amount which could be brought against it, but, if all assembled, was adequate to the encounter of the largest army ever yet collected in a single field under the standards of Napoleon! †

But it was not so much from underrating the numerical strength as mistaking the spirit which animated the British army, and the degree of interest which its exploits excited in the country, that the French government was led to regard too lightly the chances of success which it possessed in a Continental struggle. With all his information and sagacity, Napoleon here fell into the usual error of judging of the present by the past. The English soldiers had achieved so little during the war, that it was generally supposed they were incapable of doing anything; their navy

Admirable spirit with which it was animated and regarded by the people.

* Foy, i., 80, 81. Jom., ii., 36. Hard., x., 157, 158.

† The numbers were, in July, 1807

	Militia.	Volunteers.	
Infantry	156,561	254,544	
Cavalry	26,315	25,342	The amount of its various branches.
	77,996	9,420	
	<u>182,876</u>		289,306
In all,	Regulars	182,867	
	Militia.	77,990	
	Volunteers	289,306	
	In arms	550,163	

Of this force of regulars, 81,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry were at home in the British isles, and of course disposable. In the muster-rolls of the English army, sabres and bayonets are alone estimated, which is otherwise in the French and Continental services: a peculiarity which made the real strength of the English regular army about 200,000 men.—*Parl. Deb.*, ix., iii., *App.*

† *Parl. Returns*, July, 1607. *Parl. Deb.*, ix., 3d *App.*, and *Napier*, i., 81, *App.*, and *Foy*, i., 210.

* Foy, i., 52, 53.

had done so much, that it was taken for granted the whole interest and pride of the nation was centred on its triumphs. In the interim, however, the general arming of the people, the excitement produced by the threats of invasion, the profound interest kept alive by the Continental war, the triumphs of Maida and Alexandria, had awakened a most extraordinary degree of military ardour, and diffused no inconsiderable amount of military information throughout the people. The warlike establishments which pervaded the country were admirably calculated to foster this growing enthusiasm, and turn it to the best account in augmenting the numbers and increasing the spirits of the regular army. The militia served as an invaluable nursery for the line; the volunteers, changed soon after into local militia, corresponding very nearly to the German *landwehr*, provided a never-failing supply of recruits tolerably instructed in the rudiments of discipline for the militia. Numbers of young men of all ranks, caught by the animation, the idleness, or the dress of the soldiers, embraced the military profession; thenceforward to the end of the war there was no difficulty whatever experienced in finding adequate supplies of recruits for the army, and filling up all the fearful chasms which war and disease made in its ranks. Thus, while the French were deluded with the idea that the English were altogether contemptible at land, they had already made great progress in the formation of a powerful army, and while they were talking about sea-wolves and maritime skill, the spirit was engendered destined to produce the triumphs of Vittoria and Waterloo!*

The vast improvements effected by the Duke of York in the discipline and or-
Character and qualities of the ganization of the army, and the im-
British soldiers. proved military education which the younger officers had now for some years received, had at the same period afforded increased advantages for the successful display of that physical strength and undaunted moral resolution which, in every age, has formed the great characteristic of the British soldiers. This invaluable quality gave them a very great advantage: it is the true basis of a powerful army. Skill, experience, discipline, can be superadded by practice, or acquired by exercise; but if this one moral quality be wanting, all such acquisitions will prove of little avail. How inferior soever to their antagonists in experience, or that skill in the varied duties of a campaign which actual service alone can give, the English soldiers, from the very first, had the animating conviction that they were their equals, possibly their superiors, in actual combat; and that all the advantages of their veteran opponents would be at an end if once they engaged in a regular battle. And so it proved, even from the outset; and it is inconceivable how soon this one quality of *dogged resolution in the field* came to neutralize all the superiority of acquired skill and veteran discipline. The military is essentially a practical art; its wants and necessities are soon brought home by actual experience and suffering to an army in the field. If it possesses the resolution to fight and the discipline to obey, a very short time will

supply the rest; there is no education so rapid and effectual as that which takes place in presence of an enemy. Of various natural and acquired excellence, it is hard to say whether, in the Peninsular war, the British or French soldiers, after a few years, were the most admirable. In the service of light troops; in undergoing with cheerfulness the fatigues of a campaign; in dexterity at making themselves comfortable under privation; in rapidity of firing, care of their horses by the cavalry, and enthusiastic gallantry at the first onset, the French troops for a long period had the advantage: but when the hostile lines actually met, and the national resolution was fairly put to the test, the British soldiers, from the very beginning, successfully asserted their superiority. Splendid in appearance, overflowing with strength, irresistible in a single charge, their cavalry could hardly be said to be equal, at least for general service or the protracted fatigues of a campaign, to that of Napoleon; a remarkable circumstance, when the great attention bestowed on horses in England is taken into consideration: but their artillery, superior to any in the world in the admirable equipment of the guns and ammunition train, was second to none in the coolness and practice of the gunners; and in the steadiness and precision of their fire, the constancy which they displayed under danger, their calmness in anger, and the terrible vehemence of their charge with the bayonet, the British infantry was, beyond all question, the first in Europe.*†

In one important particular the English army was founded upon an entirely different principle from the French. In the latter, the officers formed in no degree a separate class from the soldiers; the equality which was the object of universal desire at the outset of the Revolution, and the conscription, which reached indiscriminately all ranks in its later stages, forbade alike any such line of demarcation; and not only had all the marshals and generals in the service originally entered on the military career in the ranks, but to such as survived the rapid consumption of life in the imperial wars promotion was still certain, from the humblest station to the highest grades in the army. In the former, again, a line, in practice almost impassable, separated the private soldier from the officer; they were drawn from different classes in society, accustomed to different habits, instructed by a different education, actuated by different desires. To the French conscript, glory, promotion, the prospect of ultimate greatness, were the chief stimulants to exertion: in the English army, though the influence of such desires was strongly felt by the officers, yet the efforts of the common men were chiefly excited by a different set of motives; and a sense of military duty, the wish to win the respect of his comrades, an instinctive principle of courage, an anxious desire to uphold the renown of his regiment, a firm determination to defend the cause of Old England, and an undoubting faith in the superiority of

Important effect of their officers being exclusively taken from the higher ranks.

* Foy, i., 226, 227.

† "Le soldat Anglais," says General Foy, "possède la qualité la plus précieuse dans la guerre, le calme dans la colère."—Foy, i., 227

* Foy, i., 210, 212, 220, 221. Hard., x., 158, 159.

its arms, constituted the real springs of military exertion. The great majority of the English soldiers felt no desire to be made officers; to become sergeants and corporals was, indeed, a very general and deserved object of ambition to the meritorious privates, because that elevated them in, without taking them out of, their own sphere in life; but they felt that they would be uncomfortable in the daily society of the commissioned officers, their superiors in birth, habits, and acquirements; and though many in the course of the war, from the force of extraordinary merit, broke through these restraints, and some discharged in the most exemplary manner the duties of the most elevated ranks, who had originally borne a musket on their shoulders, yet in general the situation of privates who had risen to the officers' mess was not so comfortable as to render the change an object of general desire. It may appear paradoxical to assert, but it is, nevertheless, strictly true, that this feeling of the propriety of each class striving to become respectable in itself, without seeking to overstep its limits, is the natural effect of long-established freedom and order; and is much more nearly allied to the genuine spirit of liberty than the feverish desire of individual elevation, which, throughout all its phases, was the mainspring of the French Revolution. Where each class is respectable and protected in itself, it feels its own importance, and often disdains to seek admission into that next in succession; the universal passion for individual exaltation is the offspring of a state of society where the rights and immunities of the humbler ranks have been habitually, by all persons in power, trampled under foot. The clearest proof of this is to be found in daily experience. The men who, throughout so many ages, have maintained the liberties of England, are not those who were striving perpetually to elevate themselves, by a sudden start, above their neighbours, but those who, by a life of unobtrusive, honest industry, rose to comfort or opulence in their own sphere without any desire to leave it; and the strength of the state at present is not to be found in the anxious aspirants after aristocratic favour, or the giddy candidates for fashionable distinction, but in the unheeded efforts of that more numerous but unobserved class which is too proud of its own rank to aspire to any beyond it.*

An iron discipline had given the military force, thus constituted, a degree of firmness and regularity unknown to any other service in Europe. The use of the lash was still frequent; and instances were not uncommon of soldiers, for inconsiderable offences, receiving 500, 800, and even 1000 stripes; but though the friends of humanity beheld with horror this barbarous infliction, so foreign to the spirit of the English Constitution, and disused in the French and several Continental armies, yet the experienced observer, who marked the class from which English recruits were almost exclusively drawn, and the impossibility of giving them the prospect of promotion, which operated so strongly on French conscripts, hesitated as to the practicability of

abolishing this painful but necessary correction; and regarded its disgrace as the price paid by the nation for the economy which denied to the soldiers such a pay as would secure for the ranks of its army a class to whom such inflictions might be unnecessary, or render expulsion from them a sufficient object of dread; and that constitution, which, by confining commissions in the military service to men of family and property, possessed of a permanent interest in the commonwealth, had obtained the best possible security against its force being applied to the destruction of the public liberties.* Better fed, clothed, lodged, and paid than any other in Europe, the English soldier had an attention devoted to his wants, both in health and sickness, and experienced an integrity in the administration of every department of the army, which could be attained only in a country where habits of freedom have long co-existed with those of order, and experience had pointed out the mode of effectually checking the abuses which invariably have a tendency to grow up in every branch of the public administration. Pensions, varying according to the period or the amount of service, secured for the veteran, the maimed, or the wounded, an adequate maintenance for the remainder of life. True, he fought, in the glowing language of Colonel Napier, in the cold shade of aristocracy; true, he could not boast that the rays of imperial favour would be attracted by the helmet of the cuirassier, or the bayonet of the grenadier; but he was sure, from good conduct, of obtaining that respect in his own sphere, and those substantial advantages which were adapted to his situation and his wishes; and experience has abundantly proved that the concentration of government support on those whose only title to power was military distinction, is a sure prelude to unbridled administration, and that, if the soldier would no longer fight in the cold shade of aristocracy, the citizen would pine in the hopeless frost of military despotism.*

* Duke of Wellington, *ut supra*.

† General Foy has left a graphic picture of the different habits of the English and French officers. General Foy's during a campaign in the Peninsular war, graphic contrast of the truth of which every one must, to a certain degree, be convinced. "Behold," French soldiers, says he, "the French battalions, when they arrive at their bivouacs after a long and painful march. No sooner have the drums ceased to beat, than the haversacks of the soldiers, disposed around the piles of arms, mark out the ground where they are to pass the night. They put off their coats: clothed only in their greatcoats, they run to collect provisions, water, and straw. The fires are lighted; the soup is soon prepared; trees brought from the adjoining woods are rudely carved into supports or beams for the huts. Quickly the simple barracks are raised: the air resounds with the sounds of the hatchet: while the soup is preparing, the young men, impatient of their idleness, clean their arms, arrange their knapsacks, clean their gaiters. The soup is soon ready; if wine is wanting, the conversation soon flags, and the noisy multitude is speedily buried in sleep. If, on the other hand, the generous fluid circulates, joyous looks follow the barrels as they are brought on men's backs into the centres of the rings; the veterans recount to the young conscripts the battles in which their regiment has acquired so much renown, and the universal transport when the emperor, mounted on his white charger and followed by his mameluke, suddenly appeared among them."

"Turn now to the English camp: you see the soldiers exhausted and motionless, reclining on the ground: are they waiting, like the Spahis in the Turkish camp, till the slaves prepare their victuals? No! they have made at leisure a very moderate march, and have reached at two in the afternoon the ground they are to occupy for the night."

* Duke of Wellington's Evidence on Military Punishment. Parl. Pro., June, 1836. Foy, i., 226, 227.

Severe discipline. Corporal punishments which still subsisted.

Nor was the inequality of force with which this great struggle was to be conducted so great in its progress as it appeared in the outset. Napoleon, indeed, commenced the contest with a hundred and fifteen thousand infantry and sixteen thousand horse in the Peninsula,* and the possession of all the most important strongholds which it contained; and the force permanently maintained over its surface, after the British troops landed, exceeded two hundred and fifty, and rose at times as high as three hundred and fifty thousand men; while there never were so many as fifty thousand British soldiers in the Peninsula, and the actual force under the stand-

Bread and meat are brought: the sergeant makes the distribution; he tells them where they will find water and straw, and where the trees which are to be felled will be found. When the logs arrive he shows where each is to be placed: he reprimands the unskilful, and stimulates the lazy. Where is the industrious, enterprising spirit of that nation which has outstripped all others in vigour and intelligence? Out of their own routine the soldiers can do nothing: if once the restraints of discipline are broken, excesses of every kind are indulged in, and intemperance prevails to an excess which would astonish the Cossacks themselves. Nevertheless, do not hazard an attack unless you are well assured of success; the English soldier is not brave at times merely; he is so whenever he has ate well, drank well, and slept well. Yet their courage, rather instinctive than acquired, has need of solid nutriment; and no thoughts of glory will ever make them forget that they are hungry, or that their shoes are worn out.*

“Nor is the difference less remarkable in the superior officers. While a French general of division is occupied, during the leisure moments of a campaign, in studying the topography of the country or the disposition of its inhabitants; in attending to the nourishment, drilling, or haranguing of his troops; in endeavouring to persuade the Spanish people to adopt the system of administration, or yield to the political conduct of his country—the English general opposed to him spends his time between the chase, riding on horseback, and the pleasures of the table. The first, alternately governor, engineer, commissary, has his mind continually on the stretch; his daily occupations lead to an enlargement of his mind, and a continual extension of his sphere of activity. The other, as indifferent to the localities of the country in which he makes war as to the language, disposition, or prejudices of its inhabitants, applies to the commissary to supply provisions; to the quartermaster-general for information concerning the country in which he is to act, and the marches he is to perform; to the adjutant-general for any other supplies of which he may stand in need. Unless when employed in a separate command, he seeks to narrow the sphere of his exertions and responsibility. He leads on his troops in battle with the most admirable courage, but in cantonments his habitual exertions are limited to superintending the police of his troops, seeing that their exercises are duly performed, and transmitting reports to his superiors.”—See Foy, i., 231, 235, 256, 257. Notwithstanding his admirable general candour, the French general appears, in this graphic description, to have been somewhat influenced by the prejudices of his country, though the outline of the sketch is undoubtedly correct. But the military is essentially a practical art; and notwithstanding all their riding and hunting, experience soon made the English generals as expert at all the really useful parts of their profession as the more inquisitive and instructed Frenchmen; and they are not the worst soldiers who, without disquieting themselves with the duties or designs of their superiors, are at all times ready with undaunted courage to carry them into effect.

* Viz.: in Spain:

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Dupont's corps.....	24,428	4056
Moncey's do.....	29,341	3860
Bessieres' do.....	19,096	1881
Duhamel's do.....	12,724	2033
Imperial Guard.....	6,412	3300

In Portugal:

Junot's corps.....	24,978	1771
--------------------	--------	------

116,979 16,901

Besides 44,374 infantry and 4685 cavalry, which arrived by the 1st of August, 1808, on the Ebro.—Foy, iv., Table 1. Appendix.

* Foy, i., 231, 233.

ards of Wellington seldom exceeded thirty, and was generally, for the first three years, not above twenty-five thousand English sabres and bayonets. Still this force formed the nucleus of an army which, with the addition of the Portuguese levies of equal amount, and disciplined and led by British officers, soon became extremely formidable. Its fortunate central position in Portugal, resting on what became, under the tutelary genius of Wellington, an impregnable intrenched position in front of Lisbon, afforded, to a commander of talent, a favourable opportunity of striking serious blows at the enemy before their dispersed forces could collect from different quarters: if they did so, the insurrection burst forth again in the provinces they had evacuated; if they remained long together, famine, in an inland country, so plentifully intersected by arid plains or desert ridges, soon paralyzed any considerable offensive operations. The truth of the old saying, “If you make war in Spain with a small army you are beaten, if with a large one starved,” was never more strongly evinced than in the Peninsular campaigns; and although Wellington frequently experienced this difficulty in the severest manner, when he advanced into the interior of the country, yet his army, in the general case, from the vicinity to the seacoast of Portugal, or the water-carriage of its principal rivers, was, in comparison, abundantly supplied with provisions; and though he was in general inferior in number to the enemy, sometimes to a very great degree, when he hazarded a battle, yet the discrepancy in this respect was never so great as the extraordinary difference in the sum total of the regular forces which the two nations had in the field might have led us to expect.*

The military establishment of Spain, when the contest commenced at the signal of the French cannon in the streets of Madrid, on the 2d of May, was far from being considerable. It consisted, in 1807, of 80,000 troops of the line, including 16,000 cavalry and 30,000 militia; but the ranks were far from being complete, and the total effective force, including the militia, was under a hundred thousand men. From this number were to be deducted sixteen thousand under Romana in Holstein, six thousand in Tuscany, or on the march thence to the north of Germany, and the garrisons of the Canary and Balearic isles; so that the troops that could be brought into the field did not at the utmost exceed seventy thousand, of whom twenty thousand were already partially concentrated in the Alentejo and Oporto, and the only considerable body of the remainder, about ten thousand strong, was in the lines of St. Roque, at Gibraltar. The composition of this force was still less formidable than its numerical amount. Enervated by a long Continental peace, the soldiers had lost much of the spirit and discipline of war; the men, enrolled, for the most part, by voluntary enlistment, and only in case of necessity, and in some of the provinces by conscription, were sober, active, and brave; but the officers were, in most instances, extremely deficient both in the knowledge and proper feelings of their profession. They were,

* Napier, i., 47. Foy, i., 204.

indeed, for the most part, composed of men of family, a certain proof of descent being necessary to obtaining commissions in two thirds of the military offices at the disposal of government; but the restriction afforded no security either for extended information or generous sentiments in a country where four hundred thousand *hidalgos*, too proud to work, too indolent to learn, loitered away an inglorious life, basking in the sun, or lounging in the billiard-rooms or coffee-houses of the great towns. From this ignorant and conceited class the great bulk of the officers of all ranks were taken; not more than three or four of the high nobility held situations in the army when the war broke out. Leading an indolent life in towns, sleeping half the day in uncomfortable barracks, associating indiscriminately with the common soldiers, many of whom were superior in birth and intelligence to themselves, and knowing no enjoyment but idleness, gallantry, and billiards, they were as deficient in the energy and vigour which the Revolution had developed in the French, as in the sentiments of honour and integrity which the habits of a monarchy, tempered by freedom, had nursed in the English army. It was easy to foresee that no reliance could be placed, in a protracted struggle, on this debilitated force; yet such is the importance of discipline and military organization, even in their most defective form, in warlike operations, that the only great success achieved in the field by the Spaniards during the whole war was owing to its exertions.*

Though Portugal had a population of somewhat above three millions, instead of the twelve millions which were contained in Spain, yet it possessed in itself the elements of a more efficient military force than its powerful neighbour. The invaluable institution of *ordenanzas*, or local militia, had survived the usurpation of Spain; and during twenty-seven campaigns which followed the restoration of the independence of the country in 1640, it had rendered more important services to the state than the regular army. By the Portuguese law, every person is legally obliged to join the battalions arrayed in defence of the country, from the age of eighteen to that of sixty years; these battalions consist of 250 men each, under the command of the chief landed proprietors of the district; and such is the native strength of a country so defended, that, with a very little aid from England, it enabled the Portuguese for two centuries to maintain their independence. The physical peculiarities of the country rendered it singularly well adapted for the active operations of an irregular force of this description. Intersected in many directions, but especially to the north of the Tagus, by lofty sierras, terminating in sharp, inaccessible cliffs, which rise, even in that favoured latitude, almost into the regions of eternal snow; destitute, for the most part, of roads, and such as do exist perpetually crossing rivers without bridges, or ravines affording the most favourable positions for a defensive army; covered with Moorish towers or castles perched on the summit of rocks, or villages in general surrounded with defensive walls, inhabited by a bold, active, and independent

peasantry, long habituated to the use of arms, and backed by impregnable mountain ridges washed by the sea, Portugal presented the most advantageous fulcrum which Europe could afford whereon to rest the military efforts of England. But these advantages were all dependant on the physical situation and natural character of the inhabitants, or the consequences of their former and more glorious epochs; for at the period when the Peninsular war broke out, no country could be in a more debilitated state, as far as concerns either political vigour or military efficiency. Corruption pervaded every department of the public service, and to such an extent as to be apparently irremediable; the army, ill fed, worse paid, and overrun by a swarm of titled locusts, who devoured the pay of the soldier for doing nothing, was both an unpopular and inefficient service. Forty thousand men, including eight thousand cavalry, of whom the troops of the line nominally consisted, might have furnished an excellent base whereon, with the addition of the militia and *ordenanzas*, to construct a powerful military establishment; but such were the abuses with which it was infested, and the ignorance of the officers in command, that hardly any reliance could be placed on this force; and it was not till they were recast in the mould of British integrity, and led by the intrepidity of British officers, that the Portuguese arms reappeared with their ancient lustre on the theatre of Europe.*

In the disposition of his forces when the contest commenced, Napoleon had principally in view to overawe and secure the metropolis, conceiving that Madrid was like Paris or Vienna, and that there was little chance of the country holding out for any length of time against the power in command of the capital. The Imperial Guards, with the corps of Monecy and Dupont, were assembled in that city or its immediate neighbourhood; and as this concentration of above fifty thousand men in the heart of the kingdom exposed the communication with the Pyrenees to danger, the emperor was indefatigable in his endeavours to form a powerful corps of reserve at Burgos and Vittoria, under Marshal Bessieres; and with such success were his efforts attended, that by the beginning of June this able officer had twenty-three thousand men under his standards. At the same period, the troops under Duhesme, in the fortresses of Barcelona and Figueras, in Catalonia, was above fifteen thousand men, sufficient, it was hoped, to overawe the discontented in that province. Thus, after making every allowance for the detachments necessary to maintain the capital and frontier fortresses, and keep up the communications, fifty thousand men, including eighty guns, were ready, in the north and centre of Spain, to commence offensive operations; a force amply sufficient, if concentrated, to crush any attempt at resistance which could have been made in the Peninsula. But the composition of these troops was very unequal; and though the Imperial Guard and some of the veteran divisions in the capital were in the finest state of discipline and efficiency, yet this

Military force
and physical
character of
Portugal.

Amount, quality,
and disposition
of the
French army
at this period
in Spain.

* Foy, ii., 216, 221. Nap., i., 46. Jom., ii., 52.

* Foy, ii., 1, 88. Napier, i., 87.

was by no means the case with the whole army; and though all partook of the admirable organization of the French service, yet the ranks were for the most part filled up with raw conscripts, hardly yet instructed in the rudiments of the military art. Had it not been for the excellence of the skeletons on which they were formed, and the officers by whom they were directed, the difference between them and the insurgent peasantry would not have been very considerable. They were very different from the soldiers of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland; the enormous consumption of life in those bloody campaigns had almost destroyed the incomparable army which, disciplined on the heights of Boulogne, had so long chained victory to the imperial eagles.*

Such was the situation of the French army when the insurrection at once broke out in every part of the Peninsula. It burst forth with such force and unanimity in all the provinces, that it could not have been more simultaneous if an electric shock had at once struck the whole population. With the intelligence of the commotion and massacre at Madrid, a convulsive throb ran through every fibre of Spain; the sense of their wrongs, the humiliation of their situation, the thirst for vengeance, burst at once upon the people, and one universal cry to arms was heard from one end of the kingdom to the other. Everywhere the peasantry met together in tumultuous crowds; from town to town, from village to village, from hamlet to hamlet, the news flew with incredible rapidity; and as the French troops, though in possession of the capital and frontier provinces, were by no means scattered over the country, the proceedings of the insurgents hardly anywhere met with molestation. The fever was universal: the young and the old, the feeble and the strong, the shepherds of the mountains and the cultivators of the plains, the citizens of the towns and the peasantry of the country, all joined in the general transport. Arms were quickly sent for and obtained from the nearest depôts in the district; officers and colonels of battalions elected; provisional juntas of government formed in the chief towns to direct the affairs of the provinces; and, in the absence of all central authority, local governments soon sprung up in every part of the kingdom. Spain awoke from the slumber of centuries, and started at once to her feet with the vigour and resolution of an armed man. Passing over, in disdain, the degradation or insignificance of the Bourbon dynasty, the people came forth fresh for the combat, glowing with the recollections of the Cid and Pelajo, and the long struggle with the Moors, and the heroic days of the monarchy. Nor was this extraordinary and unanimous burst of feeling lost in mere empty ebullition; resolving, with a facility peculiar to themselves, into the pristine elements of the monarchy, the different provinces, with unparalleled rapidity, formed separate and independent juntas of government, which early gave a systematic direction to their efforts, and effected the formation of numerous and enthusiastic

legions for their defence. It was easy to foresee how prejudicial to any combined or efficient general operations this unavoidable partition of the directing power into so many separate and independent assemblies must, in the end necessarily prove; but, in the first instance, it tended strongly to promote the progress of the insurrection, by establishing in every province a centre of insulated, detached, and often ill-advised, but still vigorous operations. Before the middle of June, numerous bodies were raised, armed, and to a certain degree disciplined, in all the provinces, and a hundred and fifty thousand men were ready to support the regular army. Even the presence of the French garrisons in the capital and the frontier fortresses could not repress the general effervescence. Almost all the regular soldiers in Madrid escaped, and joined the insurgent bands of New Castile; and even under the guns of their strong castles of Montjuic and St. Juan de Fernando, alarming symptoms of disaffection appeared in Barcelona and Figueras, and their Spanish garrisons almost all made their escape to the enemy.*

In the northern provinces, especially Catalonia, Asturias, Leon, and Galicia, the insurrection took place, and the provincial junta were established in a comparatively regular manner, without any of the usual frightful ebullitions of popular passion; but it was far otherwise in the cities of the south and east of Spain. The usual vehemence and intemperance of the unbridled populace of great towns was there increased by the fiery intermixture of Moorish blood. Frightful atrocities were committed. At Badajoz, the governor, who endeavoured to restrain the furious multitude which surrounded his house clamouring for arms, was dragged out and murdered: numbers were massacred, on the supposition of being agents or partisans of the French, at Carthagena, Granada, Carolina, Cadiz, and other places; and at Cadiz a fearful altercation took place between the governor, Solano, who refused to commence the hostilities which were required of him against the French squadron of five ships of the line, which had lain in the harbour since the battle of Trafalgar, and the ardent populace, who clamoured for an immediate attack. Independently of a secret leaning to the French interest, he naturally hesitated, as an officer of prudence and honour, at taking the decisive step of attacking, without any previous declaration of war or authority from the executive power, a squadron of an allied state which had taken refuge in Cadiz during the hostilities with Great Britain; and he openly expressed an apprehension that, during these dissensions, the English would break in and destroy the fleet of both contending parties. Finding that the popular effervescence was becoming too strong to be openly resisted, he endeavoured to temporize, called a council of war, and gave symptoms of submission to the public wish; but the populace, distrusting his sincerity, broke into his house, and chased him into the house of Mr. Strange, an English merchant, where he was discovered by a bloodthirsty set of assass-

* Napoleon's Notes, App. No. 3. Napier, vol. i. Thiebault, 64, 72. Napier, i., 47. Duhesme's Guerre en Catalogne, 17, 21.

* Tor., i., 173, 175. South., i., 335, 337. Duhesme, 11, 12. Foy, iv., 32, 33. Lond., i., 80, 81. Napier, i., 55.

sins, who dragged him from his place of concealment, notwithstanding the courageous efforts of Mrs. Strange to save his life, and massacred him while on the road towards the gallows. He met his fate with dignity and composure, bidding his heroic supporter, Mrs. Strange, farewell till eternity. Don Thomas Morla, the second in command, was next day nominated to the government of Cadiz by popular acclamation, and immediately entered on the duties of his important office.*

At Valencia, the first burst of popular indignation was accompanied with still more frightful atrocities. Three hundred French merchants or traders had long been established in that city, and when the insurrection broke out there in the end of May, they all, as a measure of precaution, took refuge in, or were sent to the citadel, where they were supposed to be safe from any violence that might arise. An ardent, resolute, and able Franciscan monk, Juan Rico, early acquired, by his powers of public speaking, the lead in the movement; but the junta elected for the government was composed, as in most other instances, of a mixture of persons of noble and plebeian origin. The people, however, early conceived a jealousy of their nobles, and to such a height did that feeling arrive, that the commander of the troops, Don Fernando Saavedra, was massacred before the eyes of

May 29. the Conde Cervellon, a nobleman of the popular side, to whose palace he had fled for safety. This deed of blood was but the prelude to still greater atrocities; and the popular appetite for slaughter being once aroused, the multitude fell, as usual in such circumstances, under the direction of the most worthless and sanguinary leaders. In Valencia there appeared at this period one of those infamous characters who degrade the human race by their cruel deeds, and who is worthy of a place in history beside Robespierre, Collot d'Herbois, and the other political fanatics whose atrocities have forever stained the annals of the French Revolution. P. Balthasar Calvo, a canon of Madrid, denounced the fugitives in the

June 1. citadel to the mob as being in correspondence with Murat for the purpose of betraying that stronghold to the French troops. As invariably ensues in such moments of excitement, strong assertions passed for proofs with the multitude, and no difficulty was experienced in finding persons to undertake the most sanguinary designs. A general massacre of the unfortunate French was resolved on, and its

June 5. execution fixed for the 5th of June. Mingling perfidiously with cruelty, Calvo, on the evening of that day, repaired to the citadel, and told the trembling victims, who already had conceived, from vague rumours, apprehensions of their fate, that their destruction was resolved on, and that their only remaining chance of safety was to avail themselves of the means of escape which, from an impulse of Christian charity, he had prepared for them. Trusting to these perfidious assurances, the unhappy victims agreed to his proposal, and two hundred of them set forth by the wicket

through the walls, which, according to his promise, was left open for them. No sooner had this flight begun, than Calvo, with a band of assassins, hastened to the spot, and spreading the cry that the French were escaping, so worked upon the passions of the populace assembled as to induce them to join his murderers, and they were all massacred on the spot. Wearied with slaughter, and yielding to the solicitations of some benevolent ecclesiastics, who earnestly besought them to desist, the assassins at length agreed to spare those who still survived in the citadel; but no sooner did Calvo hear of this returning feeling of humanity, than he hastened to the spot, and conducted the remaining prisoners outside the walls to a ruined tower called the Tour de Cuarte. There he spread a false report that papers had been found upon them, proving a design to deliver up the citadel to the French, and the mob, again infuriated, fell upon their victims, and despatched them without mercy. Above three hundred French citizens, wholly innocent of the misdeeds of their emperor, perished on that dreadful night; the junta were overawed; the magistrates of the city, elected by popular suffrage, powerless, as might have been expected, in repressing their excesses; and Calvo, drunk with blood, not only despatched his orders from the citadel during the whole massacre, like a sovereign prince, but in the morning was named a member of the junta, at the very moment that Rico was concerting measures for his apprehension, and took his seat, with his clothes yet drenched with gore, at the council-board of government! It affords some consolation to the friends of virtue to know that the triumph of this miscreant was not of long duration. Excited almost to insanity by his execrable success, he openly aspired to supreme power, and had already given orders for the apprehension of the other members of the government, when a sense of their common danger made them unite, like the Convention on the 9th Thermidor, against the tyrant. He was suddenly arrested and sent to Minorca, before the mob, who certainly would have rescued him and massacred the junta, were aware of his seizure. There he was strangled in prison, and the government, having regained their authority by this vigorous act, two hundred of his associates underwent the same fate: a severe but necessary deed of public justice, which at least rescued the nation generally from the disgrace of these atrocious deeds, and indicating a very different standard of public morality from that which prevailed in France during its Revolution, where not only were such crimes almost invariably committed with impunity, but their perpetrators elevated to the highest situations in the state.*†

* Tor., i., 236, 244. Foy, iii., 244, 247. South., i., 363, 370.

† Only one prisoner escaped this hideous massacre. Chance had selected for his murderer a man whom he had frequently relieved in prison; the wretch recognised his benefactor, and though he twice raised his dagger to strike him, yet twice a sense of pity arrested his uplifted arm, and at length he suffered him to escape, in the obscurity of the night, among the populace. An extraordinary instance of presence of mind occurred in the daughter of the Count de Cervellon. The people, distrustful of their leaders, had insisted that the mail from Madrid should be brought to the count, and the letters it contained publicly read: hardly was it opened when one from the *Auerda Real* was discov-

* South., i., 341, 356. Nell., i., 134, 143. Tor., i., 209, 214. Foy, i., 201, 208.

These deplorable disorders sufficiently demonstrated that even the best of causes could not obviate the dangers of popular insurrection, and that, unless the higher orders and holders of property early and courageously exert themselves to obtain its direction, a revolutionary movement, even when called forth by the national defence, speedily falls under the guidance of the most depraved of the people. But by adopting this prudent and patriotic course, the higher classes at Seville succeeded, not only in preserving their own city from servile atrocities, but acquired an ascendancy which was attended with the greatest public benefit, and gave their junta almost the general management of the affairs of Spain. There, as elsewhere in the South, the public effervescence began with murder, and the Count d'Aguila, one of the chief magistrates and most enlightened citizens, who became the innocent object of their suspicion, fell a victim to the ungovernable passions of the populace, who, when too late, lamented the irreparable crime they had committed. Speedily, however, the junta was elected; and, happily, though all ranks were represented, a preponderance of votes in the twenty-three members of which it was composed were in the hands of the nobility. The wisdom of the choice which had been made soon appeared in the measures which were adopted: immediately they despatched couriers to Cadiz and Algeiras to secure the co-operation of the naval and military forces who were there assembled; and by the aid of CASTANOS, the commander of the former, who was at the head of the troops before Gibraltar, in the camp of St. Roche, and who had already entered into communication with Sir Hugh Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress, the entire co-operation of the army was secured. A violent demagogue, named Tap-y-Nunez, who had acquired a great sway over the populace, and who required that the nobility should be expelled from the junta, was arrested and sent to Cadiz, and this necessary act of vigour confirmed the authority of the provisional government. At its head was Don Francisco Saavedra, who had formerly been minister of finance, and P. Gil de Sevilla, who had both been sufferers under Godoy's administration; and the combined prudence and energy of their measures formed a striking contrast to the conceit, declamation, and imbecility which, in many other quarters of the Peninsula, afterward rendered nugatory all the enthusiasm of the people. The regular troops were immediately directed towards the Sierra Morena to secure the passes; a general levy of all persons between the years of eighteen and forty-five was ordered; subsidiary juntas formed in all the towns of Andalusia, the great foundry of cannon at Seville, the only one in the south of Spain, put into full activity, and arms and clothing manufactured; war decla-

red in a formal manner against France, and a manifesto issued, which not only eloquently defended the national cause, but contained the most admirable instructions as to the mode of successfully combating the formidable enemy with whom they had to contend.* This declaration from so great a city, containing ninety thousand inhabitants, and possessing all the nobility of the south of Spain within its walls, was of the utmost consequence, and gave, both in reality and in the eyes of Europe, a degree of consistence to the insurrection which it could never otherwise have obtained.†

* Foy, iii, 201, 203. South., i., 342, 346. Tor., x., 204, 207, 215. Espanol., i., 13.

† In this proclamation, which may be considered as the national declaration of Spain against France, it was not less justly than eloquently observed, "The king, to whom we all swore allegiance with emotions of joy unprecedented in history, has been deceived from us; the fundamental laws of our monarchy have been trampled under foot; our property, customs, religion, laws, wives, and children are threatened with destruction; and a foreign power has done this; done it, too, not by force of arms, but by deceit and treachery; by converting the very persons who call themselves the heads of our government into instruments of these atrocious acts. It therefore became indispensable to break our shackles, and to demonstrate that noble courage with which, in all former ages, the Spanish people have defended their monarch, their laws, their honour, their religion. The people of Seville have assembled, and, through the medium of all their magistrates and constituted authorities, and the most respectable individuals of every rank, formed this supreme council of government. We accept the heroic trust; we swear to discharge it; and we reckon on the strength and energy of the whole nation. We have again proclaimed Ferdinand VII., again sworn allegiance to him; sworn to die in his defence: this was the signal of our union, and it will prove the forerunner of happiness and glory to Spain."

Proclamation of the junta of Seville against Napoleon.

"The abdication, extorted by such detestable artifices from Ferdinand, was void, from want of authority in him who made it. The monarchy was not his to bestow, nor is Spain composed of animals subject to the absolute control of their owners. His title to the throne was founded on his royal descent and the fundamental laws of the realm. His resignation is void, from the state of compulsion in which it was made, from the want of consent in the nation to whom it related, from the want of concurrence in the foreign princes, the next heirs in succession to the throne. The French emperor summoned a few deputies, devoted to himself, to deliberate in a foreign country, and surrounded by foreign bayonets, on the most sacred concerns of the nation; while he publicly declared a respectful letter, written to him by Ferdinand VII. when Prince of Asturias, was a criminal act, injurious to the rights of the sovereign! He has resorted to every other means to deceive us; he has distributed, with boundless profusion, libels to corrupt public opinion, in which, under the mask of respect for the laws and our holy religion, he covertly insults both. He assures us that the supreme pontiff sanctions his proceedings, while it is notorious that he has despoiled him of his dominions, and forced him to dismiss his cardinals, to prevent him from conducting the government of the Church according to its fundamental constitution. Every consideration calls on us to unite and frustrate views so atrocious. No revolution exists in Spain; our sole object is to defend all we hold most sacred against the invader who would treacherously despoil us of our religion, our monarchy, our laws. Let us, therefore, sacrifice everything in a cause so just; and if we are to lose all, let us lose it combating like brave men. Let all, therefore, unite: the wisest and ablest in refuting the falsehoods propagated by the enemy; the Church in imploring the assistance of the God of hosts; the young and active in marching against the enemy. The Almighty will vouchsafe his protection to so just a cause; Europe will applaud our efforts, and hasten to our assistance; Italy, Germany, the North, suffering under the despotism of France, will eagerly avail themselves of the example set by Spain to shake off the yoke, and recover their liberty, their laws, their independence, of which they have been robbed by that nation."

Special and prudent instructions were at the same time given for the conduct of the war. "All general actions are to be avoided as perfectly hopeless and highly dangerous: a war of partisans is what suits both our national character and physical circumstances. Each province should have its junta, its generals, its local government, but there

ered, to Murat, exultating himself from the share he had taken in the insurrection, and demanding troops. The courageous young lady, who was present, instantly seized the letter, and tore it in pieces in presence of the multitude, saying it related to her own private affairs; thereby saving the whole members of the junta from immediate death, though at the imminent hazard of her own life.—See SOUTHEY, i., 367, and TORENO, i., 234, 235.

Prudent instructions to their troops.

The first important blow struck at the French was delivered at Cadiz. The fleet there, consisting of five ships of the line and one frigate, early excited the jealousy of the inhabitants, to whom the French flag had become an object of perfect abhorrence; while Lord Collingwood, at the head of the English fleet, which lay off the harbour, effectually prevented their departure. To withdraw as far as possible from the danger, Rosilly, the French admiral, warped his ships in the Canal of Caracca to such a distance as to be beyond the reach both of the fire of the castles and the fleet; and at the same time endeavoured, by negotiating, to gain time for the arrival of the succours under Dupont, which he was aware were rapidly approaching through La Mancha and the Sierra Morena. Equally sensible, however, with his skilful opponent, of the importance of time in the operation, the Spanish general, Morla, insisted upon an immediate surrender, and constructed batteries in such places as to command the French ships even in their new stations. Lord Collingwood, who, with the English fleet in the bay, was an impatient spectator of those hostile preparations, offered the assistance of the British squadron to ensure the reduction of the enemy; but the offer was courteously declined, from a wish, no doubt, that England might have no ground for any claim to the prizes which were expected. At length, on the 9th of June, a sufficient number of guns being mounted, a heavy fire was opened upon the French ships, which, being in a situation where they could not make any reply, soon produced a sensible effect, and led to a negotiation which terminated June 14. in the unconditional surrender of the whole French fleet five days afterward. Thus was the last remnant of that proud armament, which was intended to convey the invincible legions of Napoleon to the British shores, finally reft from the arms of France, and that, too, by the forces of the very allies who were then ranged by their side for our subjugation.*

In the northern provinces the insurrection spread with much fewer circumstances of atrocity, but an almost equal degree of enthusiasm. Excepting Barcelona, Figueras, St. Sebastian, and a few other places where the French garrisons overawed the people, they everywhere rose in arms against their oppressors. A junta for the Asturias was formed before the end of May at Oviedo, the capital of Asturias, the first which was organized in Spain, and which thus gave to that province a second time the honour of having taken the lead in the deliverance of the Peninsula. The first step of this body was to despatch deputies to England, soliciting arms, am-

munition, and money, whose arrival produced an extraordinary impression, as will immediately be shown, in the British isles. The junta of Galicia, secure behind their almost inaccessible mountains, took the most vigorous measures to organize the insurrection, and May 29. not only arrayed all the regular soldiers of Ferrol and Corunna under its standard, but summoned the Spanish troops, ten thousand strong, to join them without delay: a summons which was immediately obeyed by the whole body, who set out for Galicia by the route of Traz oz Montes, and thus laid the foundation of a powerful force on the flank and rear of the invader's communications. A junta was formed at Llerida, which assumed the general direction of the affairs of Catalonia, and soon arrayed thirty thousand hardy mountaineers under the national colours, while, nothing daunted by the proximity of France, and the alarming vicinity of powerful French corps, the Arragonese proclaimed Ferdinand VII. at Saragossa; and, after choosing the young and gallant Palafox for their commander, who had attended Ferdinand to Bayonne, and escaped from that fortress, issued a proclamation, in which they declared their resolution, should the royal family be detained in captivity or destroyed by Napoleon, of exercising their right of election in favour of the Archduke Charles, as grandson of Charles III. and one of the imperial branch of the Spanish family.*

From the outset, Napoleon was fully impressed with the importance and danger of this contest, and in an especial manner alive to the vital consequence of preserving entire the communications of the army, which had been pushed forward into the very heart of the kingdom, with the French frontier. Murat, after the catastrophe of the 2d of May, had been taken ill and withdrawn from Madrid, and was on his route to take possession of the throne destined for him on the shores of Naples, and he had been succeeded in the general direction of affairs at Madrid by Savary. Napoleon, on his departure from Bayonne, spoke to him in such a way as sufficiently demonstrated his growing anxiety for the issue of the contest, as well as the sagacity with which he had already discerned in what way it was most likely to be brought to a successful issue.† Re-enforcements were poured into Spain with all possible expedition; Burgos, Vittoria, and all the principal towns along the great road to Madrid from Bayonne, were strongly occupied; General Dupont, with his whole corps, was moved from La Mancha towards the Sierra Morena and Andalusia.

* South., i., 337, 341, 372, 378. Foy, iii., 190, 192. Torr., i., 181, 195, 245, 250. Napier, i., 57.

† "The essential point," said he, "at this moment, is to occupy as many places as possible, in order to have the means of diffusing the principles which we wish to inculcate upon the people; but, to avoid the dangers of such a dispersion of force, you must be wise, moderate, and observe the strictest discipline. For God's sake, permit no pillage. I have heard nothing of the line which Castanos, who commands at the camp of St. Roche, will take; Murat has promised much on that head, but you know what reliance is to be placed on his assurances. Neglect nothing which can secure the rapidity and exactness of your communications; that is the cardinal point; and spare nothing which can secure you good information. Above all, take care to avoid any misfortune; its consequences would be incalculable."—SAVARY, iii., 247, 251.

* should be three generals-in-chief: one for Andalusia, Murcia, and Lower Estremadura; one for Galicia, Leon, the Castles, Asturia; one for Valencia, Arragon, Catalonia. France has never domineered over us, nor set foot with impunity in our territory. We have often mastered her, not by deceit, but force of arms; we have made her kings prisoners, and the nation tremble. We are the same Spaniards, and France, and Europe, and the world shall see we have not degenerated from our ancestors."—*Proclamation of the Junta of Seville, June 6, 1808.* SOUTHEY, i., 389, 393.

* Torr., i., 217, 218. Foy, iii., 213, 214. Collingwood, ii., 43.

lusia, in order to overawe Seville and Cordova, and, if possible, disengage the French squadron at Cadiz; and Marshal Moncey detached into Valencia, with instructions to put down, at all hazards, the violent and bloodthirsty revolution which had burst forth in that province.*

But while making every preparation for military operations, the French emperor, at the same time, actively pursued those civil changes at Bayonne to which, even more than the terror of his arms, he trusted for subjugating the minds of men in the Spanish Peninsula. The Assembly of Notables met at that fortress on

the 15th of June, agreeably to the summons which they had received, and they comprised the principal nobility and a large proportion of the leading characters in Spain. Having been selected by the junta of government at Madrid, without the form even of any election by the people, they were entirely in the French interest, and the mere creatures of the emperor's will. Their proceedings formed a singular and instructive contrast to the generous and fearless bursts of indignant hostility with which the resignations at Bayonne had been received by the middling and lower orders through the whole of Spain. Even before the

June 8. assembly had formally met, such of them as had arrived at Bayonne published an address to their countrymen, in which they indulged in the usual vein of flattery to the astonishing abilities and power of the august emperor, and strongly advised them to accept his brother for their sovereign.† The levees of Joseph were attended by all the chief grandees of Spain; every day appeared to add to the strength of the party who were inclined to support his elevation to the throne. All the principal counsellors of Ferdinand, Cevallos, Escoiquiz, and others, not only took the oath of allegiance to the new monarch, but petitioned to be allowed to retain their honours and employments under the new dynasty.‡ The Spanish corps in Holstein took

the oath of allegiance to Joseph, but under a reservation that his appointment was ratified by a free cortes, convened in June 17 Spain according to the fundamental customs of the monarchy. A proclamation was addressed by the new king, in which he June 10

accepted the cession of the crown of Spain made to him by his august brother, Napoleon I., and appointed Murat his lieutenant-general. The consent of Russia was already secured to all the changes in the Peninsula; and, in order to reconcile the other courts of Europe to them, an elaborate circular note was June 24

addressed to all their cabinets, in which it was announced that "the occupation of the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, the regeneration of these fine nations, the creation of the fleets at Cadiz and the Tagus, would be a mortal stroke to the power of England, and put the finishing hand to the triumph of the maritime system, in which all the Continental powers were so warmly interested." Finally, on the 15th of June, ninety-two deputies, out of one hundred and fifty summoned, assembled at Bayonne, and formally accepted the Constitution prepared for them by the Emperor Napoleon.*

By this constitution it was provided that the crown was to be vested in Joseph Constitution of Bayonne given by Napoleon to the Spaniards. and his heirs-male; whom failing, the emperor and his heirs-male; and in default of both, to the other

brothers of the imperial family, in their order of seniority, but under the condition that the crown was not to be united on the same head with another. The Legislature consisted of a Senate of 80 members, nominated by the king: a Cortes, consisting of 172 members, arranged in the following proportions and order: 25 archbishops and bishops, and 25 grandees on the first bench; 62 deputies of the provinces of Spain and the Indies; 30 of the principal towns; 15 of the merchants and manufacturers; and 15 of the arts and sciences. The first fifty, composing the peers, were appointed by the king, but could not be displaced by him; the second class were elected by the provinces and municipalities; the third was appointed by the king out of lists presented to him by the tribunals and chambers of commerce, and the universities. The deliberations of the Cortes were not to be public; none of their proceedings were to be published, under the penalties of high treason; the finances and expenditure were to be settled by them at one sitting for three years; the colonies were constantly to have a deputation of twenty-two persons at the seat of government to superintend their interests; all exclusive exemptions from taxation were abolished; entails permitted only to the amount of 20,000 piasters, and with the consent of the king; an alliance, offensive and defensive,

goodness and humanity, induce us to hope that, considering the need which these princes have of a continuation of their services in the situations which they respectively held under the old dynasty, the magnanimity of your august majesty will induce you to continue them in the enjoyments of the estates and offices which they formerly held. Assured thus of the continuance of the posts which they have hitherto enjoyed, they will ever prove faithful subjects to your majesty, and true Spaniards, ready to obey blindly even the smallest wish which your majesty may express."—Signed, SAN CARLOS, JUAN ESCOQUIZ, MARQUIS AVERLEB, and others, June 22, 1808. NELLETO, i., 250, 251.

* Thib., vi., 395, 401. South., i., 400, 409. Nell., ii., 214, 224, 226.

* Sav., iii., 247, 249. Nap., i., 59.

† "An irresistible sense of duty, an object as sacred as it is important, has made us quit our homes, and led us to the invincible emperor of the French. We admit it; the sight of his countrymen, glory, of his power, was fitted to dazzle us; but we arrived here already determined to address to him our reiterated supplications for the prosperity of a monarchy of which the fate is inseparably united with our own. But judge of our surprise when we were received by his imperial and royal majesty with a degree of kindness and humanity not less admirable than his power. He has no other desire but that of our preservation and happiness. If he gives us a sovereign to govern us, it is his august brother Joseph, whose virtues are the admiration of his subjects. If he is engaged in modifying and correcting our institutions, it is in order that we may live in peace and happiness. If he is desirous that our finances should receive a new organization, it is in order to render our navy and army powerful and formidable to our enemies. Spaniards! worthy of a better lot, avoid the terrible anarchy which threatens you. What benefit can you derive from the troubles fomented by malevolence or folly? Anarchy is the greatest curse which God can inflict upon mankind: during its reign, unbridled license sacks, destroys, burns everything; worthy citizens, men of property, are invariably the first victims, and an abyss of horror follows its triumphs."

—Proclamation of the grandees of Spain to their countrymen, dated Bayonne, June 8, 1808. NELLETO, ii., 214, No. 70.

‡ "The subscribers have given the strongest proofs of their fidelity to the former government; they deprecating letter of Escoiquiz and trust it will be considered as the surest Ferdinand's counsellors to Joseph. pledge of their sincerity of the oath which they now take of obedience to the new Constitution of their country, and fidelity to the King of Spain, Joseph I. The generosity of your Catholic majesty, your

'was concluded with France, and a promise held out of the establishment of the liberty of the press within two years after the commencement of the new Constitution.*

Everything was conducted by the junta of notables at Bayonne to the entire satisfaction of Napoleon. The grandees of Spain rivalled his own senate in graceful adulation of his achievements, in obsequious submission to his will. When the

Constitution was read to them, it was received with transport, and adopted by acclamation; thunders of applause shook the hall when the new king made his appearance in his royal robes; when he retired, two medals

July 7. were unanimously voted to record the memorable acts of Bayonne; and the assembly, in a body, hastened to the emperor to lay at his feet the homage of their gratitude for the unparalleled services which he had rendered to their country. There was in the flattery of the Spanish nobles a mixture of studied servility with Oriental grandiloquence, which was novel and agreeable to a sovereign who had exhausted all the arts of European adulation.†

July 9. Two days after, the new king set out for the capital of his dominions; he was accompanied as far as the frontier by his imperial brother in a splendid cortège of a hundred carriages, and crossed the Bidassoa amid the roar of artillery and all the pomp of more than regal

July 20. magnificence. On the 20th, Napoleon himself set out from Bayonne, having first given such instructions to Savary as he deemed sufficient to bring the insurrection, which had now broken out on all sides, to a successful issue; and returned by Pau, where he visited the birthplace of Henry IV., Bourdeaux, La Vendée, the mouth of the Loire, Nantes, and Tours, to St. Cloud, which he reached in the middle of August. Meanwhile, Fer-

Aug. 14. dinand VII., resigning himself to his chains, wrote to the emperor from Valençay, thanking him for his condescension, and requesting permission to meet him on his

July 26. route to lay his homage at his feet,‡

* See Constitution of Bayonne, Thib., vi., 402, 403, and Tor., i., 292, 295.

† "Sire!" said M. Azanza, the president of the notables, "the junta of Spain has accomplished the glorious task for which your majesty convened it in this city. It has accepted, with as much eagerness as freedom, the great charter, which fixes upon a sure foundation the happiness of Spain. Happily for our country, an overruling Providence has employed your irresistible hand to snatch it from the abyss into which it was about to be precipitated. It is well that it was irresistible; for an inexplicable blindness has caused those who ought most to rejoice at this benefit to misapprehend it. But all Spain, sire! will open its eyes. It will see that it required a total regeneration, and that from your majesty alone it could obtain it. Public evil was at its height; the agents of a feeble government devoured the public patrimony, or extended unceasingly the limits of arbitrary power; the finances were a chaos; the public debt an abyss; the period of total dissolution was approaching. To what other power but that of your imperial and royal majesty could it be reserved, not merely to arrest the evil, but entirely to remove it? Such are the wonders, sire, which you have wrought in a few days, and which fill the world with astonishment."—SOUTHEY, i., 436, 437.

‡ "My uncle and brother have been equally charmed with myself at the announcement of the arrival of your imperial and royal majesty at Pau, which brings us nearer your presence; and since, whatever route you choose, you must pass near this, we should regard it as a very great satisfaction if your imperial and royal majesty would per-

which was not granted; and Charles IV., after testifying his entire satisfaction with the palace, parks, and country around Compeigne, requested permission, on account of his health, to pass the winter in a warmer climate, which was graciously accorded, and July 5 and in the autumn he moved to Marseilles, Aug. 1. where he lingered out in ease and obscurity the remainder of his inglorious life.*

The ministry appointed by Joseph, before his departure from Bayonne, was mainly taken from the counsellors of the Prince of Asturias; and this selection, joined to their ready acceptance of their new dignities, throws a deep shade of doubt over

the fidelity with which they had served that unhappy prince during his brief but eventful possession of the throne. Don Luis de Urquijo was made secretary of state; Don Pedro Cevallos, minister for foreign affairs; Don Sebastian de Pinuela and Don Gonzalo O'Farrel, ministers of justice and at war; Don Miguel Azanza obtained the colonies, and Mazaredo the marine. Even Escociquiz wrote to Joseph, protesting his devotion to him, and declaring that he and the rest of Ferdinand's household "were willing to obey his will blindly, down to the minutest particulars." The

Duke del Infantado was appointed June 22, 1808. to the command of the Spanish, and the Prince of Castel-Franco to that of the Walloon Guards. Joseph entered Spain surrounded with the highest grandees and most illustrious titles of Spain. He reached Madrid on the 20th, having

July 20. lingered for several days at Burgos and Vittoria, and received there the oaths of allegiance from the Council of State, the Council of the Indies, and that of the finances. His reception in the capital was melancholy in the extreme; orders had been given that the houses of the inhabitants should be decked out to receive their new sovereign, but very few obeyed the injunction. A crowd assembled to see the brilliant cortège and splendid guards which accompanied the king, but no cheers or applauses were heard. Every countenance bore a mournful expression; hardly any ladies appeared at the windows, notwithstanding the passionate fondness of the Spanish women for such displays. The bells of all the churches rang together, but they resembled rather the dismal toll at the interment of the dead, than the merry chime which announces a joyful event to the living.†

To the honour of Spain and of human nature it must be stated, that in the midst of this humiliating scene of aristocratic baseness, some sparks of an independent spirit were elicited, and some men in high station asserted the ancient honour of the Spanish character. When the Duke del Infantado, at the head of the grandees

Honourable instances of resistance to the general torrent of adulation among the grandees in his favour.

mit us to meet you, and renew in person those homages of sincere attachment and respect which we all feel, if it is not inconvenient."—FERDINAND VII. to NAPOLEON, July 26, 1808; NELLERTO, ii., 262. Napoleon, however, declined the honour, and never saw Ferdinand or any of his family more.

* See the Letter in Nell., ii., 262. Thib., vi., 406, 408. Tor., i., 294, 295.

† Thib., vi., 427. Tor., i., 355. South., i., 482.

of the monarchy, delivered their address to the new sovereign, he concluded it with these words: "The laws of Spain do not permit us to go farther at present. We awaited the decision of the nation, which can alone authorize us to give a freer vent to our sentiments." No words can convey an idea of the anger of Napoleon at this unexpected reservation. Instantly approaching the duke, he said, "As you are a gentleman, you should conduct yourself as such; and instead of disputing here on the words of an oath, which you will doubtless violate as soon as you have an opportunity, you would do better to withdraw at once, put yourself at the head of your party, and combat there openly and honourably. But you may rest assured, that if you take an oath here, and afterward fail in its performance, before eight days you shall be shot." This violent apostrophe intimidated the duke; the address was corrected, and delivered as above-mentioned, by Azanza; but the duke retained his opinions, and ere'long appeared in the ranks of his country. The Council of Castile prefaced their address by the fulsome expression, "Your majesty is one of the principal branches of a family destined by Heaven to reign over mankind;" but they eluded, by alleging want of authority, the simple and unqualified taking of the oath of allegiance. Jovellanos, who had been liberated by the resignation of Charles IV. and the fall of Godoy from his long captivity in the dungeons of Minorca, was offered by Joseph the portfolio of the minister of the interior; but the lengthened sufferings of that incorruptible patriot, under an oppressive government, could not blind him to the injustice now attempted by his deliverers, and he declared his resolution to abide by the fortunes of his suffering countrymen rather than accept wealth and greatness from their oppressors.* The Bishop of Orense, when nominated as one of the junta to proceed to Bayonne by the regency of Madrid,† returned an answer declining the honour in such independent and elevated terms as must forever command the respect of the generous among mankind.‡

* "I am resolved," said he, in reply to the reiterated entreaties of Joseph and his ministers, "to decline the place in the administration which you offer me; and I am convinced that you will strive in vain to overcome the resistance, by means of exhortations, of a people so brave and resolute to recover their liberties. Even if the cause of my country were as desperate as you suppose it, it will never cease to be that of honour and loyalty, and which every good Spaniard should embrace at any hazard."—TORENO, i., 299.

† Tor., i., 281, 299, 413. *Pièces Just.*

‡ "Spain," said this courageous prelate, in his letter to the junta at Madrid, "now sees in the

French emperor the oppressor of its princes and its own tyrant; it feels itself enslaved, while it is told of its happiness; and these chains it owes even less to perjury than the presence of an army which it admitted to its strongholds when in terms of perfect amity. The nation is without a king, and knows not which way to turn. The abdication of its sovereign, and the appointment of Murat as lieutenant-general of the kingdom, all took place in France amid foreign armies, and under the eyes of an emperor who conceived he was bestowing prosperity on Spain by placing on her throne a prince of his own family. The supreme junta has against it a thousand rumours, besides its armed president and the troops which surround it; all which forbid its acts from being regarded as those of a free assembly. The same may be said of the councils and tribunals of justice. What a chaos of confusion, of misfortune to Spain! and will these misfortunes be avoided by an assembly held without the kingdom, convened in a situation where its deliberations

Future ages will find it difficult to credit the enthusiasm and transport with which the tidings of the insurrection in Spain were received in the British islands. The earliest accounts were brought by the Austrian deputies, who reached London in the first week of June; and their reports were speedily confirmed and extended by the accounts from Corunna, Cadiz, and Gibraltar. Never was public joy more universal. As the intelligence successively arrived of province after province having risen in indignant fury against the invader, and boldly hoisted the flag of defiance to his legions, the general rapture knew no bounds. It was evident now, even to the most ordinary capacity, that the Revolutionary ambition of France had brought it into violent collision with the patriotic and religious feelings of a high-spirited and virgin people. "Never," says Southey, "since the glorious morning of the French Revolution, before one bloody cloud had risen to overcast the deceitful promise of its beauty, had the heart of England been affected by so generous and universal a joy." All classes joined in it; all degrees of intellect were swept away by the flood. The aristocratic party, who had so long struggled, with almost hopeless constancy, against the ever-advancing wave of Revolutionary ambition, rejoiced that it had at last broke on a rugged shore; and that, in the insolence of apparently unbounded power, it had finally proceeded to such extremities as had roused the impassioned resistance of a gallant people. The lovers of freedom hailed the Peninsular contest as the commencement of the first real effort of THE PEOPLE in the war. Former contests had lain between cabinets and armies on the one side, and Democratic zeal, ripened into military prowess, on the other; but now the case was changed; it was no longer a struggle for the power of kings or the privileges of nobles; the energy of the multitude was roused into action, the spirit of liberty was enlisted in the cause; the mighty lever which had shaken all the thrones of Europe had now, by the imprudence of him who wielded it, fallen into the hands of the enemy; it would cast down the fabric of imperial, as it had done that of regal power. With honest zeal and fervent sympathy, the great body of the British people united heart and soul with the gallant nation who, with generous, perhaps imprudent enthusiasm, had rushed into the contest for their country's independence, and loudly called on the government to take their station by their side, and stake all upon the issue of so heart-stirring a conflict; while the few sagacious and well-informed observers, whom the general transport permitted to take a cool survey of the probable

Universal joy with which the news of the insurrection is received in England.

can never be regarded as free! And if to the tumultuous movements which menace the interior of the kingdom we add the pretensions and probable pretensions of princes and powers abroad, and the probable intervention of a foreign armed force in the contests of which the Peninsula will soon be the theatre, what can be imagined more frightful or more worthy of pity? Cannot the love and solicitude of the emperor find some other mode of manifesting itself than by such measures as will lead to its ruin rather than its cure?"—Answer of PEDRO, Bishop of ORENSE, to the junta of government at Madrid, which had named him as representative at Bayonne, May 29, 1808; TORENO, i., 413, 414; *Pièces Just.*

issue of the contest, observed with satisfaction that the ambition of the French emperor had at length offered a seagirt and mountainous region for a battle-field, where the numerical inferiority of the British armies would expose them to less disadvantage than in any other theatre of European warfare.*

The first notice taken of these animating events in the British Parliament was on the 15th of June, when the subject was introduced in a splendid speech by Mr. Sheridan, which merely embodied, in glowing language, the feelings which then, with unprecedented unanimity, agitated the British heart. "Never before," he exclaimed, "had so happy an opportunity existed for Great Britain to strike a bold stroke for the rescue of the world. Hitherto Bonaparte had run a victorious race, because he had contended with princes without dignity, ministers without wisdom, or people without patriotism; he had yet to learn what it was to combat a people who were animated with one spirit against him. Now was the time to stand up boldly and fairly for the deliverance of Europe; and if the ministry would co-operate effectually with the Spanish patriots, they should receive from him as cordial a support as if the man whom he most loved† were restored to life. Will not the animation of the Spanish mind be excited by the knowledge that their cause is espoused, not by the ministers merely, but the Parliament and people of England? If there be a disposition in Spain to resent the insults and injuries, too enormous to be described by language, which they have endured from the tyrant of the earth, will not that disposition be roused to the most sublime exertion by the assurance that their efforts will be cordially aided by a great and powerful nation? Never was anything so brave, so noble, so generous, as the conduct of the Spaniards; never was there a more important crisis than that which their patriotism has thus occasioned to the state of Europe. Instead of striking at the core of the evil, the administrations of this country have hitherto gone on nibbling merely at the rind; filching sugar islands, but neglecting all that was dignified and consonant to the real interests of the country. Now, therefore, is the moment to let the world know that we are resolved to stand up, firmly and fairly, for the salvation of Europe. Let us, then, co-operate with the Spaniards, but co-operate in an effectual and energetic way; and if we find that they are really resolved to engage heart and soul in the enterprise, advance with them in a magnanimous way, and with an undaunted step, for the liberation of mankind. Formerly, the contest in La Vendée afforded the fairest chance of effecting the deliverance of Europe; but that favourable chance was neglected by this country. What was then neglected was now looked up to with sanguine expectation; the only hope now was that Spair might prove another La Vendée. Above all, let us mix no little interests with this mighty contest; let us discard or forget British objects, and conduct the war on the great principles of generous support and active co-operation."‡

These generous sentiments, worthy of the real friends of freedom and the leaders of the liberal party in its last asylum, found a responsive echo in the members of administration. Mr. Secretary Canning replied: "His majesty's ministers see, with as deep and lively an interest as my right honourable friend, the noble struggle which the Spanish nation are now making to resist the unexampled atrocity of France, and preserve the independence of their country; and there exists the strongest disposition on the part of the British government to afford every practicable aid in a contest so magnanimous. In endeavouring to afford this aid, it will never occur to us to consider that a state of war exists between this country and Spain. Whenever any nation in Europe starts up with a determination to oppose a power which, whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is alike the common enemy of all other people, that nation, whatever its former relation may be, becomes *ipso facto* the ally of Great Britain. In directing the aid which may be required, government will be guided by three principles: to direct the united efforts of both countries against the common foe; to direct them in such a way as shall be most beneficial to our new ally, and to such objects as may be most conducive to British interest. But of these objects, the last will be out of all question compared with the other two. I mention British objects chiefly for the purpose of disclaiming them as any material part of the considerations which influence the British government. No interest can be so purely British as Spanish success; no conquest so advantageous to England as conquering from France the complete integrity of Spanish dominions in every quarter of the globe."§

This debate marks, in more ways than one, an important era in the war, and indicates a remarkable change in the sentiments with which it was regarded by a large portion of the liberal party in the British dominions. There were no longer any apologies for Napoleon or the principles of the Revolution; no deprecation of any attempt to resist the power of France, as in the earlier periods of the war. The eloquent declamations of Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine in favour of the great Republic—their sophistical excuses for the grasping ambition in which its fervour had terminated—had expired. Experience and suffering, danger and difficulty, had in a great degree subdued even political passion, the strongest feeling, save religious, which can agitate mankind. Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Windham, from the *opposition* benches, earnestly called on the government to engage deeply in the war; they loudly and justly condemned the selfish policy and Lilliputian expeditions of the aristocratic government in its earlier years, and demanded, in the name of public freedom, that England should at last take her appropriate place in the van of the conflict, and, disregarding all selfish or exclusively national objects, stand forth with all her might for the deliverance of mankind. In such sentiments, from such men, none but the vulgar and superficial could see any inconsistency with their former

* South., i., 443, 444. Ann. Reg., 1803, 193, 195.

† Mr. Fox. ‡ Parl. Deb., xi., 886, 889.

§ Parl. Deb., xi., 890, 891, 895.

opinions; whatever others might do, it was not to be supposed that the highest intellects and most generous hearts in the Empire were to gaze all day at the east in hopes of still seeing the sun there. Resistance to French despotism and invasion was not only not inconsistent with, but necessarily flowed from, the real principles of the ardent philanthropists who had formerly opposed the overshadowing what they then deemed the brilliant dawn of the French Revolution; but it had the appearance of change to the numerous class who judge by words instead of things, and are attached, not to abstract principles, but actual parties; and, therefore, the enunciation of such sentiments by any of the Whig leaders not only was an honourable instance of moral courage, but evinced a remarkable change in the general feeling of their party. Not less clearly was the disclamation of interested views or British objects by the ministerial chiefs an indication of the arrival of that period in the contest when the generous passions were at length aroused, and the fervent warmth of popular feeling had melted or overcome that frigid attention to interested objects which, not less than their tenacity and perseverance, is the uniform characteristic of aristocratic governments among mankind.

Animated by such powerful support, from the quarter where it was least expected, the English government made a most liberal provision for its prosecution. The supplies voted for the war-charges amounted to the enormous sum of £48,300,000, to meet which, ways and means, to the value of £48,400,000, were voted by Parliament; and the total income of the year 1808, including the ordinary and permanent revenue, was £86,780,000, and the expenditure £84,797,000. The loan was £10,102,000 for England, and £2,000,000 for Ireland, and the new taxes imposed were only £300,000; the chancellor of the Exchequer having adhered, in a great measure, to the system approved of by both sides of the House in the finance debates of the preceding year, of providing for the increased charges of the year and the interest of the loans, in part at least, by an impignoration, in time of peace, of the war-taxes. A subsidy of £1,100,000 was provided for the King of Sweden. But these sums, great as they are, convey no adequate idea of the expenditure of this eventful year; April 14. the budget was arranged in April, before the Spanish contest had arisen;* and for the vast expenses with which it was attended, and which, not having been foreseen, had not been provided for, there was no resource but a

* *Parl. Deb.*, xi., 14, 21, and *App. No. 1. Ann. Reg.*, 1808, 103, 105. *Marshall's Tables*, Statement No. 1.

† The budget was as follows:

War Income.	
Malt and pension duties	£3,000,000
Bank advances	3,500,000
Surplus of consolidated fund	4,226,876
Surplus income of 1807	2,253,111
War-taxes	20,000,000
Lottery	300,000
Exchequer bills	4,500,000
Do. for East India Company	1,500,000
Exchequer bills charged on 1809	1,161,100
Loan*	8,000,000
War income	£48,441,087

* It was afterward, by the vote of credit, extended to 10,100,000.

liberal issue of Exchequer bills, which fell as an oppressive burden upon future years.

The supplies of all sorts sent out during this year to the Spanish patriots, though in great part misapplied or wasted, were on a princely scale of liberality, and worthy of the exalted station which, by consent of all parties, England now took at the head of the alliance. In every province of the Peninsula juntas were established, and to all British envoys were sent, who made as minute inquiries into the wants and capabilities of the district as the circumstances would admit, and received ample powers from government to afford such aid, either in money, arms, clothing, or warlike stores, as they deemed expedient to demand. Supplies of all sorts were, in consequence of these requisitions, sent to Corunna, Santander, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Valencia, Malaga, and other places, with a profusion which astonished the inhabitants, and gave them at least ample means to fit themselves out for the contest in which they were engaged. It may readily be conceived that, amid the enthusiasm and animation of the insurgent provinces, and the universal transport with which the British envoys were received, abundance of room was afforded for misrepresentation or delusion; that the accounts transmitted to government must, in many cases, have been inaccurate; and that, amid the extraordinary profusion with which supplies of all sorts were poured into the country, there were many opportunities afforded to the native authorities of fraud or embezzlement, of which, amid the general confusion, they were not slow of availing themselves. In truth, lamentable experience afterward demonstrated that great part of these magnificent supplies was misapplied or neglected: the money being squandered or secreted, the stores sold or wast-

Immense extent of the supplies which were sent out to Spain from Great Britain.

Permanent Income, viz.:	
Customs	£7,462,380
Excise	17,896,145
Stamps	4,458,735
Land and assessed taxes	7,073,530
Postoffice	1,277,538
Pension tax	62,685
Do.	71,353
Hackney coaches	26,455
Hawkers and pedlars	10,325
Total permanent	£38,339,146
Add war	48,441,087
Grand total	£86,780,233

War Expenditure.	
Navy	£17,496,047
Army	19,439,189
Ordnance	4,534,571
Miscellaneous	1,750,000
East India Company	1,500,000
Swedish subsidy	1,100,000
Vote of credit	2,500,000
War expenditure	£48,319,807

Permanent Expenditure, viz.:	
Interest of public debt	£20,771,871
And charges	210,549
Sinking Fund	10,188,606
Interest of Exchequer bills	1,616,562
Civil lists	1,638,677
Civil government of Scotland	85,470
Miscellaneous charges	787,262
Total permanent	35,298,997
Add war	48,319,807
Grand total	£83,618,804

The increased expenditure arising from the Spanish war, which was not foreseen in the budget, raised the charges to £84,797,000.—See *Parl. Deb.*, xi., 1-15; *Parl. Papers and Ann. Reg.*, 1808, 103-105.

ed, the arms piled and forgotten in magazines, when the patriots in the field were in want of the most necessary part of military equipment. Still, with all these evils, inseparable, probably, from the condition of a country thus driven into a dreadful contest in the absence of any regular government, and unavoidably thrown under the direction of local and recently-elected authorities, alike destitute of the knowledge, unacquainted with the arrangements, and relieved from the responsibility requisite for the faithful discharge of official duty, the prodigal bounty of England was attended with the most important effects upon the progress of the strife. It removed at once the imputation of cautious and prudential policy which the incessant declamations of the French writers, during the former periods of the war, joined to the feeble temporizing measures of preceding cabinets, had so strongly affixed to the British name: it demonstrated the sincerity and energy of a cabinet which thus, with unprecedented profusion, spread abroad in every quarter the means of resistance, and inspired boundless confidence in the resources of a power which, great at all times, seemed capable of gigantic expansion at the decisive moment, and appeared rather to have increased than diminished from a contest of fifteen years' duration.*†

No sooner was Napoleon made aware, by the general progress and formidable character of the insurrection, that a serious contest awaited him, than he set about, with all his usual caution and ability, preparing the means of overcoming its difficulties. Bessières received orders to put Burgos into a state of defence, to detach Lefebvre Desnouettes, with five thousand foot and eight hundred horse, against Saragossa, and to move his main body so as to overawe the insurgents in Biscay, Asturias, and Old Castile. A re-enforcement of nine thousand men was prepared for Duhesme in Catalonia, which, it was hoped, would enable him to make head against the enemy in that quarter; a reserve was organized, under General Drouet, on the Pyrenean frontier of Navarre, which, besides nourishing Bessières with continual additions of force, established five thousand men in the openings of the valleys towards the castle of Jaca, which was in pos-

session of the enemy; another reserve was established in Perpignan, and detachments were stationed in the eastern passes of the mountains. The communications and rear being thus adequately provided for, Marshal Moncey was directed, with part of his corps, to move upon Cuença, so as to prevent any communication between the patriots of Valencia and Saragossa, and subsequently threaten the former city, while Dupont, with two divisions of his corps, ten thousand strong, received orders to proceed across the Sierra Morena towards Cordova and Seville, the remainder of his corps and that of Moncey being stationed in reserve in La Mancha to keep up the communications of the divisions pushed forward, and be in readiness, if necessary, to support either which might require assistance. With so much foresight and caution did this great commander distribute his forces, even against an insurgent peasantry, and an enemy at that period deemed wholly unable to withstand the shock of his veteran legions.‡

The first military operations of any importance were those of Marshal Bessières in Biscay and Old Castile. That able officer was at Burgos, with twelve thousand men, when the insurrection broke out with great violence in all directions

Successful operations of Bessières and Frere in Old Castile and Leon against the insurgents.

around him; and he received advices that a body of five thousand armed men had got possession of the important dépôt of artillery at Segovia, and another assemblage of equal force was arming itself from the royal manufactory of arms at Palencia, while General Cuesta, the captain-general of the province, with a few regiments of regular troops and a strong body of undisciplined peasantry, had taken post at Cabeçon on the Pisuerga. These positions appeared to Savary, who was now the chief in command at Madrid, so alarming, that he detached General Frere with his division, forming part of Dupont's corps, in all haste to Segovia, where he routed the peasantry, and made himself master of all the artillery they had taken from the arsenal, amounting to thirty pieces. Meanwhile, Bessières divided his disposable force into several moveable columns, which, issuing from Burgos as a centre, traversed the country in all directions, everywhere defeating and disarming the insurgents, and reinstating the French authorities whom they had dispossessed. One of these divisions, under Verdier, routed the enemy at Logrono, and, with inhuman and unjustifiable cruelty, put all their leaders to death; another, under Lasalle, broke the armed peasantry at Torquemada, burned the town, pursued them with merciless severity, and entered Palencia on the day following; while a third, under Merle, uniting with Lasalle, made straight for Cuesta at Cabeçon, who accepted battle, but was speedily overthrown, and his whole new levies dispersed, with the loss of all their artillery, and several thousand muskets, which were thrown away in the pursuit. By these successes the whole level country in the upper part of the valley of the Douro was overawed and reduced to sub-

* Tor., i., 301, 307. Ann. Reg., 1808, 194. Hard., x., 491, 193, 236. Lond., i., 102.

† The following is a statement of the sums of money and warlike stores sent by Great Britain to the Peninsula, from the beginning of the contest in June, 1808, to the commencement of 1809:

Subsidies in money,	Infantry accoutrements.....	39,000
£3,100,000	Tents.....	40,000
Pieces of cannon.....	98	
Cannon balls.....	31,000	Field equipages..... 10,000
Mortars.....	38	Ells of linen.....113,000
Mortar charges.....	7,200	Cloth.....125,000
Cartronades.....	80	Cotton.....82,000
Muskets.....	200,177	Cloaks.....50,000
Carabines.....	220	Coats and trousers.....92,000
Sabres.....	61,300	Shirts.....35,000
Pikes.....	79,000	Cotton pieces.....22,000
Cartridges.....	23,477,000	Pairs of shoes.....96,000
Lead balls.....	6,000,000	Soles of shoes.....15,000
Barrels of powder.....	15,400	Canteens.....50,000
Haversacks.....	24,000	Hats and bonnets.....16,000
Cartridge-boxes.....	240,000	

—See *Parl. Pap.*, and *HARD.*, x., 492. *Pièces Just.*

In addition to these immense national supplies, private subscriptions were entered into in the chief towns of the empire, and large sums collected and remitted from the British islands to the Spanish patriots.—*Annual Register*, 1808, 195.

* Napoleon's Orders. Napier, i., App. No. 2. Ibid., i., 60. Foy, iii., 265, 268.

mission. Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and all the principal towns which had revolted, were compelled to send deputies to take the oath of allegiance to Joseph; and the terrible French dragoons, dispersing through the smaller towns and villages, diffused such universal consternation, that all the flat country in this quarter submitted to King Joseph and the French; requisitions and taxes were levied without difficulty throughout the whole remainder of the campaign. General Merle, continuing his success, marched northward against the province of Santander in Asturias, forced the rugged passes of Lantuerio and Venta d'Escudo, and descending the northern side of the ridge of Santander, in concert with a portion of the reserve, which the emperor despatched to his assistance, made themselves masters of that town, and forced the intrepid bishop, with his warlike followers, to take refuge in the inaccessible fastnesses of the neighbouring mountains.*

While Leon and Castile were the theatre of these early and important successes, the province of Arragon, though almost entirely destitute of regular forces, was successful, after sustaining several bloody reverses, in maintaining a more prolonged resistance to the enemy. By indefatigable exertions, Palafox and the energetic junta of Saragossa had succeeded in arming and communicating the rudiments of discipline to a tumultuous assembly of ten thousand infantry and two hundred horse, with which, and eight pieces of artillery, his brother,

the Marquis Lazan, ventured to march out of the city and await Lefebvre in a favourable position behind the Huecha. But, though the French were not more than half the number of the enemy, they were, from the want of discipline in their opponents, and their own great superiority in cavalry, much more than a match for them. The peasants withstood, without flinching, several attacks in front; but a vigorous charge in flank threw them into disorder, and a gallant attack by the Polish lancers completed their rout. Notwithstanding this defeat, the Arragonese who had escaped, having received re-enforcements, again

stood firm on the following day at Galur, still nearer Saragossa, and were again overthrown. Upon this, Palafox himself marched out of the capital, at the head of five thousand undisciplined burghers and peasants, and moved to re-enforce the wreck of the former army at Alagon: an advantageous position, four leagues from the capital of the province, on the banks of the Jalon, near its confluence with the Ebro,

where the whole took post. But the undisciplined crowd, discouraged by the preceding defeats, was now in no condition to make head against the French legions. The burghers, at the first sight of the enemy, broke and fled; and though Palafox, with a few pieces of artillery and three companies of regular troops, contrived for long to defend the entrance of the town, they, too, were at last compelled to yield, and retire in disorder into SARAGOSSA, and the French troops appeared before the heroic city. In the first tumult of alarm

the gates were feebly defended, and a battalion of French penetrated by the Corso as far as Santa Engracia; but, being unsupported, it was compelled to retire, and the inhabitants, elated with this trifling advantage, crowded to the walls and prepared seriously for their defence.*

Saragossa, which has now, like Numantia and Saguntum, become immortal in the rolls of fame, is situated on the right bank of the Ebro, in the midst of a fertile plain abounding in olive groves, vineyards, gardens, and all the marks of long-continued civilization. It contained at that period 55,000 inhabitants, though the sword and pestilence consequent on the two memorable sieges which it underwent have since considerably reduced its numbers. The immediate vicinity is flat, and in some places marshy; on the southern or right bank of the river it is bounded by the little course of the Huerba, the bed of which has been converted into a canal, while on the northern, the clearer stream of the Gallego, descending from the Pyrenean summits, falls at right angles into the Ebro. On the southern side, and at a distance of a quarter of a league, rises Mont Torrero, on the side of which is conducted the Canal of Arragon, a noble work, forming a water communication, without a single lock, from Tudela to Saragossa, commenced by the Emperor Charles V. This hill commands all the plain on the left bank, and overlooks the town; several warehouses and edifices, constructed for the commerce of the canal, were intrenched and occupied by twelve hundred men. The city itself, surrounded by a low brick wall, not above ten or twelve feet in height, and three in thickness, interrupted in many places by houses and convents which were built in its line, and pierced by eight gates, with no outworks, could scarcely be said to be fortified. Very few guns were on the ramparts in a state fit for service; but the houses were strongly built, partly of stone, partly of brick, and in general two stories in height, with each story vaulted in the roof, so as to render them nearly proof against fire; and the massy piles of the convents, rising like castles in many quarters, afforded strong positions, if the walls were forced, to a desperate and inflamed population. Few regular generals would have thought of making a stand in such a city; but Florus has recorded that Numantia had neither walls nor towers when it resisted so long and heroically the Roman legions; and Colmenar had said, nearly a century before, with a prophetic spirit, "Saragossa is without defences, but the valour of its inhabitants supplies the want of ramparts."*

The resolution to defend Saragossa cannot with justice be ascribed to the honour of any single individual, as the glory belongs to the whole population, all of whom, in the first movements of confusion and excitement, had a share in the generous resolution. When Palafox retired, after his repeated defeats, into the town, he either despaired of being able to defend it, or deemed it necessary to collect re-enforcements for a prolonged resistance from other quarters, and accordingly set out

June 15.

* Napier, i., 62, 64. Tor., i., 300, 307. Foy, iii., 269, 285.

* Foy, iii., 291, 292. Tor., i., 307, 308. South., i., 457. † Tor., ii., 1, 4. Foy, iii., 293, 294. Nap., i., 65, 66. Cavallero, Siège de Saragossa, 29, 33.

with a small body of regular troops for the northern bank of the river, leaving the armed population nearly unsupported to defend the walls. This measure was well adapted to increase the ultimate means of resistance which might be brought to bear upon the invader, if the town, when left to its own resources, could make head against the enemy; but it exposed it to imminent hazard of being taken, if, in the first moments of alarm consequent on the removal of the captain-general and regular forces, the besiegers should vigorously prosecute their operations. This accordingly happened. On

June 16. the day after the repulse of his first attack, Lefebvre presented himself in greater force before the gates, and commenced an immediate assault. But the people, though without leaders, with surprising energy prepared to repulse it. In the first moment of assault, indeed, a column of the enemy penetrated to the street Santa Engracia; the people, though violently excited, were without leaders or concert, and a few additional battalions would have made the enemy masters of Saragossa. But at this critical moment a desultory fire from some peasants and disbanded soldiers arrested his advance, and the inhabitants, regaining hope from the hesitation of the assailants, exerted themselves with such vigour that the enemy again retired beyond the gates. Instantly the whole population were in activity: men, women, and children flew to the ramparts; cannons were dragged to the gates; loopholes struck out in the walls; fascines and gabions constructed with astonishing celerity, and in less than twenty-four hours the city was secure from a *coup-de-main*.*

The loss sustained by Lefebvre in these unsuccessful assaults was very severe, and sufficient to convince him that operations in form would be requisite before the town could be reduced. He withdrew to a little distance, therefore, from the walls, and sent for heavy artillery from Pampeluna and Bayonne, with a view to the commencement of a regular siege. Meanwhile, Palafox, who had issued into the plain on the left bank of the Ebro, moved to Pina, where he crossed the river and advanced to Belchite, where he joined the Baron Versage, who had assembled four thousand new levies; and uniting everywhere the volunteers whom he found in the villages,

gained, by a circuitous route, the River June 23. Xalon, in the rear of the French army, with seven thousand infantry, a hundred horse, and four pieces of cannon. Some of his officers, seeing so respectable a force collected together, deemed it imprudent to hazard it by attempting the relief of Saragossa, and proposed that they should retire to Valencia. Palafox assembled the troops the moment that he heard of this proposal, and, after describing in energetic colours the glorious task which awaited them of delivering their country, offered to give passports to all those who wished to leave the army. Such was the ascendancy of his intrepid spirit that not one person left the ranks.† Taking

advantage of the enthusiasm excited by this unanimous determination, the Spanish general led them against the enemy, but before they could reach him night had fallen. They took up their quarters, accordingly, at Epila, where they were unexpectedly assailed, after dark, by Lefebvre with five thousand men. The Spanish levies, surprised and unable to form their ranks during the confusion of a nocturnal combat, were easily dispersed, although a few fought with such obstinacy that they only effected their retreat to Calatayud the following morning. Despairing, from the issue of this conflict, of being able to keep the field,* Palafox became sensible that Saragossa must be defended within its own walls, and, making a long circuit, he at length re-en- July 2. tered the city on the 2d of July.

Meanwhile, the besieging force having received heavy artillery and stores from Bayonne and Pampeluna, were vigorously prosecuting their operations, which were in the first instance chiefly directed against Monte Torrero, on the left bank of the river. Destitute at this critical moment of any noble leaders, the people of Saragossa did not at the same time sink under their difficulties. Calvo de Rozas, to whom the command had been devolved in his absence by Palafox, was a man whose calm resolution was equal to the emergency; and he was energetically supported by a plebeian chief, Tió Martin, to whom, with Tio Jorge, of similar rank, the real glory of resolving on defence, in circumstances all but desperate, is due. Encouraged by the intrepid conduct of their chiefs, the people assembled in the public square, and

June 25. with the magistrates, officers, and troops of the garrison, voluntarily took an oath "to shed the last drop of their blood for the defence of their religion, their king, and their hearths." They had need of all their resolution, for the means of attack against them were multiplying in a fearful progression. Verdier, whose talents had been fatally felt by the Prussians and Russians in the Polish campaign, was appointed to the command of the siege; the troops under his command were strongly re-enforced, and Lefebvre detached to act under the orders of Bessières against the insurgents in Leon. At the end of June, the besieging force being augmented to twelve thousand June 26. men, and the battering train having arrived, an attack was made on the Convent of St. Joseph, situated outside of the walls, which at first failed, though the besieged had no other defence than loopholes struck out in the rampart;

that firmness in danger which his speech promised, as he must have fled early and reached Calatayud in the night, though many of the troops arrived there unbroken next morning." Neither the words in italics, nor any corresponding words, are to be found in Cavallero, whom he quotes as his authority, nor in any Spanish historian with whom I am acquainted. Toreno, though an avowed Liberal, after recounting Palafox's speech on this occasion, says, "Such is the power which the inflexible resolution of a chief exercises in critical circumstances." There is not the least reason to suspect the distinguished English author of intentional misrepresentation, but the insinuations here made are vital to the character of Palafox; and as there is no ground for them, at least in the author quoted by him, it is desirable that the authorities on which they are made should be given in the next edition of that able work.—See CAVALLERO, *Siège de Saragossa*, 49; TORENO, ii., 11; and NAPIER, i., 67.

* Tor., i., 11, 12. Cav., 49, 50. Nap., i., 67, 68, 1

* Cavallero, 46, 47. Tor., i., 6, 7. Napier, ii., 66, 67.

† Colonel Napier, who is never favourable to aristocratic leaders, says that "Palafox, ignorant of war, and probably aided by Tio Jorge (an urban chief of humble origin), expressed his determination to fight," but he "did not display

but, being resumed with greater force, the defences were carried, and the brave garrison, after obstinately defending the church, refectory, and cells, set fire to the edifice, and retreated to the city. Monte Torrero

June 27. was the next object of attack, while a tremendous fire, kept up with uncommon vigour on other parts of the town, diverted the attention of the besieged from the quarter where the real attack was to be made. The commander, despairing of success with the undisciplined crowd under his command, and not aware of the difference between fighting with such troops behind walls and in the open field, evacuated that important post; for which, though perhaps inevitable, he was remitted to a council of war, condemned and executed.*

Having gained this vantage-ground, Verdier commenced a vigorous bombardment of the city, and battered its feeble walls furiously from the advantageous position which had so unexpectedly fallen into his power; and amid the terror and confusion thus excited, made repeated attacks on the gates of El Carmen and Portillo; but such was the ardour and tenacity of the defence, and the severity of the fire kept up from the windows, walls, and roofs of houses, that he was on every occasion repulsed, after desperate struggles, with severe loss. These repeated failures convinced Verdier of the necessity of making approaches in form, and completing the investment of the city, which still received constant supplies of men and provisions from the surrounding province.

July 10. With this view he threw a bridge of boats over the Ebro, and having thus opened a communication with the left bank, the communication of the besieged with the country, though not entirely cut off, was, after hard fighting, for many days restrained within very narrow limits. Before this could be effected,

July 17. however, the patriots received a re-enforcement from the regiment of Estremadura eight hundred strong, with the aid of which they made a desperate sally with two thousand men to retake the Monte Torrero; but, though the assailants fought with the utmost vehemence, they were unable to prevail against the disciplined valour of the French, and were repulsed with very heavy loss, including that of their commander. After this disaster they were necessarily confined to their walls; and the French approaches having been at length completed, the breaching batteries opened against the quarters of St. Engracia and Aljafria, and a terrible bombardment having at the same time been kept up, a powder-magazine blew up with terrific devastation in the public walk of the Cosso. The slender wall being soon laid in ruins, the town was summoned to surrender; but Palafox having rejected the offer, preparations were made for an assault.†

Aug. 3. The storm took place on the 4th of August. Fruitless Palafox at an early hour stationed himself on the breach, and even when the town. the forlorn hope was approaching, refused all terms of capitulation. The combat at

the ruined rampart was long and bloody; but after a violent struggle the French penetrated into the town, and made themselves masters of the street of Santa Engracia. Deeming themselves now in possession of Saragossa, their numerous battalions poured through the deserted breach, overspread the ramparts on either side, while a close column pushed on, with fixed bayonets and loud cheers, from Santa Engracia to the street of Cosso. But a desperate resistance there awaited them. Despite all the efforts of the citizens, they penetrated to the centre of the street, planted the tricolour flag on the Church of the Cross near its middle, and pierced into the Convent of St. Francisco on its left, and the lunatic asylum on its right, whence the insane inmates, taking advantage of the confusion, issued forth, and mingled, with frightful cries, shouts, and grimaces, among the combatants. To add to the consternation, another powder-magazine blew up in the thickest of the fight, and the burning fragments falling in all directions, set the city on fire in many different quarters. But notwithstanding all these horrors, the Spaniards maintained the conflict; an incessant fire issued from the windows and roofs of the houses; several detached bodies of the enemy which penetrated into the adjoining streets were repulsed; a column got entangled in a long crooked street, the Arco de Cineja, and was driven back into the Cosso with great slaughter; Palafox, Calvo, Tio Jorge, and St. Martin vied with each other in heroism; and when night separated the combatants, the French were in possession of one side of the Cosso and the citizens of the other.*

The successful resistance thus made to the enemy after they had penetrated into the city, and the defences of the place, in a military point of view, had been overcome, showed the Saragossans with what prospects they might maintain the conflict even from house to house; but their gallant leader was not without apprehensions that their ammunition might fail, or their defenders be ruinously reduced during so prolonged a struggle; and, therefore, no sooner had the first triumph of the enemy been arrested, than he hastened out of the town to accelerate the arrival of the re-enforcements which he knew were approaching, and exerted himself with so much vigour during the succeeding days, that on the morning of the 8th he succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Aug. 8. besiegers, and entered the city at the head of three thousand men and a large convoy of ammunition and provisions. It may easily be imagined with what transports they were received, for in the interim the citizens had had a desperate conflict to maintain, from which they never enjoyed one moment's respite. From street to street, from house to house, from room to room, the fight was kept up with incredible obstinacy on both sides; every post became the theatre of bloody strife, to which company after company, column after column, regiment after regiment, were successively brought up; while the fire of musketry, the roar of artillery, the flight of bombs, the glare of conflagration, and the cries of the combatants, continued without

Continued contest in the streets, and raising of the siege.

* Nap., i., 67, 68. Cav., 52, 53. Tor., i., 15, 16.

† Cav., 51, 55. Tor., ii., 21, 25. Foy, iii., 298, 300.

Nap., i., 68, 69.

* Cav., 56, 59. Tor., ii., 25, 29. Nap., i., 70.

intermission night and day. But all the efforts of the besiegers were in vain: animated almost to phrensy by the long duration and heart-stirring interest of the conflict, all classes vied with each other in heroic constancy; the priests were to be seen at the posts of danger, encouraging the soldiers, and administering consolation to the wounded and the dying; the women and children carried water incessantly to the quarters on fire, attended the wounded, interred the dead; many even forgot the timidity of their sex, and took the places of their slain husbands or brothers at the cannon side; the citizens relieved each other night and day at the mortal and perpetual struggle with the enemy. Such was the vigour of the resistance, that from the 4th to the 14th of August the besiegers made themselves masters only of four houses; one in front of the treasury was only won after an incessant combat of six days' duration. After the arrival of the re-enforcements under Palafox, the conflict was no longer equal: symptoms of discouragement were manifest in the enemy; sinister rumours circulated on both sides of a great disaster in the south; and they were gradually losing ground, even in those quarters of which they had obtained possession during the first burst of the assault. Still the fire of artillery continued, and was particularly violent during the night of the 14th of August; but at daybreak on the following morning it suddenly ceased, and the besieged, when the sun rose, beheld with astonishment the enemy at some distance, in full retreat, traversing the plain towards Pampeluna. The victory was complete: the heavy cannon and siege stores were all abandoned or thrown into the canal; and the inhabitants, with enthusiastic shouts of transport, concluded, amid cries of "Long live our Lady of the Pillar!" the ceremony of the *fête Dieu*, which had been interrupted by the commencement of the siege on the 16th of June.*

Operations of Moneycey in Valencia. In truth, while this sanguinary conflict was raging in Saragossa, disasters of the most serious nature had been experienced by the French in the south and east of Spain. Moneycey, who had set out

from Madrid early in June, with eight thousand men, to suppress the insurrection in Valencia and cut off the communication between that city and Saragossa, reached Cuenca on the 11th, where he remained inactive for several days. Resuming at length his march on the 16th, he advanced by Pesquiera towards Valencia; but as he penetrated farther into the country, the universal desertion of the towns and villages, and evident traces of armed men on his line of march, gave gloomy presages of an approaching storm. In the first instance, however, these indications proved fallacious. Some Swiss companies, with a body of armed peasants and four pieces of cannon, had, indeed, taken post to defend the strong and important pass of the bridge of Pajazo, on the River Cabriel; but the new levies dispersed on the first appearance of the enemy, and the greater part of the Swiss troops joined the invaders, so that the bridge was gained without any difficulty. Encouraged by this success, Moneycey wrote to General Chabran,

who was ordered to co-operate with him from the side of Catalonia, appointing a rendezvous on the 28th, under the walls of Valencia; and, advancing forward, approached the rocky ridge of calcareous mountains called Cabrillas, which forms the western boundary of the kingdom of Valencia. A single road traversed, by a rapid and laborious ascent, this rugged barrier; and as the adjoining heights were impassable for cavalry, a more advantageous position for resisting the enemy could not have been desired. The summits of the rocks which bordered the defile on either side, were covered with armed peasants to the number of six thousand; and four pieces of artillery, supported by a regiment of regular troops and a troop of horse, guarded the main road. All these obstacles, however, were speedily overcome: while the cavalry and artillery engaged the attention of the enemy in front, General Harispe turned their flank, and by a rapid attack over almost inaccessible rocks, threw them into confusion, dispersed the new levies, and captured all the ammunition, baggage, and artillery. Nothing now existed to retard the advance of the invaders; the summit of the ridge was soon gained, from which the French soldiers, wearied with the arid mountains and waterless plains of Castile,* beheld, with the delight of the Israelites of old, the green plains, and irrigated meadows, and level richness of the promised land, and three days afterward they appeared before the walls of Valencia.

Situated on the right of the Guadalaviar or Turia, and in the vicinity of the sea, Valencia is one of the most delightful cities which is to be found in Europe. It contains a hundred thousand inhabitants; but of that number more than one half inhabit the enchanting suburban villas which lie without the walls. These consist of an old rampart of unhewn stones, rudely put together, including within their circuit a decayed citadel. In a military point of view, therefore, it could hardly be regarded as a place of defence; but the spirit and circumstances of the inhabitants rendered the slightest rampart a tower of strength. The enthusiasm of the people ran high; their hatred of the invaders was inextinguishable, and the crimes they had committed were too serious to give them any rational hope of safety but in the most determined resistance. It is a melancholy but certain fact, that in revolutionary movements, as in all others where passion is the prime mover, the most enduring and often successful efforts result from the consciousness of such enormities as leave no hope but in obstinate hostility—*unas pes victis, nullam sperare salutem*. The junta had ably and energetically directed the public activity; engineers had marked out intrenchments and planted batteries to protect the principal gates of the city; a fortified camp had been constructed at a league from the walls; and the inhabitants, without distinction of age, rank, or sex, had laboured night and day, for several weeks past, to complete the works on which their common safety depended. Within the gates preparations had been made for the most vigorous resistance; trenches had been cut and barriers constructed

June 24.

Description of Valencia, and preparations for its defence.

* Cav., 59, 63. Tor., ii., 28, 32. Foy, ii., 321, 331. South., ii., 25, 31.

* Nap., i., 92, 93. Tor. i., 326, 329. Foy, iii., 250, 253.

across the principal streets; chariots and carts overturned so as to impede the advance of the assailants; the windows were filled with mattresses, and the doors barricaded; while a plentiful array of firearms, stones, and boiling oil was prepared, on the flat tops of the houses, to rain down death on the enemy.*

The wreck of the troops and armed peasants who had combated at the Cabrillas, city. Its re- took refuge in the entrenched camp pulse. at Cuarte, without the walls, where

they occupied in force the sides of the canal which unites the waters of the Guadalaviar to those of the Fera. In that position they were June 27. attacked early on the morning of the 27th, and, after three hours' firing, driven back to the batteries and intrenchments in front of the gates. There, however, a more determined stand was made; and Moncey, desirous of bringing up his whole forces and artillery, deferred the attack on the city itself till the following day. Hardly an eye was closed in Valencia during the succeeding night; all ranks and both sexes laboured incessantly to complete the preparations of defence; and so great was the universal activity, that, when the rays of the morning sun appeared above the blue expanse of the Mediterranean, it was hardly possible for the assailants to hope for success but from the pusillanimity of the defenders.

June 28. Moncey disposed his fieldpieces in the most favourable situations to reply to the heavy artillery on the ramparts and outworks, and, having driven the enemy through the suburbs, commenced the assault. Such, however, was the vigour of the defence that very little success was gained: the light artillery of the French was soon overpowered by the heavy cannon on the walls; a murderous fire of grape was kept up from the top of the rampart and the intrenchments round the entrances of the city; while the new levies, wholly unable to withstand the shock of their veteran opponents in the open field, contended on terms of comparative equality in the houses and behind the walls or enclosures adjoining the gates. The enthusiasm within increased as the fire approached their dwellings; the priests traversed the streets with the cross in their hands, exhorting the people to continue the contest; the women brought up ammunition to the combatants, and when the grapeshot began to fail, the ladies of rank instantly furnished an ample supply of missiles to charge the guns. A city so defended was beyond the reach of a *coup-de-main*: the French troops rapidly melted away under the dropping fire with which they were assailed from many different quarters; and in the evening Moncey drew off to Cuarte, having lost two thousand men in this fruitless attack.†

The spirit of the Valencians was roused to the very highest pitch by this glorious result, and, in the first burst of their triumph, they confidently expected that the Conde Cervallon, who commanded a corps six thousand strong, consisting chiefly of armed peasants, on the banks of the Xucar, would fall upon the enemy in his retreat, and

complete his destruction. But, while these flattering illusions were filling the city with transport, Cervallon himself narrowly escaped destruction. Attacked by Moncey in his July 1. retreat, he was surprised with one half of his corps on one side of the river and the remainder on the other; the part first assailed made a feeble resistance: in the confusion of the rout the French made themselves masters of a bridge, and, rapidly passing over, soon completed the defeat of the portion on the other side. Two days after, three thousand, July 3. who had escaped from the first disaster, were attacked and dispersed, with the loss of all their artillery, near Almanza, the celebrated theatre of the victory of the French over the allies in the Succession War. But these advantages, though considerable, gained by a retreating army in the course of its flight, were no counterpoise to the disaster experienced before Valencia: the whole province was up in arms at the glorious tidings; the communication both with Catalonia and Madrid was cut off; Cuenca was besieged by a body of seven thousand peasants, who overpowered the detachment left in that town; and though July 1. the victors were themselves assailed two days after and dispersed with great slaughter by Caulaincourt, whom Savary despatched from Madrid with a powerful body of horse to restore the communication with Moncey in that July 3. quarter, yet the object of the advance towards Valencia was totally lost; and the French general finding that Frere, with his division, on whose aid he had calculated in a renewed attack which he was preparing against that city, had been recalled to Madrid by orders of Savary, who was alarmed at the advance of Cuesta and Blake towards the Guadarrama pass, gave up the expedition in despair, and returned by Ocaña to the capital.*

The ultimate failure of the expedition of Moncey towards Valencia was occasioned by the terror excited in the capital of the threatening advance of Cuesta and Blake, with their united forces, upon the French line of communication between Madrid and the Bayonne frontier. There, it was evident, was the vital point of the contest; there a disaster would instantly be attended with fatal consequences; secured in that quarter, the failure of less considerable expeditions emanating from the capital was of comparatively little importance. Napoleon, who was strongly impressed with these views, had used the utmost efforts to re-enforce Bessières, to whom the defence of the line through Old Castile was intrusted; and, after providing for the occupation of the various points in which he had so early and successfully suppressed the insurrection, he could concentrate twenty thousand men to act against the enemy, who were approaching from the Galician Mountains. But meantime the enemy had not been idle. Filanghieri, captain-general of Galicia, had, with the aid of the bountiful supplies of England, succeeded in organizing twenty-five thousand men—including the soldiers who had come to Corunna from Oporto, originally part of Junot's expedition,

Operations of Bessières against Blake and Cuesta in Leon.

* Tor., 329, 330. Foy, iii., 253, 255. Nap., i., 93.

† Tor., i., 333, 336. Nap., i., 94, 95. Foy, iii., 254, 259.

* Nap., i., 97, 98. Tor., ii., 336, 343. Foy, iii., 260, 262, and iv., 40, 44.

and the garrisons of that place and Ferrol, with a considerable train of artillery—and taken post in the mountains ten miles in the rear of Astorga. The situation of this corps, threatening the line of communication between Bayonne and Madrid, was such as to excite the utmost disquietude in the breast of Napoleon, and he sedulously impressed upon Savary that it was there that the decisive blow was to be struck.* That general, however, was not so well aware as his imperial master where the vital point was to be found; and, instead of re-enforcing Bessières with all his disposable forces, he despatched Frere with his division on the track of Moncey, to endeavour to reopen the communication with that marshal, which the intervening insurrection had entirely cut off; and sent on Vedel and Gobert, with their respective divisions, to re-enforce Dupont, who had by this time crossed the Sierra Morena, and was far advanced in his progress through Andalusia. Impressed, in a short time afterward, with the increasing danger to his communications which arose from the junction of the Galician army near Astorga with that which still kept its ground in Leon under Cuesta, he hastily countermanded these orders, recalled Frere to Madrid, ordered Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont himself to remeasure their steps, and held himself in readiness to march from the capital with all the disposable troops he could collect, to re-enforce Bessières on the line of the great northern communication. These dispositions, as usual with alterations made in general designs on the spur of the moment, and in presence of the enemy, were essentially erroneous: the decisive point should have been looked to at first; the subsequent vacillation was too late to strengthen Bessières, but was calculated essentially to weaken Dupont, whom it went to deprive, in imminent danger, of one of his best divisions. As such they excited the greatest displeasure in Napoleon, who gave vent to it in an able and acrimonious despatch (which throws great light on the state of the campaign at this period), and never afterward, in military transactions, intrusted Savary with any important command.†

* "A stroke delivered by Bessières," said he, "would paralyze all Spain. What signifies now Valencia and Andalusia? The only way really to strengthen Dupont is to re-enforce Bessières. There is not a citizen of Madrid, not a peasant in the remotest valleys of Spain, who does not feel that the fate of the campaign is exclusively in the hands of Marshal Bessières. What a misfortune, then, that in so important an affair we should lose a chance, how inconsiderable soever, of success."—NAPOLEON TO SAVARY, July 13, 1808. Foy, iv., 45, 46, and NAPIER, i., Appendix No. 1. † Sav., iii., 248, 252. Tor., ii., 344, 345. Foy, iv., 40, 47. Nap., i., 101, 102.

‡ "The French affairs in Spain," said Napoleon, "would be in an excellent state if Gobert's division had marched upon Valladolid to support Bessières, and Frere's division had occupied San Clemente, alike ready to re-enforce Moncey or Dupont, as circumstances might require. Instead of this, Gobert having been directed upon Dupont, and Frere being with Moncey, harassed and weakened by marches and countermarches, our situation has been sensibly injured. It is a great mistake not to have occupied the citadel of Segovia; of all positions in that quarter it is the most dangerous to the French army, as, situated between two roads, it intercepts both communications. If Dupont should experience a check, it is of no consequence; the only effect of it would be to leave him to repass the mountains; but a stroke delivered to Marshal Bessières would tell on the heart of the army, which would give it a locked jaw, and speedily be felt in all its extremities. It is on this account that it is so unfortunate that the prescribed orders have not been specifically obeyed. The army of Bessières should have had at

But meanwhile the danger had blown over in the North: Bessières, though unsupported, had not only made head against Cuesta and Blake, but defeated them; and a great victory in the plains of Leon had opened to Joseph the gates of Madrid.

Blake, with the army of Galicia, having effected a junction with the remains of Cuesta's troops which had escaped the rout of Palencia, their united forces having left a division at Benevento to protect their stores, advanced into the plains of Leon to give battle to Bessières. This plan could not but appear rash, considering the veteran character of the French troops, their superiority in cavalry, and the undisciplined crowd of which a large part of the Spanish levies was composed. It was undertaken solely on the responsibility of Cuesta, who had assumed the chief command, and against the strongest remonstrances of Blake, who urged that, by falling back to the frontiers of Galicia, where the French general could never pretend to follow them, they would gain time to discipline and equip their troops, and would soon be enabled to advance again at the head of forty thousand effective men. This sage counsel was rejected. Cuesta, who was a brave but inexperienced veteran, equally headstrong and obstinate, insisted upon an immediate action, and finding that Blake still declined to obey, he addressed himself to the junta of Galicia, who, yielding to popular clamour, seconded his orders, and directed Blake forthwith to advance and give battle. Having now no alternative but submission, Blake did the utmost in his power, during the short interval which remained, to put his troops into good condition; and on the 13th of July 13. Cuesta moved forward with the united forces, amounting to twenty-five thousand infantry, four hundred cavalry, and thirty pieces of cannon, to Rio Seco. Bessières' force was, upon the whole, less numerous, amounting only to fifteen thousand men and twenty-five guns; but of these nearly two thousand were admirable horsemen, and the composition of the whole was such as more than to counterbalance the inferiority in point of numbers.*

least 8000 men more than it has, in order to remove all chance of a disaster in that quarter. The affair of Valencia was a matter of no importance; Moncey was alone adequate to it; it was absurd to think of re-enforcing him. If he could not take that town with the forces he had, he could not have done so with 20,000 more; in that view it would become an affair of artillery. You cannot take by a stroke on the neck a town with 80,000 or 100,000 inhabitants, who have barricaded the streets and fortified the houses. Frere, therefore, could have added nothing to the means of Moncey against Valencia, while the abstraction of his division seriously weakened Dupont. Moreover, if the latter general was to be succoured, it would have been better to have sent him a single regiment direct, than three by so circuitous a route as that by which Frere was ordered to march. In civil wars it is the important points which must be defended, and no attempt made to go everywhere. The grand object of all the armies should be to preserve Madrid; it is there that everything is to be lost or won. Madrid cannot be seriously menaced but by the army of Galicia; for Bessières has not adequate forces to ensure its defeat. It may be threatened by the army of Andalusia, but hardly endangered; for, in proportion as Dupont falls back, he is re-enforced, and with their 20,000 men he and Vedel should at least be able to keep the enemy in check in that quarter. 7.—

Notes addressed to SAVARY on the affairs of Spain by NAPOLEON, 13th July, 1808; taken at the battle of Vittoria, in King JOSEPH's Portfolio. NAPIER, i., Appendix No. 1.

* Nap., i., 106. Tor., ii., 347, 348. Foy, iii., 302, 308.

The dispositions of Cuesta for the battle were as faulty as the resolution to hazard it was ill advised. Contrary alike to the rules of the military art and the dictates of common sense on the subject, he drew up his troops in two lines at the distance of nearly a mile and a half from each other. The first, ten thousand strong, under Blake, with fifteen pieces of cannon, was stationed on a plateau in advance, of rugged and difficult access; the second, fifteen hundred toises (9000 feet) in the rear, led by Cuesta in person, consisted of fifteen thousand men, almost all regular soldiers, and fifteen guns. The few cavalry they had were with the first line. Bessières, perceiving at once the advantage which this extraordinary disposition offered to an enterprising attack, prepared to avail himself to the utmost of it by throwing the bulk of his forces into the wide chasm between the two lines, so as to overwhelm the first before the second could come up to its assistance. Penetrating rapidly into the open space between the two parts of the army, he attacked Blake both in flank and rear with such vigour, that in an instant his lines were broken, his artillery taken, his men dispersed. As soon as he saw the rout of his first line, Cuesta moved forward with the second to the attack, and succeeded in reaching the enemy before the disorder consequent on their rapid success and pursuit had been repaired. The consequences had wellnigh proved fatal to the victors. Cuesta's right wing, advancing swiftly and steadily forward in good order, overthrew several French battalions which had not fully recovered their ranks, and captured four guns. This disaster, like that experienced by Zach's grenadiers at Marengo, might, with a less skilful commander, or less steady troops, have turned the fortune of the day; for the example of disorder is contagious, and the confusion was already spreading into the French centre, when Bessières, with the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, twelve hundred strong, charged the Spanish right in flank, which had become exposed by the rapidity of its advance, with great vigour; and Merle's division, returning from the pursuit of Blake, renewed the combat in front. A short but sanguinary struggle ensued: the Spanish infantry fought bravely, and for a few minutes the fate of the battle hung by a thread; but at length they were broken, and the loud shouts of victory, which had been raised in the Castilian ranks, passed to the French side. After this it was no longer a battle, but a massacre and rout: the Spaniards broke and dispersed on all sides, leaving eighteen guns and their whole ammunition, besides two thousand prisoners, in the hands of the enemy. Three thousand had fallen on the field, while the loss of the victors did not exceed twelve hundred men. The town of Rio Seco, taken in the pursuit, was sacked and plundered with merciless severity, and all the nuns in the convents were subjected to the brutal violence of the soldiery. Few days have been more disastrous to Spain, for, worse than the loss of artillery and prisoners, it destroyed all confidence in the ability of their troops to withstand the enemy in the field; while to Napoleon it was the source of unbounded, and, as it turned

out, undeserved exultation. "It is Villa Viciosa" (Almanza), he exclaimed, when the joyful intelligence arrived at Bayonne: "Bessières has placed Joseph on the throne of Spain;"*† and, deeming the war over, he left that fortress, and pursued his journey by Bordeaux for the French capital; while Joseph, relieved now of all anxiety in regard to his communications, pursued his journey to Madrid, where he arrived, as already mentioned, on the 21st of July.

Napoleon was premature in this judgment: Rio Seco placed Joseph on the throne of Madrid, but it neither finished the war nor maintained him there. He did not, however, on that account suspend his military preparations: nine thousand Poles, who had entered the service of France, were directed, with four regiments of infantry and two of cavalry from the grand army in Germany, towards the Pyrenees. All the princes of the Rhenish Confederacy received orders to send a regiment each in the same direction. The guards of Joseph followed him to Spain from Naples. Tuscany and the kingdom of Italy were commanded to send their contingents to re-enforce Duhesme in Catalonia. Re-enforcements to the amount of forty thousand men were thus provided for, which all arrived in Spain during the three following months, but too late to arrest the progress of disaster. While both the French emperor and his royal brother were indulging in the sanguine hope that all was terminated, a dreadful disaster had occurred in Andalusia, and a blow been struck on the banks of the Guadalquivir which resounded from one end of Europe to the other.‡

Dupont, who was at Toledo when the insurrection broke out in all parts of Spain, received, on the 24th of May, an order from Murat, then Lieutenant-general of Spain, to move upon Cadiz, by the route of the Sierra Morena, Cordova, and Seville. He was to be joined in Andalusia by four thousand men and ten guns drawn from the army of Portugal. He immediately set out, and experienced no resistance while traversing the open plains of La Mancha, and in the Sierra Morena found the villages indeed deserted, but no enemy to dispute his progress. At Andujar, however, where he arrived on the 2d of June, he received information of the real state of June 2. matters in that province: that Seville, Cadiz, and all the principal towns were ruled by juntas, which had declared war against France; that the army at St. Roque had joined the patriot cause, and that the peasants, by tens of thousands, were flocking into the burghs to enrol themselves under the national banners. Alarmed by this intelligence, Dupont wrote to

Farther preparations of Napoleon for this war.

March of Dupont into Andalusia, and his early successes there

* South., i., 480, 481. Foy, iii., 310, 313. Tor., ii., 352, 354. Nap., i., 107.

† In allusion to the battle at Villa Viciosa, where Philip V. and the Duke de Vendome gained a complete victory over the allies, which decided the Succession War in favour of the house of Bourbon. But the comparison was the reverse of the truth, for at Villa Viciosa Philip and the Spaniards combated for Spain against foreign armies; and the affair was decisive, for the whole military force of both sides was collected in one field; whereas at Rio Seco the general of an intrusive king sought to beat down the native troops of Castile, and a fragment only of the military strength of either side was engaged.—See Foy, iv., 47.

‡ Foy, iv., 48, 49.

Madrid for re-enforcements, and, after establishing a hospital at Andujar, and taking measures of precaution to secure his rear, set out four days afterward, and continued his march towards Cordova, still following the left bank of the Guadalquivir. This road, however, after running eight-and-twenty leagues on that bank of the river, crosses it at Vinta de Alcolea by a

June 7. long bridge of nineteen arches, strongly constructed of black marble. It was at its extremity that the Spaniards awaited the enemy. The end of the bridge on the left bank was fortified by a *tête-du-pont*: twelve guns were mounted on the right bank to enfilade the approach to it, and three thousand regular troops, supported by ten thousand armed peasants, awaited in Alcolea to dispute the passage, while the heights on the left bank, in the rear of the French, were occupied by a cloud of insurgents ready to fall on them behind as soon as they were actively engaged with the more regular force in front. The French general, seeing such preparations made for his reception, delayed the attack till the following morning, and meanwhile made his dispositions against the numerous enemies by whom he was surrounded. This was no difficult matter: a very small part only of the Spanish force was adequate to

the encounter of regular soldiers. At June 8. daybreak on the following morning, General Fresia, with a battalion of infantry and a large body of cavalry, attacked the peasants on the left bank, and by a few charges dispersed them; at the same time a column with ease broke into the *tête-du-pont*, the works of which were not yet finished, and rapidly charging across the bridge, of which the arches had not been cut, routed the Spanish troops at Alcolea on the opposite side with such loss that all their artillery was taken, and Echevarria, the commander, despairing of defending Cordova, fled with such precipitance, that before night he reached Ecija, twelve leagues from the field of battle.*

Abandoned to their own resources, and destitute of any leaders for their guidance, the magistrates having all fled on the first alarm, the inhabitants of Cordova, before which the French presented themselves the same day, were in no condition to resist the invaders. The gates, nevertheless, were shut, and the old towers which flanked their approaches filled with armed men, by whom, as the cannon of the enemy approached, a feeble fire was kept up. A parleying for surrender, however, took place, and the conferences were going on, when, under pretence of a few random shots from some windows, the guns were discharged at the gates, which were instantly burst open; the troops rushed into the town, where hardly any resistance was made, but which, notwithstanding, underwent all the horrors of a place carried by assault. A scene of indescribable horror ensued, fraught with acute but passing suffering to the Spaniards, with lasting disgrace to the French. A universal pillage took place: Every public establishment was sacked, every private house plundered. Armed and unarmed men were slaughtered indiscriminately; women ravished; the

churches plundered; even the venerable cathedral, originally the much-loved mosque of the Omniade Caliphs, which had survived the devastations of the first Christian conquest, six hundred years before, was stripped of its riches and ornaments, and defiled by the vilest debauchery. Nor was this merely the unbridled license of subaltern insubordination: the general-in-chief and superior officers themselves set the first example of a rapacity as pernicious as it was disgraceful; and from the plunder of the treasury and office of consolidation, Dupont contrived to realize above ten millions of reals, or £197,000 sterling. Not content with this hideous devastation, the French general, when the sack had ceased, overwhelmed the city by an enormous contribution. It is some consolation, amid so frightful a display of military license and unbridled cupidity, that a righteous retribution speedily overtook its perpetrators; that it was the load of their public and private plunder which shortly after retarded their retreat along the banks of the Guadalquivir; and that it was anxiety to preserve their ill-gotten spoil which paralyzed their arms in the field, and brought an unheard-of disgrace on the French standards.*†

Dupont remained several days at Cordova, but learning that the insurrection had spread and was gathering strength in all directions, and finding his communications with Madrid intercepted with the patriot bands in his rear, he deemed it imprudent to make any farther advance in the direction of Seville. Meanwhile the insurgents closed around and hemmed him in on every side. The armed peasants of Jaen and its vicinity crossed the Guadalquivir, and overwhelmed the detachment left at Andujar in charge of the sick there, and with savage cruelty, in revenge for the sack of Cordova, put them all to death; the smugglers of the Sierra Morena, relinquishing

Accumulation of forces round the invaders under Castanos.

* Foy, iii., 229, 231. Tor., i., 321, 323. Nap., i., 113. South., i., 475, 476. Lond., i., 87.

† Colonel Napier says (i., 114, 1st edit.), "As the inhabitants took no part in the contest, and received the French without any signs of aversion, the town was protected from pillage, and Dupont fixed his headquarters there." It would be well if he would specify the authority on which this assertion is made, as it is directly contrary to the united testimony of even the most liberal French and Spanish historians. Foy says, with his usual admirable candour, "To some musket-shots, discharged almost by accident from the windows, the French answered by a continued discharge, and speedily burst open the gates. Men without arms, without the means of resistance, were slaughtered in the streets; the houses, the churches, even the celebrated mosque, which the Christians had converted into a cathedral, were alike sacked. The ancient capital of the Omniade Caliphs, the greatest kings which Spain ever beheld, saw scenes of horror renewed such as it had not witnessed since the city was taken in 1236 by Ferdinand, king of Castile. These terrible scenes had no excuse in the losses sustained by the conqueror; for the attack of the town had not cost them ten men, and the total success of the day had only cost them thirty killed and eighty wounded." Toreno, though a decided liberal Spanish historian, observes: "Rushing into the town, the French proceeded, killing or wounding all those whom they met on their road; they sacked the houses, the temples, even the humblest dwellings of the poor. The ancient and celebrated cathedral became the prey of the insatiable and destructive rapacity of the stranger. The massacre was great; the quantity of precious spoil collected immense. From the single depôts of the treasury and the consolidation Dupont extracted 10,000,000 reals, besides the sums extracted from public and private places of deposit. It was thus that a population was delivered up to plunder which had neither made nor attempted the slightest resistance."—See Foy, iii., 230, 231, and TORENO, i., 322.

* Foy, iii., 224, 230. Nap., i., 112, 113. Tor., i., 320, 321.

their illicit traffic for a more heart-stirring conflict, issued from their gloomy retreats, and beset all the passes of their inaccessible mountains. Even the peasants of La Mancha had caught the flame; the magazines of Mudela had fallen into their power; the sick at Manzanares had been put to the sword; the roads were so beset that even considerable detachments in his rear were captured or defeated; General Roize, with a body of four hundred convalescents, was defeated in the open plains of La Mancha; and after having joined five hundred light horse under General Belair, the united force was deemed inadequate to forcing the passes of the Sierra Morena, and fell back towards Toledo. These accumulating disasters, which were greatly magnified by popular rumour, and the impossibility of getting any correct detail of the facts from the general intercepting of the communications, produced such an impression on Dupont, that he deemed it hopeless to attempt any farther advance into Andalusia: a resolution which proved the salvation of that province, and, in the end, of Spain; for such was the state of anarchy and irresolution which prevailed among the troops intrusted with its defence, that, had he advanced boldly forward, and followed up his successes at Alcolea and Cordova with the requisite vigour, Seville would at once have fallen into his power, and the insurrection in that quarter been entirely crushed. Castanos, indeed, was at the head of eight thousand regular troops, drawn from the camp at St. Roque, and an enthusiastic but undisciplined body of thirty thousand armed peasants assembled at Utrera; but the latter part of his force was incapable of any operations that could be relied on in the field; and such was the consternation occasioned, in the first instance, by the success of the French irruption, that the general-in-chief was desirous of retiring to Cadiz, and making its impregnable fortifications the citadel of an intrenched camp, where the new levies might acquire some degree of consistency, and the support of ten or twelve thousand British troops might, in case of necessity, be obtained. The authority of

Castanos was merely nominal; Morla, governor of Cadiz, was his enemy, and the junta of Seville issued orders independent of either; so that the former general, despairing of success, had actually, under pretence of providing for the security of Cadiz, embarked his heavy artillery for that fortress. From this disgrace, however, the Spaniards were relieved by the hesitation of the enemy: a pause in an invading army is dangerous at all times, but especially so when an insurrection is to be put down by the moral influence of its advance; and the hesitation of Dupont at Cordova proved his ruin. He remained ten days inactive there, during which the whole effect of his victory was lost; confidence returned to the enemy from the hourly increase of their force and the evident apprehensions of the French general; and at length some intercepted despatches to Savary were found to contain so doleful an account of his situation,* that not only were all thoughts of retiring farther laid aside, but it was resolved immediately to advance, and sur-

round the enemy in the city which he had conquered.

The fears of Dupont, however, prevented Cordova from a second time becoming the theatre of military license. Detachments of peasants had occupied all the passes in the Sierra Morena; troops, including some regulars, were accumulating in the direction of Grenada, with the design of seizing Carolina and intercepting his retreat to La Mancha. Fame had magnified the amount of the forces descending into the plains of Leon, under Cuesta and Blake, and rumours had got abroad that Savary was fortifying himself in the Retiro. Unable to withstand the sinister presentiments consequent on such an accumulation of adverse incidents, the French general resolved to fall back; and accordingly broke up from Cordova on June 16. the 16th of June, and three days afterwards reached Andujar without having experienced any molestation. A strong detachment was immediately sent off to Jaen, which defeated the insurgents, and took a severe but not undeserved vengeance on the inhabitants for their barbarity to the sick at Andujar, by sacking and burning the town.* The supplies, however, which Dupont expected from this excursion were not obtained, for every article of provisions which the town contained was consumed in the conflagration. Both sides after this continued inactive for above three weeks, during which the sick in the French hospital, as usual with a retreating army, rapidly augmented; while the Spanish forces, under Castanos, which now approached, increased so much, by re-enforcements from all quarters, that that general could now muster above twenty thousand regular infantry and two thousand horse, besides a motley crowd of thirty thousand armed peasants under his command. During the same period, however, powerful re-enforcements reached the French general; for Gobert, with his division, whose absence from Leon Napoleon had so bitterly lamented, joined Vedel at BAYLEN on the 15th of July,† and a brigade was pushed on under Leger Belair to open up the communication with the main body at Andujar, while the Spanish generals, now deeming the escape of the French impossible, were taking measures for enveloping the whole and forcing them to surrender.

Meanwhile the long delay afforded by the inactivity of Dupont had been turned to the best account by Castanos. In the interim he contrived to give a certain degree of consistence to his numerous but tumultuous array of peasants, while the disembarkation of General Spencer with five thousand English troops, chiefly from Gibraltar, at Port St. Mary's, near Cadiz, inspired general confidence by securing a rallying-point in case of disaster.

Spanish plan of attack, and preparatory movements on both sides.

* That severity, however deplorable, was perhaps rendered necessary, and therefore justified, by the massacre of the sick at Andujar; but, in the prosecution of their orders, the French soldiers proceeded to excesses as wanton as they were savage: massacring old men, and infants at the breast, and exercising the last acts of cruelty on some sick friars of St. Domingo and St. Augustine who could not escape from the town.—TORENO, i. 326.

† Nap., i., 117, 120. Foy, iv., 49, 52. Tor., i., 326, 360

* Nap., i., 114, 116. Foy, iii., 234, 236. Tor., ii., 326. Nap., i., App. No. 13.

At length the regular troops from Grenada, St. Roque, Cadiz, and other quarters having assembled, to the number of eight-and-twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, a combined plan of attack was agreed on. The army was arranged in three divisions: the first, under Reding, a Swiss general of distinction, brother to the intrepid patriot of the same name,* received orders to cross the

July 11. Guadalquivir at Mengibar, and move to Baylen, in the rear of Andujar, where Dupont still was, and between that town and the Sierra Morena; the second, under Coupigny, was to pass the same river at Villa-Nueva and support Reding; while Castanos, with the third and the reserve, was to press the enemy in front, and a body of irregular troops, under Don Juan de la Cruz, passing by the bridge of Marmolejo, and harass his right flank. A glance at any good map of the country will at once show that the effect of these dispositions, which were ably combined, was to throw a preponderating force in the rear of Dupont directly on his line of communications, and either separate the division under his immediate command from those of Gobert and Vedel, or interpose between them both and the road to Madrid. They were promptly and vigorously carried into execution: Castanos, with the troops under his immediate command, approached to within a league of Andujar, and so alarmed Dupont that he sent

July 14. to Vedel for assistance, who came with his whole division, except thirteen hundred men left to guard the ford of Mengibar.

July 16. This small body was there attacked, two days after, by Reding with eight thousand men, defeated, and the passage of the river forced; Gobert, advancing from Baylen to support the broken detachment, received a ball on the forehead, and fell dead on the spot. The French in dismay retreated to Baylen; the Spaniards, seeing themselves interposed in this manner between Gobert and Vedel, with forces little superior to either, taken singly, also retired in the night across the ford to the other bank of the river. But this bold irruption into the middle of their line of march, and the disaster of Gobert, spread dismay through the army; a loud cannonade heard the whole day from the side of Andujar, where Castanos was engaging the attention of Dupont, induced the belief that they were beset on all sides, and the accounts which reached both armies in the evening of the disaster experienced before Valencia, increased the confidence of the Spaniards as much as it depressed the feelings of the French soldiers.††

In the whole French army there was not a general of division who bore a higher character than Dupont; and when he set out for Andalusia, in command of so considerable a force,

it was universally believed that he would find his marshal's baton at Cadiz. In 1801, he had distinguished himself, under Brune, in the winter campaign with the Austrians on the Italian plains: in 1805, his gallant conduct had eminently contributed to the glorious triumph at Ulm: in 1807, he had been not less conspicuous in the Polish war at Eylau and Friedland. His courage was unquestionable; his talents of no ordinary kind. But it is one thing to possess the spirit and intrepidity which makes a good general of division or colonel of grenadiers; it is another and a very different thing to be endowed with the moral resolution which is requisite to withstand disaster, and act with the decision and energy indispensable in a general-in-chief. In the situation in which he was now placed there was but one course to adopt, and that was to mass all his forces together, and bear down in a single column upon the enemy, so as to reopen his communications, and secure, at all hazards, his retreat; and twenty thousand French soldiers assembled together were adequate to bursting through at a single point all the troops of Spain. Instead of this he divided his force, and thereby

July 17. exposed it to destruction. Vedel received orders to lead back to Baylen his own division and that of Gobert, while the general-in-chief himself continued fronting Castanos at Andujar. But meanwhile Generals Dupont and Leger Belair, who had been left at Baylen, were so much disquieted by the forces under Reding and Coupigny, which had now united together, and threatened them with an attack, that they retired towards Carolina, on the road to the Sierra Morena; and Vedel finding, on his arrival at Baylen, that it was entirely evacuated by the French troops, followed them to the same place, with the design of securing the passes of the mountains in their rear. By this fatal movement the two divisions of the French army were irrevocably separated, and Reding and Coupigny, finding no enemy to oppose them, entered in great force into Baylen and established themselves there. Thus the two hostile armies became interlaced in the most extraordinary manner: Castanos having Dupont between him and Reding, and Reding being interposed between the French general and his lieutenant, Vedel.*

In such a situation a decisive advantage to one or other party is at hand, and it generally falls to the commander who boldly takes the initiative and brings his combined forces to bear on the isolated corps of his opponent. Dupont, sensible of his danger, broke up from Andujar late on the evening of the 18th and marched towards Baylen, on his direct line of retreat; while Reding and Coupigny, finding themselves relieved of all fears from Vedel and Dufour, who had moved to Carolina, in the entrance of the mountains, turned their faces to the southward, and early on the following morning marched towards Andujar, with the design of co-operating with Castanos in the destruction of Dupont. Hearing, soon after their departure, of his approach towards them, they took post in a

Singular manner in which these armies became interlaced.

Battle of Baylen. July 19.

* Ante, i., 538.

† Tor., i., 360, 363. Foy, iv., 59, 66. Jom., iii., 60, 61. Nap., i., 120, 121.

† A singular coincidence occurred in relation to the place and day of the action in which General Gobert lost his life. On the same day (16th of July), nearly six hundred years before (16th of July, 1212), there had been gained at the same place the great battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, by Alphonso IX. over the Mussulman host of Spain and Africa, two hundred thousand strong. Gobert fell on the field still called the *field of massacre*, from the carnage made of the Moors on that memorable occasion; the greatest victory after that of Tours ever gained by the Christians over the soldiers of the Crescent.—TORENO, i., 363.

* Foy, iv., 67, 77. Tor., i., 363, 364. Nap., i., 122. Jom., iii., 60, 61.

strong position, intersected with ravines and covered by olive woods, in front of Baylen, and soon the French outposts appeared in sight. Their forces, widely scattered and coming up in disorder, resembled rather a detachment guarding an immense convoy than a corps equipped for field operations; so heavily were they laden by five hundred baggage-wagons, which conveyed along the artillery, ammunition stores, and ill-gotten plunder of Cordova. Great was the dismay in the French troops when, in the obscurity of the morning, an hour before sunrise, they suddenly came upon the Spanish array right in their front, occupying this advantageous position; but there was no time for deliberation, for Castanos, having heard of their departure from Andujar, had shortly after entered that town, and, passing through it with the bulk of his forces, was already threatening their rear. Dupont immediately made his dispositions for forcing his way, sword in hand, through the barrier of steel which opposed his progress; and had his troops been concentrated, there can be little doubt that he would have succeeded in doing so, and either thrown Reding back towards Vedel, or opened up his own communication with that general. But at this decisive moment the sack of Cordova proved their ruin. The troops were scattered along a line of march of three leagues in length, encumbered with innumerable wagons; the best were in rear to guard the precious convoy from the attacks of Castanos. Hastily assembling such troops as he could collect in front, Dupont, with three thousand men, commenced an attack when the day broke, at four o'clock in the morning; but his troops, fatigued by a long night march, and discouraged by the unexpected and dangerous enemy which obstructed their advance, could make no impression on the Swiss regiments and Walloon Guards, the flower of the Spanish army, which there awaited their approach. After a gallant struggle, in which they sustained a severe loss, they were driven back, and lost not only some guns, which in the commencement of the action they had taken from the enemy, but even their own. As brigade after brigade successively came up to the front, they were brought forward to the attack, but with no better success; the French troops, wearied by a night march, choked with dust, disordered by the encumbrance of baggage-wagons, overwhelmed by the burning sun of Andalusia in the dog-days, were no match for the steady Swiss and Walloon Guards who had rested all night, cool under the shade, in a strong position, or even the new levies, to whom Reding had imparted his own invincible spirit; and their guns, which came up one by one, in haste and confusion, and never equalled those which the enemy had in battery, were speedily dismounted by the superior force and unerring aim of the Spanish artillery. Two thousand men had already fallen on the side of the invaders, while scarce a tenth of the number were disabled on that of their enemies; heat and thirst overwhelmed even the bravest soldiers; and that fatal dejection, the forerunner of disaster, was rapidly spreading among the young conscripts, when two Swiss regiments, which had hitherto bravely maintained the combat on the right, came to a

parley with their brethren in the Spanish lines, and passed over to the side of Reding. At the same time a loud cannonade was heard from behind, and disordered fugitives, breathless from running, and almost melting with heat, burst through the ranks, and announced that a large body of the Spaniards, under La Pena, the advanced guard of Castanos, was already menacing the rear. Despairing now of extricating himself from his difficulties, ignorant of the situation of Vedel or Dufour, and deeming a capitulation the only way to preserve the army from destruction, Dupont sent to Reding to propose a suspension of arms, which was at once agreed to.*

While Dupont, with the corps under his immediate command, not ten thousand strong, was thus maintaining of Vedel, who a painful and hopeless struggle with the concentrated masses of the Spaniards, more than double their amount, the remainder of his army, of equal force, under Vedel and Dufour, was occupied to no purpose at a distance from the scene of action. The whole of the 18th was spent by these generals at Carolina in allowing the soldiers to repose, and repairing the losses of the artillery; but as the enemy, whom they expected to find at the entrance of the passes, had disappeared, and a loud cannonade was heard the following morning on the side of Baylen, they rightly judged that it was there that the decisive point was to be found, and set out in that direction. The distance from Carolina to Baylen was only eight miles; that from Andujar to the same place was sixteen: by a little activity, therefore, Vedel might have reached the rear of Reding sooner than Castanos could that of Dupont, and then the fate which the Spanish generals designed for the French troops might have overtaken themselves. When he arrived at Guaroman, however, nearly half way, the troops were so much exhausted by the heat that Vedel, though he heard the cannonade, now only five miles distant, hourly increasing, had the weakness to allow them some hours of repose. This halt proved decisive; while it continued, Dupont's troops, whom he might with ease have reached in two hours, were reduced to desperation. At noon it suddenly ceased, and the soldiers flattered themselves that the danger had passed; it was the suspension of arms, which was about to bring unheard-of disgrace upon them all. When they resumed their march, at two in the afternoon, they soon came upon the rear of Reding, and discrediting the statement of an armistice, which was immediately made to them, commenced an attack, made prisoners a battalion of Irish in the service of Spain, captured some guns, dispersed some new levies which defended them, and were within a league of their comrades in distress, when an officer from Dupont arrived with the mournful intelligence that an armistice had been agreed to, and that they had no alternative but submission. It was all over: the halt of a few hours at Guaroman had ruined the expedition; twenty thousand men were about to lay down their arms; Europe was to be electrified; the empire of Napoleon shaken to its

* *Foy*, iv., 77, 84. *Tor.*, i., 364, 367. *Nap.*, i., 122, 123. *Jom.*, iii., 61, 62. *London*, i., 94, 95.

foundation. Such is the importance of time in war.*

Dupont, in the first instance, proposed a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole French troops were to be allowed to retire, with their artillery and baggage, out of Andalusia; and Castanos was at first inclined to have acceded to the proposal, deeming it an immense advantage to clear that province of the enemy, and gain time in this way for completing their preparations. But at this critical moment the despatches were intercepted and brought to headquarters, which announced the approach of Cuesta to the capital, and recalled Dupont to contribute to its defence. A convention would no longer be listened to; an absolute surrender of arms was required, under condition only of being sent to France by sea. After many fruitless efforts to avoid so hard a fate, this was agreed to by Dupont, but he insinuated to Vedel that he might endeavour to extricate himself from his toils. That general accordingly retired to Carolina; but the Spaniards threatened to put Dupont and his whole division to the sword if this movement was not stopped and Vedel included in the capitulation. Intimidated by these menaces, orders to this effect were despatched by Dupont, and so completely were the spirits of the French officers broken, that, out of twenty-four whom Vedel assembled to deliberate on the course they should pursue at this crisis, only *four*, including that general himself, voted for disregarding the capitulation and continuing their retreat, which was now open, to La Mancha. Nay, to such an extent did the panic extend, that a Spanish detachment crossed the mountains and made prisoners, upon the strength of the capitulation of Baylen, all the French depôts and insulated bodies as far as Toledo, which, with those who laid down their arms on the field, swelled the captives to twenty-one thousand. Two thousand had fallen in the battle; a thousand in the previous operations, or from the effect of sickness: twenty-four thousand men were lost to France.†

Language can convey to future ages no adequate idea of the impression which this extraordinary event produced in Europe. Nothing, since the opening of the Revolutionary war, had at all approached to it in importance. Hitherto the career of the French armies had been one of almost unbroken success, and even though the talents of the Archduke Charles and the firmness of the Russians had for a time arrested the torrent, yet it had been suspended only to break out shortly after with accumulated force, and sweep away every obstacle which courage, combination, or genius could oppose to its progress. Even at their lowest point of depression, disgrace had never sullied the Republican ranks: victorious or vanquished, they had ever commanded the respect of their enemies; no large bodies had laid down their arms; their retreat had ever been that of brave and honourable men. Now, however, a disaster unheard-of in Europe since the battle of Pavia, had overtaken their standards:

twenty-thousand men had surrendered; the imperial eagles had found in Andalusia the Cadiz Forks. Fame and incorrect information gave greater importance to this triumph than even its intrinsic magnitude deserved; it was unknown or overlooked that it was by a skilful series of military movements on the one side, and an extraordinary combination of errors on the other, that Dupont had been brought to such hazardous straits; by the firmness of the Swiss and Walloon Guards, the precision in fire of the Spanish artillery, and the inexperience of his own troops, that he had been compelled to surrender. It was generally imagined that the French veterans had laid down their arms to the Spanish peasants; it was unknown or forgotten that the victory was really gained by experienced soldiers; and the imaginations of men, both in the Peninsula and over all Europe, were set on fire by the belief that a new era had dawned upon mankind; that the superiority of disciplined troops and regular armies was at an end; and that popular enthusiasm and general zeal were all that were necessary to secure the victory even over the greatest and most formidable veteran armies. How widely this belief spread, how generally it was acted upon, and what oceans of blood it caused to be spilled in vain in Spain itself, will amply appear in the sequel of this history; and probably, by inspiring the people of that country with an overweening idea of their own strength, and of the capability of raw levies to contend with regular forces, it contributed, in no small degree, to that almost unbroken train of disasters in the field which their armies, when unsupported by the British, subsequently experienced during the remainder of the war. But in the first instance it produced a prodigious and most important burst of exultation and enthusiasm; it determined the conduct of a great proportion of the grandes and nobles of Spain, who had in the first instance adhered to the usurper, but now, with the Dukes del Infantado and del Parque, Cevallos and Penuela, rejoined the ranks of their countrymen; and by throwing the capital and chief towns of the kingdom, with the exception of the frontier fortresses, into the hands of the insurgents, gave the struggle, in the eyes of all Europe, as well as of the people themselves, the character of a national contest. Nor was the effect less momentous over the whole Continent, by affording a convincing proof that the French, at least, were not invincible, and opening the eyes of all governments to the immense addition which the military force, on which they had hitherto exclusively relied, might receive from the ardour and enthusiasm of the people.*

Napoleon was at Bordeaux when the account of the capitulation reached him. Opinions of Napoleon on this algar, had he been so completely overwhelmed: for a time he could not speak; the excess of his depression excited the alarm of his ministers. "Is your majesty unwell?" said the minister for foreign affairs, Maret. "No." "Has Austria declared war?" "Would to God that were all!" "What, then, has happened?" The emperor recounted the humil-

* Tor., i., 367, 368. Foy, iv., 85, 91. Nap., i., 122, 124. Jom., ii., 62, 63.

† Nap., i., 123, 124. Foy, iv., 97, 106. Tor., i., 370, 372. Jom., ii., 63, 64.

† Montg., vi., 345. Foy, iv., 110, 114. Lond., i., 97. Tor., i., 378. Nell., i., 124, 125. Jom., iii., 64.

iating details of the capitulation, and added, "That an army should be beaten is nothing; it is the daily fate of war, and is easily repaired; but that an army should submit to a dishonourable capitulation, is a stain on the glory of our arms which can never be effaced. Wounds inflicted on honour are incurable. The moral effect of this catastrophe will be terrible. What! they have had the infamy to consent that the haversacks of our soldiers should be searched like those of robbers! Could I have ever expected that of General Dupont, a man whom I loved, and was rearing up to become a marshal? They say he had no other way to prevent the destruction of the army—to save the lives of the soldiers! Better, far better, to have perished with arms in their hands, that not one should have escaped. Their death would have been glorious; we would have avenged them. You can always supply the place of soldiers; honour alone, when once lost, can never be regained."*

If the capitulation itself was dishonourable to the French arms, the subsequent violation of it by the Spaniards was still more disgraceful to the victors, and remains a dark stain on the Castilian good faith. From the moment that the long file of prisoners began their march towards Cadiz as the place of their embarkation, it was felt to be extremely difficult to restrain the indignation of the people, who loudly complained that so large a body of men, for the most part stained by robbery or murder, committed in Spain, should be forwarded to France, apparently for no other purpose but that they might be again let loose in the Peninsula to commit similar devastations. Alarmed at the increase and serious character of the ferment, the junta of Seville consulted Castanos and Morla, the governor of Cadiz, in the course which they should adopt. The first, with the honour and good faith of a gallant soldier, in opposition to the public clamour, insisted that the capitulation should be religiously observed; the latter, forgetting every other consideration in the desire to gain a temporary popularity with the multitude, contended that no treaty could be binding with men who had committed such enormities on the Spanish soil as the French prisoners; that to let them return to France, loaded with the spoil of Cordova, torn from the wretched inhabitants in open violation of the laws of war, would be a palpable act of insanity; and that, having once got them in their power, the only sensible course was to detain them till the war was over. These specious but sophistical arguments, unworthy of a Spanish officer, found a responsive echo in the breast of the infuriated multitude; the public effervescence increased as they advanced in their march; in consequence of the discovery of precious spoils in the knapsacks of some of the soldiers at Lebrixa, a tumult ensued between the peasantry and the prisoners, which cost many lives to the latter; the sacred vases of Cordova and Jaen were loudly demanded; and at Port St. Mary's the accidental circumstance of one of these holy cups falling from the haversack of a soldier gave rise to such a tu-

mult, that a general search of the baggage could no longer be prevented. These disorders were, perhaps, unavoidable in the circumstances in which the Spanish government of the province was situated, and the unexampled treachery with which they had been assailed by the French, but for the subsequent violation of the capitulation no sort of apology can be found. Desirous of maintaining their popularity, the junta of Seville acceded to the opinion of Morla, in which they in vain endeavoured to get Lord Collingwood and Sir Hugh Dalrymple to concur; instead of being sent by sea to France, the soldiers and regimental officers were crowded together into the hulks of Cadiz, where, such were the privations and misery to which they were subjected, that very few remained at the conclusion of the war.* Dupont, the officers of his staff, and all the generals, were permitted to return to France; but the remainder, nearly eighteen thousand in number, were kept in lingering suffering in their dismal captivity, and, with the exception of a few who accepted service under the Spanish government, and took the first opportunity to desert to their beloved eagles, and those contained in one hulk, who overpowered their guards during the night, and contrived to float her across to the lines of their countrymen three years afterward, during the siege of Cadiz, hardly any ever revisited their native country.† This frightful act of injustice was as impolitic as it was disgraceful; it gave the French, in their turn, too fair a ground for inveighing against the perfidy of their enemies, exasperated the feelings of their armies, who had first entered into this contest with lukewarm dispositions or undisguised aversion, and repeatedly afterward stimulated them to desperate and sanguinary resistance, under circumstances when, with a more trustworthy enemy, they would have entered into terms of accommodation.‡

* Sir Hugh Dalrymple's answer to the junta of Seville, when his opinion was asked on this subject, is worthy of a place in history. "It is quite clear that the capitulation is binding on the contracting parties, so far as they have the means of carrying it into execution. The laws of honour, not considerations of expediency, should ever govern soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; the surrender of General Vatel could only be supposed to have arisen from the confidence which he placed in the honour which characterized the Spanish nation. The reputation of a government, especially one newly formed, is public property, which ought not to be lightly squandered. The matter, therefore, is clear on considerations of honour and justice; even viewed in the light of expediency, it is far from being beyond dispute." Lord Collingwood, when applied to, answered, that if the Spanish government had not adequate seamen to man transport vessels for conveying the troops, he would order British seamen to fit out their merchant vessels for that purpose; that the capitulation must be observed so far as possible; if the conditions were impossible, they annulled themselves. —SOUTHBY, i., 502, 504. COLLINGWOOD'S *Memoirs*, ii., 127, 128.

† Foy, iv., 107, 109. Tor., i., 373, 377. Nap., i., 125, 127. South., i., 502, 510. Collingwood, ii., 124.

‡ The fate of the generals and officers who were returned to France from Cadiz was hardly less deplorable than that of their comrades who lingered away in prolonged torments on board the Spanish hulks. Dupont and all the generals were immediately arrested and sent to prison, where they lingered, without either trial or investigation, for many years afterward. General Marescot, who, though in a subaltern rank, had taken a certain part in the negotiation, loudly, but in vain, demanded to be brought to a court-martial. Neither he nor Dupont, nor any of the superior officers connected with the capitulation of Baylen, were ever more heard of till after the fall of Napoleon in 1814. In 1812, a court of inquiry sat on the generals Feb. 17, 1812, and condemned them all, but public opinion

The fatal news of the capitulation of Baylen arrived at Madrid on the 29th of July, and diffused universal consternation among the adherents of Joseph. A council of war was immediately summoned by Savary, and opinions were much divided on the course which should be pursued. Moncey proposed that Bessières' division should be recalled, and that with their united forces they should take a position in front of the capital, and defend it to the last extremity. But Savary, to whom the situation which he held as lieutenant-general of the king, as well as the known confidence which he enjoyed with the emperor, gave a preponderating voice in the deliberations, strongly urged the necessity of retiring to the northward, and taking council from circumstances as to the point to which it should be prolonged. On the 30th of July the intrusive king commenced his retreat: the hospitals had previously been evacuated for Bayonne; the heavy artillery, which could not be brought away, amounting to eighty pieces, were spiked; but the retiring monarch and his military satellites carried off with them all the jewels and precious articles from the palaces they had so recently occupied. They retired by the great road to Burgos, where headquarters were established on the 9th of August; the rear-guard collecting as it went along all the garrisons of the towns and castles which had been occupied by the French troops to the south of the Ebro. They experienced no molestation from the Spaniards during their retreat; notwithstanding which, all the villages and hamlets through which they passed were given up to pillage, and a great number burned to the ground. Soon after Joseph arrived at Burgos, Bessières arrived with his corps, and Verdier came up with the force which had been engaged in the siege of Saragossa, so that, including Moncey's corps and the troops brought up from Madrid, above fifty thousand veteran troops could, notwithstanding all the losses of the campaign, be collected for the defence of the Ebro.*†

was far from supporting their decision. Shortly after (1st May 1. May, 1812), an imperial decree forbade, on pain of death, any capitulation in the field which should amount to a laying down of arms. Such was Napoleon's irritation in everything connected with this convention, that when he afterward saw General Legendre, who, as chief of the staff to Dupont, had officially affixed his signature to the treaty, he was seized with a trembling from head to foot, and his indignation exhaled in these words: "How, general! did your hand not wither when you signed that infamous capitulation?" He never afterward heard Baylen alluded to without evincing such indignation as showed how deeply it had wounded his mind.—Foy, iv., 110, 113. * Foy, iv., 117, 124. Thib., vi., 442, 443. Sav., iii., 275, 277.

† Savary was blamed by Napoleon for this retreat to the Ebro, and he alleged that the line of the Douro might have been maintained, and the operations against Saragossa in consequence not interrupted. In justice to the French general, however, it must be observed, that his situation in the capital, after the surrender of Dupont, had become extremely critical; and that the losses which the troops at the capital had undergone were such as to preclude the hope of a successful stand being made against the united Spanish armies which might advance from the South. Shortly after his arrival at Madrid he had written in these luminous and explicit terms to the emperor, in a despatch which throws great light on the state of the contest at that period: "It is no longer a mere affair in which, by punishing the leaders, a revolt may be suppressed. If the arrival of the king does not pacify the country, we shall have a regular war on our hands with the troops of the line,

While this decisive stroke was struck in the south of Spain, the contest had already assumed a sanguinary character; the success had been more checkered in the Catalonian mountains, and the British army, under the guidance of WELLINGTON, had chased the French eagles from the rock of Lisbon.

Napoleon, who was by no means aware of the almost insurmountable obstacles which the tenacious spirit and rugged mountains of Catalonia were to oppose to his arms, had directed Duhesme to lend a helping hand to Lefebvre Desnoettes in the siege of Saragossa. In order to accomplish this object, that general, early in June, fitted out two corps: the first, four thousand five hundred strong, under the orders of General Chabran, was despatched towards the south, with instructions to make himself master of Tortosa and Tarragona, and then proceed on and co-operate with Marshal Moncey in the attack on Valencia; while the second, under General Schwartz, consisting of three thousand eight hundred men, after punishing Manresa, destroying the powder-mills there, and levying a heavy contribution on its inhabitants, was to push on to Lerida, and, after securing that important fortress, lend a hand to Lefebvre before the walls of Saragossa. These columns

quitted Barcelona early in June, and directed their march to their respective points of destination; but both experienced defeat. The tocsin was ringing in all the hills; the villages were deserted; the woods and higher parts of the mountains, the rugged passes and inaccessible thickets, formed so many rallying-points to the courageous Somatenes.* Schwartz, indeed, in his march towards Saragossa, forced the celebrated pass of Bruch, though beset with armed men; but, advancing a little farther, he fell into a disaster at Casa Mansana: the villagers assailed the invaders with showers of stones, balls, and even boiling water from the roofs of the houses; the peasants, who had fled in disorder a few minutes before through the streets, returned to the charge; threatened on all sides, Schwartz resolved to retreat, which he effected at first in good order; but his advanced guard having attempted to force the passage of the town of Esparraguera, which lay on his road during the night, was repulsed with loss, and his troops, thrown into disorder by that nocturnal check, were never able to regain their proper array till they found refuge, two days after, under the cannon of Barcelona. Chabran, whose route

and one of extermination with the peasantry. The system of sending movable columns over the provinces is likely to induce partial checks, which will lead to the spreading of the insurrection. It is indispensable that your majesty should consider seriously of the means of carrying on the war. We lose four hundred men a month in the hospitals alone; our army can in no respect be compared to that which occupies Germany. Everything has been calculated according to the turn which it was expected affairs would assume, not that they have actually taken. Many battalions have not four officers; the whole cavalry is fit for the hospital together. The crowds of young and presumptuous men who crowd the army, contribute rather to embarrassment than anything else. There is an incalculable difference between such coxcombs and a steady veteran sergeant or officer."—SAVARY TO NAPOLEON; Foy, iv., 34, 35.

* The *Somatenes* are the *levy-en-masse*, which, by an ancient law of Catalonia, are bound to turn out and defend their parishes whenever the *Somaten* or alarm-bell is heard from the churches.—TORENO, i., 309.

lay through a less mountainous district, reached Tarragona in safety on the 7th, and got possession of that important town without opposition; but Duhesme was so much alarmed by the repulse of Schwartz that he hastily recalled him to Barcelona; and so dangerous is it to make a retrograde movement while engaged with an insurrection, that a very severe resistance was experienced in the retreat, at places where not a shot had been fired during the advance. Irritated by this opposition and the sanguinary excesses of the peasants, the French set fire to the Villa-Franca as they retired; and Duhesme having sent Count Theodore Lecchi with the Italian division and Schwartz's troops to his assistance, the united columns again approached the pass of Bruch; but finding the Somatenes posted on its rugged cliffs in even greater strength than before, they fell back, after a bloody skirmish, and regained the shelter of Barcelona, pursued up to the very gates by the dropping fire and taunting scoffs of their gallant though rustic opponents.*†

These defeats produced the greater sensation, both among the French and the Spaniards, that they were gained, not by regular troops, but a tumultuary array of peasants, wholly undisciplined, and most of whom had then for the first time been engaged either in military service or exercise. They occasioned, in consequence, a universal insurrection in Catalonia: the cities equally as the mountains caught the flame; the burghers of Lerida, Tortona, Tarragona, Gerona, and all the towns in the province not garrisoned by French troops, closed their gates, manned their ramparts, and elected juntas to direct measures of defence; while the mountain districts, which embraced four fifths of the province, obeyed the animating call of the Somaten, and, under the guidance of their parish priests, organized a desperate Vendéan warfare. Forty regiments, of a thousand men each, were ordered to be raised for active operations of these formidable mountaineers; regular officers were, for the most part, obtained to direct their organization, and the ranks were in a short time complete, and, for the service of light troops, of a very efficient description. An equal force was directed to be prepared as a reserve, in case their mountain fastnesses should be threatened by the enemy. The peculiar nature of these extensive and thickly-peopled hill districts, as well as the character and resolution of their inhabitants; their rugged precipices, wood-clad steeps, and terraced slopes; their villages, perched like eyries on the summit of cliffs, and numerous forts and castles, each susceptible of a separate defence; their bold and energetic inhabitants, consisting of lawless smugglers or hardy peasants, long habituated to the enjoyment of almost unbounded practical freedom, rendered this warfare one of a peculiarly hazardous and laborious description.‡ Aware of the necessity of stri-

king a decisive blow in the present critical state of affairs of the province, Duhesme conceived that a sudden *coup-dé-main* against GERONA, which lies on the direct road to France, would both re-establish his communications, which the insurrections in all directions had totally intercepted, and strike a general terror into the enemy. Two days after the return of the former ill-fated expedition, accordingly, June 16. he set out in the direction of that town, with six thousand of his best troops, taking the coast-road to avoid the fortress of Hostalrich, which was in the hands of the enemy, and after cutting his way with great slaughter through a large body of Somatenes who endeavoured to obstruct his progress, appeared on the 20th before the walls of Gerona. Little preparation had been made to repel June 17. an assault; but the gates were closed, and the inhabitants, in great numbers, were on the walls prepared to defend their hearths. Having at length got his scaling-ladders ready, and diverted the attention of the besieged by a skirmish with the Somatenes on the plain at a distance from the ramparts, the assaulting columns suddenly approached the walls at five in the afternoon. Though they got very near without being perceived, and a few brave men reached the summit, they were repulsed in two successive attacks with great slaughter; and Duhesme having in vain tried the effect of a negotiation to induce a surrender, returned, by forced marches, to Barcelona, harassed at every step by the Somatenes, who, descending in great strength from the hills, inflicted a severe loss on his retreating columns.*

After this defeat, the whole plain round Barcelona, called the Llobregat, was filled with the enemy's troops; and General Duhesme, enraged at finding himself thus beset in the capital of the province, marched out against them a week afterward, and defeated a large body of the peasantry at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, capturing all their artillery. Rallying, however, at their old fastnesses of Bruch and Igualado, they again, when the French retired, returned to the Llobregat, and not only shut up the enemy within the ramparts of Barcelona, but established a communication with the insurgents in the interior, along the seacoast, from the Pyrenean frontier to the mouth of the Ebro, which all became the theatre of insurrection. Napoleon, to whom the prolongation of the war in so many different quarters of Spain had become a subject of great uneasiness, no sooner received intelli-

province of Catalonia, like those of Navarre and Biscay, has long enjoyed such extensive civil privileges as savour rather of Democratic equality than despotic authority. Its social state differs altogether from that of Arragon, though it was so long united under the same sceptre. Nowhere, except in this mountain Republic, is there so ardent a thirst after political freedom, or so large an enjoyment, at least in the mountainous districts, of its practical blessings. The inhabitants nourish the most profound hatred at the French, whom they accuse of having excited their fathers to revolt against the government of Madrid, and abandoned, when the contest was no longer conducive to their interests. In the long and opulent district which runs along the seashore, and contains the flourishing seaports of Tarragona, Roses, and Barcelona, commercial interests prevail; and the alliance and consequent trade with England was as much the object of desire as the withering union with France had been a subject of aversion.—Foy, iv., 137, 138.

* Nap., i., 77, 80. Foy, iv., 151, 159. Tor., i., 315, 317.

* Tor., i., 309, 315. Nap., i., 75, 77. Foy, iv., 143, 151. Duhesme, 18, 19.

† The inhabitants of Bruch, to commemorate their victory, erected a stone in the pass, with this pompous though laconic inscription: "Victores Marengo, Austerlitz, et Jena, hic victi fuerunt diebus vi. et xiv. Junii, anno 1808."—Foy, iv., 151.

‡ Though locally situated in an unlimited monarchy, the

gence of these untoward events than he directed Duhesme to issue from Barcelona, relieve Figueras, where four hundred French were closely blockaded by the insurgent peasantry, and afterward carry by assault both Rosas and

July 5. Gerona. General Reille, whom he sent

forward with a large convoy guarded by five thousand men, defeated the Somatenes before Figueras, and raised the blockade of that fortress; but when, encouraged by this success,

July 11. he attempted a *coup-de-main* against

Rosas, he sustained a repulse; and, finding himself daily more closely straitened by the insurgents, was obliged to retire with considerable loss towards Gerona. About the same time the Spanish affairs in the whole province acquired a degree of consistency to which they had never previously attained, by

July 22. the conclusion of a treaty between Lord

Collingwood and the Marquis Palacios, governor of the Balearic Isles, in virtue of which the whole disposable force in those islands was conveyed to the Catalanian shores, and thirteen hundred good troops were directed towards Gerona, while Palacios himself, with four thousand five hundred, and thirty-seven pieces of cannon, landed at Tarragona, where their presence excited a most extraordinary degree of enthusiasm.*

Meanwhile Duhesme, with the main body of

his forces, six thousand strong, a considerable train of heavy artillery, and everything requisite for a

siege, set out from Barcelona, and took the road for Gerona; but he was long delayed on the road, which runs close to the seashore, by the fire of an English frigate, under the command of Lord COCHRANE, which sent a shower of balls among his columns whenever they came within range, on the one side, and the desultory but incessant attacks of the Somatenes on the other. At length, after encountering great difficulties and experiencing a heavy loss, he succeeded in forcing his way, by the hill-road, to Hostalrich, which he summoned in vain to surrender; and leaving a few troops only to observe its garrison, he, by infinite skill and no small good fortune, avoided the guns of that

July 24. fortress, and proceeded on to Gerona,

under the walls of which he effected a junction with Reille's troops, who had come up from Rosas. Their united strength being now, notwithstanding all their losses, above

July 22. nine thousand men, operations in form

were commenced against the place. Before this could be done, however, the succours from Majorca had been thrown into the town; and as the besiegers were themselves cut off from all communication, both with their reserve magazines at Barcelona and the frontier of France, by the incessant activity of the peasantry, who lay in wait for and frequently intercepted the convoys, the works advanced

Aug. 15. very slowly. On the 15th of August, however, the breach of Fort Montjuic was declared practicable, and an assault was about to commence, when the besiegers were themselves assailed by a confused but formidable body, ten thousand strong, which appeared in their rear. This consisted, one half of reg-

ular troops, which the Count Caldagues had brought up from Tarragona, the other of Somatenes and Miquelets, with which he had augmented his force during its march along the coast of Catalonia. Count Theodore Lecchi, who was left in charge of Barcelona, was in no condition to oppose their passage almost within range of the guns of the fortress; for the troops he commanded, hardly four thousand strong, were barely adequate to guard its extensive works, and the Miquelets, stationed on the heights which overhang the city, had carried their audacity to such a pitch as not only to keep up a constant fire on the French sentinels, but even make signals to the disturbed multitude in the streets to revolt. When this powerful force approached Gerona, the besieged made a general sally on the French lines, and with such vigour that they penetrated into the batteries through the embrasures of the guns, spiked the heavy cannon, and set fire to the works; while Duhesme, with the great body of the besiegers' force, was sufficiently engaged in observing the enemy which threatened them from the outside. Finding it totally impossible to continue the siege, Duhesme broke up in the night, and, dividing his force into two columns, took the road for Barcelona. But here fresh difficulties awaited him: two English frigates, under the able direction of Lord Cochrane, cannonaded and raked the road by the seacoast; overhanging cliffs prevented them from getting out of the destructive range; while the route by the mountains in the interior, besides being closed by the cannon of Hostalrich, was in many places steep and intersected by ravines, and beset by armed peasants, who, from the rocks and woods above, kept up a destructive fire upon the troops beneath.* In these circumstances, the French general did not hesitate to sacrifice his artillery and stores; and, thus lightened, he succeeded in fighting his way back, by mountain-paths on the summit of the cliffs which overhang the sea, amid a constant fire, to Barcelona. In this disastrous expedition above two thousand men and thirty pieces of artillery, besides extensive stores, were lost; and at its conclusion the French possessed nothing in Catalonia but the fortress of Barcelona and the citadel of Figueras.

Unbounded was the joy which these extraordinary successes in every part of Spain excited among its inhabitants. The variety of quarters in which they had arisen augmented their moral effect: it was supposed that popular energy was irresistible, when it had triumphed over its enemies at once in Andalusia and Arragon, Valencia and Catalonia. Abandoning themselves to a pleasing and allowable, though short-lived illusion, the Spaniards generally believed that the war was at an end; that the Castilian soil was finally delivered from its invaders; and that, relieved of all disquietude as to the defence of their own country, the only question was, when they should unite their victorious arms to those of the English, and carry the torrent of invasion across the Pyrenees into the French plains. These enthusiastic feelings rose to a perfect

* Tor., i., 38, 39. Nap., i., 82, 83. Foy, iv., 169, 172. St. Cyr, *Guerre la Catal.*, 14, 17. Castanos, i., 32, 84.

* Cabanes, ii., 62, 81. Foy, iv., 172, 193. Tor., i., 37, 40. Nap., i., 85, 86. St. Cyr, 40, 47. Duhesme, 28, 39.

climax when the Spanish army from Andalusia entered the capital, in great pomp, with Castanos at their head, under a majestic triumphal arch, erected by the citizens to do honour to their arrival; and the whole of Spain, Aug. 25. now delivered from the enemy, with the exception of the small portion occupied by the French army in Navarre and on the Ebro, joined in one universal chorus of national exultation and hatred of the invaders. The press joined its influence to the same excitement; newspapers, warmly advocating the patriotic cause, were established at Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, and the other chief towns of Spain, and by their vehement declamation added to the general enthusiasm, as much as by their extravagant boasting they weakened the sense of the necessity of present exertion, and thus diminished the chance of bringing the contest in the end to a successful issue. But in the midst of the universal exultation it was observed with regret that few vigorous or efficient measures were adopted by the many separate and independent juntas to prosecute the war against the enemy: a feeling increased by the calamitous issue of the revolt of Bilbao, which had taken up arms upon receipt of the glorious news from Andalusia. The inhabitants, in the first instance, had succeeded in expelling the French garrison; but, being unsupported by any aid from Asturias or Aug. 16. Galicia, the place was quickly recaptured, with great slaughter, by the French division of Merle. This was done by the express commands of Joseph Bonaparte, to whom this dangerous movement, in a town of such magnitude, so near his line of communications with France, had been the subject of no small disquietude; and who boasted in his despatches, that "the fire of the insurrection at Bilbao had been extinguished in the blood of twelve hundred men."^{*}

Meanwhile events of a still more glorious and decisive character had liberated the kingdom of Portugal from its oppressors.

In every phase of modern history it has been observed that Portugal has, sooner or later, followed the course of changes which public feeling had established in Spain; and it was hardly to be expected that so great and heart-stirring an event as the resurrection of Castilian independence was not to find a responsive echo in the kingdom so closely neighbouring, and equally suffering under the evils of Gallic oppression. At a very early period, accordingly, symptoms of an alarming effervescence manifested themselves in Portugal, and Napoleon, appreciating more justly than Junot the probable course of events in that kingdom, strongly enjoined him to abandon the pompous proclamations in which he was endeavouring to win the affections of the people, and in good earnest prepare for military operations.† Not

anticipating, however, any immediate hostilities, he ordered him to detach four thousand men to support Bessières in Leon, and three thousand to co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia. But these detachments were rendered impossible by the pressure of events in Portugal itself. No sooner did the intelligence of the massacre at Madrid on the 2d of May, and the insurrection in Galicia reach Oporto, than the Spanish troops there, ten thousand strong, dispossessed the French authorities, and marched off in a body towards Galicia, from June 5. whence, as already mentioned, they were forwarded to Leon in time to share in the disaster of Rio Seco. The inhabitants, in the first moment of enthusiasm, installed insurrectionary authorities in room of the French ones, who had been dispossessed; but after the departure of the Spanish troops they became alarmed at their own boldness, and hastened to reinstate the tricolour flag, and to renew their protestation of fidelity to the French general at Lisbon. The moment, however, that he was apprized of the events at Oporto, Junot made preparations to effect the disarming of the June 9. Spanish troops in the capital; and with such secrecy and decision were his measures taken, that, before they were well aware of the danger impending over them, they were all surrounded by greatly superior masses of French troops, and compelled to surrender. By this able stroke nearly five thousand Spanish troops were made prisoners, who might have been highly prejudicial to the French arms, if they had succeeded in withdrawing and forming the nucleus of an insurrection in the interior of the country.*

The flame, however, excited by the glorious intelligence of popular success, which daily came pouring in from all parts of Spain, could not so easily be suppressed. The students at Coimbra were among the first to take up arms; the mountaineers of Tras-los-Montes speedily followed the example; the tocsins were heard in their lovely hills, arms and torches gleamed in their vine-clad vales; Al- June 11. garves was speedily in open revolt; Alentejo was known to be ripe for insurrection, and, at the summons of Colonel Lopez de Souza, soon after took up arms. Encouraged by this revolt in their neighbourhood, the inhabitants of Oporto a second time hoisted the standard of independence. A junta was speedily formed June 9. in that opulent city, which shared the supreme direction of affairs with the bishop, who early signalized himself by his zeal in the patriot cause. The insurrection in the province of Entre Douro-Minho appeared so formidable, that Junot directed General Loison with a strong division to proceed against it from Almeida; but though he at first obtained some

Progress of the insurrection.

Affairs of Portugal, and disarming of the Spanish troops in that country.

* South., ii., 287, 288. Tor., ii., 82, 85. Nap., i., 287, 288.

† "What is the use," said he, "of promising to the Portuguese what you will never have the means of fulfilling? Nothing is more praiseworthy, without doubt, than to gain the affections of the people; but it should never be forgotten that the primary object of a general should be the safety of his soldiers. Instantly disarm the Portuguese; watch over the soldiers who have been sent to their homes, in order

that their chiefs may not form so many centres of insurrection in the interior. Keep your eye on the Spanish troops; secure the important fortresses of Almeida and Elvas. Lisbon is too large and populous a city; its population is necessarily hostile. Withdraw your troops from it; place them in barracks on the seacoast. Keep them in breath—well disciplined, massed, and instructed, in order to be in a condition to combat the English army, which, sooner or later, will disembark on the coasts of Portugal."—NAPOLÉON to JUNOT, May 24, 1808. Foy, iv., 198, 199.

* Lond., i., 117, 119. South., ii., 41, 47. Nevis, 99, 109. Foy, iv., 202, 210.

success, yet, as he advanced into the mountains, his communications were so completely cut off, and the insurrection appeared so formidable on all sides, that he was obliged to return to Lisbon by Celorico and Guarda, at which places he routed the peasantry with great slaughter.* In the south, the patriots gained considerable successes against the French detachments, which endeavoured to penetrate into the Alentejo; in the northeast, Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents of the Valley of the Tezers; in the east, the revolt at Beija was only extinguished by a bloody nocturnal assault of the town, after a rapid march, by a French brigade.† Surrounded in

June 9. this manner with embarrassments, Junot, after holding a council of war, the invariable sign of experienced difficulty, again despatched Loison with four thousand men to Abrantes; in his progress he had several severe actions with the Portuguese peasants, who were dispersed with great slaughter, but who evinced, by their courage in disaster, what materials were to be found among them for a formidable resistance in future times; and he returned to Lisbon, having irritated the insurrection more by his cruelty than he had overawed it by his success. His recall to the capital was rendered necessary by the progress of the insurrection in the Alentejo, which had

July 25. elected a junta, and established a sort of provisional government at Evora. Resolved to strike a decisive blow in that quarter, where the proximity of English succours from Gibraltar rendered it peculiarly formidable, Junot fitted out a more powerful expedition, consisting of seven thousand infantry, twelve hundred horse with eight guns, which was sent forth under the command of the sanguinary Loison. After dispersing several armed assemblages which strove in vain to obstruct his progress, this general came

July 29. up with the main body of the insurgents posted in front of Evora. Ten thousand Portuguese peasants, and four thousand Spanish troops, who had advanced to support them from Badajoz, were there assembled, with twelve pieces of cannon. They were wholly unable, however, to withstand the shock of the French legions; at the first onset, the undisciplined peasantry fled from the terrible charge of their dragoons. The Spanish auxiliaries, seeing themselves left alone with the whole weight of the action on their hands, retired in haste, and were speedily thrown into disorder; and in the general confusion, the victorious troops entered the town, where a feeble resistance only was attempted, but an indiscriminate massacre im-

mediately commenced. Neither age nor sex was spared: armed and unarmed were inhumanly put to the sword: it is the boast of the French historians, that while "they lost only two hundred and ninety, eight thousand were slain or wounded on the part of the insurgents."* Never, while Portuguese blood flows in the human veins, will the remembrance of that dreadful day be forgotten: never will the French be any other than an object of execration to the descendants of those who perished in that inhuman massacre.† But the cup of human suffering was full: the hour of retribution was fast approaching, and Loison was awakened from his fancied dream of security, and the farther prosecution of his blood-stained progress towards Elvas, by intelligence that a BRITISH ARMY HAD APPEARED OFF THE COAST OF PORTUGAL.

Ever since the insurrection in the Peninsula had assumed a serious aspect, the English government had resolved upon sending out powerful military succours to its assistance, and at length bringing the strength of the two nations to a fair contest with land-forces.

The English cabinet resolve on sending succours to Portugal.

Fortunately, a body of about ten thousand men were already assembled at Cork, having been collected there by the preceding administration for the purpose of an expedition against South America; a proposed diversion of force, at a time when every sabre and bayonet was required in European warfare, which appears almost inconceivable; unless, as Colonel Napier sarcastically observes, it was projected in imitation of the Romans, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at their gates.‡ The command of the expedition was given to SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, whose great capacity had been evinced in the glorious fields of Indian warfare, and, more recently, in the easier conquest of the Danish militia; and General Miranda, the able adventurer who had so long been concerned in projects for the separation of the Spanish colonies from the mother-country, was given to understand that no countenance could now be shown by the British government to any such designs. Two smaller divisions were soon afterward prepared, and set sail from Ramsgate and Margate; and orders were sent to Sir John Moore, who, with twelve thousand men, had been sent to Gottenberg to aid the King of Sweden in his heroic defence of his kingdom against Russia, an offer which that gallant monarch declined to accept,§ to return forthwith to England, to form a farther reinforcement of the armies in the Peninsula. Though the direction of the Cork expedition, however, was intrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesley, yet a senior officer, Sir Harry Burrard, was appointed to supersede him in the command shortly after he landed in Portugal; who, again, was to retain the supreme direction only until Sir Hugh Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar.

* "In this expedition," says Thiebault, "we lost 60 men killed and 140 wounded: of the insurgents at least 4000 were killed or wounded on the different fields of battle."—THIEBAULT, 155.

† The French general, Thiebault, boasts of this as a great exploit. "Twelve hundred Portuguese were put to death in the conflict; no quarter was shown to any one with arms in his hands. The town was afterward set on fire and plundered, and the worst military excesses committed on the wretched inhabitants. Kellerman shortly afterward said, in a proclamation to the people of Alentejo, 'Beija had revolted; Beija is no more. Its guilty inhabitants have been put to the sword; its houses delivered up to pillage and the flames. Thus shall all those be treated who listen to the counsels of a perfidious rebellion, and with a senseless hatred take up arms against us.'"—THIEBAULT, 135, 136. SOUTH-
EY, i., 105.

* Thiebault, 165.

† Thiebault, 131, 175. Nap., i., 161, 165. South., ii., 72, 155. Nevis, iv., 1, 205. Poy, iv., 246, 272.

‡ Nap., i., 180.

§ The particulars of this expedition, and the causes of the disagreement with the Swedish monarch, will be found below, Chap. LIV., which treats of the war between Turkey, Sweden, and Russia.

Thus, in the most momentous period of the campaign, that in which the British troops were first to be engaged with the enemy, and when they were exposed to all the difficulty incident to a first landing on a hostile shore, they were to be intrusted successively to the command of three different generals: an arrangement as characteristic of the happy ignorance of military affairs which at that period prevailed in the British government, as the cheerful acquiescence of the first commander in the appointment of any officer, how unknown soever to fame, over his head, was of the single-hearted feeling and patriotic devotion which in every age has been found to be the accompaniment of real greatness.*†

The expedition, under the command of Sir Arthur, sailed from Cork on the 12th of July, but the general himself preceded them in a fast-sailing frigate, and arrived at Corunna on the 20th. He immediately entered into communication with the junta of Galicia, from whom he received the distressing intelligence of the defeat at Rio Seco, and also was made acquainted with the desire of the Spaniards in that quarter to receive no succours, except in arms, stores, and money, from England: a resolution which it is hard to say, after such a disaster, savoured more of magnanimous resolution or presumptuous confidence.‡ He found the opinion of all classes so unanimous in hatred of the French, "that no one dared to show that he was a friend to them." Having supplied the junta, therefore,

with £200,000 in money, and assured them of the speedy arrival of extensive military stores, which in a great measure elevated their spirits after their late misfortunes, he proceeded to the southward to secure the main objects of the expedition, which were, in the first instance, an attack upon the Tagus, and afterward the detachment of such a force to the southward as might effectually secure Cadiz from any attack from the French under Dupont. As the whole force of the expedition, when joined by the reinforcements from England, the corps of Sir John Moore, and that under General Spencer, which was off Cadiz, was estimated by government at thirty thousand men, it was thought that ample means existed to achieve both these objects; and as the primary condition of all successful military efforts by a transmarine power is the securing strong seaports, as a base for the army, and a point of refuge in case of disaster, it is evident that the attainment of one or both of these objects was an indispensable preliminary to future operations. It was fortunate, however, that subsequent events rendered the dispersion of the English force, and the formation of a double base of operations, unnecessary; and that the British army was thereby concentrated in Portugal, where it had a strong country to defend, a docile population to work upon, and a central position in the flank of the French armies in Spain to maintain.*

Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Oporto on the 26th, and proceeded on with the expedition to Mondego Bay, where he arrived on the 30th of July. Having there received intelligence of the surrender of Dupont, he deemed all operations in Andalusia unnecessary, and having sent orders to General Spencer to come round from the Bay of Cadiz and join him, he determined upon an immediate landing: a bold and decisive resolution, considering that his own force did not exceed ten thousand men, and Junot had fifteen thousand at Lisbon.† He accordingly issued a proclamation to the people of Portugal, eminently descriptive of the principles of that glorious struggle which was now about to commence,‡ and which his own talents and constancy, and the resolution of the three nations now banded together, ultimately brought to so glorious a termination. At first, Sir Arthur thought of landing on the small peninsula of Peniche, about seventy miles to the north of the Rock of Lisbon, but, though the anchorage

* Well, Desp. by Gurwood, iv., 1, 3, 21, 22, 43.

† When Sir A. Wellesley received the command of the expedition at Cork, government gave him no reason to believe that he was to be superseded in the supreme direction of it. The first intimation he obtained of that intention was by a letter from Lord Castlereagh, dated the 15th of July, 1808, which was received by him when at sea, off Mondego Bay. Many officers, who had held the situations and achieved the victories which he had in India, would have at once resigned the command in which he was now reduced to so subordinate a station; but Sir Arthur acted otherwise. In answer to Lord Castlereagh, he said, "Pole and Burghersh have apprized me of the arrangements for the future command of the army. All that I can say on the subject is, that whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to ensure its success; and you may depend on it that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of the success. The government will determine for me in what way they will employ me hereafter, either here or elsewhere." When asked by an intimate friend, after his return, how he, who had commanded armies of 40,000 men, received the Order of the Bath, and the thanks of Parliament, could thus submit to be reduced to the rank of a brigadier of infantry, he replied: "For this reason, I was nimuk-wallah, as we say in the East; I have ate of the king's salt, and therefore I consider it my duty to serve with zeal and promptitude when or wherever the king or his government may think proper to employ me." Nor was this disinterested and high-minded patriotism and sense of duty without its final reward; inferior men would probably have thrown up the command, and rested on the laurels of Seringapatam and Assaye; but Wellington pursued the path of duty under every slight, and he lived to strike down Napoleon on the field of Waterloo.—See GURWOOD'S *Despatches*, August 1, 1808, vol. iv., 43; and *Blackwood's Magazine*, xli., 714.

‡ "Notwithstanding the recent defeat of the Galician army, the junta here have not expressed any wish to receive the assistance of British troops; and they again repeated, this morning, that they could put any number of men into the field if they were provided with arms and money; and I think this disinclination to receive the assistance of British troops is founded, in a great degree, on the objection to give the command of their troops to British officers."—WELLINGTON to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Corunna, July 21, 1808; GURWOOD, iv., 27.

* Gurw., iv., 20, 33. Lond., i., 114, 116. Nap., i., 187.

† The exact number was 9280 sabres and bayonets—about 10,000 men, including subalterns and officers. Spencer's corps was 4793 strong—about 5000 men.—GURWOOD, iv., 20.

‡ "The English soldiers who land upon your shores do so with every sentiment of friendship, faith, and honour. The glorious struggle in which you are engaged is for all that is dear to man: the protection of your wives and children, the restoration of your lawful prince, the independence, nay, the existence of your kingdom, the preservation of your holy religion; objects like these can only be attained by distinguished examples of fortitude and constancy. The noble struggle against the tyranny and usurpation of France will be jointly maintained by Portugal, Spain, and England; and, in contributing to the success of a cause so just and glorious, the views of your Britannic majesty are the same as those by which you yourselves are animated."—A. WELLESLEY'S *Letter*. It is seldom that a proclamation, in the outset of a struggle, so faithfully represents the real objects at issue in it; still seldomer that it so prophetically and truly describes its ultimate result after many and long-continued disasters.—See GURWOOD, iv., 46.

was safe and practicable, it was commanded by the guns of the fort at its extremity, which was still in the hands of the enemy. He therefore, by the advice of Sir Charles Cotton, selected in preference Mondego Bay, where the whole fleet were assembled on the 31st of July. On

Aug. 1. the following morning the disembarkation commenced, and, notwithstanding the obstacles arising from a strong west wind and heavy surf, which occasioned the swamping of several boats and the loss of many lives, it

Aug. 5. was completed by the 5th, at which time General Spencer with his division came up, and was immediately put on shore. He had not received Sir Arthur's orders to join, but, with great presence of mind and the true military spirit, the moment he heard of Dupont's surrender he made sail for the Tagus, from whence he was sent forward by Sir Charles Cotton to the general point of disembarkation.

Aug. 8. On the evening of the 8th the united forces, thirteen thousand strong, bivouacked on the beach, and on the following morning the advanced guard moved forward, and commenced that memorable march which, though deeply checkered with disaster, was destined to be never finally arrested till the British cavalry passed in triumph from Bayonne to Calais.*

The troops took the field in the highest spirit, and the most perfect state of discipline and equipment, confident in their leader, and not less confident in themselves; for even at this early period of the war it was the habit of the British soldiers, the habit bequeathed by centuries of glory, to admit of no doubt as to the issue of a combat. The Portuguese generals, who had six thousand men, were at first most extravagant in their demands, and would only consent to join the English upon condition that their troops should all be maintained from the British commissariat: a proposition so utterly unreasonable when made by the natives of the country to their allies, just landed from their ships, that it thus early evinced, what the future progress of the war so clearly demonstrated, that jealousy of foreign co-operation, and aversion to foreign command, were nearly as strongly imprinted on their minds as hatred at the invaders. At length they consented to let General Freire, with one brigade of infantry, fourteen hundred strong, and two hundred and fifty horse, remain with Sir Arthur; but the main body was positively prohibited to advance beyond Leira, on the road to Lisbon. The truth was, that they entertained a secret dread of the French troops; and deeming the English totally inadequate to contend with them, they were unwilling to commit themselves by their side to a decisive affair. This defection of the native troops threw a chill over the English army, not from any doubt as to its ability to contend single-handed with the forces of Junot, but from the apprehensions which it inspired regarding the sincerity of their allies' professions of zeal against the common enemy. Sir Arthur, notwithstanding, continued his advance, and was received everywhere by the people with rapturous enthusiasm. His route lay by Alcobaca to Caldas, which latter place he

reached on the evening of the 15th; Aug. 15. Laborde, who commanded a division of five thousand French, which Junot, on the first alarm, had sent down to the coast, retiring as he advanced. A trifling unsuccessful skirmish occurred on the same day at Obidos, in which a few men were killed and wounded on both sides: memorable as the first British soldiers who fell in the Peninsular war.*

Meanwhile, Junot despatched orders in all directions to call in his detached columns, and concentrate all his forces for the protection of Lisbon; and Laborde, to give him time to complete his arrangements, resolved to stand firm at ROLICA, a little village situated at the southern extremity of a large oblong valley, running nearly north and south in the bosom of the Monte Junta, in the centre of which the little village and Moorish tower of Obidos are situated. His force, five thousand strong, including five hundred horse and five guns, was stationed on a small elevated plateau in front of Rolica; at the upper end of the valley; and the hills on either side which shut it in were occupied by detachments, who, from amid the rocky thickets and close underwood of myrtles and gumcistus with which they were covered, threatened to keep up a heavy fire on the assailants. Sir Arthur divided his force into three columns: the right, consisting of the Portuguese infantry, and fifty horse under Colonel Trant, was directed to turn the mountains in the rear; while the centre, under Sir Arthur in person, attacked the plateau in front; and the left, under General Ferguson, was ordered to ascend the hills abreast of Obidos, and menace the French right by turning it in the mountains. As the centre advanced, preceded by nine guns, the corps on the right and left moved simultaneously forward in the hills, and the aspect of the body in the plain, nine thousand strong, moving majestically forward at a slow pace, in the finest order, and constantly closing again, after the array had been broken by trees or houses in the line of its advance, strongly impressed the French soldiers, most of whom, like the British, were that day to make their first essay in real warfare against an antagonist worthy of their arms. No sooner, however, was Laborde made aware of the risk he ran, if he remained in his present situation, of being outflanked on either side, than he fell swiftly back, in admirable order, and took up a second position, much stronger than the former, in a little plain projecting into the valley higher up in the gorge of the pass, and shut in by close rocky thickets on either side. Thither he was rapidly pursued by the British, the right, centre, and left still moving in the same order. Never in the whole progress of the Peninsular campaigns did war appear in a more picturesque and animating form than in the first engagement of the British soldiers. The loud shouts of the advancing columns, re-echoed by the surrounding hills, and answered by as confident cheers from the enemy; the sharp rattle of the musketry among the woods, which marked the advance of the assailants as they drove before them the French light troops; the curling wreaths of smoke

Combat of Rolica.

* Gurw., iv., 66, 67. Nap., i., 190, 191. Lond., 124, 125.

* Gurw., iv., 71, 80. Nap., i., 198, 199. Lond., i., 128, 130.

which rose above the foliage, and were wafted by the morning air up the sides of the mountains, amid the rays of a resplendent sun, formed a scene which resembled rather the mimic warfare of the opera stage than the opening of the most desperate and sanguinary strife recorded in modern times. Such was the impetuosity of the attack that the leading troops of the centre column, particularly the 29th regiment, forced their way through the gorge, and alone sustained the brunt of the enemy's fire before any of their comrades could come up to their assistance. But the severity of the concentric discharges, not merely from the line in front, but the woods on either flank, was so great that this gallant regiment, on first emerging into the little plain, wavered and broke, and their noble colonel, Lake, as he waved his hat to lead them back to the charge, was killed. At that critical moment, however, the 5th and 9th came up, the 29th rallied, and the whole rushed forward with irresistible impetuosity upon the enemy. The French were obliged to give ground; the position was carried before it was menaced by the flank columns getting into its rear. Even then the enemy retired slowly and in compact order, keeping up a continued fire from the rear-guard, and exhibiting, equally with the advance of the assailants, the finest specimen of discipline and steadiness amid all the confusion incident to a retreat over broken ground and through entangled thickets. In this brilliant affair the British lost five hundred men killed and wounded; the French six hundred, and three pieces of cannon; and as the former, though nearly triple the enemy upon the whole, were necessarily, from the narrow and rugged character of the ground, inferior, in the first instance, at least, at all the points of attack, it was hard to say to which of these two gallant nations the palm of courage and skill in this their first encounter in the Peninsula was to be awarded.*†

On the following morning orders were, in the first instance, issued for the continuance of the pursuit, and it was universally believed in the army that the enemy would be pursued, at the point of the bayonet, to the Rock of Lisbon; but at noon accounts arrived at headquarters of the arrival of Generals Anstruther and Ackland, with their respective brigades from Eng-

land, off the coast; and, at the same time, that Junot had marched with all his disposable force out of Lisbon to bring matters to the issue of a decisive battle. Orders were therefore given to suspend the pursuit, and the line of march was directed by Lourinhã to Vimiero, where headquarters were established on the 19th, in order to be near the seacoast, to take advantage of the re-enforcements which were at hand. On the other hand, Junot, having by great exertion collected all his disposable force and formed a junction at Torres Vedras with the retiring division of Laborde, found himself at the head of only fourteen thousand men, including, however, twelve hundred horse and six-and-twenty pieces of cannon; so heavily had the necessity of occupying many different points in a hostile country weighed upon and divided the twenty-five thousand which still remained at his disposal. On the 19th, General Anstruther's brigade was landed, and on the 20th General Ackland's; and these re-enforcements raised the English army to sixteen thousand fighting men, besides Trant's Portuguese and two regiments which were with Sir Charles Cotton off the Tagus. It had, however, only eighteen guns and a hundred and eighty horse British, and two hundred Portuguese horse, so that the superiority of infantry was nearly counterbalanced by the advantage of the enemy in the other arms of war. Accurately informed of the nature of the country through which he was to advance, Sir Arthur proposed, on the 21st, to turn the strong position of Torres Vedras and gain Mafra with a powerful advanced guard, while the main body was to move forward and seize the adjoining heights, so as to intercept the French line of retreat by Montachique to Lisbon. But Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Arthur's superior in command, who had now arrived off the coast, forbade any such hazardous operation, as endangering unnecessarily part of the army, when the force already in hand, and still more the powerful re-enforcement approaching under Sir John Moore, rendered ultimate success a matter of certainty without incurring any such risk. The troops, therefore, were concentrated at Vimiero, and every arrangement made for a decisive battle on the morrow; while Junot, having mustered every man he could collect at Torres Vedras, set out, soon after nightfall, and advanced, through tedious and difficult defiles, to within a league and a half of the British outposts, where he arrived by seven o'clock on the following morning.*†

* Foy, iv., 304, 315. Thieb., 174, 182. Gurw., iv., 81, 84. Nap., i., 202, 205. Lond., i., 130, 137.

† In this, as in all the other actions of the war, the estimate of the numbers engaged is taken from a medium of the accounts on both sides; keeping in view the credit due to the different narratives, and the maxim, *testimonia ponderanda sunt potius quam numeranda*. In this affair Sir Arthur estimates the French at six thousand men, Thiebault at nineteen hundred, Foy at twenty-five hundred, Torneo at five thousand, Thibaudenau at three thousand five hundred. —See THIEB., 179; GURW., iv., 81; FOY, iv., 324; TOR., ii., 46; THIB., vi., 464. With the utmost wish to maintain an impartial view, and the greatest anxiety to avoid the influence of undue national partiality, it is impossible to study the French accounts of the actions in the Peninsular war, and particularly the numbers engaged and lost on the opposite sides, without feeling as great distrust of the fidelity of their facts as admiration of the brilliancy of their descriptions and the talent of their observations, and arriving at the conclusion that the two rival races of modern Europe have here, as elsewhere, preserved their never-failing characteristics; and that, if the palm for the eagle-glance and the scientific reflection is frequently to be awarded to the writers of the Celtic, the credit of honest and trustworthy narrative is in general due to the historians of the Gothic race.

* Gurw., iv., 89, 93. Sir A. Wellesley's Evid. Ibid., iv., 181. Lond., i., 137, 142. Nap., i., 207, 209. Foy, iv., 319, 323. Thieb., 183, 195.

† The road by which Sir Arthur proposed to have advanced from Vimiero to Mafra was near the seacoast; that by which Junot actually came up from Torres Vedras to Vimiero was farther in the interior, but nearly parallel to the former. If, therefore, the design of the English general had been followed out, it would have brought the two armies into a position similar to the French and Prussian at Jena: they would have mutually turned and crossed each other in their march, and when they came to blows, Junot would have fought with his back to Oporto and his face to Lisbon, and Wellington with his back to Lisbon and his face to Oporto. But there would have been this essential distinction between the situation of the two armies, after having thus mutually passed each other: that Junot, out off from all his reserves and supplies at Lisbon, would have been driven, in case of disaster, to a ruinous retreat through

The ground occupied by the British in front of Vimiero, though not clearly defined as a military position, was yet of considerable strength. The village of that name stands in a beautiful valley, running in a northwesterly direction from the interior towards the Atlantic, with the clear stream of the Maceira glittering over a pebbly bottom in its bosom, at the distance of about three miles from the sea. Hills rise on either side, especially on the northern, where a range of abrupt heights overhang the little plain. Over the summit of these runs the great

Battle of Vimiero, Aug. 20.
road from Lisbon, through the hamlets of Fontaniel and Ventoza to

Lourinham, while on the southeast is a sort of high table-land, covered in the ravines with myrtle, in the open part bare, over which the approach on the side of Torres Vedras passes. A still loftier mass of heights overlook these in the rear, and lie between them and the sea. On this rugged ground the British army lay in bivouac on the night of the 20th, the village of Vimiero being occupied by a strong detachment, and a few pickets stationed on the heights towards Lourinham, to give warning of the arrival of the enemy. The first information of their approach was obtained at midnight, when a horseman in haste rode up to Sir Arthur with the account that Junot's whole army, said to be twenty thousand strong, was approaching. Shortly before sunrise a cloud of dust was seen to arise in the direction of the road leading from Torres Vedras to Lourinham: column after column were soon after discerned, through the morning dawn, to cross the sky-line of the opposite eminences, and it was evident that the French were bearing down in great force on the British left. After they descended from the heights on the opposite side, however, the direction of their march could no longer be distinctly perceived, and the advanced guards were upon the English videttes almost as soon as they were perceived. But Sir Arthur, concluding, from the line of road on which they were marching, that the left was the principal object of attack, had, meanwhile, ordered four brigades successively to cross the valley from the heights on the south to those on the north of the stream, and before the action began the left was secure. Observing the rapid concentration of troops on the English left, the

French accumulated their forces on their own right. General Laborde commanded a column, six thousand strong, which advanced against the centre, while Brennier, with his division of five thousand, moved against the left of the British; and the reserve under Killerman, with the cavalry led by Margaron, in all about three thousand men, was ready to support any point where their aid might be required. Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, and Bower commanded the English left. Ackland united the left to the centre, which, strongly grouped together in the valley in front of Vimiero, was formed of the brigades of Anstruther and Fane, while, on the right, Hill's brigade, in massy column, rested on the summit of the heights which formed the southern boundary of the valley.*

The action began with the head of Laborde's column, which, advancing with the utmost impetuosity against the British centre, first came in contact with the 50th regiment. Its light troops were driven in with great vigour, and the French mounted the hill to the northeast of Vimiero with loud cries and all the confidence of victory; but when they reached the summit, they were shattered by a well-directed fire from the artillery, disposed along the front of the English line on the edge of the steep; and their troops, astonished by the effect of the shrapnell shells, then first used against them, which, after striking down by a point-blank discharge whole files of soldiers in front, exploded with all the devastation of bombs in the rear. While yet breathless with their ascent, they received a discharge within pistol-shot from the 50th, and were immediately charged with the bayonet with such vigour that, ere the rush took place, they broke and fled.† At the same time, Fane's brigade repulsed, with equal success, an attack on the village of Vimiero in the centre, and, after a desperate contest, seven pieces of cannon were taken in that quarter; while the few horsemen with the army who were there sta-

Battle of Vimiero, Aug. 21.

* Lond., i., 140, 142. Nap., i., 208, 212. Foy, iv., 324, 333. Thieb., 192, 194. Gurw., iv., 93, 94.

† Colonel Walker, of the 50th regiment, finding his battalion, which had only 700 bayonets in the field, unable, by a direct resistance in front, to withstand the assault of above 2000 men in column, whom Laborde led on, most skillfully drew it up obliquely to their advance, with the left, against which they were directed, thrown back. The effect of this was to expose the flank as well as front of the French column to the British fire, almost every shot of which told on their crowded ranks, while a small number only would return their discharge, and the numerous ranks in rear were perfectly useless. When the order to charge was given, the British regiment in line came down in compact order on the French column, partly in front and partly in flank, and in the attempt to deploy and form line to withstand the levelled steel, they almost unavoidably broke and fled. This method of resisting the French attack in column was very frequently afterward employed by Wellington, and always with the same success. It can hardly fail of proving so, if the part of the line menaced by the head of the column can be relied on to withstand the shock till the fire of the other parts on the flank of the column has produced the desired effect; but, unless this is the case, the column will break the line, and deploying against the oblique line, now itself taken in flank, soon drive it off the field. Of all the European troops the British are the only ones by whom this hazardous, but, if successful, decisive mode of resisting the attack in column was habitually practised. General Loison, who witnessed this able movement, desired, after the convention of Cintra, to be introduced to Colonel Walker, and, with true military frankness, congratulated him on the steadiness and talent with which he had, with a battalion in line, withstood the formidable attack of the French column.—See Scott's *Napoleon*, vi., 235.

the insurgent and hostile mountains of the north of Portugal; whereas Wellington, backed by the sea, and having his fleet, containing powerful re-enforcements, to fall back upon, would have fought in the most advantageous position. There can be little doubt that, in these circumstances, defeat to Junot would have been attended with decisive consequences, and that Wellington was pursuing the plan of an able commander in throwing himself in this manner upon his enemy's line of communication without compromising his own—the great object and most decisive stroke which can be dealt out in war. At the same time, it is not surprising that Sir Harry Burrard, who came in on the broadside of the affair, and could not be supposed to appreciate so clearly as the commander actually engaged, the vital importance of not delaying an hour the proposed night-march between the sea and the hills, should have declined to plunge at once into so perilous an operation. His real error consisted in interfering at all with an important and delicate military operation, at a time when it was on the eve of execution by an able and experienced general; and the chief fault lay with the government in subjecting the army, at such a critical time, to the successive command of three different generals, who could not be supposed properly to enter into, or thoroughly understand, the operations in the course of execution at the time when they successively assumed the direction.

tioned broke forth among the retreating lines with great execution; but, pursuing their advantage too far, they were assailed when in disorder by the superior troops of the French cavalry, and almost cut to pieces. While these successes were achieved in the centre, a most severe conflict was going on in the hills to the left, where the road to Lourinham ascends the steep heights to the north of Vimiero. Brennier and Solignac commanded in that quarter; and as Junot perceived that their attack did not at once prove successful, they were supported in the end by the whole reserve of infantry, under Kellerman. The French, under Solignac, preceded by a cloud of light troops, came on with the utmost impetuosity, and first encountered Ferguson's brigade on the summit of the ridge. Several terrible discharges of musketry were exchanged between these dauntless antagonists with extraordinary execution on both sides, as the firearms, almost within pistol-shot, told with murderous effect on the dense array of either line; but at length the three English regiments, which had hitherto singly maintained the combat (36th, 40th, and 71st), being supported by three others, levelled their bayonets, and, rushing forward with irresistible impetuosity, drove the French line headlong down the steep, with the loss of all their artillery. So dreadful was the execution of the bayonet on this occasion, that the whole front line of one of the French regiments went down like grass before the scythe, and three hundred men lay dead as they stood in their ranks. Brennier's, however, still remained, as well as the reserve under Kellerman—the flower of the French army—and with these choice troops Junot made a gallant attempt to regain the day. Forming his men under the cover of the rocks and woods which concealed them from the enemy, Brennier, with his columns in admirable order, came suddenly upon the victorious British as they were lying on the ground, in loose array in the valley, reposing after their success, and, suddenly charging, drove them back and retook the guns; but his triumph was but momentary; the surprised troops rallied upon the heights in their rear, to which they had been driven, and, facing about, poured in a destructive volley upon their pursuers; and immediately charging with a loud shout, not only again captured the artillery, but made Brennier himself prisoner, and drove the enemy a second time in utter confusion down the hill. So complete was the rout, that Solignac's brigade was driven off the ground in a different direction from Brennier's; the former general was desperately wounded, and his troops would all have been made prisoners had not an unexpected order from Sir H. Burrard obliged Ferguson to halt in the midst of his success. The broken French upon this rallied and reunited, and the whole fell back to the heights on the opposite side of the valley, considerably to the north of the ground from which they had commenced their attack in the morning, leaving in the hands of the victors thirteen pieces of cannon, a large quantity of ammunition, and four hundred prisoners, besides two thousand who had fallen on the field.* The English had

to lament the loss of nearly eight hundred men in killed and wounded.

Like the allied sovereigns at Austerlitz, Junot had made his attack by a flank march directed in echelon athwart the front, against the left of the British in position; and his disaster, like theirs, was in a great measure owing to that cause, which brought his different columns not simultaneously, but at successive periods, into action. Sir Arthur Wellesley had as decisive success in his power as Napoleon at the close of the day; for not only had the three brigades under Hill on the right and the Portuguese never fired a shot, but two other brigades had suffered very little; the whole army was in excellent order and the most enthusiastic spirits; the shouts of victory, the triumphant clang of trumpets, were heard along their whole line; and from the direction which the broken French had taken after their defeat, they were entirely cut off from the retreat to Lisbon; while the British, who had repulsed their oblique attack, and driven them off in a northeasterly direction, were masters of the great road by Torres Vedras to the capital. This situation of things promised the greatest results to immediate activity: Sir Arthur was fully aware of the vast advantages thus placed within his grasp, and prepared, by immediate and decisive operations, instantly to turn them to the best account. He proposed, with the five brigades on the left, about nine thousand men, and the Portuguese, five thousand more, to follow up his success against the retreating columns of the enemy, now blended together in great confusion on the opposite heights, and drive them as far as possible back in a northeasterly direction over the Sierra da Baragueda, away from the capital; while Hill, Anstruther, and Fane, six thousand strong, should make straight for the defile of Torres Vedras, which lay open to the south, and thence push on to Montachique, and cut off all retreat by the French to the capital. Considering that Junot had lost two thirds of his artillery, and great part of his reserve park of ammunition, there can be no doubt that this operation would have proved successful, and that not only would Lisbon have fallen an easy prey to the victors, but Junot himself, driven to an eccentric and disastrous retreat through an insurgent and mountainous country almost destitute of roads, would have been too happy to find shelter under the cannon of Almeida with half his forces. Orders to that effect were already given, the army was preparing to execute them, when the assumption of the command by Sir Harry Burrard at once stopped short the career of victory. That officer, who had arrived on the field with his staff early in the day, had, with generous forbearance, declined to take the command from Sir Arthur during the battle; but after it was over, considering the responsibility of ulterior operations as resting on himself, he gave orders to halt at all points, and remain in position at Vimiero till the expected re-enforcements under Sir John Moore joined the army. Sir Arthur, in the strongest terms and with military frankness, represented to his superior general, on the field of battle, the inestimable importance of instantly follow-

Sir A. Wellesley proposes to follow up the victory, but is prevented by Sir Harry Burrard.

* Sir A. Wellesley's Despatches. Gurw., iv., 93, 96. Nap., i., 212, 216. Lond., i., 142, 144. Foy, iv., 330, 339. Thieb., 193, 201. Jom., iii., 71, 72. Scott, vi., 234, 235.

ing up the beaten enemy, driving him still farther to the northeast, and interposing between his disordered columns and the strong defiles of Torres Vedras, the real gates of the capital. But all was in vain. Sir Harry Burrard, though a respectable and gallant veteran, had none of the vigour or daring requisite for decisive success; he belonged to the old school, by whom one battle was considered sufficient work for one week, and deemed it imprudent, when the artillery-horses were fatigued and the cavalry destroyed, to hazard anything by a farther advance, the more especially as ultimate success without any risk was certainly to be looked for upon the arrival of Sir John Moore's division. He persisted, accordingly, in his resolution not to move from his ground: the precious-moments never to be regained were lost; the disordered French, seeing with astonishment that they were not pursued, re-entered their ranks. Junot that very night, by a forced and circuitous march, regained the defiles of Torres Vedras, and secured his retreat to the capital, while Sir Arthur, seeing the opportunity was lost, and concealing the bitterness of his disappointment under an affected gayety, said to the officers of his staff, "Gentlemen, nothing now remains to us but to go and shoot red-legged partridges."^{*†}

Sir Harry Burrard's tenure of the supreme direction of affairs was of short duration. Early on the morning of the 22d, Sir Hugh Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar, and immediately landed and assumed the command; so that within thirty hours a pitched battle had been fought, a decisive operation rejected, and three successive commanders called to the direction of the army. After consulting with Sir Arthur and Sir Harry, and getting the best information he could, he resolved to advance on the 23d against Aug. 23. Junot, now in position at Torres Vedras, and orders to that effect had already been issued, when information was brought that a French flag of truce had reached the outposts. It proved to be General Kellerman, with a proposal from Junot for a suspension of arms, with a view to the evacuation of Portugal.[†]

In truth, the situation of Junot since the battle of Vimiero had been such, that he had no longer any alternative to adopt. Early on the morning of the 22d, a council of war was held at Torres Vedras; and the proverb almost invariably holds good, that such a council never fights. The French generals were aware that a powerful re-enforcement, under Sir John Moore, was on the eve of landing; that a city containing three hundred thousand agitated and hostile citizens was in the rear; that the forts and points of defence which it contained were

hardly tenable against an army of thirty thousand English troops; and that to attempt a retreat through Portugal, intersected as it was by mountain torrents and almost inaccessible ridges, in the face of an insurgent population, and pursued by a victorious army, could not fail to be attended with the greatest disasters. In these circumstances, it was unanimously agreed that enough had been done for the honour of the imperial arms, and that to endeavour to obtain by negotiation a convention which might restore the army to the French soil, and ultimately to renewed operations in the north of Spain, was the most prudent course which could be adopted. General Kellerman was selected for this delicate mission, and it could not have been intrusted to abler or more skilful hands. Enjoying a European reputation, not less from the glory of his father, the hero of Valmy,* than his own inappreciable achievements on the field of Marengo,† he was at the same time possessed of all the tact and finesse in which the French diplomatists excel all those of Europe, with the exception of those of Russia. Perceiving, from some hints dropped in conversation by the English general, Sir Hugh Dalrymple, and his brother officers, who were not aware that he understood their language, that they were far from possessing the confidence of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the results to be expected from immediate and decisive operations, he began by representing, in the most favourable colours, the strength of the French army and the magnitude of its resources, especially from the aid of the sailors and artillery of the Russian fleet, as well as the resolution of its commander, whom he described as determined to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon rather than submit to any conditions derogatory to the honour of the imperial arms. Having thus effected his object of producing a favourable impression of the protracted and doubtful nature of the contest which awaited them if hostilities were persisted in, he gradually opened the real object of his mission, which was the conclusion of an armistice preparatory to a convention for the evacuation of Portugal. The terms proposed were, that the French army should not be considered as prisoners of war, but be sent back to France by sea, with their artillery, arms, and baggage; that their partisans in the country should not be disquieted on account of their political opinions, but, so far as they desired it, be permitted to withdraw with their effects; and that the Russian fleet should remain in Lisbon as in a neutral harbour. The first two conditions were accepted without any difficulty by all 23d Aug. the English generals; but Sir Arthur Wellesley strenuously opposed the last, and it was at length agreed to refer it to the decision of Sir Charles Cotton, who positively refused to agree to it. Foiled in this attempt to extricate the Russian fleet from their awkward situation, the French general was obliged to leave them to their fate, and a separate convention was some days afterward concluded with Admiral Sinavin, the Russian commander, in virtue of which the whole fleet was to be conducted to England and retained in deposit till the conclusion of a

* Sir A. Wellesley's Despatches. Gurw., iv., 99, and Evid. Ibid., iv., 207, 208. Lord Burghersh's Evidence. Ibid., iv., 214. Lond., i., 145, 146. Nap., i., 216, 217.

† Lord Burghersh, in his evidence before the court of inquiry, declared, "I recollect that, on the evening of the 21st of August, Sir Arthur Wellesley urged Sir H. Burrard to advance, giving as a reason that his right was some miles nearer to Torres Vedras than the enemy; that he had four brigades that had not been engaged; that Torres Vedras was the pass by which the enemy must retire to Lisbon, and that, in his opinion, by that movement no part of the French army could reach Lisbon."—Evidence, Court of Inquiry. Gurwood, iv., 214.

‡ Gurw., iv., 104. Nap., i., 220. Foy, iv., 340.

* Ante, i., 189.

† Ante, ii., 106

general peace, and the officers and crews be transported to Russia at the expense of the British government, without any restriction as to their future service.*†

Posterity will scarcely be able to credit the universal burst of indignation with which this convention was received, both in the Peninsular nations and the British islands. Totally incapable of appreciating the real importance of the acquisition

of Portugal at one blow on the future progress of the war, the inhabitants of all these countries united in condemning a treaty which was thought to step between them and the glory which they had earned, or the vengeance which was their due. The Portuguese, though they had been in no hurry to confront the invader in the field, and were strangers to the glories of Rólica and Vimiero, were yet loud in their complaints of the capitulation which had been granted, and bitterly inveighed against the clauses which, under the specious veil of protecting private property, in effect gave the public robbers the means of securely carrying off the stores of private and ecclesiastical plunder which they had amassed. The Spaniards re-echoed the same sentiments, and with some appearance of reason; contrasted the unconditional surrender of Dupont's corps at Baylen with the unhappy convention which tended only to remove the French army from a situation where it was detached from the remainder of the imperial forces, and ran the most imminent hazard of being made prisoners of war, to one where it might be more advantageously and securely employed in forming the right wing of the army with which the invasion of the Peninsula was again to be attempted. Roused to the very highest pitch of enthusiasm by the early and decisive successes which had attended their arms—panting for their full share of the glories which had been won—and nothing doubting that an unconditional surrender would immediately follow, and that they should soon see a marshal of France and twenty thousand men arrive as prisoners of war at Spithead, the British people abandoned themselves

to unbounded vexation when the capitulation was announced which was to convey them, without that last disgrace being incurred, to swell the invader's ranks at Rochefort and L'Orient. In vain were the Park and Tower guns fired on this as on other triumphs of our arms: the public voice refused to join in the acclamation; the press, both in the metropolis and the provinces, loudly condemned the convention as more disgraceful than even those of the Helder and Closter Seven, where the British troops had been constrained to sue for terms of accommodation; many of the public journals refused to stain their pages by the obnoxious articles, others appeared with their columns in mourning, as in a season of national calamity; public meetings were assembled in most parts of England to express the general indignation, and call for the punishment of the guilty parties; and to such a length did the outcry proceed that it was deemed indispensable to appoint a court of inquiry, consisting of highly respectable, though somewhat antiquated officers, who, after a full investigation, arrived at the conclusion that, considering the extraordinary manner in which three successive commanders had been invested with the direction of the army after the battle of Vimiero, it was not surprising that that victory had not been more vigorously followed up; that unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited by all the three generals; and that, in the whole circumstances of the case, no farther proceedings were necessary. The general odium attached to Sir Hugh Dalrymple, as the senior officer in command at the time the convention was signed, though it was evident that the chief fault in the case, if there was fault at all, lay with Sir Harry Burrard, as the commander-in-chief when the decisive march to Torres Vedras was declined. Such was the general discontent that neither of these two generals, notwithstanding the acquittal of the court-martial, was again employed in any considerable command in the British army; and it required all the family influence and early celebrity of the hero of Assaye and Vimiero to save the future conqueror of Napoleon from being cut short in the threshold of his career, for no fault whatever of his own, by the very people upon whom he had conferred an inestimable benefit.*†

The English people in general arrive in the end at more sober and rational Its expedience opinions on political subjects than at that juncture. served a record; but they are prone, in the first instance, in a most extraordinary degree, to common delusions or phrensies, which almost amount to national insanity. The cruel injustice with which they persecuted Sir Robert Calder for having gained a victory, perhaps the most momentous in its ultimate consequences, and most vital to the safety of the country, of any recorded in the British annals,‡ is an instance of the first; the universal and senseless

* Nap., i., 220, 229. Gurw., iv., 105, 116, 117. Foy, iv., 343, 345. Lond., i., 152, 160. Thieb., 204, 209.

† The Convention of Cintra excited such a clamour at the time, both in the British and Peninsular nations, that a short summary of its leading provisions is indispensable. It was provided that the French should evacuate the forts of Lisbon and the whole kingdom of Portugal, and be conveyed to France, with their artillery and sixty rounds a gun, but with liberty to serve again; all other artillery, arms, and ammunition to be delivered up to the British army and navy; the French army to carry with them all their equipments, the cavalry their horses, and the individuals their property; the sick and wounded to be intrusted to the care of the British government, and returned to France when convalescent; the fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmela shall be delivered up as soon as British detachments can be sent forward to take possession of them; all subjects of France shall be protected who are domiciliated in Portugal; all their property of every description to be guaranteed to the French citizens in Portugal; no inhabitants of that country to be disquieted on account of their political conduct or opinions; the Spanish troops in the custody of the French armies to be liberated. By the supplementary convention, in regard to the Russian fleet, it was stipulated that it should be conveyed to Great Britain, to remain in deposit with all its stores till six months after the conclusion of a general peace; and the officers and men, meanwhile, to be returned to Russia, without any restriction as to their future service.—See GURWOOD, iv., 113, 117.

* Court of Inquiry. Gurw., iv., 235, 239. South., ii., 272, 276. Lond., i., 157, 165. Tor., ii., 57, 58.

† At the meeting of Parliament, the public thanks of both houses were voted to Sir Arthur Wellesley for the battle of Vimiero. But he had a narrow escape, notwithstanding all his glory, from the obloquy consequent on the Convention of Cintra.—See GURWOOD, iv., 239, 241.

‡ *Ante*, ii., 330.

clamour raised about the Convention of Cintra an example of the second. There cannot be a doubt, not only of its expedience at the juncture when it was concluded, but of its having been the means of acquiring the basis on which the whole future successes of the British arms were rested. Having missed, perhaps through an excess of caution, the opportunity of following up, according to Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice, the brilliant success of Vimiero on the evening of the battle, nothing remained but to close with the highly advantageous offer, which at once liberated Portugal from its oppressors and established the best possible base for future operations. The sea, sterile and unproductive if in the rear of the forces of any other power, is the source of strength and vigour to the British armies; to them every tide is fraught with plenty, every wind wafts the sinews of war on its gales. Thenceforward Lisbon became the great *place d'armes* to the English army; the stronghold of defence in periods of disaster, the reservoir from whence all the muniments of war were drawn in prosperous times. To have missed the opportunity of at once, and in the outset of the campaign, acquiring such a base for future operations, for the vain glory of possibly compelling a French corps and marshal, after a bloody siege of several months' duration, to lay down their arms in Lisbon, Elvas, or Almeida, would have been sacrificing the solid advantages of war for its empty honours. The restoration of twenty thousand defeated and dispirited soldiers to the standards of the enemy was a matter of no sort of consequence to a sovereign who had seven hundred thousand disciplined men at his command: the loss of a whole kingdom, of a chain of strong fortresses, of an admirable harbour, of ten sail of the line to his ally, of the *prestige* of victory to himself, was a calamity of a very different description. Napoleon showed clearly in what light he viewed the acquisition of such advantages to the French arms when, in the outset of his career, he stipulated only, in return for his glorious successes in the Maritime Alps, the cession of the Piedmontese fortresses from the cabinet of Turin;* and when, after the triumph of Marengo, he at once allowed the Austrian army, cut off from the hereditary states and thrown back on Genoa, to retire unmolested to the Mincio, provided only they ceded Alexandria, Tortona, and the other strongholds in the west of Lombardy, as the reward of victory.† On the present occasion, he felt quite as strongly the vast importance of the fortified bases for future operations, so advantageously situated on the edge of the sea, and on the flank of the Peninsular plains, which had thus, in the very outset of their career, been wrested from him by the British arms: had the advantage been gained by himself, he would have made Europe ring from side to side with the triumph which had been achieved. As it was, he manifested the utmost displeasure at the generals who were engaged in the Convention of Cintra; and Junot, in particular, never afterward regained his confidence or esteem. "I was about," said he, "to send Junot to a council of war; but, happily, the English got the start of

me by sending their generals to one, and thus saved me from the pain of punishing an old friend."*†

Many causes conspired to make the execution of the Convention of Cintra a matter of great difficulty to all the contracting parties. The French troops, from the time it was concluded, were constantly kept together in masses, encamped on the heights and forts, with cannon directed down the principal streets which led to their bivouacs. Notwithstanding these formidable preparations, and the proximity of the British forces, who, early in September, approached close to Lisbon, Sept. 5 it was found to be impossible to prevent the indignation of the populace from finding vent in detached acts of aggression; crowds of infuriated peasants incessantly thronged into the city, decorated with ribands, vociferating shouts of triumph, and bearing on their hats the favourite motto, "Death to the French!" and at night the discharge of firearms or explosion of petards was heard on all sides, occasioned by skirmishes between the enraged populace and the French advanced posts. Loison, whose unnecessary cruelty had rendered him in an especial manner the object of universal hatred, was menaced by a serious attack; while other generals, especially Travot, who had executed their orders with humanity, were not only unmolested, but traversed the streets alone in perfect safety: a fact, as Colonel Napier justly observes,‡ extremely honourable to the Portuguese, and conclusive as to the misconduct of the obnoxious officers. But these difficulties, great as they were, soon sunk into insignificance when compared with those which arose from the discoveries made, in the course of the preparations for the embarkation, of the extent to which public and private plunder had been

Disgraceful revelations which are made at Lisbon of the plunder by all ranks in the French army.

* Thieb., vi., 472. D'Abr., xii., 64, 102.

† "He," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "to whom the whole life of Junot was devoted, alone viewed in a false light the Convention of Cintra. Everything which was not a triumph he regarded as a defeat; and, like Augustus, he never ceased to demand his legions from all those who had not succeeded in conducting his young conscripts, hardly emerged from boyhood, to victory."—D'ABRANTES, xii., 64, 102.

The Duke of Wellington's opinion on the expedience of the Convention of Cintra was equally clearly expressed. "If we had not negotiated," said he, "we could not have advanced before the 30th, as Sir John Moore's corps was not ready till that day. The French would by that time have fortified their positions near Lisbon, which, it is probable, we could not have been in a situation to attack till the end of the first week in September. Then, taking the chance of the bad weather depriving us of the communication with the fleet of transports and victuallers, and delaying and rendering more difficult and precarious our land operations, which, after all, could not have been effectual to cut off the retreat of the French across the Tagus into Alentejo, I was clearly of opinion that the best thing to do was to consent to a convention, and allow them to evacuate Portugal. The details of the convention and the agreement to suspend hostilities are different matters: to both of them I have very serious objections. I do not know what Sir Hugh Dalrymple proposes to do, or is instructed to do, but, if I were in his situation, I would be in Madrid with 20,000 men in less than a month from this time."—Sir A. WELLESLEY to CHARLES STUART, Esq., September 1, 1808. GURWOOD, iv., 121. Here is the clearest evidence of the advantageous results of obtaining so early in the campaign the great fortified base of Portugal for the British operations. Sir Arthur, in a month, proposed to have had twenty thousand men in Madrid! He is a bold man who, on such a subject, dissents from the concurring opinion of Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington. ‡ Nap., i., 231.

* Ante, i., 401.

† Ante, ii., 107.

carried by the French army. Sir John Hope, who had been appointed governor of Lisbon, took possession of the castle of Belem on the 10th of September, and by his firm and vigorous conduct soon reduced the unruly multitude to some degree of order; but the complaints which daily arose as to the enormous quantity of plunder which the French were about to carry off under pretence of its being their private property, continually increased, and became the occasion of much more serious embarrassment. The museum, the treasury, the public libraries, the church plate, the arsenals of the state, equally with the houses of individuals, had been indiscriminately ransacked; most of the valuable articles left in the royal palace by the flying regent were packed up and ready for embarkation; all the money in the public offices was laid hold of; even the sums lying in the *Deposito Publico*, a bank where they were placed to await the decision of the courts of law on matters of litigation, were appropriated by these insatiable hands. Junot even demanded five vessels to take away his personal effects. Matters at length rose to such a height that the British commanders felt themselves called upon to interfere; and the commissioners, to whom the execution of the convention had been intrusted, with much difficulty, and after the most violent altercation, succeeded in putting a stop to the disgraceful spoliation. These high functionaries, General Berresford and Lord Proby, acted with such firmness, that not only was the progress of the plunder arrested, and much which had been seized from the public offices

restored; but a general order was extorted from the French commander, enjoining the immediate restitution of all the property which had been taken from public or private establishments within twenty-four hours. Yet so inveterate was the habit of plunder in all ranks of the French army, from the highest to the lowest, that, within a few hours after this order was issued, Colonel Delambis, Junot's chief aid-de-camp, carried off the prince regent's horses; a valuable collection of private pictures was seized on by Junot himself; and two carriages belonging to the Duke of Sussex were appropriated, which were only got back by the threat of detaining the general himself as a hostage. At length, however, after vehement discussion and a complete revelation of that extraordinary system of public and private plunder which had been so long and disgracefully the characteristic of the French army, the greater part of this ill-gotten spoil

was wrested from the invaders. On the 15th the first division of the fleet sailed from the Tagus; by the 30th the whole were embarked; shortly after Elvas and Almeida were given up in terms of the capitulation; and before the middle of October not a French soldier remained on the soil of Portugal. Twenty-two thousand men were disembarked on the coasts of France; thirty thousand had perished of fatigue, disease, fallen in the field, or voluntarily enlisted in the British army. The convention, though loudly disapproved of by the British people, was, on the admission of the French themselves, carried into execution

with scrupulous good faith by the British government.*†

The subordinate arrangements consequent on the decisive events which had in this manner liberated Portugal, were soon concluded. Such was the violence of the groundless clamour which arose in England on the subject of the convention, that all the generals engaged in it, Sir Hugh Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, were obliged to return to Great Britain, where, as already mentioned, their conduct in relation to it became the subject of deliberation to a court of inquiry, which, after a long and impartial investigation, returned a report distinguished by little ability, and which, in substance, found that no blame could be attached to any of these officers. Meanwhile the army, deprived in this way, for a time, of the assistance of the brave leader who had, in so glorious a manner, led it to victory, was placed under the command of Sir John Moore, an officer whose gallant conduct in Egypt, as well as admirable skill in the training and disciplining of his troops, had already rendered him distinguished among all his brethren in arms. His division had landed and joined the other troops at Lisbon, while another corps, fifteen thousand strong, under the orders of Sir David Baird, whose gallantry and firmness had been conspicuous at the storming of Seringapatam, was assembled in the British islands, and was destined to land at Corunna, descend through Galicia, and co-operate with those which had advanced from Portugal, in the plains of Leon. The two together, it was hoped, would amount to nearly forty thousand men, even after providing in an adequate manner for the security of Portugal, and the magazines and dépôts in the rear: a force which appeared, and doubtless was, if tolerably supported by its Peninsular allies, capable of achieving great things for the deliverance of Europe. Meanwhile, the Spanish troops, nearly five thousand strong, which had been liberated at Lisbon, were equipped anew, at the expense of the British government, and despatched by sea to Catalonia, from whence the most pressing representations had been sent of the necessity of regular troops to aid the efforts and improve the discipline of the numerous peasants in arms in the province; the Russian fleet, in conformity with the treaty, was conducted to the British harbours; a central junta was formed at Lisbon, to administer the affairs of the kingdom in the absence of the prince regent; and the preparations for the campaign being at length completed, the British troops began their march from the Portuguese capital for the seat of war at the foot of the Pyrenees.‡

The decisive influence of the recent successes and central position of the English army, in possession of the capital and principal strongholds of the

* Nap., i., 232, 234. South., i., 240, 249. Nevins, ii., 230, 249. Foy, iv., 356, 364. Thieb., 239.

† "That same public opinion, under the influence of a free constitution, which condemned the Convention of Cintra, enjoined to its government its faithful execution. In so far as depended on the English government, the convention was executed with honourable fidelity."—Foy, iv., 356.

‡ Lond., i., 179, 181. Nap., i., 247, 248. South., i., 267. Nevins, ii., 264, 287.

country, rendered the appointment of a central junta, and the defeat of the local intrigues everywhere set on foot in order to obtain a preponderating voice for particular men in its councils, a comparatively easy task in Portugal. But the case was very different in Spain, where jealousy of foreign interference had already risen to a most extravagant height, where the people entertained a most exaggerated idea of their own strength and resources, and many different provincial governments, elected under the pressure of necessity in different parts of the country, had opposite and jarring pretensions to advance for the supreme direction of affairs. Much division, and many dangerous jealousies, were rapidly rising upon this subject, when the junta of Seville, whose prudence and success, as well as the consideration due to the great cities and opulent province which they represented, had already invested with a sort of lead in the affairs of the Peninsula, had the good fortune to bring forward a project, which, from its equity and expedience, soon commanded universal assent. This was, that

Aug. 3. the different supreme juntas, each on the same day, should elect two deputies, who should, when united together, form the central government, to which all the local authorities were to be subject; that the local juntas should, nevertheless, continue their functions, in obedience to the commands of the supreme junta; and that the seat of government should be some town in La Mancha, equally convenient for all the deputies. This proposal having met with general concurrence, the different provincial juntas elected their respective representatives for the central government, which was installed with extraordinary pomp at Aranjuez in the end of September, Sept. 25. and immediately commenced its sittings. At first it consisted of twenty-four members, but their ranks were soon augmented, by the number of provinces which claimed the right of sending representatives, to thirty-five: an unhappy medium, too small for a legislative assembly, too large for an executive cabinet. Though it numbered several eminent men and incorruptible patriots among its members, particularly Count Florida Blanca, who, though in the eightieth year of his age, preserved undiminished the vigour of intellect and cautious policy which had distinguished his long administration, and Jovellanos, in whom the severities of a tedious captivity had still left unextinguished the light of an elevated understanding and the warmth of an unsuspecting heart; yet it was easy to foresee, what subsequent events too mournfully verified, that it was not composed of the elements calculated either to communicate vigour and decision to the national councils, or impress foreign nations with a favourable idea of its probable stability. Formed, for the most part, of persons who were totally unknown, at least to public life, before the commencement of the Revolution, and many of whom had been elevated to greatness solely by its convulsions, it was early distinguished by that overweening jealousy of their own importance, which in all men is the accompaniment of newly, and still more of undeservedly acquired power, and torn with intestine intrigues, when the utmost possible unanimity and vigour

were required to enable them to make head against the formidable tempest which was arising against them, under the guidance of the Emperor Napoleon.*

The central junta displayed a becoming vigour in asserting the inviolability of their privileges against Cuesta, who had arrested one of its members; but they were far from evincing equal energy in the more important duty of providing for the wants of the military force which was to maintain the conflict. So completely had the idea of their own invincibility taken possession of the Spaniards, that they never once contemplated the possibility of defeat; and all their arrangements were based on the assumption that they were speedily to drive the French over the Pyrenees, and intended to meet the contingencies which might then occur. Nothing was foreseen or provided for in case of disaster; there were no magazines or reserve stores accumulated in the rear, no positions fortified, no fortresses armed; there was no money in the treasury, no funds in the military chests of the generals; the soldiers were naked, destitute of shoes, and rarely supplied with provisions; the cavalry dismounted; the artillery in the most wretched condition; even the magnificent supplies which the generosity of England had thrown with such profuse bounty into the Peninsula, were squandered or dilapidated by private cupidity, and seldom reached the proper objects of their destination. Corruption in its worst form pervaded every department of the state; the inferior officers sold or plundered the stores; the superior, in many instances, made free with the military chest. In the midst of the general misrule, the central junta, among eloquent and pompous declamations, could find no more worthy object of their practical deliberations than discussing the honorary titles which they were to bear, the ample salaries which they assigned to themselves, the dress they were to wear, and the form of the medals which were to be suspended round their necks. In the midst of this general scene of cupidity, imbecility, and vanity, nothing efficient was done, either for the service of the armies or the defence of the state. This deplorable result is not to be ascribed exclusively, or even chiefly, to the character of the members of the central junta, or the leaders at the head of the troops: it arose from the nature of things, the overthrow of all regular government in Spain, and the jarring and conflicting interests of the popular assemblages by which its place had been supplied. Democratic energy is a powerful auxiliary, and when directed or made use of, in the first instance, by aristocratic foresight, it often produces the most important results; but its vigour speedily exhausts itself if not sustained by the lasting compulsion of terror or force; and the despotic tyranny of a committee of public safety is not less necessary to give success to its external operations than restore credit or usefulness to its internal administration.†

In the north of Europe, however, decisive

* Tor., ii., 80, 90, 97. Nap., i., 298, 308. South., ii., 277, 313. Jovellanos Memoria, ii., 12, 34.

† Tor., ii., 95, 102. Lond., i., 200, 203. Nap., i., 310, 311. South., ii., 298, 307, 315.

Miserable condition of the central government, and armies on the Ebro.

Escape of the Marquis Romana's corps from Jutland, and its forwarding to Spain.

steps were adopted by the British government, which had the happiest results, and succeeded in restoring ten thousand of the veteran soldiers, whom the prudent foresight and anticipating perfidy of Napoleon had so early removed from the Peninsula, to the Spanish standards. It has been already mentioned that, so early as the spring of 1807, the French emperor had made it the price of his reconciliation with Spain, after the premature proclamation of the Prince of Peace in the October preceding, that they should furnish sixteen thousand men to aid in the contest in the north of Europe, and that the corps of the Marquis of Romana was, in consequence, forwarded to the shores of the Baltic.* Soon after the commencement of hostilities in the Peninsula, Castanos, who had entered into very cordial and confidential communications with Sir Hugh Dalrymple, then chief in command at Gibraltar, strongly represented to that officer the great importance of conveying to the Spanish troops, then in Jutland, secret information as to the real state of affairs, which was likely to lead to their at once declaring for the cause of their country. In consequence of this advice, the English government made various attempts to communicate with the Spanish forces, but they were at first frustrated by the vigilant eye which the French kept on their doubtful allies. At length, however, by the address of a Catholic priest named Robertson, the dangerous communication was effected, and Romana was informed, in a secret conference held in Lahn, of the extraordinary events which had occurred in the Peninsula: the victory in Andalusia, the repulse from Saragossa, the capitulation of Junot, the flight from Madrid.† Violently agitated at this heart-stirring intelligence, the noble Spaniard did not for a moment hesitate as to the course which he should adopt. Robertson was immediately sent back, with a request that a British naval force might be forwarded to convey away his troops, and that, if possible, the assistance of Sir John Moore and the English troops at Gottenberg might be granted in aid of the undertaking. The latter part of the request could not be complied with, as Sir John Moore, with the British troops, had already sailed for England; but Admiral Keats, with the fleet stationed in those seas, drew near to the coast of Jutland, and suddenly appeared Aug. 9. off Nyborg, in the island of Funen. Romana, having seized all the Danish craft he could collect, pushed across the arm of the sea which separated the mainland from that

island, and, with the assistance of Keats, made himself master of the Port and Castle of Nyborg. From thence he traversed another strait to Langland, where all the troops he could collect were assembled together, and publicly informed of the extraordinary events which had occurred in the Peninsula, and which went to sever them from the connexion they had so long maintained with their brethren in arms. Kneeling around their standards, wrought to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by the intelligence they had received, with hands uplifted to heaven, and tears streaming from their eyes, they unanimously swore to remain faithful to their country, and brave all the anger of the Emperor Napoleon in the attempt to aid its fortunes. Such was the universal zeal which animated them, that one of the regiments which lay at Ebeltoft, having received intelligence at ten in the evening, immediately started, and, marching all night and the greater part of the next day, reached their comrades at the point of embarkation in time to get off, after having marched fifty miles in twenty-one hours. Nine thousand five hundred were brought Aug. 13. away, and, after touching at Gottenberg, were forwarded in transports, by the English government, to the coasts of Galicia, where they were disembarked, amid shouts of joy, before the middle of September, in time to share in the dangers which the efforts of Napoleon were preparing for their country. The remainder, being stationed in the middle of Jutland, could not be rescued, and were made prisoners by the French troops; and as the horses of two of the regiments of cavalry which embarked could not be provided for in the English ships, they were abandoned on the beach by the horsemen whom they had transported so far from their native plains. These noble animals, eleven hundred in number, of the true Andalusian breed, all of which were un mutilated, seemed to share in the passions which agitated their masters, and no sooner were they liberated, on the sands, from control, than, forming into squadrons, they charged violently with loud cries against each other, and when the British fleet hove out of sight, they could still be discerned by telescopes, fighting with each other on the beach, surrounded by the dead and the dying, with all the fury of human passions.*†

This long and unprecedented train of disasters made the deepest impression on the foreseeing and prophetic mind of Napoleon. It was not the mere loss of soldiers, fortresses, or territory, which affected him: these, to a sovereign possessed of such almost boundless resources, were of little importance, and could be easily supplied. It was their moral influence which he dreaded; it was the shake given to the opinions of men which devoured him with anxiety. No one knew better, or has expressed more clearly and emphatically, that his empire was founded entirely on

Deep impression which these events make on the mind of Napoleon.

* Ante, iii., 19.

† — Robertson was despatched in a boat from Heligoland, of which the English had recently taken possession, to the coast of Jutland; but the principal difficulty was to furnish him with a secret sign of intelligence which, beyond the reach of any other's observation, might at once convince Romana of the reality and importance of his mission. This was at last fallen upon in a very singular way. Romana, who was an accomplished scholar, had been formerly intimate with Mr. Frere when ambassador in Spain; and one day, having called when he was reading the *Gests of the Cid*, the English ambassador suggested a conjectural emendation of one of the lines.* Romana instantly perceived the propriety of the proposed emendation; and this line, so amended, was made the passport which Robertson was to make use of, which at once proved successful.—See SOUTH-
EY, ii., 337.

* *Aun vea el hora que vos Merceos doe tanto.*
Mr. Frere proposed to read *Mercedos*.

* Tor., ii., 68, 70. South., ii., 336, 351. Nap., i., 337, 338.

† The singular anecdote as to the horses, which were all of the highest breed, and in the finest condition, is related by Southey on the authority of Sir Richard Keats himself, as well as in a contemporary journal, *Plain Englishman*, i., 294, on the same high testimony.—SOUTH-
EY, ii., 346.

opinion; that it was the minds of men whom his own victories and those of the Revolution had really subdued; and that, great as their triumphs had really been, it was the imaginative idea of their invincibility which constituted the secret charm which had fascinated and subdued the world. Now, however, the spell appeared to be broken; the veil was drawn aside, the charm dissolved. This had been done, too, by hands whose weakness and inexperience augmented the severity of the blow. Armies had surrendered, kingdoms been evacuated, capitals abandoned: in Andalusia the French legions had found the Caudine Forks; in Portugal experienced the fate of Closter-Seven. These disasters had been inflicted, not by the sternness of Russia or the discipline of Austria; not by the skill of civilization or the perfection of art, but by the simple enthusiasm of an insurgent people; by bands at which the French legions had with reason scoffed; by those island warriors whose descent on the Continent his tutored journals had hailed as the dawn of yet brighter glories to the French arms.* Such misfortunes, coming from such quarters, appeared with reason to be doubly calamitous; his proclamations, instead of the heralds of victory, had become the precursors of defeat; and he anticipated in their ultimate effect, not merely the possible expulsion of his arms from the Peninsula, but the general resurrection of Europe from his authority.†

Already this effect had in some degree appeared. Austria, by a decree of the 9th of June, had directed the formation of a landwehr, or local militia, in all the provinces of her still vast dominions. The Archduke Charles, at the head of the war department, had infused an unheard-of activity into all branches of the army; and three hundred thousand provincial troops, already in the course of formation, promised to add an invaluable reserve to the regular forces. Pressed by Napoleon to give some account of such formidable preparations, Count Metternich, the imperial ambassador at Paris, alleged the specious excuse that the cabinet of Vienna was only imitating the conduct of his powerful neighbours; and that, when Bavaria had not merely adopted the system of the French conscription, but organized National Guards, which raised its disposable force to a hundred thousand men, it became indispensable to take corresponding measures of security in the hereditary states. The reason assigned was plausible, but it failed to impose upon the French emperor, who forthwith directed the princes of the Rhenish Confederacy to call out and encamp their respective contingents, and shortly after adopted the most energetic measures for the augmentation of the military strength of the Empire.‡

* "Nothing," said the president of the Senate, in his public speech, "can be more agreeable to the French and to the Continent, than to see the English at length throw off the mask and descend into the lists to meet our warriors. Would to God that eighty or a hundred thousand English would present themselves before us in an open field! The Continent has in every age been their tomb." Fifteen days afterward the Convention of Cintra was published!—See *Moniteur*, 22d Sept., 1808.

† *Thib.* vii., i., 14. *Month.*, vi., 350. *South.*, ii., 359, 360. *Jom.*, ii., 79, 81. ‡ *Jom.*, ii., 60. *Pelet*, i. 64, 72.

By a senatus consultum of the 10th of September, the Senate of France placed at the disposal of the French emperor eighty thousand conscripts, taken from those coming to the legal age (18 to 19) in the years 1806–7–8 and 9, and eighty thousand additional from those of 1810, which last were, in an especial manner, destined to the defence of the coasts and frontiers of the Empire. So far had the demands of the French emperor already exceeded the growth of the human race, and the boundless consumption of mankind in the Revolutionary wars outstripped even the prolific powers of nature! The adulatory expressions with which this frightful demand was acquiesced in by the Senate, was not less characteristic than its anticipating the resources of future years, of the iron tyranny as well as fawning servility which distinguished the government of the Empire. "How," said Lacépède, their president, "would the shades of Louis XIV., of Francis I., of the great Henry, be consoled by the generous resolutions taken by Napoleon! The French hasten to respond to his sacred voice! He requires a new proof of their affection; they hasten with generous ardour to furnish it to him. The wish of the French people, sire! is the same as that of your majesty: the war of Spain is *politic*, it is *just*, it is *necessary*; it will be *victorious*. May the English send their whole armies to combat in the Peninsula; they will furnish only feeble glories to our arms, and fresh disgrace to themselves." Such was the roseate hue under which the titled and richly-endowed senators of France represented the hideous spectacle of a hundred and fifty thousand human beings being torn from their homes to meet certain destruction, in the prosecution of the most perfidious and unjust aggression recorded in history; and such the triumphs which they anticipated for their arms, when Providence was preparing for them the catastrophes of Salamanca and Vittoria.*

At the same time, a subsidiary treaty was concluded with Prussia, calculated to relieve, in some degree, that unhappy power from the chains which Prussia, had fettered it since the battle of Jena. Napoleon, vanquished by necessity, and standing in need of a hundred thousand soldiers of the grand army for the Peninsular war, was driven to more moderate sentiments. It was stipulated that, for the space of ten years, the Prussian army should not exceed forty thousand men; that Glogau, Stettin, and Austria should be garrisoned by French troops till the entire payment of arrears of contributions of every description; that their garrisons, four thousand strong each, should be maintained and paid solely at the expense of Prussia; that seven military roads, for the use of France and her allies, should traverse the Prussian dominions; and that the arrears of the war contributions should be reduced to 140,000,000 francs, or £5,600,000 sterling; but that, at the expiration of forty days after these sums were provided for, the French troops should, with the exception of these fortresses, evacuate the Prussian dominions.† To Prussia this evacuation

His preparations to meet the dangers, and great levy of men by the French government, September 10.

Subsidiary treaty with Prussia, Sept. 8.

* *Montg.*, vi., 350. *Jom.*, ii., 82, 83. † *Ante*, ii., 569.

was a source of unspeakable relief, and notwithstanding that the restriction on the army was both humiliating and hurtful, yet the cabinet of Frederic William had no alternative but submission; although, by the skilful change of the soldiers called out into actual service, they eluded the most galling part of the obligation, and prepared the means of political resurrection in future times.*

Napoleon, however, was well aware that, even after these treaties and precautions, he was still exposed to great danger from the renewed hostility of the German States in his rear, while engaged with the armies of England and Spain in front in the Peninsula, if he was not well secured in the alliance with Russia, and that it was in the breast of Alexander that the true security for the peace of the Continent beyond the Rhine was to be found. This was more especially the case, as the losses and serious aspect of the Spanish war had already rendered it necessary to withdraw a large part of the grand army from the north of Germany; and before winter, not more than a hundred thousand French soldiers would remain to assert the French supremacy in the centre of Europe. Impressed with these ideas, the French emperor used his utmost efforts to prevail on the Czar to meet him at a town in the north of Germany, where the destinies of the world might be arranged; and such was the ascendant which he had gained over his mind during the negotiations at Tilsit, and such the attractions of the new objects of ambition in Finland and on the Danube, which he had had the address to present to his ambition, that Alexander completely fell into his views. Erfurth was the town selected for this purpose, and there a conference was held between the two potentates, almost rivalling that of Tilsit in interest and importance. On his route for Germany, the emperor met large bodies of the grand army on their road from the Rhine to the Pyrenean frontier; he addressed them in one of those nervous proclamations which ever bear so strong an impress of his genius, but which, long the heralds of his victories, began now to afford a curious contrast to the disasters he was destined to undergo.† The troops traversed France in the highest spirits, animated by the emperor's address, magnificently feasted by the municipalities, beneath triumphal arches, and amid songs of congratulation from their fellow-citizens. Vain illusion! They were marching only to the scene of protracted ag-

ony; to whiten by their bones the fields of Spain; to a lengthened conflict, which, ushered in at first by brilliant victories, was destined in the end to thin their ranks by its carnage, and overwhelm their honour by its disasters.*

The Emperor Alexander set out before Napoleon, and on his way paid a melancholy visit to the King and Queen of Prussia at Königsburg. Proceeding on his route, he rapidly traversed the Prussian States, received with marked gratification the honours paid to him by the French troops; took Marshal Lannes with him in his own carriage, and expressed publicly to the French officers the satisfaction which he felt "at finding himself among such brave men, such renowned warriors." Proceeding in this manner, and received everywhere with the utmost distinction by the French authorities, he arrived at Weimar late on the evening of the 26th, and found everything prepared for his reception by his brother the Grand-duke Constantine, and the French ambassador Caulaincourt, who had arrived two days before. Meanwhile Napoleon, in more than regal state, was leisurely advancing from Paris, surrounded by the sovereigns, princes, and ministers of Germany, enjoying the first satisfaction of exhibiting the Russian autocrat awaiting his arrival in an inconsiderable town of Germany, above five hundred miles distant from the nearest point of his dominions. At ten o'clock on the morning of the 27th he made his public entry into Erfurth, and, after reviewing the troops, proceeded on horseback to meet Alexander, who had left Weimar at the same hour to approach his august ally. The two sovereigns met on the highway, between the village of Ottsted and Nora, near a remarkable pear-tree, which is still to be seen on the roadside. Alexander immediately descended from his carriage; Napoleon alighted from his horse, and the two monarchs embraced with the strongest marks of mutual esteem. The French emperor was decorated with the order of St. Andrew of Russia, the Russian bore the grand badge of the legion of honour on his bosom. Magnificent presents were interchanged on both parts; side by side the two emperors rode into Weimar, amid the roar of artillery, the cheers of multitudes, and the thundering acclamations of ten thousand soldiers. When they arrived at the hotel of the Czar the monarchs again embraced, and ascended the stairs arm in arm. Napoleon requested Alexander to give him the watchword of the day; he complied, and it was "Erfurth and confidence." The two monarchs dined together, and in the evening a general illumination evinced the intoxicating joy of the inhabitants.†

No adequate idea can be formed of the greatness of Napoleon's power, or the almost irresistible sway which he had acquired in northern and central Europe, but by those who had witnessed the pomp and deference with which he was surrounded at Tilsit and Erfurth, and, four years afterward, at Dresden. Environed by a brilliant cortège of marshals, generals, diplomatists, and staff-

* Montg., vi., 350. Martens, Sup., v., 113, 127.

† "Soldiers! after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, you have traversed Germany by forced marches. I now make you traverse France without giving you a moment's repose. Soldiers! I have need of you. The hideous presence of the leopard (the arms of England) defiles the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let it fly dismayed at your aspect! Let us carry our arms to the Columns of Hercules; there also we have outrages to avenge. Soldiers! you have surpassed the renown of all modern armies, but have you yet equalled the glory of the Roman legions, which in the same campaign frequently triumphed on the Rhine and the Euphrates, in Illyria and on the Tagus! A long peace, a durable tract of prosperity, shall be the reward of your labours. A true Frenchman should never taste of repose till the seas are enfranchised from their oppressors. Soldiers! all that you have already done, all that you will yet do for the happiness of the French people, will be eternally engraven in my heart."—THIBAUDEAU, vii., 50.

* Thib., vii., 49, 51. Montg., vi., 352. Jom., ii., 84, 85

† Thib., vii., 61. Montg., vi., 352.

Its secret object, and tenour of the conferences held there.

Sept. 26.

Fêtes and spectacles acquired in northern and central Europe.

officers, he was at the same time the object of obsequious attention to a crowd of princes and inferior potentates, who depended on his breath for their political existence or nominal independence. All the beauty, rank, and distinction of Germany were assembled, seventy princes or independent sovereigns were in attendance, and literally it might be said that the monarchs of Europe watched for a favourable sign from the mighty conqueror's chamberlains. The two emperors spent the forenoons together, conversing on the public affairs of Europe and the separate plans of administration for their vast dominions; they then rode out in company to a review or inspection of their respective troops, dined alternately with each other, and in the evening went to the same box at theatre. A brilliant band of the most distinguished French performers had come from Paris to grace the conference, and, during a fortnight, the theatre of Erfurth, resplendent with illustrious men and beautiful women, beheld the master-pieces of Racine and Corneille performed by the talents of Talma, Saint Pris, Mademoiselles Duchesnois and Bourgois, besides a host of inferior performers.* On the 6th of October the whole court proceeded to Weimar, where they were magnificently entertained by the grand-duke of that place, and Napoleon enjoyed the satisfaction of conversing with Goethe, Wieland, and the other illustrious men who

* The attentions of Alexander and Napoleon to each other at Erfurth, though delicate, were got up with so much anxiety as to impress the spectators with the impression that the intimacy of Tilsit had somewhat declined, and that a feeling, of which they were on every occasion so very solicitous to give public demonstration, could not in reality have a very deep foundation. On one occasion Alexander expressed great admiration for a singularly beautiful dressing-case and breakfast set of porcelain and gold in Napoleon's sleeping apartment: they were sent to him as a present on the same evening. At the representation of *Oedipe* on October 3, when the line was repeated,

"L'Amitie d'un grand homme est un bienfait des dieux,"

Alexander turned to Napoleon, and presented to him his hand. A few days after, the Czar, when preparing to go into the *salle-a-manger* to dinner, perceived that he had forgotten his sword. Napoleon immediately unbuckled his own, and presented it to him. "I accept it as a mark of your friendship," replied Alexander. "Your majesty may be well assured I shall never draw it against you." In the midst of all his grandeur, Napoleon had sufficient greatness of soul and true discernment to attempt no concealment of his origin. At dinner, one day, the conversation turned on the Golden Bull, and the primate of Germany insisted that it had been published in 1409. "I beg your pardon," observed Napoleon; "when I was a second lieutenant of artillery, I was three years at Valence, and there I had the good fortune to lodge with a learned person, in whose library I learned that and many other valuable details. Nature has given me a memory singularly tenacious of figures." Mademoiselle Bourgois, whose personal charms were equal to her talents as an actress, attracted the particular notice of the Emperor Alexander; and he inquired of Napoleon if there would be any inconvenience in his forming her personal acquaintance. "None whatever," replied Napoleon, "except that it would be a certain mode of making you thoroughly known to all Paris. The day after to-morrow, at the post hour, the most minute particulars of your visit to her will be despatched; and soon there will not be a statuary in Paris who will not be in a situation to model your person from head to foot." This hint had the effect of cooling the rising passion of the Russian emperor, who, with all his admiration for the fair sex, had an extreme apprehension of such a species of notoriety. It was at Erfurth that Napoleon made the memorable observation to Talma on his erroneous view of the character of Nero, in the *Britannicus* of Racine: that the poet had not represented him as such in the commencement of his career; and that it was not till love, his ruling passion at the moment, was thwarted, that he became violent, cruel, and tyrannical.—See LAS CASAS, iv., 232, and THIBAUDEAU, vii., 61, 65, 71.

have thrown an imperishable lustre over German literature. On the 7th, the whole party visited the field of Jena. An elegant temple had been constructed by the grand-duke on the highest summit of the Landgrafenberg, the scene of Napoleon's frigid bivouac two years before, on the night before the battle;* and a little lower down were a number of tents, of sumptuous construction, where the emperor and his cortège of kings were entertained, and from whence he pointed out to Alexander the line of the different movements, which, on that memorable spot, had led to the overthrow of his most cherished projects. At length, after seventeen days spent together in the closest intimacy, the two emperors, on the 14th of October, the anniversary of the battle of Jena, rode out together to the spot where they had met on the 27th of September; they there alighted from their horses, and walked side by side for a few minutes in close conversation, and then embracing, bade each other a final adieu. Alexander returned rapidly towards Poland; Napoleon remeasured his steps slowly and pensively towards Erfurth. They never met again in this world.†

Though Austria was not admitted as a party to the conference at Erfurth, Baron Vincent, envoy of the cabinet of Vienna, came with a letter from the Emperor Francis on the subject of the armaments on either side in Southern Germany; and a joint memorial was presented by the Emperors of France and Russia, proposing a termination of hostilities to the government of Great Britain. But these important state papers will more fitly come under consideration in the succeeding chapters, which treat specifically of the affairs of Austria and England at this momentous crisis of their history.‡

But it was neither to amuse themselves with reviews and theatrical representations, nor to make proposals to Austria and England, which they were well aware could not be listened to, that the two emperors had come so far and remained together so long. It was with no view to peace, but, on the contrary, with a clear prophetic anticipation of an approaching multiplication of hostilities, that the conference at Erfurth took place. Napoleon clearly perceived that Austria was about to take advantage of his immersion in the Peninsular war, and of the extraordinary preparations which England was making for a Continental campaign, to renew the contest in Germany, and it was to Russia alone that he could look for a sure guarantee of the peace of the north of Europe during the arduous crisis which was approaching. Albeit internally convinced of the necessity of a fearful contest in the end with the power of France, Alexander was not less sensible of the importance of gaining time for the preparations for it; and strongly impressed

* *Ante*, ii., 443.

† *Thib.*, vii., 61, 76. *Montg.*, vi., 353, 354. *Las Casas*, iv., 232. *Hard.*, x., 239.

‡ In one of their conversations Alexander strongly represented to the French emperor the resistance which he experienced in his senate from the aristocratic chiefs in his projects for the public good. "Believe me," said Napoleon, "how large soever a throne may be, it will always be found too small for two masters."—*MONTGAILLARD*, vi., 354.

§ See below, Chap. lii. and liii.

with the conviction that the peculiar and national interests of Russia were in the mean time chiefly to be promoted by remaining firm in the French alliance, and that when the evil day did come, the best preparation for it would be found in the augmentation of the strength of the empire in Finland and on the Danube, which was likely to follow an adherence to his present engagements. Thus, while both these great potentates were lavishing professions of friendship and regard on each other, they were in reality nursing the feelings destined to lead to inextinguishable hostility in their hearts; Napoleon returned, almost blinded by Russian flattery, to Paris, to prepare, in the subjugation of the Peninsula, the means of arranging the countless host which he was afterward to lead to the Kremlin; and Alexander, loaded with French presents, remeasured his steps to Muscovy to organize the force, destined, after adding Finland and the principalities on the Danube to his dominions, to hurl back to the Seine the tide of Gallic invasion.*†

The conferences of Erfurth were not reduced, like those of Tilsit, to formal or secret treaties; at least, if such were held there. signed, they have not yet transpired from any of the European archives. But they were not, on that account, the less important, or the less calculated to determine, for a course of years, the fate of the Continental monarchies. In the verbal conversations which took place, the great object of the two potentates was to obtain the consent of each other to their respective projects of aggrandizement at the expense of the lesser states in their vicinity; and their mutual interests or necessities rendered this an easy task. Alexander gave his sanction to the invasion of Spain and Portugal, and the placing of the princes of the Napoleon dynasty on the thrones of the Peninsula, as well as to the establishment of Murat in the kingdom of Naples, and the annexation of Tuscany to the French Empire. The effects of this consent soon appeared in the accrediting of Russian ambassadors to the courts of these infant sovereigns. On the other hand, Napoleon consented to the uniting of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia to the already vast dominions of the Czar, admitted his relation and future brother-in-law, the Grand-duke of Oldenberg, into the Confederation of the Rhine, gave satisfactory explanations in regard to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and held out to the Emperor of the East the prospects of obtaining aid from France in the attempt to stretch his mighty arms over the Asiatic Continent, and give a deadly wound

to the power of England on the plains of Hindostan. In return for so many concessions, he procured from Alexander a promise to aid France with a considerable force in the event of a war with Austria, and conceded to his earnest entreaties a considerable relaxation of the oppressive burdens under which Prussia had so long groaned. The arrear of contributions, fixed at 140,000 000 francs by the treaty of the 8th of September,* was reduced to 125,000,000; and a more important relaxation took place in the form of payment, by which, in consideration of 50,000,000 of francs received by Daru on the 5th of November, and 70,000,000 more, for which promissory notes were granted, the royal revenues were to be restored to the Prussian authorities; and the French troops, which were urgently required in the Peninsula, were, with the exception of the garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, entirely to evacuate the Prussian dominions. Thus had Napoleon the address to make his disasters in Spain, which imperatively required the removal of the French troops from the north of Germany, the means of gratifying Alexander by an apparent concession to his wishes, and diminishing the irritation of Prussia, which, in the event of hostilities with Austria, might prove, even after all its disasters, a formidable enemy in his rear. Two other more delicate subjects of discussion were, after being touched on, averted rather than settled, by the diplomatic skill of the two emperors, and left the seeds of inextinguishable future jealousy in their minds. The first was a proposal by Napoleon, who already had resolved to divorce Josephine, for the hand of the Grand-duchess Catherine Paolowna, the favourite sister of the emperor: a proposal which the astute Russian evaded by referring the matter, not to the reigning empress, whose ambition its brilliancy might have dazzled, but the empress-dowager, whose firmness of character was proof against the seduction, and who hastened to terminate the dangerous negotiation by alleging religious scruples, and shortly after marrying her daughter to Prince Oldenberg. The second was the amicable but resolute contest for the possession of Constantinople. Napoleon, as he himself has told us,† could not bring his mind to cede to his rival the Queen of the East: Alexander, with justice, regarded it as the outlet to his southern dominions: the back-door of his empire, and was earnest that its key should be placed in his hands. Fearful of interrupting their present harmony by any such irreconcilable theme of discord, the subject was, by common consent, laid aside: the city of Constantine was suffered to remain in the hands of the Turks, who, in every other respect, were abandoned to Muscovite ambition; but the tender point had been touched: the chord which jarred in the hearts of each struck, and the inestimable prize formed the secret subject of hostility, which, as much as jealousy of English power, afterward

* Thib., vii., 76, 78. Boutourlin, i., 32, 33, 45. Join., iii., 86.

† "The Emperor Alexander," says Boutourlin, "felt that the alliance concluded at Tilsit, cemented at Erfurth, as soon as it ceased to be conformable to the interests of Napoleon, would come to an end; and that the grand crisis was approaching which was destined either to consolidate the universal empire which the French emperor was endeavouring to establish on the Continent, or to break the chains which retained so many Continental states under his rule. Determined never to submit to any condition inconsistent with the honour of his crown, the Emperor of Russia regarded the rupture as near and unavoidable, and thenceforward applied himself silently to organize the immense resources of his states, to resist the danger which was approaching: a danger which promised to be more terrible, that Russia would have to sustain it, to all appearance alone, against the accumulated forces of the greater part of Europe."—BOUTOURLIN, i., 45.

* Ante, iii., p. 90.

† "We talked," says Napoleon, "of the affairs of Turkey, at Erfurth. Alexander was very desirous that I should consent to his obtaining possession of Constantinople, but I could never bring my mind to consent to it. It is the finest harbour in the world, is placed in the finest situation, and is itself worth a kingdom."—LAS CAJAS, iv., 231, and O'MEARA, i., 382.

led the French legions to Borodino and the Kremlin.*

Immediately after the conference at Erfurth, Nov. 5, 1808. a formal treaty was concluded with Prussia, by which the alleviations to her miseries provided for by the arbiters of Europe was reduced to writing; and in a short time the evacuation of the Prussian States, with the exception of the three retained fortresses, took place. Restored by this removal, and the recovery of the right of collecting his revenue, in a certain degree to his rank of an independent sovereign, Frederic William, Dec. 3. in company with his beautiful queen, returned to the capital, and made his public entry into Berlin amid the transports and tears of his subjects.†

The secret objects of the conference at Erfurth soon developed themselves. Murat declared King of Naples, and takes possession of his dominions. Murat was declared by Napoleon King of Naples and Sicily; and, leaving the theatre of his sanguinary measures and rash hostility in the Peninsula, hastened to take possession of his newly-acquired dominions. He was received with universal joy by the inconstant people, who seemed equally delighted with any sovereign sent to them by the great Northern conqueror. His entry into Naples was as great a scene of triumph, felicitations, and enthusiasm, as that of Joseph had been. Shortly afterward, however, he gave proof of the vigour which was at least to attend his military operations, by a successful expedition against the island of Capri, which the English had held for three years, but now yielded, with a small garrison under Sir Hudson Lowe, which capitulated and was sent back to England, to a vigorous and well-conceived attack from the French forces.‡

Secured by the conferences at Erfurth from all danger in his rear, Napoleon speedily returned to Paris; and, after presiding over the opening of the Legislative Assembly, then resolved, with his wonted vigour, to set out for the Pyrenees, determined by a sudden attack to disperse the Spanish armaments and capture Madrid, before either the English auxiliaries could acquire a solid foundation in the Peninsula, or Austria could gain time to put in motion the extensive armaments she was preparing on the Danube. Leaving Paris in the end of October, he Oct. 29. arrived at Bayonne on the 3d of November, and immediately disposed his forces for active operations.§

The effect of the vigorous exertions which he had made to strengthen his armies in that quarter was now beginning to display itself. The fifty thousand soldiers who, in the middle of August, were concentrated on the Ebro, dejected by disaster, dispirited by defeat, had now swelled, by the end of September, as if by enchantment, to ninety thousand men, present under arms on the Ebro, besides twenty thousand, under St. Cyr, in Catalonia. This body, already so formidable, subsequently received vast acces-

sions of force from the troops arriving from Germany, especially the Imperial Guard, and the corps of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, all of which were veterans from the Grand Army, confident in themselves, and inured to victory. During the whole of October, the road from Bayonne to Vittoria was crowded with horsemen and carriages; through every opening in the Pyrenees foot-soldiers were pouring in endless multitudes to re-enforce the grand muster in Navarre. Conformably to his general custom, Napoleon divided the whole army into eight corps, commanded by so many marshals, whose names, already rendered immortal in the rolls of Fame, seemed a sure presage to victory.* Their united force, when the emperor took the field in the beginning of November, was not less than three hundred thousand men, of whom at least forty thousand were cavalry; and, after deducting the troops in Catalonia, and those which required to be maintained in garrison in the northern fortresses, and the sick and absent, at least a hundred and eighty thousand could be relied on for offensive operations on the Ebro. But the magnitude of this force, great as it was, constituted the least formidable part of its character. It was its incomparable discipline, spirit, and equipment, the skill and vigour of its officers, the docility and experience of its soldiers, the central and impregnable position which it occupied among the mountains of Navarre, and the unity of design which it was well known would soon be communicated to its operations by the consummate talents of Napoleon, which constituted its real strength, and rendered the friends of freedom in Europe justly fearful of the collision of such a host with the divided and inexperienced armies of the Spanish provinces.†‡

These armies, though very numerous on paper, and in considerable strength in the field, were far from being in a situation, either from discipline, equipment, or position, to make head against so formidable an enemy. The Spanish troops were divided into three armies: that of the right, under Palafox, consisting of eighteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, occupied the country between Saragossa and Sanguessa, and was composed almost entirely of Arragonese; the centre, under Castanos, which boasted of the victors of Baylen in its ranks, was twenty-eight thousand strong, including thirteen hundred horse, and had thirty-

* First corps, Victor, Duke of Belluno	33,937
Second do., Bessières, Duke of Istria, afterward Soult, Duke of Dalmatia	33,054
Third do., Moncey, Duke of Cornegiano	37,690
Fourth do., Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic	25,984
Fifth do., Mortier, Duke of Treviso	26,713
Sixth do., Ney, Duke of Elchingen	38,033
Seventh do., General St. Cyr, in Catalonia	42,107
Eighth do., Junot, Duke of Abrantes	25,730
Reserve, Napoleon in person	42,382
On march from France	14,060
	319,690

† Tor., ii., 119. Napier, i., 361, 362, 377. South., ii., 386, 387. Thib., vii., 152.

‡ Before assuming the command of the army, Napoleon had said, in his opening address to the Legislative Body at Paris, "In a few days I shall set out to place myself at the head of my army, and, with the aid of God, crown at Madrid the King of Spain, and plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon!"—Discourse, October 25, 1808. *Moniteur*, October 26, 1808; and THIB., vii., 66; and *Imperial Muster-rolls*, NAPIER, i., 88, *Appendix*

* Thib., vii., 76, 78. Hard., x., 239, 245. Bout., i., 34, 35. Jom., iii., 86. Las Cas., iv., 232, 233. O'Meara, i., 382.

† Montg., vi., 365. Martens, Sup., v., 106.

‡ Thib., vii., 149. Bot., iv., 237, 239.

§ Thib., vii., 150, 153.

six pieces of cannon; it lay at Tarazona and Agreda, right opposite to the French position; the left, under Blake, thirty thousand in number, almost entirely Galicians, but with hardly any cavalry, and only twenty-six guns, was stationed on the rocky mountains near Reynosa, from whence the Ebro takes its rise. Thus, seventy-four thousand infantry and two thousand horse, with eighty-six guns, were all that the Spaniards could rely upon for immediate operations on the Ebro; for, although considerable reserves were collecting in the rear,* yet they were too far from the scene of action, and their discipline and equipment not in a sufficient state or forwardness to permit of their either arriving in time at the theatre of conflict, or taking any useful part in it if they were there. Seventy thousand Spanish infantry and two thousand Spanish cavalry could never be considered a match for a hundred and fifty thousand French foot and thirty thousand horse, even under the most favourable circumstances; least of all could they be relied on, when the French occupied a central position, defended by almost inaccessible mountains, and were guided by one commander of consummate abilities, while their undisciplined antagonists, scattered over a circumference two hundred miles in length, and separated from each other by deep ravines, rapid rivers, and impassable ridges, were under the command of different and independent generals, jealous of each other, and gifted with comparatively moderate military talents.†

The British forces, it is true, under Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird, were rapidly approaching the scene of action; but their distance, notwithstanding all their efforts, was still such as to preclude the hope of their being in a situation to render any effectual assistance. Sir John Moore's forces, which set out on their march from Lisbon, as already mentioned, in the middle of October, had broken, for the sake of procuring better roads for the artillery and wagon train, into two columns; and while the main body, under Sir John in person, followed the direct road by Abrantes, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo, a lesser division, but with the reserve and most of the guns, took the more circuitous route by Elvas, Badajoz, Talavera, and Madrid. It was not, however, till Nov. 8. the 8th of November that this heavily-encumbered corps reached the Spanish capital, and on the 27th of the same month Nov. 27. that it crossed the Guadarrama Mountains, before which time the fate of all the Spanish armies on the Ebro was sealed. Meanwhile, Sir John Moore was farther advanced; for, on the 11th, he crossed the Spanish frontier, and on the 18th had collected the bulk of his forces at Salamanca; but

Sir David Baird, who had landed at Coruña on the 13th of October, had only, by Oct. 13 great exertion, succeeded in reaching Astorga in Leon, four days' march from Salamanca, on the 20th of November. Thus the British army, not in all more than thirty thousand strong, was split into three divisions, severally stationed at the Escorial, Salamanca, and Astorga, distant eighty or a hundred miles from each other, and without any common base or line of operations; and the Spaniards, a hundred miles farther in advance, were also divided into three armies, separated by still greater distances from each other, while Napoleon lay with a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops clustered round the basin of Vittoria. It was easy to see that the allies, exhibiting, in this respect, a melancholy contrast to their antagonists, were but novices in the art of war, and signally ignorant of the importance of time in its combinations; and that the English, in particular, inheriting too much of the character of their Saxon ancestors, were, like Athelstane the Unready, still unprepared to strike till the moment for decisive operations had passed.*†

Napoleon, who was well aware of the importance of striking a decisive blow in the outset, and dispersing the Spanish armies in his front, before the warlike and disciplined reserve of the English troops could arrive

Movements on the French left before the arrival of Napoleon.

* South, ii., 470. Nap., i., 425, 431. Lond., i., 181, 199.

† These observations apply to those having the general direction of the allied campaign, and especially the English government, who, at this period, were far from being adequately impressed with the vital importance of time in war. Their instructions for the campaign were dated so late as October 6. Both the gallant generals intrusted with the direction of the English army pressed forward with all imaginable expedition after they received them; and Sir John Moore, in particular, as it will appear in the sequel, with mournful resolution, commenced an important advance, under circumstances, to all but a soldier of honour, utterly desperate. It was impossible for him to commence operations before the junction with Sir David Baird, which did not take place till the end of November. But still, in all concerned, there was at this period an evident want of the vigour and expedition requisite for success in war. Napoleon would never have permitted the main English army to have lingered inactive at Lisbon from the end of August, when the convention at Cintra was concluded, till the middle of October, when the march for Spain commenced, nor delayed the British expedition under Sir David Baird till it reached the Spanish shores for the first time on the 18th of that month. But these were the faults of government.

The greatest error, in a military point of view, of Sir John Moore, was separating the artillery from the infantry and cavalry in the advance into Spain. For this oblivion of the first rule of military movements, viz., to station each portion of the army so that its different arms may, in case of need, support and aid each other, it is hardly possible to find any excuse. It is difficult to conceive how the direct road by Almeida could at that period have been impassable for artillery and wagons, when it had so recently before been traversed by Junot, with all his army, and was ever after the great line of military communication which the Duke of Wellington made use of from the capital to the frontier; and, at any rate, if the passage at that period was impracticable for the guns, that might have been a good reason for sending the whole army round by Elvas, but it could be none for separating it into two parts, severed by two hundred miles from each other, and exposing either to the chance of destruction when the other was not at hand to lend it any support. Colonel Napier, much to his credit, admits that this separation violated a great military principle, though he endeavours to defend it in that particular case as unattended with danger. It will appear, in the sequel, that the greatest commanders sometimes unnecessarily fall into a similar forgetfulness; and that the cantoning the English infantry apart from the cavalry and artillery on the Flemish frontier, and within the reach of the enemy's attack, in 1815, had wellnigh induced a serious disaster at Quatre Bras.—See NAPIER, i., 334, and *Infra*, vol. iii., *Voce Waterloo*

* These reserves were stated to be as follows; but they were all distant from the scene of action, and had, for the most part, hardly acquired the rudiments of the military art:

Castilians at Segovia, about 150 miles in the rear	12,000
Estremadureans at Talavera	13,000
Andalusians in La Mancha	14,000
Asturians in reserve at Llanes	18,000

Total 57,000

† Nap., i., 362, 363. Tor., ii., 103, 104. Thib., vii., 152, 153. Tor., ii., 108.

at the scene of action, lost no time, after his arrival on the Bidassoa, in pressing forward the most active operations. Some inconsiderable actions had, before his arrival, taken place on the left, where Blake had, since the 18th of September, been engaged in an offensive movement, from which no material results had ensued. Prior to this the French had evacuated Burgos and Tudela, and extended themselves towards Bilbao, which they still held, much against the will of Napoleon, who strongly censured such a proceeding, as gaining nothing in strength of position, and losing much in moral influence.*

Sept. 18. Blake broke up from Reynosa on the 18th of September with thirty thousand Galicians, and advanced to Santander. The effect of this movement was to make the French

Sept. 23. concentrate their forces in the basin of Vittoria; and Blake attacked Bilbao with fifteen thousand men, which fell the day after it was invested, while the French withdrew up the valley of Durango, and all the lateral valleys in its vicinity, to the higher parts of the mountains of Navarre. But though these operations were at first successful, yet the natural effects of the presumption and want of foresight of the Spanish government and generals soon developed itself. Blake had engaged in this laborious and dangerous mountain warfare without magazine stores, or any base of operations, and with only seventy rounds of ammunition for each gun. His men, when the winter was approaching and the snow beginning to fall, were without greatcoats, and many without shoes. The bulk of his forces, grouped around Burgos, exposed his right flank to successful attack.†

A combined attack had been arranged between the Spanish generals along the whole circumference which they occupied upon the central mountain position of the French army. But such a complicated movement, difficult and hazardous even with the best disciplined troops, when acting along such an extensive and rugged line of country, was altogether hopeless with the disorderly and ill-appointed bands of the Peninsular patriots. An attack by Castanos, with the Andalusian army, upon the French posts on the Ebro around Logrono, though at the first attended with some success, at length terminated in disaster; and the Spanish division of Pignatelli was driven back with

the loss of all its artillery, and immediately dispersed. Discouraged by this check, Castanos fell back to Calahorra; and dissensions, threatening very serious consequences, broke out between that General and Palafox, who retired with the Arragonese levies towards Saragossa. Meanwhile Blake, whose forces, from the junction of the troops under Romana, which had come up from Corunna, and the Asturians, with whom he was in communication near Santander, were increased to nearly fifty thousand men, commenced a forward movement on the French left in the Biscayan provinces, and stretching himself out by the seacoast, and up the valley of Durango, threatened to interpose between the advanced divisions of Lefebvre and Ney's corps, which lay most exposed, and their communication with the French frontier on the Bidassoa.*

This offensive movement was well conceived, and, if conducted and followed up with the requisite vigour, might have led to great results. As it

Defeat of Blake at Tornos.

was, however, his forces were so scattered, that, though thirty-six thousand were under his immediate orders, only seventeen thousand were collected by Blake in front of the enemy, without any artillery, in the valley of Durango, the remainder being stretched inactive along the seacoast, or separated from the main body by impassable mountain ridges. Alarmed, however, by the probable consequence of an interposition of such a force between the bulk of his troops and their communications with Bayonne and St. Sebastian, Lefebvre resolved to make a general attack upon the enemy, and drive them back to the neighbourhood of Bilbao. Descending from the heights of Durango under cover of a thick fog, he suddenly attacked the Spanish army at daybreak on the 31st of October with such vigour, that the divisions in front were thrown back on those in the rear, and the whole driven in utter confusion to Bilbao, from whence they continued their retreat in the night to Balma-seda, in the direction of the Asturias. Lefebvre followed him up next day, but Blake, having assembled his troops, turned upon his pursuers, and, after some sharp partial engagements, the French retired to Bilbao, of which they were allowed to retain undisturbed possession.†

Matters were in this state in Navarre and Biscay when Napoleon arrived at Vittoria, and instantly, as if by an electric shock, communicated his own unequalled energy to the operations of the army. Disapproving Lefebvre's unsupported attack upon Blake, which promised merely to force him back from the scene of action, without effecting those decisive results which his presence both usually occasioned and at present required, he immediately gave orders for the most vigorous operations. The position of the allied armies promised the greatest results to immediate attack. Blake, with twenty-five thousand defeated and starving mountaineers, was near Espinosa in Biscay; the Conde de Belvidere, with the Etre-maduran levies, twelve thousand strong, was in Burgos; Castanos and Palafox, little dream-

Position of the French and Spanish armies on Napoleon's arrival.

* "The line of the Ebro," says Napoleon, "was actually taken; it must be kept. To advance from that river without an object would create indecision; but why evacuate Burgos—why abandon Tudela? Both were of importance, both politically and morally; the latter as commanding a stone bridge and the canal of Saragossa; the former as the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army. If occupied in force, it would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, even Madrid itself. If the enemy occupies Burgos, Logrono, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful situation." It is remarkable how early the experienced eye of the French emperor, at the distance of three hundred leagues from the scene of action, discerned the military importance of Burgos, a town then unknown to military fame, but the value of which was afterward so strongly felt by the Duke of Wellington, that he strained every nerve and exposed himself to imminent risk in the close of the brilliant campaign of 1812, in the unsuccessful attempt to effect its reduction.—*Vide Note, Sur les Affaires d'Espagne, August, 1808, taken at Vittoria.*—NAPIER, App. No. iv., p. 18.

† Nap., i., 343, 369. South., i., 387, 389. Tor., ii., 104, 105

* Tor., ii., 110, 113. Nap., i., 368.

† Tor., ii., 120, 123. Nap., i., 379, 381.

ing of the danger which was approaching, were preparing to advance again towards Logrono, and confidently expected to drive the invaders over the Pyrenees, while the English forces, slowly converging towards the scene of action, were still scattered, from Corunna to Madrid, over the half of Spain. Napoleon, on the other hand, had a hundred thousand excellent troops ready for immediate operations, in a circumference of twenty miles round his headquarters at Vittoria,* besides nearly an equal force at a greater distance in Biscay and Navarre.

The plans of the French emperor were immediately formed. Blake, whose eyes were at length opened to the perilous situation in which he was placed, so far in advance, and destitute of all communication with the other Spanish armies, had retired to ESPINOSA, where he had concentrated nearly all his troops, including those which had come with Romana from the Baltic, in a very strong position, while his reserves and park of artillery were stationed in the rear at Reynosa. He had now rejoined his artillery, and had collected twenty-five thousand men; but his troops, half naked and in great part without shoes, were shivering from the inclemency of the weather, and exhausted by incessant marching and countermarching, often without food, for fourteen days. In this state they

Nov. 10. were attacked, on the forenoon of the 10th, by Marshal Victor, with twenty-five thousand men, while Lefebvre, with fifteen thousand, marched upon the Spanish line of retreat. Romana's infantry, posted in a wood on the right, made a gallant resistance, and not only was the action prolonged till nightfall, without any disadvantage, by those gallant veterans, but the Spanish centre, who were protected by the fire of a battery well posted, to which the French had no guns to oppose, had gained ground upon the enemy. Next morn-

Nov. 11. ing, however, the result was very different. Victor, who had changed his columns of attack during the night, renewed the action at daybreak, and directed their efforts against the left, where the Asturian levies were posted. These gallant mountaineers, though almost starving, and but recently imbedded, stood their ground bravely as long as their chiefs, Quiron, Acevedo, and Valdes, remained to head them; but the French, perceiving the influence which they exercised over the minds of their followers, sent forward some sharpshooters under cover of the rocks and thickets in front of the position, who speedily killed the first and severely wounded the two latter. Disheartened by this loss, the Asturians broke and fled. Blake detached a column of grenadiers to support them, but, instead of doing so, they were themselves overwhelmed by the torrent of fugitives, and swept along: in a short time the whole army disbanded, and rushed in the wildest disorder towards the river Trueba, which encircles the rear of the position.† Great numbers perished in the stream, which was deeply swollen with the rains of winter; those

who reached the fords dispersed, and made the best of their way into their own provinces, carrying dismay into all parts of Galicia, Asturias, and Leon, where Romana afterward contrived to rally ten thousand men. With difficulty Blake collected seven thousand men, with whom he fell back to Reynosa, where he endeavoured to make a stand, with the aid of his reserve artillery, which was still stationed there; but this ineffectual attempt only rendered his defeat in the end more complete. Soult, who, as well as Lefebvre, was now upon his traces, despatched a large body of troops on the 10th to cut him off from his retreat towards Leon; and on the 13th he was attacked by the advanced guard of the former marshal, who displayed even more than his wonted vigour on the occasion, completely routed, with the loss of his whole artillery and ammunition, and driven, with a few thousand miserable and spectre-looking followers, into the heart of the Asturian mountains. Meanwhile Bilbao, Santander, and the whole line of the intermediate seacoast, with great stores landed at the latter port by the British, fell into the hands of the enemy.*

While these decisive blows in a manner annihilated the Spanish right, an equally important stroke was delivered by Soult, who had now taken the command of the second corps, against the centre. It consisted of the army of Estremadura, under the Count de Belvidere, with which were united some of the bravest regular troops in Spain: in particular, the Spanish and Walloon Guards, some of the best-appointed regiments of the line, and the Royal Carabineers; and the whole were completely equipped and clothed by the English government. It made, however, even less resistance than the undisciplined levies of Asturias and Galicia. The Spanish soldiers, eighteen thousand strong, of whom eleven thousand were regulars, were posted at Gamonal, in front of Burgos, with twenty pieces of cannon disposed along their front; the right occupied a wood, the left the walled park of Villemer. The action commenced by General Lasalle, with the French horse, driving in the Spanish right and threatening its flank, while Mouton, with a division of veterans, charged rapidly through the trees and assailed their front; Bonnet followed closely with another division immediately in his rear; but such was the vigour and effect of Mouton's attack, that the enemy broke and fled in utter confusion towards Burgos, pursued all the way by Bessières' heavy dragoons, who did dreadful execution among the fugitives, and took all the guns which had been saved from the first attack. Don Juan de Henestrosa, who commanded the Spanish cavalry, to cover the retreat, charged this dreadful body of horse with more gallantry than success; his dragoons, led by youths of the best families in Spain, were unable to withstand the shock of the French cuirassiers, and shared in the general rout. Two thousand Spaniards fell on the field or in the pursuit; all the artillery, consisting of twenty guns, with eight hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors; all the ammunition and

* Nap., i., 385, 387. Tor., ii., 124, 125.

† Great part of the disasters of this defeat were owing to the injudicious selection of a position for battle, with the river in the rear: another example, like that of the Russians at Friedland, of one of the most fatal errors which a general can commit.

* Tor., ii., 126, 135. Nap., i., 391, 393. Jom., ii., 97, 98. South., ii., 380, 393.

stores of the army were taken in Burgos, which was given up to pillage, and the dispersion of the defeated troops was complete.*

Burgos now became the centre of the emperor's operations; headquarters were established there on the 12th, and ten thousand light troops were despatched forward to scour the country, levy contributions, and diffuse a general terror of the French arms. Such was the consternation produced by their advance, that they traversed the open fields in every direction without experiencing the slightest opposition; they swept over the plains of Leon as far as Benavente, Toro, and Tordesillas, spreading everywhere the triumphant proclamations of the emperor, and boasting that, notwithstanding their utmost exertion, the French horsemen could not overtake the English army, which, abandoning its allies without striking a blow, was flying in disgrace to its ships. But while, by these incursions, the attention of the enemy was drawn to the side of Salamanca, the eyes of Napoleon were in reality turned in a different quarter, and it was against Castanos and Palafox that the weight of his forces was directed. The position of the French army seemed to expose them to certain destruction; for Ney's corps, which had been destined to act against the army of Estremadura at Burgos, being rendered disposable by its sudden destruction, was in a situation to make a circuit round their position and cut them off from the line of retreat to New Castile and Madrid. That brave marshal, accordingly, re-enforced by a division from the reserve, was directed to move from Aranda by Soria to Agreda, which was directly in their rear; while Lannes was despatched from Burgos, with two divisions of infantry and one of heavy cavalry from the reserve, to put himself at the head of Moncey's corps, and attack them in front.† Meanwhile Castanos, finding himself separated both from Belvidere and Blake's armies, with the destruction of which he was unacquainted, had adopted the extraordinary plan of forcing a passage through the French forces in his front, and marching by Conchade-Hara and Soria to Burgos, where he was to annihilate the emperor's reserves and rear-guard, and thence pass on to Vittoria to co-operate with Blake in the destruction of the two corps in Biscay.‡

In the midst of these extravagant projects, the hand of fate was upon him. Marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, entered Soria on the 21st, upon which Castanos retreated towards Tudela, which he reached on the evening of the 22d. There his army formed a junction with that of Arragon, under Palafox, and their united forces amounted to thirty-nine thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, with forty guns. The generals of the armies of Andalusia and Arragon could not concur in

any plan of common operations; Palafox contending strongly for the defence of Arragon, Castanos for the more prudent plan of retiring before the enemy. Nothing was as yet decided between these conflicting opinions, when it was announced from the outposts that the enemy were already upon them. In haste, the troops were drawn up nearly on the ground which they occupied at the moment, which was along a range of inconsiderable hills, nearly six miles long, stretching from Tudela to Taranzona. The Arragonese, with Palafox, were on the right, leaning on Tudela; the Valencians and Castilians loosely scattered in the centre; the veterans of Andalusia, proud of the laurels of Baylen, on the left, stretching to Taranzona, which they occupied with three divisions, the flower of the army. Lannes, who commanded the French, and had concentrated thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, with sixty pieces of cannon, instantly perceived the weakness of the enemy's line, and prepared to pierce the long and feebly guarded front in the centre, where it was weakest, and composed of the most inexperienced troops, so as to separate altogether the army of Arragon from that of Andalusia. This well-conceived plan proved entirely successful. General Maurice Mathieu, with a strong body of infantry, and the whole cavalry under Lefebvre Desnouettes, attacked the Valencians and Castilians in the centre with great vigour, and soon compelled them to give ground; but they were in turn charged by the Spanish guards, whom Castanos despatched to their assistance from the left, who threw the assailants into confusion, and the Spanish line in that quarter was gaining ground when they were taken in flank by General Morlot, who had beaten back the Arragonese on the right, and now turned fiercely on the enemy's centre. Aided by such powerful auxiliaries, Maurice Mathieu and Lefebvre Desnouettes regained the advantage, and, in their turn, drove back and threw into confusion the Valencians and Castilians, who had got into disorder by the length of the combat. The centre was speedily routed, and Lefebvre, charging the right with vigour, drove them entirely off the field in confusion, towards Saragossa. Meanwhile, La Pena, with the victors of Baylen on the extreme left, had routed the French under La Grange, to whom he was opposed, but, when following up their success in some disorder, and already confident of victory, the victors were suddenly met by a solid mass of infantry which diverged from the victorious centre of the enemy, and broken; the other divisions of the army of Andalusia, three in number, and embracing twelve thousand soldiers, took no part in the action. They commenced their retreat, however, in good order, when it was evident the battle was lost; but some of the advanced troops of Ney's corps having appeared in their rear, from the side of Soria, and a powder-wagon exploded by accident, the retreat became disorderly, and it was with some difficulty the guns were brought off. As it was, the separation of the Spanish armies was complete: fifteen thousand men, Arragonese, Valencians, and Castilians, had taken refuge in Saragossa, without either guns or ammunition-wagons. Twenty thousand, under Castanos,

* Nap., i., 389, 390. Jom., ii., 96. Tor., ii., 131, 132. St. uth., ii., 395, 396.

† In crossing a mountain range near Tolosa the horse of Marshal Lannes fell with him, and he sustained several severe and dangerous bruises. He was cured in a very singular manner by being wrapped in a warm skin of a newly-slain sheep, and was able in two days to resume the command of the army.—LARREY, *M. moires et Camp.*, iv., 237.

‡ Thib., vii., 160, 161. Tor., ii., 138, 139. Nap., ii., 395, 401.

with all their artillery, fell back, comparatively in good order, to Catalayud, and were immediately ordered up by the central junta to Madrid to defend the capital. Five thousand were killed and wounded or made prisoners on the field; the remainder, with twenty guns, dispersed in the pursuit, and were never more heard of. But if Napoleon's directions had been implicitly followed by Ney, who arrived at Soria on the 22d, and if, instead of remaining in that town as he did inactive for two days, he had advanced in the direction of Catalayud, he would have fallen perpendicularly on the retreating columns of Castanos; and totally destroyed them. This failure on the part of Ney excited great displeasure in Napoleon (who had with reason calculated upon much greater results from the battle), and was attended with important consequences on the future fortunes of the war.*†

The battles of Espinosa, Burgos, and Tudela were not only totally destructive of the Spanish armies in the north, but they rendered, by the dispersion of their forces with which they were attended, the approach to the capital a matter of ease to the French emperor. Blake's troops, of which Romana had now assumed the command, had almost all dispersed, some into Asturias, others into Leon; and it was with the utmost difficulty that that gallant commander had rallied ten thousand of the starving fugitives, without either artillery, ammunition, or stores, in the rugged mountains from which the Ebro takes its rise; the remnant of the army of Estremadura, routed at Burgos, had fallen back, in the utmost confusion, towards the Guadarrama Mountains; while Castanos, with the army of Andalusia, was driven off in a southeasterly direction to Catalayud, in the road to Valencia; and Palafox, with the levies of Arragon and Castile, had sought a refuge behind the walls of Saragossa. Thus, the Spanish armies were not only individually and grievously weakened by the losses they had sustained, but so disjointed and severed as to be incapable of acting in concert, or affording any support to each other; while Napoleon, at the head of a hundred thousand men, occupied a central position in the heart of them all, and was master of the great road leading direct to the capital.‡

It was in such circumstances that the genius of that great general appeared most conspicuous, which never shone with such lustre as in the vigour and ability with which he followed up a beaten enemy. Abandoning the remains of Blake's army to Soult's, and the

care of watching the English troops to Lefebvre's corps, and directing Lannes to observe Saragossa and the discomfited but warlike multitude which it contained, while Ney was to press incessantly on Castanos, and drive him off, as far as possible, in an easterly direction, the emperor himself, with the Imperial Guards, Victor's corps, and the reserve, at least sixty thousand strong, advanced towards Madrid. So skilfully were these various movements combined, that, while each corps had the following up and destroying of its own peculiar antagonist in an especial manner intrusted to its care, the whole combined to protect and support the advance of the main body of the capital: Lefebvre protecting its right flank, Ney its left, while Lannes and Soult secured and protected the rear, at the same time that they disposed of the remnants of the Arragonese and Galician armies.*

Departing from Aranda de Douro on the 28th, the emperor arrived at the foot of the ^{Forcing of} Somo-sierra on the morning of the 30th. Some fieldworks, hastily constructed at the summit of the pass, were garrisoned by a disorderly crowd, composed of the reserve of the divisions of Andalusia which had been sent forward from Madrid, with which were united the remains of the army of Estremadura, in all about twelve thousand men, with sixteen pieces of cannon, under the command of General St. Juan. The guns swept the road along the whole ascent, which was long and very steep; and as it was impossible that the toilsome acclivity could be surmounted by the troops except during a considerable time, a very serious loss was anticipated by the assailants. Preceded, however, by a cloud of sharpshooters, which covered the mountains on either side, a column of three regiments ascended the causeway, while as many assailed the position on its right, and a like number on its left. The fire, however, of the artillery on the summit was very violent, to which it was difficult to reply, as a thick fog, intermingled with smoke, hung over their line on the higher part of the ridge, on entering into which the French found themselves torn by a descending shower of balls from an enemy whom they could not discern. The head of the column on the causeway was already arrested, and hesitation, as always ensues in such an event, was beginning to spread in the rear, when Napoleon, having rode to the bottom of the pass, at once ordered the Polish lancers and chasseurs of the guard, under General Montbrun, to charge. Advancing up the steep ascent at a rapid pace, these brave men opened a way for themselves through the columns of infantry with which it was encumbered, and attacked the battery; the first squadrons, shattered by a terrible discharge, reeled and fell back; but the next, galloping forward before the guns could be reloaded, dashed among the artillerymen, and carried the pass. Meanwhile the Spanish infantry, stationed on either flank, retired, after discharging their muskets at the swarms of tirailleurs by whom they were assailed, and the whole body falling into confusion, soon fled in disorder to Segovia, where a small number only could be rallied by the efforts of

* Jom., ii., 99, 100. Tor., ii., 138, 142. Nap., i., 401, 406. Soult, i., 399, 401.

† Colonel Napier says, "Palafox, with the right wing and centre, fled to Saragossa with such speed that some of the fugitives are said to have arrived there the same evening." It would be desirable that the authority on which this serious charge is made against Palafox should be given, as no foundation appears for it in the military authorities with which I am acquainted. Jomini says merely that after the battle "Palafox took the road to Saragossa;" Torreno, "that Don Joseph Palafox in the morning (*des le matin*) resumed the route to Saragossa." Neither say anything about any of the Arragonese, or Palafox himself, having either fled to Saragossa, or arrived there that night.—See NAPIER, i., 403, 1st ed.; TORENO, ii., 141; JOMINI, iii., 100.

‡ Nap., i., 405, 406. Jom., ii., 102. Tor., ii., 141.

* Nap., i., 407. Jom., i., 101, 102. Tor., ii., 143, 144.

their gallant leader, San Juan, who cut his way, sword in hand, through a body of Polish lancers, by whom he was enveloped.*

Great was the dismay in the Spanish capital when the alarming intelligence arrived, early on the morning of the 1st of December, that the Somosierra pass had been forced, and that Napoleon, with his terrible legions, was advancing with rapid strides against its defenceless walls. The central junta at Aranjuez, at the same time, heard of the disaster, and instantly fixing on Badajoz as their point of union, they set out with all imaginable haste for Talavera de la Reyna in different parties and by different roads, and were fortunate enough to arrive at their place of destination without accident. Meanwhile, the general government of Madrid was intrusted to a provisional junta, of which the Duke del Infantado was head, while the direction of its military defence was in the hands of Don Thomas de Morla, who had early taken a lead in the Cadiz insurrection, but whose subsequent violation of faith to the prisoners taken at Baylen augured ill for the integrity with which he would discharge the arduous duties now intrusted to his care. The regular troops in the city consisted only of three hundred regular soldiers, with two battalions and a single squadron newly levied. Nevertheless, vigorous preparations were made for defence: eight thousand muskets, and a still greater number of pikes, were hastily distributed from the arsenal to the people; heavy cannon were planted on the Retiro and principal streets; the pavement was torn up, barricades constructed, and the most enthusiastic spirit pervaded the multitude. Ammunition was served out in abundance, but some of the cartridges were discovered to be filled with black sand instead of gunpowder: a discovery which, in the excited state of the inhabitants, proved fatal to the Marquis Perales, who was at the head of that department. He had formerly been the idol of the people; but, with their usual inconsistency, upon the first discovery of this fraud, originating, probably, in the cupidity of some inferior agent, a furious mob assailed his house, dragged him into the street, and there murdered him. On the morning of the 2d, the advanced guards of the French arrived on the heights to the north of Madrid; and the emperor, who was extremely desirous of gaining possession of the capital on the anniversary of his coronation, and of the battle of Austerlitz, immediately summoned it to surrender; but the proposal was indignantly rejected. On the same day the Duke del Infantado was fortunate enough to make his escape, under cover of a thick fog, and directed his steps to Guadalaxara, to join the army of Castanos, which had retreated in that direction. During the night the French infantry arrived in great strength around the capital, and on the

Dec. 3. following morning a thick fog overspread both the agitated multitude within, and the host without by which it was menaced. By degrees, however, the mist was dispelled by the ascending rays of the sun, and the emperor directed his columns of attack against the RETIRO, the heights of which completely com-

manded the city. A battery of thirty guns soon made a practicable breach in its weak defence, and a French division advancing to the assault, speedily rushed in and made themselves masters of that important post.*

The agitation in Madrid now became excessive: twenty thousand armed men were within its walls, but almost entirely disorganized; agitated by furious passions, burning with individual ardour, but destitute of the organization and discipline necessary for success against the formidable enemy by whom they were now assailed. The city presented the most frightful scene of disorder: exasperated crowds filled the streets; strong barricades were erected in various quarters; the bells of two hundred churches rang together; a confused murmur, like the sound of a mighty cataract, was heard incessantly, even during the night, which was audible at the distance of miles from the capital; while in the French lines all was silent and orderly, and the step only of the passing sentinel broke the stillness: a striking image of the difference between the disorderly passions which agitate the populace, without being directed by superior intelligence to any useful end, and the experienced discipline which restrains an ardour not less powerful, till the moment for letting it loose with decisive effect has arrived. But the possession of the Retiro, in a military point of view, is possession of Madrid; bombs from its heights can reach the farthest points of the city. Sensible of the impossibility of maintaining the defence, the Spanish authorities were deliberating on the expedience of proposing terms of capitulation, when a flag of truce arrived from Berthier, threatening the utmost severity of military execution if the white flag was not hoisted within two hours. Morla and Ivriarte were, upon that, despatched to the headquarters of the emperor, to negotiate the terms of surrender. He received the former with unusual sternness, and in just but cutting terms reproached him with his violation of good faith towards the unhappy prisoners taken at Baylen.† "Injustice and bad

* Tor., ii., 149, 152. Nap., i., 411, 415. South., ii., 410, 414. Jom., ii., 103.

† When Morla appeared before him, Napoleon addressed Morla in these words: "You in vain seek to shelter yourself under the name of the people; if you cannot now appease them, it is because you have formerly excited and misled them by your falsehoods; return to Madrid, assemble the clergy, the magistrates, the principal inhabitants; tell them that if, by to-morrow morning at six o'clock, the town has not surrendered, it will cease to exist: I neither will nor ought to withdraw my troops. You have massacred the unhappy French prisoners who fell into your hands: within these few days you have suffered two servants of the Russian ambassador to be dragged into the streets and murdered, because they were born in France. The unskilfulness and cowardice of a general had placed in your hands troops who had capitulated on the field of battle, and the capitulation was violated. What sort of a letter did you, M. Morla, write to the general who subscribed that capitulation?" It well became you to speak of pillage, you, who in Roussillon had carried off women, and divided them like booty among your soldiers. What right, besides, had you to hold such language? The capitulation expressly forbade it. What have the English done, who are far from piquing themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations? they complained of the Convention of Cintra, but nevertheless carried it into execution. To violate military conventions is to renounce civilization and put ourselves on a level

* Tor., ii., 145, 146. Nap., i., 409. Jom., ii., 103.

* Alluding to Morla's letter to Dupont of the 10th of August, 1808, in which he sought to vindicate the violation of the capitulation by the plunder of the French soldiers.

faith," said he, "ever in the end recoil upon those who practice them." Prophetic words! of the truth and universal application of which Napoleon himself, on the rock of St. Helena, afterward afforded a memorable example. Filled with consternation at the perilous predicament in which he was individually placed, from the well-founded resentment of the emperor, and inspired with a sense of the necessity of appeasing the wrath of the conqueror by an immediate surrender, Morla returned to the city, and easily persuaded the majority of the junta that submission had become a matter of necessity. A few gallant men, with the Marquis Castellanos and Viscount de Gaeta, disdaining to surrender, withdrew from the city during the night, and took the road for Estremadura. At daybreak the capitulation was signed, and by ten o'clock the principal points of the city were in the possession of the French troops.*

Napoleon did not himself enter Madrid, but established his headquarters at Chamartin, in the neighbourhood of the capital, where he received the submission of the authorities, and fulminated his anathemas against the functionaries who had resisted or swerved from his government. In a short time everything wore the appearance of peace: the theatres were reopened; the shopkeepers displayed their tempting wares, secure in the discipline of the conquerors; the Prado and public walks were crowded with spectators. Numerous deputations, embracing some of the most wealthy and respectable inhabitants of Madrid, waited on the emperor, and renewed their protestations of fidelity to his brother Joseph, who was established at the royal palace of Pardo: it then appeared how completely and fatally the corruptions and enjoyments of opulence and civilized life disqualify men from acting a heroic part in defence of their country.† Measures of great severity were adopted against all the constituted authorities who, after having recognised Joseph as King of Spain, had joined the popular party. The Marquis des Simon, a Frenchman by birth, who had to the last prolonged the conflict after the capitulation had paralyzed all general resistance, and was taken

fighting bravely, when endeavouring to cut his way through at the gate of Fuencarral, was ordered to be shot. He owed his life to the intercession of his daughter, who threw herself at the emperor's feet, and obtained from his clemency a commutation of the sentence. All the members of the Council of Castile who had declared that they had sworn allegiance to Joseph, under Jesuitical mutual reservations, were dismissed, and ordered to be detained prisoners in their own houses. Nor were general measures wanting, calculated to reconcile the nation to the sway of the intrusive monarch. By a solemn decree, the Inquisition was abolished, and all its funds directed to be applied towards the reduction of the public debt; feudal rights were suppressed; all personal restrictions and privileges declared at an end; the number of convents throughout the kingdom was at once reduced a third, and their inmates turned adrift, while all novices were permitted to leave their places of seclusion. One half of the proceeds of the estates of the suppressed convents was to be applied to the public debt, the other to the relief of the cities and towns which had suffered from the French invasion; and all the barriers between province and province, which had so long impeded the internal commerce of the kingdom, were declared at an end. A few days after, the emperor fulminated a bulletin against the English government, which deserves to be recorded, from the singular contrast which its predictions exhibited to the future march of events with which his own destinies were so deeply implicated.*†

Nor was the emperor less actively employed during the fortnight that he remained at Madrid, in dispersing his armies so as to spread them over the greatest possible space, and complete in all the provinces that thorough conquest which had already been effected in the capital. Ney's corps, which had been brought up from Soria, was stationed at Madrid, under his own immediate control, with the guards and reserve; Victor was advanced to Toledo, which, notwithstanding its expressed determi-

Positions of the French corps in the end of December.

with the Bedouins of the Desert. How can you now venture to demand a capitulation, you who have violated that of Baylen? See how injustice and bad faith ever recoil upon those who commit them. I had a fleet at Cadiz: it had come there as to an ally's harbour, and you directed against it the mortars of the town which you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks, but I preferred allowing it to escape on board the English vessels, and precipitating it from the rocks of Espinosa to disarming it. I would rather have seven thousand additional enemies to combat than be wanting in good faith. Return to Madrid: I give you till to-morrow at ten; return then if you are the bearer of submission; if not, you and your troops shall be all put to the sword."—THIBAUDREAU, vii., 165, 166. There can be no doubt that consciousness of his former breach of faith now paralyzed Morla, and impelled him into a second act of pusillanimity, if not treachery, to his own countrymen: so true it is, in Napoleon's words, that "injustice and bad faith ever recoil in the end upon those who commit them." Morla lingered out a few years, abhorred and shunned by all; he died as he had lived, devoured by remorse and sunk in misery.—See TORENO, ii., 155.

* Tor., ii., 152, 155. Thib., vii., 163, 165. Nap., i., 413, 415. South., ii., 414, 417.

† Their number amounted to above twelve hundred, comprehending the most eminent and wealthy individuals of all classes in the metropolis.—JOMINI, iii., 105.

* Thib., vii., 168, 170. Tor., ii., 156, 158. South., ii., 419, 420.

† "As to the English armies, I will chase them from the Peninsula. Saragossa, Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced to subjection, either by persuasion or force of arms; there is no longer any obstacle which can long retard the execution of my wishes. The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe; the divisions in the royal family have been fomented by the English. It was not the old King Charles or his favourite whom the Duke del Infantado, the instrument of England, wished to overturn from the throne: his papers recently taken prove what the real object was; it was British preponderance which they wished to establish in Spain. Insensate project! which could have led to no other result but a war without end, and the shedding of oceans of blood. No power influenced by England can exist on the Continent; if there are any which desire it, their wish is insensate, and will, sooner or later, cause their ruin. If you swear allegiance to my brother with sincerity and truth, without equivocation or mental reservation, I will relinquish all the rights which conquest have now afforded me, and make it my first object to conduct myself towards you as a faithful friend. The present generation may differ in opinion; too many passions have been brought into action; but your grandchildren will bless me as their regenerator: they will place among their memorable days that in which I appeared among them, and from those days will date the future prosperity of Spain."—NAPOLEON'S Proclamation to the Spaniards, Dec. 7, 1808. JOMINI, iii., 108, 110.

ntaion to hold out to the uttermost, opened its gates on the first summons, while his light cavalry scoured the plains of La Mancha, carrying devastation and terror to the foot of the Sierra Moreno; Lefebvre advanced to Talavera, on the great road from Badajoz and Elvas; Soult was reposing on the banks of the Carrion, preparing to follow the broken remains of Romana's army into the fastnesses of Galicia; Junot's corps was broken up, and the divisions composing it incorporated with Soult's troops; Moncey was ordered up to Madrid for an expedition against Valencia; while Mortier was directed to advance to support his corps, which was occupied with the siege of Saragossa. Thus the emperor, from his central position at Madrid, was preparing expeditions to subdue the insurrection at once in Andalusia, Estremadura, Galicia, Valencia, and Arragon; following out these measures on his favourite maxim, which had been acted upon with such fatal effect against the Prussians after the battle of Jena, that the true secret of war is to concentrate when a decisive blow is to be struck, but to disperse when the broken remains of the enemy are to be pursued, and the moral effect of victory is to be magnified by the numerous minor successes by which it is followed.

Vast as such a plan of operations undoubtedly was, it was not disproportioned to the resources of the emperor; for the imperial muster-rolls, on October the 10th, showed in the Peninsula the enormous number of three hundred and thirty thousand men and sixty thousand horses, of whom no less than two hundred and fifty thousand were present with the eagles and with their regiments, and the losses since sustained had been more than counterbalanced by the re-enforcements received; so that, after making every allowance for the troops requisite for garrisons and communications, at least a hundred and sixty thousand were disposable for active operations, or above thirty thousand men could be directed against each of the provinces menaced with an attack.*† The disorganized condition of the Spanish armies, the deplorable state of destitution to which they were reduced, the vast distance which separated them from each other, and the want of any efficient central government to combine their operations, rendered it too probable that this vigorous and unrelenting system of conquest would be attended with the desired effect, and that the national resistance of the Spaniards would, in the first moments of consternation consequent on their disasters,† be speedily suppressed in all the provinces; when the career of victory was arrested from a quarter from whence it was least expected, and by an enemy who had been hitherto almost forgotten, from the mistaken view which the emperor entertained of his prowess.

While these disasters were accumulating on the Bold advance the Spanish monarchy, the English of Sir John army, unobserved and unassailed, Moore. had at length been concentrating its

forces. Baird had come up from Corunna, Hope from the Escorial, and Sir John Moore found himself at the head of nearly thirty thousand men, of whom above two thousand were cavalry in admirable condition, and sixty pieces of cannon.* The English general was for long extremely perplexed what to do, in consequence of the imperfect information which he received, and the contradictory nature of the remonstrances addressed to him by Mr. Frere, the British ambassador at Madrid, who strongly urged an immediate advance to the capital, and the evidence which the progress of events around him was daily affording of the utter incapacity of the Spanish armies to contend with the formidable legions of Napoleon. At one time, the intelligence of the successive rout of all the Spanish armies appeared so alarming that orders were given to the troops to retreat, Nov. 29. and Sir David Baird's heavy baggage, which was coming up from Lugo to Astorga, commenced a retrograde movement to the latter place. This determination excited the utmost dissatisfaction in the troops: officers and men loudly and openly murmured against such a resolution, and declared it would be better to sacrifice half the army than retire from so fair a field without striking a blow for the allies who had staked their all in the common cause. The gallant spirit of the general himself secretly recoiled from the mournful resolution, which nothing had made him adopt but an imperious sense of duty to the troops intrusted to his care, the gloomy forebodings consequent on the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and the defeat and dispersion of all the Spanish forces by whom it had been attempted to arrest his progress. These feelings, both in the general and the soldiers, were wrought up to the highest degree when intelligence was received shortly after of the advance of the French to Madrid, of the enthusiastic preparations made for the defence of the capital, and the determination of the inhabitants to bury themselves under its ruins rather than submit to the invader. Giving vent joyfully to the native courage of his disposition, as well as the loudly-expressed wishes of the army, Sir John Moore now sent orders to Sir David Baird to suspend his retreat, and, to the infinite joy of the troops, directions were given indicating a disposition to advance. These preparations were not relaxed, although Colonel Graham, the future hero of Barrosa, returned on the 9th with the disheartening intelligence of the capture of the Retiro and perilous situation of Madrid: the British general knew that his countrymen looked to him for some great exploit, and, though fully aware of the danger of such a step, he resolved to

* The British army, however, had its full proportion of that usual drawback upon all armies, the difference between the actual numbers appearing upon the muster-rolls and the efficient force that could really be brought into the field. The following is the state of the British army from the adjutant-general's list, December 19, 1808:

	Fit for duty.	In hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry	2,278	182	794	3,254
Infantry	22,222	3786	893	26,871
Artillery	1,358	97		1,455
	25,858	4035	1687	31,580

2275 were left in Portugal, or were on the march between Lugo and Villa-Franca, and must be deducted from this number.—See NAPIER, i., 83, App.

* Imperial Muster-rolls, Nap., i., App., 28.

† Eight corps, as on page 93 319,690

Of whom were present under arms 247,834

Horses 56,567

Detached 32,536

In hospital 37,419

—See *Imperial Muster-rolls*; NAPIER, i., p. 88, App.

† Nap., i., 421, 422. Jom., iii., 104. Ter., ii., 166, 172.

throw himself upon the enemy's communication, and menace Soult, who lay exposed to his blows, with fifteen thousand men, in unsuspecting security in the valley of the Carrion. The

Dec. 11. gallant resolution was no sooner taken than it was acted upon: two days after the British army, completely concentrated, commenced its advance, and Moore, with twenty-five thousand men around his banners, ventured to essay it against Napoleon, who had two hundred thousand under his command.*

The forward march of the English forces, To Sahagun, on the French line of communication. however, was combined as prudence, and indeed necessity, dictated, with preparations for a retreat; and as it was uncertain

which line would be adopted, magazines were formed both on the great road to Lisbon and at Benavente, Astorga, and Lugo in the direction of Galicia. On the 13th, headquarters reached Alaejos, and the advanced posts of cavalry extended to Rueda and Toro, at the former of which places they surprised a French post and made eighty prisoners. Great was the astonishment of these haughty conquerors at finding themselves thus assailed by an enemy whom the boastful proclamations of the emperor had

Dec. 14. led them to believe was in full retreat for his ships. At first, Sir John's march was directed towards Valladolid, in order to facilitate the junction with Baird's corps; but an intercepted despatch from Napoleon on the 14th having made him acquainted with the fall of Madrid, and the unsuspecting security in which Soult's corps lay in the valley of the Carrion, the columns were moved towards Toro and Benavente, and Valderas was assigned as the point of junction for the two armies. At Toro,

Dec. 16. where headquarters were on the 16th, information was received that Romana, who had been informed of the movement and invited to co-operate in it, instead of doing so was, in consequence of the retrograde movement of Sir David Baird a few days before, in full retreat towards the Galician Mountains; the truth was, his troops, from hunger, fatigue, and misery, had dwindled away to eight thousand ragged and disheartened fugitives, totally unfit to take the field with regular forces, and whom he was even ashamed to array by their side. Notwithstanding this disappointment, the

English forces continued to advance; Dec. 20. on the 20th, the junction between Sir David Baird and Sir John Moore was fully effected at Moyorga, and on the 21st the

Dec. 21. united forces were established at Sahagun, near which town Lord Paget, afterward Marquis of Anglesea, at the head of the 10th and 15th hussars, not above four hundred strong, fell in with, and, after a short but brilliant action, totally defeated a body of seven hundred French cavalry, making two colonels and one hundred and sixty men prisoners in twenty minutes.† Soult, now seriously alarmed, hastily called in his detachments from all quarters, and with some difficulty concentrated eighteen thousand men on the banks of the Carrion and be-

tween that and Saldana, where Moore was making preparations for attacking him on the 23d.

Never was more completely evinced than on this occasion the prophetic sagacity of the saying of Napoleon seven months before, that a victory by the allies on the plains of Leon would give a locked-jaw to every French army in Spain. No sooner was the advance of Sir John Moore known at Madrid, than it instantly paralyzed the movements of the whole French armies in the south of Spain. Napoleon immediately despatched orders in all directions to suspend the expeditions into the different provinces which were in preparation. Milhaud's and Lasalle's cuirassiers were arrested at Talavera, Victor's advanced guards were recalled from La Mancha, the expedition against Valencia was abandoned, the preparations against Saragossa suspended, and fifty thousand men, under the emperor in person, including the Imperial Guards, the whole of Ney's corps, and a great part of the reserve, the Dec. 21. flower of the army, were, at a few hours' notice, suddenly marched off in the direction of Somo-sierra.*

On the evening of the 22d, they were at the foot of the Guadarrama Pass; but a violent hurricane of wind and snow enveloped the higher parts of the mountains, where the thermometer was at 10° of cold;† and the general in command of the advance guard, after twelve hours of fruitless toil, reported that the passage was impracticable. The conqueror of the St. Bernard, however, was not so easily to be arrested. Napoleon in person hastened to the advanced posts, and ordered the march to be continued Dec. 23. without interruption, himself setting the example by pressing forward with the leading files on foot. The example animated the men to fresh exertions: amid storms of snow and sleet, which in the higher parts of the passage were truly frightful, the columns pressed on with ceaseless activity, and after two days of incessant labour the difficulties were sur-

Dec. 25. mounted, and the whole were collected on the northern side of the mountains, in the valley of the Douro. Urging on his troops with indefatigable activity, and riding even at that inclement season with the advanced posts in person, the emperor soon arrived at the scene of action; on the 26th headquarters were at Tordesillas, the cavalry were at Valladolid, and Ney's corps at Rio-Secco. Fully anticipating the immediate destruction of the English army, from the immense force now brought to bear against them, Napoleon on the same day wrote to Soult: "The advanced posts of the cavalry are already at Benavente; if the English remain another day in their position they are undone; should they attack you with all their forces, retire a day's march to the rear; the farther they advance the better for us; if they retreat, pursue them closely."

Dec. 26. The march of Ney by Zamora and Rio-Secco

* Nap., i., 435, 451. Lond., i., 217, 233. Moore's Camp. in Spain, 187, 194. Tor., i., 178, 182.

† Tor., ii., 178, 187. Nap., i., 450, 461. Lond., i., 212, 243

* Jom., ii., 113. Tor., ii., 187. Nap., i., 461.

† About 14 deg. of Fahrenheit above zero.

‡ Thib., vii., 174, 175. Tor., ii., 187, 189. Nap., i., 461, 462. Jom., ii., 113, 114.

They retreat towards Benavente was so direct on the line of ed, that he early intercepted the Galicia.

British from their communication with Portugal; and if he could have reached the latter town before Sir John Moore, he would have cut him off from the line of retreat to Galicia also, and rendered the situation of the army all but desperate. This catastrophe, however, was prevented by the prudent foresight of the English commander, who, having received vague but alarming accounts of the march of a large French army from the South, suspended his advance on the 23d, and on the 24th commenced his retreat towards Galicia, to the infinite mortification of the soldiers, who were in the highest state of vigour and spirits, and in whom an unbroken series of brilliant successes at the outposts had produced an unbounded confidence in their own prowess, likely, if not met by overwhelming odds, to have

Dec. 26. led to the most important and glorious results. On the 26th, Baird's troops passed the Esla on their retreat, while Moore, who was with the rear-guard to protect the passage of the stores and baggage over the bridge of Castro-Gonzalo, was threatened by a large body of Ney's horsemen. Lord Paget, however, with two squadrons of the 10th, charged and overthrew them, making a hundred prisoners, besides numbers killed and wounded. Indeed, the superiority of the English horse had become so apparent, that they set all odds at defiance, never hesitated to attack the enemy's cavalry, though threefold in number, and had already made five hundred prisoners during the few days they had been engaged in active operations.*

By this timely retreat, Sir John Moore reached Benavente before the enemy; and the hazardous operation of crossing the Esla, then a roaring torrent swollen by melting snow, and over planks laid across the broken arches of the bridge of Castro, in the dark, was successfully performed by General Craufurd with the rear-guard. The army remained two days at that place, reposing from its fatigues under the shelter of its magnificent baronial castle, almost unequalled in Europe for extent and grandeur.† Discipline,

however, had already become seriously relaxed during the retreat, though only of three days' duration, from Sahagun; the spirit of the men had been surprisingly depressed by the thoughts of retiring before the enemy; the officers had in a great degree lost their authority, and disorders, equally fatal to the army and inhabitants, had already commenced. But these evils were accumulating only in the front part of the column, which was suffering merely under the fatigues of the march and the severity of the weather; no decline of spirit or enterprise was perceptible in the rear-guard, which was in presence of the enemy. Pickets of cavalry had been left to guard the fords of the Esla, and on the 28th a body of six hundred horse-

Dec. 28.

men of the Imperial Guard crossed over and began to drive in the rear-guard, stationed in that quarter to repel their incursions. Instantly these gallant horsemen made ready to oppose them, and, though only two hundred in number, repeatedly faced about, and by successive charges, under Colonel Otway, retarded the advance of the enemy till assistance was at hand. At length the enemy, having been drawn sufficiently far into the plain, the 10th, who were formed concealed by some houses, suddenly appeared, and advanced to the assistance of their brave comrades. At the joyful sight of the well-known plumes the retiring horsemen wheeled about, a loud cheer was given, and the whole bore down at full speed upon the enemy. The Imperial Guard, the flower of the French army, wreathed with the trophies of Austerlitz,* were in an instant broken and driven over the Esla, with the loss of a hundred and thirty killed and seventy prisoners, among whom was their commander, General Lefebvre Desnouettes.†

The destruction of the bridge of Castro-Gonzalo was so thoroughly effected Return of the that it delayed for two days the emperor to Pa- advance of the French, who could ris. not cross the stream at other points from its swollen state; but at length, the arches having been restored, Bessières crossed on the 30th, with nine thousand horsemen, and reached Benavente, which had been evacuated by the English on the same day. At the same time, the bridge of Mansilla, guarded by Romana's troops, was forced by a charge of cavalry,

In the midst of this disgraceful scene of unbridled license and military devastation, there is one trait of heroic presence of mind which in some degree redeems the character of the British soldier. Several thousand infantry slept in the long galleries of an immense convent built round a square; the horses of the cavalry and artillery, scarcely less numerous, were in the corridor below, so closely jammed together that no one could pass between them, and there was but one entrance. Two officers, returning at night from the bridge of Castro, being desirous of finding shelter for their men, entered the gate of this convent, and perceived, with horror, that a large window-shutter was on fire, and the flames were spreading to the rafters above, from whence a single spark, falling on the straw under the horses, would ignite the whole, and six thousand men and horses would inevitably perish. Without saying a word, one of them (Captain Lloyd of the 43d) made a sign to his companions to keep silence, and, springing on the nearest horse, ran along the backs of the others till he reached the flaming shutter, which, by great efforts, he tore from its hinges and flung into the courtyard without giving any alarm; which, in such circumstances, would have been hardly less destructive than the flames.—See *Life of a Sergeant*, p. 143; and NAPIER, i., 467.

* *Ante*, ii., 371.

† Lond., i., 253, 256. Nap., i., 467, 468. Tor., i., 189, 190. Larrey, iii., 127.

Gallant action of light cavalry with the enemy, and capture of Lefebvre Desnouettes.

* Lond., i., 247, 253. Nap., i., 462, 464. Tor., i., 188, 189.

† This splendid relic of feudal grandeur is thus described by an eloquent eyewitness, whose pictures, equally vivid in travels as history, has given to prose all the colours of poetry. "The Castle of Benavente is one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry; nothing in England approaches to it in magnificence. Berkeley, Rahy, even Warwick, are poor fabrics in comparison. With Gothic grandeur, it has the richness of Moorish decoration; open alcoves, where Saracenic arches are supported by pillars of porphyry and granite; cloisters with fountains playing in their courts; jasper columns, and tessellated floors; niches all over, and seats in the walls, overarched in various forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of gold and silver, and colours which are hardly less gorgeous. It belonged to the Duke of Ossuna, and the splendour of old times was still continued there. The extent of this magnificent structure may be estimated from this single circumstance, that two regiments, besides artillery, were quartered within its walls: they proved the most destructive enemies that had ever entered them; the officers, who felt and admired the beauties of this venerable pile, attempted in vain to save it from devastation. Everything combustible was seized; fires were lighted against the fine walls, and pictures of unknown value, the works, perhaps, of the greatest Spanish masters, were heaped together as fuel. Fortunately, the archives of the family escaped."—SOUTHEY, i., 499.

and Soult passed over, overspread the plains of Leon with his troops, and captured the town of the same name with great stores belonging to the Spanish government. The whole army, consisting of the guards, reserve, Soult and Ney's corps, seventy thousand strong, including ten thousand horse and a hundred pieces of

cannon, were, on the 1st of January, Jan. 1, 1809. united by the emperor at Astorga.

The union of so great a force in that remote part of the Peninsula was both the highest compliment that could be paid by that great general to the prowess of the English army and the important stroke delivered by its commander, and the strongest proof of the vigour and celerity with which, by long experience and admirable arrangements, the movements of the French troops could be effected. In ten days Napoleon had not only transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga, a distance of two hundred miles, but crossed the Guadarama range when enveloped in a frightful snow-storm, and the torrent of the Esla when swollen by wintry rains, in each of which operations more than a day's march had been lost, so that the advanced posts of his army, at least, had marched the astonishing number of twenty-five miles a day, when actually in motion, in the depth of winter: an instance of exertion almost unparalleled in modern times.* But they were there left by Napoleon. On the road between Benavente and Astorga, when riding in pursuit at the gallop, with the advanced posts, he was overtaken by a courier with despatches; he instantly dismounted, ordered a bivouac fire to be lighted by the roadside, and, seating himself beside it on the ground, was soon so lost in thought as to be insensible to the snow which fell in thick flakes around him. He had ample subject for meditation: they contained authentic intelligence of the accession of Austria to the European Confederacy, and the rapid preparations which her armies were making for taking the field. On the spot, he wrote an order for calling into immediate activity the second levy of 80,000 conscripts authorized by the senatus consultum of the 10th of October preceding; and proceeding slowly and pensively on to Astorga, remained there for two days, writing innumerable despatches, and regulating at once the pursuit of the English army, the internal affairs of Spain, the organization of the forces of the Rhenish Confederacy, and the development of the gigantic strength of France Jan. 3. for the German war. On the 3d, he returned to Valladolid, where he remained three days, still indefatigably engaged in writing despatches, and then returned, with extraordinary celerity, by Burgos and Bayonne, to Paris,

* It has been greatly exceeded, however, in the same country, in later times, though by a much smaller force. In December, 1836, the Spanish General Gomez marched from the lines of St. Roque, in front of Gibraltar, to Tudela on the Ebro: he left St. Roque on the 24th of November and reached the Ebro on the 17th of December, having repeatedly fought, and been driven to circuitous roads to avoid the enemy on the way. The distance was above five hundred miles, performed in twenty-five days. There is no such instance of sustained effort in modern times. Septimius Severus marched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of 800 miles, in forty days, or twenty miles a day, but he had the glittering prospect of the empire to animate his exertions.—See *Ann. Reg.*, 1836, 379, 380, and GIBBON, ch. iv.

† On leaving Valladolid he rode to Burgos, a distance of thirty-five French leagues, in five hours! This rapidity

where he arrived on the 23d. He took back his guards, but sent on Soult and Ney with two divisions of the reserve, in all about sixty thousand men, to continue the pursuit of the English army, who were falling back by rapid marches, and in great disorder, towards the Galician Mountains.*

The withdrawing of the emperor, however, made no change in the vigour with which the pursuit of the English

Sir John Moore retires to Lugo.

army was continued. Soult, who immediately pressed upon their retiring columns, had twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry under his command; and, though the British army was still nearly twenty thousand strong,† yet the inclemency of the weather and rapidity of the retreat had in a great degree relaxed the bonds of discipline, and diminished the moral strength of the troops. The rear-guard, indeed, still with unabated resolution repelled the attacks of the enemy; but the other troops, who had not the excitement of combat, often sunk under the rigour of the season, or yielded to the temptations of intemperance, which the extensive stores of wine along their line of march too readily afforded. The native and ineradicable vice of northern climates, drunkenness, here appeared in frightful colours: the great wine-vaults of Bembibre proved more fatal than the sword of the enemy; and when the gallant rear-guard, which preserved its ranks unbroken, closed up the array, they had to force their way through a motley crowd of English and Spanish soldiers, stragglers and marauders, who reeled out of the houses in disgusting crowds, or lay stretched on the roadside an easy prey to the enemy's cavalry, which thundered in close pursuit. The condition of the army daily became more deplorable: the frost had been succeeded by a thaw; rain and sleet fell in torrents; the roads were almost broken up; the horses foundered at every step; the few artillery-wagons which had hitherto kept up fell one by one to the rear, and, being immediately blown up to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands, gave melancholy token, by the sound of their explosions, of the work of destruction which was going on. The mountain-passes through which the retreat was conducted presented, indeed, positions at every step in which a few regiments might have arrested, on that single road, an army; but it was, unhappily, thought there was no use in contesting them, as the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, and the advancing columns of Ney's corps, were supposed to enable the pursuers speedily to turn them on either flank; and it is well known to all really acquainted with war, that a mountainous region, in appearance the most defensible,

would appear incredible were it not for the circumstance that the emperor here had his saddle-horses arranged by divisions of nine each at every three or four leagues along the road, so that every eight or ten miles he found fresh relays of his own horses, which were in admirable condition. This was his usual practice wherever there appeared the least chance of his riding on horseback during his journeys. The remainder of the road to Paris he travelled in his carriage. —See THIBAUDEAU, vii., 194.

* Nap. i., 469, 473. Torr. ii., 189, 195. Lond., i., 256, 259. Thib., vii., 176, 183. Pellet, *Guerra de 1809*, i., 47, 48.

† Three thousand men, chiefly light troops, had been detached from the main body to Vigo, to facilitate the embarkation on which the English commander was already determined.—NAPIER, i., 473.

is, in reality, often the most indefensible of all districts against a superior and enterprising enemy, led by a skilful general. Sir John Moore was constantly with the rear-guard, doing his utmost to arrest the disorders and protect the retiring columns; and at Villa

Jan. 5. Franca a sharp skirmish ensued with the rear-guard, in which, though the French cavalry were at first successful, they were ultimately repulsed by a heavy fire from the British light troops, with the loss of several hundred men, including General Colbert, who fell while gallantly leading on the vanguard. In other quarters, however, the same discipline was not preserved: disorders went on accumulating with frightful rapidity along the whole line, and such was the general wreck of presence of mind or foresight, that at Nogales the military chest of the army, containing £25,000 in dollars, having stuck fast in the mud, the treasure was rolled in the cask in which it was contained over a precipitous descent, and became the prey of the peasantry, who picked it up at the bottom. All order or subordination was now at an end: the soldiers, exhausted by fatigue or depressed by suffering, sunk down by hundreds on the wayside, and breathed their last, some with prayers, others with curses on their lips; and the army, in frightful disorder, at length reached Lugo, late on the evening of the 6th of January.*

Here, however, Sir John Moore halted, and, in a proclamation issued next day, severely rebuked the insubordination of the troops, and announced his intention of halting to give battle to the enemy. The army, accordingly, was drawn up in a strong position, extending along a ridge of low hills, flanked on either side by precipitous rocks, from the mountains to the bed of the Minho; and it then speedily appeared that the preceding disorders of the march had, at least,

Nov. 8. not been owing to want of courage. Instantly, as if by enchantment, the disorder ceased: joyfully the men fell into their places, the stragglers came up from the rear; arms were cleaned, faces brightened, confidence was restored; and, before the morning of the 8th, nineteen thousand men stood in battle array, impatiently awaiting the attack of the enemy. Soult, however, declined the combat, though on that day he had seventeen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery in line; and Moore, having gained his object of recruiting his troops, and having little food remaining in the stores of Lugo, broke up in the following night, and retired towards Corunna.†

The night was cold and tempestuous; a severe storm of wind and rain, mixed with sleet, burst upon the troops; and, in the confusion of a nocturnal retreat, two divisions lost their way, and complete disorganization ensued, inasmuch that a large part of the army became little better than a mass of stragglers, who were only prevented from becoming the prey of the pursuers by none of his

cavalry fortunately appearing in sight. Order having, at daylight, been in some degree restored, Sir John Moore collected the army into a solid mass, and the retreat to Corunna was effected without farther molestation from the enemy, the night-march from Lugo having gained to the British twelve hours' start of their pursuers, which they were never afterwards able to regain; but, notwithstanding this, it was nearly as disorderly and harassing as the preceding part had been. As

the troops successively arrived at the heights from whence the sea was visible, and Corunna, with its white citadel and towers, rose upon the view, all eyes were anxiously directed to the bay, in hopes that the joyful sight of a friendly fleet of transports might be seen; but the wide expanse was deserted, and a few coasters and fishing-boats alone were visible on the dreary main. Deeply did every one then lament that a battle had not been fought long before; and, as the officers cast their eyes on the low sandhills in front of the ramparts of the town, on which they well knew the contest for their embarkation must be sustained, they thought with poignant regret of the innumerable positions, a hundred times stronger, which might have been taken up in the course of the retreat for the encounter. Now, however, there was no alternative: the sea was in their front, the enemy in their rear; fight they must to secure the means of embarkation, be the positions favourable or unfavourable. The brigades, as they successively arrived, were passed on into the town, and

Jan. 12. all the means which circumstances would admit of taken to strengthen the land defences, which, though regular, were very weak; the inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joining in the toil, though they well knew, from the preparations which were going forward, that an embarkation was intended. On the day following, two powder-magazines, at a short distance without the walls, containing four thousand barrels of powder, the gift of England, were blown up, with an explosion so terrific, that nothing in the whole course of the war approached to it. The coast resembled the sudden explosion of a volcano; the city was shaken to its foundations, the rocks torn from their bases, the sea was tossed as in a tempest, the earth shook for leagues around; while slowly arose in the air a huge black cloud, shooting forth dazzling sparks, from whence, at a great height, stones burst forth with a prodigious sound, and fell with a sharp rattle in all directions. A stillness yet more awful ensued, broken only by the hoarse and sullen lashing of the still agitated waves on the shore.* On the following Jan. 14. day, the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and soon after stood into the bay; preparations were immediately made for the embarkation of the sick and wounded; the cavalry

* It is from Colonel Napier, an eyewitness, that this eloquent description is taken. Whoever has had the good fortune to see that most sublime of spectacles, an eruption of Vesuvius, will have no difficulty in giving implicit credit to the graphic truth of the picture. The author witnessed one twenty years ago, and the act of transcribing these lines recalls, in all its vividness, the thrilling recollection of the matchless scene.

* Tor., ii., 194, 198. Nap., i., 473, 481. Lond., i., 260, 267. South., ii., 504, 514.

† Nap., i., 485, 486. Tor., ii., 195, 196. Lond., i., 270, 276.

horses were almost all destroyed, and the greater part of the artillery, consisting of fifty-two pieces, put on board; eight British and four Spanish being only reserved for immediate use. Notwithstanding all the sufferings of the retreat, not one gun had been taken by the enemy. Meanwhile, the bulk of the army, still fourteen thousand strong, was drawn up with great care by Sir John Moore, on a range of heights, or, rather, of swelling knolls, which form a sort of amphitheatre around the village of Elvina, at the distance of rather more than a mile from CORUNNA. Hope's division was on the left, its flank covered by the muddy stream of the Mero, commanding the road to Lugo; Baird's next, directly behind Elvina; then the rifles and Fraser's division, which watched the coast-road to St. Jago, and was prepared to support any menaced point; General Paget, half a mile in the rear, with the reserve, at the village of Airis. The French, fully twenty thousand strong, were posted on a higher semicircular ridge, sweeping round a lesser one occupied by the British, at the distance of about a mile; Laborde's division was on the right, Merle's in the centre, Mermet's on the left; their light field-pieces were distributed along the front of the line; the dragoons, under Lahoussaye, Lorge, and Franceschi, to which the English had nothing to oppose, clustered to the left of the infantry, and menaced the British right flank, while a great battery of twelve heavy guns, advantageously posted on a steep eminence between their foot and horse, not twelve hundred yards from Baird's division, was prepared to carry devastation along the whole line.*

From the inactivity of the French army during the two preceding days, Sir John Moore had been led to imagine that they had no serious intention of disquieting his retreat, and preparations on the 16th were making for withdrawing the troops into the town as soon as the darkness would admit of its being done without observation; when, about noon, a general movement was seen along their whole line, and soon after, at two o'clock, their infantry, in four massy columns, was observed to be descending from the heights which they occupied, and advancing with a swift step towards the English position. Perceiving that the hour he had so long and so passionately wished for was at hand, Sir John Moore instantly galloped to the front; the troops everywhere stood to their arms, and were deployed into line, while the French, according to custom, advanced in long and deep columns, preceded by a cloud of light troops. Their onset, as at Vimiero, and in all the subsequent actions of the war, was extremely impetuous. A cloud of skirmishers led the way, which drove in the English advanced posts with great vigour; and, in the confusion of the retreat, made themselves masters of Elvina, directly in front of the centre. As they drew near to the British position, they deployed into line, and it soon appeared that they extended greatly beyond its extreme right; but the 4th regiment, which was there stationed, noways discouraged by this alarming circumstance, threw back its right wing, and presenting a

front in two directions, in which attitude it advanced, was soon warmly engaged with the enemy. Highly delighted with this display of presence of mind, and deeming the right secure when intrusted to such intrepid defenders, Sir John Moore rode up to Baird's division in the centre, which was now come to blows with Mermet's troops, who, having carried Elvina, were bursting through the enclosures which lay between its houses and the British, with loud cries and all the exultation of victory. The action now became extremely warm along the whole line; the French and English centres advanced to within pistol-shot of each other, and, after exchanging a few volleys, the 50th and 42d charged bayonets, and drove the enemy opposed to them in the most gallant style back again through Elvina, and a considerable way up the slope on the other side. But this furious onset being carried too far, and not adequately supported, met with a severe check; the victorious troops, when broken by the enclosures and stone walls on the other side of the village, were assailed in their turn by fresh French regiments, and driven back a second time through its streets, Major Napier, who commanded the 50th, being wounded and made prisoner. But Moore was at hand to repair the disorder; instantly addressing the 42d regiment with the animating words, "Highlanders, remember Egypt!" and bringing up a battalion of the guards to its support, he again led them forward to the charge. The shock was irresistible: borne back at the point of the bayonet, the enemy were again driven into Elvina, from whence, after a desperate struggle, they were finally expelled with great slaughter. In this decisive contest, however, Sir John Moore received a mortal wound from a cannon-shot, and Sir David Baird, struck down at the head of his men, had shortly before been carried from the field in a senseless condition.*

Foiled in this attempt to pierce the centre, Soult renewed his attacks with Delaborde's division on the left, while a heavy column endeavoured to steal unperceived round the British right, where they so greatly outflanked their opponents. But the ground in the left being in favour of the English, all his efforts were defeated with comparative ease; and General Hope, who commanded there, pressing forward in pursuit of the repulsed columns, carried the village of Palavio Abaxo, close under the enemy's original position, which remained in his hands at nightfall; while on the right General Paget, with the reserve, not only at once perceived and advanced to meet the column which was endeavouring to turn his flank, but assailed it with such vigour that it was thrown back upon Lahoussaye's dragoons, and the whole driven in disorder to the foot of the hill on which the great battery was placed. When night, arriving in that wintry season at an early hour, separated the combatants, the enemy was not only repulsed at all points, but the British line was considerably advanced, holding, on the left, Palavio Abaxo; on the centre, Elvina; and on the right, being advanced to the acclivity of their central battery. Had Fraser's troops,

* Nap., i., 487, 488. Tor., i., 199, 200. Lond., i., 278, 280. South., ii., 519, 523. Jom., iii., 116.

* General Hope's account of the battle. Ann. Reg., 1809, p. 372. Nap., i., 494, 496. Lond., i., 285, 286. Tor., ii., 201, 202.

stationed on the coast-road to St. Jago on the extreme right, been at hand to support this splendid advance of the reserve, and an hour more of daylight remained, the enemy would have been routed; had the cavalry been on the field, and the horses not foundered, he would have been thrown back in irretrievable confusion on the swampy stream of the Mero, now flooded by the full tide, and traversed only by a single arch at El Burgo, and totally annihilated. Night, however, having supervened when the success was still incomplete, and the means of embarking unmolested having been gained by the enemy's repulse, General Hope, upon whom the command now devolved,* did not conceive himself warranted in making any change in the preparations for departure, and after dark the troops were withdrawn into the town, where they were all got on board without either confusion or delay.†

Sir John Moore received his death-wound while animating the 42d to the charge. A cannon-ball struck his left breast, and beat him down by its violence to the earth; but his countenance remained unchanged; not a sigh escaped his lips, and, sitting on the ground, he watched with an anxious and steadfast eye the progress of the line. As it advanced, however, and it became manifest that the troops were gaining ground, his countenance brightened, and he reluctantly allowed himself to be led to the rear. Then the dreadful nature of the wound appeared manifest: the shoulder was shattered to pieces; the arm hanging by a film of skin, the breast and lungs almost laid open. As the soldiers placed him on a blanket to carry him from the field, the hilt of his sword was driven into the wound; an officer, destined to celebrity in future times, CAPTAIN HARDINGE, attempted to take it off, but the dying hero exclaimed, "It is as well as it is; I had rather it should go off the field with me." He was carried by the soldiers towards the town, but though the pain of the wound soon became excessive, such was the serenity of his countenance, that those around him expressed a hope of his recovery. "No," said he, "I feel that is impossible." When approaching the ramparts, he several times desired his attendants to stop, and turn him round that he might again see the field of battle; and when the advance of the firing indicated that the British were successful, he expressed his satisfaction, and a smile overspread the features that were relaxing in death. The examination of his wound at his lodgings speed-

ily foreclosed all hopes of recovery, but he never for an instant lost his serenity of mind, and repeatedly expressed his satisfaction when he heard that the enemy were beaten. "You know," said he to his old friend, Colonel Anderson, "that I always wished to die this way." He continued to converse in a calm, and even cheerful voice, on the events of the day, inquired after the safety of his friends and staff, and recommended several for promotion on account of their services during the retreat. Once only his voice faltered, as he spoke of his mother. Life was ebbing fast, and his strength was all but extinct, when he exclaimed, in words which will forever thrill in every British heart, "I hope the people of England will be satisfied: I hope my country will do me justice." Released a few minutes after from his sufferings, he was wrapped by his attendants in his military cloak, and laid in a grave hastily formed on the ramparts of Corunna, where a monument was soon after constructed over his uncoffined remains by the generosity of Marshal Ney.* Not a word was spoken as the melancholy interment by torchlight took place; silently they laid him in his grave, while the distant cannon of the battle fired the funeral honours to his memory.†

On the fall of Sir John Moore, and the wound of Sir David Baird, the command devolved upon General Hope, who conducted the remaining arrangements with that decision and judgment which afterward became so conspicuous in the Peninsular war, and whose eloquent despatch announcing the battle of Corunna and the death of Sir John Moore agitated so profoundly the heart of his country. The boats being all in readiness, the embarkation commenced at ten of night; the troops were silently filed down to the beach, put on board with admirable order, and the whole, except the rear-guard, reached the transports in safety before day. GENERAL BERESFORD, at the head of the rear-guard, two thousand, and GENERAL HILL, who was stationed on the promontory behind the town, both destined to celebrity in future times,

Embarcation of the troops, and their return to England. January 17.

* Moore's Narrative, 354, 371. Nap., i., 499, 500.

† This touching scene will live forever in the British heart, embalmed in the exquisite words of the poet:

Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,
As his corse to the rampart we hurried;
Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot
O'er the grave where our hero we buried.

We buried him darkly at dead of night,
The sods with our bayonets turning;
By the struggling moonbeam's misty light,
And the lantern dimly burning.

No useless coffin enclosed his breast,
Not in sheet or in shroud we bound him;
But he lay like a warrior taking his rest,
With his martial cloak around him.

Few and short were the prayers we said,
And we spoke not a word of sorrow;
But we steadfastly gazed on the face that was dead,
And we bitterly thought on the morrow.

We thought, as we hallow'd his narrow bed,
And smoothed down his lonely pillow,
That the foe and the stranger would tread o'er his head
And we far away on the billow.

But half of our heavy task was done,
When the clock struck the hour for retiring,
And we heard the distant and random gun,
That the foe was sullenly firing.

Slowly and sadly we laid him down,
From the field of his fame fresh and gory;
We carved not a line, and we raised not a stone,
But we left him alone with his glory.

* Hope's Despatch. Ann. Reg., 1809, p. 373. Nap., i., 498, 499. Lond., i., 287. Tor., ii., 201, 202.

† The British loss at Corunna was from 800 to 1000 men; that of the French was stated by their own officers to Colonel Napier at 3000; Sir John Hope estimated it at 1600, but it was at least 2000: a number which would, doubtless, appear surprisingly large, if the murderous effect of the fire of the British infantry, from the coolness and discipline of the men, were not decisively proved by every action throughout the war. The total loss of the army during the retreat was 4033, of whom 1397 were missing before the position of Lugo, and 2636 from that to the final embarkation of the army, including those who fell at Corunna: of this number 800 stragglers contrived to escape into Portugal, and, being united with the sick left in that country, formed a corps of 1876 men, which afterward did good service both at Oporto and Talavera. Six three-pounders which never were horsed were thrown over the rocks near Villa Franca; the guns used at Corunna, twelve in number, were spiked and buried in the sand, but afterward discovered by the enemy. Not one, from first to last, was taken in fight.—See the general returns quoted in NAPOLEON, i., App., No. 26.

were the last to be withdrawn; the latter did not embark till three o'clock in the afternoon of the following day. The French gave them no annoyance, so strongly had the bloody repulse of the preceding day inspired them with respect for British valour. With a courage and generosity worthy of the highest admiration, the Spaniards manned the ramparts when the last of the English forces were withdrawn, and prolonged the defence for several days, so as to allow the whole sick, wounded, artillery, stores, and even prisoners to be brought away. A few guns placed by the French on the heights of St. Lucie, without the walls, which could not be maintained, alone occasioned, by the fire which they opened upon the vessels in the bay, great confusion among the transports, but without doing any serious damage. At length the last

Jan. 19. of the long files of baggage and stragglers were got on board, and the English fleet, amid the tears of the inhabitants, stood to the northward, and were lost to the sight amid the cold expanse of the watery main. Then, and not till then, the inhabitants of Corunna, feeling it in vain to prolong a defence which such a host had resigned in despair, and having honourably discharged every duty to their discomfited allies, capitulated to Marshal Soult, who, a few days afterward, obtained possession, after a trifling resistance, of the important fortress of Ferrol, with seven sail of the line, and very extensive naval stores.*

No words can convey an adequate idea of the gloom and despondency which prevailed in the British isles when intelligence of this long catalogue of disasters was received. In proportion to the warm and enthusiastic hopes which had been formed of a successful issue to the patriotic cause, had been the anxiety and interest which was felt when the crisis approached. In particular, when Napoleon, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen troops, burst through the Pyrenees, and the brave but undisciplined Spanish levies were brought in contact with his experienced veterans, the public anxiety became almost unbearable. The rout of Espinosa, the overthrow at Burgos, the defeat of Tudela, succeeding each other in rapid succession, were felt the more keenly, that the British nation had been led by the exaggerations of the public journals to form a most erroneous idea, both of the strength of the Spanish and the force of the French armies. Most of all, they were misled by the pleasing illusion, which the experience of every age has proved to be fallacious, but which is probably destined to the end of the world to mislead the enthusiastic portion of mankind, that a certain degree of popular excitement can supply the want of discipline and experience, and that general ardour is more to be relied on than organization and conduct. When, therefore, the Spanish levies, flushed with the trophies of Baylen and Saragossa, were dissipated with more ease than the regular armies of Austria and Moscow; when the Somo-sierra pass was stormed by a charge of lancers, and Madrid fell within three weeks after the campaign had been opened by Napoleon, a sort of despair seized the public

mind, and nothing seemed now capable of withstanding a power which beat down with equal ease the regular forces of Northern, and the enthusiastic levies of Southern Europe. A transient gleam shot across the gloom when Sir John Moore advanced to Sahagun, and the English journals confidently announced that seventy thousand English and Spaniards were rapidly interposing between the emperor and the French frontier, and would possibly make him prisoner in the capital he had won. Proportionally deeper was the gloom when this hope also proved fallacious, when Romana's forty thousand men dwindled into a few thousand starving wanderers, and the British army, instead of making Napoleon prisoner in the heart of Spain, was expelled, after a disastrous retreat, with the loss of its general, from the shores of the Peninsula.

The English had hitherto only known war in its holiday dress: their ideas of it were formed on the pomp of melodramatic representation, or the interest of pacific reviews; and though strongly impressed with a military spirit, they were, from their happy insular situation, strangers to the hardships and the calamities of actual campaigns. The inhabitants of the towns along the Channel had seen the successive expeditions which composed Sir John Moore's army embark in all the pride of military display, with drums beating and colours flying, amid the cheers and tears of a countless host of spectators. When, therefore, they beheld the same regiments return, now reduced to half their numbers, with haggard countenances, ragged accoutrements, and worn-out clothing, they were struck with astonishment and horror; which was soon greatly increased by a malignant fever which the troops brought back with them, the result of fatigue, confinement on ship-board, and mental depression, joined to the dismal and often exaggerated accounts which were spread by the survivors of the hardships and miseries they had undergone. These gloomy narratives riveted every mind by a painful but enchainning interest: they speedily made their way into the public newspapers, and were devoured with unceasing interest by the whole people; the fate of these gallant men became a general subject of commiseration; and the old cry, raised for factious purposes, began to resound through the land,* that England could never contend on the Continent with France, and that the only rational policy for the prosecution of the war was to withdraw entirely behind our wooden walls.

And yet, to a dispassionate observer, it could not but be manifest that, though the campaign had to both parties been deeply checkered by misfortune, it had, in reality, been far more calamitous to the French than the allies; and that the power of Napoleon had received a shock ruder than any which it had yet received since his accession to the supreme authority. The Spanish armies, it is true, had been dispersed on the Ebro, the Somo-sierra forced, Madrid taken, and the British, after a calamitous retreat, been driven to their ships; but the Peninsula was still unsubdued; Saragossa was fortifying its blood-stained battlements; Catalonia was in arms; Valencia and

Horror excited by the appearance of the army on its return.

Reflections on the campaign: its checkered character, but on the whole eminently unfavourable to France.

* Tor., ii., 203, 205. Nap., i., 498, 499. - Lond., i., 289, 291. South., ii., 530, 531.

* Ann. Reg., 1809, 22, 25. Nap., i., 520.

Andalusia recruiting their forces; Portugal was untouched, and the British troops, though in diminished strength, still held the towers of Lisbon. No submission or subjugation had followed the irruption of three hundred thousand men into the Peninsula: driven from their capital, the Spaniards, like their ancestors in the Roman and Moorish wars, were preparing in the provinces to maintain a separate warfare; while the number of their fortresses and chains of mountains, joined to the aid of England, promised them the means of there prolonging a desperate resistance. And what had happened in the same campaign to the hitherto invincible arms of France? One whole corps had laid down its arms with unheard-of disgrace; another had capitulated, and surrendered a kingdom to purchase its retreat; foiled in more than one provincial expedition, the imperial arms had been driven from the capital behind the Ebro, and only regained their lost ground by denuding Germany of its defenders, and exposing for the Peninsular thrones the Rhine itself to invasion. The spell which held the world enchained had been broken; the dangerous secret had been disclosed that French armies could pass under the Caudine Forks. Already the effects of the discovery had become manifest: Europe had been shaken from one extremity to the other by the Peninsular disasters, and Austria, which beheld unmoved the desperate strife of Pultusk and Eylau, encouraged by the immersion of the best French armies in the Peninsula, was preparing to renew the struggle on a scale of unprecedented magnitude.

The movement in advance by Sir John Moore to Sahagun, his rapid subsequent retreat, when surrounded by superior forces, to Benavente, the skill with which he reorganized his shattered army at Lugo, and the firmness with which, disdaining every proposal for a capitulation,* he boldly fronted the enemy at Corunna, and met a glorious death on the field of victory, are worthy of the highest admiration, and will forever secure him a place in the temple of British heroes. Nor is it merely the fond partiality of national gratitude, often mistaken or exaggerated in its opinions, which has secured this distinction: a calm consideration of the consequences of his campaign must, with all impartial observers, lead to the same result. In the whole annals of the Revolutionary war, there is not to be found a single movement more ably conceived, or attended with more important consequences. Levelled against the vital line of the enemy's communications, based on the principles which, unknown to the English general, Napoleon had so emphatically unfolded six months before in his secret despatch to Savary,† it had literally paralyzed every hostile army in Spain; snatched the Spanish monarchy from the verge of destruction, when its own resources were exhausted; and, by drawing Napoleon himself, with his terrible legions, into the northern extremity of the Peninsula, it both gave time to the southern provinces to restore their armies and arm their fortresses, and averted the

war from Portugal, till an opportunity of organizing fresh means of resistance within its frontiers was afforded. But for this bold and well-conceived advance, Andalusia would have been overrun, Valencia taken, Saragossa subdued, within a few weeks; and before the emperor was recalled from the theatre of Peninsular warfare by the Austrian armaments, he would have realized his favourite threat of planting the French eagles on the towers of Lisbon. These great results, however, were attended with proportional dangers: Napoleon, with seventy thousand chosen troops, was speedily sweeping round the audacious enemy who had thus interrupted his designs, and, but for the celerity and skill of the retreat to Astorga, the army which achieved them must speedily have been consigned to destruction.*

But if in these particulars the conduct of Sir John Moore was worthy of unequalled admiration, there are others in ^{Errors which he committed,} which the impartial voice of history must deal out a different measure of eulogium. Admitting that the celerity of the retreat to Astorga was unavoidable, and saved the army from destruction, where was the necessity of the subsequent forced marches to Lugo, when Napoleon had retired with his guards from the pursuit, in dreadful weather, attended as it was with such ruinous effects upon the discipline and spirit of the troops? His ablest defenders admit that there were in the magazines of Villa Franca and Lugo provisions for fourteen days' consumption;† and even if there had been nothing but the resources of the country to be had, subsequent events proved that they were sufficient for the maintenance of the army; for the French found wherewithal to live on and advance through it, even when following in the rear of the British soldiers. There was no necessity for hurrying on from the danger of being turned in flank, for Ney's corps was several days' march behind Soult's in the defile, and the rugged nature of the country rendered it totally impossible for his troops, worn out by a march of unexampled hardship and rapidity from Madrid, to attempt any threatening movement against the British flank. Everything, then, counselled deliberation and order in the retreating columns, and the nature of the road through which they passed, consisting of an ascent several leagues in length, up a bare slope, followed by tremendous passes, continuing for several days' journey, shut in on every side by steep or forest-clad mountains, offered the most favourable opportunities for stopping, by a vigorous resistance on the part of the rear-guard, the active pursuit of the enemy.‡ The rapid restoration of discipline and order, when battle was offered at Lugo, the issue of the fight at Corunna, leave no room for doubt as to what would have been the result of such a conflict; and the example of Moreau's retreat through the Black Forest, in 1796, was not required to show how effectually such a fierce aspect on the part of the retiring force saves the blood and secures the safety of the remainder of the army.§ The luminous fact that the losses sustained by the rear-guard when they

* It was seriously pressed upon his consideration by several officers, when the absence of the transports on the first arrival at Corunna rendered it evident that a battle must be fought for the embarkation, but he indignantly rejected the proposal.—NAPIER, i., 492, 493; SOUTHEY, ii., 520.

† Ante, iii., 65.

* Napoleon subsequently said, at St. Helena, that nothing but the talents and firmness of Sir John Moore saved his army from destruction.—O'MEARA, i., 55.

† Nap., i., 474. ‡ Lond., i., 260, 261. § Ante, i., 437

arrived at Corunna, notwithstanding all the combats they had undergone, were less than those of any other division of equal number in the army,* affords a decisive proof how much would have been gained upon the whole by fighting at an earlier period, when the strength and discipline of the army were still comparatively unbroken.

But most of all, the step adopted by Sir David Baird, though a most gallant officer, in unison with Sir John Moore, in counselling the British government, instead of sending out the strong re-enforcements which they projected, and had in preparation, to Galicia, to forward *empty transports* to bring away the troops, appears to have been unhappy in its consequences. These despatches were sent off in the course of December, and they were not acted upon by the British government without the most severe regret, but at their distance from the scene of action they had no alternative but acquiescence.† But for this fatal step, the English army, upon their retreat to the seacoast, would have found, instead of transports to bring them off, thirteen thousand fresh troops, sufficient to have enabled them to hold out these important fortresses against the enemy, and possibly take a bloody revenge on their pursuers. Ney and Soult would have been retained in Galicia by the presence of thirty thousand men, intrenched in fortified seaports on its coast; the incursion of Soult to Oporto would have been prevented, the battle of Talavera have proved a decisive victory, and the march of Wellington to the Alherche, unmenaced by the descent of Soult, Ney, and Mortier in his rear, would have led him in triumph to Madrid. If the British could not have maintained their ground behind the strong battlements of Ferrol, or the weaker fortifications of Corunna, that might have afforded a good reason for bringing the troops round to Lisbon or Cadiz, but it was none for setting sail to England with the whole expedition, abandoning the contest in the Peninsula as hopeless, when the south was still unsubdued, and leaving ten thousand English soldiers, still in Portugal, to their fate.‡

* Nap., i., 488.

† "The troops which had been embarked on board the transports in England to re-enforce Sir J. Moore's army," said Mr. Canning, then secretary for foreign affairs, in his place in Parliament, "were disembarked in consequence of a distinct requisition from Sir David Baird that he wanted a certain number of transports; and the transports from which these troops had been disembarked were sent out, pursuant to that requisition. It was an afflicting circumstance, that it had become necessary to retard these troops, and send out empty, for the purpose of bringing off the British army, those transports which had been fitted for the purpose of re-enforcement and assault. But at this distance from the scene of action, ministers could not venture to refuse to send out these transports. The sending them out empty cost government a severe pang; no resolution ever gave him more pain. Every dictate of the head was tortured, every feeling of the heart wrung by it; but ministers had no alternative; they were compelled to submit to the hard necessity." The troops so embarked, or in course of embarkation, were 13,000 men. What might not they have achieved, joined to the 17,000 whom Moore led back to Vigo and Corunna!—See *Parl. Deb.*, xii., 1089, 1100. Sir John Moore also concurred in the propriety of withholding the re-enforcements and sending out the transports empty.—See SOUTHEY, ii., 519.

‡ "The road from Astorga to Corunna," says General Jomini, "traverses a long defile of thirty leagues, bounded by high mountains on either side. A slender rear-guard would have sufficed to defend that chaussee, and it was impracticable to manœuvre on either flank of it. That rendered it impossible for Soult to get at the enemy; and Ney, entangled behind him in the defile, could do nothing. This was the more unfortunate, as the English army, having prepared no-

In truth, this desponding conduct on the part of such able and gallant officers affords decisive proof that it was a much deeper and more general cause which was in operation, and that England was now paying the penalty, not of the incapacity of its generals, but of the long-established, and, till the Peninsular war opened, discreditable prudence in military transaction of its government. Accustomed only to land on the Continent for transient expeditions, and to look always, not to their guns and bayonets, but to their ships, as their ultimate refuge, the whole English nation were ignorant of the incalculable effects of invincible tenacity of purpose upon public undertakings, and regarded the strength of the state as consisting chiefly in its naval power, when, in reality, it possessed a military force capable of contending, with fair chances of success, even against the Conqueror of Continental Europe. Like the bulk of mankind in all ages, they judged of the future by the past, and were unaware of those important modifications of the lessons of experience, which the rapid whirl of events in which they were placed was every hour bringing into action. In Sir John Moore's case, this universal, and perhaps unavoidable error, was greatly enhanced by his connexion with the opposition party, by whom the military strength of England had been always underrated, the system of Continental operations uniformly decried, and the power and capacity of the French emperor, great as they were, unworthily magnified. Almost all his despatches, in the later stages of the campaign, evince in the clearest colours the influence of this depressing feeling, to which the false exaggerations and real disasters of the Spaniards afforded at the time too much confirmation. Instead, therefore, of casting a shade on the memory of any of the gallant officers intrusted with the direction of the campaign, let us regard its calamitous issue as the forfeit paid by the nation for the undue circumspection of former years, which had become so universal as to have penetrated the breast and chilled the hopes even of its most intrepid defenders, and inspired them with that disquietude for their country's safety which they would never have felt for their own. Nations, like individuals, never yet withdrew from the ways of error but by the path of suffering: the sins of the fathers are still visited upon the children; the retreat of Sir John Moore was the transition from the paralyzed timidity which refused succours to the Russians after Eylau, to the invincible tenacity which gave durable success to Wellington's campaigns. Happy the nation which can purchase absolution for past errors by so trivial a sacrifice, which can span the gulf from disaster to victory with no greater losses than those sustained in the Corunna retreat; and to whom the path of

It was public opinion which was really to blame.

thing on that line, stood in want of everything, and was in a frightful state of disorder, in consequence of the forced marches which it took for no conceivable reason. He cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned three or four thousand stragglers or dying men, when their line of operations was never menaced. It is impossible to conceive why the English did not defend Corunna. It is not, indeed, a Gibraltar; but against an enemy who had nothing but field-pieces, it surely could have been maintained for some time, the more especially as they could, at any time, throw in succour by sea. I could never understand their haste on that occasion, which the nation, it is true, has well wiped off in subsequent times, but was inferior to no other of the same description."

necessary suffering, commencing by the gift of a momentous benefit, is terminated by a ray of imperishable glory.

The peculiar character of the British and French troops had already clearly manifested itself in the course of this brief but active campaign. In every regular engagement, from first to last, the English had proved successful: they had triumphed equally over the conscripts of Junot and the Imperial Guards of Bessières; the heroes of Austerlitz and Friedland had sunk and quailed beneath the British steel. Considering how inexperienced almost all the English regiments were, and that most of the troops engaged at Rolicca, Vimiero, and Corunna there saw a shot fired for the first time in anger, these successes were extremely remarkable, achieved as they were, sometimes over veteran troops of the enemy, always over those who had the discipline and experience gained by fifteen years of victory to direct their organization and animate their spirits. They point evidently to what subsequent experience so clearly verified, a greater degree of courage at the decisive moment, arising either from some inherent peculiarity of race, or the animating influence of a free constitution and a long train of historic glory. But in other respects the superiority of the enemy was manifest, and all the good effects of achieved victory were liable to be lost on the English army, by the want of due discipline and docility in the troops, or of remissness and inex-

perience on the part of the officers. Place them in a fair field in front of the enemy, and both would honourably discharge their duty; but expose them to the fatigues of a campaign, subject them to the frozen snow or the dripping bivouac, require them to recede before the enemy, and bear the galling reproaches of a pursuer or ally in expectation of the time when the proper season for action arrived, and it was evident that they had still much to learn in the military art. Above all, intoxication, the inherent national vice, too often loosened the bonds of discipline, and exposed the army to the most serious disasters. These disorders explain the calamities of Sir John Moore's retreat, and go far to render blameless his gloomy presentiments as the issue of the campaign. In sobriety, durable activity, perseverance under fatigue, care of their horses, versatility of talent, and cheerfulness in disaster, the French were evidently and painfully the superiors of their undaunted rivals; the British army could never, in the same time and with the same array, have made Napoleon's march from Madrid to Astorga. Such were the varied excellences of the two armies who were destined, in six successive campaigns, to emulate each other's virtues and shun each other's defects; and such the aspect of the war when Great Britain, throwing off the unworthy timidity of former years, first descended as a principal into the fight, and Wellington, alternately the Fabius and Marcellus of the contest, prepared, in the fields illustrated by a former Scipio, the triumphs of a second Zama.

CHAPTER LI.

BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA PRIOR TO LORD WELLESLEY'S ADMINISTRATION.

ARGUMENT.

Comparison of the Roman Empire in Europe and British in India.—Wonderful Circumstances attending the British Empire in the East.—Its present Extent, Population, Revenue, and Military Strength.—Physical Description of the Indian Peninsula.—Its Vegetable and Animal Productions.—Extraordinary diplomatic Ability with which India has been governed.—Immense Advantages of the British Rule to the native Population.—Great Diminution of Crime under the British Rule, and Change effected in the Aspect of the Country in the Central and Western Provinces.—Rapid Progress of Wealth, Population, and Comfort, over all India under the English Government.—Increased Taste for British Manufactures over India.—Vast Police Force established in Bengal, and its admirable Effects.—Principles of Indian Taxation.—Management of Land in India.—The Zemindar System.—Its practical Operation.—The Ryotwar System.—The Village System.—Its admirable Effects in all Ages of Oriental History.—Effect of this large Land Revenue on the general System of Taxation.—Complete System of Religious Toleration Established in India.—Vast Diversities of Faith in that Country.—Vast Variety of National Character in India.—Difference of Character owing to physical Causes.—Origin and Composition of the Sepoy Force.—Elevated Rank and Situation of the Sepoy Troops.—General Character of the Indian Army.—Touching Anecdotes of the Generosity of the Sepoy Troops.—Their Fidelity under every Trial and Privation.—Which is owing to the Fidelity of the English Government to their Engagements.—Contrast of the Company's Rule to the devastating Mohammedan Sway which preceded it.—Wonderful Smallness of the Force by which this Empire has been won.—Desperate British Wars during which this Empire has arisen in the East.—Wars in which the Empire was involved during the Growth of the Indian Power.—What were the Causes of their extraordinary Successes.—Conquest was forced upon them by Necessity, not adopted by Inclination.—Sketch of the principal Indian Powers when the British Empire in the East arose.—Origin and early History of the East India Company.—Capture of Calcutta by Surajee Dowlah.—Calcutta retaken, and great Exploits of Clive.—His dethrone-

ment of Surajee Dowlah.—Acquisition of Territory by the Company and Defeat of the Mogul Emperor.—Cession of all Bengal and Bahar to the English.—Origin and Progress of the Madras Presidency.—Sieges of Madras and Pondicherry by the French and English respectively.—Rise and Character of Hyder Ali.—First Rupture between the British and Hyder.—First Campaigns with him, and early Disasters and Peace.—Transactions in the Carnatic down to the Renewal of the War with Hyder in 1780.—Great Successes of Hyder on the Renewal of Hostilities.—The firm Conduct of Warren Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote re-establishes Affairs.—Farther Disasters stemmed by the Energy of Warren Hastings.—Death of Hyder.—War with Tippoo, and Invasion of Mysore from Bombay.—Early Successes and final Disasters of the Invasion.—Siege of Mangalore by Tippoo, which is raised by the British invasion of Mysore, which leads to a Peace.—Change introduced by Tippoo in the Indian Armies.—Its ruinous Effects on the Independence of the Native Powers.—Long-protracted Prosecution of Mr. Hastings.—Proceedings in Parliament on the Subject.—His Trial and Acquittal.—Alternate Change of Public Opinion on the Subject.—Reflections on the cruel Injustice of this Prosecution.—Mr. Fox's India Bill.—Its premature Fate, which occasions the Downfall of his Administration.—Objections to which this Bill was liable.—Mr. Pitt's Indian Bill, which passes into a Law.—Arrangements with the British Government for the Increase of British Forces in the East.—Fresh War with Tippoo.—Lord Cornwallis's first Campaign with him.—Vast Preparations for the Siege of Seringapatam.—Preparations for a decisive Battle under the Walls of that Capital.—Total Defeat of Tippoo.—Dangers of Cornwallis, and his ultimate Rescue.—Concluding Operations of the War.—Treaty of Peace with Tippoo.—Experienced Necessity of adding new Conquests to the British Empire in India.—Pacific Administration and Principles of Sir John Shaw.—Its disastrous Effects.—Intrigues of Tippoo to form a Confederacy against the English.—His overt Acts of Hostility.

VAST and interesting as are the events which have now been traced, springing out of the wars

Comparison of
the Roman
Empire and
British India.

of the French Revolution, they are yet outdone by the spectacle which, at the same period, the Oriental World exhibited. The BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA forms, beyond all question, the most dazzling object in that age of wonders; perhaps the most extraordinary phenomenon in the history of the species. Antiquity may be searched in vain for a parallel to its lustre. During the plenitude of its power, the Roman Empire never contained above a hundred and twenty millions of inhabitants, and they were congregated round the shores of the Mediterranean, with a great inland sea to form their interior line of communication, and an army of four hundred thousand men to secure the submission of its multifarious inhabitants. Magnificent causeways emanating from Rome, the centre of authority, reached the farthest extremities of its dominions: the legions not only conquered, but humanized mankind; and the proconsuls, whether they journeyed from the Forum to the wall of Antoninus and the solitudes of Caledonia, or the shores of the Euphrates and the sands of Parthia, the cataracts of the Nile, the banks of the Danube, or the mountains of Atlas, rolled along the great roads with which these indomitable pioneers of civilization had penetrated the wilds of nature. Their immense dominions were the result of three centuries of conquest; and the genius of Scipio, Cæsar, and Severus, not less than the civic virtues of Regulus, Cato, and Cicero, were required to extend and cement the mighty fabric.

Wonderful circumstances attending the British dominion in India.

But in the Eastern world, an empire hardly less extensive or populous, embracing as great a variety of people, and rich in as many millions and provinces, has been conquered by the British arms in less than eighty years, at the distance of above eight thousand miles from the ruling state. That vast region, the fabled scene of opulence and grandeur since the dawn of civilization, from which the arms of Alexander rolled back, which the ferocity of Timour imperfectly vanquished, and the banners of Nadir Shah traversed only to destroy, has been permanently subdued and moulded into a regular province by a company of British merchants, originally settled as obscure traffickers on the shores of Hindostan; who have been dragged to their present perilous height of power by incessant attempts at their destruction by the native princes; whose rise was contemporaneous with numerous and desperate struggles of the British nation with its European rivals, and who never had a fourth part of the disposable national strength at their command. For such a body, in such times, and with such forces, to have acquired so immense a dominion, is one of those prodigies of civilization of which the history of the last half century is so pregnant; with which we are too familiar to be able fully to appreciate the wonder; and which must be viewed by mankind, simplified by distance, and gilded by the colours of history, before its due proportions can be understood.

The British Empire in India, extending now, with few interruptions, and those only of tributary or allied states, from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya Mountains, comprehends by

far the richest and most important part of Southern Asia; is nearly four times in extent the area of France,* and six times that of Great Britain and Ireland; contains above a hundred millions of inhabitants;† and yields a revenue of nearly twenty millions sterling.‡ The land-forces rose in the year 1826, when two bloody wars were to be maintained at the same time, to the enormous amount of 260,000 native troops, including 45,000 cavalry, and 1000 pieces of artillery, besides 31,000 native English; and even under the reduced peace establishment of the present time, they still amount to 194,000, of whom 35,000 are British soldiers §. This immense force, all in the very highest state of discipline and equipment, is raised entirely by voluntary enrolment, without a compulsory conscription ever being resorted to; and so popular is the British service, and so unbounded the general confidence both in the company's stability and its fidelity to its engagements, that the only difficulty the authorities experience is to select the most deserving from the numerous competitors who are desirous of being enrolled under its banners. If public danger threatened, or the Russian eagles approached the Indus, this force might be instantly raised by the same means to a million of armed men. When the British power was threatened with a double attack, and the Rajah of Bhurtpore raised the standard of revolt at the time that the 1825 bulk of their forces were entangled in the jungles of the Irrawaddy, or dying under the fevers of Arracan, no vacillation or weakness appeared in the British councils; with the right hand they humbled what the Orientals styled the giant strength of Ava, while with the left they crushed the rising power of the northern rajahs; and while a larger force than combated in Portugal under Wellington was pursuing the career of conquest in the Burmese Empire, and advancing the British standard almost to the minarets of Ummerapoora, a greater force than the native British who conquered at Waterloo assembled as if by enchantment round the walls of Bhurtpore, and, at the distance of fourteen hundred miles from Calcutta, and ten thousand from the British isles, carried the last and hitherto impregnable stronghold of Hindoo independence.¶ The greatness of Napoleon flits as a brilliant vision across our recollection; the power of Russia stands forth a present object of terror to our senses; but Russia never invaded Persia or Turkey, albeit adjoining her own frontiers, with forces equal to those which England has arrayed in the plains of Hindostan; ¶

* See note A.

† See note B.

‡ See note C.

§ Martin, ix., 90.

¶ Lord Combermere besieged Bhurtpore in 1825 with 36,000 red-coats and 180 pieces of cannon; the force employed in the Burmese Empire, at the same time, was in all 55,000 strong.—MARTIN, viii., 36, and *Ann. Reg.*, 1825. The British and King's German legion at Waterloo were 29,715 infantry, 8219 cavalry, 6054 artillery; the Hanoverians and Brunswickers about 15,000; the Belgians 12,000.—See *Adjutant-general's Report*, 6th Nov., 1816. *Battle of Waterloo*, by a *Near Observer*, ii., 138.

¶ In the war of 1828, and which terminated in the crossing of the Balkan and capture of Adrianople, the Russians could never collect 40,000 men in a single field. In the Persian war of 1824–25, they never had 10,000 men together in one army to the south of the Caucasus. In 1792 and 1800, the English besieged Seringapatam with 42,000 men and 104 pieces of cannon; in 1814, Lord Hastings sent 30,000 men against the Goorkhas on the first range of the Himalaya Mountains.—MARTIN, viii., 33, 51.

Its extent, population, revenue, and military strength.

and the host which followed Napoleon to Austerlitz and Friedland was inferior to that with which Lord Hastings made war on the Mahratta States.*

Imagination itself can scarcely do justice to the varied and magnificent scenery of Hindostan. From the snowy summits of the Himalaya to the green slopes of Cape Comorin, from the steep ghauts of Malabar to the sandy shores of Coromandel, it exhibits a succession of the most noble or beautiful features : at times stupendous mountain ranges, their sides clothed with lofty forests, their peaks reposing in icy stillness ; at others vast plains, rivaling the Delta of Egypt in richness, and, like it, submerged yearly by the fertilizing waters of the Ganges ; here lofty ghauts running parallel, at a short distance from the shore of the ocean, to the edge of its waters, and marking the line of demarcation between the low rich or sandy plains on the seaside, and the elevated tableland, several thousand feet in height, in the interior ; there, rugged hills or thick forests teeming with the riches of a southern sun. The natural boundaries of India are the Himalaya range and mountains of Cabul and Candahar on the north ; the splendid and rapid stream of the Indus, seventeen hundred miles in length, of which seven hundred and sixty are navigable, flowing impetuously from their perennial snows, on the northwest ; the deep and stagnant Irrawaddy, fourteen hundred miles in length, fed by the eastern extremity of the chain, and winding its way to the Bay of Bengal through the rank luxuriance of tropical vegetation, on the northeast ; and the encircling ocean on the coasts of Malabar and Coromandel, on the south. Nature everywhere appears in this highly-favoured region in her most imposing array : the Himalaya Mountains, surmounting even Chimborazo in elevation ; the Indus, rivaling the river of the Amazons in magnitude ; the plain of Bengal, outstripping Mesopotamia itself in fertility, form some of the features of a country which from the earliest times has been the seat of civilization, and the fabled abode of opulence and magnificence.†

All the productions of the globe are to be found, and for the most part flourish and attain to perfection, in the varied climates and soils of this splendid peninsula. The forests, the fruits, the crops of Europe, are recognised by the delighted traveller in the Himalaya Mountains, where the prodigy is exhibited of valleys tolerably peopled, and bearing crops, at the height of sixteen or seventeen thousand feet above the sea, or considerably above the summit of Mount Blanc, or the Great Glochner. The peach, the apricot, the nectarine, even apples, pears, and strawberries, refresh the European, to whom they recall, in a distant land and amid Oriental luxuries, the images and enjoyments of his youth. Wheat, barley, and oats, with noble forests of teak and oak, flourish on the cool slopes of the mount-

ains ; while at their feet the vast plain of Bengal is covered, to an incalculable extent, with double crops yearly of rice or thickets of bamboo canes, fed by the fertilizing floods, which, often to the breadth of a hundred miles, exhibit a sea of waters, interspersed only with tufts of wood, solitary palms, hamlets, and pagodas. Indigo grows in luxuriance in many districts, and forms a staple article of commerce to the country ; sugar thrives as well as in the West Indies, and promises to fill up the gap in the production of the globe occasioned by the disastrous emancipation of the slaves in the western tropical regions ; grapes, melons, pine-apples, figs, dates, mangoes, are everywhere found in profusion, with many other fruits, still more luscious, peculiar to the Eastern Hemisphere. The elephant, at once the strongest, the most sagacious, and the most docile of animals ; the camel, the ship of the desert ; the horse, the companion and fellow-soldier of man, alike flourish in a country where the tiger and the rhinoceros rule the wilds of nature. Even the flowers and birds partake of the splendid character of creation : the roses of Cachmere and Delhi send their highly-prized perfume through the world ; the scarlet flowers of the ixora and mussonda, and innumerable other tropical plants, diffuse a blaze of beauty through the woods ; the scarlet plumage of the flamingo, the varied hue of the parrots, rival the colours of the setting sun. But the woods are silent, or resound only with the harsh scream of birds or the fearful cry of beasts of prey ;* no troops of feathered songsters fill the air with their melodious voices, nor welcome in the breath of spring with the voice of gladness and the notes of love.

In the transactions of Europe, the historian has too good reason frequently to lament the indecision and want of foresight with which both diplomatic negotiations and military operations have been conducted by the English cabinet ; and he is, perhaps, driven to the conclusion that greatness has rather been forced on the state by the energy and virtues of its inhabitants, than conferred upon the inhabitants by the wisdom or ability of the government. But in the East the reverse has from the outset been the case. If the intelligence, vigour, and bravery of the middle and working classes of England, who sent forth their sons to push their fortunes in the plains of Hindostan, has furnished an inexhaustible supply of talent and resolution to conduct their enterprises, the foresight and capacity of the Indian government has almost invariably brought their qualities to bear upon the public service in the most efficient manner. Perhaps there is not to be found in the history of any country so remarkable a succession of able statesmen and warriors as in India have reared the mighty fabric of British greatness. The cool, daring, invincible intrepidity and military genius of LORD CLIVE laid the foundation of the structure ; the quick sagacity, prompt determination, and high moral courage of WARREN HASTINGS rescued it more than once from ruin ; but it was the enlarged views, statesmanlike wisdom, and energetic conduct of MARQUIS WELLESLEY

* In 1817, Marquis Hastings took the field against the Mahratta confederacy at the head of 81,000 regular infantry and 33,000 cavalry, the greatest force ever assembled under one commander on the plains of Hindostan. The French who fought at Austerlitz were 90,000, of all arms ; at Friedland, 60,000.—*Ante*, ii., 368 and 535 ; and MARTIN, viii., 35. † Malte Brun, iii., 5, 11 Martin, viii., 91, 92.

* Hamilton's Account of Hindostan, i., 24, 72. Malte Brun, iii., 32, 33. Martin, viii., 153, 157.

which completed the superstructure, and left to succeeding governors a force which nothing could resist, a moral ascendancy which nothing could counterbalance. MARQUIS HASTINGS has since, with equal ability, followed out the same enlightened principles; crushed the united confederacy of the Mahrattas and Pindarries; vanquished the hill strength of the Goorkhas, and left to his successors a matchless empire, from the Himalaya snows to the Cape Comorin, and from the frontiers of China to the banks of the Indus, united under one rule, obeying one government, and actuated by one common sense of experience and obligation.

Mr. Burke has said that, if the English were to be expelled from India, they would leave no better traces of their dominion than the hyæna or the tiger. Even at the period when this celebrated expression was used, it savoured more of the fire of the orator than the sober judgment of the statesman; but had that great man survived to these times, he would have gratefully retracted the sarcasm, and admitted that, of all the marvels attending the British sway in the East, the most wonderful is the extraordinary blessings which it has conferred upon the inhabitants. Facts, more eloquent than words, statistics, more irresistible than arguments, place this important point beyond the possibility of a doubt. While under its native princes the state of capital in India was so insecure that twelve per cent. was the common, and thirty-six per cent. no unusual rate of interest; under the British rule, the interest of the public debt has, for the first time in Eastern history, been lowered to five per cent., and, at that reduced rate, the capitalists of Arabia and Armenia daily transmit their surplus funds to be purchased into the company's stock, as the most secure investment in the East. Of the public debt of £47,000,000, a large proportion is due to native or Asiatic capitalists; and such is the unbounded confidence in the good faith and probity of the government, that bales stamped with their signet circulate unopened, like coined money, through the vast empire of China. So complete has been the protection, so ample the security enjoyed by the inhabitants of the British provinces, compared with what obtains under their native rajahs, that the people from every part of India flock, as Bishop Heber has observed, to the three presidencies; and the extension of the company's empire, in whatever direction, is immediately followed by a vast concourse of population, and increase of industry, by the settlers from the adjoining native dominions.*

Brilliant as has been the career of England in the European world during the last half century, there are several circumstances in its internal situation which cannot be contemplated without painful feelings. Among these, the constant and uninterrupted increase of crime, through all the vicissitudes of peace and war, unchecked by penal vigilance, undiminished by intellectual cultivation, is one of the most alarming. But under the British empire in the East a very different and much more satisfactory prog-

ress has taken place. Rapid as has been the growth of crime in the European dominions of England during the last half century, its decrease in her Eastern possessions has been still more striking; and the steady, powerful rule of a central government has done as much for the inhabitants of Hindostan as the vices consequent on a corrupted manufacturing population have undone for the people of Great Britain.* From our returns of commitments and crime in many different provinces of India for the last thirty years, it distinctly appears that crime has, during that period, diminished one half, in many places sunk to a sixth, in the East; while it has, in the same time, more than quadrupled in the British islands, and in Ireland multiplied ninefold.† Nor is it difficult to perceive to what cause this remarkable difference is owing. Robbery and plunder, the crimes of violence, were those chiefly prevalent in India, growing out of the lawless habits which ages of misrule had diffused through a large portion of the population. These savage and dangerous crimes have been everywhere severely repressed, in some districts totally extirpated, by the strong and steady arm of the English government. The long-established hordes of robbers have in most places been dissolved; the Pindarries, who so long spread ruin and desolation through Central India, rooted out; the gangs of Dacoits and Looties, who levied a frightful tax on honest industry, transported or broken up. But if this unwonted feeling of security against hostile spoliation is so generally perceptible even in the provinces which have enjoyed the benefit of English protection for the longest period, what must it be to those which have been lately rescued from a state of anarchy, misery, and bloodshed, unparalleled in the modern history of the world!‡

"Nothing," says an intelligent observer, "can be more gratifying to an Englishman than to travel through the central and western provinces, so long the theatre of merciless and oppressive war, and to witness the wonderful change which has everywhere been wrought. Every village in that part of the country was closely surrounded by fortifications, and no man ventured to go to the labours of the plough or the loom without being armed with his sword and shield. Now the forts are useless, and are slowly crumbling into ruin; substantial houses begin, for the first time, to be built in the open plain; cultivation is extended over the distant and undefended fields; the useless encumbrance of defensive armour is laid aside, and the peasant may fearlessly venture to enjoy the wealth and comforts which his industry and labour enable him to acquire. In short, the course of events, within the last fifteen years, has done more than the whole preceding century to improve the condition of the middle and lower classes through the whole of India; to give them a taste for the comforts and conveniences of life, and to relieve their industry from the paralysis under which a long continuance of internal dissension had caused it to sink. Englishmen, who have so long been blessed with internal

Great change effected in the aspect of the country in central and western provinces.

* Sinclair's Account of India, 13, 27. Heber's India, iii., 274. Life, i. 98, 211; ii., 74, 114.

* See note D.

† See note E.

‡ Statistical Tables in Martin's India, ix., 322, 329.

tranquillity, and to whom the idea of an invasion presents only a vague and indistinct notion of confusion, bloodshed, and rapine, can hardly conceive the rapturous delight which animates the Hindoo peasant who has had, from time immemorial, a wretched experience of these frightful realities, or the gratitude he feels to those who protect him from them, who enable him to reap his harvest in security, defend his home from profanation, and his property from the never-ending extortion of the powerful.*

This progress, accordingly, of wealth, comfort, and population during the last twenty years, especially in Central India, has been rapid in a most extraordinary degree; and even that short period of firm pacific administration has gone far to obliterate the deep furrows which the devastating wars and interminable oppression of former times had produced. Old neglected tanks have been cleared out, their banks restored, and again filled with vivifying floods; roads repaired or struck out anew in the most important lines of communication; harbours excavated, bridges erected, aqueducts constructed, with all the advantages of European skill; irrigation spread over the thirsty plains, and cultivation extended far into the open country, at a distance from any villages, the centres, in former times, of all the operations of human labour.† Villages, almost beyond the power of enumeration, have risen up from their ruins in every part of the country; the ryots around them are to be seen cheerfully cutting into the jungle, and chasing the leopard and the tiger from their hereditary haunts;‡ an entirely new feature in Indian society has arisen, a *middle class*, which is gradually approximating to the yeomanry of the Western world, and the never-failing symptoms of a prosperous population have generally appeared; a great increase in the numbers of the people, coexistent with a marked elevation in their standard of comfort and individual prosperity.‡§

The effect of this progressive elevation in the situation of the middle, and improvement in the circumstances of the lower orders, has already been strongly and beneficially felt in the extended commercial intercourse between India and the British islands. The growing taste for British manufactures of almost every kind, as well as the increased capability of the working classes to purchase them, in every part of Hindostan, was long ago remarked by Bishop Heber, and the same gratifying change has, since his time, been noticed by not less competent observers. The gradual rise of the more opulent of the working into a middle class, has spread a taste among them for luxuries and

conveniences to which their fathers, during the many ages of Hindostan oppression, were strangers. The calicoes and long cloths of Manchester and Paisley have now obtained as undisputed possession of the markets of the East as the hardwares of Sheffield, Birmingham, and Leeds; and the abundance and cheapness of British manufactures have diffused a taste for these articles among classes who formerly never had a wish beyond the mere necessities of life. While the industry of Indian artisans was, in former times, exclusively directed to fabricate only the coarsest articles for the poorer, and the most costly luxuries for the richer classes, the rapid increase of the consumption of a superior sort of fabric (still much below the Cachmere shawls and brocades of the rich), unknown till within these twenty years in any part of Hindostan, marks the slow but gradual growth, under British protection, of an intermediate class in society, superior to the naked ryot, but inferior to the pampered zemindar; while, by one of those changes which bespeak the revolutions of ages, and measure the difference in the progress of different quarters of the globe, the cotton of India, transported to the British shores and manufactured by the refinements of European machinery, is sent back to the East, and, by its greater cheapness, has opened to a class who never before could enjoy them, the comforts of the original produce of Hindostan.*†

The extraordinary diminution of crime, especially of a violent kind, in all parts of the Indian Peninsula of late years, and progressive amelioration of the people, is in a great measure to be ascribed to the extensive and powerful police force which is very generally established. The discipline and organization of this civil body is admirable; and such is its extent, that in the provinces of Bengal and Bahar it numbers one hundred and sixty thousand men in its ranks. In most villages there are two or three, in many ten or twelve, of this protecting force permanently established. Europeans may feel astonished at the magnitude of this establishment; but experience has completely demonstrated that it is highly useful, and, indeed, indispensable, amid the habits of rapine and violence to which ages of license and rapine have inured the inhabitants of India. The rapid diminution of crimes of violence in Bengal under the operation of this preventive system, proves that a remedy has been discovered and applied to the prevailing causes of evil in those regions: would that human wisdom could devise an equally effectual preservation against the passion for illicit gain, sensual indulgence, and habitual intoxication, which are now, like a gangrene, overspreading the face of society in the British islands!‡

Taxation in India is for the most part direct; that is, it consists of the rent of Principles of lands belonging in property to the Indian taxation government, and which, from time immemorial, have been devoted to the maintenance of the supreme authority. Of the nine-

Rapid progress of wealth, population, and comfort, over all India.

Increased taste for British manufactures over India.

Vast police force established throughout Bengal, and its admirable effects.

* Sinclair's India, 8, 9. Heber's India, iii., 336, and Life, 314.

† The public works undertaken and carried through by the British government in India, especially in the formation of roads, bridges, aqueducts, canals, harbours, tanks, &c., almost exceed belief; and though less pompously set forth in official reports, equal those which have shed such an imperishable lustre over the reign of Napoleon in Europe. An enumeration of them will be found in the *Parl. Papers* in 1833, and an abstract in MARTIN, ix., 344-349. The roads constructed under Lord W. Bentinck's administration alone, in 1831, were 1784 miles, and 10,000 persons were employed on them.—MARTIN, ix., 349.

‡ Heber, iii., 252. Mart., ix., 336, 352. Sinclair, 29. Malcolm's Central India, App. § See note G.

* Sinclair, 29, 30. Heber, iii., 284. Martin, ix., 353, 355.

† Martin, ix., 94, 96. Auber, 553.

‡ See note H.

teen millions which at present constitute the general revenue of India, nearly eleven millions are drawn in this manner from the rent of the government lands. The principle on which this immense revenue is derived from land has no analogy to the European land-tax, which is a burden superinduced upon the owner of the rent; it is, on the contrary, the rent itself. The modes in which this tax is levied over India are three: either a perpetual settlement with, or fixed rent constantly payable by, the proprietors of land; or a temporary settlement with the heads of villages or townships; or a definite settlement with each individual occupant of the ground. These different modes of taxation are all founded on one principle, which is universally admitted and acknowledged in every part of Hindostan, viz., that government, as the paramount owner of the soil, has right to a certain portion of the gross produce of every foot of cultivated land, which may be commuted generally or partially, by permanent or partial settlements, with classes of men or separate individuals, but never can be wholly alienated by any ruler to the prejudice of his successors. Government, therefore, in India is at once the ruling power and the universal landlord in the state; and hence the general and omnipotent influence which its severity or justice has upon the prosperity and well-being of the people, and the immediate effect of the British sway—by whose agents the collection of rent has been fixed, upon comparatively equitable principles—upon the welfare of the humbler classes.*

When the East India Company came into possession of the Bengal provinces, they found the land revenue everywhere collected by the intervention of officers under the Mohammedan government, who had charge of districts or provinces under the title of *zemindars*. These officers were paid by a per centage on the sums which they collected: the utmost irregularity and abuse generally existed; military force was constantly resorted to to enforce the collection; and some of them held their offices for life only, others transmitted them, by hereditary succession, to their descendants. Misled by the analogy of European institutions, or desirous of laying the foundation for their establishment in the East, Marquis Cornwallis, in 1793, conceived and carried into effect the idea of transforming the zemindars into landed proprietors, by conferring upon them and their descendants an indefeasible right to the territories over which their powers extended, so long as they continued to pay regularly the fixed land-tax to government. The propriety of this change was very much doubted at the time, and gave rise to a long and interesting controversy; but it was, nevertheless, carried into execution, and now forms the basis on which the taxation of two hundred thousand square miles of the Bengal territory, a district thrice the size of Great Britain, is founded. Though framed on the principles of benevolence and moderation, it has, however, like almost all similar institutions borrowed from the analogy of other nations, and a different state of society,

proved altogether ineffective for the principal object in view. The zemindars could not, by the mere regulation of the company, be converted from Asiatic to European habits: instead of acquiring the interests and views of hereditary landholders, they continued to act with the characteristic improvidence of Eastern rulers. To squeeze the last farthing, by any means how unjust soever, from the ryots, and squander it in extravagance or luxury upon themselves or their families, was the general practice: numbers were ruined and dispossessed by the company, who exacted the quit-rent with unrelenting and injudicious rigour;* and thus no step was made towards the formation of a landed aristocracy, while no alleviation was experienced in the burdens of the poor.

The evil, in effect, became so great, that it has in some degree worked out, like ^{Its practical operation.} all other excessive ills, its own cure. The zemindar system has come in the end to benefit a class of landed proprietors, though not the one which Lord Cornwallis originally intended. From the general ruin which overtook these powerful officers, and the terror everywhere inspired by the rigorous exactions of the company, the price of estates fell so low, that at last it became a prudent matter of speculation to buy land, and look to its returns for the interest of the price. A different and more provident class has thus, to a considerable extent, been introduced into the management of estates; and, as the land-rent which they are required to pay continues fixed, they have the strongest possible inducement to increase by good management the surplus which may accrue to themselves and their families. But, unfortunately, they have not learned in the East to look so far into the future as to see that this is to be most effectually done by equitable and just dealings towards the cultivators: the burdens imposed on the ryots are still generally exorbitant, often ruinous; and the benefits of the British government are felt by that numerous and important class rather by the cessation of war and depredation than in any practical diminution of the duties legally exigible from them by their landlords.†

Impressed with these evils, a different system was adopted by Sir Thomas Munro, late Governor of Madras, ^{The ryot-war system.} in his administration of some of the newly-acquired provinces of that presidency. The principle acted on by that able ruler, of whom Mr. Canning justly said that "Asia did not possess a braver warrior, nor Europe a more enlightened statesman," was to consider the ryot, according to the true Oriental principle, as the real proprietor, to dispense altogether with the zemindar or intermediate collector, and to levy the government duties, fixed forever in amount, directly from the cultivator or landholder, whatever was the size of his possession. It is evident that this system is calculated to be much more beneficial than the zemindar one to the cultivators of the soil, because they are thereby brought directly into contact with government, and participate at once, without the intervention of any middleman, in the benefit

* Com. Report, 1832, 2, 29. Martin, ix., 116. Heber, iii., 275.

* Parl. Pap., 1831, 3115, *et seq.*, 1832, p. 21.

† Heber, iii., 273, 275. Mart., ix., 118, 119. Parl. Pap., 1831. Com., 3115, *et seq.*, 1832, p. 21.

of a fixed quit-rent only being exacted from the land. It has, accordingly, found many and able supporters, and in some districts has been found in practice to be attended with the most admirable effects.* But when so powerful a party as government is brought into immediate contact with the cultivators, in a matter of such vital importance as the rent of land, it is indispensable to the success of the system that its demands should be moderate, and enforced with justice and consideration; and, unfortunately, this can hardly be generally expected under an empire of such immense extent as that of Hindostan, in which the supreme authority is situated at such a distance from the theatre of its fiscal operations. The land-tax is usually taken at twelve shillings in the pound, of the nett produce of the soil: an enormous exaction, rendered still more burdensome by the rigour with which it is collected. The project of bringing the cultivator at once into contact with the government, so equitable in theory, has often proved most fallacious in practice; for such is the subdivision of forms in most parts of India, that the immediate collection of the land-revenue by the government collector is out of the question. He is obliged to delegate his duties to a host of subordinate agents, over whose operations or oppression he is little able to keep any effectual control: the treasury officers too often come to esteem a subordinate functionary in proportion to the regularity and amount of his remittances rather than any other quality; the expenses of collection rise enormously with the multiplication of inferior agents, and the ryot has often little reason to congratulate himself on the exchange of a British collector for a native zemindar.†

A third system of land-rents is the *Village system*. This prevails chiefly in the upper districts of India, and is the prevalent institution over the greater part of the East, to which, probably, more than any other cause, the preservation of its population and industry amid the endless devastations of wars is to be ascribed. Each village forms a little community or republic in itself, possessing a certain district of surrounding territory, and paying a certain fixed rent for the whole to government. As long as this is regularly paid the public authorities have no title to interfere in the internal concerns of the community: they elect their own *mocuddims*, or head men, who levy the proportions of the quit-rent from each individual, settle disputes, and allocate to each profession or individual the share of the general produce of the public territory which is to belong to it. As the community is justly desirous of avoiding any pretext for the interference of the state collectors in its internal concerns, they make good the quota of every defaulter from the funds of his neighbours, so as

to exhibit no defalcations in the general return to government. The only point in which the interference of the national authorities is required, is in fixing the limits of the village territories in a question with each other, which is done with great care by surveyors, in presence of the competing parties and their witnesses, and a great concourse of the neighbouring inhabitants. In times of trouble they arm and fortify themselves, drive their cattle within their walls, and often contrive, by the payment of a certain contribution, to avoid the evils of actual pillage, even by the most considerable armies. These villages are, indeed, frequently burned or destroyed by hostile forces, the little community dispersed, and its lands restored to a state of nature; but when better times return, and the means of peaceable occupation are again restored, the remnant reassemble with their children in their paternal inheritance. A generation may pass away, but the succeeding generation return: the sons take the place of their fathers; the same trades and occupations are filled by the descendants of the same individuals; the same division of lands takes place, the very houses are rebuilt on the site of those which had been destroyed, and, emerging from the storm, the community revives, "another and the same."*

It is in these village municipalities that the real secret of the durability of society in the East is to be found. If we contemplate the desolating invasions to which, from the earliest times, the Asiatic monarchies have been exposed from their proximity to the regions of Central Asia; if we reflect on the wide-spread devastation consequent on the twelve dreadful irruptions of the Tartars into Hindostan, and recollect that society, in the intervals of these terrific scourges, has invariably been subjected to the varied but never-ending oppression of different rulers, who seemed to have no other idea of government but to extract as large contributions as possible from the people, it seems surprising how the human race did not become extinct under such a succession of calamities. But amid those multiplied evils the village system has provided an unheeded but enduring and effectual refuge for mankind. Invasion may succeed invasion, horde after horde may sweep over the country, dynasty may overturn dynasty, revolution be followed by revolution; but the wide-spread foundations of rural society are unchanged: the social families bend, but break not, beneath the storm; industry revives in its ancient seats, and in its pristine form, under whatever government ultimately prevails; and the dominant power, intent only on fresh objects of plunder or aggrandizement, rolls past these unheeded fountains of industry and population. The Hindoos, the Patans, the Moguls, the Mahrattas, the Seiks, and the English, have all been masters in turn; but the village communities remain the same. Abuses and oppression, without doubt, may prevail in this as in all other human institutions; but its extensive establishment and long duration in the East prove that it has been found capable by experience of affording tolerable security to the

* See, in particular, a most interesting account of a settlement on these principles in MALCOLM'S *India*, 526-528. It is also much more beneficial to government, as is proved by the fact that, in 1827, the land-tax per head was,

	Per head.	Per square mile.	Population per square mile.
In Bengal,	22 pence.	23 pence.	244
In Madras,	52 —	17 —	77
In Bombay,	60 —	19 —	76

—*Parl. Papers*, quoted in MARTIN, ix., 123.

† Sinclair, 33, 36. *Parl. Pap. Com.*, 3156, 4577, 4579. *Mart.*, ix., 122, 123.

* *Com. Committee*, 1832, p. 29. *Lords*, 398, 399, 405. *Mart.*, ix., 126, 121.

labouring classes; and perhaps by no other means, in the absence of those effective bulwarks of freedom which the intelligence, hereditary succession, and free spirit of Europe create, is the inestimable blessing of protection to humble industry to be so generally and effectually obtained. The whole upper and western provinces of Bengal, the greater part of the Bombay territories, the ceded districts on the Nerbuddah, and the province of Tanjore, comprising about two hundred and sixty thousand square miles, are assessed according to this system.*

The concentration in the hands of government of so large a proportion of the surplus produce of the earth, as is effected by the great land-tax of India, is undoubtedly prejudicial to society, in so far as it prevents the growth of that important class, so well known in European civilization—a body of hereditary, independent landed proprietors; but it is attended by this important advantage, that it renders the other imports of the state extremely trifling. Of the total revenue of £19,500,000, more than a half is derived from the land revenue; and of the indirect taxes, nearly two thirds are laid on the single articles of salt and opium.† When we reflect on the numerous taxes which are levied on almost every article of consumption in Great Britain, this must appear no small recommendation of the Eastern system. It is obviously the same advantage to a nation to have a considerable portion of its revenue derived from crown lands, as it is to have its ecclesiastical or charitable institutions supported by separate property of their own. In either case, the cost of these expensive establishments, essential to the protection, religious instruction, or relief of the people, is laid upon their own funds, instead of being imposed as a burden upon the earnings of the other classes of the community. It is, perhaps, the most remarkable instance of political blindness on record, that the Republican party, both in France and England, should so long have endeavoured, and in the former country successfully, to destroy the property both of the Church and the corporations holding funds devoted to the purposes of charity and education; that is, to terminate the payment of these necessary establishments by their own funds, and throw their maintenance as a tax on the wages of labour. And, without going the length of the opinion that the Oriental system is preferable to the landed proprietors of modern Europe, with the stability which they confer upon society, it may safely be asserted, that the receipt of a considerable portion of the public revenue from landed property, vested in government or public bodies, is an invaluable feature in political institutions, and the very last which a real patriot would seek to subvert.

Religious difference, and the exclusive possession of power by persons of one ecclesiastical establishment, political party, or dominant race, have been found to be the great obstacles to the pacification of the kingdoms of modern Europe; and in the centre of her power,

England has found it impossible to conciliate the affections or overcome the antipathy of the native inhabitants of Ireland. But, in her Eastern empire, political exclusion far more rigid, religious distinctions far more irreconcilable, have, under the able and judicious management of the company, proved no obstacle to the consolidation of a vast and peaceable dominion. In India, notwithstanding the long period that some districts have been in British possession, and the universal peace which reigns from Cape Comorin to the Himalaya Mountains, the natives are still ineligible to offices of trust, both in the civil and military departments. In religion, the principle of separation is still more rigid. Hindostan has, in different ages, been overrun, not merely by conquerors of different races, agreeing only in their ferocity to the vanquished, but by hosts of totally distinct and irreconcilable religious creeds. The mild and pacific followers of Bramah have in different ages been obliged to bow the neck to the fierce idolaters of Caubul, the rigid followers of Shiva, the savage pagans of Tartary, the impetuous fire-worshippers of Persia, the triumphant followers of Mohammed, the disciplined battalions of Christ. These different and hostile religions have imprinted their traces deeply and indelibly on the Hindoo population; and of the two hundred millions who now inhabit the vast Peninsula to the south of the Himalaya Mountains, a considerable proportion still follow the faith of the dominant races from which they severally sprang.

Fifteen millions of Mussulmen, haughty in manners, indolent in character, voluptuous in disposition, even now recall the era when the followers of Mohammed issued from their burning deserts, with the sword in one hand and the Koran in the other, to win, through the blood of conquest, a path to the houis of Paradise; sixty millions of pacific Hindoos on the banks of the Ganges still continue the worship of Bramah and Vishnu, which has endured unchanged for four thousand years; fifteen millions of hardy freebooters, in the upper provinces, follow a mixed creed, in which the tenets of Islamism and the doctrines of the Hindoo faith are strangely compounded together. Heathens and cannibals are found in great numbers on the hilly regions of the northeastern frontier; a numerous fragment of Parsees or fire-worshippers, scattered through various parts of India, still preserve, untainted by foreign usage, the pure tenets, charitable practices, and elevating worship of Zoroaster; Jews are to be seen in many places, whose Old Testament, coming down no farther than the Babylonian Captivity, indicates that they had strayed to the East after that memorable event; while a small number of Christians have preserved inviolate, through eighteen hundred years, the fundamental principles of the Gospel, and traces are to be found in some remote quarters of the lost tribes of the children of Israel.*

At first sight it would be natural to conclude that this extraordinary amalgamation of different religions in one community would produce an insurmountable difficulty in conducting the

* Com. Rep., 1831, 3119, 3123, 3129, 3130. Mart., ix., 120, 122.

† See note I.

* Mart., ix., 207, 233. Sinclair, 40, 48, 49.

Vast varieties of religious belief found in India.

Effect of this religious division in facilitating the government of the country.

government, and that the strength of a united empire could never be obtained with such various and discordant materials. The reverse, however, is so much the case, that it is owing to this more, perhaps, than any other cause, that the subjection of so great a body of natives to the government of a handful of Europeans is to be ascribed. The Indian population is divided into so great a number of different faiths that no one is predominant, or can claim an undisputed pre-eminence over the others; and political power has so long been dissevered from religious belief, that it no longer constitutes a bond of union by which any formidable coalition can be held together. Not only are there to be found Hindoos of every province, and tribe, and dialect, in the ranks of the British native army, but the worshippers of Shiva, the adorers of Vishnu, a multitude of Mohammedans, both of the Soonee and Shiah sects, Protestant and Catholic half-castes, and even Jews and Ghebirs. By this intermixture, unparalleled in history, the chances of any considerable combination, either for the purposes of military revolt or political hostility, have been considerably reduced. Although all classes live together on terms of mutual forbearance, and this amazing diversity of religious sentiment in no way interrupts the chain of military subordination, no sooner are their professional duties at an end than the distinctions of religion and caste return with undiminished influence. When the regimental parade is dismissed, the soldiers break into separate knots, the gradation of caste is restored, the distinctions of faith return: the Sudra sergeant makes his *salaam* to the Brahmin or the Rajpoot private; the Mussulman avoids the Christian, the Shiah the Soonee, the Hindoo all; and an almost impassable barrier of mutual distrust and jealousy obstructs all amalgamation of opinion, or unity of action, even upon those national objects which separately interest the whole body. Thus the heterogeneous and discordant mass is kept in a state of complete subordination by the only power among them which possesses the inestimable advantage of unity of action; and the British government, strong in its established probity, and the good faith with which it observes its engagements both towards its subjects and its enemies, is enabled to maintain an undisputed dominion over its innumerable and multifarious subjects.*

It is a common opinion in Great Britain—where the real nature of our Eastern dominions is unknown to an extent which, *a priori*, would appear incredible—that the whole of India is inhabited by a race of meek and inoffensive Hindoos, who willingly bow the neck to every invader who chooses to oppress them, and are incapable, alike from their character, climate, and ignorance, of opposing any effectual resistance to a European invader. The slightest acquaintance, not merely with Indian, but Asiatic history, must be sufficient to demonstrate the unfounded nature of this opinion. In no part of the world, perhaps, has foreign conquest implanted its traces in more indelible features on

the original population, in none is variety of present character and qualities so conspicuous. So far from the inhabitants of India being all of one description, alike timid and inoffensive, there is within its limits to be found a greater intermixture of races than in any part of the world, and as large a proportion of hardy valour and desperate daring as in any people recorded in history. Bishop Heber justly observes, that there is as great a disparity between the inhabitants of Guzerat, Bengal, the Duab, and the Deccan, as between any four nations of Europe; and that the inhabitants of the presidencies of Madras and Bombay, and of the Deccan, are as different from each other as the French and Portuguese from the Greeks, Germans, or Poles. Independent of the varieties of the proper Indian race, which are innumerable, there are to be found in the peninsula of Hindostan at least *thirty* distinct nations, speaking different languages, and almost entirely unknown to each other. The Mahrattas are as much strangers to the people of Bengal as to the Europeans; the inhabitants of the Carnatic are foreign to both; the Seiks have no resemblance to the Mahrattas; and even the fifteen millions of Mohammedans have no common bond but their religion, and exhibit the descendants of adventurers, from all the nations of Asia, who crowded to the standards of the Prophet. If we penetrate into more distant possessions, the varieties of human character are still more remarkable: the inhabitants of the swamps of Arracan, or the meadows of the Irrawaddy, are as distinct from the highlanders of Nepaul as the rice-growers of the Ganges are from the horsemen of Mysore, or the Pindarries of Malwa. It was in the plains of Bengal alone that the British force met with the genuine Hindoo race, and there victory was of comparatively easy acquisition; but as foreign aggression, or the necessities of their situation, forced them into more distant warfare, they were brought in collision with nations as fierce, and forces as formidable, as any that are arrayed under the banners of Western Europe. The desperate defence of Saragossa, the obstinate valour of Aspern, the enthusiastic gallantry of Tyrol, have all their parallels in the annals of Indian warfare; and the heroism with which Napoleon and his redoubtable followers resisted and overcame these varied modes of hostility, was not greater than that with which the British soldiers and their worthy native allies combated on the plateau of Mysore, the hills of Nepaul, or the plains of Hindostan. The harassing hostility and terrible sweep of the Cossacks were fully equalled by the squadrons of Hyder and the Pindarree hordes; the free-born valour of the Tyrolese was rivalled by the heroic resistance of the Goorkhas; the storm of Badajoz, the devotion of Saragossa, have their parallels in the defence of Bhurtapore and the ramparts of Seringapatam; and the decision and skill which converted the perils of Assaye into a decisive victory were not outdone by the most illustrious deeds of the conqueror of Napoleon.*

Climate and physical circumstances, in addition to original difference of race, have exer-

* Sinclair, 48, 49. Malcolm, Central India, i., 42, 47.

* Mart., ix., 267, 279. Heber's India, iii., 262. Crawford's Eastern Archipelago, i., 47, 54.

Difference of character owing to physical causes.

cised their wonted influence on the character of the Indian population. In the flat, hot regions of Bengal, on the shores of the Ganges, and amid the meanderings of its tributary streams, is to be found a timid, gentle, pacific race: educated, but prone to superstition; servile to their superiors, but tyrannical to their inferiors; obsequious, yet treacherous; skilled in the arts of Eastern adulation, but mild and inoffensive in their intercourse with each other. In the elevated regions of the Peninsula, on the other hand, on the table-land of Mysore, in the wild hills of Almorah, on the lofty mountains of Nepaul, the inhabitants are brave, ardent, and impetuous: glowing with ardour, chivalrous to women, courteous to strangers, glorying in deeds of heroism, faithful in their friendships, vehement in their hatred. With these elevated qualities are mingled, however, others which belong to the same national character: a fierce and revengeful temper, a disposition uncultivated and impatient of discipline, habits prone to violence, and nursed to crime by ages of uncontrolled licentiousness. It is in these nations, among the proud Rajpoots, the roving Mahrattas, the daring Affghans, that the restraints of regular government are with most difficulty introduced, and its blessings most sensibly felt by the inhabitants; but it is among them also that the military spirit is most prevalent, and the British government has found its most faithful and intrepid native defenders *

Origin and composition of the sepoy force.

Among all the prodigies attending the British dominions in India, none, perhaps, is so extraordinary as the rise, progress, and fidelity of the SEPOY FORCE. It was in Bombay that these invaluable auxiliaries were originally organized, and the first mention of them in history is when a corps of 100 natives from Bombay, and 400 from Tellicherry, assisted the army at Madras in 1747. From these humble beginnings has arisen the present magnificent native army of India, which at one period amounted to nearly three hundred thousand men, and even now, on a reduced peace establishment, numbers a hundred and ninety-five thousand. Their ranks have from the first been filled indiscriminately with recruits of all nations and religious persuasions; and Mohammedans, Hindoos, Parsees, Jews, and Christians are to be found blended among them, without the distinction of race having ever interfered with the unity of action, or the difference of religion ever shaken fidelity to duty. The whole have throughout been raised entirely by voluntary enrolment, without a conscription or forced levy having ever been found necessary; and, great as the present army is, it could be quadrupled in a few months, if the circumstances of the Indian government required such an augmentation of force. The facility with which vast armies can be raised in the East, when compared to the violent measures by which it has been found necessary in Europe to accomplish the same object, appears at first sight surprising; but it ceases to be so when the effects of the distinction of castes and the relative situation of the sepoy soldiers and the other classes of the community are considered. The military form a distinct caste in all the

Hindoo communities, and, from father to son, deeds of arms are handed down as the only object of honourable ambition, the true incitement to glorious exploit. The Rajpoot of Bengal is born a soldier. The mother recounts acts of heroism to her infant: from earliest youth he is habituated to the use and exercise of arms. Even when still a child, the future warrior is accustomed to handle the sword and dagger, and to look without fear on the implements of death. If his father tills the ground, the sword and shield are placed near the furrow, and moved as his labour advances. The frame of the youth is constantly strengthened by martial exercises: he is habitually temperate in his diet, of a generous though warm disposition, and, if well treated, zealous, faithful, and obedient. It was from this military caste that the chief Indian armies were first formed, and they still form the strength of the native infantry. In process of time, however, as our empire has extended into more distant regions, the military qualities of its varied inhabitants have been called into action; and the desultory activity of the Mahratta horse, not less than the firm intrepidity of the Mysore cavalry, or the chivalrous valour of the Affghan gunners, have contributed to the formation of our mighty dominions.*

Unlike the soldier of Europe, the sepoy is an object of envy to his less fortunate compatriots. His profession gives him the precedence, not less in general estimation than in that of his caste, to persons engaged in civil occupations; and his pay is so considerable as to raise him, both in station and enjoyments, far above his brethren who are left behind him in his native village. Each private sepoy is attended by two servants: in the field there are, at an average, nine followers to every two fighting men: a system which gives to a hundred thousand men, in a campaign, nearly five hundred thousand attendants, and goes far to explain both the prodigious hosts recorded in history, as commanded by Xerxes and Darius, and the facility with which they were routed by a comparatively small body of Greeks, all real soldiers. Such a mode of carrying on war augments to a great degree the difficulty of providing subsistence for so prodigious a multitude as attend every considerable army,† but it renders it comparatively an easy matter to raise a military force. When the pay given to a private soldier is so considerable as to admit of his keeping two servants in the camp, and a still greater number in the field, no want of recruits will ever be experienced: the real difficulty is, to find resources adequate to the support of a large army at that elevated standard. When Cromwell gave half a crown a day to every dragoon, he readily got recruits for the Parliamentary armies.‡

* Quart. Rev., xviii., 414, 415. Orme's Hindostan, i., 72, 104. Mart., ix., 61, 65. Snelcar, 46.

† When General Harris advanced against Seringapatam, in 1799, his army was composed of 35,000 fighting men and 120,000 attendants; and when Marquis Hastings took the field in 1817 against the Mahrattas, his regular forces, amounting to 110,000 men, were swelled by above 500,000 camp followers; among whom, chiefly of the lower grades in society, and persons habituated to the humblest fare, the cholera made the most unheard-of ravages.—MALTE BRUN, iii., 328.

‡ Malte Brun, iii., 328. Martin, ix., 79, 80.

* Malte Brun, iii., 280, 299. Mart., ix., 278, 279.

The Indian infantry can hardly be said to be equal, even when led by British officers, to that of England, and, when left to the direction of their own leaders, evince the general inferiority of the Asiatic race to the European; but it is only in the last extremity or most trying situations that this difference is conspicuous, and for the ordinary duties of a campaign no troops in the world are superior to the sepoys. In many of the most essential duties of a soldier, sobriety during duty, patience under privation, docility in learning, hardihood in undergoing fatigue, steady, enduring valour, and fidelity to their colours under every temptation to swerve from them, the Indian auxiliaries might serve as a model to every service in Europe. Nay, examples are numerous in which, emulous of the deeds of their British comrades, they have performed deeds of daring worthy of being placed beside the most exalted of European glory, and instances are not wanting where they have unhesitatingly faced dangers before which even English troops had recoiled.* The native cavalry is of more recent introduction than the infantry, but it is not less admirable in many of the most valuable qualities: the men are fearless riders, indefatigable in the service of light troops, sober and vigilant; they take exemplary care of their horses, many of which are of the best Persian and Arabian breeds, and in the sword exercise, or single combat, are superior to almost any of the cavaliers of Europe. Nor is the artillery inferior to any in the world, either in the perfection of the material, the condition of the horses, or the coolness, precision, or bravery of the gunners. The immense host is entirely under the direction of British officers, nearly five thousand of whom are employed in this important service; but the non-commissioned officers and subalterns always were natives, and the avenue to more elevated promotion is now opened to the most deserving of their number.† In the shock of a regular charge

alone the native horse is still inferior to the British, a peculiarity which has distinguished the cavalry of the Eastern and Western worlds in every age, from the days of Marathon to those of the Crusades.*

Volumes might be filled with the anecdotes which have occurred within the last eighty years, illustrative of the steady courage and incorruptible fidelity of the sepoy troops. They first rose to eminence in the wars of Lord Clive, Lawrence, Smith, and Coote, in the middle of the last century; and the number of Europeans who were then engaged in Indian warfare was so inconsiderable, that almost the whole glory of their marvellous victories is, in reality, due to the sepoys. The hardships which were undergone at this period by all the soldiers, both native and European, from the defective state, or, rather, total want of a commissariat, were excessive; but, although the British power was then only in its infancy, and little promised future stability to its empire, nothing could shake the fidelity of the sepoy troops. On one occasion, when the provisions of a garrison were very low, and a surrender, in consequence, appeared unavoidable, the Hindoo soldiers entreated their commander to allow them to boil their rice, the only food left for the whole garrison. "Your English soldiers," said they, "can eat from our hands, though we cannot from theirs; we will allow them as their share every grain of the rice, and subsist ourselves by drinking the water in which it has been boiled." In the years 1780, 1781, and 1782, they suffered hardships almost unparalleled: there was hardly a corps that was not twenty months in arrear, and their families, under the pressure of a dreadful famine, were expiring on all sides; nevertheless, their fidelity never gave way under this extreme trial, and they repaid, with gratitude and attachment, the consideration, to them unwonted, with which they were treated by their European officers. The campaigns of Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Clive, in which they bore so prominent a part, still form an object of well-founded pride to the sepoys of Madras; and when a regiment comes into garrison, they lead their children into the great room of the exchange of that capital, to point out the portraits of the chiefs who first led their fathers to victory.†

Towards the close of the war with Tippoo, in 1782, General Mathews, with his whole troops, almost entirely native, were made prisoners. The sultan, sensible of the advantages he might derive from the services of so large a body of disciplined men in his ranks, made every effort to induce the English sepoys to enter his army, but in vain. He then tread severity, and subjected them for long to the most rigorous confinement and unhealthy employments; but nothing could shake their fidelity; and at

* At the first siege of Bhurtpore, in 1805, the 12th regiment of native Bengal infantry was associated with the 75th and 76th British infantry, whose deeds of valour they had emulated at the battle of Laswarree. The British were first led to the assault and gallantly mounted the breach, but they were driven back with dreadful slaughter, and such was the panic inspired by the disaster, that, when they were ordered a second time to advance, the soldiers refused to follow their officers and leave the trenches. The 2d battalion of the 12th native regiment were then ordered to advance; they did so with resolute steps, though well aware of the desperate nature of the service on which they were sent, and cheered, as they passed, the English troops who lay sheltered in the trenches. Such was the heroic valour of their onset that they overcame all opposition, and planted their colours, in sight of the whole army, on the summit of the breach. This work, unfortunately, was cut off by a deep ditch from the body of the fortress, and, finding it impossible to pass that barrier, Lord Lake was reluctantly obliged to order a retreat. It was with great difficulty, however, that the brave sepoys could be prevailed on to retire from the perilous post of honour which they had won, and not till they had sustained a loss of 360 men, being half their total number when they went into action. The British regiment, stung with shame, now implored to be allowed to return to the assault, which was granted, but, notwithstanding their desperate valour, it was still unsuccessful.—See MARTIN, viii., 30, 31, and ix., 69, 70. The author has frequently heard this anecdote from his late lamented brother-in-law, Colonel Gerard, adjutant-general of the Bengal army, who was present on the occasion, an officer to whose talents, zeal, and bravery the wonders of Lord Lake's campaign are in a considerable degree to be ascribed.

† The British officers in the Indian army amount to 4467; the Indian to 3416; but the latter cannot rise to a higher

rank than that of ensign or cornet. The total British troops in India amount at present to 30,915 sabres and bayonets, of whom 19,540 are composed of the queen's regiments, the remainder being English in the service of the East India Company; but the expense of the whole is defrayed by the Indian government.—MARTIN, i., 73, 79–81.

* Martin, ix., 63. Williams's Indian Army, 32, 68 Quart. Rev., xviii., 414, 415.

† Sir J. Malcolm in Quart. Rev., xviii., 389, 396

the peace of 1783, fifteen hundred of these brave men marched a distance of five hundred miles to Madras, to embark and rejoin the army to which they belonged, at Bombay. During the march, the utmost pains were taken by Tippoo's guards to keep the Hindoo privates from their European officers, in the hope that their fidelity might yet sink under the hardships to which they were exposed, but in vain; and not only did they all remain true to their colours, but swam the tanks and rivers by which they were separated from the officers during the night, bringing them all they could save from their little pittance; "for we," they said, "can live on anything, but you require beef and mutton." A battalion of the Bombay 12th regiment mutinied in 1764, on account of some promises made to the soldiers having, as they said, been broken. A severe example was thought necessary, and twenty-eight of the most guilty were sentenced to be blown from the mouth of a cannon. As they were on the point of being executed, three grenadiers who happened to be among them stepped forward and claimed the honour of being blown away from the right guns: "they had always fought on the right," they said, "and they hoped they should be allowed to die at that post of honour."* In the advance of Lord Lake's army to Delhi and Agra in 1804, the hardships and privations which the troops of all sorts endured were such as almost to break down the spirit of the British officers; but the Hindoo privates never showed the least symptoms of faintness or despondence, saying, "Keep up your spirits, sir; we will bring you in safety to Agra." When in square, and sustaining charges of the enemy's horse, it more than once happened, when a musket was fired by a young soldier, that a veteran struck him with the butt-end of his firelock, exclaiming, "Are you mad, to destroy our discipline, and make us like the rabble that are attacking us?" Nor was the same steady courage and devoted fidelity wanting on still more trying occasions, when the national or religious prejudices of the native soldier were brought still more violently in collision with their military duties. At the mutiny of Vellore, which shook the Indian Empire to its foundation, and was brought on by an absurd interference with the religious feelings of the troops, the sabres of the native dragoons were dyed as deep as those of the British in the blood of their unhappy countrymen; and, on occasion of a recent tumult at Bareilly, the capital of Rohilcund, occasioned by the introduction of a necessary but unpopular police-tax, which commanded the sympathy of the whole neighbouring population, a battalion of the 27th native infantry, with four hundred Rohilla horse recently imbedded, were all that could be brought against the insurgents, who were above twelve thousand strong. They continued to resist till two thousand were slain; and, although many

of them were their relations and neighbours, and their priest advanced and invoked them to join their natural friends, only one man was found wanting to his duty, and he was immediately put to death by his comrades, who throughout maintained the most unshaken fidelity and courage.*

The secret of this extraordinary fidelity of the native troops, under every temptation, to a foreign power, professing a different religion, and known only by its successive overthrow of all the native potentates, is to be found in the wise and magnanimous policy with which the East India Company, through every vicissitude of fortune, have made good their engagements, and the inviolable fidelity with which they have rewarded the services of the troops engaged in their ranks. From the earliest times the Indian princes have known no other way of paying their troops than by quartering them on some of the hereditary or conquered provinces of their dominions, where, though military license was allowed every latitude in the exaction of their pay or provisions, the soldiers experienced great difficulty, and were subject to a most vexatious uncertainty in the recovery of their dues. When, therefore, instead of this harassing and oppressive system, the Indian sepoys found that they received their daily pay as regularly as an English soldier; that their wants were all provided for by a vigilant and honest government; that no subaltern fraud or chicanery was permitted to intercept the just rewards of their valour; and that, after a certain number of years' service, they were permitted to retire on ample allowances, or a grant of land which formed a little patrimony to themselves and their descendants,† they were struck with astonishment, and conceived the most unbounded confidence in a power which had thus, for the first time, set them the example of an upright and beneficent administration. Power in India is, even more than elsewhere in the world, founded on opinion; and the belief which gradually spread universally that the East India Company would, with perfect regularity and good faith, discharge all its engagements, formed a magnet of attraction which, in the end, drew almost all the strength and military virtue of the Peninsula to its standards. When minutely examined, it will be found that it was neither the military discipline, nor the scientific acquisitions, nor the political

Which is owing to the fidelity of the English government to its engagements

* Martin, ix., 66, 72. Williams's Indian Army, 272, 304. Malcolm in Quart. Rev., xviii., 389, 415.

† "I have beheld," says Sir John Malcolm, "with more patriotic pride than has ever been excited in my mind by any other act of British policy in India, a tract of country more than a hundred miles in length, upon the banks of the Ganges, which had a few years before been a complete jungle, abandoned for ages to tigers and robbers, covered with cultivated fields and villages, the latter of which were filled with old soldiers and their families, in a manner which showed their deep gratitude and attachment for the comfort and happiness they enjoyed. When we consider the immeasurable quantity of waste land in the dominions of the company, it appears extraordinary that this plan has not been adopted in every part of British India upon a more liberal and enlarged scale. The native soldiers of Bengal are almost all cultivators, and a reward of this nature was peculiarly calculated to attach them. The accomplishment of this object would add in an incalculable degree to the ties which we have upon the fidelity of those by whom our dominion in India is likely to be preserved or lost."—MALCOLM'S *British India*, 1st ed., 526-528.

* "I am sure," says Captain Williams, who was an eyewitness of this remarkable scene, "there was not a dry eye among the marines who executed the sentence, though they had long been accustomed to hard service, and two of them had actually been in the execution party which shot Admiral Byng in 1757. The corps to which they belonged subsequently distinguished itself greatly both at Laswarree and the first siege of Bhurtpore."—WILLIAMS'S *Indian Army*, 247, and *Ante*, iii.

talents of the British which gave them the empire of India, for all these were matched in the ranks of their enemies, recruited and directed as they were by French officers, but their HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH, which filled them with confidence in each other, and inspired the same reliance in the native powers: qualities which, though often overreached in the outset by cunning and perfidy, generally prove more than a match for them in the end, and are destined ultimately to give to the Anglo-Saxon race the dominion of the globe.*

The order and regularity which prevail both in the maintenance of the Indian army, and the administration of its provinces, have produced the greater impression on the natives of the East, from the contrasts which they afford to the hideous scenes of devastation and massacre with which, from the earliest times, conquest had been invariably attended in the plains of Hindostan. Throughout the whole period of the Mohammedan ascendancy in the south of India, the same enormities, the never-failing accompaniments of their presence and power, have occurred as in the northern provinces. The annals of this period give a succession of examples of the same unprovoked and devastating warfare; the same struggles for power among the nobles; the same unbridled lust of conquest in the government; the same perfidy, treason, and assassination in the transactions of courts; the same massacres, oppression, and suffering inflicted on the people. It was no unusual thing for sixty, eighty, or a hundred thousand persons of all ages and sexes to be put to death in a single day; great cities and even capitals were at once destroyed and delivered over tenantless to the alligator and the tiger; the treasures of the native princes were invariably filled with the plunder of their defenceless subjects. The system of Mohammedan exaction, at first under the name of contribution, permanently under that of revenue, being everywhere the same, with the power of rapacious armies to enforce it, the fate of the unhappy people was stamped with permanent wretchedness. Dreadful as were the devastations of war and conquest, they were as nothing compared to the lasting evils of military exaction and cupidity. There was no security whatever either for persons or property: the latter was always considered as the fair object of seizure wherever it was known to exist, and the mass of the people were subject to a state of poverty from which there was no escape; of violence and oppression, against which there was no redress. Wars between the native or Mohammedan princes were perpetual, and the devastation extended not merely to the troops or armed men engaged, but to the whole population: weeping mothers, smiling infants at their breasts, were alike doomed to destruction; the march of troops might be tracked by hillocks of bodies and pyramids of human heads, burning villages, and desolated capitals. Under the Mahratta chiefs, who rose upon the decline of the Tartar dynasty, the same boundless rapacity continued, aggravated by the establishment of above twenty petty chiefs, each

of whom exercised the right of making war on his own account; the work of devastation was perpetual: massacres, conquests, conflagrations, make up the history of India for the last eight hundred years. So universal had this oppression been, and so deeply rooted had its effects become in the habits of the people, that the display of property was universally avoided as the certain forerunner of additional exaction: property was invariably either buried or vested in diamonds, which admitted of easy concealment; of the vast and fertile plains of India not more than a fourth part was cultivated;* the population was hardly a fifth part of what, under a more beneficent government, it might become; while the long-continued drain of the precious metals to the East, so well known to politicians of every age, indicated as clearly the precarious tenure of wealth which rendered concealment of property indispensable, as the recent and unparalleled occurrence of the importation of gold and silver from India demonstrates the arrival of the era for the first time in Eastern history, when the necessity for hoarding has ceased,† and, under British protection, the natural desire for enjoyment can find an unrestrained vent among the natives of Hindostan.

To complete the almost fabulous wonders of this Oriental dominion, it only requires to be added, that it has been achieved by a mercantile company in an island of the Atlantic, possessing no territorial force at home; who merely took into their temporary pay, while in India, such parts of the English troops as could be spared from the contests of European ambition; who never had, at any period, thirty thousand British soldiers in their service, while their civil and military servants did not amount to six thousand; the number of persons under their auspices who proceed yearly to India is never six hundred, and the total number of white inhabitants who reside among the two hundred millions of the sable population is hardly eighty thousand! So enormous, indeed, is the disproportion between the British rulers and their native subjects, that it is literally true what the Hindoos say, that if every one of the followers of Bramah were to throw a handful of earth on the Europeans, they would be buried alive in the midst of their conquests.‡

It augments our astonishment at the wisdom and beneficence of the Indian government, that these marvellous conquests have been gained, and these lasting benefits conferred upon their subjects, during a period checkered by the most desperate wars; when the very existence of the English authority was frequently at stake, and the whole energies of government were necessarily directed, in the first instance, to the preservation of their own national independence. During the growth of this astonishing prosperity in the Indian provinces, the Peninsula has been the seat of almost unceasing warfare. It has witnessed the dreadful invasion of Hyder Ali; the two terrible

Wonderful nature of this empire, won by so small a force.

Desperate wars during which this empire has arisen in the East.

* See note K.

† Rickard's India, i., 223, 234. Orme, b. i., c. 4. Martin, ix., 75, 86. Malte Brun, iii., 310, 314.

‡ Sinclair, 27. Martin, ix., 73, 78.

* Malcolm's Evidence before Parliament, quoted in Martin, ix., 35, 72, 74, 80. Sinclair, 47, 49.

wars with Tippoo Sultaun; the alternations of fortune, from the horrors of the Black Hole at Calcutta to the storming of Seringapatam; the long and bloody Mahratta wars; the Pindarree conflict; the Goorkha campaigns; the capture of Bhurtpore, and the murderous warfare in the Burmese Empire. During the seventy years of its recent and unexampled rise, twelve long and bloody wars have been maintained; the military strength of eighty millions of men, headed and directed by French officers, has been broken, and greatness insensibly forced upon the East India Company, in the perpetual struggle to maintain its existence. The Indian government has been but for a short time in the possession of its vast empire: twenty years only have elapsed since the Mahratta confederacy was finally broken; its efforts for a long period have been directed rather to the acquisition or defence of its territories than their improvement; and yet, during this anxious and agitated period, the progress of the sable multitude who are embraced in its rule has been unexampled in wealth, tranquillity, and public felicity.

It was a maxim with the Romans, from which Wars in which the empire was involved during the growth of the Indian power. they never deviated, not to undertake two great wars at the same period, but rather to submit even to insults and losses for a time than bring a second formidable enemy on their hands. Strongly as this principle is recommended, both by its intrinsic wisdom and the example of that renowned people, it is not always capable of being carried into execution; and the British were frequently compelled in Hindostan, by the pressure of native confederacies, to sustain the most formidable foreign conflicts, at a time when the resources of the monarchy were all required to sustain the fortunes of the state in the contests of European ambition. At the same time that the East India Company, with their brave and faithful sepoys, were successfully combating the immense and disciplined hordes of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, the vast American colonies of England, directly ruled by Parliament, were severed from the empire without any considerable external aid, by the mere force of internal discontent; the dissatisfaction of Canada has more than once led to alarming collisions between the central government and the native French population; and the West India islands have been restrained only by the inherent weakness of a slave colony from breaking off all connexion with the parent state. The first rise of our Indian Empire was contemporaneous with the energetic administration of Chatham and the glories of the Seven Years' War: the moral courage and decided conduct of Hastings saved it from destruction, at the very time when the weakness and corruptions of Lord North's administration occasioned the loss of the North American colonies; the contest with the Mysore princes occurred at the same time as that with Revolutionary France, and "Citizen Tippoo" was not the least esteemed ally both of the Directory and the consular government, while the able and vigorous administration of Marquis Wellesley took place when Napoleon was commencing his immortal career in Europe; and Great Britain stretched forth her

mighty arms into the Eastern hemisphere, and struck down the formidable confederacy of the Mahratta princes, at the very moment when she was engaged in a desperate contest for her existence with the conqueror of Continental Europe.

It is an interesting object of inquiry, What was the form of government and system of foreign administration under which those astonishing triumphs were achieved by England in the Eastern hemisphere? Were these triumphs, as the Continental writers and the enemies of the East India Company assert, the result of a continual system of aggression on their part, like the wars of the Romans in ancient, or the conquests of Napoleon or of Russia in modern times; or were they, as their supporters maintain, forced upon them, much against their will, by native combinations and intrigues, which constantly gave them no other alternative but conquest or ruin?

It is observed by a French annalist, and quoted with approbation by the greatest of modern historians, that "in a light of precaution all conquest must be ineffectual unless it could be universal, since the increasing circle must be involved in a larger sphere of hostility."* There can be no doubt that this remark is well founded, and that it sufficiently explains the experienced impossibility which the British, like all other conquering nations, have felt of stopping short in their career, when once commenced, before they had reached the limits assigned by nature to their farther progress. From the time when they first became territorial sovereigns in the East, and a handful of Europeans ventured to rear the standard of independence among the sable multitudes of Asia, they had no alternative but to go on conquering, in a continually increasing circle, till they came to the snows of the Himalaya and the waves of the Indus. But while the British were, unquestionably, equally with the Romans or Napoleon, exposed to this necessity, yet there was a wide difference in their relative situations, and the consequent readiness with which they may be supposed to have embraced the career of conquest, thus in a manner forced upon them. Rome had an inexhaustible stock of vigour and capacity in the numerous bands of experienced soldiers whom she nourished in her bosom; and from the moment that they left the frontiers of the Republic, they subsisted at the expense of the allied or conquered states. France vomited forth a host of ardent, starving insolvents, to regenerate by plundering all mankind; and, borrowing from her predecessors in ancient times the maxim that war should be made to maintain war, experienced not less relief to her finances than security to her institutions, by providing either by death or victory for such a multitude of turbulent defenders. But England had a very different task to execute when she became involved in the task of subjugating Hindostan. The centre of her strength was situated eight thousand miles from the banks of the Ganges; a few thousand soldiers were all she could spare for Eastern from the pressure of Euro-

What were the causes of these extraordinary successes?

Conquest was forced upon the British by necessity, not adopted from inclination.

* Gaillard, quoted by Gibbon, c. 49, ix., 187.

pean or the dangers of American warfare; the power which was involved in Indian hostilities was a mere company of merchants, who looked only to a profitable return for their capital or a rise in the value of their stock, and dreaded nothing so much as the cost of unproductive warfare: for thirty years after they were involved in hostilities; so far from effecting any conquests, they were barely able to defend their own mercantile establishments from destruction; and every foot-soldier they transported from Europe to Hindostan cost thirty, every horseman eighty, pounds sterling. In these circumstances, it requires no argument to demonstrate that foreign aggression could not, in the first instance at least, have been voluntarily entered upon by the East India Company; and, in fact, the slightest acquaintance with their annals is sufficient to show that they stood in every instance, really, if not formally, on the defensive, and that it was in the overthrow of the coalitions formed for their destruction, or the necessary defence of the allies whom previous victory had brought to their side, that the real cause of all their Indian acquisitions is to be found.

When the English, in the middle of the eighteenth century, quitted their commercial establishments at Calcutta and Madras to engage in a perilous contest with the native powers of India, the chief potentates with whom they were brought in contact, either as allies or as enemies, were the following: In the northern parts of the Peninsula, on the banks of the Jumna and the Ganges, which is properly called Hindostan, the once dreaded empire of Timour had sunk into the dust, and the Mogul emperors, on their throne at Delhi, could with difficulty retain even a nominal sway over the powerful rajahs in their vast dominions. The most considerable of these was the Rajah of Bengal and Berar, whose dominions extended over the vast and fertile plains watered by the Ganges, and who boasted of thirty millions of inhabitants who acknowledged his authority. The next formidable potentate on the eastern coast, between Calcutta and Madras, was the Nizam, whose dominions embraced eleven millions of souls, and whose seat of government was Hyderabad. Dread of the Mahrattas, who lay contiguous to this state on the west, and the Sultan of Mysore, who adjoined it on the south, rendered the court of Hyderabad the firm and faithful ally of the East India Company. In the southern part of the Peninsula, the dominions of the Rajah of Mysore extended over a vast extent on the high table-land of Mysore, three or four thousand feet above the sea, and from his strong fortress of Seringapatam he gave the law to sixteen millions of brave men. This dynasty, however, was supplanted, about the same time that the British dominion was established on the banks of the Ganges, by that of Hyder Ali, a soldier of fortune, who usurped his dominions, and added to them various lesser states in its vicinity, and soon communicated to the whole the vigour of enterprise and the thirst for foreign dominion. With this great power serious and bloody wars were waged by the English for above thirty years.

Farther to the north, and on the western coast, the Mahratta confederacy governed a territory of vast extent and boundless resources, though their predatory and restless habits, which engaged them in constant wars with their neighbours and each other, kept the country in great part desolate, and blighted the fairest gifts of nature. If united, the Mahratta chieftains could bring two hundred thousand horsemen, long the scourge of Northern and Central India, into the field; but their constant quarrels with each other rendered it improbable that this vast force would be concentrated against any external enemy. The most renowned of these chieftains were the Rajah of Berar, Scindiah, and Holkar, each of whom could muster sixty thousand men, almost entirely cavalry. They acknowledged allegiance to the Peishwa, who was the head of their confederation, and from his seat of government at Poonah professed to execute treaties and issue orders binding on the whole confederacy; but his authority was little more than nominal, and each of these powerful chieftains took upon himself, without scruple, to make war and conclude alliances on his own account. A vast number of lesser chieftains occupied the intervening country, from the northern frontier of the Mahratta States to the Indus, which was inhabited by different races, the Seiks and Rajpoots, famed in every period of Indian history for their martial qualities, while, in the great Alpine ridge which separated Hindostan from Tartary, the Goorkha and Nepal tribes had found shelter, and maintained, amid forest-steeps and narrow vales, the indomitable valor which, in every part of the world, seems to be the peculiar attribute of the mountain race.

The first charter of incorporation of the East India Company was granted by Queen Elizabeth on the last day of the sixteenth century; but it was not for a hundred and fifty years that they became territorial sovereigns. During the long period that intervened from their first origin till the middle of the eighteenth century, they painfully and industriously pursued a pacific career, neither aspiring after foreign conquest nor accumulating any force to defend even their own factories from aggression. So humbled were their fortunes at this period, that in 1756, when the ferocious tyrant Surajee Dowlah invested and captured Calcutta, the destined Queen of the East, and now the abode of a million of inhabitants, the whole persons made prisoners amounted only to one hundred and forty-six! They were all confined, by his orders, in a dungeon not twenty feet square, with only one window, during an intensely hot night in June. Only twenty-four survived the dreadful suffocation which followed, among whom was Mr. Hollwell, the governor; but the indignation excited throughout England by that inhuman cruelty was unexampled: all classes were animated by a generous desire to avenge the sufferings of their countrymen; and from the horrors of the *Black Hole of Calcutta* the glories of our Indian empire may be said to have taken their rise.*

* Auber's India, i., 53, 54. Martin, vii., 10. Orme, ii., 71, 76.

Sketch of the principal Indian powers when the British Empire arose.

Origin and early history of the East India Company.

1756. Capture of Calcutta by Surajee Dowlah.

The East India Company, at that period, possessed an inconsiderable settlement at Madras, on the eastern coast of India, protected by a fort, called Fort George, and to it the distressed merchants at Calcutta despatched a deputation, earnestly soliciting succour. Fortunately, at that period, the hostilities which were hourly expected with France had caused a considerable body of British troops to be assembled in that city, which, from its comparative vicinity to Pondicherry, the principal seat of French power in the East, was most exposed to danger, and a detachment of nine hundred Europeans and fifteen hundred sepoys was forthwith despatched to restore the British fortunes at the mouth of the Ganges. This inconsiderable band seemed little qualified to combat the vast armies of the Mogul Nabob on the plains of Bengal; but it was under the direction of one of those heroes who appear at distant intervals in history, whose master minds acquire such an ascendancy over mankind as almost to command fortune, and from whose exertions, in circumstances the most adverse, unhopèd-for triumphs often proceed. In the end of December, 1756, COLONEL CLIVE appeared in the mouth of the Ganges, defeated the Mogul detachment sent to oppose his landing, retook Calcutta, and, disregarding the timid exostulation of the council, took upon himself the supreme direction of affairs. It soon appeared how essential the guidance of a chief of such personal and moral courage was to the salvation of our Indian possessions at that critical juncture. Surajee Dowlah in a few weeks returned with increased forces; but Clive stormed his camp and struck such terror into his troops that a treaty was concluded, by which Calcutta was restored to the company, and permission granted to fortify it. From that hour the territorial empire of England in India may be said to have been founded.*

Shortly after this important event, intelligence arrived in India of the commencement of hostilities between France and England, and the government of Calcutta received advices that Surajee Dowlah was preparing to join the former with all his forces. Clive instantly took his determination: he resolved to raise up Meer Jaffier, a renowned military leader in Bengal, to the viceroyship of that province, in the hopes that, owing his elevation to the British, he would be less disposed to join their enemies than the Nabob, who was already their inveterate enemy. Such a treaty was immediately concluded with Meer Jaffier, on terms highly favourable to the English; and shortly after hostilities commenced, by Colonel Clive marching with two thousand men against the French fort of Chandernagore, on the Hooghly, sixteen miles above Calcutta. This fort was soon taken, and several other forts reduced. At length, on the 22d of June, 1757, June, Clive, with his little army, then raised to 900 Europeans, 2000 sepoys, and six guns, came up with the vast array of Surajee, consisting of fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and fifty guns, under French officers. For the first and last time in his life,

Clive called a council or war: the proverb held good, and the council declined to fight;* but the English general consulted only his own heroic character, and led his troops against the enemy. The odds were fearful, but valour and decision can sometimes supply the want of numbers: the British were sheltered, in the early part of the day, by a high bank from the cannon-shot of the enemy; treachery and disaffection reigned in their ranks, and before Clive led his troops in their turn to the attack, the victory was already gained. The Nabob fled on his swiftest elephant; Clive remained master of the Indian camp, artillery, and baggage; and the fate of a kingdom as great as France, containing thirty millions of inhabitants, was determined with the loss of seventy men.†

The British ascendancy on the Ganges was now secured: Meer Jaffier, as the reward of his treachery, was saluted by the conqueror as Nabob of Bengal and Bahar; Surajee was soon made prisoner and slain, and his successor paid for the foreign aid which had gained him the throne, by the grant of an ample territory around Calcutta and the immediate payment of £800,000 as an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The Mogul emperor, alarmed at this formidable irruption of strangers into one of the provinces of his dominions, made an attempt to expel the intruders, and reinstate the former dynasty on the throne; but he was defeated by Meer Jaffier, aided by the company's forces; 22d Feb., 1760. the former was soon after deposed in consequence of his weak and tyrannical disposition, and succeeded by his natural son, Meer Cossim: the Moguls were finally routed by Major Carnac, and the French auxiliaries made prisoners; and the British proceeded from one acquisition to another, till, after several intrigues and revolutions in the native governments of Bengal, sometimes effected by the British influence,

Acquisition of territory by the company, and defeat of the Mogul emperor.

15th June, 1761.

* Clive stated, in his evidence before the House of Commons, "This was the only council of war I ever called, and if I had abided by its decision, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company." The same truth may be observed in all ages and in all transactions, civil and military, where vigour and decision are requisite to success. The shelter of numbers is never sought but by those who have not the moral courage to act on their own conviction: true intrepidity of mind never seeks to divide responsibility; in the multitude of the counsellors there may be safety, but it is safety to the counsellors, not the counselled.—See CLIVE's Evidence before the House of Commons, given in MILL's App. No. vi., and iii., 166.

He assigned the following reasons for his treaty with Meer Jaffier to dethrone Surajee Dowlah: "That, after Chandernagore was attacked, he saw clearly they could not stop there, but *must go on*; that, having established themselves by force and not by the consent of the Nabob, he would endeavour to drive them out again; that they had numberless proofs of his intentions, and some upon record; that he suggested, in consequence, the necessity of a revolution, and Meer Jaffier was pitched upon to be the Nabob instead of Surajee Dowlah." This is precisely the language and principles of Napoleon; this necessity of advancing to avoid being destroyed is the accompaniment of power founded on force in all ages. The British power in India was driven on to greatness by the same necessity which impelled the European conqueror to Moscow and the Kremlin; it is the prodigious difference in the use they made of their power, even when acquired by violence, which, hitherto at least, has saved them from the fate which so soon overtook him.—CLIVE's Evidence, *ut supra*, and MILL, iii., 162.

† Orme, ii., 171, 179. Mill, iii., 165, 169. Martin, viii., 17.

* Orme, ii., 127, 137. Auber, i., 60, 61.

sometimes forced upon them by the inconstancy of the Mohammedan princes, a great battle was fought at Buxar, in which the 23d Oct., 1764. Moguls were totally defeated, with the loss of six thousand killed and one hundred and fifty guns.*

This important victory decided the fate of Bengal: Lord Clive, who had returned to Europe in 1760, soon after was sent out again to Hindostan, and, foreseeing the necessity of the East India Company assuming the government of the whole of that province, if they would preserve their footing on the banks of the Ganges, insisted, as an indispensable preliminary, that its sovereignty should be ceded to the English power. The court of Delhi was too much humbled to be enabled to resist; and after a short negotiation the Mogul emperor signed a treaty, by which he resigned all sovereign claims over Bengal, and part of Bahar and Orissa, in consideration of an annuity of

£325,000 a year; Surajee Dowlah, the Vizier of Oude, was restored to all his dominions, on condition of being taken under British protection, and paying a tribute for the support of the subsidiary force stationed in his capital; while the claims of the family of Meer Jaffier were adjusted by the settlement of a pension of £660,000 on his natural son. Thus in the short space of ten years was the English power on the Ganges raised from the lowest point of depression to an unexampled height of prosperity and glory; the refugees from an insignificant mud-fort at Calcutta were invested with the sovereignty over 150,000 square miles and thirty millions of men; the frightful dungeon of the Black Hole was exchanged for the dominion of the richest part of India; and, in the extremity of human suffering, the foundations laid of an empire destined, in half a century, to overshadow the throne of Baber and Aurengzebe.†

While the genius of Clive, supported by the commanding spirit of Chatham and the resolutions of the local government, was thus spreading the British dominion on the banks of the Ganges, the English had to sustain a still more obstinate contest in the southern part of India. Madras, on the coast of Coromandel, was, so early as the year 1653, invested with the dignity of a presidency, though at that period its garrison was limited by an express resolution of the Court of Directors to ten men. This insignificant town was the object of fierce contests between the English and French in the middle of the eighteenth century: the war which broke out in Europe in 1744 was as warmly contested in the East as the West; and a strong French military and naval force besieged and took it in 1746, its weak garrison of two hundred soldiers being allowed to retire by capitulation. Clive, then a clerk in a mercantile house at Madras, first embraced the profession of arms at this siege, and, after the capture of the town, escaped in the disguise of a Moor to Fort St. David, a fortress sixteen miles dis-

tant, where the remnant of the British successfully made a stand, and the talents of the young soldier materially contributed to the defeat which followed of the French, seventeen hundred strong, by two hundred British soldiers. Madras continued in possession of the French till the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1749, when it was restored to the English dominion. Although, however, the direct war between England and France was terminated by this treaty, yet the mutual jealousy of these powers led to the continuance of a smothered and ill-disguised hostility in the East; the rival potentates struggled for the ascendancy in the councils of the Carnatic, a vast district, five hundred miles in length and a hundred in breadth, stretching along the coast of Coromandel, comprising the dominions and dependencies of the Nabob of Arcot. For several years the skill and address of M. Dupleix, the French commander, prevailed; but at length the daring courage of Colonel Clive, and the diplomatic ability of Major Lawrence, counterbalanced his influence. This, however, was more than counterbalanced in the Deccan, where M. Du Bussy had gained firm possession of an extensive district, six hundred miles in length, and yielding a million sterling of revenue for the French crown.*

No sooner had hostilities broken out a second time in Europe between France and England, in 1756, than the cabinet of Versailles made a strenuous effort to root out the British settlements on the coast of Coromandel.

The expedition fitted out from Pondicherry, the chief French stronghold, for this purpose consisted of eight thousand men, of whom more than half were Europeans, under Lally; and after capturing Fort St. David, to which the British had retired on the former war, besieged Madras in form, and the garrison, consisting of eighteen hundred European and two thousand sepoy troops, had to sustain a variety of desperate assaults, almost without intermission, for two months. At length the siege was raised, when the brave garrison were nearly reduced to extremities, by the arrival of the English fleet with six hundred fresh troops. Lally retired precipitately, and the British immediately carried the war into the enemy's territories. Colonel, afterward Sir Eyre Coote, invested and took the important fortress of Wandimash in the Carnatic; and Lally, having collected all his forces to regain that stronghold, was met and totally defeated by Coote, with 6000 men, who made

General Bussy and several of the ablest French officers prisoners, and took twenty pieces of cannon. This great victory proved decisive of the fate of the French power in India. Lally was soon after shut up in his capital, after losing all the detached forts which he held in the province: he was closely blockaded by sea and land by the victorious armies and fleets of England; and at length, after a protracted siege of eight months, in which the gallant Frenchman exerted all the resources of courage and skill to avert his fate, his resources were exhausted; he was compelled to capit-

* Orme, ii. 347, 365. Auber, i., 90, 94.

† Auber, i. 90, 94, 119, 149. Orme, ii., 347, 365. Martin, 21, 22.

* Martin, viii., 42, 43. Orme, i., 360, 420. Auber, i., 48, 53.

ulate, and in the middle of January the British standards were hoisted on the towers of Pondicherry.*

The downfall of the French power in India first brought the English into contact with a still more formidable enemy than the ambitious rivals who had so long disputed with them the palm of European ascendancy. On the high tableland of Mysore, elevated three or four thousand feet above the level of Madras, are to be found a race of men, very different from the inhabitants of the level plains of India, breathing a purer air, hardened by a cooler temperature, inured to more manly occupations. The inhabitants of Mysore are bold, restless, and impetuous, roving in disposition, predatory in habit, warlike in character, whose fierce poverty had for ages "insulted the plenty of the vales beneath." HYDER ALI was originally a private soldier in the army of the rajah of this district, and he received the command of three hundred men, in consequence of his gallantry at a siege in one of the hill forts of a neighbouring rajah. He was one of those domineering characters whom nature appears to have formed to command, and who, in troubled times, so often make their way, despite every obstacle, to the head of affairs. So illiterate as to be unable either to read or write, he was yet possessed of the ambition to desire, the daring to seize, and the capacity to wield supreme power; and the natural sagacity of his mind more than supplied what, in others, is the fruit of lengthened study, or the dear-bought result of the experience of the world.† Active, indefatigable, and intrepid, he fearlessly incurred danger and underwent fatigue in the pursuit of ambition: liberal of money, affable in manner, discerning in character, he soon won the affections of his followers, and attracted to his standards that host of adventurers who, in the East, are ever ready to swell the trains of conquest: faithless in disposition, regardless of oaths, unscrupulous in action, he was distinguished by that singular mixture of great and wicked qualities which in every age, from the days of Cæsar to those of Napoleon, has marked the character of those who raise themselves amid blood and tumult from a private station to the command of their country. He appeared at that era, ever so favourable to usurpers, when the established government is falling to pieces from the weakness and vices of its possessors, and the experienced evils of anarchy at once prepare the throne for an audacious soldier, and induce men to range themselves in willing multitudes under his banners. His career began as a subaltern at the head of two hundred foot and fifty horse; but he was soon vested with the command of the important fortress of Dindigul, and rapidly attracted numbers to his standard, by the success of his operations and the boundless license which he permitted to his followers in plunder-

ing the adjacent territories. He experienced many reverses, but rose superior to them all, and went on from one acquisition to another, till he had entirely subverted the ancient government, seized the great commercial city of Bednore, with its treasures, estimated at twelve millions sterling, placed himself on the throne of Seringapatam, and established his authority over almost the whole southern parts of the Indian Peninsula.*

Hyder had established amicable relations with the French in the Carnatic during the period of their influence in India; but the early destruction of their power after the commencement of his importance prevented any rupture for a number of years from taking place. At length, however, the growing importance of the Mysore usurper on the one hand, and the preponderating strength of the company on the other, necessarily led these two great powers into collision: hostilities with Hyder were resolved on, and, as a precautionary measure, a treaty offensive and defensive was concluded with the Nizam, a rajah whose dominions were more immediately exposed to his incursions, by which Lord Clive engaged to support him, if attacked, with a considerable body of European and sepoy troops. The directors at home, less impressed than the authorities on the spot with the indispensable necessity of advancing in power if they would avoid destruction, evinced the utmost repugnance at this treaty, and distinctly foretold that, if offensive wars were once engaged in, the British would be drawn on from one conquest to another, till they could find no security but in the subjection of the whole, and would be involved in destruction by the very magnitude of their acquisitions.† But ere their pacific instructions could reach their destination the die was already cast, and the dreadful war with Hyder Ali had commenced.‡

Within a few weeks after its opening, the British were rewarded for their aggression by the defection of their faithless ally the Nizam, who deserted to the Mysore chief with all his forces; and at the same time intelligence was received that he had accommodated all his differences in the north with the Mah-rattas, so that the confederacy which the English had projected against Hyder was now turned against themselves. The united forces of Hyder and the Nizam, forty thousand strong, approached Madras, and ravaged the country up to the very gates of

First rupture between the British and Hyder.

Nov. 12, 1766.

July, 1767

First campaigns with him, and early disasters.

Aug., 1767

* Orme, ii., 480, 724. Martin, viii., 43, 44. Auber, i., 102, 104.

† He was entirely ignorant of arithmetic; but such was the power he possessed of mental calculation, that he could outstrip, in arriving at a result even of complicated figures, the most skilful arithmeticians; and none of his followers could deceive him in his estimate of the amount of the plunder which should be brought into his treasury.—MILL, iii., 407.

* Wilks's Historical Sketches, 240, 449, 472. Mill, iii., 404, 417. Martin, viii., 46, 47. Auber, ii., 112, 115.

† "If once we pass the bounds of defensive warfare, we shall be led from one acquisition to another, till we shall find no security but in the subjection of the whole, which, by dividing your force, would lose you the whole, and end in our extirpation from Hindostan." And again, in another despatch, "We utterly disapprove and condemn offensive wars." The same principles were constantly followed by the Court of Directors, both during the administration of Warren Hastings and Marquis Wellesley; but these great statesmen early perceived that it was in vain for a handful of foreigners to stop short in the career of conquest, and that, like Napoleon, they were constantly placed in the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin.—Directors' Despatch, 22d April, 1768; AUBER, i., 223-226.

‡ Mill, iii., 414, 470. Auber, i., 249.

the fortress; and, though Colonel Smith, with the British and sepoy troops, defeated them with the loss of sixty pieces of cannon, want of cavalry prevented him from obtaining any decisive success in the face of the innumerable squadrons of the Mysore horse. The hostile incursion was repeated in the following year, when he laid waste the company's territory in so savage a manner, that, like the countries desolated by Timour or Genghis Khan, nothing remained but bleached skeletons and smoking ruins to attest where the dwellings of man had been. In the midst of these successes, Hyder opened a communication with the French authorities of Pondicherry, to whom he announced the approaching destruction of the English power in the Peninsula; while the East India directors at home, panic-struck by the magnitude of the disasters already incurred, and the interminable prospect of wars and difficulties which opened before them, renewed in earnest terms the necessity of resuming the now almost hopeless prospect of effecting an accommodation. At length he struck a decisive blow. Sending all his heavy cannon and baggage home from Pondicherry, which during his incursions he had twice visited to confer with the French, he put himself at the head of six thousand of his swiftest horse, drew the English army by a series of able movements to a considerable distance from April, 1769. Madras, and then, by a rapid march of a hundred and twenty miles in three days, interposed between them and that capital, and approached to Mount St. Thomé, in its immediate vicinity. The council was filled with consternation: although the fortress could have held out till the arrival of the English army, the open town and villas in its vicinity were exposed to immediate destruction, and they gladly embraced the overtures of accommodation which, like Napoleon, he made in the moment of his greatest success, and concluded peace on the invader's terms. By this treaty it was provided that both parties should make a mutual restitution of their conquests, and that, in case of attack, they should afford each other mutual aid and assistance.*

The principal object of Hyder in concluding thus suddenly this important treaty was to obtain for his usurped throne the countenance of the English power: the same motive which was Napoleon's inducement, immediately after obtaining the consular power, in making proposals of peace to Great Britain. He soon after, accordingly, made a requisition for the junction of a small body of English soldiers to his forces, in order to demonstrate to the native powers the reality of the alliance. The company's affairs received so serious a shock by this inglorious treaty, that their stock fell at once sixty per cent. Hyder, some years afterward, became involved in wars with his powerful northern neighbours, the Mahrattas, in which he was at first reduced to great straits, and he made an earnest requisition for assistance to the company in terms of the treaty of 1769; but the Madras council contrived, on one pretence or another, to elude the

demand, to the inconveniences of which they were now fully awakened. July, 1776. These repeated refusals excited great jealousy in the breast of the Mysore chief, the more especially as he was well aware that the English had, in the interval since the cessation of hostilities, greatly augmented their army, especially in cavalry, in which it had formerly experienced so lamentable a deficiency, and that they had now thirty thousand well-disciplined men in the presidency. Accordingly, in June, 1780, he descended into the Carnatic, at the head of the most powerful and best-appointed army which ever had appeared in India, consisting of twenty thousand regular infantry and seventy thousand horse, of whom nearly one half were disciplined in the European method. So suddenly and with such secrecy were his measures taken, that the dreadful torrent was in motion before the English were so much as aware of its existence; and the government of Madras were apprized of the approach of the enemy for the first time by vast columns of smoke rising from burning villages in the Carnatic, which, converging from different directions, threatened to wrap the capital in conflagration.*

The success of Hyder in this tremendous inroad was almost equal to that of Great successes of Hyder in Calcutta twenty-four years before. the Carnatic. With a degree of daring and military skill which rivalled that of Napoleon himself, he interposed with his whole forces between the two English armies, the one commanded by Colonel Baillie, the other by Sir Hector Monro, who were approaching each other, and only six miles distant; overwhelmed the former, when caught in ambuscade, by the multitude and vehement charges of his horse, literally trampling the English infantry under foot with his terrible squadrons and ponderous elephants,† and compelled the latter to retreat, and leave open the whole 3d Nov., 1780, fortresses of the Carnatic to his attacks. The Indian chief was not slow in following up this extraordinary tide of success: Arcot was speedily reduced; the whole open country ravaged, and siege laid to Wandimash, Vellore, Chingle-

* Martin, viii., 47, 48. Auber, i., 540, 579. Mill, iv., 145, 153.

† The valour displayed on this occasion by Colonel Baillie with his little band of followers, consisting only of 400 European and 2000 sepoys, never was exceeded even in the glorious fields of Indian warfare. Surrounded on all sides by the countless squadrons of Hyder's horse, torn in pieces by a terrible fire from sixty pieces of cannon, borne down by the weight and fury of the armed elephants, they yet long resisted with vigour such as more than once balanced the fortunes of the day, and threw Hyder into such perplexity that, but for the advice of Lally, he would have drawn off in despair. The accidental explosion of two ammunition-wagons early deprived them of their reserve ammunition; but, nevertheless, they continued the combat with heroic resolution to the last, forming a square which repelled thirteen different attacks of the Mysore horse, the men raising themselves, in many cases, from the ground to resist the enemy with their bayonets, while the officers kept them at bay with their swords. Two hundred were made prisoners, for the most part desperately wounded, including the commander himself and his principal officers. They owed their lives to the humane interposition of Lally and the other French officers in the service of Hyder, who also did all in their power to mitigate the horrors of the captivity, more terrible far than death, which they afterward underwent in the Mysorean dungeons.—See *Narrative of the Sufferings of those who fell into Hyder's hands after the battle of Conjeeram*, Sept. 10, 1780. *Mem. of War in Asia*, ii 102-188. MILL, iv., 185, 186.

* Mill, iii., 414, 424. Auber, i., 249, 250.

put, and all the strongholds of the Carnatic. Parties of the Mysorean horse approached to the gates of Madras: the whole villas in its vicinity were deserted, and preparations were even made in the presidency for crossing the surf at the bar and abandoning the Carnatic forever.*

It is invariably on a crisis of this kind that the really great acquire an ascendancy: the timid shrink from responsibility, the multitude clamour for submission; the brave and intrepid stand forth as the deserving leaders of mankind. The council of Madras, in the last extremity, applied to the government of Calcutta for aid; and WARREN HASTINGS was at its head. Instantly summoning up all his resources, he rose superior to the danger: despatched Sir Eyre Coote, with five hundred Europeans and an equal number of sepoys, to the succour of Madras, Nov. 7th, 1780.

and superseding the council, whose improvidence or incapacity had brought the public fortunes to such a pass, took upon himself the supreme direction of affairs both in his own and the sister presidency. Nothing could exceed the disastrous state of affairs when Sir Eyre Coote now took the field against Hyder. His whole force did not exceed seven thousand men, of whom only one thousand seven hundred were Europeans; and he had to oppose above a hundred thousand enemies, of whom eighty thousand were admirable horse, and three thousand French auxiliaries who had recently landed from Europe, in hopes, by the aid of so renowned a chieftain, of restoring their fallen fortunes in the East. By a conduct, however, at once prudent and intrepid, he succeeded in re-establishing affairs in the Carnatic: the sieges of Wandimash, Vellore, and the other beleaguered fortresses, were raised by Hyder, at the approach of this new and more formidable enemy; and at length, after a variety of operations attended with various success, a decisive battle was fought between

the opposing forces on the seacoast near Porto Novo, where the English had proceeded, in order to stop the incursions of the Mysoreans in the direction of Cuddalore. The contest lasted six hours, and success was for a long period so nearly balanced that the whole reserves of the English were brought into action; but at length, by incredible exertions, Hyder's forces were repulsed at all

points, and driven off the field in such confusion, that, if Sir Eyre Coote had possessed an adequate force of cavalry, he would have been involved in total ruin.†

This great success, however, was balanced by a bloody action fought on the very ground where Baillie had so recently been defeated, in which, although neither party could boast decisive success, the English, upon the whole, were worsted, and Hyder, as they retreated during the night, had good ground for proclaiming it to all India as a decided victory. The affairs of Madras were now reduced to extremities: Lord Macartney, who had just arrived there as gov-

ernor, in vain made proposals of peace to the victorious chief; another murderous and indecisive action took place in the end of September; there was not a rupee in the treasury, nor the means of fitting out an additional soldier; the supreme government at Calcutta was as much straitened in finances, in consequence of a burdensome war with the Mah-rattas, as the Madras presidency, and nothing but the unconquerable firmness and energy of Mr. Hastings's administration preserved the affairs of the company from total ruin. By his indefatigable efforts, the resources of Lord Macartney were so much augmented that his lordship was enabled, in November, to undertake the important enterprise of attacking Negabatam, a stronghold of Hyder's on the seacoast which gave him an easy entry into the Carnatic; and with such vigour were the operations conducted, that in a few weeks the place was taken, and the garrison of seven thousand men made prisoners. The British, upon this, regained their superiority over the enemy in the field, and Sir Eyre Coote, taking advantage of it, pushed on and relieved Vellore, to the infinite joy of the garri-

son, who had been sixteen months closely blockaded, and were then reduced to the last extremities. Sir Eyre Coote, whose valour and conduct had done so much towards the re-establishment of affairs in the Carnatic, soon after reduced Chittor and drove the enemy entirely out of the Tanjore. He afterward fought, with checkered success, several other actions with his old antagonist, Hyder. Colonel Braithwaite, with two thousand men, was totally defeated by Tippoos SAIB, Hyder's son. at the head of ten thousand horse

and twenty pieces of cannon, on the banks of the Cole River in the Tanjore, and the humane interposition of Lally and the French auxiliary officers alone preserved the prisoners from destruction; while, after a bloody action, Hyder in person was repulsed by Sir Eyre Coote, near Arnee, a few months after. This was the last contest between these two redoubtable antagonists: Sir Eyre was soon after obliged, by bad health, to return to Calcutta, and Hyder, in the midst of the most active operations, in conjunction with the French fleet of twelve sail of the line, which had arrived off the coast, was summoned to another world, and died at Chitore at the advanced age of eighty-two.*

Peace had been concluded between the Bombay government and the Mahrattas in the May preceding, which enabled the governor-general to assist the Madras presidency with large succours; and offensive operations were commenced at all points against Tippoo, who had succeeded to his father's dominions, and all his animosity against the English government. The contest, however, was still extremely equally balanced, and the government at Madras was far from exhibiting the unanimity and vigour which the importance of the occasion demanded. In vain Lord Macartney, who was aware of the slender tie by which Oriental armies are held together, urged General Stuart, who had suc-

Farther disasters stemmed by the energy of Mr. Hastings. Death of Hyder.

Aug. 3.

* Mill, iv., 168, 171. Martin, viii., 48, 49. Auber, i., 580, 582. † Mill, iv., 224, 228. Auber, i., 624, 626.

* Auber, i., 600, 631. Mill, iv., 210, 225.

ceeded Sir Eyre Coote in the command of the army, to take advantage of the consternation produced by the death of Hyder and absence of Tippoo, and instantly attack the enemy. The precious moments were lost : dissension broke out between the civil and military authorities, and Tippoo joined his army and established himself on his father's throne in the beginning of January. He was recalled, however, to the centre of his dominions, obliged to evacuate all his father's conquests in the Carnatic, and abandon and blow up Arcot, in consequence of the appearance of a formidable enemy in the vitals of his power. The Bombay government, having considerable disposable forces, in consequence of the Mahratta peace, had detached a powerful body, under Colonel Humberstone and General Matthews, into the Mysore country. These enterprising officers carried Onore by storm, on the seacoast, mounted the great pass called the Hussaingurly Ghaut, four thousand feet high, surmounted by a road slowly ascending through cliffs and precipices for five miles, drove the enemy from all the batteries and forts, hitherto deemed impregnable, by which it was defended, and rapidly advancing along the table-land of Mysore, at the summit made themselves masters of the rich city of Bednore, with a vast treasure, by capitulation, carried Ananpore and Bangalore by assault, and spread terror throughout the whole centre of Tippoo's dominions.*

This formidable irruption completely relieved the Carnatic, which had hitherto been almost exclusively the seat of hostilities, from the invasion by which it had been for a series of years so cruelly ravaged, and by depriving Tippoo of the treasure at Bednore, amounting to above a million sterling, severely crippled his power; but it led, in the first instance, to a cruel and unexpected reverse. The magnitude of the spoil taken at Bednore threw the apple of discord among the victors: General Matthews refused to devote any portion of it to the pay of the troops, though they were above eighteen months in arrear; Colonel Humberstone and several of the leading officers threw up their commands, and returned to lay their complaints before the government at Bombay; the army was ruinously dispersed to occupy all the towns which had been taken, and, in the midst of this scene of cupidity and dissension, Tippoo suddenly appeared among them at the head of fifty thousand men. Matthews, with two thousand infantry, was defeated before Bednore, and soon after forced to surrender in that town. The prisoners were put in irons, marched off, like felons, to a dreadful imprisonment in the dungeons of Mysore; the whole towns taken by the British in the high country were regained, and the remnant of their forces, driven down the passes, threw themselves into the important fortress of Mangalore on the seacoast below the Ghauts, where they were immediately invested by the victorious troops of the sultan.†

The governments of Madras and Bombay, alive to the vital importance of withdrawing Tippoo's attention from this siege by diversions

in other parts of his dominions, put in motion two different expeditions from the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, into the country of Coimbatore, in the centre of his do-

Siege of Mangalore raised by the British invasion of Mysore.

minions, and endeavoured to stir up a civil war there by supporting the cause of the deposed Rajah of Mysore, whom Hyder had dispossessed. This project proved entirely successful. Colonel Fullarton, who commanded the southern army, acted with great vigour and intelligence, reduced Palacatcherry, one of the strongest places in India, commanding an important pass on the seacoast, made himself master of Coimbatore on the high road to Seringapatam, the centre of the sultan's power, and menaced that capital itself. At the same time the northern army made considerable progress on the other side, and both, converging towards the capital, had the conquest of Seringapatam full in view. The superiority of the British forces in the field was now apparent; the conclusion of a peace between France and England, of which intelligence had lately arrived in India, had deprived Tippoo of all hope of European aid, and the gallantry of the brave garrison of Mangalore had baffled all the efforts of his vast army, and exposed them to dreadful losses by sickness during the rainy months. Discouraged by so many untoward circumstances, the bold spirit and inveterate hostility of the sultan at length yielded: after several insincere attempts at an accommodation, a real negotiation was set on foot in the close of 1783; and though the pacification came too late to save Mangalore, the brave garrison of which, after sustaining a siege of seven months against sixty thousand men, had at length been forced by famine to capitulate on the honourable terms of marching to the nearest English territories with all their arms and accoutrements, yet it was in the end concluded, and delivered the English from the most formidable war they have ever sustained for the empire of the East.*

Which leads to a peace.

On the 11th of March, 1784, peace was concluded on the equitable terms of a mutual restitution of conquests.

March 11, 1784.

It is seldom, says Gibbon, that the father and the son, he who has borne the weight and he who has been brought up in the lustre of the diadem, exhibit equal capacity for the administration of affairs. Tippoo inherited from his father all his activity and vigour, all his cruelty and perfidy, and, if possible, more than his hatred and inveteracy against the English; but he was by no means his equal either in military genius or in the capacity of winning the affections and commanding the respect of mankind. Above all, he was not equally impressed as his great predecessor with the expedience of combating the invaders with the national arms of the East, and wearing out the disciplined and invincible battalions of Europe by those innumerable horsemen in whom, from the earliest times, the real strength of Asia has consisted. Almost all Hyder's successes were gained by his cavalry: it was when severed from his infantry and heavy artillery, and attended only by a few fly-

Change introduced by Tippoo in the Indian armies.

* Mill, iv., 224, 231. Auber, iv., 624, 631.

† Mill, iv., 232, 239. Auber, i., 629, 632.

* Mill, iv., 239, 247. Mem. of the late War in Asia, i., 256, 403. Auber, i., 631, 641.

ing guns, that his forces were most formidable ; and it augments our admiration of the firmness and discipline with which the British and sepoy regiments under Coote withstood his assaults, when we recollect that they had to resist for days and weeks together, under the rays of a tropical sun, the incessant charges of a cavalry rivaling that of the Parthians in swiftness, equalling that of the Mamelukes in daring, approaching to that of the Tartars in numbers. But it was the very excess of the admiration which their great qualities awakened among the native powers which proved the ruin of Tippoo, and in the end gave the British the empire of the East. The officers of the Mysore court were so much struck by the extraordinary spectacle of a few thousand disciplined men successfully resisting the thundering charges of thirty or forty thousand admirable horsemen, that they conceived that the secret lay not in their character, but their tactics ; and naturally enough imagined that, if they could give to their own numbers and daring the discipline and steadiness of Europe, they would prove irresistible.

Hence the general adoption, not only in the Mysore, but the other Indian states, of the European tactics, arms, and discipline—a change of all others the most ruinous to their arms, and which, in subsequent times, has proved fatal to the independence of Turkey. Every people will find safety best in their own peculiar and national forces : the adoption of the tactics and military systems of another race will generally share the fate of the transplantation of a constitution to a different people ; it was neither by imitating the Roman legions that the Parthians defeated the invasions of Crassus and Julian, nor by rivaling the heavily-armed crusaders of Europe that Saladin baffled the heroism of Richard, nor by vanquishing the French infantry that Alexander forced Napoleon into the Moscow retreat. Light horse ever have been, and ever will be, the main strength of the Asiatic monarchies ; and when they rely on such defenders, and they are conducted by competent skill, they have hitherto proved invincible. It is the adoption of the system of European warfare which has uniformly proved their ruin. Hyder's horse, like the Parthian or Scythian cavalry, might be repulsed, but they could not be destroyed : the European squares toiled in vain after their fugitive squadrons, and, when worn out by incessant marching, found themselves enveloped by an indefatigable and long-invisible enemy. But Tippoo's battalions could not so easily escape : protection to their guns and ammunition-wagons required that they should stand the shock of regular soldiers. Asiatic vehemence strove in vain to withstand European valour : the strength of the East was lost without that of the West being gained ; and in the attempt to substitute the one for the other, the throne of Mysore fell to the earth.*

* In the war with Hyder, in 1768, Colonel Wood, who commanded the British forces, found it impossible to bring him to a pitched battle. In vain the Madras government tried to equip him with a light train of artillery and a body of chosen men, in hopes that, by the velocity of their advance, they might succeed in bringing him to action : all their efforts were defeated by the rapidity and secrecy of

Soon after the Indian empire of the East India Company had been engaged in these desperate contests for their very existence on the plains of the Carnatic, the statesman whose firmness and ability had brought them through the crisis was exposed to an unparalleled persecution from the people on whom he had conferred so inestimable a benefit. In the confusion and vicissitudes of an empire thus suddenly elevated to greatness in a distant hemisphere, without any adequate restraint either on private cupidity or public ambition, many deeds of injustice had been committed, many private fortunes made by means which would not bear the light, many acts of oppression perpetrated in the name, and sometimes under the pressure, of state necessity. All these misdeeds, inseparable from an empire rising under such peculiar and unparalleled circumstances, were visited on the head of Mr. Hastings : faction fastened on the East as the chosen field of its ambitious efforts, where the lever was to be found by which the inestimable prize of Indian opulence was to be wrested from the hands of its present possessors ; the sacred names of justice and equity, of religion and humanity, were prostituted as a cloak to the selfishness of private ambition ; and the whole efforts of a powerful party in the British islands devoted, for a long course of years, to the persecution of the statesman who had saved our empire in the East from destruction.

Early in 1782, the House of Commons, on the motion of Mr. Dundas, and under the influence of the Rockingham administration, adopted a resolution condemnatory of Mr. Hastings's administration, which led to a vote of recall by the East India Company ; and although the latter resolution was, after the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, the head of the ministry, rescinded by a large majority of the East India proprietors, yet the investigation resolved on by the Commons was prosecuted with increased vigour by the coalition ministry of Mr. Fox and Lord North, by which the former cabinet was succeeded. Mr. Hastings finally resigned his office, and returned to this country early

his movements. At length Wood, completely exhausted with the pursuit, hoping to rouse the sultan's pride, wrote him a letter, stating "that it was disgraceful for a great prince, at the head of a large army, to fly before a detachment of infantry and a few pieces of cannon, unsupported by cavalry." Hyder, however, returned the following characteristic answer : "I have received your letter, in which you invite me to an action with your army. Give me the same sort of troops that you command, and your wishes shall be accomplished. You will, in time, come to understand my mode of warfare. Shall I risk my cavalry, which cost a thousand rupees each horse, against your cannonballs, which cost two pence ? No ! I will march your troops until their legs shall become the size of their bodies ; you shall not have a blade of grass nor a drop of water. I will hear of you every time your drum beats ; but you shall not know where I am once a month. I will give your army battle, but it must be when I please, not when you please." Hyder was as good as his word. He laid waste the country, and, retiring before Colonel Wood, drew him on till his little army was exhausted with fatigue and privations, and in that weakened state attacked him, captured all his artillery, and reduced him to such straits that nothing but the opportune arrival of succours under Colonel Smith saved him from a total defeat. Had Tippoo's armies been formed on the same model, his descendants would, in all probability, have been still on the throne of Seringapatam.—See MARTIN, viii., 46, note.

Mr. Hastings's long-protracted prosecution.

May 30, 1782.

Proceedings in Parliament on the subject.

June 14.

Oct. 31.

Feb. 1, 1785.

in 1785, and in the following year the prosecution commenced under the administration of Mr. Pitt, who had succeeded to the helm. The impeachment was solemnly voted by a large majority of the Commons: proceedings soon after commenced with extraordinary solemnity before the House of Lords, and were protracted for many years in Westminster Hall, with a degree of zeal and talent altogether unexampled in the British Senate.*

Never before had such an assemblage of talent, eloquence, and influence been exerted in any judicial proceeding. The powerful declamation and impassioned oratory of Mr. Fox, the burning thoughts and thrilling words of Mr. Burke, the playful wit and fervent declamation of Mr. Sheridan, gave lustre to the progress of the prosecution; while the cool judgment and sagacious mind of Mr. Pitt interposed with decisive effect in the earlier stages of the proceedings against the accused.† During one hundred and thirty days that the trial lasted, diffused over seven years, the public interest was unabated: Westminster Hall was thronged with all the rank, and wit, and beauty of the realm; and though it terminated in his acquittal by a majority of eight to one on all the charges, yet the national mind was seriously impressed with the numerous accusations enforced with so much eloquence: his private fortune was almost ruined in the contest, and nothing but the liberality of the East India Company, who nobly supported him against such a torrent of obloquy with unshaken firmness, preserved the otherwise unbe-

friendied statesman from total ruin.* The sovereign of Hindostan, the man who might have placed himself on the throne of Aurengzebe, and severed the empire of the East from the British crown during the perils of the American war, was bowed to the earth by the stroke: he remained for twenty years in retirement in the country, and sank at last unennobled into the grave. Aug. 4, 1818.

But truth is great, and will prevail. Time rolled on, and brought its wonted changes on its wings. The passionate declamations of Mr. Burke were forgotten; the thrilling words of Mr. Fox had passed away; the moral courage of Mr. Pitt had become doubted in the transaction; but the great achievements, the far-seeing wisdom, the patriotic disinterestedness of Mr. Hastings had slowly regained their ascendancy over general thought; many of the deeds proved against him, it was seen, had been imposed on him by secret instructions, others originated in overbearing necessity; the poverty of the illustrious statesman pleaded eloquently in his favour; the magnitude of his services rose in irresistible force to the recollection; and a few years before his death he was made a privy councillor, from a growing sense of the injustice he had experienced. When he appeared, in 1813, at the bar of the House of Commons, to give evidence on the renewal of the company's charter, the whole members spontaneously rose up in token of respect to the victim of their former persecution; and when he was called from this checkered scene, his statue was, with general consent, placed by his unshaken friends, the East India Directors, among those of the illustrious men who had founded and enlarged the empire of the East.††

Bright, indeed, is the memory of a statesman

* The East India Company lent Mr. Hastings £50,000 for eighteen years, without interest, to meet the expenses of his trial, and settled on him a pension of £4000 for twenty-eight years, from June 24, 1785, being till the expiration of their charter; and it was continued on its renewal in 1813.—*Debates of Lords on Mr. Hastings's Trial*, 495; MILL, v., 230.

† Auber, i., 683, 697. Mill, iv., 40, 256. Parl. Hist. 1788, 1795.

‡ A few hours before Mr. Hastings's death, he wrote to the East India Directors, "I have called you by the only appellation that language can express me, 'Var Wooffadar,' my profitable friend; for such, with every other quality of friendship, I have ever experienced yours in all our mutual intercourse, and my heart has returned it, unprofitably, I own, but with equal sentiments of the purest affection. My own conscience assuredly attests me that I myself have not been wanting in my duty to my respectable employers. I quit the world and their service, to which I shall conceive myself, to the latest moment that I still draw my breath, still devotedly attached, and in the firm belief that, in the efficient body of directors, I have not one individual ill affected towards me. I do not express my full feelings: I believe them all to be kindly, generously disposed towards me; and to the larger constituent body I can only express a hope that, if there be any of a different sentiment, the number is but few; for they have supported me when I thought myself abandoned by all other powers from whom I ever thought myself entitled to any benefit. My latest prayers shall be offered for their service, for that of my beloved country, and for that, also, whose interest both have so long committed to my partial guardianship, and for which I feel a sentiment in my departing hours not alien from that which is due from every subject to his own."

In January, 1820, a proposition was submitted to the East India Directors by their chairman, Campbell Majoribank, Esq. After enumerating the great services of Mr. Hastings, he asked, "How were these great services rewarded? He was not allowed even to repose in dignified retirement; he was dragged forward to contend with public accusations,

* Auber, i., 683, 692. Mill, v., 40, 100. Parliamentary Deb., 1786.

† In the earlier stages of the proceedings against Mr. Hastings, Mr. Pitt voted with him, and, in consequence, a considerable part of the accusations were negatived by the House of Commons; and his friends looked forward with reason to a total absolution. Not only on several preliminary questions, but on the great question of the Rohilla war, he had the support of government, and these charges were negatived in the House of Commons by a majority of 119 to 67. But, in regard to the charge of extortion from the Rajah of Benares, he suddenly took part with the Whig prosecutors, stigmatizing the fine levied on that potentate—£500,000—as enormous and oppressive, and declaring, in regard to these transactions, "The conduct of Mr. Hastings had been so cruel, unjust, and oppressive, that it was impossible that he, as a man of honour or honesty, having any regard to faith or conscience, could any longer resist; and, therefore, he had fully satisfied his conscience that Warren Hastings, in the case in question, had been guilty of such enormities and misdemeanours as constitute a crime sufficient to call for an impeachment." This sudden and unexpected change of measure on the part of Mr. Pitt was decisive against Mr. Hastings, as it immediately brought the majority in the lower house against him; and it led, in consequence, to many vehement reflections on the conduct of the minister by the friends of the illustrious accused; and, without disputing that the fine was excessive, it must be allowed that it was imposed on a refractory delinquent, who had failed in the duty which his allegiance required; that it was determined on under the overbearing pressure of state necessity; that the exhaustion of the treasury, and the pressing dangers in the Carnatic, imperatively required an immediate supply of money, which could be obtained in no other way; that the funds thus acquired proved the salvation of India, by enabling Sir Eyre Coote to make head against Hyder, and were all applied by Mr. Hastings to public purposes; and that, if justice and not persecution had been the object of the House of Commons, it would have been better obtained by a vote of restitution or reparation from the English Legislature to the injured rajah, than by the adoption of vindictive proceedings against the statesman who, in this matter, did evil that good might come of it.—See *Parl. Hist.*, 1786, xxvii., 108-112; MILL, v., 55, 56; and WRAXALL'S *Mem.*, ii., p. 174, 201.

Ultimate
change of pub-
lic opinion on
the subject.

Reflections on the cruel injustice of this prosecution.

who has statues erected to his memory forty years after his power has terminated, and thirty after all the vehemence of a powerful faction, and all the fury of popular outcry had been raised to consign him to destruction. To how many men, once the idol of the people during the plenitude of their power, will similar monuments, after the lapse of such a period, be raised? Persecution of its most illustrious citizens, of the greatest benefactors of their country, has ever been the disgrace of free states: the sacrifice of Sir Robert Calder, who saved England from Napoleon's invasion; of Lord Melville, who prepared for it the triumph of Trafalgar; of the Duke of York, who laid the foundation of Wellington's victories; of Warren Hastings, who preserved the empire of the East, prove that the people of this country are governed by the same principles which consigned Themistocles to Asiatic exile, banished Aristides because it was tiresome to hear him called the Just, and doomed Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Carthage, to an unhonoured sepulture in a foreign land. But the friends of freedom may console themselves with the reflection that, if popular institutions sometimes expose their best citizens to the effects of these occasional fits of national insanity, they furnish the only sure security for the ultimate triumph of just principles; that, if despotic power discerns more correctly the real character of its servants, it is liable to no external correction from the growing influence of equitable feelings after the decay of transitory passion; and that, if the historian of England, under other direction, would not have had to record the impeachment of the statesman who had saved its Eastern dominions from destruction, there would not have been permitted to him the grateful duty of contributing, against the united efforts of Whigs and Tories, against all the acrimony of selfish ambition, and all the fury of public passion, to rescue the memory of a great Eastern statesman from unmerited obloquy.

These frequent and interesting discussions on Indian affairs, however characteristic of the grievous injustice of the Bill. Its premature fate. which the efforts of party frequently inflict on individuals in all popular communities, were, however, attended with one important and salutary consequence—that it drew the attention both of government and the nation to the administration of our Indian dominions, and the absolute necessity of assuming a more direct control than could be maintained by a

and rewarded with two-and-twenty articles of impeachment. He (Mr. M.) would not enter on the proceedings which distressed and harassed the feelings of that great man: they were at an end, and the feelings which excited them and that great man himself were now no more; but this he thought himself allowed to say, that those proceedings were contrary to the practice and spirit of the laws of this happy nation."

It was unanimously resolved, "That, as the last testimony of approbation of the long, zealous, and successful services of the late Right Hon. Warren Hastings, in maintaining, without diminution, the British possessions in India against the combined efforts of European, Mohammedan, and Mahratta enemies, the statue of that distinguished servant of the East India Company be placed among the statesmen and heroes who have contributed, in their several stations, to the recovery, preservation, and security of the British power and authority in India."—See ACBER, I., 695, 696.

mere body of directors of a trading company over the numerous servants, civil and military, of their vast and growing possessions. This opinion, which had been strongly impressed upon the public mind by the serious and protracted disasters in the campaigns with Hyder in 1780 and 1781, was already general with all parties before the fall of Lord North's ministry; and when Mr. Fox succeeded to the head of affairs in 1783, all parties were already prepared for a great and important change in the government of our Eastern empire.* But the designs of that able and ambitious statesman far outstripped either the reason or necessity of the case. He proposed, in his famous India Bill, which convulsed the nation from end to end, and in its ultimate results occasioned the downfall of his administration, to vest the exclusive right of governing India in seven directors to be named in the act, that is, appointed by the Legislature under the direction of the ministry for the time. The vacancies in these commissioners were to be filled up by the House of Commons under the same direction. The ferment raised by this prodigious change in the country was unprecedented in the eighteenth century: Mr. Pitt, from the first, denounced it as tyrannical, unconstitutional, and subversive of the public liberties; the sagacious mind of George III. at once perceived that it would render the present ministers, to whom he was secretly hostile, irremovable in their places, and put Mr. Fox at the head of a powerful empire, an *impe-rium in imperio*, which would soon overshadow the British diadem. By the combined exertions of the crown and the Tory party this important innovation was defeated, after it had passed the lower house, by a small majority of nineteen in the House of Peers, and this defeat was immediately followed by the dismissal of Mr. Fox and his whole administration.†

The ground taken by the king and the Tory party against this celebrated bill was its unconstitutional tendency, by vesting the patronage of so large a portion of the empire in directors appointed, not by the executive, but the House of Commons; and it was this consideration which gave them the decisive majority which they obtained upon the dissolution of Parliament in the April following. Nevertheless, it is now apparent that, though at that period unperceived or unnoticed, the greatest danger of the proposed change would have arisen, not from this cause, but from the direct control thereby conferred over our Indian empire on the British Legislature. If the vacillating and improvident policy on many occasions forced even upon the resolute and clear-sighted mind of Mr. Pitt, by the unreflecting habits, and, on material questions, popular control of the House of Commons—and still more the total want of foresight in all financial measures since

Which occasions the downfall of his administration. Dec. 15, 1783.

Objections to which this bill was liable.

April, 1789.

* Mr. Pitt, in November, 1783, when the coalition ministry were still in power, called on Mr. Fox "to bring forward a plan, not of temporary palliation or timorous expedient, but vigorous and effectual, suited to the magnitude, the importance, and the alarming exigence of the case"—*Parl. Hist.*, xxiv., 129.

† *Parl. Deb.*, xxiv., 122, 195

the peace of Paris, on the part both of government and the Legislature, be compared with the steady rule, invincible firmness, and wise anticipations of our Indian government during the same period, no doubt can remain that the interest of the East would inevitably have been sacrificed by the change; that the ministerial directors, acting under the guidance of the House of Commons, could never have carried into execution those prompt and vigorous resolutions indispensable for the preservation of dominions so critically situated as those in Hindostan, and so far removed from the resources of the ruling state; and that no government under the direct control of a popular assembly would have been permitted to engage in those vast undertakings, or incur the expense of those gigantic establishments, which were necessary to ward off future danger, or obtain present success, over the immense extent of our Indian dominions.*

Although, however, Mr. Fox's India Bill was Mr. Pitt's India rejected, yet the numerous abuses Bill, which be- of our Indian dominions, as well comes a law. as the imminent hazard which they

had run during the war with Hyder Ali from the want of a firmly-constituted central government, were too fresh in the public recollection to permit the existing state of matters to continue. Mr. Pitt, accordingly, was no sooner installed in power than he brought forward an India Bill of his own, which, it was hoped, would prove exempt from the objections to which its predecessor had been exposed, and, at the same time, remedy the serious evils to which the administration of affairs in India had

hitherto been liable. This bill passed 13th Aug., both houses, and formed the basis of 1784.

the system under which, with some subsequent but inconsiderable amendments, the affairs of the East have been administered from that period down to the present time. By it the court of directors, appointed by the East India Company, remained as before, and to them the general administration of Indian affairs was still intrusted. The great change introduced was the institution of the *Board of Control*, a body composed of six members of the Privy Council, chosen by the king; the chancellor of the exchequer and one of the secretaries of state being two, in whom the power of directing and controlling the proceedings of the Indian Empire were vested. The duties of this board, which were very loosely defined, and which have come all to centre in the president, an officer who has become a fourth secretary of state for the Indian Empire, were defined to be, "from time to time to check, superintend, and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil

or military government, or revenues of the territories and possessions of the East India Company." These powers were ample enough, but in practice they have led to little more than a control of the company in the more important political or military concerns of the East, leaving the directors in possession of the practical direction of affairs in ordinary cases. All vacancies in official situations, with the exception of the governor-general of India, governors of Madras and Bombay, and commanders-in-chief, which were to be filled up by the British government, were left at the disposal of the East India Directors. A most important provision was made in the institution of a secret committee, who were to send to India in duplicate such despatches as they might receive from the Board of Control, and in the establishment of the supreme government at Calcutta, with a controlling power over the other presidencies: a change which at once introduced unity of action into all parts of the Peninsula. It cannot be affirmed that this anomalous constitution will stand the test of theoretical examination, or that a distribution of supreme power between a governor-general and two subordinate governors in the East, and a board of control and body of directors in the British islands, gave any fair prospect either of unity of purpose or efficiency of action. Nevertheless, if experience, the great test of truth, be consulted, and the splendid progress of the Indian Empire of Great Britain since it was directed in this manner be alone considered, there is reason to hold this system of government one of the most perfect that ever was devised by human wisdom for the advancement and confirmation of political greatness.*

It soon appeared how much the vigour and efficiency of Indian administration had been increased by the important changes made in its central government. By Mr. Pitt's India Bill, all ideas of foreign conquest in the East had been studiously repressed, it having been declared that "to pursue schemes of conquest or extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of the nation." But this declaration, in appearance so just and practicable, differed widely from the conduct which extraneous events shortly after forced upon the British government; and, in truth, an extended view of human affairs, as well as the past experience of our Indian possessions, might even then have shown the impracticability of following out such a course of policy, and convinced our rulers that a foreign people, settled as aliens and conquerors on the soil of Hindostan, could maintain themselves only by the sword. In order to carry into execution the pacific views of government, a nobleman of high rank and character, Lord Cornwallis, was sent out by Mr. Pitt, who united in his person the two offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief, so as to give the greatest possible unity to the action of government; but no sooner had he arrived there than he discovered that Tippoo was intriguing with the other native powers for the subversion of

Arrangement with the British government for the increase of the British force in India.

* This is not the place to discuss the details of Mr. Fox's bill: but it does not appear to have been calculated to afford any practical remedy for most of the evils under which the administration of Indian affairs at that period laboured; and, accordingly, it is observed with great candour by Mr. Mill, whose leaning to the popular side is well known, "The bills of Mr. Fox, many and celebrated as were the men who united their wisdom to compose them, manifest a feeble effort in legislation. They demonstrate that the authors of them, however celebrated for their skill in speaking, were not remarkable for their powers of thought. For the right exercise of the powers of government in India not one new security was provided, and it would not be very easy to prove that any strength was added to the old."—MILL'S *British India*, iv., 480.

* See 24 Geo. III., c. 24. 26 Geo. III., c. 16. Auber, ii 1, 16. Parl. Deb., xxiv., 1085, 1215.

our Indian dominion; and, as a rupture with France was apprehended at that juncture, four strong regiments were despatched to India; and, as the company complained of the expense which this additional force entailed upon their finances, a bill was brought into Parliament by Mr. Pitt, which fixed the number of king's troops which might be ordered to India by the Board of Control, at the expense of the company, at eight thousand, besides twelve thousand European forces in the company's service.*

The wisdom of this great addition to the native European force in India, as well as the increased vigour and efficiency of the supreme government, speedily appeared in the next war which broke out. Tippoo, whose hostility to the English was well known to be inveterate, and who had long been watched with jealous eyes by the Madras presidency, at length commenced an attack upon the Rajah of Travancore, a prince in alliance with the British, and actually supported by a subsidiary force of their troops; and at first, from the total want of preparation which had arisen from the pacific policy so strongly inculcated upon the Indian authorities by the government at home, he obtained very great success, and totally subdued the rajah against whom he had commenced hostilities. Perceiving that the British character was now at stake in the Peninsula, and being well aware that a power founded on opinion must instantly sink into insignificance, if the idea gets abroad that its allies may be insulted with impunity, Lord Cornwallis immediately took the most energetic measures to reassert the honour of the British name. Fifteen thousand men were collected in the Carnatic under General Meadows, while eight thousand more were to ascend the Ghauts from the side of Bombay, under General Abercromby. So obvious was the necessity of this war, so flagrant the aggressive acts which Tippoo had committed, that, notwithstanding their general aversion to hostile measures, from the expense with which they were attended, and their recent declaration of pacific intentions, on this occasion both the English Parliament and the Court of Directors passed resolutions cordially approving of the conduct of Lord Cornwallis in the transaction.† Treas-

ties of alliance were at the same time entered into with the Peishaw and the Nizam, native powers, whose jealousy of the Mysore chief had been of long standing; and hostilities commenced, which were at first attended with checkered success: General Meadows having taken Caroor and other towns, and Tippoo having surprised Colonel Floyd, and burst into the Carnatic, where he committed the most dreadful ravages.*

The energies of government, however, were now thoroughly aroused. In December, 1791, Lord Cornwallis embarked in person for Madras; the Bengal sepoys were with great difficulty reconciled to a sea voyage, and great re-enforcements, with the commander-in-chief, safely landed in the southern presidency. It was resolved to commence operations with the siege of Bangalore, one of the strongest fortresses in Mysore, and commanding the most eligible pass from the coast to the centre of Tippoo's dominions. In the end of January the grand army moved forward: the important pass of Coorg, leading up the Ghauts, was occupied within a month after; Bangalore was invested in the beginning of March, and carried by assault on the 21st. Encouraged by this great success, Lord Cornwallis again pushed on direct to Seringapatam, although the advanced period of the season and scanty supplies of the army rendered it a service of considerable peril, which was increased rather than diminished by the junction, shortly after, of ten thousand of the Nizam's horse, who, without rendering any service to the army, consumed every particle of grass and forage within its reach. Still the English general continued to press forward, and at length reached the fortified position of the enemy, on strong ground, about six miles in front of Seringapatam. An attack was immediately resolved on, but Tippoo, who conducted his defence with great skill, did not await the formidable onset of the assaulting columns, and, after inflicting a severe loss on the assailants by the fire of his artillery, withdrew all his forces within the works of the fortress. The English were now within sight of the capital of Mysore, and decisive success seemed almost within their reach. They were in no condition, however, to undertake the siege: the supplies of the army were exhausted; the promised co-operation of the Mahrattas had failed; of General Abercromby, who was to advance from the side of Bombay, no advices had been received; and the famished state of the bullock train precluded the possibility of getting up the heavy artillery or siege equipage. Orders were therefore given to retreat, and both armies retired with heavy hearts and considerable loss of stores and men; but the opportune arrival of the advanced guard of the Mahratta contingent on the second day of the march, which at first caused great alarm, suspended the retrograde movement, and the army encamped, for the rainy season, in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam.†

* Auber, ii., 45, 65.

† It is remarkable that the most violent declaimer against this war in the House of Peers, as uncalculated for, inexpedient, and unjust, was Lord Rawdon, afterward Marquis of Hastings, who himself, in 1817, with much less provocation, was drawn into the great contest with the Mahrattas, which terminated so gloriously for the British arms. So dangerous is it to judge of distant transactions from party prejudice or preconceived European ideas.—See *Parl. Hist.*, 1791, xxix., 119–159. On this occasion Lord Forchester, the nobleman who opened the debate against the war, said, “I have proved that it has been the uniform policy of the directors and of the Legislature to avoid wars of conquest in India, and to confine the company to the limits of their present territories, and the management of their commercial interests.”—*Ibid.*, 133. In 1815, Lord Hastings, then Governor-general of India, observed, in a very valuable minute on India finance, “It was by preponderance of power that those mines of wealth were acquired by the company, and by preponderance of power alone could they be retained. The supposition that the British power could discard the means of strength, and yet enjoy the fruits of it, was one that would speedily and certainly be dissipated: in the state of India, were we to be feeble, our rule would be contemptible and a very short one.”—LORD HASTINGS'S *Minute on Revenue*, 15th Sept., 1815; AUBER, ii., 352.

* Auber, ii., 103, 111. *Parl. Hist.*, xxix., 119, 159. *Mill*, v., 257, 314.

† *Mill*, v., 314, 325. Auber, ii., 118, 121. *Wilks*, iii., 115, 146.

The attack on the capital of Mysore, however, was only suspended by this untoward event : in the autumn following, Lord Cornwallis was again in motion, having in the preceding months, after the termination of the rains, made himself master of several important forts which commanded or threatened his communications with the Carnatic. A most important blow was struck by a detachment of

British against a general of Tippoo's, who had taken post in the woods, near Simoga, in order to disturb the siege of that place, which was commencing, and who was defeated with the loss of ten thousand men : a disaster which led to the surrender of that fortress shortly after. Meanwhile Abercromby, with a powerful force, amply provided with all the muniments of war,

broke up from Bombay, surmounted, with incredible labour, the ascent of the Poodicherrum Ghaut, and was in readiness to take his part in the combined enterprise. In the end of January Lord Cornwallis's army moved forward towards Seringapatam, no longer depending on the doubtful aid of the Mahratta chiefs, but presenting a vast array of native British and sepoy troops, such as had never before been presented on the plains of India. Eleven thousand English, thirty thousand regular sepoys, with eighty-four pieces of cannon, exhibited a force worthy of contending for the empire of the East. Nor was this force, considerable as it was, disproportioned to the magnitude and hazard of the enterprise in which they were engaged ; for not only were the ramparts of Seringapatam of surpassing strength, but Tippoo lay in front of them at the head of fifty thousand regular infantry and five thousand horse, in a strong position, defended by numerous fortifications, and one hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery.*

No sooner had Lord Cornwallis reconnoitred the enemy's position than he resolved to commence an attack, and the assault was fixed for that very night. The army was formed in three divisions : his lordship in person commanded the centre, General Meadows the right, Colonel Maxwell the left. Seringapatam is situated on an island formed by two branches of the River Cavery, which enclose between them a space four miles in length and a mile and a half in breadth. On the eastern portion of the island Tippoo had constructed, without the walls, but within reach of them, in case of disaster, a strongly-fortified camp supported by numerous fieldworks and batteries, and without this stronghold, beyond the river, the bulk of the sultan's army was encamped, on elevated ground, covered on one side by a large tank, on the other by a small river which falls into the Cavery, and supported on the side next the enemy by six large redoubts. Three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the interior fortifications and the walls of the fortress, besides one hundred and fifty on the exterior line, and a thick hedge, formed of bamboos and prickly shrubs, connecting the works, formed a most serious obstacle

to the attacking columns, from presenting no resistance to cannon-shot, and being altogether impervious to foot-soldiers. To attack such a force, so posted, in the dark, and subject to the chances and confusion of a nocturnal assault, must be considered one of the most daring deeds even in the annals of Indian heroism.*

At eight o'clock the order was given to march. The evening was calm and serene, the moon shone bright, and the troops advanced swiftly and steadily, but in perfect silence, while the reserve, with the whole artillery and ammunition-train, struck their tents and stood to their guns in breathless anxiety. The surprise was complete : so admirably was silence preserved that the centre came upon the enemy wholly unawares, forced their way through the bound hedge, and, carrying everything before them, pushed through the camp, passed the ford of the Cavery, crossed over to the opposite side, and taking the batteries, which had opened their fire upon the other division in the inner intrenchment in the rear, drove the gunners from their pieces. The right wing, under General Meadows, also cut through the bound hedge about half past eleven, while the left, with ease, carried the Carighaut Hill : the roar of artillery was heard on all sides, while the flash of musketry now illuminated the whole extent of the horizon. Panic-struck at the celerity and vigour of the attack, which had penetrated their works in so many different quarters at once, the enemy gave way on all sides, when fortune was nearly restored by one of those accidents to which all nocturnal attacks are subject, and the centre, with its noble commander, was nearly cut off. The right wing, under Meadows, had been grievously impeded in its march within the bound hedge by several rice enclosures and watercourses, which could not be crossed without great difficulty, and, in consequence, for two hours he was unable to reach the advanced point to which Cornwallis had arrived in the island in the early part of the night. Meanwhile, Tippoo's troops began to recover from their consternation, and as day dawned, and they perceived that the body which had penetrated into the centre of their intrenchments did not exceed five thousand men, they closed in on all sides, and commenced, with overwhelming numbers, an attack upon this band of heroes.†

Preparations for a decisive battle under the walls of Seringapatam, Feb. 6, 1792.

The British troops, however, animated by the presence of their commander-in-chief, made a gallant defence : the repeated and furious onsets of the enemy were repulsed by a rolling fire, enforced, when necessary, by the bayonet, and at length, when daylight dawned, and the guns of the fortress began to be turned upon them, they retired towards Carighaut Hill in perfect order, and took post beyond their destructive range. Meanwhile, the troops of Meadows having by a mistake of their guides been brought close to the Mosque redoubt, which was meant to have been passed without molestation, transported by the ardour of the moment, commenced an assault, which, at first, was repulsed with heavy loss ; the troops, however,

Dangers of Cornwallis, and his ultimate rescue.

* Mill, v., 360, 361. Wilks, iii., 172, 180.

† Lord Cornwallis's Despatches, 4th March, 1792. Ann. Reg., 469. Mill, v., 372.

* Mill, v., 356, 361. Martin, viii., 48, 49. Auber, ii., 122, 123. Wilks, iii., 162, 168.

returned to the charge, and that formidable work was at length carried amid cheers which were heard over the whole camp. Animated by the joyful sound, Cornwallis's men stood their ground with invincible firmness, while Meadows was no sooner disengaged from the perilous contest into which he had been unwillingly drawn, than he pressed on with renewed alacrity to the relief of the main body, which he was well aware, from the weight of the firing in that direction, must be engaged in a very serious contest; and, as morning broke, the two divisions met and mutually saluted each other as victors.* The victory was complete. Out of six of the enemy's redoubts, four were in the hands of the victors: Tippoo, in an early part of the night, had taken refuge in his capital; the intrenched camp, with above a hundred pieces of cannon, was abandoned; four thousand men had fallen and nearly twenty thousand more had disbanded and left their colours, while the loss of the victors did not amount to six hundred men.†

On the following morning Tippoo made a desperate attempt to regain the sultan's redoubt, which was so near the capital as to be commanded in rear by its guns; and a body of two thousand chosen horse came on with appalling cries to storm the gorge, before the slender garrison, consisting only of a hundred and fifty men, could barricade it; but they were repulsed by the steady gallantry and ceaseless fire of this heroic band. Upon this the enemy retreated entirely within the fort, and soon after the army obtained an important accession of strength by the arrival of Abercromby with two thousand Europeans and four thousand sepoy troops. Operations were now commenced in form against the fortress: the first parallel was begun Feb. 18. and completed on the night of the 18th; the splendid gardens and shady walks of the country palace, in which the sultan so much delighted, were destroyed, and the palace itself converted into a great hospital; and at length, when the breaching batteries were in readiness and armed with fifty pieces of heavy cannon, the sultan concluded a treaty on such terms as Lord Cornwallis chose to prescribe, and hostilities terminated. Such, however, was the ardour of the troops, especially the sepoys, who were engaged in the trenches, that it was with the greatest difficulty they

could be prevailed on to cease firing, and when the European troops enforced the command, they retired sullen and dejected to their tents; while Tippoo's men by a vain bravado continued discharging cannon for some time after the British lines were silent, as if to demonstrate that they had not been the first to give in in the contest.*

By the treaty of peace which followed, Tippoo was compelled to submit to the Treaty with cession of half his dominions to the Tippoo, 19th British, the Nizam, and the Mahratta, 1792. to pay £3,500,000, as the expenses of the war; to deliver up all the prisoners made in Hyder's time, some of whom still lingered in a miserable captivity; and to surrender his two sons as hostages. The young princes were immediately after courteously received and splendidly treated by the British government. Lord Cornwallis, whose health had for some time been declining, and who had postponed his return to England only on account of the contest in the Mysore, soon after returned to his native country, having, during his short government, added 24,000 square miles to its Eastern dominions.†

Human affairs are everywhere governed at bottom by the same principle: the varieties of colour, language, and civilization, are but the different hues which conceal the operation of passions and interests which are forever identical among mankind. Differing widely in its origin and its effects upon social happiness, the British empire in India bears, in many respects, a very close analogy to the contemporaneous French domination in Europe; and in none more than in the experienced necessity of advancing, in order to avoid destruction, which was felt equally strongly by the Emperor Napoleon and the English governors-general of India. The reason in both cases was the same, viz., that a power had got a footing in the midst of other states, so formidable in its character, and so much at variance in its principles with the policy of the powers by whom it was surrounded, that of necessity it was engaged in constant hostilities, and had no security for existence but in the continual extension of its dominions, or increased terrors of its name. The East India Company had fondly flattered themselves that Tippoo, being thus humbled, would lay aside his hereditary hostility to the English power, just as Napoleon seems to have imagined that, after the spoliation of Tilsit, he might rely upon the forced submission or cured inveteracy of Prussia, and the result to both was the same.

Sir John Shore, a most respectable civil servant of the company, who was appointed governor-general after the retirement of Lord Cornwallis, was strongly imbued with these maxims of the necessity of pursuing a pacific policy in India, and avoiding all causes of collision with the native powers, which were so general both with the government, the directors, and the people at home, and which had been so strongly enforced upon the local authorities by the Board of Control. Ample opportunities soon occurred for putting the expedience of

Experienced necessity of further conquests in India.

Pacific administration and principles of Sir John Shore.

* When the enemy had surrounded Lord Cornwallis in the middle of the night, and a heavy fire had set in on all sides, he said to those around him, "If General Meadows is above ground this will bring him." Nor was he mistaken. True as the magnet to the pole, his gallant lieutenant pressed to the scene of danger, and, attracted by the sound, reached in time the theatre of that desperate conflict. The unanimity and heartfelt mutual admiration of these two great men is, as Mill has justly observed, one of the finest features of this campaign, and is particularly worthy of admiration on the part of Meadows, considering that Cornwallis, by assuming the direction in person, deprived him of the honour of a separate command in so momentous a service. What a striking circumstance, that he so soon after should have the means of rescuing his noble and respected commander-in-chief from destruction! But India is the theatre of romantic adventure as well as of heroic and disinterested exploits; and a most inadequate conception will be formed of British character or glory, till the memorable history of its empire in the East is given by an historian worthy of so magnificent a theme.—See MILL, v., 367, note.

† Lord Cornwallis's Despatches, 4th March, 1792. Ann. Reg. Mill, v., 372, 374. Auber, ii., 120, 124.

* Auber, ii., 123, 124. Mill, v., 377, 378. Wilks, iii., 225, 235.

† Martin, viii., 50. Auber, ii., 125.

their apparently reasonable and just principles to the test. Shortly after the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo, differences broke out between the Mahrattas and the Nizam; and the English government, as the old ally of the latter prince, were strongly urged by his partisans to support him, as they had done the Rajah of Travancore, in the contest.* This, however, Sir J. Shore, acting on the pacific system, refused, and even declined to permit the Nizam to employ in his warfare with the Mahrattas the battalions which were placed as a protecting force in his territories.

The consequences of this temporizing conduct might easily have been foreseen. The Nizam, after a short contest, was overthrown by the superior force of the Mahrattas (who could bring twenty thousand cavalry, forty thousand infantry, and two hundred guns into the field), and compelled to make peace on very disadvantageous terms. Such was the March, 1794.

dissatisfaction produced very naturally at the court of the Nizam, by this desertion of their ally at the most perilous crisis, that they soon after signified a wish to be relieved of the presence of the British subsidiary force, which was complied with; and the Nizam immediately threw himself without reserve into the arms of the French resident, M. Raymond, and augmented the organized force in his dominions, under the direction of officers of the French Republic, to twenty-three battalions and twelve pieces of artillery. These troops carried the colours of the French Republic, and the cap of liberty was engraven on their buttons. Thus, by the timid policy of the British government at that crisis, not only was the power and influence of the Mahrattas materially increased, but their old and faithful ally, the Nizam, converted from a friend into an embittered enemy, and the moral sway resulting from the glorious termination of the war with Mysore seriously impaired.†

Tippoo was not slow in turning to the best advantage this unexpected course of events in his favour. Already had exaggerated reports of the growing power and conquests of the great Republic reached the courts of Hindostan; and numerous French agents had found their way to all the native powers, who represented in glowing colours the favourable opportunity which now presented itself for expelling the English from the Peninsula, and re-establishing on a durable basis the independence of all the Indian states. The Mysorean chief, whose cunning and perfidy were equal to his ability, strove, in the first instance, by professions of eternal gratitude and attachment, to disarm the suspicions of the British government, and he succeeded so far that, in two years after the treaty of Seringapatam, his two sons were restored to his embraces. No sooner had he got free from this restraint than he sent a secret circular to the different native powers of India, proposing to them all to unite in a common league for the expulsion of the English from Hindostan; received with unbounded confidence the agents

who had been despatched to the court of Seringapatam by the French Directory; and even sent emissaries to the distant court of Caubul, beyond the Himalaya snows, to confirm Zemaun Schah, the restless and ambitious chief of that formidable people, in his declared design of invading the northern parts of India, and re-instating, in its original splendour, the throne of the Moguls. Meanwhile, his own activity was indefatigable, and his preparations were complete: his army was on the best footing, and constantly ready to take the field; and while the Mahrattas and the Nizam had, by mutual dissensions, broken up the triple league of which he had formerly experienced the weight, and the former had fallen entirely under the guidance of the large French force in his capital, the military strength and political consideration of Mysore were more formidable than ever.*

Matters were at length brought to a crisis by the sultan's taking the extraordinary step, in spring, 1798, of sending Tippoo's overt ambassadors to the Isle of France to negotiate with the French authorities for the expulsion of the English from India, and effect the levy of a subsidiary European force to assist him in his designs, and afterward publicly receiving the troops then raised at Mangalore, and conducting them with great pomp to his capital. It was impossible to doubt, after this decisive step, that he was only awaiting the favourable moment for commencing his operations; the more especially when, at the very same period, a French armament of unprecedented magnitude sailed from Toulon for the Nile, and both the Directory and Napoleon publicly spoke of their communications with the redoubted Mysorean chief as their principal inducement for giving it that direction, and "Citizen Tippoo" was openly announced as the powerful ally who was to co-operate in the ultimate objects of the expedition.†† It was evident, therefore, that a

* Wellesley's Despatches, i., 25, 82, 83. Malcolm, 185, 186.

† Wellesley's Despatches, i., xi., Introduction. Auber, ii., 167. Gurw., i., 7.

‡ The following were the terms of this remarkable proclamation by General Hypolite Malartie, governor of the Isle of France: "Tippoo Sultan Jan. 30, 1798. has despatched two ambassadors to us with particular letters to the colonial assembly, to all the generals employed under this government, and to the executive Directory. 1. He desires an alliance offensive and defensive with the French, and proposes to maintain at his charge, as long as the war shall last in India, the troops which may be sent him. 2. He declares that he has made every preparation to receive the succours which may be sent to him. 3. In a word, he only waits the moment when the French shall come to his assistance to declare war against the English, whom he ardently desires to expel from India. 4. This power desires also to be assisted by the free citizens of colour: we therefore invite all such who are willing to serve under his flag to enrol themselves."—WELLESLEY'S Despatches, ix., x., Introduction.

On the 20th of July, 1798, Tippoo transmitted to the Directory at Paris a note of proposals for an alliance offensive and defensive, "in order to obtain such an accession of force as, joined to mine, may enable me to attack and annihilate forever our common enemies in Asia; and may the heavens and the earth meet ere the alliance of the two nations shall suffer the smallest diminution." The proposals were, 1. That the French should furnish a subsidiary force of ten or fifteen thousand troops of every description, with an adequate naval force. 2. That the sultan should furnish military stores, horses, bullocks, provisions, and all other necessities. 3. That the expedition should be directed to Porto Novo, or some other point on the coast of Coromandel, where it will be joined by an army under the command

* Malcolm, 136, 154. Auber, ii., 137, 142.

† Malcolm's India, 136, 177. Auber, ii., 137, 145.

crisis of the most dangerous kind was approaching, and that, too, at the very time when the diminution in the consideration of the English in India, and the weakening of their alliances among the native powers, had rendered them least capable of bearing the shock. But the hand of Fate was upon the curtain. At this perilous moment the sons of Britain were not

wanting to herself. Sprung from one family, two illustrious men were now entering upon the theatre, who were destined to carry its glory to the highest point of exaltation, and leave an empire, both in the East and West, unrivalled in the extent of its dominions, unequalled in the impression it was destined to produce upon the fortunes of mankind.

CHAPTER LII.

ADMINISTRATION OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY, AND FIRST APPEARANCE OF WELLINGTON IN INDIA.

ARGUMENT.

Birth of the Duke of Wellington and Marquis Wellesley.—Illustrious Men then rising into Manhood in England and France.—Wellington's Education and first Military Services.—His Talents are distinguished during the Retreat from Flanders.—Excellent Effect of this Campaign on his Mind.—He is sent to India, and first Entry on separate Command there.—His Character as a public Man.—His Military Character.—Difficulties with which he had to contend in that Capacity.—Admirable Ability and Skill with which he overcame them.—Character of Marquis Wellesley, and of his Indian Administration.—Statesman-like Wisdom with which it was accompanied.—Character of Lord Melville.—His great Abilities and vast Information on Indian Affairs.—Lord Wellesley's first Objects of Policy, and early Perception of the Necessity of War.—He is unable, from financial and military Difficulties, to commence immediate Hostilities.—Rapid Effect of his Administration in improving Affairs.—Successful Reduction of the French subsidiary Force at Hyderabad.—Its great Effects in India.—Prodigious Energy of Lord Wellesley in overcoming the Difficulties of his Situation.—Commencement of Hostilities against Tippee, and his Defeat by the Bombay Army.—General Harris's Advance to Seringapatam, and Defeat of the Sultan.—Investment of that Capital.—Progress of the Siege, and Repulse of Colonel Wellesley.—Assault and Storm of the Fortress.—Death of Tippee.—Immense Importance of the Blow thus struck.—Appointment of Colonel Wellesley as Governor of Seringapatam.—Judicious Arrangements consequent on the Fall of Mysore.—Rise and formidable Force of Doondiah Waugh.—His Defeat and Overthrow by Colonel Wellesley.—Alliances with the Nizam, Persia, and the Imam of Muscat.—Expedition of Sir D. Baird from India to Egypt.—Great Acquisition of Territory from the Vizier of Oude.—Assumption of the Government of the Carnatic.—Causes of the Rupture with the Maharrattas.—Character and Situation of the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah, and of Holkar.—Reasons for a Maharratta War.—Perron's French Force.—Collection of Forces, and Delivery of Poonah by General Wellesley.—War with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.—Lord Wellesley's Plan of Operations.—Defeat of Perron's Force, and Storming of Alighur.—Battle of Delhi.—Lord Lake's strong Opinion on the Necessity of European Troops in India.—Alliance with the Mogul Emperor, and Surrender of the French Chiefs.—Battle and Fall of Agra.—Humane Conduct of the British Troops.—Battle of Laswarro.—Desperate Fight and final Victory of the English.—Conquest of the Cuttack.—Operations in the Deccan under General Wellesley.—Movements which led to the Battle of Assaye.—Battle of Assaye.—Imminent Danger and final Victory of the English.—Operations after the Battle.—Battle of Argaum.—Siege and Fall of Gawilghur, which compels Scindiah to sue for Peace.—Its Terms.—Peculiar

Difficulties of the Government on the Conclusion of the War.—Negotiations and Rupture with Holkar.—Commencement of the War with that Chief.—Its arduous Character.—His Strength, and its Causes.—Defeat and Capture of Mohammed Khan.—Plan of the Campaign against Holkar.—Its Errors and early Disasters.—Holkar's able Conduct against Colonel Monson in Bundelcund.—Advance of Monson's Division.—His Disasters and Defeat.—Desperate Action on the Bannas River, and Conclusion of the Retreat.—Alarming Fermentation produced through the whole of India.—Generous Conduct and able Resolutions of Lord Wellesley and Lord Lake.—Advance of Holkar to Delhi.—His Repulse and Retreat.—Battle of Dieg.—Pursuit and Defeat of Holkar at Furrukabad.—Siege and Capture of Dieg.—Siege and unsuccessful Assault of Bhurtpore.—Repeated Assaults, and their Defeats.—Reasons on both Sides which led to an Accommodation with that Chieftain.—Peace with the Rajah of Bhurtpore.—Holkar, expelled from Bhurtpore, joins Scindiah.—Operations in Cuttack, Bundelcund, and against Meer Khan; and against Scindiah, who sues for Peace.—Lord Wellesley returns to England.—Second Administration, and Death of Marquis Cornwallis.—Arrival of Sir G. Barlow.—Treaty of Peace with Holkar and Scindiah.—Review of Lord Wellesley's Administration.—Return of Wellington to Europe.—Reflections on the Rise of the British Power in India.—Causes of its extraordinary Progress.—It was owing to the Union of Democratic Energy with Aristocratic Foresight.—Causes of this unusual Combination.—Circumstances which will eventually subvert our Eastern Dominion.—Great and lasting Benefits it has produced in Human Affairs.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY, afterward Duke of WELLINGTON, was born on the 1st Birth of Wellington, and Earl of Mornington, and he was de- Marquis Wellesley-scended, by his mother's side, from an ancient and noble family. His elder brother, who succeeded to the hereditary honours, afterward was created MARQUIS WELLESLEY, so that one family enjoyed the rare felicity of giving birth to the statesman whose energetic councils established the empire of England in the Eastern, and the warrior whose immortal deeds proved the salvation of Europe in the Western hemisphere.*

The young soldier was regularly educated for the profession of his choice, and received his first commission in the year 1787, being then in the eight- Illustrious men then rising into manhood in England and France. teenth year of his age. Napoleon had entered the artillery two years before, at the age of sixteen, and was then musing on the heroes of Plutarch. Sir Walter Scott, at the age of seventeen, was then relieving the tedium of legal education by wandering over the mountains of his native land, and dreaming of Ariosto and Amadis, in the grassy vale of St. Leonard's, near Edinburgh; Viscount Chateaubriand was inhaling the spirit of devotion and chivalry, and wandering, in anticipation, as a pilgrim to the Holy Land, amid

of the king in person. 4. All conquests which shall be made from the common enemy, excepting the dominions of the sultan which have been wrested from him by the English, shall be equally divided between the two contracting parties.—WELLESLEY'S *Despatches*, 711, 712, *Appendix*.

Napoleon's letters to Tippee, upon landing in Egypt, already alluded to,* was in the following terms: "Cairo, 25th Jan., 1799. You have already been made acquainted with my arrival on the shores of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire to deliver you from the iron yoke of England. I hasten to convey to you my desire that you should give me, by the way of Mascut or Mokha, intelligence of the political circumstances in which you find yourself placed. I desire even that you will send to Suez, or Grand Cairo, some able man in whom you have confidence, with whom I may confer. BONAPARTE."—*Corresp. Confid. de Napoleon*, vii., 192.

* *Ante*, i., 513.

* Scherer, i., 1. Gurw., i., 1.

the solitude of La Vendée; Goëthe, profound and imaginative, was reflecting on the destiny of man on earth, like a cloud which "turns up its silver lining to the moon;" Schiller was embodying in immortal verse the shadows of history and the creations of fancy; and the ardent spirit of Nelson was chafing on inaction, and counting the weary hours of a pacific West Indian station. Little did any of them think of each other, or anticipate the heart-stirring scenes which were soon about to arise, in the course of which their names were to shine forth like stars in the firmament, and their genius acquire immortal renown. There were giants in the earth in those days.*

Mr. Arthur Wellesley, educated at Eton, studied for a short time at the Military Academy of Angers, in France, but he was soon removed from that seminary to take part in the active duties of his profession. As subaltern and captain he served both in the cavalry and infantry; in spring, 1793, he was promoted to the majority of the 33d regiment, and in autumn of the same year he became, by purchase, its lieutenant-colonel. At the head of that regiment he first entered upon active service, by sailing from Cork, in May, 1794, and landing at Ostend in the beginning of June following, with orders to join Lord Moira's corps, which was assembling in that place, to re-enforce the Duke of York, who was in the field near Tournay. That ill-fated prince, however, was then hard pressed by the vast army of the Republicans, under Pichegru,† and, as he was under the necessity of retreating, it was justly deemed inadvisable to attempt the retention of a fortress so far in advance as Ostend, and Lord Moira marched by Bruges and Ghent to Scheldt, and crossing that river at the Tête de Flandre, joined the English army encamped around Antwerp.‡

The multiplied disasters of that unhappy campaign soon brought Colonel Wellesley into contact with the enemy, and taught him the art of war in the best of all schools, that of great operations and adverse fortune. The English army, now entirely separated from that of the Austrians, who had marched off towards the Rhine, were in no sufficient strength to face the immense masses of the Republicans in any considerable combat; but a number of detached actions took place with the rear-guard, in which the spirit and intelligence of Colonel Wellesley speedily became conspicuous. On the River Neethe, in a warm affair near the village of Jan. 5, 1795. Boxtel, and in a hot skirmish on the shores of the Waal, the 33d did good service: the ability with which they were conducted excited general remark, and Colonel Wellesley was in consequence promoted to the command of a brigade of three regiments in the ulterior retreat from the Leck to the Issel. They were no longer, indeed, pursued by the enemy, who had turned aside for the memorable invasion of Holland;

but the rudeness of the elements proved a more formidable adversary than the bayonets of the Republicans. The route of the army lay through the inhospitable provinces of Guelderland and Over Issel: the country consisted of flat and desert heaths; few houses were to be found on the road, and these scattered, singly, or in small hamlets, affording no shelter to any considerable body of men. Over this dreary tract the British troops marched during the dreadful winter of 1794-5, through an unbroken wilderness of snow, with the thermometer frequently down at 15° and 20° below zero of Fahrenheit, and, when it was somewhat milder, a fierce and biting north wind blowing direct in the faces of the soldiers. In this trying crisis, Colonel Wellesley commanded the rear-guard: his activity and vigilance arrested, in a great degree, the disorders which prevailed; and, in his first essay in arms, he experienced severities equal to the far-famed horrors of the Moscow retreat.**

Short as was the first campaign of the Duke of Wellington, it was the best Excellent effect of this campaign on his mind. school that had been presented for nearly a century for the formation of a great commander. War was there exhibited on a grand scale: it was in an army of sixty-eight battalions and eighty squadrons that he had served. The indomitable courage and admirable spirit of the British soldiers had there appeared in their full lustre; but the natural results of these great qualities were completely prevented by the defects, at that period, of their military organization; by total ignorance of warlike measures in the cabinet which planned their movements; a destructive minuteness of direction, arising from too little confidence on the part of government in their generals in the field; a general want of experience in officers of all ranks in the most ordinary operations of a campaign; and, above all, the ruinous parsimony which, in all states subject to a really popular government, breaks down, on the return of peace, the military force, by which alone, on the next resumption of hostilities, early success can be secured. These defects appeared in painful contrast to the brilliant and efficient state of the more experienced German armies, which, with national resources noways superior, and troops far inferior, both in courage and energy, were able to keep the field with more perseverance, and, in the end, achieve successes to which the British soldiers could hardly hope to arrive. These considerations forcibly impressed themselves on the mind of the young officer, and he was early led to revolve in his mind those necessary changes in the direction and discipline of the army which, matured by the diligence and vigour of the Duke of York, ultimately led the British nation to an unparalleled pitch of strength and glory.‡

It was not long before an opportunity presented itself for witnessing the capability of British soldiers when subjected to an abler direction, and led by more experienced officers. After the return of the troops from

Colonel Wellesley sent to India, and first entry on command there.

* Scherer. Life of Wellington. *Ante*, i., 393. Lockhart's Life of Scott, i., 45, 54. Southey's Nelson, i., 73, 77. Chateaub. Mem., 72-77.

† *Ante*, i., 321.

‡ Gurw., i., 1. Scherer, i., 23.

* Gurw., i., 2, 3. Scherer, i., 4, 5.

† "The cold in Russia in 1812 never fell so low as in Holland in the winter of 1794-5."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoleon*, iv., 74.

‡ Scherer, i., 6, 10.

Flanders to England, the 33d regiment was ordered to the West Indies; but contrary winds prevented the transports on which it was embarked from sailing, and their destination was soon after changed for the East. Colonel Wellesley arrived with his corps at Calcutta in January, 1797. During the voyage out it was observed that he spent most of his time in reading; and after he landed in India, he was indefatigable in acquiring information regarding the situation and resources of the country in which he was to serve, so that when he was called, as he early was, to high command, he was perfectly acquainted, as his correspondence from the first demonstrates, both with the peculiarities of Indian warfare and the intricacies of Indian politics.* And when his division of the army took the field in January, 1799, against Tipoo Suldaun, the fine condition and perfect discipline of the men, as well as the skill and judgment of the arrangements made for their supplies, called forth the warm commendations of the commander-in-chief, who little thought what a hero he was then ushering the name into the world.†

The name of no commander in the long array of British greatness will occupy so large a space in the annals of the world as that of Wellington; and yet there are few whose public character possesses, with so many excellences, so simple and unblemished a complexion. It is to the purity and elevation of his principles, in every public situation, that this enviable distinction is to be ascribed. Intrusted early in life with high command, and subjected from the first to serious responsibility, he possessed that singleness of heart and integrity of purpose which, even more than talent or audacity, are the foundation of true moral courage, and the only pure path to public greatness: a sense of duty, a feeling of honour, a generous patriotism, a forgetfulness of self, constituted the spring of all his actions. He was ambitious, but it was to serve his king and country only; fearless, because his whole heart was wound up in these noble objects; disinterested, because the enriching of himself or his family never for a moment crossed his mind; insensible to private fame when it interfered with public duty, indifferent to popular obloquy when it arose from rectitude of conduct. Like the Roman patriot, he eschewed rather to be than appear deserving. "Esse quam videri bonus malebat, ita quo minus gloriam petebat eo magis adsequebatur."‡ Greatness was forced upon him, both in military and political life, rather because he

was felt to be the worthiest, than because he desired to be the first; he was the architect of his own fortune, but he became so almost unconsciously, while solely engrossed in constructing that of his country. He has left undone many things, as a soldier, which might have added to his fame, and done many things, as a statesman, which were fatal to his power; but he omitted the first because they would have endangered his country, and committed the second because he felt them to be essential to its salvation. It is to the honour of England, and of human nature, that such a man should have risen at such a time to the rule of her armies and her councils; but he experienced, with Themistocles and Scipio Africanus, the mutable tenure of popular applause, and the base ingratitude of those whom he had saved. Having triumphed over the arms of the threatened tyrant, he was equally immovable in the presence of the insane citizens; and it is hard to say whether his greatness appeared most when he struck down the conqueror of Europe on the field of Waterloo, or was himself with difficulty rescued from death on its anniversary, eighteen years afterward, in the streets of London.

A constant recollection of these circumstances, and of the peculiar and very difficult task which was committed to his charge, is necessary in forming a correct estimate of the Duke of Wellington's military achievements. The brilliancy of his course is well known: an unbroken series of triumphs from Vimiero to Toulouse; the entire expulsion of the French from the Peninsula; the planting of the British standard in the heart of France; the successive defeat of those veteran marshals who had so long conquered in every country of Europe; the overthrow of Waterloo; the hurling of Napoleon from his throne; and the termination, in one day, of the military empire founded on twenty years of conquest. But these results, great and imperishable as they are, convey no adequate idea, either of the difficulties with which Wellington had to contend, or of the merit due to his transcendent exertions. With an army seldom superior in number to a single corps of the French marshals; with troops dispirited by recent disasters, and wholly unaided by practical experience; without any compulsory law to recruit his ranks, or any strong national passion for war to supply its wants, he was called on to combat successively vast armies, composed, in great part, of veteran soldiers, perpetually filled by the terrible powers of the conscription, headed by chiefs who, risen from the ranks, and practically acquainted with the duties of war in all its grades, had fought their way from the grenadier's musket to the marshal's baton, and were followed by men who, trained in the same school, were animated by the same ambition. Still more, he was the general of a nation in which the chivalrous and mercantile qualities are strongly blended together; which, justly proud of its historic glory, is unreasonably jealous of its military expenditure; which, covetous beyond measure of warlike renown, is ruinously impatient of pacific preparation; which starves its establishment when danger

His military character.

Difficulties with which he had to contend in that capacity.

* Gurw., i., 2, 3. Scher., i., 9, 10. Wellesley's Despatches, i., 425.

† "I have much satisfaction in acquainting your lordship that the very handsome appearance and perfect discipline of the troops under the orders of the Hon. Colonel Wellesley do honour to themselves and to him, while the judicious and masterly arrangements as to supplies, which opened an abundant free market, and inspired confidence in dealers of every description, were no less creditable to Colonel Wellesley than advantageous to the public service, and deservedly entitle him to my marked approbation." How early is the real character of great men shown when once thrown into important situations! This might have passed for a description of Wellington's arrangements for the supply of his army in the south of France in spring, 1814.—General HARRIS to the Governor-general in Council, Feb. 2, 1799; WELLESLEY'S Despatches, i., 425.

‡ Sall., Bell. Cat.

is over, and yet frets at defeat when its terrors are present; which dreams, in war, of Cressy and Agincourt, and ruminates, in peace, on economic reduction. He combated at the head of an alliance formed of heterogeneous states, composed of discordant materials, in which ancient animosities and religious divisions were imperfectly suppressed by recent fervour or present danger; in which corruption often paralyzed the arm of patriotism, and jealousy withheld the resources of power. He acted under the direction of a ministry which, albeit zealous and active, was alike inexperienced in hostility and unskilled in combinations; in presence of an opposition which, powerful in eloquence, supported by faction, was prejudiced against the war, and indefatigable to arrest it; for the interests of a people who, although ardent in the cause and enthusiastic in its support, were impatient of disaster and prone to depression, and whose military resources, how great soever, were dissipated in the protection of a colonial empire which encircled the earth.

Nothing but the most consummate prudence, as well as ability in conduct, could, with such means, have achieved victory over such an enemy; and the character of Wellington was singularly fitted for the task. Capable, when the occasion required or opportunity was afforded, of the most daring enterprises, he was yet cautious and wary in his general conduct; prodigal of his own labour, regardless of his own person, he was avaricious only of the blood of his soldiers; endowed by nature with an indomitable soul, a constitution of iron, he possessed that tenacity of purpose and indefatigable activity which is ever necessary to great achievements; prudent in council, sagacious in design, he was yet prompt and decided in action; no general ever revolved the probable dangers of an enterprise more anxiously before undertaking it, none possessed in a higher degree the eagle eye, the arm of steel, necessary to carry it into execution. By the steady application of these rare qualities, he was enabled to raise the British military force from an unworthy state of depression to an unparalleled pitch of glory; to educate, in presence of the enemy, not only his soldiers in the field, but his rulers in the cabinet; to silence, by avoiding disaster, the clamour of his enemies; to strengthen, by progressive success, the ascendancy of his friends; to augment, by the exhibition of its results, the energy of the government; to rouse, by deeds of glory, the enthusiasm of the people. Skilfully seizing the opportunity of victory, he studiously avoided the chances of defeat; aware that a single disaster would at once endanger his prospects, discourage his countrymen, and strengthen his opponents, he was content to forego many opportunities of earning fame, and stifle many desires to grasp at glory; magnanimously checking the aspirations of genius, he trusted for ultimate success rather to perseverance in a wise, than audacity in a daring course. He thus succeeded, during six successive campaigns, with a comparatively inconsiderable army, in maintaining his ground against the vast and veteran forces of Napoleon, in defeating successively all his marshals, and baffling successively all

his enterprises, and finally rousing such an enthusiastic spirit in the British empire as enabled its government to put forth its immense resources on a scale worthy of its present greatness and ancient renown, and terminate a contest of twenty years by planting the English standard on the walls of Paris.

To have given birth to such a man, is a sufficient distinction for one family; but Wellington is not the only illustrious character which England owes to the house of Mornington. It is hard to say whether, in a different line, in the management of the cabinet, the civil government of men, and the far-seeing sagacity of a consummate statesman, Marquis WELLESLEY is not equally remarkable. He was the elder brother of the family, and gave early promise, both at school and college, of those brilliant qualities which afterward shone forth with such lustre in the administration of India. His talents for business soon introduced him to the notice of government, but his predilection was so strongly evinced from the first for Oriental affairs, that nature appeared to have expressly formed him for the command of the East. At an age when most of his contemporaries were acquainted with the affairs of India only through the uncertain medium of distant report, or the casual hints of private conversation, he was fully master of the politics of Hindostan, and had already formed those clear and luminous views of the condition and situation of our power there, which enabled him, from the very outset of his career, to direct with so steady a hand the complicated mazes of Indian diplomacy. He had for several years been an active member of the Board of Control, then under the able direction of Lord Melville, and had acquired, from his remarkable proficiency in the subject, a large share in the confidence of government; but it was not in any of the public offices, it was not from the inspiration of Leadenhall-street, that he drew the enlarged and statesmanlike views which from the first characterized his Eastern administration. It was in the solitude of study that the knowledge was obtained; it was from the sages and historians of antiquity that the spirit was inhaled; it was in the fire of his own genius that the light was found.

The maxims on which Marquis Wellesley acted in the East were the same Character of his Indian administration. with those which Napoleon perceived to be indispensable to his existence in Europe, and which, in former times, had given the Romans the empire of the world. He at once perceived that the British sway in India was founded entirely on opinion; that twenty or thirty thousand Europeans, scattered among a hundred million of Asiatics, must have acquired their supremacy by fascinating the mind; that this moral sway could be maintained only by fidelity to engagement and fearlessness in conduct; and that, in such circumstances, the most prudent course was generally the most audacious. Disregarding, therefore, entirely that temporizing policy which the government at home had taken such pains to impress upon its rulers, which Cornwallis had triumphed over only by disregarding, and Sir John Shore had obeyed only to destroy, he re-

solved, at all hazards, to maintain the British faith inviolate, to strike terror into his enemies by the vigour of his measures, and secure victory by never despairing and being always worthy of it. He recollected the words of Cato, "Quanto vos attentior ea agetis tanto illis animus infirmior erit; si paullulum modo vos languere viderint, jam omnes feroces aderunt."*

But vigour and resolution are not alone capable of achieving success, though they are generally essential towards it: wisdom in combination, foresight in council, prudence in preparation, are also indispensable; and it was in the union of these invaluable qualities, with the courage of the hero and the heart of the patriot, that Marquis Wellesley was unrivalled. Boldly assuming the lead, he kept it without difficulty, because he was felt to be the first; ardently devoted to his country, he inspired a portion of the sacred fire into all his followers; † discerning in the estimation of character, he selected from the many men in his service the most gifted; penetrated with the most lofty, as well as the soundest views, he communicated his own statesmanlike principles both to the direction of the councils and the guidance of the armies of India. In vigour of resolution, moral courage, diplomatic ability, and military combination, he was the first of British statesmen, even in the days of Pitt and Fox. Never, perhaps, in so short a time, was such a change produced on the character of public administration, the vigour of national councils, or the success of national arms, as by his Eastern rule. He found them vacillating, he left them decided; he found the public service weakened by corruption, he left it teeming with energy; he found the East India Company striving only to defend their possessions on the coast, he left them seated on the throne of Aurengzebe. So vast a change effected in a few years, is one of the most remarkable instances which history affords of the impress which a lofty character can communicate to the sphere of its influence; and, like the corresponding and simultaneous elevation of France under the guidance of Napoleon, may tend to modify the ideas which philosophic minds are apt to entertain of the entire government of human affairs by general causes, and to make us suspect that, in working out its mysterious designs, Providence not unfrequently makes use of the agency of individual greatness.

Another statesman, possessed of less brilliant, but equally important qualities, presided over the direction of Indian affairs in this coun-

* Sall., Bell. Cat.

† "So entirely devoted am I," said Lord Wellesley, "to the indispensable duty of providing a large force in the field and an efficient system of alliance, that my estimate of character, and my sentiments of respect, and even of affection, in this country, are regulated absolutely by the degree of zeal and alacrity which I find in those who are to assist me in this great struggle. Nor can I conceive a more firm foundation, or a more honourable bond of friendship, than a common share in the labours, difficulties, and honour of defending and saving so valuable a part of the British Empire. This is the nature of the connexion which I seek with your lordship, and these are the sentiments which render me so averse to those men who appear negligent, or reluctant, or irresolute in a conjuncture which ought to extinguish all partialities, all private resentments and affections, and unite and animate all talents and exertions in one common cause." — MARQUIS WELLESLEY TO LORD CLIVE, governor of Madras, 14th of Nov., 1798. *WELL. Despatches*, i., 344.

try during the most momentous period of Lord Wellesley's gov- Character of Lord Melville.
ernment, and had long contributed essentially, by the enlarged and statesmanlike views with which he himself was impressed, to train the mind of the future ruler of the East to those great conceptions which, from the very first, distinguished his administration. HENRY DUNDAS, afterward LORD VISCOUNT MELVILLE, was descended from the house of Arniston in Scotland: a family which, since the Revolution, had enjoyed a large share of the legal honours and offices in that country, and had early risen, alike from his talents and his connexions, to the office of lord-advocate. But his force of mind and ambition impelled him into a more elevated career. In 1782 he entered Parliament, and from that time, for the next twenty-five years, enjoyed to a greater degree than any other person the confidence and friendship of Mr. Pitt. In 1792 he was promoted to the important situation of president of the Board of Control, and from that period down to Mr. Pitt's retirement in 1800, had the almost exclusive direction of Eastern affairs. When that great man resumed the helm in 1804, he was made first lord of the admiralty, and by his indefatigable energy soon restored the navy from the state of decay into which it had fallen during the shortsighted parsimony of the Addington administration: so that the same statesman enjoyed the rare distinction of framing the policy which produced Lord Wellesley's triumphs in India, and launching the fleets which extinguished the navy of France amid the shoals of Trafalgar.

Lord Melville's talents were of the highest order, but they were of the solid His great abilities and vast information on Indian affairs.
and useful rather than the brilliant and attractive kind. A powerful debater from strength of intellect and vigour of thought, he overcame by these qualities the disadvantages of a Northern accent, a deficiency in imaginative or oratorical qualities, and the prejudices against his country, which were general in England, till the genius of Sir Walter Scott and the increasing intercourse between the two nations converted it into a sometimes indulgent partiality. But if he could not rival Mr. Fox or Mr. Sheridan in the fire of genius or graces of eloquence, he excelled them in many sterling qualities which constitute a great statesman; and the want of which is too often, to its grievous loss, thought to be compensated in Great Britain by the more showy but inferior accomplishments which command and seduce a popular assembly. To vast powers of application he united a sound judgment and a retentive memory; the native force of his mind made him seize at once the strong points of a subject; his prodigious information rendered him thoroughly master of its details. Nowhere is to be found a more comprehensive and statesmanlike series of instructions than is presented in his Indian correspondence: it has been declared by an equally competent judge and unbiased opponent, that in these and Marquis Wellesley's Despatches is to be sought the whole materials both of history and information on our Eastern dominions.* All the features of Lord Wellesley's administration are to be

* Lord Brougham, *Edin. Review*, No. 139

there found chalked out with prophetic wisdom, even before that illustrious man left the British shores. The true principles of colonial government are developed with a master's hand and a statesman's wisdom; all his subsequent measures obtained the cordial support of that able auxiliary in the British cabinet. It may safely be affirmed that, if England ever lose the empire of the seas, it will be from departing from his maxims in the management of the navy; if she is stripped of her Indian Empire, from forgetting his principles of colonial administration.*

The general objects of his policy are clearly pointed out in his letters from the Cape of Good Hope, in February, 1798, to Lord Melville: a series of state papers drawn up before he had set foot in India, which will bear a comparison with any in the world for sound and enlarged views of complicated politics. He at once perceived that the advantages of the triple alliance against Tippoo Sultaun, and the ascendancy acquired by the glorious victory of Lord Cornwallis before Seringapatam, had been in a great measure lost by the timid policy of the succeeding administration, and therefore the first object of his endeavours was to recover the ascendancy which had been so unhappily impaired, and take measures against the powers which had risen upon its ruins. The destruction of the French subsidiary force at Hyderabad and restoration of our influence at the court of the Nizam; the arrangement by mediation of the differences among the Mahratta powers; the removal of the league which was to prove a counterpoise to the ascendancy of Tippoo, and the separation of his territories, if hostilities became unavoidable, from the coast, so as to detach him from French intrigue or co-operation, were the objects which presented themselves to his mind, not so much as steps to power as essential to existence.†

No sooner had he landed in India, however, than he perceived that the open alliance of Tippoo with the French, joined to the success of their expedition to Egypt and the increase to their influence among the native powers which Napoleon's victories had produced, rendered an early attack on the Mysore chief indispensable.‡ Had he possessed

He is unable, from financial and military difficulties, to commence immediate hostilities.

than he perceived that the open alliance of Tippoo with the French, joined to the success of their expedition to Egypt and the increase to their influence among the native powers which Napoleon's victories had produced, rendered an early attack on the Mysore chief indispensable.‡ Had he possessed

* "It is of the last importance to keep up the means of a large importation from India: not only from the encouragement it affords to the navigation and shipping of the kingdom, and the addition which it makes annually to the wealth and capital of the country, and being a fruitful source of revenue, but its necessity as immediately connected with the prosperity of our Indian provinces. It is to the increased exports from India to Europe that we are to attribute the increase of Indian prosperity, industry, population, and revenue, and the manufacturers of that country would immediately be reduced to a deplorable state if any check were ever given to their annual exports to this country."—*LORD MELVILLE TO LORD WELLESLEY, August, 1799. Wel. Desp., ii., 102.* It is on this principle, a fair reciprocity of advantages, that all really wise colonial administrations must be founded, and by it alone that such distant possessions can be permanently preserved; but how different is this view from the sacrifice of all colonial interest to cheap purchasing by the mother state, which, under the free-trade system, has almost exclusively regulated our policy for the last fifteen years!

† Wellesley's Despatches to Lord Melville, Feb. 28, 1798, i., 1, 34, 81, 91.

‡ Sir Thomas Monro, one of the ablest men that India

ed the means, he would immediately have commenced hostilities before the Sultaun's preparations were completed; but, unfortunately, the state of the government finances and military establishment at Madras, where the principal efforts required to be made, rendered that altogether impracticable. So low had the credit of the company fallen at that presidency, that their eight per cent. paper had sunk to a discount of eighteen or twenty per cent.; the finances, both there and at Bombay, were completely exhausted; the present deficiency was eighteen lacks of pagodas (£480,000); bills designed to supply the want of specie had multiplied so much that they had alarmingly depreciated; only fourteen thousand men of all arms could be drawn together for the attack on Tippoo; a war was pronounced impracticable without at least six months' previous preparation; the frontier fortresses were without provisions, the army without stores, equipment, or transport train; and, so far from being in a condition to equip it for the field, the government had hardly the means of moving it from Madras to the Mysore territory. These evils were also felt, though in a lesser degree, at Calcutta: the general treasury was drained by the incessant demands of the sister presidencies, and that general despondency prevailed which is so often both the forerunner and the cause of national disaster.*†

But it soon appeared how powerful is the influence of a gifted and magnanimous mind upon national fortunes, if called into action at a time when the heart of the nation is sound, and those symptoms of debility have arisen, not from the decline of public virtues, but the timidity or misdirection of those who have been placed at the head of affairs. Many months had not elapsed before Lord Wellesley had communicated the impress of his zeal and energy to every branch of the public service. Disregarding altogether the sinister forebodings and gloomy representations of the Madras government, he laboured assiduously to augment the military force and restore the financial resources of that important part of our Eastern dominions: by never yielding to difficulties, he soon found none; by boldly assuming the lead in diplomacy, he speedily acquired the command. All classes, both at home and abroad, rapidly discovered the character of the man with whom they were now brought in contact: British patriotism was roused by the clear indications which were afforded of capacity at the head of affairs; Asiatic hostility sunk before the ascendancy of European talent; Indian jealousy before the force of English courage. The army was rapidly augmented;

Rapid effect of Lord Wellesley's administration in improving affairs.

has ever produced, was of the same opinion at this period. "Men read books," says he, "and because they find all warlike nations have had their downfall, they declaim against conquest as not only dangerous, but unprofitable; but there are times and situations where, conquest not only brings a revenue greatly beyond its expenses, but also additional security. Let us advance to the Kistna: we shall triple our revenue, our barrier will then be both stronger and shorter. The dissensions and revolutions of the native governments will point out the time when it is proper for us to become actors. While Tippoo's power exists we shall be perpetually in danger of losing what we have."—*SIR THOS. MONRO TO EARL OF MORNINGTON, June 7, 1798; MONRO'S Memoirs, i., 234; and AUBER, ii., 174.*

* *Mém. of the Madras Government, 6th July, 1798. Wellesley's Desp., i., 72, 79, 191.*

† See Note A.

the frontier fortresses were armed and victualled; the bullock-service and commissariat put on a respectable footing; a powerful battering-train was collected at Madras; voluntary subscriptions on a magnificent scale, at all the three presidencies, bespoke at once the public spirit and opulence of the inhabitants; corps of European volunteers were formed, and soon acquired a great degree of efficiency, while a subsidiary treaty, concluded with the Nizam in the beginning of September, restored the British influence at the court of Hyderabad, and gave public proof of the renewal of British influence among the native powers.*

Sept. 1, 1798.

The first vigorous stroke was directed against the French subsidiary force, now fourteen thousand strong, which had so long exercised a domineering influence at the court of the Nizam. Fortunately for the interests of England, the same over-

bearing character which has in every age made the permanent rule of the French insupportable to a vanquished people had already manifested itself; and the Nizam, now reposing confidence in the support of the English government, had become exceedingly desirous of ridding himself of his obnoxious defenders. By the new treaty of Hyderabad, the British subsidiary troops, formerly two thousand, were to be augmented to six thousand men, and they were under the direction of Colonel Kirkpatrick, an officer whose skill and prudence were equal to the difficult and important task committed to his charge. The increased force entered the Nizam's territories in the beginning of October, reached Hyderabad on the 10th, joined a large body of the Nizam's horse, and surrounded the French camp on the 22d. A mutiny had broken out in the corps on the preceding day, and the sepoys had arrested their officers; in this state of insubordination no authority existed capable of withstanding the British troops, and the whole French officers were, without bloodshed, delivered up to the English authorities, on condition of their private property being preserved and their being immediately transported to France: conditions which were immediately and faithfully executed.†

This bold and important stroke was immediately attended with most important effects. The French influence at the native courts received a rude shock, while that of the English was proportionably augmented; the natives of the subsidiary corps almost all entered the British ranks, and formed an important addition to the sepoy force; while the Nizam, overjoyed at his delivery from such supercilious defenders, renewed his ancient and cordial alliance with the East India Company. It soon appeared how necessary this decisive stroke had been, and what was the magnitude of the dangers which would soon have assailed the British power if the war had not in this manner been at once carried into the enemy's territory. Secret information was received that Scindiah had entered into correspondence with Tippoo and the

French: the Peishwa was ascertained to have supported his views against the company and the Nizam; the inveterate hostility of the Sul-taun of Mysore was well known, and his preparations, though secretly conducted, were daily assuming a more formidable character; Zemaun Schah, by the terrors of an Afghan invasion, operated as a powerful diversion, and rendered it necessary to station a large force on the northern frontiers of Hindostan; a deep-laid plot was on foot for expelling the English from Bengal, Bahar, and all their provinces on the banks of the Ganges, in which most of the Mohammedan chiefs of those countries were implicated; while the whole Mahratta potentates were secretly intriguing against the British power, and only awaited the expected arrival of the French from Egypt to join openly in the general confederacy against it.*

The indefatigable activity and commanding energy of Lord Mornington, however, enabled him to make head against all these difficulties; and he soon made such progress in the military preparations as enabled him, early in 1799, to anticipate the designs of his enemies, by striking a decisive blow at the heart of their power. The army collected at Madras was raised, before the close of the preceding year, to thirty thousand fighting men, with an immense battering-train: a noble force, in an incomparable state of discipline and equipment, while a co-operating body of six thousand men, in equally admirable condition, were ready to advance from Bombay under General Stuart. Explanations were demanded from Tippoo of his hostile measures, particularly his sending ambassadors to the Isle of France; but no reply was received, although the British government gave ample proof of their disposition to act with fidelity according to the existing treaties, by relinquishing to him, at this very crisis, the territory of Wynnaad, a disputed district which, on Lord Wellington's arrival in India, was in the possession of the British authorities, without any adequate title. A proposition on the part of the governor-general to open an amicable negotiation through Colonel Doveton having been eluded with characteristic artifice by the Sul-taun, and the military preparations being complete, Marquis Wellesley, early in January, proceeded to Madras in person, and on the 10th of February the army, under General Harris, entered the Mysore territory, while, shortly after, General Stuart also advanced with his co-operating force from the side of Bombay.‡

Notwithstanding the depth and extent of his plans, Tippoo was on this occasion taken by surprise. He had not anticipated the vigour and celerity of the new governor-general, and calculated upon being permitted to choose his own time, as on former occasions, for the commencement of hostilities, which he would have

* Lord Wellesley to General Harris, 23d of Feb., 1799, Desp., i., 581; and to the Directors, 22d of April, 1799, *ibid.*, i., 535.

† Tippoo wrote, in answer to the communication announcing Major Doveton's mission, "That, being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, he was accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion; but that he would be pleased that the governor-general would be so good as to despatch Major Doveton to him unattended, or slightly attended."—Tippoo to Governor-general, February 9, 1799; WELLESLEY'S Desp., i., 452.

‡ Well. Desp., i., 452, 466, 478.

* Wellesley's Desp., ii., 626, and i., 355. Auber, ii., 179.
† Lord Wellesley to Court of Directors, 21st Nov., 1798. Dup., i., 356.

Its great effects in India.

deferred till his preparations were complete, and the extensive confederacy in the course of formation was encouraged by the presence of a French auxiliary force. His military power, however, was already very great: Seringapatam was in a formidable state of defence, and he had above fifty thousand men in a central position under arms. Finding, therefore, that his territories were menaced on two sides at once, he judiciously resolved to direct his efforts, in the first instance, against the least considerable of the invading armies; and with that view moved against General Stuart, even before he had crossed the Bombay frontier. The Sultaun's force on this occasion amounted to twelve thousand men, the flower of his army; but, though the weight of the contest fell on two thousand European and sepoy troops, they were defeated in half an hour, and quickly retired to the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, with the loss of fifteen hundred killed and wounded.*

The progress of the grand army, thirty thousand strong, which advanced from the side of Madras, was at first very slow, owing to the immense battering and siege equipage which followed in its train, and the sickness which almost uniformly seizes the transport cattle when they leave the coast and ascend the high table-land of Mysore. They experienced, however, very little molestation from the Sultaun until the 27th of March, when a general engagement took place. Tipoo's army occupied a range of heights beyond the little town of Malavilly, and a distant exchange of cannon-shot from the batteries on either side at length led to a general action. Colonel Wellesley (Wellington) commanded the division on the left, and General Floyd the centre. Owing to the exhausted state of the bullocks which drew the artillery, a delay occurred in the formation of the line, of which the Mysore horse took advantage to make a daring charge on Colonel Wellesley's division, which moved on to the attack, and was considerably in advance, and separated by a wide gap from the centre.† A huge mass of cavalry, supported by the bravest of Tipoo's turbaned infantry, bore down on the English division, and filled the opening; but the 33d were ordered to reserve their fire till within pistol-shot, when they delivered it with decisive effect, and immediately charged with the bayonet, while the red-plumed dragoons of Floyd soon after coming up from the centre, charged them on the other flank, and completed the rout. Two thousand of the enemy fell in

the battle or the pursuit, while the loss of the victors did not exceed three hundred.*

No farther obstacle now remained to prevent the British from taking up their ^{Investment of} ground before Seringapatam, which ^{Seringapatam.} was done on the 5th of April. The April 5. assembled host, which was soon joined by the corps under General Stuart, from Bombay, presented a formidable appearance, and exhibited a splendid proof of the magnitude and resources of the British empire in the East. Thirty-five thousand fighting men, a hundred pieces of battering cannon, and camp followers in the usual Asiatic proportion of four to one soldier, formed a stupendous array of above a hundred and fifty thousand men, assembled on the high table-land of Mysore, three thousand feet above the level of the sea, and above eight thousand miles from the parent European state. The greatness of this effort will not be duly appreciated unless it is recollected that at the same moment twenty thousand admirable troops, under Sir James Craig, lay in the territories of Oude, to guard the northern provinces of India from Zemaun Schah; that the army was collected in the Mediterranean which so soon after expelled the French from Egypt, and the fleet was afloat which was to dissolve, by the cannon of Nelson, the Northern coalition.†

The efforts of Lord Cornwallis had been directed against the northern face of the fortress of Seringapatam, and ^{Progress of the} Tipoo, anticipating an attack in the ^{siege, and re-} same quarter, had greatly strengthened the defences in that direction. These preparations, however, were rendered altogether unavailing by the able movement of General Harris, previous to taking up his ground before the town, in suddenly crossing the Cavery by a neglected ford, and appearing before its southern front: a quarter in which the country was not yet ravaged, the fortifications in a comparatively neglected state, and the communication with the Bombay army direct and easy. The camp was formed opposite to the southwestern side of the fortress, the army from Bombay effected its junction on the 9th, and the approaches were conducted with great vigour. In the course of these operations, much annoyance was experienced from an advanced post of the Sultaun's, placed on a rocky eminence near the walls, from whence a destructive fire, chiefly with rockets, was kept up on the parties working in the trenches. In order to put a stop to this harassing warfare, an attack on the post during the night was resolved on, and intrusted to Colonel Wellesley and Colonel Shaw. This nocturnal encounter would be of little importance, were it not rendered remarkable by a circumstance as rare as it is memorable, and worthy of being recorded for the encouragement of young officers exposed to early disaster—a failure by Wellington.‡

Both divisions marched a little after it was dark: Colonel Shaw succeeded in getting possession of a ruined village, within forty yards of the aqueduct from whence the firing issued; but Colonel Wellesley, on entering the rocky

* Well. Desp., i., 505, 508. Scherer, i., 21, 23.

† Colonel Wellesley, on this occasion, was not intended by General Harris to make the attack, but to wait till the onset was made by the right and centre, and orders to that effect were sent him by the commander-in-chief. When they were delivered, however, he saw, from the confusion into which the enemy in his front had fallen, that the attack could be made with more prospect of success by his division, and he said so to the officer who bore the despatches. He agreed with him, but stated that he had only to deliver his orders; but that he would report the circumstance, and Colonel Wellesley's opinion, to General Harris; and that, if he did not hear from him to the contrary in ten minutes, he might conclude the suggestion was approved of. Nothing was heard during that time, and Colonel Wellesley made the attack, which proved successful. "I was a little annoyed," said the duke in London, in 1823, "at the time, that this circumstance was not noticed by Harris in his official despatches, but I now see he was quite right not to mention it."

* General Harris's Desp., April 5, 1799. Well. Desp., i., 515. Scher., i., 23, 24.

† Well. Desp., i., 517, and ii., 98. Ante, ii., 175.

‡ Wellesley's Desp., i., 534, 540. Gurw., i., 23, 25.

eminence, near the Sultanpettah Tope, was assailed on all sides with so severe a fire, that both the 33d regiment and sepoy battalion, which he commanded, were thrown into disorder, and he was obliged to fall back to the camp; and such was the confusion which prevailed, owing to the darkness of the night, that he arrived there accompanied only by Colonel Mackenzie. The young officer proceeded at midnight to the general's tent, at first much agitated, but finding General Harris not yet awake, he threw himself on the table of the tent and *fell asleep*: a fact in such a moment singularly characteristic of the imperturbable character of the future hero of Torres Vedras. General Harris next morning drew out the troops for a second attack, and offered the command to General Baird, but that generous officer suggested that Colonel Wellesley should again be intrusted with the command. General Harris happily allowed him an opportunity of obliterating his failure, by resuming the command; and at ten next morning

April 6. Colonel Wellesley, with the Scotch brigade and two battalions of sepoys, again advanced against the Tope, which was soon carried in gallant style, while Colonel Shaw, at the same time, drove the Mysoreans from their post on the side of the ruined village. But for this circumstance, and the elevation of mind which prompted both General Harris and General Baird to overlook this casual failure, and intrust the next attack to the defeated officer, the fate of the world might have been different, and the star of the future conqueror of Napoleon extinguished in an obscure nocturnal encounter in an Indian watercourse.*†

The approaches to the fortress being much facilitated by this success, the operations of the siege were conducted with great rapidity. Several formidable sallies of the Mysore horse were repulsed by the steadiness of the besiegers' infantry, and the admirable vigilance exhibited in all parts of the trenches, the most exposed part of which were under Colonel Wellesley's direction. At length, on the 30th of April, the breaching batteries opened on one of the bastions, which was soon shaken by a severe cross fire from different sides; the curtain on the right was soon levelled; a great magazine of rockets blew up in the town on the morning of the 2d of May, and spread terror and devastation far and wide by its tremendous ex-

* Wellesley's Desp., 20th April, 1799, i., 534, 540. Gurwood, i., 23, 24.

† General, afterward Sir David Baird, in particular, delicately suggested that Colonel Wellesley should be intrusted with the second attack: an instance of magnanimity in a superior officer, who might, if actuated by selfish feelings, have been anxious rather to throw into the shade a rival for the honours of the siege, worthy of the highest admiration. This fact is mentioned in Hook's *Memoirs of Sir David Baird*, and some doubt is thrown upon it in Gurwood's *Despatches of Wellington*; though that gallant officer admits that Baird's elevated character was perfectly capable of so honourable a course. But, for the honour of human nature, the author is happy to be able to give it an entire confirmation, having repeatedly heard the anecdote from a most gallant officer who was present on the occasion, and afterward contributed, in no small degree, to the glories of Delhi and Laswaree: Colonel Gerard, afterward adjutant-general of the Bengal army, then engaged in the siege, the author's lamented brother-in-law, to whose talents and virtues, durably recorded in the exploits of that band of heroes, he has a melancholy pleasure in bearing this public testimony.—See Hook's *Memoirs of Sir David Baird*, i., 193; and Gurwood, i., 25, note.

plosion. Early on the morning of the 4th, the troops destined for the assault were placed in the trenches; and the hour of one o'clock May 4. in the afternoon was chosen for the attack, when the sultry heat usually disposed the Asiatics to repose. Two thousand five hundred Europeans and eighteen hundred natives formed the storming party, under the command of General Baird. They had a fearful prospect before them, for two-and-twenty thousand veteran troops composed the garrison, and the bastions, of uncommon strength, were armed with two hundred and forty pieces of cannon.* "Follow me, my brave fellows, and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers!" was the brief address of that noble officer to his gallant followers, as, leaping sword in hand out of the trenches, he descended the slope which led to the rocky bed of the Cavery, and required to be crossed before the foot of the breach was reached. He was rapidly followed by the forlorn hope, which soon led the host, and was immediately succeeded by the assaulting column in close array. But the enemy were at their post: all was ready for the assault, every battery was manned, and from every bastion and gun which bore on the assailants a close and deadly fire was directed, which speedily thinned their ranks, and would have caused any other troops to recoil. On, however, the British rushed, followed by their brave allies, through the deadly storm; in five minutes the river was crossed, in five more the breach was mounted; a crimson torrent streamed over the ruin; a sally on the flank of the assaulting column by a chosen body of Tippoo's guards was repulsed; and, as Baird was leading his men up the entangled steep, a loud shout and a waiving of the British colours on its summits announced that the fortress was won, and the capital of Mysore fallen. Dividing his men into two columns, under Colonels Sherbrooke and Dunlop, Baird soon swept the ramparts both to the right and left; the brave Asiatics were by degrees forced back, though not without desperate resistance, to the palace, where a dreadful slaughter took place. It at length surrendered, with two of Tippoo's sons, when the firing had ceased at other points; while the sultan himself, who had endeavoured to escape at one of the gates of the town, which was assaulted by the sepoys, was some time afterward found dead under a heap of several hundred slain, composed in part of the principal officers of his palace, who had been driven into a confined space, and mowed down by a cross fire of musketry. He was shot by a private soldier when stretched on his palanquin, after having been wounded himself, and had his horse killed under him; while Baird, who for three years had been detained a captive in chains in his dungeons, had the glorious triumph of taking vengeance for his wrongs, by generously protecting and soothing the fears of the youthful sons of his redoubted antagonist.†

Tippoo could never be brought to believe that the English would venture to storm Seringapatam, and he looked forward with confidence to

* Baird's Life, i., 367, 378. Well. Desp., i., 697, 698.

† Baird's Desp., i. Well. Desp., i., 697, 699. Harris's Desp., 7th May, 1799. Ibid., 569. Hook's Life of Baird, i., 367, 386. Scher., i., 29, 33.

the setting in of the heavy rains which were soon approaching, to compel them to raise the siege. He was brave, liberal, and popular during his father's life; but his reign was felt as tyrannical and oppressive by his subjects, which, however, as is often the case in the East, they ascribed rather to the cupidity of his ministers than his own disposition. The Bramins had predicted that the 4th of May would prove an inauspicious day to him; he made them large presents on that very day, and asked them for their prayers. He was sitting at dinner under a covered shed, to avert the rays of the sun, when the alarm was given. He instantly washed his hands, called for his arms, and, mounting his horse, rode towards the breach. On the way he received intelligence that Syed Goffar, his best officer, was killed. "Syed Goffar was never afraid of death," he exclaimed: "let Mohammed Cassim take charge of his division." His corpse was found under a mountain of slain, stripped of all its ornaments and clothing, but with the trusty amulet which he always wore still bound round his right arm. He had received three wounds in the body and one in the temple; but the countenance was not distorted, the eyes open, and the expression that of stern composure. The body was still warm, and for a minute Colonel Wellesley, who was present, thought he was still alive; but the pulse had ceased to beat, which had so long throbbed for the independence of India.*

The storming of Seringapatam was one of the greatest blows ever struck by any nation, and demonstrated at once of what vast efforts the British Empire was capable, when directed by capacity and led by resolution. The immediate fruits of victory were immense: the formidable fortress, the centre of Tippoo's power, garrisoned by twenty-two thousand regular troops, with all his treasures and military resources, had fallen; the whole arsenal and foundries of the kingdom of Mysore were taken, and the artillery they contained amounted to the enormous number of 451 brass and 478 iron guns, besides 287 mounted on the works. Above 520,000 pounds of powder and 424,000 round shot also fell into the hands of the victors: the military resources, on the whole, resembled rather those of an old-established European monarchy than of an Indian potentate recently elevated to greatness. But these trophies, great as they were, constituted the least considerable fruits of this memorable conquest: its moral consequences were far more lasting and important. In one day a race of usurpers had been extinguished, and a powerful empire overthrown; a rival to the British power struck down, and a tyrant of the native princes slain; a military monarchy subverted, and a stroke paralyzing all India delivered. The loss in the assault was very trifling, amounting only to three hundred and eighty-seven killed and wounded, though fourteen hundred had fallen since the commencement of the siege; but the proportion in which it was divided indicated upon whom the weight of the contest had fallen, and how superior in the deadly breach European energy was to

Asiatic valour; for of that number three hundred and forty were British, and only forty-seven native soldiers.*

Colonel Wellesley was not engaged in the storm, but he commanded the reserve, which did not require to be called into action, and viewed, merely with impatient regret, the heart-stirring scene. He was next day, however, appointed governor of the town by General Harris, which appointment was confirmed by Lord Wellesley, and constitutes one of the few blots on his administration. History, indeed, apart from biographical discussion, has little cause to lament an appointment which early called into active service the great civil as well as military qualities of the Duke of Wellington, and which were immediately exerted with such vigour and effect in arresting the plunder and disorders consequent on the storm, that in a few days the shops were all reopened, and the bazars were as crowded as they had been during the most flourishing days of the Mysore dynasty. But individual injustice is not to be always excused by the merits of the preferred functionary; and unquestionably the hero of Seringapatam, the gallant officer who led the assault, was entitled to a very different fate from that of being superseded in the command almost before the sweat was wiped from the brow which he had adorned with the laurels of victory.†

The political arrangements consequent on the fall of Mysore rivalled in ability and wisdom the vigour with which the military operations had been directed. The body of Tippoo was interred, with the honours due to his rank, in his father's mausoleum: his sons obtained a splendid establishment from the prudent generosity of the victors; the principal Mohammedan officers of the Mysore family, the main strength of the monarchy, were conciliated by being permitted to retain their rank, offices, and emoluments under the new government; the heir of the ancient rajahs of Mysore, whom Hyder had dispossessed, was restored to the sovereignty of the country, with a larger territory than any of his ancestors had possessed; the Nizam was rewarded for his fidelity by a large accession of territory taken from the conquests made by the Hyder family; the Peishwa was confirmed in his alliance by a grant somewhat more than a half of what had been allotted to the Nizam, although his conduct during the war had been so equivocal as to have forfeited all claim to the generosity of the British government, and rendered his participation in the spoil a matter merely of policy; while to the company were reserved the rich territories of Tippoo on either coast, below the Ghauts, the forts commanding those important passes into the high table-land of Mysore, with the fortress and island of Seringapatam in its centre: acquisitions which entirely encircled the dominions of the new Rajah of Mysore by the British possessions, and rendered his forces a subsidiary addition to those of the company. With such judgment were these arrangements

Appointment of Colonel Wellesley as Governor of Seringapatam.

Judicious arrangements consequent on the fall of Mysore.

* Wellesley's *Desp.*, i., 709, App., and 572. Scherer, i., 39.

† Hook's *Life of Baird*, i., 226. Scherer, i., 34.

* Scherer, i., 31, 37.

effected by the directions of Lord Wellesley, and under the immediate superintendence of Colonel Wellesley, and so considerable were the territories which were at the disposal of the victorious power, that all parties were fully satisfied with their acquisitions. The families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun enjoyed more magnificent establishments than they had even done during the late reign: the infant Rajah of Mysore was elevated from a hovel to a palace, and reinstated in more than his ancestral splendour; the Mohammedan officers of the fallen dynasty, surprised by the continuance of all the honours and offices which they had formerly enjoyed, were impressed with the strongest sense of the generosity of the British government; while the substantial power of Mysore had passed, with a territory yielding five hundred and sixty thousand pounds sterling a year, to the munificent victors,* and Marquis Wellesley, the distributor of all this magnificence, put the purest gem in the diadem of glory with which his brows were encircled,† by refusing for himself and his family any portion of the extensive prize-money derived from the public stores taken at Seringapatam, which had fallen into the hands of the victorious army.‡

Little difficulty was experienced in effecting the pacific settlement of the Mysore after the death of Tippoo, the principal rajahs having hastened to make their submission after they heard of the favourable terms offered by the conqueror to the nobles; and the judgment as well as firmness of Colonel Wellesley, upon whom, as Governor of Mysore, the principal part of that important duty devolved, was alike conspicuous. One, however, Doondiah Waugh, a partisan of great energy and activity, was imprudently liberated during the confusion consequent on the storm of Seringapatam, and, having collected a band of freebooters and disbanded soldiers from the wreck of Tippoo's army, long maintained, with indefatigable perseverance, a desultory warfare. He first retired into the rich province of Bednore, which he plundered, during the paralysis of government consequent on the fall of the Mysore dynasty, with merciless severity; but Colonel Stevenson and Col-

onel Dalrymple having advanced against him at the head of light bodies of cavalry and infantry, he was defeated in several encounters, the forts which he had occupied carried by assault, and himself driven, with a few followers, into the neutral Mahratta territory. Doondiah, however, though defeated, was not subdued. Meeting with no very friendly reception from the Mahratta chiefs, he again, in the succeeding year, hoisted the colours of independence, and soon attracted to his standard multitudes of those roving adventurers who, in India, are ever ready to join any chieftain of renown who promises them impunity and plunder.*

Colonel Wellesley was so fully aware of the necessity of not permitting such a leader to accumulate a considerable force in provinces but recently subjected to European rule, and abounding with disorderly characters of every description, that, though he had recently refused the command of the projected expedition against Batavia from a sense of the importance of his duties in Mysore, he took the field against him in person, and soon brought the contest to a successful termination. Doondiah having entered the Peishwa's territories in May, 1800, he immediately moved against him with a body of light infantry, two regiments of British and two of native dragoons. A victory recently gained over a considerable body of Mahratta horse had greatly elated the spirits of Doondiah and his followers; he was rapidly following in the footsteps of Hyder Ali in the formation of a dynasty; and, in the anticipation of boundless dominion, he had already assumed the title of "King of the World." But the hand of fate was upon him. Advancing with a celerity which exceeded the far-famed swiftness of the Indian chief, marching frequently twenty-five or thirty miles a day, even under the burning sun and over the waterless plains of India, Colonel Wellesley at length came up with the enemy, who retired at his approach. Hangal, into which he had thrown a garrison, was stormed; Dummul, garrisoned by a thousand choice troops, carried by escalade; a division of his army, four thousand strong, attacked and routed, early on the morning of the 30th, on the banks of the Malpoorba, the whole artillery, baggage, and camels being taken; and at length intelligence was received that Doondiah himself, with five thousand horse, lay at Conaghur, about thirty miles distant from Colonel Wellesley's cavalry. The latter made a forced march to reach him before it was dark, but the jaded state of the horses rendered it impossible to get nearer than nine miles; two hours before daylight, however, on the following morning, he was again in motion, and at five o'clock met the "King of the World," as he was marching to the westward, without any expectation of the British being at hand. Colonel Wellesley had only the 19th and 22d dragoons, and two regiments of native horse, in all about twelve hundred men; but with these he instantly advanced to the attack. Forming his troops into one line, so as not to be outflanked by the superior numbers of the enemy, who were quadruple his own force,

* The territory acquired by Tippoo's conquest at this juncture by the company was 20,000 square miles, while the Rajah of Mysore was reinstated in 29,250. The cession made by Tippoo on occasion of Lord Cornwallis's treaty was 24,000 square miles. England contains 43,000 square miles.—MARTIN'S *Map of India, Colonial Library*, and *WELL. Desp.* i., p. 1.

† Lord Well. *Desp.* to Directors, 3d Aug., 1799, ii., 72, 101.

‡ His letter on this subject is as follows: "I understand that, if the reserved part of the prize taken at Seringapatam, consisting of prize-money and ordnance, should come into the possession of the company, it is their intention to grant the whole to the army, reserving £100,000, to be afterward granted to me. I am satisfied that, upon reflection, you will perceive that the accepting such a grant would place me in a very humiliating situation with respect to the army; and, independent of any question of my character, or of the dignity and vigour of my government, I should be miserable if I could ever feel that I had been enriched at the expense of those who must ever be the objects of my affection, admiration, and gratitude, and who are justly entitled to the exclusive possession of all that a munificent king and an admiring country can bestow. Even if the independence of my family were at stake, which I thank God is not, I never could consent to establish it on an arrangement injurious to the conquerors of Mysore."—LORD WELLESLEY to Henry Dundas, 20th April, 1800, *Desp.* ii., 262, 263.

* Auber, ii., 196, 197. Scherer, i., 42, 43

and leading the charge himself, the British general resolutely bore down upon the foe. Doondiah's men were hardy veterans, skilfully drawn up in a strong position; but they quailed before the terrible charge of the British horse, and broke ere the hostile squadrons were upon them. The whole force was dispersed in the pursuit, and Doondiah himself slain: a decisive event, which at once terminated the war, and afforded no small exultation to the English soldiers,* who brought back his body in triumph, lashed to a galloper gun, to the camp.

The effect of these brilliant successes soon appeared in the alliances which were courted with the company by the Asiatic powers. The Nizam, who had obtained so large an accession of territory by the partition treaty of Mysore, soon found himself unequal to the task of governing his newly-acquired territories, which were filled with warlike hordes, whom the strong arm of military power alone could retain in subjection, and he solicited, in consequence, to be relieved of a burden which his character and resources were alike incapable of bearing. A treaty, offensive and defensive, was accordingly concluded

with that potentate soon after he had entered into possession of his new dominions, by which the company guaranteed the integrity of his dominions against all attacks from whatever quarter, and, to add to the security which he so ardently desired, agreed to augment the subsidiary force stationed at Hyderabad by two additional regiments of infantry and one of cavalry; while the Nizam ceded to the company the whole territories which he had acquired by the treaties of Seringapatam in 1792, and Mysore in 1799, of which he had never been able to obtain more than a nominal possession. The territories thus acquired by the company amounted to 25,950 square miles, or more than half of all England, and yielded a revenue of £450,000. The Rajah of Tanjore, anxious to shelter himself under a similar protection, entered into a treaty of the same description, and in return ceded territories, for the maintenance of his subsidiary force, amounting to 4000 square miles.† The Portuguese settlement of Goa was voluntarily surrendered by its debilitated possessors to the English authorities, and the descendants of the ancient discoverers and conquerors of India acknowledged the rising supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Amicable relations were at the same time established with the Imaum of Muscat, a powerful chief, having a considerable naval force and vast maritime coast in the Persian Gulf and on the shores of Arabia, and the King of Persia, which terminated in the conclusion of a most important treaty, both commercial and political, with the court of Ispahan. By its valuable privileges were secured to British trade in the interior of Asia, and a barrier was provided against the only powers which at that period were thought to

threaten the provinces of Hindostan. It was agreed that, in the event of any inroad being threatened by the Affghans, or any hostile measures attempted by France, Persia would make common cause with England in arresting the invader. No stipulations were deemed necessary against Russia, though all history told that it was from that quarter that all the serious invasions of India had emanated, and although only two years before a treaty had been concluded between Napoleon and the Emperor Paul for the transport of a force of thirty-five thousand French and fifty thousand Russian troops, from the banks of the Rhine and of the Wolga to those of the Indus.* So shortsighted are the views even of the ablest statesmen and diplomatists when, carried away by the pressing, and perhaps accidental dangers of the moment, they overlook the durable causes which, in every age, elevate and direct the waves of conquest.†

Delivered from all domestic dangers by these prosperous events, Lord Wellesley was enabled to direct the now colossal strength of the Indian Empire to foreign objects. Such was the extent of resources at the disposal of government, that, without weakening the force to any considerable degree at any of the presidencies, he was enabled to fit out an expedition at Bombay, consisting of seven thousand men, to take part in the great concerted attack by the British government upon the French in Egypt. Sir D. Baird, as a just reward for his heroic conduct at Seringapatam, received the command, and sailed from Bombay on the 30th of March. Colonel Wellesley had been appointed second in command, and he looked forward with exultation to the service for which he was destined, but a severe illness rendered it impossible for him to follow out his destination. General Baird, therefore, proceeded alone, and Colonel Wellesley, to whom the importance and romantic character of the expedition had rendered it an object of the highest interest, continued during his recovery to write letters to his brave commanding officer, containing suggestions for the conduct of the campaign and precautions against its dangers, highly characteristic of the sagacious foresight of his mind. General Baird conducted the expedition with admirable skill, and contributed in no small degree, by his opportune arrival, to the surrender of the French force at Cairo and the triumphant issue of the Egyptian campaign;‡ while fate, which here seemed to have blasted Colonel Wellesley in the brightest epoch of his career, was only reserving him for higher destinies, and preparing, in the triumph of Assaye, the opening of that career which was destined to bring the war to a triumphant conclusion.§

Civil transactions, however, of the most important nature, highly conducive to the power and stability of the British Empire in the East, ensued before the sword was again drawn

Expedition under Sir David Baird from India to Egypt, March, 1801.

Great acquisition of territory from the Vizier of Oude.

And with the Imaum of Muscat and the King of Persia.

Jan. 12, 1801.

* Sir A. Wellesley to Col. Monro, 11th Sept., 1800, and Lord Wellesley, 31st Aug., 1800. Gurw., i., 69, 72, 73.

† Auber, ii., 205. Malcolm, ii., 283, 284. Well. Desp., ii., 580, 582.

* See *Ante*, ii., 156.
† Auber, i., 205. Malcolm, 283, 284, 317. App., 534, 538. Well. Desp., ii., 580, 581.

‡ *Ante*, ii., 173.
§ Baird's Life, ii., 283, 293. Col. Wellesley to Gen. Baird, 11th of April, 1801. Gurw., i., 84, 97.

on the plains of Hindostan. The kingdom of Oude had long been the seat of a large British force, both on account of the internal weakness of its government and the importance of its situation on the northern frontier of India, and the first likely to fall a victim to foreign invasion. By existing treaties, the company were at liberty to augment the subsidiary force serving in that province, if they deemed such increase requisite for the security of the two states; and the mutinous, turbulent disposition both of the vizier's soldiers and subjects, as well as his inextricable pecuniary embarrassments, had long made it too apparent that it was indispensably necessary for the very existence of society in these provinces, the security of our northern frontier, as well as the payment of the subsidized force, that the weakness and corruption of the native government should be exchanged for the vigour and equity of British rule. The native prince, however, though well aware of his inability either to conduct his own administration or discharge his engagements to the British government, evinced the utmost repugnance to make the proposed cessions of territory in discharge of his obligations to maintain a subsidiary force; but at length his scruples were overcome by the firmness and ability of the British diplomatic agent, Mr. Henry Wellesley, and a treaty was concluded at Lucknow, by which his high-

Sept. 6.

ness ceded to the British government all the frontier provinces of Oude, particularly Goorackpore and the lower Doab, containing thirty-two thousand square miles, or three fourths of the area of England. The revenue of the ceded districts, at the time of the treaty, was estimated at considerably less than the subsidy which the Nawaub was bound to furnish for the pay of the subsidiary force, by which alone his authority had been maintained; but the British government was amply indemnified for this temporary loss by the value of the ceded districts, which, under the firm government of the company, soon rose to triple their former value, while the native prince obtained the benefit of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the company, and a permanent force of thirteen thousand men to defend his remaining territories; and the inhabitants of the transferred provinces received the incalculable advantage of exchanging a corrupt and oppressive native for an honest and energetic European government.*

Another transaction of a similar character, about the same period, put the British in possession of territories of equal value in the Carnatic. Among many other important papers discovered in the secret archives of Tippoo Sultan at Seringapatam, was a correspondence in cipher between that ambitious chief and the Nawaub of the Carnatic, Omdut-ul-Onraah, which left no doubt that the latter had been engaged in a hostile combination against the British government.† The

situation of the rich and fertile district of the Carnatic, so near to the British provinces on the Madras coast, rendered it of the highest importance that no hidden enemy should exist in that quarter; and, as the authority of the Nawaub had been little more than nominal for a number of years past, Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, received orders to take military possession of the country in June, 1801. The old Nawaub died about that time, and after a difficult negotiation with his son, who had succeeded to his dominions, a treaty was at length concluded, by which the British obtained July 31, 1801. the entire command of his dominions, under the condition only of providing an income suitable to the splendour and dignity of the deposed family. This condition, like all others of a similar character, was faithfully complied with; and though, in making the cession, the young Nawaub unquestionably yielded to compulsion, yet he obtained for himself a peaceable affluence and splendid establishment; for his country, the termination of a distracted rule and a ruinous oppression; and for his subjects, blessings which they never could have obtained under a native dynasty. The territories thus acquired amounted to twenty-seven thousand square miles, and were of the richest description, extending on the plains from the foot of the Mysore Mountains to the coast of Coromandel.*

But there never was a juster observation than the one already noticed, that con- Causes of the quest, to induce security, must be rapture with universal; for anything short of that the Mahrattas. only induces additional causes of

jealousy, and a wider sphere of hostility. By destroying the power of Tippoo and reducing the Nizam to a mere tributary condition, the English had done what Napoleon had achieved by crushing Prussia, humbling Austria, and establishing the Confederation of the Rhine; they had rendered inevitable a contest with a more formidable power than either, and induced a struggle for life or death with the most powerful nations in India. The formation of alliances, offensive and defensive, with the Nizam and the Rajah of Mysore, necessarily brought the British government into contact with their restless and enterprising neighbours the MAHRATTAS, and made them succeed to all the complicated diplomatic relations between the courts of Hyderabad, Seringapatam, and Poonah. It is needless to examine minutely the causes of the jealousy and ultimate rupture which ensued between them. That the Mahrattas, a powerful confederacy, inflamed by conquest, inured to rapine, whose hand was against every man and every man's hand against them, and who could bring two hundred thousand horsemen into the field, should view with apprehension the rapid advances of the English to supreme dominion, is not surprising; the only thing to

tentate and the Mahrattas and the English, which had been the principal means, in 1792, of reducing the power of Tippoo. The English were denominated *Taza Waruds*, or the new-comers; the Nizam himself *Fleece*, or nothing; and the Mahrattas *Pooch*, or contemptible. By the 10th article of the treaty of 1792, he was bound "not to enter into any negotiation or political correspondence with any European or native power whatever without the consent of the company."—MALCOLM'S *India*, 337, 339.

* Well. Desp., ii., 515, 531, 547, 561. Auber, ii., 209 211. Malcolm, 334, 360

* Sultan's Treaty, Well. Desp., ii., 599. Malcolm, 322, 325. Auber, ii., 227, 231.

† This correspondence, the cipher to which was accidentally discovered, was very curious. It contained decisive evidence that the Nawaub had severely reprobated the Nizam's alliance with the English, as contrary to the dictates of religion; as well as the triple alliance between that po-

wonder at is, that, like the European powers in regard to Napoleon, they should so long have looked supinely on while the redoubtable stranger beat down successively every native power within his reach. They owed, as already mentioned, a nominal allegiance to the Peishwa, who was the head of their confederacy, and held his seat of government on the Musnud, or throne, at Poonah; and it was with him that all the treaties and diplomatic intercourse, both of the company and the native powers, had been held. But his authority, like that of the emperor in the Germanic confederacy, was more nominal than real; and the principal chiefs in this warlike, restless race, acted as much on their own account as the cabinets of Vienna, Berlin, or Munich.* Three of these had recently risen to eminence, and formed the chief powers with whom the English had to contend in the arduous conflict which followed: the Rajahs of BERAR, SCINDIAH, and HOLKAR.

The Rajah of Berar had established a sway over all the territory from the sea on the western shore of the Bay of Bengal to the dominions of the Nizam on the southwest. His capital was at Nagpoor, and he could bring twenty thousand disciplined cavalry, and half that number of infantry, into the field. Scindiah's power was much more considerable. Besides eighteen thousand admirable horse, he had sixteen battalions of regular infantry under the command of European officers, and above two hundred pieces of cannon ready for action. Holkar's territories were farther removed from the scene of action, being situated between the dominions of the Scindiah and Bombay, but his power was greater than either of the other chieftains. He could with ease bring eighty thousand men into the field; and, though the greater part of them were cavalry, they were only on that account the more formidable to an invading enemy. The families of the two latter of these chiefs had been of recent elevation; the founder of that of Scindiah, the grandfather of the present rajah, had originally been a cultivator, and owed his rise, when a private soldier in the guard of the Peishwa, to the accidental circumstance of being discovered by his sovereign, when left at the door in charge of his slippers, asleep, with the slippers clasped with fixed hands to his breast: a proof of fidelity to his humble duty which justly attracted the attention of the monarch. Both the present rajah and his father had been the resolute opposers of the English power; and, though they wielded at will the resources of the Peishwa, they were careful to observe all the ceremonials of respect to that decayed potentate. When Scindiah was at the head of sixteen regular battalions, a hundred thousand horse, and two hundred pieces of cannon, he placed himself at the court of the Peishwa below all the hereditary nobles of the state, declined to sit down in their presence, and, untying a bundle of slippers, said, "This is my occupation: it was my father's." But, though thus humble in matters of form, no man was more vigorous and energetic in the real business of government. He was the nominal subject, but real

master of the unfortunate Mogul emperor, Schah Aulum; the ostensible friend, but secret enemy of his rival Holkar; the professed inferior, but actual superior and oppressor of the Rajpoot chiefs of Central India; the enrolled soldier, but tyrannic ruler of the declining throne of the Peishwa.*

The family of Holkar were of the shepherd tribe; the first who rose above the class of peasants was Mulhar Row, born in 1693. By the vigour and ability which they displayed, his ancestors gradually rose to eminence under the Mahratta chiefs, and, at the death of Tukajie, the head of the family, in 1797, two legitimate and two natural sons appeared to contest the palm of supremacy. Jeswunt Row was the youngest of the latter class; and in the first civil contest which ensued with his legitimate brothers he was totally defeated, and obliged to fly with only a few followers. The native vigour of his character, however, rose superior to all his difficulties; after undergoing the most extraordinary vicissitudes of fortune, in the course of which he on one occasion quelled a revolt among his Pindarrie followers by springing from his horse, and with his own hand loading and discharging a fieldpiece among them, he at length succeeded in all his designs, and, under the title of guardian to the infant son of his elder legitimate brother, in effect obtained the command of the whole possessions of the Holkar family. For some time he was engaged in hostilities with Scindiah; but no sooner was his power fully established, than these two formidable chieftains united their forces against the Peishwa, the acknowledged head of their confederacy. The combined armies encountered those of the Peishwa in the neighbourhood of Poonah; 25th October, 1800. Scindiah's forces commenced the action, and his troops at first met with a repulse; while Holkar, with his cavalry mounted, watched the conflict from the heights in the rear. Instantly mounting his horse, the brave chief bade all who did not intend to conquer or die to return to their wives and children; for himself, he was resolved not to survive defeat. Bearing down with his squadrons, yet fresh, on the wearied foe, Holkar soon restored the combat, and finally routed the Peishwa's troops with great slaughter. The unhappy monarch was obliged to fly from his capital, which was soon occupied by his enemies, and the august head of the Mahrattas appeared as a suppliant in the British territories.†

Lord Wellesley justly deemed this a favourable opportunity to establish a proper balance of power among the Mahratta states, and erect a barrier between their most enterprising chiefs and the British dependances. It had long been a leading object of English policy to prevent the establishment of any considerable power in India with whom the French might form dangerous connexions; and already a sort of military state had risen up, of the most formidable character, under French officers, and under Scindiah's protection, on the banks of

* Auber, ii., 272, 277. Lord Wellesley to the Secret Committee, Sept., 1803, iii., 372.

† Auber, ii., 275, 287. Malcolm, 287, 290. Well. Despatches, iii., 27, 34, Introduct.

* Lord Well. Memoirs, iii., 26, Introduct. Auber, ii., 272, 273.

the Jumna. Perron, a French officer in the service of that chieftain, had organized a formidable force, consisting of thirty thousand infantry and eight thousand cavalry, admirably equipped and disciplined, with a train of a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon of brass, and one hundred and twenty iron guns, entirely under the direction of officers of his own country, and disposed equally to second the hostile views of the Mahratta confederacy, or forward those of Napoleon for the subversion of the British power in the East. For the maintenance of this subsidiary force he had obtained a grant of a rich and extensive territory yielding £1,700,000 a year of revenue, extending from the banks of the Jumna towards those of the Indus, through the Punjab, and comprising Agra, Delhi, and a large portion of the Doab, or alluvial plain between the Jumna and the Ganges. It was not the least important circumstance in this military establishment that it gave M. Perron the entire command of the person of the unfortunate Shah Aulum, the degraded heir of the throne of Delhi, and promised, at no distant period, to put the French emperor in possession of the rights of the house of Timour over the Indian peninsula.*

The Peishwa was not insensible of the need in which he stood of British protection to maintain his precarious authority over the unruly Mahratta chiefs; but dread of the hostility of Scindiah and Holkar, joined to a secret jealousy of the rising power of those aspiring foreigners, had hitherto prevented him from closing with the advances made to him by the governor-general; and he had even declined to accept the share of the spoils of Mysore, which, in order to conciliate his cabinet, had, notwithstanding their dubious conduct in the war with Tippoo, been offered by the British government. The decisive overthrow received from Scindiah and Holkar, however, and the desperate state of his affairs in consequence of their invasion, entirely overcame these scruples; and, on the morning of the day on which he evacuated his capital, the fugitive monarch eagerly solicited the aid of a British subsidiary force to enable him to make head against his rebellious feudatories. He was cordially received, therefore, by the English authorities; and, having escaped out of his dominions, he embarked on board a British vessel, and landed safely at Bombay. The result of these disastrous circumstances was the conclusion of the treaty of Bassieu, between the company and the Peishwa, in virtue of which a close alliance, offensive and defensive, was contracted by the two powers, and the latter agreed to receive a subsidiary force, to be maintained at his expense, of six thousand men.†

This crisis was rightly considered by Lord Wellesley to require the immediate application of the most vigorous measures. In contemplation of its arrival, he had already collected a body of twenty thousand men un-

der General Stuart, at Hurrighur, a town of the Madras presidency, near the Mahratta frontier; while General, afterward Lord LAKE, received the command of the principal force, called the army of Bengal, which was stationed in Oude. The Madras army, however, was afterward divided into two parts, and the command of the advanced guard, consisting of ten thousand European and sepoy troops, with two thousand of the Mysore horse, was intrusted to Colonel Wellesley, whose admirable disposition during the war with Doondiah had both won for him the confidence of the troops and conciliated the good-will of the native powers. With this force, that enterprising officer broke up from Hurrighur on the 9th of March, and, after crossing the Tumbudra River, entered the Mahratta territory. He was everywhere received by the people as a deliverer: the peasants, won by the strict discipline of his troops, and the regular payment for provisions in the former campaign, flocked in crowds with supplies to the camp; while the whole inhabitants, worn out with the incessant oppression of the Mahratta sway, welcomed, with loud shouts, the troops who were to introduce in its room the steadiness of British rule and the efficiency of British protection. Holkar had left Poonah some time before, with the bulk of his forces, and the garrison which he had left in that capital abandoned it on the approach of the British forces. Colonel Wellesley, therefore, deemed it unnecessary to wait the tardy movements of the infantry; and, aware of the importance of gaining possession of the capital before Scindiah could assemble forces for its relief, or the threats of burning it, which they had uttered, could be executed, put himself at the head of the cavalry, and, advancing by forced marches, reached Poonah on the 19th of April, and entered the city amid the acclamations of the inhabitants, whom, by an extraordinary effort, he had saved from the vengeance of the retiring enemy. In the thirty-two hours immediately preceding he had marched at the head of his horse above sixty miles: an instance of sustained effort, under the burning sun of India, which never has been exceeded in history.*

The effects of this vigorous step were soon apparent. The Peishwa, relieved from his compulsory exile in Bombay, returned to his dominions, and was re-seated with much pomp, in presence of the British army, on the Musnud, or hereditary throne of the Mahrattas. His principal feudatories renewed their allegiance to him, and even, in some instances, joined their troops to the British forces; and it was for a short time hoped that this great stroke of securing the Peishwa to the British interest, by the strong bond of experienced necessity, would be accomplished without the effusion of human blood. It soon appeared, however, that those hopes were fallacious. The jealousies and animosities of the Mahratta chiefs had been subdued by the approach of common danger; and it speedily became manifest, from the great accumulation of forces which assembled on the frontiers of the Nizam's territories, that hostile

* Malcolm, 308. Wellesley's Desp., iii., 29, 31, Introd. Auber, ii., 286, 287. Gurw., i., 87.

† Wellesley's Desp., iii., 33, 36. Malcolm, 290, 291. Auber, ii., 287, 289.

* Wellesley's Desp., iii., 37, 38, Introd. Gurw., iii., 138, 145.

ities on a very extended scale were in contemplation. Lord Wellesley's preparations were immediate, and proportioned to the imminence of the danger. General Lake assumed the command of the principal army, twenty-five thousand strong, which had assembled in Oude; while Colonel Wellesley, now promoted to the rank of general, drew near to the threatening mass of forces which was collected on the Nizam's frontier. A long negotiation ensued, conducted by Colonel Collins, the British resident at the court of Scindiah, the professed aim of which was to smooth away the subjects of jealousy which had arisen between the two powers; its real object to gain time for Scindiah, till the preparations of the Rajah of Berar were completed, and his approach had enabled

May 27. the combined forces to take the field. At length, in the end of May, Scindiah, being much pressed to give an explanation of his armaments, or direct the withdrawal of his troops, broke up the conference by declaring, "After my interview with the Rajah of Berar, you shall be informed whether we will have peace or war." It was evident to the persons who conducted this negotiation that the success of the Mahratta confederacy with Hyder in 1780, which had brought the Madras presidency to the brink of ruin, had inspired the chiefs of that nation with a most extravagant opinion of their own importance; that they were wholly unaware of the vast intermediate progress which the British power had made, and deemed that the renewal of hostilities on their part was to be immediately followed by the siege of Madras and expulsion of the English from India. Perceiving this, and being convinced that a rupture was inevitable, Lord Wellesley committed full diplomatic powers to his generals in the field; and General Wellesley demanded, in July 22. peremptory terms, an explanation of his intentions, and removal of his forces from Scindiah to a less threatening station. The rajah, in his turn, insisted upon the withdrawal of the British forces, to which General Wellesley at once agreed; but, when the time for carrying the mutual retreat into effect arrived, the Mahratta showed no disposition to move, and the British government received information that the combined chiefs had resolved not to retire Aug. 3. from their threatening position. Upon this, the resident quitted Scindiah's court, and war began both in the Oude frontier under Lord Lake, and that of the Nizam under General Wellesley.*†

* Wellesley's *Desp.*, iii., 38, 41, *Intro.*, and 344, 346. Malcolm, 293, 307. Auber, ii., 291, 299.

† The substance of this important negotiation was thus pithily summed up by the Duke of Wellington, in a letter to Scindiah at this period: "The British government did not threaten to commit hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against them and their allies; and, when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war, and, in conformity with your threats and declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam frontier. On this ground I called upon you to withdraw your army to its usual stations, if your pacific declarations were sincere; but, instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs; and that you and the Rajah of Berar should be suffered to remain with your troops assembled, in readiness to take advantage of their absence. This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible, and you must stand to the consequences of the

The campaign which followed, though it lasted only five months, was one of the most brilliant in the British annals, and conducted our Eastern empire, by an uninterrupted series of victories, to the proud pre-eminence which it has ever since retained. General Lake's instructions, dictated by that clear perception of the vital point of retack, which, as much as his admirable foresight, characterized all Marquis Wellesley's combinations, were to concentrate all his efforts, in the first instance, upon the destruction of M. Perron's formidable force on the banks of the Jumna; next, to get possession of Delhi and Agra, with the person of Shah Aulum, the Mogul emperor; and, finally, to form alliances with the Rajpoots and other native powers beyond the Jumna, so as to exclude Scindiah from the northern parts of India. General Wellesley was directed to move against the combined forces of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, on the Nizam's frontier, and distract their attention by vigorous operations, while the decisive blows were struck by General Lake at the centre of their power, and subsidiary operations were to be conducted by Colonel Campbell against the province of Cuttack, and the city of Jaggernaut, with the view of adding that important district, the link between the Bengal and Madras provinces, to the British dominions.*

General Lake's army commenced its march from the ceded provinces of Cawn- Defeat of Perron's force, and storm of Allighur. Aug. 28. pore on the 7th of August, and on the 28th, as he drew near to Perron's force, he received a letter from that officer, proposing to enter into an arrangement, by which he himself and the troops under his command might remain neutral in the contest which was approaching; but the terms proposed were deemed inadmissible, and the flag of truce returned without effecting any arrangement. On the day following, 29th Aug. the English came up with the whole of Perron's force, drawn up in a strong position, covering the important fort of Allighur. They were immediately attacked by the British army with the greatest vigour, and, after a short resistance, put to flight. The fortress of Allighur was next besieged; and, as the extraordinary strength of its fortifications, armed with one hundred and eighty guns, rendered operations in form a very tedious undertaking, General Lake, after a few days' cannonading, 4th Sept. resolved to hazard the perilous attempt of an escalade. The ditch, to use his own expression, was so large as to float a seventy-four, and the garrison, four thousand strong, both disciplined and resolute; but all these difficulties were overcome by the devoted gallantry of the storming party, headed by the 76th regiment, led by Colonel Monson; and after a bloody struggle, an hour in duration, the gates were blown open, and the British colours hoisted on the walls of the fortress.†

measures which I find myself obliged to adopt to repel your aggressions. I offered you peace upon terms of equality, and honourable to all parties; you have chosen war, and are responsible for all the consequences."—Gen. WELLESLEY TO SCINDIAH, Aug. 6, 1803. *Well. Desp.*, iii., 277.

* Auber, ii., 301, 305. Wellesley's *Desp.*, iii., 210, 215. † Lord Lake's *Desp.*, Sept. 4, 1803. *Well. Desp.*, iii., 291, 294. Auber, ii., 306.

Brilliant as was this opening of the campaign, it was speedily succeeded by other successes still more important. Advancing rapidly towards Delhi, General Lake was met by General Perron, who entered into a separate negotiation, and soon passed through the British camp on his way to embark for France, with the large fortune which he had made in the Mahratta service. But he Sept. 11. was succeeded in the command of the French subsidiary force by M. Louis, who, instead of showing any disposition to come to an accommodation, advanced in great force, and with a most formidable train of artillery. The British army, after a fatiguing march of eighteen miles, on the 11th of September found the enemy, twenty thousand strong, including sixteen thousand disciplined in the European method, with a hundred pieces of cannon, posted on a strong ridge which covered the approaches to the city of Delhi. The troops which General Lake had at his immediate disposal, as the whole of the army had not come up, did not exceed five thousand men; but with this handful of heroes he did not hesitate instantly to advance to the attack. When the men came within range, they were received by a tremendous fire, first of round and chain-shot, and afterward of grape and musketry. Advancing, however, without flinching, through the dreadful storm, the British waited till the order was given, at the distance of a hundred yards, to fire; and then, after pouring in a close and well-directed volley, rushed forward with the bayonet, and in a few minutes drove the enemy from their guns and from the field in the utmost confusion. Sixty-eight pieces of heavy artillery, thirty-seven tumbrils, and eleven standards were taken; but such was the severity of the fire to which they were exposed during their rapid advance, that in that short time four hundred of the British army were killed and wounded, and it was to the steady intrepidity of the 76th regiment that General Lake mainly ascribed the glorious result of the battle.*†

* Lord Lake's Despatch, Sept. 12 and 13, 1803. Well. Despatch, iii., 308, 313.

† The following passage in Lord Lake's private despatch to Lord Wellesley on this occasion contains a remark of permanent interest, more especially in anticipation of the future progress of events in the Indian Peninsula: "I cannot avoid saying, in the most confidential manner, that, in the event of a foreign foe coming into this country, without a very great addition of force in Europeans the consequences will be fatal, as there ought always to be at least one European battalion to four native ones: this I think necessary. I have seen a great deal of these people lately, and am quite convinced that, without king's troops, very little is to be expected: in short, the infantry of this army, as well as cavalry, should be remodelled."—*Confidential Despatch*, Sept. 12, 1803. Well. Despatch, iii., 312. This wise advice has been since entirely thrown away: because government did not venture, in the face of popular clamour for reduction and retrenchment, to keep up the British troops in India at their former level, far less to augment them to double their amount, as they should have been, to preserve the proper balance between the European and native forces. It was immediately after the battle of Austerlitz that Napoleon, gifted with the sagacity which amounts to prescience, formed his designs for the fortification of Paris; and it was immediately after the battle of Delhi that Lord Lake impressed upon government the necessity of a great augmentation in the European forces in India. The future to the one has passed; and Napoleon, as we shall see in the sequel, fell, because dread of offending the Parisian populace prevented him from carrying into execution what he felt to be essential to the salvation of their independence: the fu-

The immediate consequence of this victory was the capture of Delhi, the ancient capital of Hindostan, and seat of the Mogul emperors, which was taken possession of without resistance on the following day, and the liberation of the Emperor Shah Alum from the degrading servitude in which he had long been retained by the Mahratta and French authorities. The English general was received by the descendant of Timour, seated on his throne with great pomp, in presence of all the dignitaries of the empire; and experience in the end proved that he had made a most beneficial change of his own interest; for, if the original Tartar conqueror would have had much to regret in the deprivation of real power with which his circumstances were attended, his enfeebled successors would have seen much to envy in the perfect security and unbounded luxury which he enjoyed under the liberal protection of his generous allies. The British power derived great moral influence and consideration from this auspicious alliance, and the name of the Emperor of Delhi proved of more service in the end than ever his arms could have been. But an event of more immediate importance to the success of the campaign soon after occurred. M. Louis, and five other chiefs of the French subsidiary force, despairing of their cause, delivered themselves up to the British, and were marched off to Calcutta; while the remainder of the troops under their orders, in a great degree destitute of leaders, retired, though in good order, towards Agra.*

Thither they were speedily followed by General Lake with the British army; Battle and fall and on the 10th of October a general attack was made on their strong positions, intersected by ravines, covering the city from the south. The gallant sepoy troops, emulating the conduct of their European brethren in arms, under the guidance of Lieutenant-colonel Gerard, the adjutant-general of the army, drove the enemy in the finest style from the rugged ground which they occupied, and, pursuing their advantages hotly, ascended the glacis, and gained possession of the town, though not without sustaining a heavy loss. Two days afterward, two thousand five hundred of the enemy came over and entered the British service; and the breaching batteries having been completed, and the fire commenced with great effect on the ramparts, the garrison, six thousand strong, soon after surrendered at discretion. By this decisive blow, the last stronghold and great arsenal of the enemy fell into our hands.† The stores captured were immense: one hundred and sixty pieces of brass and iron cannon were taken, with all their equipments and ammunition; while the discipline observed by the troops in the midst of their triumphs was so extraordinary, and afforded such a contrast to the license

Alliance with the Mogul emperor, and surrender of the French chiefs. Sept. 16.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 17.

ture to us is still to come, though the prospect is enveloped in clouds, and sinister omens may already be discerned in the heavens; but posterity will see whether the British Empire is to be an exception to the rule, and stability is to be given to our power by concessions to popular clamour, which have proved fatal to the greatest of those which have preceded us. * Well. Despatch, iii., 316, 318, 319.

† Lord Lake's Despatch, 10, 13, and 18th October, 1803. Well. Despatch, iii., 393, 408, and App., 670.

and devastation usually attendant on military success in Hindostan, that it contributed, even more than their astonishing victories, to the belief that they were, and the wish that they should continue to be, invincible.*

This early and unparalleled series of successes secured the submission or alliance of all the native potentates in the north of Hindostan; and a treaty of alliance was concluded with the Rajah of

Battle of Laswaree. Oct. 10. Bhurtpore, and another with Runjeet

Oct. 21. Sing, the Rajah of Lahore, in consequence of which fifteen hundred of the latter's horse joined the British camp. Mean-

while, however, Scindiah moved up Nov. 1. fourteen battalions of his best regular infantry from the Deccan by forced marches

into the northern provinces; and these troops, having joined some regiments which had escaped from the wreck of Delhi and Agra, and received an ample supply of artillery, formed a formidable force, which it was of the last importance to destroy before its numbers were still farther augmented by additions from other quarters.

Leaving behind him, therefore, his artillery, and the greater part of his infantry, General Lake set out with the cavalry and light infantry, by forced marches, in pursuit of the enemy.

After several fatiguing days' journey, he reached the spot they had quitted the day before, and received intelligence that they were not more than forty miles from the British camp. Setting out at midnight, he accomplished that distance, at the head of his cavalry, in the next twenty-four hours, and

about noon, on the 1st of November, Nov. 1. came up with the enemy, sixteen thousand strong, with seventy pieces of cannon, advantageously posted with their right upon a rivulet, which required to be crossed before their position was reached, and their left resting on the village of LASWAREE. The dust, which obscured all the ground in advance of the enemy as soon as the rivulet was crossed, prevented the English general from seeing the ex-

tent of the formidable array of guns which protected his front, and, in his anxiety to cut off his retreat to the neighbouring hills, he resolved upon an immediate assault with the cavalry alone, before any part of the infantry had come up. The attack was made, and at first with brilliant success. Wearied as they were, the British and native horse forced the enemy's line at several points, penetrated into the village, and even carried a part of the artillery;* but, being unsupported by infantry and cannon, these gallant horsemen could make no reply to the severe fire of artillery and musketry with which they were assailed; the taken guns could not be withdrawn for want of bullocks, and, after sustaining a severe loss, they were obliged to evacuate all the ground they had gained, and retire to a short distance from the field.

Encouraged by this success, but yet fearful of the onset of the British infantry, when it came up, the enemy sent to say that, if certain terms were allowed them, they would deliver up their guns. General Lake, being doubtful of the issue of a second attack, acceded to the proposal, and gave them an hour to carry it into effect; during which time he formed his little army, consisting of the 76th regiment and seven weak battalions of sepoys, with a few galloper guns, and three regiments of British and five of native cavalry, in all four thousand infantry and three thousand five hundred horse, into two columns; and when the time allowed expired, moved on to the attack. The 76th regiment headed the array, and was directed to move against the enemy's left flank and assault the village of Laswaree; the second column of infantry and all the cavalry were to support the onset of the first, and take advantage of any confusion which might appear in the enemy's line. With an undaunted step, the 76th, with General Lake and all his staff at their head, advanced against the terrible line of cannon which was planted along the enemy's front; so admirable was their steadiness that a staff officer observed at the moment, as they approached the fire, that an arrow discharged at one end of the line would go through half the feathers of the regiment.† No sooner, however, were they arrived within range of canister shot than they were received by so tremendous a fire that in a few minutes a third of their number were struck down; and, at this awful moment, a large body of the enemy's horse bore down to the charge. A close and well-directed volley from this heroic regiment, however, who had never yet fired a shot, repulsed the attack; but, as they retired only to a little distance, and still preserved a menacing attitude on the flank of the advancing column, General Lake ordered them to be charged by the British cavalry.‡

This momentous duty was instantly and ably performed by the 29th regiment of English dragoons, who, by a brilliant charge, overthrew the Mahratta horse, and, by clearing the flank of

Desperate action and final victory of the English.

* "All the inhabitants of this place (Delhi), who for a time fled, perceiving that no ravages had been committed by the troops, returned to their habitations last night. I am informed from all quarters that the inhabitants beheld with astonishment this proof of the discipline and good conduct of the army, and declare that hitherto it has been unknown in Hindostan that a victorious army should pass through a country without destroying by fire, and committing every excess the most injurious to the inhabitants; but, on the contrary, from the regularity observed by us, our approach is a blessing, instead of bringing with it, as they at first feared, all the horrors of war, attended by rapine and murder; that their cattle remain in their fields without being molested, and the inhabitants in their houses receive every protection."—Lord Lake to Lord Wellesley, 2d Oct., 1803; *WELL. Desp.*, iii., 426, 427.

On this occasion, also, Lord Lake reiterates his observation of the indispensable necessity of having a large proportion of British troops to achieve success in India. "The sepoys," says he, "have behaved excessively well; but from my observations on this day, as well as every other, it is impossible to do great things in a gallant and quick style without Europeans; therefore, if they do not in England think it necessary to send British troops in the proportion of one to three sepoy regiments, which is, in fact, as one to six, they will stand a good chance of losing their possessions in India, if a French force once get a footing in India. You may perceive, from the loss of European officers in sepoy regiments, how necessary it is for them to expose themselves; in fact, everything has been done by the example and exertions of the officers, and without which we had not been where we are."—Lord Lake to Lord Wellesley, Oct. 10, 1803; *WELL. Desp.*, iii., 396.

* Lord Lake's *Desp.*, Nov. 2, 1803. *Well. Desp.*, iii., 441, 442.

† I received this striking anecdote from the adjutant-general of the army, Lieutenant-colonel Gerard, to whom the words in the text were addressed by Major Lake, the gallant son of the commander-in-chief.

‡ Lord Lake's *Desp.* Nov. 2, 1803. *Well. Desp.*, iii., 445, 446.

the column of infantry, enabled the successive regiments, as they came up, to deploy. The whole now moved forward at a rapid pace against the enemy's batteries, and sustaining, without flinching, the continued and terrific fire of his artillery, at length, by a sudden rush, made themselves masters of the guns. Aug. 10. Then the left wing did not fly, but commenced, in admirable order, a regular retreat, which, however, was ultimately changed into a rout by the repeated and impetuous charges of the British and native horse, under Colonel Vandeleur. So obstinate was the resistance, so complete the victory, that, of seventeen regular battalions who had engaged in the battle, the whole, with the exception of two thousand prisoners, were either killed or wounded; all the guns, seventy in number, forty-four colours, and the whole ammunition and baggage, taken. By this decisive overthrow, not only was the power of Scindiah in the northern provinces completely broken, but the French influence and authority on the banks of the Jumna, which had suddenly grown up to so formidable a height, finally destroyed. But the success was dearly bought by the British army: above eight hundred of that band of heroes had fallen, or were wounded in the fight; the battle was the most severe that had yet been fought in India; Lord Lake avowed, in his secret despatches to the governor-general, that, if the enemy's sepoy had had an adequate appointment of French officers, the result would have been extremely doubtful, and that the victory was owing entirely to the incomparable valour of the native English troops.*†

Successes of a subordinate kind, but, nevertheless, material in the issue of the campaign, at the same time took place in the eastern provinces.

In the beginning of September, a British force under Colonel Harcourt broke up from the Bengal frontier, invaded Cuttack, and a short time after reached the far-famed city of Jaggernaut. Heavy rains for some weeks afterward prevented farther operations; but in the end of the month they again advanced, and occupied, without resistance, the town of Cuttack, and some days afterward stormed the citadel; and this rich and highly important province, a link lying on the seacoast between the presidencies of Bengal and Madras, was permanently added to the British dominions.‡

While this splendid succession of victories was establishing the British power in the north of India, triumphs of an equally brilliant kind signalized their efforts in the western provinces. Operations commenced in the Deccan with the invasion of the territories of the Rajah of Berar, by General Wellesley, on the 8th of August. On the following day he arrived at the town of Achmednugger, a

strong fortress defended by lofty walls of masonry, supported by towers: without hesitating an instant, he directed an escalade, which was bravely executed, and proved successful without any very serious loss. Batteries were immediately erected against the citadel, and with such effect that it surrendered at discretion in two days, the garrison of fourteen hundred men being made prisoners. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar now advanced towards the invader, who soon after took possession, without resistance, of the noble city of Aurungabad. Scindiah, upon that, moved as if to threaten Hyderabad; but General Wellesley, by marching eastward along the banks of the Godavery, effectually frustrated his designs, and at the same time covered the advance of two important convoys which were coming up to his army. Jalna, an important fort on the frontier of the Mahratta territory, was soon after carried by Colonel Stevenson by assault; and a few days after he surprised a considerable detachment of the enemy by a nocturnal attack, and routed them with very heavy loss; while, on the side of Bombay, the fortress of Baroach was carried by storm by Colonel Woodington. But more decisive events were approaching. The confederate chieftains, who hitherto had merely hovered round the British troops with clouds of horse, followed by a few thousand irregular foot, were now joined by the flower of their forces: sixteen battalions of Scindiah's regular infantry and an immense train of artillery, under French officers, entered their camp,* and they exhibited an imposing array of fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand were admirable horse, with a hundred pieces of cannon.

This formidable concentration of force evidenced the necessity of combined operations to the British generals, and for this purpose a conference took place between General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson on the 21st of September. It was then agreed that a joint attack should be made on the enemy, who were about a day and a half's journey off, and reported to be encamped at Bokerdun. The two generals separated on the day following, and advanced towards the concerted point by different routes: Colonel Stevenson by the western, General Wellesley by the eastern road, having a range of hills between them. The motive for this separation, though it may be doubted whether it was a sufficient one for a division in the neighbourhood of so great a force, was the difficulty of getting forward the united army through the narrow defiles by which both roads passed, and the chance that, if they both moved by one line, the enemy would retire by another, and the opportunity of striking a decisive blow be lost. In moving forward thus parallel to each other, the two corps were not more than twelve miles asunder; but the intervening hills rendered any mutual support impossible. Upon arriving within five miles of the enemy, General Wellesley received intelligence that their horse had retreated, and that the infantry alone remained, exposed to the chance of defeat if quickly assailed. As

* Lord Lake's Desp., Nov. 2, 1803. Well. Desp., iii., 435, 446.

† "The action of yesterday has convinced me how impossible it is to do anything without British troops; and of them there ought to be a very great proportion. The returns of yesterday will, I fear, prove the necessity of what I say too fully."—LORD LAKE TO LORD WELLESLEY, *Secret Despatch*, 2d Nov., 1803; WELL. Desp., iii., 446.

‡ Well. Desp., iii., 432, 433.

* Gurw., i., 299, 301, 366, 370. Scherer, i., 55, 56.

the chief strength of the Mahrattas lay in their cavalry, the English general resolved upon an immediate attack, and despatched orders to Colonel Stevenson to co-operate in the proposed enterprise. When he arrived, however, in sight of the enemy, he found their whole army, infantry and cavalry, with an immense artillery, drawn in a strong position, with the River Kaitna, which could be crossed over only by a single ford, flowing along their front. The sight was enough to appal the stoutest heart: thirty thousand horse, in one magnificent mass, crowded the right; a dense array of infantry, powerfully supported by artillery, formed the centre and left; the gunners were beside their pieces, and a hundred pieces of cannon, in front of the line, stood ready to vomit forth death upon the assailants. Wellington paused for a moment, impressed, but not daunted, by the sight; his whole force, as Colonel Stevenson had not come up, did not exceed eight thousand men, of whom sixteen hundred were cavalry; the effective native British were not above fifteen hundred, and he had only seventeen pieces of cannon. But, feeling at once that a retreat in presence of so prodigious a force of cavalry was impossible, and that the most audacious course was, in such circumstances, the most prudent, he ordered an immediate attack. "*Dux cautus et providens Scipio, victus necessitatibus, temerarium capit consilium, ut statim hosti obviam iret; et, quocumque occurreret loco, prælium consereret. 'Scio,' inquit, 'audax videri consilium; sed in rebus asperis et tenui spe, fortissima quæque consilia tutissima sunt: quia, si in occasione momento ejus prætervolat opportunitas, cunctatus paululum fueris, nequidquam mox omisam quæras.'*"*

Wellington wisely determined to direct his attack against the Mahratta left, as the infantry, which were there crowded together, presented less formidable obstacles than the immense mass of horse which glittered on the right. With this view, the British troops were moved off to their own right, the lateral movement being covered by the cavalry and the Mysore horse; and the whole crossed the Kaitna at the ford, and immediately formed in two lines, with the cavalry in reserve, on the enemy's extreme left. The confederates, upon this, altered their front, and, instead of remaining parallel to the Kaitna, formed a diagonal line across the plain from that river to the village of ASSAYE. The guns were disposed along the whole front, and presented one immense battery, formidable alike by the number and weight of its metal. With the pickets of the 85th and whole 74th in front on the right, and the 78th on the left, the British line marched swiftly forward to the attack; but, when they came within range, their guns were almost immediately dismounted by the superior fire of the enemy's artillery. Nothing, however, could arrest the steady advance of the pickets and 74th regiment, who moved direct upon Assaye; but, as they approached the enemy and got within reach of their grapeshot, the execution became so severe that frightful chasms were soon made in their ranks, and a

large body of Mahratta horse, which had got round the village unperceived, taking advantage of the openings thus made, dashed through with fearful effect, and a forest of uplifted sabres were seen in the centre of the British line.*†

All seemed lost; but at that critical moment Wellington ordered up the British and native cavalry, under Colonel Maxwell. On they came at the gallop: the gallant 19th dragoons, headed by their heroic leader, bore down upon the Mahratta horse, now disordered by success, with irresistible force, and drove them off the field headlong into the Juah. The 74th and pickets, relieved from their oppressors, now rallied with admirable discipline; and, the second line coming up, a great part of the guns which had spread such havoc through the field were taken. Still, however, the enemy held Assaye with a large body of infantry, and the cannon placed around it thundered on the attacking corps with terrific effect; but at that critical moment Wellington, having taken the guns on the left, assailed it with the 78th and a regiment of native horse with such resolution, that that important post was at length carried by storm. In this desperate conflict Wellington, who led on the 78th regiment, had a horse shot under him. The enemy resisted to the very last, the artillerymen being bayoneted at their guns; the infantry in many places lying in files on the ground, as they had stood in their ranks. During the retreat a large body of foot-soldiers collected together, and for a short time showed a determined front; but they were dispersed by a brilliant charge of Colonel Maxwell with the unconquerable 19th, in which that gallant officer lost his life. Some of Scindiah's gunners, when the flight was general, fell on the earth and feigned to be dead, to avoid the sabres of the cavalry; but no sooner had the horsemen passed than they started up, turned the guns about, and opened a destructive fire on the backs of the advancing enemy. Indignant at the fraud, the British soldiers wheeled about, again stormed the batteries, and bayoneted the deceitful gunners at their pieces. At length they fled on all sides, just as night set in, leaving in the hands of the British ninety-seven pieces of cannon, and almost all the ammunition and stores of the army. The Mahrattas had two thousand men slain on the field and six thousand wounded; but the British loss was very severe, and the victor found himself weakened by above fifteen hundred killed and wounded, including more than a third of the whole British force.‡

* Wellesley's Letter to Sir T. Munro. Gurw., i., 401, and Mem. Ibid., i., 391, 394.

† The extraordinary loss sustained by the 74th on this occasion was chiefly owing to the officer who led the pickets not having followed out Wellington's instructions, which were to make the attack on Assaye by a circuitous sweep, which would have kept the men for the greater part of the way out of the reach of cannon-shot, instead of which, carried away by an heroic courage, he moved direct upon the village, over a space swept like a glacié by the cannon of the enemy. "I lament," said Wellington, "the consequences of this mistake; but I must acknowledge, it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the pickets on that day against Assaye. One company of the pickets alone, consisting of one officer and fifty men, lost the officer and forty-four rank and file."—WELL., Mem., 24th Sept., 1803. Gurw., i., 393, 403.

‡ Gen. Wellesley's Despatch to Sir T. Munro. Gurw., i., 401, 403, and i., 386. Well. Despatch, iii., 669. Scher., i., 60, 61.

* Liv., lib. xxv., c. 34, 38. General Wellesley's Despatch, 1st Nov., 1803, and 24th Sept., 1803. Well. Despatch, iii., 372. Gurw., i., 401, 386. Scherer, i., 57, 58.

"Never," says Southey, "was victory gained under so many disadvantages; superior arms and discipline have often provided against as great a numerical difference, but it would be describing the least part of this day's glory to say that the number of the enemy was as five to one; they had disciplined troops in the field, under European officers, who more than doubled the British force; they had a hundred pieces of cannon, which were served with fearful skill, and which the British, without the aid of artillery, twice won with the bayonet."^{*}†

After this decisive overthrow, the confederates retired twelve miles from the field of battle, where they passed the night; but no sooner did they hear of the approach of Colonel Stevenson, who, with eight thousand men, was advancing against them, than they fled headlong down the Ghauts, and reached the bottom in great confusion, without either cannon or ammunition. These losses, however, were soon restored, and the exhausted state of both corps of the British army rendered any effective pursuit of an enemy still so immensely superior in cavalry, altogether impossible. Colonel Stevenson soon after reduced Asseeghur, an important

21st Oct. fortress in the Rajah of Berar's dominions; while Wellington, by a series of masterly manœuvres, defended the territories of his allies, the Nizam and Soubadar of the Deccan, and threw back the clouds of the Mahratta horse on their own territories. After some weeks marching and countermarching, Scindiah, disgusted with a war in which no plunder was to be obtained, and of which the burden, as well as dangers, fell entirely on his own dominions, made proposals for peace.

11th Nov. An armistice, on certain terms, was agreed to by the British general; but the conditions not having been complied with by the Mahratta chiefs, he resolved not to

23d Nov. lose the opportunity which presented itself of determining their indecision by striking a decisive blow against their united forces before they were thoroughly recovered from their late defeat. Having effected a junction

25th Nov. with Colonel Stevenson, the whole moved against the enemy; and late on the evening of the 28th, after a fatiguing march in a sultry day, when the Mysore horse, which were skirmishing with the Mahratta cavalry in front, cleared away, a long line of cavalry, infantry, and artillery could be distinctly perceived, extending about five miles in length, in the plains in front of ARGAUM. Though the men were much exhausted by the heat, Wellington deemed the opportunity too favourable to be lost; for he had fourteen battalions of infantry, and six regiments of cavalry, in all about fourteen thousand men, besides four thousand irregular horse, and the enemy did not exceed forty thousand. Rapidly, therefore, the formation was made, the infantry, with the 74th and 78th on the right, and in advance, so as to enter first into action; the cavalry in the sec-

ond line following the first in echelon; the Mysore and Mogul horse on the left, thrown back, so as rather to protect the rear than enter into the fight, and opposite to the immense mass of Mahratta horse, which crowded the enemy's right wing.*

As the British line advanced, the European regiments in front were received by a heavy fire from the batteries placed along the front of the enemy's line, and shortly after they were assailed in flank with the utmost fury by a large body of Persians, who engaged in a close conflict, hand to hand, with the British, in which, after a fierce struggle, the Asiatic cimeter yielded to the European bayonet, and the assailants were almost wholly destroyed. Three battalions of sepoy, however, who succeeded next in the column, no sooner came into cannon-shot than they disbanded and fled, though they had advanced bravely through a much heavier fire at Assaye. Wellington, however, was at hand to repair the confusion: rallying them, and advancing at their head himself, he soon restored the day; a disorderly charge of Scindiah's horse on the left of the line was repulsed by the steadiness of another battalion of the native troops; and the British regiments in advance having carried the principal batteries which played upon their line, the whole Mahratta force went off in confusion, leaving in the hands of the victors thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition. Had there been an hour more of daylight, or the delay consequent on the breaking of the sepoy regiments not occurred, the whole of the enemy would have been destroyed, as it was, the pursuit was actively continued for many miles by the British cavalry, by moonlight, and all their elephants and baggage taken. But that singular failure, even in veteran soldiers who had formerly distinguished themselves, demonstrates the necessity of a large proportion of European to native troops in all Indian campaigns; for we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that, if he had not been at hand to repair the disorder, the day would have been lost.†

On the very day after the battle, Wellington marched to invest Gawilghur. This celebrated fortress is situated in a capture of range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee, and stands on a lofty pile of rocky eminences, surrounded by a triple circuit of walls, rising from the edge of inaccessible precipices. The entrance to this almost impregnable stronghold are by three narrow and steep paths, winding for a long ascent through the cross-fire of batteries, and intersected at various points by strong iron gates. After reconnoitring the different sides of this formidable fortress, Wellington resolved to attack it on the northern front, where the ground is comparatively level, though to reach that quarter required a circuit of thirty miles, over rugged intervening mountains. Thither the heavy ordnance and stores were dragged, over heights hitherto deemed impassable for all but foot-soldiers, through roads made by themselves;

* Quarterly Rev., xiii., 225.

† "Their fire," said the Duke of Wellington, "was so heavy, I much doubted, at the time, whether I should be able to prevail on the troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India; our troops behaved admirably, the sepoys astonished me." — WELLINGTON & MAJOR MALCOLM, Oct. 3, 1803. GURW., i., 437.

* Wellington's Despatch. Gurw., i., 528, 531.

† Wellington to Major Shaw, 2d Dec., 1803. Gurw., i., 529, 534.

Nov. 13. and at length, after considerable exertion, a sufficient number of cannon were placed in the trenches on that side to commence battering. With such vigour was the fire sustained, though nine heavy guns only had been brought round, that by the evening of the 14th the breach in the outer wall was declared practicable. Arrangements were immediately made for the storm, which were carried into execution on the following morning with the most perfect success. The troops on the north side, headed by the flank companies of the 94th regiment, mounted the breach with irresistible vigour, while a false attack on the south distracted the attention of the enemy. The inner wall was surmounted by escalade, the inner gates blow open, and, at the moment when the fugitive garrison were attempting to escape by the southern ports, they were met by the victorious British, who in that quarter also had made their way in, and all made prisoners.*

The capture of this stronghold, deemed over which compels all India impregnable, following Scindiah to sue such a train of disasters, at length for peace. Dec. 17, 1803. broke the proud spirit of the Mahratta princes. Negotiations in real earnest were now resumed, and a treaty was concluded two days afterward between Wellington and the Rajah of Berar. By this pacification it was stipulated that the rajah should cede to the company all the territories which he had possessed in the Deccan, the province of Cuttack, and various districts to Dec. 30, 1803. the south of the hills of Gawilghur; while, by a subsequent treaty with Scindiah, all his territories in the Doab, between the Jumna and the Ganges, its terms. the fortresses of Baroach and Achmednuggur, with their circumjacent territories, the whole district below the Adjutee Hills and the Godavery River, were made over to the company. By these glorious treaties territories amounting to 32,000 square miles, and yielding, even under all the disadvantages of the Mahratta rule, nearly three millions sterling a year of revenue, including Delhi, the ancient capital of the Mogul emperors, Agra, Gwalior, and many other fortresses, were acquired by the British government,† and their influence rendered paramount through the whole north of Hindostan.‡

The termination of the Mahratta war, though it established the political supremacy of the British in India, and spread the fame of their valour over all Asia, yet left the government involved in considerable difficulties. The expenses of moving such large bodies of men to

such immense distances was very great; and as the English, reversing the usual principles of Indian warfare, uniformly paid for everything which they required, their march, though hailed with blessings by the natives of the conquered provinces, proved extremely burdensome to the company's treasury. The dangers of the Mahratta war had been strongly felt in India, and seriously exaggerated in the mother-country; the company's stock had fallen, in consequence, since the commencement of hostilities, from two hundred and fifteen to one hundred and sixty; no less than £1,700,000 in specie had been remitted by the Court of Directors in the course of the year; and, large as this sum was, it was exceeded by the wants of the Indian treasury. Mercantile men, unacquainted with the real state of affairs in the East, who estimated the propriety of all measures by their effect upon the value of their stock or the amount of their dividends, and were incapable of appreciating the present sacrifices requisite to produce ultimate security to so vast a dominion, murmured loudly at these effects of Lord Wellesley's administration, and the opinion became general in Great Britain that his inordinate ambition had involved us in endless wars, which would ultimately prove fatal to our empire in the East. So vexatious were the restrictions with which his administration was surrounded, and so disproportioned the ideas of the directors to the grandeur or the real nature of their situation, that he tendered his resignation to government, and was only prevailed on to continue at the head of affairs in India on an assurance that, as soon as the present complicated transactions with the Mahrattas were brought to a conclusion, he would be relieved from his duties.*

Meanwhile, a treaty had been concluded with Scindiah, by which it was stipulated that he should cede Gualior and Gohud, and receive a subsidiary force; in other words, become entirely dependant on the British government. Negotiations and rupture with Holkar. 27th of Feb., 1804. These events, however, brought the English in contact with a still more formidable power, whose hostility it hitherto had been their studious care to avoid. Holkar commanded a powerful army, which was posted in a threatening position on the frontier of Scindiah's territory; and, as he held several valuable possessions in the Doab which had recently been ceded to the British government, it was indispensable to come to some terms to accommodate the conflicting interests of the parties. Though that wily chieftain, with the characteristic dissimulation of a Mahratta, professed the utmost desire to cultivate the friendship of the company, it soon appeared that he had resolved on the most determined hostility. Secret information reached the governor-general that he was underhand instigating the tributaries and dependants of the English to enter into a confederacy against them; and he even wrote to General Wellesley threatening to overrun the British provinces with an innumerable army.† At length, he openly sent an agent to

* Wellington's Desp., 15th Dec., 1803. Gurw., i., 550, 554.

† See the Trials in Gurw., i., 555, 571, and Auber, i., 323, 326.

‡ By these treaties certain districts were to be ceded by the Mahratta chiefs to the Nizam. His minister, Mohiput Ram, was most anxious to obtain information as to what particular countries or districts were likely to be ceded, and, at a secret conference, offered Wellington ten lacs of rupees (£70,000) to obtain it. "Can you keep a secret?" asked the English general. "Yes," replied Mohiput Ram. "And so can I," answered the general. So universal is corruption at the native courts, that they have no conception that any functionary, how high soever, is above it. The conquests of the English were mainly ascribed by them to the incorruptible integrity of their officers, and the fidelity to engagements of their government.—AUBER, ii., 325.

* Auber, ii., 333, 341. Well. Desp., iii., 3, 24, Intrôd.

† "Countries of many hundred miles in extent shall be overrun and plundered. Lord Lake shall not have leisure to

Scindiah's camp to solicit that chieftain to renew hostilities with the British, and, at the same time, he began plundering the territories of their ally, the Rajah of Jypore. Justly considering these acts as equivalent to a declaration of war, the commander-in-chief advanced into Holkar's territory.*

General Wellesley was invested with the general direction of affairs, military as well as political, in the Deccan and the territories of the Peishwa and Mahratta chiefs; but he had no longer any active command in the war, and the chief weight of the contest fell on General Lake in the northern provinces. Arduous as the conflict with Tipoo Sultaun and Scindiah had been, this last strife was still more formidable, from the recurrence of the Asiatic chief to that system of warfare in which the strength of the East, from the earliest ages, has consisted. Without despising the aid of disciplined battalions and a powerful train of artillery, it was the policy of Holkar to trust chiefly to his cavalry; to relieve his army of those encumbrances which retarded their march, and seldom failed to fall a prey in regular battles to the swift advance and daring courage of the British soldiers; and to trust for success to the encompassing the European hosts, like the Roman legions by the Parthian cavalry, with clouds of light horse, who could not be reached by the heavy-armed European squadrons. True, these irregular bodies could not withstand the charge of the English or sepoy dragoons, any more than the Saracens could the shock of the steel-clad crusaders of Europe; but they seldom awaited their approach, and, by hovering round their columns and cutting off their foraging and watering parties, frequently reduced to extreme distress bodies of men before whom they could not have stood a quarter of an hour in regular combat.†

Holkar's territories, though extensive, lay in different parts of the Deccan and Hindostan; they were for the most part in a neglected state, from the devastation and military license to which, from time immemorial, all the Mahratta provinces had been subjected; he was a usurper of his brother's rights, his family had never risen to the rank of considerable potentates, and his present power was mainly owing to the vast concourse of predatory horsemen who, on the conclusion of peace by Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, flocked to his standard as the only one which promised a continuance of violence and plunder. Vast bodies of these irregular but formidable freebooters swarmed in all the northern parts of the Deccan and over Hindostan; and

breathe for a moment; and calamities will fall on backs of human beings in continual war by the attacks of my army, which overwhelms like the waves of the sea."—HOLKAR to GENERAL WELLESLEY, Feb. 21, 1804; MALCOLM, 315. In his letters to the Indian chiefs, tributary of England, he uniformly styled the English "infidel Christians, the enemies of the Christian faith;" "sedition men, whom they should be prepared to do distinguished service against;" and "that it is the object of the religion and the rule of Mussulmen, that the whole body of the faithful having assembled together, they should be employed, heart and soul, in extirpating the profligate infidels."—See *intercepted Corresp.* of HOLKAR, WELL. Desp., iv., 48, 49.

* Malcolm, 315, 316. Auber, ii., 341, 345. Well. Desp., iv.

† Malcolm, 316. Auber, ii., 345.

the number of them, amounting to little short of a hundred thousand, whom Holkar had collected under his banners, was so disproportioned to the resources of his dominions that foreign conquest had become to him, as to Napoleon, a matter of necessity. Bands of these plunderers, before they were attracted by the reputation of the Mahratta chief, had already appeared in various quarters, spreading terror and devastation wherever they went; and one, ten thousand strong, which had passed the Kistna, burst into the British dependances and was making for the Toomboodra, with the design of crossing the company's frontier, was overtaken by General Campbell, and entirely routed Dec. 30, 1803. by a skilfully-conducted surprise before sunrise, with the loss of three thousand killed and wounded. Twenty thousand head of cattle taken in their camp demonstrated the vast extent of the depredation which in a few days these marauding horsemen could commit. Mohammed Beg Khan, the leader of the party, was wounded and made prisoner, and the whole body dispersed.*

Important as this early success was in arresting the destructive inroads of the Mahratta freebooters, it was attended with one bad effect, in leading the British commanders to underrate the enemy with whom they had to deal; inducing the belief that the strength of their confederacy had been broken, by the reduction of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar's power, and that, by a simultaneous invasion of his territories by comparatively small bodies of troops, converging from different directions, Holkar would speedily be reduced to submission. The plan of the campaign was arranged on these principles. Lord Lake, with the army of Bengal, about ten thousand strong, was to advance from the neighbourhood of Delhi, westward into Holkar's country; while lesser bodies, acting in concert with Scindiah's forces, pressed upon it from the Guzerat, Malwa, and the Deccan. Colonel Murray, with two European and six native regiments, about six thousand men, was to advance from Guzerat; while Colonel Monson, with the 76th regiment and four battalions of sepoys, about three thousand men, moved upon Jyenagur, in order to menace the rear of Holkar's main army, which was ravaging the country in that neighbourhood. These movements had the effect of inducing the Mahratta chief to retreat, which he did to the westward, with extraordinary rapidity, while General Lake, following in his footsteps, carried by assault the important fort of Rampoora, and expelled the enemy from all his possessions in that part of Hindostan. So completely was government impressed with the idea that Holkar could nowhere face the British troops, and that a short campaign at the close of the rainy season would effectually reduce his power, that the troops, on its commencement, were everywhere withdrawn to their original stations: General Lake returned to his cantonments near Delhi, while Colonel Monson was left at Malwa, above two hundred miles in advance, in a position which it was

Plan of the campaign against Holkar. Its errors and early disasters.

April 23, 1804.

May 16.

* General Campbell's Desp., Dec. 30, 1803., Well. Desp., iv., 2, 3.

thought would effectually preclude the possibility of the predatory chieftain's return into Hindostan.*†

Holkar's conduct now demonstrated that he was intimately acquainted with the art of war, the principles of which are often as thoroughly understood by illiterate chieftains, to whom native sagacity and practical experience have unfolded them, as by those who have most learnedly studied the enterprises of others. Rapidly concentrating his desultory bands, he fell with an overwhelming force, as soon as the decline of the rainy season would admit of military operations, upon Colonel Monson's division; while a subordinate force, five thousand strong, made a diversion by an irruption into the province of Bundelcund. A

British detachment, under Colonel Smith, of three hundred men, was there almost entirely cut off by the sudden attack of these freebooters, and with it six guns and a considerable quantity of ammunition captured: a disgrace which was the more sensibly felt, as Colonel Fawcett, who, with five battalions, lay within a few miles, and had, by imprudently separating his infantry from his artillery, brought about this disaster, instead of attempting to avenge it, commenced a retreat. Such was the consternation produced by this unwonted calamity, that it was only by the firm countenance and intrepid conduct of Captain Baillie, who commanded a small subsidiary force at Banda, the capital, in the southern portion of the province, that subordination was maintained; and the Mahrattas at length retired, finding a farther advance hazardous, leaving their course everywhere marked by conflagration and ruin.†

This disgrace was but the prelude to still greater misfortunes, in which, however, the high character and undaunted courage of the British troops remained untarnished. Colonel Monson, having been joined by the troops under General Don which had captured Rampoor, which raised his force to about four thousand men, with fifteen guns, besides three thousand irregular horse, advanced through the strong pass of Mokundra, which commanded the entrance through the mountains into Hindostan from the westward; and, contrary to the directions of General Lake, who had stationed him only to protect that defile, still pushing on fifty miles farther, carried by assault the important fortress of Henglaisgush, a stronghold of Holkar's, though garrisoned by eleven hundred of his best troops. The Mahratta chief, meanwhile, lay at Malwa with his whole disposable force, which exceeded forty thousand men, and of whom

twenty thousand were disciplined infantry, with one hundred and sixty guns. With this immense body he rapidly approached the English general; and the exaggerated rumours which preceded his march as to the strength of the Mahratta host, impressed the latter with the idea that he had no chance of safety but in an immediate retreat. Colonel Murray, who, with a powerful force, including fifteen hundred Europeans, was to have advanced from the Guzerat into such a position as to have been able to render him assistance if required, had, instead of performing his part of the general plan, been unfortunately induced to fall back; and thus Monson was left alone to withstand the whole shock of Holkar's force. His troops, however, though not a fourth part of the enemy in point of number, were highly disciplined, admirably equipped, and inured to victory; and, by a daring advance upon the Mahratta chief, especially when embarrassed with getting his immense artillery across the Chumbul River, then swollen by rains, he might, perhaps, have achieved as decisive success as, with a similar numerical inferiority, Wellington and Lake obtained at Assaye and Laswaree.*

But it then appeared of what importance is military skill and moral resolution in Indian warfare, and how much the brilliant career of Lord Wellesley's victories had been dependant on the daring energy which, seizing the initiative, never lost it till the enemy was destroyed. Monson was as brave as any officer in the English army; second to none in undaunted valour at storming a breach, but he wanted the rarer quality of moral intrepidity, and the power of adopting great designs on his own responsibility. On the 6th of July, Holkar was engaged in crossing the Chumbul; the fortunate moment of attack never to be recalled was allowed to escape, and two days afterward the English general commenced his retreat. He did what ordinary officers would have done at Assaye, when it was ascertained Stevenson's division could not come up; and what was the result? In a few hours the subsidiary horse, now four thousand strong, which was left to observe the enemy, was enveloped by clouds of the Mahratta cavalry, and, after a bloody struggle, cut to pieces with their gallant commander, Lieutenant Lucan, whose individual heroism long averted the disaster. The infantry and guns retired without molestation to the strong Mokundra pass, and several attacks made by Holkar on the outposts stationed there were repulsed with great slaughter. Despairing, however, after the recent disaster, of being able to make good the pass against the enemy when his infantry and numerous artillery should come up, Monson resumed his retreat, a few days after, to Kotah, and from thence to Rampoor, with great precipitation. Such were the obstacles presented by the horrible state of the roads and incessant rains, during the latter part of this journey,† that the whole guns, fifteen in number, were abandoned, and fell into the enemy's hands.

* Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, June, 1804, Well Desp., iv., 115, 127.

† "The necessity of repelling Holkar's banditti from the frontier of Hindostan, and of reducing him to a peaceable conduct, will not lead to any serious interruption of peace, and will probably tend to consolidate our connexion with Scindiah. The commander-in-chief, with the greater part of the main army in Hindostan, has returned to the cantonment of Cawnpore, and my attention is now directed to the desirable object of withdrawing the whole army from the field, and reducing the military charges."—Lord WELLESLEY to Lord CASTLEREAGH, 9th July, 1804, Well. Desp., iv., 131.

‡ Colonel Fawcett's Desp., 22d May, 1804, Well. Desp., iv., 72, 73, 75, 127.

* Lord Lake's Account, Well. Desp., v., 288, 290. Ibid., iv., 327, 329.

† Lord Lake's Account, Well. Desp., v., 288, 290. Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, ibid., iv., 327, 330.

No sooner was General Lake apprized of the commencement of this retreat, than he despatched two fresh battalions and three thousand irregular horse to re-enforce his lieutenant; and with such expedition did

they advance, that they reached Rampoora a few days after the retiring column had arrived there. Still Monson deemed it impossible to make a stand; and on the 21st of August, after leaving a sufficient garrison in that fortress, he resumed his march for the British frontier. On the day following, his progress was stopped by the Bannas River, which was so swelled by the rains as to be no longer fordable; and during the delay occasioned by this obstacle, the whole of the enemy's force arrived close to the British detachment. Their situation was now truly frightful: in their front was a raging torrent, in their rear twenty thousand horsemen, continually receiving fresh accessions of strength in infantry and guns, as they successively came up. The river having at length become fordable,

four battalions crossed over; and the enemy, seeing his advantage, immediately commenced a furious attack on the single battalion and pickets, which now remained alone on the other side. With such heroic constancy, however, was this unequal contest maintained by these brave men, that they not only repulsed the whole attacks made upon them, but, pursuing their success, captured several of the enemy's guns: an event which clearly demonstrated what results might have followed the adoption of a vigorous offensive in the outset, when the troops were undiminished in strength and unbroken in spirit.* As it was, however, this little phalanx, being unsupported, was unable to follow up its success, and, in the course of falling back to the river and effecting their passage, had to sustain an arduous conflict, and experienced a frightful loss.

Meanwhile Captain Nicholl, with the treasure of the army and six companies of sepoys, who had been first ferried across, proceeded to Khooshalghur, where they were attacked by a large body of Scindiah's troops, who, with the characteristic faithlessness and rapacity of Maharrattas, assailed their allies in their distress, in hope of plunder, and, being beat off, openly joined Holkar's camp. Almost all the irregular horse, which had come up to Rampoora, soon after deserted to the enemy; and even some companies of sepoys, shaken by the horrors of the retreat, abandoned their colours and followed their example, though in general the conduct of these faithful troops was exemplary in the extreme. Abandoned by his horse,

Colonel Monson, on his route from Khooshalghur to the British frontier, formed his whole men into an oblong square, with the ammunition and bullocks in the centre, and in that order retreated for several days, almost always fighting with the enemy, and surrounded by fifteen thousand indefatigable horsemen, who were constantly repulsed with invincible constancy by the rolling fire of the sepoys. At length, however, this vigorous pursuit was discontinued: the firm array of the

British dissolved as they entered their own territories; great numbers perished of fatigue or by the sword of the pursuers, others allowed themselves to fall into the hands of the enemy, and the sad remnant of a brilliant division, which had altogether mustered, with its reinforcements on the retreat,* six thousand regular and as many irregular troops, now reduced to a thousand or twelve hundred men without cannon or ammunition, arrived at Agra, in a scattered and disorderly manner, about the end of August.

Then was seen in clear colours the precarious tenure by which our empire in India is held, and the indispensable necessity of those vigorous measures in former times, which, to an inexperienced observer, might wear the aspect of rashness. The overthrow of Monson's division resounded through Hindostan from sea to sea. Great as had been the disasters of the retreat, they were magnified by the voice of fame, ever ready to augment the extent of public and private calamity; and the sinister reports of the native powers, whose wishes, father to their thoughts, represented the British empire in India as tottering to its fall. The general consternation was increased by the cruelties exercised by Holkar on the prisoners of all descriptions who fell into his hands: the Europeans were immediately put to death, and the natives who refused to enter his service mutilated in the most shocking manner. Everywhere an alarming fermentation was apparent. The conduct of several of the allied states was such as to afford just grounds to distrust their fidelity; that of others was verging on open hostility. Scindiah, so far from acting up to the spirit, or even letter of his alliance, was secretly intriguing, and even publicly assisting the enemy; the Rajah of Bhurtpore, already repenting of his recent treaty, was supporting him with his treasures and his arms; the spirit of disaffection was found to have spread to some of the chiefs of the British newly-acquired provinces;† even the fidelity of the sepoys was not everywhere proof against the seductions or threats of the enemy; and that general despondency prevailed which is so often at once the forerunner and the cause of public calamity.

But the British government in India was at that period in the hands of men whom no reverse could daunt, whose energy and foresight were equal to any emergency. Generously resolving to take their full share in the responsibility of all the measures which had turned out so unfortunately, determining to screen the commander from all blame, even for those details of execution which were necessarily intrusted to himself, they set vigorously to stem the progress of disaster.‡ The causes which had led to it were obvious: it was the reversing the principles which had produced the triumphs of Delhi

Alarming fermentation through the whole of India.

Generous conduct and able resolutions of Lord Wellesley and Lord Lake.

* Colonel Monson's Desp., 2d Sept., 1804., Well. Desp., iv., 199. Lord Lake's Desp., July 1, 1805., Well. Desp., v., 289, 292. Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, v., 333, 343.

† Lord Lake to Lord Wellesley, July 1, 1805. Lord Well. to General Lake, Sept. 11, 1804. Ibid., iv., 205

‡ See note B.

* Colonel Monson's Desp. Well. Desp., iv., 199.

and Laswaree. These glorious days were the result of striking with an adequate force at the heart of the enemy's power, and suspending, or even neglecting, all minor considerations to accomplish that grand object; the present misfortunes were the consequence of attacking from four different quarters at once, with forces inadequate to victory, if singly brought into action; trusting for success to their combined operation, and advancing one column, single and unsupported, into the heart of the enemy's power. The British victories had been the result of the strategy which caused Napoleon to triumph at Ulm and Jena: their misfortunes, of the system which, for twenty years, had chained disaster to the Austrian standard. Wellesley resolved instantly to return to this enlightened plan of operations, from which, in an evil hour, under the influence of undue contempt of the enemy, he had departed.* "The success of your noble triumphs of last year," said he to Lord Lake, "proceeded chiefly from your vigorous system of attack. In every war the native states will always gain courage in proportion as we shall allow them to attack us, and I know that you will always bear this principle in mind, especially against such a power as Holkar."

Proceeding on these just and manly principles, every exertion was made to re-Holkar to enforce the main army under Lord Delhi.

Lake, then lying at Cawnpore, and put it into a condition speedily to take the field. It was full time that some decisive effort should be made to retrieve affairs, for the British empire in Hindostan was, in truth, in a

very critical situation. Rapidly following up his success, Holkar pursued the

remains of the beaten army to the banks of the Jumna; and on the British cavalry under Lord Lake approaching his position, they drew off, the infantry and guns taking the direction of Delhi, while the horse engaged the attention of the English troops by endeavouring to cut off

their baggage. On the 8th of October the enemy's main force arrived before the imperial city, and summoned the garrison, consisting only of one battalion and a half of sepoys, with a few irregulars, to surrender; while his emissaries used every exertion to excite the native chiefs in the Doab to revolt against their European masters, and with such success as seriously embarrassed the operations of the British army, especially in the vital article of obtaining supplies.†

For seven days Holkar continued before Delhi, battering its extensive and ruinous walls with the utmost vigour; but such was the resolution of the little garrison under Colonels Ochterlony and Burn, that they not only repulsed repeated assaults, but, sallying forth, carried a battery which was violently shaking the rampart, and spiked the guns. At length the Mahrattas, despairing of storming the city, and intimidated by the approach of Lord Lake with the Bengal

army, raised the siege, and retired by slow marches through the hills in the direction of Dieg. The English general had

now the fairest prospect of bringing the enemy's whole force to action, with every chance of success; for the prodigious train of artillery which accompanied him rendered his retreat very slow, and ten thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, including about two thousand five hundred Europeans, followed the British standards. But a total failure of supplies, arising from the disaffection or treachery of the native chiefs, by whom they were to have been furnished, rendered it impossible to continue the pursuit for some days; and during that time Holkar got out of the reach of immediate attack, and, crossing the Jumna with his whole force, proceeded to ravage the country, and stir up resistance to the English beyond that river. Suddenly recrossing it, however, with his cavalry alone, a few days after, he advanced by forced marches to attack Colonel Burn, who, with a detachment, had been sent to Seranhpore, after the retreat of the enemy from the neighbourhood of Delhi.*

General, now Lord Lake, upon this, made a corresponding division of his force.

Putting himself at the head of the horse artillery, two thousand cavalry, and fifteen hundred light-armed infantry, he pursued in person Holkar's horse on the one side of the river; General Fraser, with eight thousand infantry, a thousand cavalry, and eighteen guns, was intrusted with the task of attacking his foot-soldiers and artillery on the other. That gallant officer, having at length, by great exertions, obtained the requisite supplies, commenced his march from Delhi, and on the 13th of November came up with the

Mahratta army, consisting of twenty-four battalions of regular infantry, a hundred and sixty pieces of cannon, and three thousand irregular horse, in all above twenty-five thousand men. This formidable force was drawn up with considerable skill, in a strong position, with their left resting on the fortress of Dieg, their right upon a walled village, situated on a height about two miles distant; an extensive morass, altogether impassable, covered the greater part of their front, a large expanse of water protected from attack the whole of their rear; while their immense artillery was so disposed as to bear with a concentric fire on the narrow isthmus by which alone their line could be assailed.†

Noways daunted by these formidable obstacles, General Fraser resolved to make the attack on the following morning. At daybreak the troops advanced to the charge, headed by the unconquerable 76th, led on by that general in person. They had to make a long circuit round the morass before they reached the point at which it could be passed; during the whole of which they were exposed to a galling cannonade in flank from the enemy's artillery, which, as they approached the isthmus leading to the village, became dreadfully severe. Rushing impetuously on, however, the 76th, followed by the native infantry, ascending the hill, stormed the village with irresistible gallantry.

* Lord Lake to Lord Wellesley, July, 1805, Well. Desp., v., 293, 297. Lord Well. to Secret Committee, Well. Desp., iv., 345, 348.

† Monson's Desp., Nov. 14, 1804, Well. Desp., iv., 233. Lord Lake's Desp., v., 298, 301.

* Lord Wellesley to Lord Lake, Sept. 11, 1804, Well. Desp., iv., 207, and 191, 192.

† Well. Desp., v., 293, 297; iv., 343, 348.

From the village, General Fraser advanced upon the main body of the enemy, who faced about, and were now posted between the morass and the lake, with the fort of Dieg in their rear, and several heights, crowned with artillery to defend the approach to it, interspersed in the intervening space. Such, however, was the vigour of the attack led by Fraser and Monson, that, though the enormous batteries of the enemy played with a concentric fire of round, chain, and grapeshot, on the advancing column, it pushed on through the awful storm, carrying everything before it from right to left of the enemy's whole position, and, storming successfully all the batteries, drove them at length, in utter confusion, into the fortress of Dieg. Nothing but the heavy fire from its ramparts prevented the whole artillery of the enemy in the field from being captured; as it was, eighty-seven guns and twenty-four tumbrils were taken; two thousand fell on the field, and great numbers perished in the lake, into which they had fled to avoid the bloody sabres of the English cavalry. The British loss was about seven hundred killed and wounded; among the latter of whom was the brave General Fraser, to whose decision and intrepidity the success was in a great degree owing; while Colonel Monson, the second in command, who succeeded to the direction of the army upon his fall, amply demonstrated, by his skill and bravery, that his former misfortunes had not been owing to any want of heroic courage. Among the guns taken were, to the inexpressible delight of the soldiers, as well as of that brave man, thirteen of those which had been lost in the late calamitous retreat.*

While this important success was gained over the infantry and artillery of Pursuit and defeat of Holkar at Furruckabad. Holkar, a triumph equally decisive attended the operations of Lord Lake in person against his cavalry. That enterprising chief having, as already mentioned, crossed the Jumna with ten thousand sand horse, made for a ford of the Ganges near Hurdwar, with the design of carrying the war into Rohileund and the provinces beyond that river. No sooner, however, did he learn that Lord Lake, with a chosen body of cavalry, was marching against him, than he suddenly changed his course, and, flying down the Doab by rapid marches, reached Furruckabad on the evening of the 16th of November. Rapid, however, as were the movements of the Mahratta chief, they were exceeded by those of the English general, who, having crossed the Jumna in pursuit on the 1st of November, continued to follow his indefatigable adversary with such vigour for the next seventeen days, that he not only effectually prevented him from devastating the country, except in the immediate line of retreat, but kept constantly at the distance only of a single march in his rear. During the whole of this period both armies marched twenty-three or twenty-four miles daily, even under the burning sun of Hindostan. At length, on the evening of the 16th of November, Lord Lake received intelligence that Holkar, after having been repulsed in an attack on Futteghur, had

encamped for the night under the walls of Furruckabad, twenty-nine miles distant. Though the troops had already marched thirty miles on that day, Lord Lake immediately formed the resolution of making a forced march in the night, and surprising the enemy in their camp before daybreak on the following morning.*

No sooner was the order to move delivered to the troops at nightfall than all fatigues were forgotten, and, instead of lying down to rest, they joyfully prepared to resume their march during the sultry hours and thick darkness of an Indian night. The fires in the enemy's camp, and the accurate information of the guides, conducted them direct to the ground which the Mahrattas occupied. As they approached the camp the utmost silence was observed in the British columns: the horse artillery only were moved to the front, and advanced slowly and cautiously to within range of their tents. All was buried in sleep in the Mahratta lines; the watchfires had almost all burned out, and a few drowsy sentinels alone were watching in the east for the first appearance of dawn. Suddenly the guns opened upon them, and the sleeping army was roused by the rattle of grapeshot falling in the tents among the horses, and through the bivouacs. So complete was the surprise, so universal the consternation, that very little resistance was attempted. Before the squadrons could be formed, or the horses in many places unpicketed, the British dragoons were upon them; and well, in that hour, did the sabres of the 8th, 27th, and 29th avenge the savage cruelty of Holkar's followers upon the captives in Monson's retreat. The enemy were thrown into irretrievable confusion by this impetuous attack, and, rushing promiscuously out of the camp, fled in all directions, hotly pursued by the British and native horse. Great numbers were slain in the pursuit as well as on the field, and still more abandoned their colours and dispersed, deeming the cause of Holkar hopeless, after so decisive an overthrow. Of the mighty host which had so lately swept like a torrent over Hindostan, a few thousand horse only escaped with their leader across the Jumna, and joined the defeated remains of their infantry within the walls of Dieg. Holkar himself was on the point of falling into the hands of the British dragoons, and owed his escape entirely to the accidental explosion of an ammunition-wagon, which, almost by a miracle, blew his pursuers off their horses, while he himself passed unhurt. Of the victors, the greater part had ridden seventy miles during the preceding twenty-four hours, when they took up their ground after the pursuit,† besides fighting the whole of Holkar's cavalry: an achievement far exceeding anything recorded of the boasted celerity of Napoleon's squadrons, and which is probably unparalleled in modern war.

Colonel Monson, whose vigour and bravery in the field was far from being accompanied by a similar degree of capacity and resolution in leading an army, had formed the design of retreating,

Siege and capture of Dieg.

* Monson's Desp., Nov. 14, 1804, Well. Desp., iv., 233, 236. Lord Lake's Desp., *ibid.*, v., 293, 304.

* Lord Lake's Desp., 18th Nov., 1804, Well. Desp., iv., 240.

† Lord Lake's Desp., 18th Nov., 1804, and July, 1805, Well. Desp., iv., 240, 244, and v., 297, 298.

Dec. 23. after the victory of Dieg, to Muttra for supplies, of which his troops stood much in need, and which were procured with extreme difficulty, owing to the hostile disposition of the inhabitants in the country, and arrived there on the 26th of November. But Lord Lake, who at once perceived the prejudicial effect which such a retrograde movement after a battle would have, by giving the enemy a plausible

Dec. 1. ground to represent it as a defeat, immediately repaired to the spot, and, reinforcing the infantry with his victorious cavalry, again moved forward his whole army, and proceeded in the direction of Dieg, where the broken remains of Holkar's army were now all assembled. On the 4th the troops arrived under the walls of that fortress, and operations were commenced against it as soon as the battering-train came up from Agra, which

Dec. 8. arrived on the 8th. The siege was prosecuted with the utmost activity, and, a breach having been pronounced practicable, the lines around the town were first stormed by

Dec. 23. the 76th regiment, and on the day following the fortress itself surrendered at discretion. By this important blow the whole of Holkar's remaining artillery, amounting to eighty pieces, many of them of very heavy calibre, with immense stores of ammunition, were taken; but that redoubtable chief himself escaped with four thousand horse, and took refuge in BHURTPORE,* the rajah of which, Runjeet Sing, had, during the last three months, treacherously embraced his cause, and deserted the British alliance.

Nothing remained to complete this glorious

Siege and unsuccessful assault of Bhurtpore. contest but the reduction of this celebrated fortress, an object become, of the highest importance, both on account of the signal

treachery of the rajah, who, on the first reverse, had violated his pledged faith to the company, by whom he had been loaded with benefits, and of its containing the person and last resources of Holkar, who had waged so desperate a contest with the British forces. Thither, accordingly, Lord Lake moved immediately after the fall of Dieg; and the battering-train having speedily made a breach in the walls, the

January 9th, 1805. assault took place in the evening of the 9th of January. The water in

the ditch proved exceedingly deep, and, during the time spent in throwing in fascines, the troops were exposed to a most destructive fire from the rampart on the opposite side. At length, however, they succeeded in passing over, but all their efforts to gain the summit of the breach proved ineffectual. The wall, which was of tough mud, was imperfectly ruined; the scaling-ladders were found to be too short; and, after sustaining a very heavy loss, the troops were compelled to return to

Jan. 21. their trenches. A second storm, some days afterward, met with still less success: the brave men reached the edge of the ditch, but it proved to be so broad and deep that all attempts to fill it up were fruitless; and, after sustaining for above an hour

Jan. 23. a dreadful fire within pistol-shot from the ramparts, the assaulting column was again obliged to retire. An attempt was soon after

made by the whole of Holkar's remaining cavalry, and that of Meer Khan, another noted Mahratta freebooter,* to cut off a valuable convoy on its way from Muttra to the British camp. The convoy, with its covering force, was hard beset by an immense body of cavalry, in a village, when the approach of the 27th light dragoons and a regiment of native horse enabled them to sally out and totally rout the assailants. Meer Khan's equipage, with all his arms and a complete suit of armour, fell into the hands of the victors.

The siege was now prosecuted with fresh vigour by the English army, which was re-enforced by a division, five thousand strong, from Bombay, which raised the besieging force

Repeated assaults on Bhurtpore, which were repulsed.

to twenty thousand men, while the efforts of the besieged, who were greatly elevated by their former success, were proportionally increased. It was soon discovered that the troops of the rajah were among the bravest and most resolute of Hindostan, comprising, in addition to the remnant of Holkar's followers, the *Jats*, or military caste of Bhurtpore, who yielded to none in Asia the palm of resolution and valour.

After a month's additional operations, Feb. 20. the breach was deemed sufficiently wide

to warrant a third assault, which was made by the 75th and 76th regiments, supported by three sepoy battalions, under Colonel Don; while two other subordinate attacks were made at the same time, one on the enemy's trenches outside the town, and another and the Beem-Narain gate, which, it was thought, might be carried by escalade. The attack on the trenches proved entirely successful, and they were carried, with all their artillery, by Captain Grant; but the other two sustained a bloody repulse. The scaling-ladders of the party destined to attack the gate were found to be too short, or were destroyed by the terrible discharges of grape which issued from its defences; and, despite all their efforts, the brave 75th and 76th were forced down with dreadful slaughter from the breach. They were ordered out again to the assault, but the troops were so staggered by the frightful scene that they refused to leave their trenches, and the heroic 12th regiment of sepoys† marched past them with loud cheers to the breach. Such was the vigour of their onset, that they reached the summit in spite of every obstacle, and the British colours were seen for a few minutes waving on the bastion, while the 76th, stung with shame, again advanced to the assault. The bastion proved to be separated by a deep ditch from the body of the place, and the guns from the neighbouring ramparts enfiladed the outwork so completely, that the valiant band, after losing half their numbers, were in the end driven down the breach, weeping with generous indignation at seeing the prize of their heroic valour thus torn from them. The attempt was renewed Feb. 21. on the following day with no better success. The whole of the European infantry in the army, about two thousand five hundred strong, with three battalions of native infantry, were employed in the assault under the command of Colonel Monson. Such, however, was

* Well. Desp., iv., 662, 663. Lord Well. to Secret Committee, March, 1805, Well. Desp., iv., 392.

* Lord Lake's Desp., Jan. 10, 21, 23, 1805, Well. Desp., iv., 264, 267.

† See *Ante*, iii., p. 131.

the height and difficulty of the breach, and such the resolute resistance opposed by the enemy, that all their efforts proved unsuccessful. A small number only could mount abreast, from the narrowness of the ruined part of the wall; and, as they pushed up, they were crushed under logs of wood, or torn in pieces by combustibles thrown among them by the besieged; while the few who reached the top were swept off by discharges of grape, which poured in by a cross fire from either side.* After two hours employed in this murderous and fruitless contest, in which prodigies of valour were performed on both sides, the troops were drawn off; and, after six weeks of open trenches, and four desperate assaults, which cost above three thousand brave men, the native colours still waved on the walls of Bhurtpore.

Although, however, the British troops had, at the close of their long career of victory, met with this unexpected check, yet many reasons concurred to recommend submission to the hitherto unsubdued rajah.

His territory was wholly occupied by the enemy, his resources cut off, his stores and magazines rapidly diminishing, and, even if he should be so fortunate as to withstand a repetition of the furious assaults from which he had so recently and narrowly escaped, he was well aware that, by the slower, but more certain process of blockade and famine, he would in the end inevitably be reduced. On the other hand, various considerations, equally forcible, concurred in recommending an accommodation with the perfidious rajah to the English government. Though Scindiah had, in the outset of the negotiation, consented to the cession of Gwalior and Gohud, with its adjacent territory, to the company, and even signed a treaty

Feb. 24, 1804.

in which they were formally ceded to them, yet he had never been reconciled to the loss of that important fortress; and, from the first moment that hostilities commenced with Holkar, it became evident that he was waiting only for a favourable moment to come to an open rupture with the English government, or take advantage of its difficulties to obtain their restitution. Troops under his banner had openly attacked the escort of the treasure in Colonel Monson's retreat; the language of his court had been so menacing, the conduct of his government so suspicious, that not only had a long and angry negotiation taken place with the acting resident, but General Wellesley had been directed to move the subsidiary force in the Deccan, eight thousand strong, to the frontier of Scindiah's territories. The prince himself, who was a weak, sensual man, had fallen entirely under the government of his minister and father-in-law, Surajee Row Ghautka, a man of the most profligate character, who was indefatigable in his endeavours to embroil his master with the British government. Under the influence of these violent counsels, matters were fast approaching a crisis: the cession of Gwalior was openly required, with menaces of joining the enemy if the demand were not acceded to; and at length he announced a determination to interfere as an armed mediator be-

tween Holkar and the English, and moved a large force to the neighbourhood of Bhurtpore to support his demands during its long-protracted siege. The conduct of the Rajah of Berar had also become extremely questionable: hostilities, evidently excited by him, had already taken place in the Cuttack and Bundelcund; and symptoms began openly to appear in all quarters, of that general disposition to throw off the British authority, which naturally arose from the exaggerated reports which had been spread of Holkar's successes.*

Under the influence of those concurring motives on both sides, there was little difficulty of coming to an accommodation with the Rajah of Bhurtpore.

The English government became sensible of the expediency of abandoning their declared intention of punishing him by the total loss of his dominions for his unpardonable defection, and limiting their resentment to the reduction of his military power and ability to do farther mischief; while he saw the necessity of abandoning the alliance of Holkar and expelling him from his dominions. The terms ultimately agreed to, at the earnest suit of the enemy, were, that the rajah should pay twenty lacs of rupees, by instalments, in four years; that he should never hold any correspondence with the enemies of the British power, whether in Europe or Asia; and that, as a security for the faithful performance of these conditions, he should forthwith surrender one of his sons as a hostage, and make over the fortress of Dieg to the British troops, and submit any difference he might have with any other power to their arbitration, and obtain from them a guarantee for his remaining possessions. These conditions appeared to the governor-general and council to be honourable to the British arms, and to provide for the main object of the present contest, viz., the separation of the Rajah of Bhurtpore from Holkar's interests, and the severing of the latter chieftain from the resources which his fortresses and treasures afforded. The treaty was therefore ratified by the governor-general, and on the day on which it was signed the rajah's son arrived in the British camp, and Holkar was compelled to leave Bhurtpore.†

As the forces of this once formidable chieftain were now reduced to three or four thousand horse, without either stores or guns, and his possessions in every part of India had been occupied by the British troops, he had no alternative but to throw himself upon the protection of his ancient enemy, Scindiah, who had recently, under his father-in-law's counsels, appeared as an armed mediator in his favour. He accordingly joined Scindiah's camp, with his remaining followers, immediately after his expulsion from Bhurtpore. The Mahratta horse had previously reassembled in small bodies in the vicinity of that town in consequence of the absence of the great bulk of the British cavalry, which had been detached from the Grand Army to stop the incursion of Meer Khan, who had

Holkar joins Scindiah, being expelled from Bhurtpore.

* Lord Lake's Desp., 21st and 23d Feb., 1805, Well. Desp., iv., 292, 295.

* Lord Well. to Secret Committee, March, 1805, Well. Desp., iv., 364, 456. Do. to do., May, 1805, v., 190, 198.

† Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, May, 1805, Well. Desp., v., 149, 151, 198, 199.

broken into the Doab, and was committing great devastations. On the 1st of April, Lord

April 1. Lake having received intelligence that a considerable body of the enemy had assembled in a position about sixty miles from Bhurtpore, made a forced march to surprise them in their camp, and he was so fortunate as to come up with, utterly rout, and disperse them, with the loss of a thousand slain, and return to his camp the same day, after a march in twelve hours of fifty miles. A few days after, four thousand of the enemy, with a few guns, were attacked by Captain Royle, in a strong position under the walls of Adaulutnaghour, and totally defeated, with the loss of their artillery and baggage. By these repeated defeats the whole of this formidable predatory cavalry was dispersed or destroyed, with the exception of the small body which accompanied Holkar into Scindiah's camp.*

April 8. Nor had the incursion of Meer Khan into Rohilcund and the Doab, or the detached efforts of the Mahrattas in other quarters, been more successful. The Rajahs of Koorkha and Kunkha, in the Cuttack, instigated by the Rajah of Berar, made an incursion into the British dominions, but they were repulsed, pursued into their own territories, and Khoordah carried by assault, by a force under the command of Colonel Harcourt. Bundelcund was for some weeks agitated by the intrigues of Scindiah, who secretly instigated its chiefs to revolt, in order to give more weight to his armed intervention in favour of Holkar;

Operations in
Cuttack, Bundelcund, and
against Meer
Khan.

but though this division, in the outset, had some success, in consequence of the absence of the British cavalry at the siege of Bhurtpore, yet it was of short duration. The approach of a considerable British force speedily reduced them to submission. More difficulty was experienced from the incursion of Meer Khan, who broke into Rohilcund at the head of fifteen thousand horse, and in the middle of February occupied its capital, Moradabad. Three regiments of British, and three of native horse, were immediately despatched by Lord Lake from the Grand Army before Bhurtpore, and marched with extraordinary expedition to arrest the enemy. They arrived in time to rescue a little garrison of three hundred sepoys, which still held good the house of Mr. Leycester, the collector for the district, and compelled the enemy to retire. Meer Khan fled to the hills, closely pursued by the British horse, under General Smith, who, after a variety of painful marches, came up with the enemy in the beginning of March, and completely destroyed the flower of his army; and on the 10th of the same month they sustained a second defeat from Colonel Burn, at the head of thirteen hundred irregular horse, and lost all their baggage. Disheartened by these disasters, and finding no disposition to join him, as he had expected, in the inhabitants of Rohilcund, Meer Khan retired across the Ganges by the same ford by which he had crossed it, and, after traversing the Doab, recrossed the Jumna in the end of March, having

Jan. and
Feb., 1805

Jan. and Feb., 1805. but though this division, in the outset, had some success, in consequence of the absence of the British cavalry at the siege of Bhurtpore, yet it was of short duration. The approach of a considerable British force speedily reduced them to submission. More difficulty was experienced from the incursion of Meer Khan, who broke into Rohilcund at the head of fifteen thousand horse, and in the middle of February occupied its capital, Moradabad. Three regiments of British, and three of native horse, were immediately despatched by Lord Lake from the Grand Army before Bhurtpore, and marched with extraordinary expedition to arrest the enemy. They arrived in time to rescue a little garrison of three hundred sepoys, which still held good the house of Mr. Leycester, the collector for the district, and compelled the enemy to retire. Meer Khan fled to the hills, closely pursued by the British horse, under General Smith, who, after a variety of painful marches, came up with the enemy in the beginning of March, and completely destroyed the flower of his army; and on the 10th of the same month they sustained a second defeat from Colonel Burn, at the head of thirteen hundred irregular horse, and lost all their baggage. Disheartened by these disasters, and finding no disposition to join him, as he had expected, in the inhabitants of Rohilcund, Meer Khan retired across the Ganges by the same ford by which he had crossed it, and, after traversing the Doab, recrossed the Jumna in the end of March, having

Feb. 18. still held good the house of Mr. Leycester, the collector for the district, and compelled the enemy to retire. Meer Khan fled to the hills, closely pursued by the British horse, under General Smith, who, after a variety of painful marches, came up with the enemy in the beginning of March, and completely destroyed the flower of his army; and on the 10th of the same month they sustained a second defeat from Colonel Burn, at the head of thirteen hundred irregular horse, and lost all their baggage. Disheartened by these disasters, and finding no disposition to join him, as he had expected, in the inhabitants of Rohilcund, Meer Khan retired across the Ganges by the same ford by which he had crossed it, and, after traversing the Doab, recrossed the Jumna in the end of March, having

March 2. at the head of thirteen hundred irregular horse, and lost all their baggage. Disheartened by these disasters, and finding no disposition to join him, as he had expected, in the inhabitants of Rohilcund, Meer Khan retired across the Ganges by the same ford by which he had crossed it, and, after traversing the Doab, recrossed the Jumna in the end of March, having

March 10. at the head of thirteen hundred irregular horse, and lost all their baggage. Disheartened by these disasters, and finding no disposition to join him, as he had expected, in the inhabitants of Rohilcund, Meer Khan retired across the Ganges by the same ford by which he had crossed it, and, after traversing the Doab, recrossed the Jumna in the end of March, having

in the course of his expedition lost half his forces.*

No sooner was the treaty with the Rajah of Bhurtpore signed, than Lord Lake marched with his whole force to watch Scindiah's movements, whom Holkar had joined, and effected a junction with the detachment under the command of Colonel Martindell. This wily rajah, finding the whole weight of the contest likely to fall upon him, and that he had derived no solid support from Holkar's force, immediately retired from his advanced position, and expressed an anxious and now sincere desire for an accommodation. A long negotiation ensued, in the outset of which the demands of the haughty chieftain were so extravagant as to be utterly inadmissible; and Lord Wellesley bequeathed it as his last advice to

Operations against Scindiah, who sues for peace.

Lord Wellesley returns to England.

July 30. Lord Wellesley returns to England. him, or any of the Mahratta chiefs, but on such terms as might maintain the power and reputation of the British government, and deprive them of the means of continuing the system of plunder and devastation by which their confederacy had hitherto been upheld;† and Lord Cornwallis, his successor, having arrived, this great statesman was relieved from the cares of sovereignty, and embarked at Calcutta on his return to England, amid the deep regrets of all classes of the people, leaving a name imperishable in the rolls alike of European and Asiatic fame.‡

These principles, however, were not equally impressed by personal observation upon his successors. The East India Company and the Board of Control, far removed from the scene of action, mainly solicitous about the husbanding of the national resources for the desperate contest with Napoleon in Europe, and unaware that a similar necessity existed to uphold the British supremacy in the East, had directed the succeeding governor-general to use his utmost efforts to bring the costly and distressing contest with the Mahratta powers to an early termination. Lord Cornwallis, however, did not live to carry these instructions into effect. The health of this distinguished nobleman, which had been declining before he left England, rapidly sunk under the heat and labours of India; and he expired at Benares, on the 5th of October, without having brought the negotiations to a termination. They were resumed in the same pacific spirit by his successor, Sir George Barlow: treaties were, in

Arrival of Sir G. Barlow.

* Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, March, 1805, Well. Desp., v., 142, 155.

† "Adverting to the restless disposition and predatory habits of Holkar, it is not probable that he will be induced to consent to any arrangement which shall deprive him of the means of ranging the territories of Hindostan, at the head of a body of plunderers, except only in the last extremity of ruined fortune. Whatever might be the expedience, under other circumstances than those which at present exist, of offering to Holkar terms of accommodation, without previous submission and solicitation on his part, at present the offer of terms such as Holkar would accept would be manifestly injurious to the reputation, and ultimately hazardous to the security of the British government."—Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, 25th June, 1805, Well. Desp., v., 269, 270.

‡ Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, July, 1805, v., 269, 270.

* Lord Wellesley to Secret Committee, 13th May, 1805, v., 155, 159.

Nov. 23, 1805. November, concluded with Scindiah, and with Holkar in the beginning of January. These treaties were, indeed, honourable to the British arms: they provided an effectual barrier against the Mahratta invasions, and secured the peace of India for twelve years. But Lord Wellesley's principles proved, in the end, to be well founded: pacific habits were found to be inconsistent with even a nominal independence on the part of these restless chieftains; conciliation impossible with men who had been inured to rapine by centuries of violence. The necessity of thorough subjugation was at last experienced, and it was then accomplished in the most effectual manner. It was reserved for the nobleman who had been most fierce in his invectives upon Lord Cornwallis's first war with Tippoo, to complete the conquest of the Mahratta powers; for a companion in arms of Wellington, to plant the British standard on the walls of Bhurtpore.*

The principal articles in the treaty with Scindiah were, that all the conditions with Scindiah of the former treaty, except in so far as expressly altered, were to continue in full force; that the claim of the company to Gwalior and Gohud should be abandoned by the British government, and the River Chumbul form the boundary of the two states, from Kotah on the west to Gohud on the east; and Scindiah was to relinquish all claim to the countries to the northward of that river, and the British to the south. Various money payments, undertaken by the company in a former treaty, were by this one remitted; and the British agreed not to restore to Holkar any of his possessions in the province of Malwa. Holkar, driven to the banks of the Hyphasis, and in extreme distress, sent to sue for peace, which was granted to him on the following conditions: That he should renounce all right to the districts of Rampoor and Boondée, on the north of the Chumbul, as well as in Koonah and Bundelcund; that he was to entertain no European in his employment without the consent of the British government, and never admit Surajee Ghautka into his counsels or service. Contrary to the earnest advice of Lord Lake, Sir George Barlow, the new governor-general, so far gratuitously modified these conditions, to which the Mahratta chiefs had consented, as to restore the provinces of Rampoor and Boondée to Holkar, and to abandon the defensive alliance which had been concluded with the Rajah of Jypore. This last measure was not adopted without the warmest remonstrances on the part both of Lord Lake and the abandoned rajah, who observed to the British resident, with truth, "That this was the first time, since the English government had been established in India, that it had been known to make its faith subservient to its convenience." But everything announced that the master spirit had fled from the helm when Lord Wellesley embarked for England: advantages conceded by our enemies were gratuitously abandoned in the vain idea of conciliation, and the objects to be gained by a pacific policy; a treaty signed, to which the illustrious states-

man who had conquered the means of dictating it would never have consented; and future burdensome and hazardous wars entailed upon the empire, to avoid the necessity of a suitable assertion of the British supremacy at the present moment.*

The administration of Marquis Wellesley exceeds, in the brilliancy and importance of the events by which it was distinguished, any recorded in British history. In the space of seven years triumphs were then accumulated which would have given lustre to an ordinary century of success. Within that short period a formidable French force, fourteen thousand strong, which had wellnigh subverted the British influence at the court of their ancient ally, the Nizam, was disarmed; the empire of Tippoo Sultaun, which had so often brought it to the brink of ruin, subverted; the Peishwa restored to his hereditary rank in the Mahratta confederacy, and secured to the British interests; the power of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar crushed, and their thrones preserved only by the magnanimity of the conqueror; the vast force organized by French officers, of forty thousand disciplined soldiers on the banks of the Jumna, totally destroyed; and Holkar himself, with the last remnant of the Mahratta horse, driven entirely from his dominions, and compelled, a needy suppliant, to sue for peace, and owe the restitution of his provinces to the perhaps misplaced generosity of the conqueror. He added provinces to the British empire in India, during his short administration, larger than the kingdom of France, extended its influence over territories more extensive than the whole of Germany, and successively vanquished four fierce and warlike nations, who could bring three hundred thousand men into the field.

From maintaining with difficulty a precarious footing at the foot of the Ghauts, on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, the British government was seated on the throne of Mysore; from resting only on the banks of the Ganges, it had come to spread its influence to the Indus and the Himalaya: it numbered among its provincial towns Delhi and Agra, the once splendid capitals of Hindostan; among its stipendiary princes, the Sultaun of Mysore and the descendant of the imperial house of Timour. These great successes were gained by an empire which never had twenty thousand European soldiers under its banners; which was engaged at home, at the moment, in a mortal conflict with the conqueror of the greatest Continental states; and found in its fidelity to its engagements, the justice of its rule, its constancy in difficulty, its magnanimity in disaster, the means of rousing the native population in its behalf, and compensating the want of British soldiers by the justice of British government, the ability of British councils, and the daring of British officers. Impressed with these ideas, future ages will dwell on this epoch as one of the most glorious in British, one of the most marvellous in European, annals; and deem the last words of the British inhabitants of Calcutta to Lord Wellesley, on his departure for Europe, as not the florid language of panegyric, but the sober

* Malcolm, 388, 427. Auber, ii., 361, 461.

* Malcolm, 416, 439. Auber, ii., 395 409.

dictates of truth. "The events of the last seven years have marked the period of your government as the most important epoch in the history of European power in India. Your discernment in seeing the exigencies of the country and of the times in which you were called upon to act; the promptitude and determination with which you have seized upon the opportunities of acting; your just conception and masterly use of our intrinsic strength, have eminently contributed, in conjunction with the zeal, the discipline, and the courage of our armies, to decide upon these great events, and to establish from one extremity of this empire to the other the ascendancy of the British name and dominion."*

General Wellesley had, a few months before his brother, set sail for the British islands. His important duties as Governor of Mysore had prevented him from taking an active part in the war with Holkar; although the judicious distribution of troops which he had made in the Deccan had secured the protection of the British provinces in that quarter, and contributed powerfully to overawe the southern Mahratta powers, and keep Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from breaking out into open hostility. But, though not personally engaged, his active and watchful spirit observed with intense interest the progress of the contest; his counsel and experience proved of essential service both to the government and the armies; and his letters on the subject remain to this day an enduring monument of judgment, foresight, and penetration.† His able and impartial government of Mysore, and the tributary and allied states connected with it, had endeared him to the native inhabitants, while his extensive local knowledge and indefatigable activity in civil administration had justly commanded the admiration of all ranks of European functionaries. But he was dissatisfied with the restrictions sometimes imposed upon him by the government at home, and prompted to return to Europe by that hidden law which so often makes the temporary vexations of men, selected by Providence for special purposes, the means of turning them into their appointed theatre; he felt the influence of that mysterious yearning, which, even in the midst of honours and power, prompts the destined actors in great events to pant for higher glories, and desire the trial of more formidable dangers. Addresses showered upon him from all quarters when his approaching departure was known: the inhabitants of Calcutta voted him a splendid sword, and erected a monument in their capital to the battle of Assaye; but among all his honours none was more touching than the parting address of the native inhabitants of Seringapatam, which seemed almost inspired with a prophetic spirit. They "implored the God of all castes and of all nations to hear their constant prayer; and wherever greater affairs than the government of them might call him, to bestow on him health, happiness, and glory."‡

The progress of the British empire in India

bears, in many respects, a close resemblance to that of Napoleon in Europe; and the "necessity of conquest to existence" which was so strongly felt, and forcibly expressed, by Lord Clive, Lord Cornwallis, Lord Wellesley, and Lord Hastings, should make us view with a charitable eye the corresponding invincible impulse under which the European conqueror continually acted. Both empires were founded on opinion and supported by military force; both brought a race of conquerors to supreme dominion, in opposition to the established rights and vested interests of the higher classes; both had to contend with physical force superior to their own, and prevailed chiefly by espousing the cause of one part of the native powers against the other; both were compelled, at first, to supply inferiority of numbers by superiority in energy and rapidity of movement; both felt that the charm of invincibility once broken was forever lost, and that the first step in serious retreat was the commencement of ruin. Both had gained their chief increase of power during periods of peace; the strength of both appeared more terrible, on the first renewal of hostilities, than it had been when they last terminated; and it was hard to say whether the open hostility or withering alliance of either was most fatal to the independence of the adjoining states.

But while, in these respects, these two empires were remarkably analogous to each other, in one vital particular of their principles of action and rules of administration were directly at variance, and it is to this difference that the different durations of their existence is to be ascribed. The French in Europe conquered only to oppress; seducing words, indeed, preceded their approach, but cruel exactions accompanied their footsteps—desolation and suffering followed their columns; the vanquished states experienced only increased severity of rule by the sway of the tricolour flag. The English in India, on the contrary, conquered only to save: the oppression of Asiatic rule, the ferocity of authorized plunder, disappeared before their banners; multitudes flocked from the adjoining states to enjoy the blessings of their protection; the advance of their frontier was marked by the smiling aspect of villages rebuilt, fields recultivated, the jungle and the forest receding before human habitations. And the difference in the practical result of the two governments has been decisively established, by the difference of the strength which they have exhibited in resisting the shocks of adverse fortune; for, while the empire of Napoleon sunk as rapidly as it rose, and was prostrated on the first serious reverse before the aroused indignation of mankind, the British dominion in Asia, like the Roman in Europe, has stood secure in the affections of its innumerable inhabitants, and, though separated by half the globe from the parent state, has risen superior, during almost a century, to the accumulated force of all its enemies.

After the most attentive consideration of the circumstances attending the rise and establishment of this extraordinary dominion, under Lord Clive, Warren Hastings, Lord Cornwallis,

Analogy of the British empire in India, and Napoleon's in Europe.

Their essential point of difference.

Reflections on the rise of the British power in India.

* Address of Inhabitants of Calcutta to Lord Wellesley, 29th July, 1805, *Well. Desp.*, iv., 613.

† *Gurw.*, ii., 457, 607.

‡ *Gurw.*, ii., 606, 608. Scherer, i., 66.

and Marquis Wellesley, it seems almost inexplicable to what cause its marvellous progress has been owing. It was not to the magnitude of the forces sent out by the mother-country, for they were few, and furnished in the most parsimonious spirit; it was not to the weakness of the conquered states, for they were vast and opulent empires, wellnigh equalling in numbers and resources all those of Europe put together; it was not to their want of courage or discipline, for they had all the resources of European military art, and fought with a courage which sometimes rivalled even the far-famed prowess of British soldiers. The means of combating with resources at first slender, and always dependant for their existence on the capacity and energy of the Indian government, were found in the moral courage and far-seeing sagacity of our Eastern administration, and the unconquerable valour of our British officers, who brought a degenerate race into the field, and taught them, by their spirit and example, to emulate the heroic deeds of their European brethren in arms. The history of the world can hardly exhibit a parallel to the vigour and intrepidity of that political administration—the courage and daring of those military exploits. And, perhaps, on reviewing their achievements, the British, like the Roman annalist, may be induced to conclude that it is to the extraordinary virtue and talent of a few leading men that these wonderful successes have been owing. “*Mihi multa legenti multa audienti, quæ populus Romanus domi militæque, mari atque terra, præclara facinora fecit, forte lubuit attendere, quæ res maxime, tanta negotia sustinuisse. Sciebam sæpe, numero parva manu, cum magnis legionibus hostium contendisse; cognoveram, parvis copiis, bella gesta cum opulentis regibus; ad hoc sæpe fortunæ violentiam tolerasse; facundia Græcos, gloria belli Gallos, ante Romanos fuisse. Ac mihi, multum agitant, constabat paucorum civium egregiam virtutem cuncta patravisse; eoque factum, ut divitiis paupertas, multitudinem paucitas superaret.*”*

Much, however, as the strenuous virtue of individuals may have contributed to the greatness of the British Empire in Asia, as it did of the Roman dominion in Europe, it will not of itself explain the phenomenon. This strenuous virtue itself is the wonder which requires solution. How did it happen that Great Britain, during the course of eighty years, should have been able to furnish a race of statesmen adequate to the conception of such mighty projects; of warriors equal to the execution of such glorious deeds; men capable of seizing with unflinching courage the moment of action, of combining with profound sagacity the means of conquest, of executing with undaunted resolution the directions of genius? Still more, how was this constellation of talent exhibited when the state was involved in bloody and arduous conflicts in the Western hemisphere, and shone with the brightest lustre at the very moment when all the resources of the state seemed concentrated for the defence of the heart of the empire? It was the boast of the Romans that their Republican constitution, by training all the citizens to civil or military duties, either as leaders or followers,

provided an inexhaustible fund of virtue and ability for the service of the state; and that the loss even of the largest army or the most skillful commanders could, without difficulty, be supplied by the multitudes in every rank whom the avocations of freedom had trained to every pacific or warlike duty. In British India, equally as in ancient Rome, the influence of the same undying energy and universal capacity may be described. The natives say that the company has always conquered because it was *always young*; and such, in truth, was ever its character. In no other state of society but that in which a large mixture of the Democratic element has spread energy and the spirit of exertion through every rank, is to be found for so considerable a period so large a share of the undecaying youth of the human race.

But this element has usually been found in human affairs to be inconsistent with durable greatness. It has either burned with such fierceness as to consume, in a few years, the vitals of the state, or dwindled into a selfish or shortsighted passion for economy, to gratify the jealousy of the middle classes of society, fatal in the end to its independence. In moments of general excitement, and when danger was obvious to the senses, Democratic societies have often been capable of the most extraordinary exertions; it is in previous preparation, sagacious foresight, and the power of present self-denial for future good, that they have in general proved deficient. That England, in its European administration, has experienced throughout the contest with revolutionary France its full share both of the strength and weakness incident to Democratic societies, is evident from the consideration that, if the unforeseen economy of the Commons had not, during the preceding peace, when danger was remote, reduced the national strength to a pitiable degree of weakness, Paris could with ease have been taken in the first campaign; and that, if the inherent energy of Democratic vigour, when danger is present, had not supported the country during its latter stages, the independence of Britain and the last remnant of European freedom, notwithstanding all the efforts of the aristocracy, must have sunk beneath the arms of Napoleon. No one can doubt that, if a popular house of commons or unbridled press had existed at Calcutta and Madras, to coerce or restrain the Indian government in its political energy or military establishment, as was the case in the British isles, the British empire in the East must have been speedily prostrated, any more than that, if its able councils and gallant armies had not been supported by popular vigour at home, even the energy of Lord Wellesley, the daring of Lord Lake, must alike have sunk before the strength of the Asiatic dynasties.

The Eastern empire of England, on the other hand, has exhibited no such vicissitudes; it has never felt the want of either of aristocratic foresight in preparation, or of Democratic vigour in execution; it has ever been distinguished alike by the resolution in council, and tenacity of purpose, which characterize patrician, and the energy in action and inexhaustible resources which are

It was owing to union of Democratic energy with aristocratic foresight.

Causes of this extraordinary progress.

Causes of this extraordinary combination.

* Sall., *Bel. Cat.*, sec. 32.

produced in plebeian governments. This extraordinary combination, peculiar, in the whole history of the species, to the British Empire in Asia and the Roman in Europe, is evidently owing to the causes which, in both, during a brief period, rendered aristocratic direction of affairs coexistent with Democratic execution of its purposes : a state of things so unusual, and threatened by so many dangers ; an equilibrium so unstable, that its continuance, even for the brief time it endured in both, is perhaps to be ascribed only to Divine interposition. And it is evident that, if the same combination had existed, in uncontrolled operation, in the government at home ; if the unconquerable popular energy of England had been permanently directed by foresight and resolution equal to that which was displayed in the East ; if no popular jealousy or impatience had existed, to extinguish, on the termination of war, the force which had gained its triumphs, and the fleets and armies of Marlborough, Chatham, Nelson, and Wellington, had been suffered to remain at the disposal of a vigilant executive, to perpetuate the ascendancy they had acquired ; if the two hundred ships of the line, and three hundred thousand warriors, once belonging to England, had been permanently directed by the energetic foresight of a Chatham, a Burke, or a Wellesley, to external purposes, the British European Empire in modern, must have proved as irresistible as the Roman in ancient times, and the emulation of independent states been extinguished in the slumber of universal dominion.

But no such gigantic empire was intended by Providence to lull the ardent spirit of Europe, till it had performed its destined work of spreading the seeds of civilization and religion through the habitable globe. To Great Britain, a durable colonial ascendancy is given ; but it will be found, not among the sable inhabitants of Hindostan, but the free descendants of the Anglo-Saxon race in the American and Australian wilds. The extraordinary combination of circumstances which gave us the empire of the East could not remain permanent : aristocratic constancy and Democratic vigour can coexist only for a brief space, even in the most favoured nation. Already the great organic change of 1832, and the extension of the direct influence of British popular power upon Eastern administration, have gone far to shake the splendid fabric. When the time arrives, as arrive it will, that adverse interests, ignorant philanthropy, or prejudiced feeling, in the dominant island, shall interfere with vested rights, violate existing engagements, or force on premature changes in the East, as they have already done in the West Indies, the discontent of the inhabitants will break out into inextinguishable revolt. When the national strength is prostrated to gratify the jealousy of popular ascendancy in the Asiatic, as it has long been in the European world, the last hour of our Indian empire has struck. Distant provinces may be long ruled by a wise, vigorous,

and paternal central government, but they cannot remain for any considerable time under the sway of a remote and tyrannical Democratic society. The interests of the masses are, in such a case, directly brought into collision : the prejudices, the passions of the ruling multitude, soon prove insupportable to the inhabitants of the subject realm ; the very spirit which the central empire has generated, becomes the expansive force which tears its colonial dependences asunder. Whether the existing contest between the different classes of society in the British islands terminates in the lasting ascendant of the multitude, or the establishment, by Democratic support, of a centralized despotism, the result will be equally fatal to our Eastern supremacy : in the first case, by terminating the steady rule of aristocratic foresight ; in the last, by drying up the fountains of popular support.

But whatever may be the ultimate fate of the British Empire in India, it will not fall without having left an imperishable name, and bequeathed enduring benefits to the human race. First of all the Christian family, England has set its foot in the East, not to enslave, but to bless ; alone of all the conquering nations in the world, she has erected, amid Asiatic bondage, the glorious fabric of European freedom. To assert that her dominion has tended only to social happiness, that justice has regulated all her measures, and equity pervaded every part of her administration, would be to assert more than ever has, or ever will be produced by human nature. But when interest has ceased to blind, or panegyric to mislead, the sober voice of impartial truth will confess that her sway in Hindostan has contributed, in an extraordinary degree, to correct the disorders of society ; to extricate from hopeless oppression the labouring, to restrain by just administration the long-established tyranny of the higher orders ; and that public happiness was never so equally diffused, general prosperity never so thoroughly established among all ranks, as under the British rule, since the descendants of Shem first came to sojourn on the banks of the Ganges. Already the fame of its equitable sway and thorough protection of all classes has spread far, and sunk deep into the mind of the East ; Mohammedan prejudice has been shaken by the exhibition, amid its severities, of Christian beneficence ; and even the ancient fabric of Hindoo superstition yielded to the ascendant of European enterprise. Whether the appointed time has arrived for the conversion of the worshippers of Brahma to the precepts of a purer faith, and the vast plains of Hindostan are to be peopled by the followers of the Cross, as yet lies buried in the womb of fate ; but, whatever may be the destiny of Asia, the British standard has not appeared on its plains in vain ; the remembrance of the blessed days of its rule will never be forgotten, and more glorious even than the triumph of her arms have been the seeds of future freedom, which the justice and integrity of English government have sown in the regions of the sun.

Great and lasting benefits it has already produced in human affairs.

CHAPTER LIII.

CAMPAIGN OF ABENSBERG, LANDSHUT, AND ECKMUHL

ARGUMENT.

Influence of the Aristocratic and Democratic Principles on the two contending Parties in Europe.—Policy of the Austrian Cabinet since the Peace of Presburg.—Important Decree, ordering the Formation of the Landwehr, in June, 1808.—Napoleon's Remonstrances against it.—Deceitful Pacific Professions of Austria at Erfurth.—Intelligence of the Preparations of Austria induces Napoleon to halt in Spain.—Division of Opinion in the Austrian Cabinet on the War.—Arguments for and against it.—Amount and Distribution of the French Force in Germany in the Spring of 1809.—Efforts of Austria to obtain the Accession of Russia to the Confederacy.—Prussia resolves to remain Neutral.—General Effervescence in Germany in Aid of the Austrian Cause.—Character of Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris.—Angry Interchange of Notes between the French and Austrian Cabinets.—Deep Umbrage taken by Austria at the Conferences of Erfurth.—Measures taken for the Concentration of the French Army.—Preparations and Forces of Austria.—Last Diplomatic Communications at Paris.—Spirit which animated all Classes in the Austrian Empire.—Austrian Plan of the Campaign.—Plans of Napoleon.—Commencement of Hostilities by the Austrians.—First Movements of the Austrians, and imminent Danger of the French.—Faulty Movements of Berthier to arrest their Progress.—Advance of the Austrians almost cuts in two the French Army.—Movements of the two Armies towards each other.—Napoleon's Plan of Operations, and its great Dangers.—Action between Davoust and Hohenzollern, at Thum.—Positions of the two Armies on the Night of the 19th.—Napoleon's Address to the German Confederates.—Combat of Abensberg.—Hiller pursued to Landshut.—Is again beaten by the Emperor.—Operations of Davoust and the Archduke Charles in the Centre.—Attack and Capture of Ratibon by the Austrians.—Preparatory Movements on both Sides with a view to a general Battle.—Description of the Field of Battle.—Battle of Eckmühl.—Victory of Napoleon.—Desperate Cavalry Actions in front of Ratibon.—The Archduke retreats across the Danube.—Operations against Ratibon by the French, and wound of Napoleon.—Its Assault and Capture.—Great Results of these Actions.—Indefatigable Activity of Napoleon and his Soldiers were the principal Cause of these Successes.—Impressive Scene in the conferring of military Honours at Ratibon.—Defeat of the Bavarians by Hiller.—Successful Operations of the Archduke John in Italy.—Total Defeat of Eugene Beauharnois at Sacile.—Important Effects of this Victory on the Italian Campaign.—Hopes which the Commencement of the Campaign afforded to the Allies.

As the history of Europe during the eventful year which succeeded the French Revolution contains, in the domestic transactions of every state possessing the shadow even of free institutions, a perpetual recurrence of the strife between the aristocratic and Democratic principles; so the military annals of the same period illustrate the effect of these contending powers on the course of external events, and the issue of warlike measures. In the results of military operations, not less than the consequences of social convulsion, we perceive the influence of the same antagonist principles; the long-continued successes of the one, not less than the persevering firmness of the other, clearly illustrate the action of those great antagonist powers which in every age have divided between them the government of mankind. France, buoyant with the energy and radiant with the enthusiasm of a revolution, was for long triumphant; but the fever of passion is transient, the suggestions of interest permanent in their effects;

and in the vehement exertions which the Democratic principle there made, externally and internally, to achieve success, the foundation was necessarily laid for disappointment and change within, exhaustion and ultimate disaster without. Austria, less powerfully agitated in the outset, was directed by principles calculated to be more uniform in their operation, and more effective in the end: recurring to the aid of popular enthusiasm only when driven to it by necessity, and guided throughout by aristocratic foresight, she did not so soon wear out the scorching flame which shakes the world; like a skilful combatant, she gave ground and yielded, till the strength of her antagonist had exhausted itself by exertion; and thus succeeded at last, not only in appearing with undiminished strength on the theatre of combat, but rousing to her standard the still unexhausted vigour of popular excitation.

Since the gallant but unsuccessful attempt made by the imperial government in 1805, the cabinet of Vienna had adhered with cautious prudence to a system of neutrality. Even the extraordinary temptation afforded by the disasters of the Polish campaign, and the opportunity, thence arising, of striking a decisive blow when the forces of the East and the West were engaged in doubtful hostility on the banks of the Alle, had not been able to rouse it to immediate exertion. Austria armed, indeed, and assumed a menacing attitude, but not a sword was drawn; and the rapid termination of the contest by the disaster of Friedland, put an entire stop to any projects of hostility which a decided victory in that quarter by the Muscovite arms, or even the transfer of the war into the interior of Russia, might probably have occasioned. But during this interval the government was not idle. Under the able guidance of the Archduke Charles, the war department assumed an extraordinary degree of activity; the vast chasms which the campaigns of Ulm and Austerlitz had occasioned in the ranks were filled up by voluntary recruiting, or the prisoners who at length were restored by the French government; and, with a patriotism and wisdom worthy of the very highest admiration, the treasury, at the very time when the state was overburdened with the enormous contribution of four millions sterling, imposed by the victorious French troops, purchased from their retiring armies the greater part of the immense park of two thousand pieces of cannon, which they were removing from the arsenal of Vienna. During the whole of 1806 and 1807, the efforts of the war department were incessant, without any ostentatious display, to restore the horses of the cavalry and artillery, and replenish the arsenals and magazines, which had been nearly emptied by the efforts or spoliation of the last campaign; but the attention of the archduke was, in an especial

Policy of the imperial cabinet since the peace of Presburg.

manner, drawn to the remodelling of the infantry, the real basis of all powerful military establishments. The French organization into corps de armée, under the command of marshals, and divisions under them of generals, each with a certain proportion of cavalry and artillery, so as to render it a little army complete in itself; that admirable system which Napoleon had adopted from the ancient conquerors of the world,* was introduced into the imperial service; while the younger and more ardent officers, with the Archduke John at their head, eagerly supported still more energetic steps: formed plans of national defence and internal communication; warmly recommended the adoption of measures calculated to rouse the national enthusiasm in the public defence; and already contemplated those heroic sacrifices, in the event of another invasion, which afterward, under Wellington in Portugal and Alexander in Russia, led to such memorable results.†

It was the presence of the Grand Army of France, two hundred thousand strong, in the north and west of Germany, which long overawed the imperial government, and prevented the adoption of any steps

which could give umbrage to Napoleon; but with the transfer of a large part of that immense force to the Peninsula, after the breaking out of the war in that direction, this oppressive load was materially diminished. The able statesman who directed the imperial councils immediately perceived that a powerful diversion was now likely to be created in the quarter where the French emperor least expected it, and where he was most desirous of obtaining a solid support; and they readily anticipated that England would not be slow in availing herself of this unexpected revolution of fortune in her favour, and descending in strength upon that theatre of warfare, where the sea would prove the best possible base for military operations, and the scanty internal resources of the country would render it impossible to keep the armies of France together for any length of time in sufficient strength for their expulsion. In order to be in a situation to improve any chances which might thus arise in their favour,

the cabinet of Vienna no sooner heard of the breaking out of the Spanish contest than they issued a decree by which a militia, raised by conscription, under the name of *Landwehr*, was instituted. The general enthusiasm in favour of the monarchy, about, it was hoped, to resume its place in the theatre of Europe, soon raised this admirable force from 200,000, fixed by the law for its German possessions, to 300,000 men. In addition to this, the Hungarian Diet voted twelve thousand recruits for the regular army for the year 1807, and eighty thousand for 1808, besides an insurrection, or levy *en masse*, of eighty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand were excellent cavalry. These immense military preparations, in addition to a regular standing army now raised to 350,000 men, were sufficient to demonstrate the existence of some great national project; and they were rendered still

more formidable by the activity which prevailed in completing the remounting of the cavalry and artillery, and arming the fortresses, both on the frontier and in the interior; as well as the enthusiastic feelings which this universal note of military preparation had awakened in all classes of the monarchy.*

Napoleon was no sooner informed of these serious military changes, than he addressed the most pressing remonstrances to the imperial cabinet; and in the midst of the increasing intricacy of the Peninsular affairs, and all the whirl of a rapid journey from Bayonne, by Bordeaux, to Paris, repeatedly demanded a categorical explanation of armaments so well calculated to disturb the peace of Europe. At the same time, he addressed a circular to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, in which he called on them "to make ready their contingents, and prevent a war without a pretext as without an object, by showing to Austria that they were prepared for it." No sooner had he arrived in Paris than he addressed a public remonstrance on 15th Aug the same subject to Metternich, the Austrian ambassador, in presence of all the diplomatists of Europe. The imperial government made loud professions of pacific intentions, but did not for an hour discontinue their military preparations. Napoleon was not deceived: the coincidence of these formidable armaments with the insurrection in Spain, and the disasters of Vimera and Baylew, was too evident to elude the most ordinary sagacity;† but he dissembled his resentment, and contented himself with ordering the princes of the confederation to keep their contingents together, and strengthening to the utmost the armies in Germany, so as to replace the veterans who were withdrawn in such numbers for the war in the Peninsula.

It was, in a great measure, to overawe Austria that Napoleon pressed the Emperor Alexander to meet him at Erfurth; and he flattered himself that, however tempting the opportunity afforded by the Spanish insurrection might be, the cabinet of Vienna would hesitate before they engaged in hostilities with the two most powerful military states of the Continent. The preparations of Austria being not yet complete, it was deemed advisable to gain time; and, in order to accomplish this object, M. de Vincent was despatched with a letter to the coalesced emperors in that city, so full of protestations of amity,‡ that Napoleon authorized the princes of the confederation to dismiss their contingents, with the advice, merely, to reassemble them as soon as ever Austria resumed her hostile attitude. To the Emperor Francis he re-

Napoleon's remonstrances against these measures.
24th July.

Deceitful pacific professions of Austria at Erfurth

* Pelet, i., 37, 38. Hard., x., 296, 297. Archduke John, Feldzug, 1809, 10, 12. Jom., iii., 138, 141.

† Pelet, i., 39, 40. Hard., x., 295, 296.

‡ "He flattered himself that the Emperor Napoleon had never ceased to be convinced that, if false insinuations, in regard to the organic changes which he had deemed it necessary to introduce into his monarchy, had for a moment thrown doubts on the continuance of his amicable relations, the explanations which Count Metternich had made on that subject had entirely dissipated them. The Baron Vincent was charged to confirm them, and to afford every explanation that could be desired."—FRANCIS to NAPOLEON, 21st Sept., 1808; SCHOELL, ix., 216.

* Ante, ii., 323.

† Pelet, Guerre de 1809, i., 36, 37. Der Erzherzog Johans Feldzug in Jahre 1809, 8

turned an answer earnestly counselling moderation and pacific views;* and having thus, as he hoped, dispelled, or at least delayed, the cloud which threatened to burst in the east of Germany,† he by a formal decree dissolved the Grand Army, and directed a considerable part of the troops composing it, particularly the corps of Soult and Ney, with the Imperial Guards, to Spain, where they achieved the successes which have already been detailed.

Notwithstanding the disasters, however, which befell the Spaniards, the cabinet of Vienna was not discouraged. During the winter, measures evidently indicating a hostile spirit were adopted: the harbour of Trieste was opened to the English and Spanish flag; large purchases of arms were there made by the agents of the insurgents; articles hostile to Napoleon began to appear in the public journals, which, being all under the control of the police, indicated more or less the disposition of government; and the Austrian ambassador declined to accede to a proposal made at Paris by Count Romanzow, for the conclusion of a treaty involving a triple guarantee between the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna, and the Tuileries. Secret amicable relations had been established with Great Britain, the common refuge of all those, however hostilely disposed in former times, on the Continent, who found the tyranny of France growing insupportable. But, though the cabinet of St. James tendered the offer of their assistance in subsidies, they strongly counselled the imperial government not to take the irrevocable step unless the resources of the monarchy were clearly equal to the struggle which awaited them. But the vigour of the English administration, notwithstanding their prudent advice, was such as eminently to inspire confidence; the spectacle of fifty thousand British soldiers taking the field in the Peninsular campaigns, was as unusual as it was animating, and promised a diversion of a very different kind from those which had terminated in such disaster on the plains of Flanders or the Bay of Quiberon. At length there appeared, in the middle of December, a declaration of the King of England, which openly alluded to the hostile preparations of Austria, and assigned the prejudicial effect of Great Britain withdrawing at such a moment from the contest, as a powerful reason for declining the mediation of France and

Russia, offered at Erfurth;* and the same courier who, on the 1st of January, 1809, brought this important state paper to Napoleon, conveyed, at the same time, decisive intelligence in regard to the hostile preparations and general movement in the Austrian States. He immediately halted, as already mentioned, at As-torga: returned with extraordinary expedition to Valladolid, where he shut himself up for two days with Maret, his minister for foreign affairs; despatched eighty-four messengers in different directions,† with orders to concentrate his forces in Germany, and call out the full contingents of the Rhenish Confederacy; and returned, without delay, himself to Paris.

The Austrian cabinet, meanwhile, notwithstanding their hostile preparations, were as yet undecided as to the course which they should finally adopt. The extreme peril which the monarchy had already undergone in the wars with Napoleon, as well as the uncertain nature of the diversion which they could expect from so tumultuary a force as the Spanish insurrection, naturally excited the most anxious solicitude, and induced many of the warmest and wisest patriots to pause before they engaged in a contest which, if unsuccessful, might prove the last which the country might ever have to sustain. Opinions were much divided, not only in the cabinet, but the nation, on the subject. At the head of the party inclined to preserve peace was the Archduke Charles, whose great military exploits and able administration as director of the war department necessarily gave his opinion the greatest weight, and who had felt too frequently the weight of the French arms not to appreciate fully the danger of again provoking their hostility. On the other hand, the war party found an able and energetic advocate in Count Stadion, the prime minister, who was cordially seconded by the majority of the nobility, and ardently supported by the great body of the people. It was known, also, that the emperor himself inclined to the same opinion. The question was vehemently argued, not only in the cabinet, but in all the private circles of the metropolis.

On the one hand, it was argued that the military preparations of the monarchy were still incomplete, and its finances in the most deplorable state of confusion; that Prussia, whatever her inclinations might be, was incapable of rendering any efficient assistance, and Russia too closely united with the French emperor to offer any hope of co-operation; that the Spanish insurgents could not be expected long to hold out against the immense forces which Napoleon had now directed against them, and, accordingly, had been defeated in every encounter since he

* "He could assure his imperial majesty that he was seriously afraid that he should see hostilities renewed: the war faction had pushed Austria to the most violent measures, and misfortunes even greater than the preceding ones. If, however, the measures of the Emperor Francis were such as to indicate confidence, they would inspire it. Truth and simplicity have now become the best politicians: he had communicated to him his apprehensions, in order that they might be instantly dissipated: when he had it in his power to have dismembered the Austrian dominions, he had not done so: he was ever ready, on the contrary, to guaranty their integrity. The last levy *en masse* would have occasioned a war if he had believed it was raised in concert with Russia. He had just disbanded the camp of the Confederation of the Rhine: one hundred thousand of his troops were about to renew their threatening attitude against England. Let your imperial majesty, therefore, abstain from all hostile armaments which could give umbrage to the French cabinet, or operate as a diversion in favour of Great Britain."—THIBAUDEAU, vii., 73, 74.

† Thib. v., 200, 201. Pelet, i., 42, 47.

* If, among the nations which maintain against France a precarious and doubtful independence, there are any who, at this moment, hesitate between the ruin which will result from a prolonged inaction and the contingent dangers which may arise from a courageous effort to escape from it, the deceitful prospect of a peace between Great Britain and France could not fail to be singularly disastrous. The vain hope of a return of tranquillity might suspend their preparations, or the fear of being abandoned to their own resources shake their resolution.—Dec. 16th, 1808, King's Speech, *Parl. Deb.*

† Ante, iii., 104. Thib., vii., 200, 202. Hard., x., 297, 298. Pelet, i., 45, 48.

in person directed their movements; and the English auxiliaries, deprived of the solid base of Peninsular co-operation, would necessarily be driven, as on former occasions, to their ships. What madness, then, for the sake of a transient and uncertain success, to incur a certain and unavoidable danger, and expose the Austrian monarchy, as it would soon be, alone and unaided, to the blows of a conqueror too strongly irritated to allow the hope that, after disaster, moderate terms would again be allowed to the vanquished. On the other hand, it was strongly contended that so favourable an opportunity of reinstating the Empire in the rank it formerly held in Europe never could again be looked for, and was, in fact, more advantageous than could possibly have been expected; that the great majority of the French veteran troops had been directed to the Peninsula, and were now either buried in the mountains of Galicia, or inextricably involved in the heart of Spain; that sixty thousand French conscripts alone remained in Germany, and the Rhenish confederates could not be relied on by the stranger when the standards of the Fatherland were openly unfurled; that the confusion of the finances was of no importance, when the subsidies of England could with certainty be relied on to furnish the necessary supplies, and the incompleteness of the military preparations of little moment when the now awakened fervour of the nation was attracting all ranks in crowds to the national standard; that it was in vain to refer to the long-dreaded prowess of the French armies, when the disaster of Baylew and the defeat of Cintra had dispelled the charm of their invincibility; that there could be no question that the hour of Europe's deliverance was approaching; the only question was, whether Austria was to remain passive during the strife, and bear no part either in the glories by which it was to be achieved or the spoils with which it would be attended. These considerations, speaking as they did to the generous and enthusiastic feelings of our nature, and supported by the great influence of the emperor, the ministry, and the principal nobility, at length prevailed over the cautious reserve and prudent foresight of the Archduke Charles, and war was resolved on. In truth, the public fervour had risen to such a height that it could no longer be delayed, and, like many other of the most important steps in the history of all nations, its consequences, be they good or be they bad, were unavoidable.*

The French forces in Germany, when the contest was thus renewed, were far from being considerable, and it was chiefly an exaggerated impression of the extent to which they had been reduced which induced the cabinet of Vienna, at that period, to throw off the mask. The total amount, in September, 1808, on paper, was one hundred and sixty thousand men, of whom forty thousand were cavalry; but the number actually present with the eagles was only a hundred and forty thousand, of whom only a hundred and ten thousand were native French, the remainder being Poles, Saxons, and Dutch. After the departure of three divisions of Soult's

corps for the Peninsula, in the end of October, the remainder, eighty thousand strong, assumed the name of the army of the Rhine, and were quartered at Magdebourg, Bareuth, Hanover, and Stettin, and in the fortresses on the Oder. But to this force of imperial France there was to be added nearly one hundred thousand men from the Rhenish Confederacy; so that, after making every allowance for detachments and garrisons, a hundred and fifty thousand men might be relied on for active operations on the Inn, or in the valley of the Danube.*

The imperial cabinet made the utmost efforts to obtain the accession of Russia to the new confederacy; and for this purpose despatched a young officer of diplomatic talent, engaging address, and noble figure, reserved for exalted destinies in future times, PRINCE SCHWARTZENBERG, to St. Petersburg. Stadion had been previously made aware, by secret communications from Baron Stein, the Duke de Serra Capriola, and others, that, notwithstanding Alexander's chivalrous admiration of Napoleon, he still retained at bottom the same opinions as to the necessity of ultimately joining in the confederacy for the deliverance of Europe; and he was not without hopes that the present opportunity, when so large a portion of the French armies were engaged in the Peninsula, would appear to the cabinet of St. Petersburg a fair one for taking the lead in the great undertaking. But all the efforts of Schwarzenberg were in vain: Alexander had given his word to the French emperor, and, though capable of the utmost dissimulation so far as the mere obligations of cabinets were concerned, the Czar was scrupulously faithful to any personal engagements which he had undertaken. He was occupied, moreover, with great schemes of ambition both on his northern and southern frontier, and little inclined to forego present and certain conquests in Finland and Moldavia for the problematical advantages of a contest in the heart of Germany. All attempts to engage Russia in the confederacy, therefore, proved abortive; and the utmost which the Austrian envoy could obtain from the imperial cabinet was a secret assurance that Russia, if compelled to take a part in the strife, would not at least bring forward any formidable force against the Austrian legions.*

Prussia had no objects of present ambition to obtain by remaining quiescent during the approaching conflict, and the wrongs of Tilsit were too recent and serious not to have left the strongest desire for liberation and vengeance in every Prussian heart. No sooner, therefore, had it become manifest that Austria was arming, than public feeling became strongly excited in all the Prussian States, and the government was violently urged by a powerful party, both in and out of the cabinet, to seize the present favourable opportunity of regaining its lost province and resuming its place among the powers of Europe. Scharnhorst, the minister at war, strongly supported the bolder policy, and offered to place at the disposal of the king, by his admirable system of temporary service, no

Efforts of Austria to obtain the accession of Russia to the confederacy.

Prussia resolves to remain neutral.

* Erz. John Feld., 1809, 24, 27. Pelet, i., 59, 61.

* Stutterheim, Feld., 3, 1809, 19, 20. Pelet, 43, 44.

† Hard., x., 299, 302. Pelet, i., 67, 68. Bout., i., 24, 56.

less than one hundred and twenty thousand men, instead of the forty thousand which they were alone permitted to have under arms.* But the cabinet of Berlin was restrained from giving vent to its wishes, not merely by prudential considerations, but a sense of gratitude. The visit of the king and queen to St. Petersburg, in Jan., 1809. the preceding spring, had renewed the bonds of amity by which they were united to the Emperor Alexander; they had obtained a considerable remission of tribute, and relaxation of the hardships of the treaty of Tilsit, from his intercession;† and they felt that, not indifferent spectators of the Austrian efforts, they could not with safety take a part in them until the intentions of Russia were declared. They resolved, therefore, to remain neuter; and thus had Napoleon again the extraordinary good fortune, through his own address or the jealousies or timidity of the other potentates, of engaging a *fourth* time in mortal conflict with one of the great European powers, while the other two were mere spectators of the strife.‡

But, though refused all co-operation from the European cabinets, the court of Vienna was not without hopes of obtaining powerful succours from the Germanic people. The Tugendbund or Burschenschaft, which had spread its ramifications as far as indignation at French oppression was felt in the north and east of Germany, had already formed a secret league against the oppressor, independent of the agreements of cabinets; and thousands of brave men in Westphalia, Cassel, Saxony, and the Prussian States, animated by the example of the Spanish patriots, were prepared to start in arms for the defence of the Fatherland, as soon as the imperial standards crossed the Inn. The peasants of Tyrol, whose ardent and hereditary attachment to the house of Hapsburg had been rendered still more enthusiastic by the bitter experience they had had of their treatment as aliens and enemies under the Bavarian government, longed passionately to rejoin the much-loved Austrian dominion; and the first battalion of the imperial troops which crossed the Salzbourg frontier would, it was well known, at once rouse twenty thousand brave mountaineers into desperate and formidable hostility. The cabinet of Vienna, despite its aristocratic prepossessions, was prepared to take full advantage of these favourable dispositions; and, impelled by necessity, not only maintained in secret an active correspondence with the numerous malecontents in the adjoining provinces, who panted for the moment of German deliverance, but was prepared, the moment hostilities were commenced, to call upon them by animated proclamations to repair to its standards, and determine, by a vigorous popular demonstration, the uncertainty or vacillations of their respective governments. Thus had the energy of general enthusiasm in the course of the contest already come to change sides; and while France, resting on the coalitions of cabinets and the force of disciplined armies, was sternly repressing, in every direction, the fervour of national exertion, Spain and Austria openly invoked the aid of

popular enthusiasm, and loudly proclaimed the right of mankind, when oppression had reached a certain point, to redress their own wrongs, and take the lead in the achievement of their own deliverance.*†

Meanwhile the Austrian ambassador at Paris had the difficult task to discharge Character of Metternich, the Austrian ambassador at Paris. of maintaining apparently amicable relations with the French government at the time when his cabinet were openly preparing the means of decided hostility. But the BARON METTERNICH, who then filled that exalted situation at the court of Napoleon, was a man whose abilities were equal to the task. A statesman, in the widest acceptation of the word, gifted with a sagacious intellect, a clear perception, a sound judgment; profoundly versed in the secrets of diplomacy, and the characters of the leading political men with whom he was brought in contact in the different European cabinets; persevering in his policy, far-seeing in his views, unrivalled in his discrimination, and at the same time skilful in concealing these varied qualities; a perfect master of dissimulation in public affairs, and yet honourable and candid in private life; capable of acquiring information from others, at the very moment when he was eluding all similar investigations from them; unbounded in application, richly endowed with knowledge, he also enjoyed the rare faculty of veiling these great acquirements under the cover of polished manners, and causing his superiority to be forgotten in the charms of a varied and intellectual conversation. These admirable abilities were fully appreciated at Berlin, where he had formerly been ambassador; but they excited jealousy and distrust among the diplomatists of Paris, who, seeing in the new representative of the Cæsars qualities which they were not accustomed to in his predecessors, and unable either to overcome his caution or divine his intentions, launched forth into invectives against his character, and put a forced or malevolent construction upon his most inconsiderable actions.‡

Notwithstanding all his caution and diplomatic address, however, the Austrian ambassador could not blind the French emperor to the preparations which were going forward. In a public audience of the envoys of the principal European powers at Paris, he openly charged the cabinet of Vienna with hostile designs, and Metternich, who could not deny them, had no alternative but to protest that they were defensive only, and rendered necessary by the hostile attitude of the princes of the Rhinish

Angry interchange of notes between the French and Austrian courts.

Feb. 17.

* Pelet, i., 71, 79. Feldzug von Erzherz., Jom., 52, 54.

† Napoleon loudly accused the cabinet of Vienna of insurrectionary iniquity, in thus fomenting popular efforts against the armies of imperial France. "Austria," said the *Moniteur*, "has adopted the revolutionary system: she has no right now to complain of the conduct of the convention, in proclaiming war to the palace and peace to the cottage. A plan has been organized at Vienna for a general insurrection over all Europe, the execution of which is confided to the ardent zeal of the princes of the house of Austria, propagated by the proclamations of its generals, and diffused by its detachments at the distance of two hundred leagues from its armies. The leading characteristic of that system is, the *terror* universally spread by the Austrian generals, to excite, by main force, that revolution."—*Moniteur*, No. 239, *ann'e* 1809; and *Pelet*, i., 78.

‡ *Hard.*, x., 302, 303. *D'Abr.*, xvi., 174 175.

* *Ante*, ii., 587.

† *Ante*, iii., 92.

‡ *Hard.*, x., 299. *Pelet*, i., 65, 67.

Confederacy, to whom Napoleon had recently transmitted orders to call out their contingents.* In truth, however, though loud complaints of hostile preparations were made on both sides, neither party were desirous to precipitate the commencement of active operations. Austria had need of every hour she could gain to complete her armament, and draw together her troops upon the frontier from the various quarters of her extensive dominions; and Napoleon had as much occasion for delay to concentrate his forces from the north and centre of Germany, in the valley of the Danube; and he was desirous not to unsheath the sword till advices from St. Petersburg made him certain of the concurrence of Alexander in his designs. At length the long-wished-for despatches arrived, and relieved him of all anxiety

Feb. 19. by announcing the mission of Prince Schwartzemberg to St. Petersburg, the refusal of the cabinet of Russia to accede to his proposals, and its determination to support Napoleon in the war with Austria which was approaching. Orders were immediately despatched for the French ambassador to leave Vienna,

Feb. 28. who accordingly took his departure on the last day of February, leaving only a chargé d'affaires to communicate intelligence till relations were finally broken off; and, though Metternich still remained at Paris, his departure was hourly expected; and such was the estrangement of the emperor, that he never addressed him a word, even in public and formal diplomatic intercourse.† In the course of his discussions with Champagny, the French minister for foreign affairs at this period, Metternich, with all his caution, could not disguise the deep umbrage taken by Austria at not

Deep umbrage taken by Austria at the conference of Erfurth.

having been invited to take part in the conferences of Erfurth; and he admitted that, if this had been done, the cabinet of Vienna would in all probability have recognised Joseph as King of Spain, and the rupture would have been entirely prevented. In truth, Austria had good reason to anticipate evil to herself from the ominous conjunction of two such bodies in her neighbourhood; while, at the same time, the cordiality of Alexander would

* "Well," said Napoleon, "M. Metternich! here are fine news from Vienna. What does all this mean? Have they been stung by scorpions? Who threatens you? What would you be at? As long as I had my army in Germany you conceived no disquietude for your existence; but the moment it was transferred to Spain you consider yourselves endangered! What can be the end of these things? What, but that I must arm as you arm, for at length I am seriously menaced; I am rightly punished for my former caution. Have you, sir, communicated your pretended apprehensions to your court? if you have done so, you have disturbed the peace of mine, and will probably plunge Europe into numberless calamities. I have always been the dupe of your court in diplomacy: we must now speak out; it is making too much noise for the preservation of peace, too little for the prosecution of war. Do they suppose me dead? We shall see how their projects will succeed; and they will reproach me with being the cause of hostilities, when it is their own folly which forces me to engage in them. But let them not imagine they will have war to carry on with me alone: I expect a courier from Russia; if matters turn out there as I expect, I shall give them fighting enough." How easily may Napoleon's ideas and words be always distinguished from those of all other men! At least, he always lets us understand his meaning: no inconsiderable advantage in the midst of the general studied obscurity and evasions of diplomatic language.—See THIBAUDEAU, vii., 204, 205.

† Thib., vii., 205, 206. Hard., x., 303, 304. Pelet, i., 117, 119. Stat., 14, 20.

unquestionably have been cooled if Francis or Metternich had been admitted to their deliberations. Napoleon's favour was too precious to be divided between two potentates without exciting jealousy: like a beauty surrounded by lovers, he could not show a preference to one without producing estrangement in the other. He chose for his intimate ally the power of whose strength he had had the most convincing experience, and from whose hostility he had, from its distance, least to apprehend.*

Meanwhile Napoleon was rapidly completing his arrangements: orders were despatched to Davoust early in March to concentrate his immense corps at Bamberg, and establish the headquarters of the whole army at

Measures for the concentration of the French army. March 4.

Wurtzburg; Massena, at the same time, received directions to repair to Strasburg, and press on with his corps to Ulm, and then unite with the army of the Rhine; Oudinot was moved upon Augsburg; Bernadotte despatched to Dresden to take the command of the Saxons; Bessières transported by post, in all imaginable haste, with the Imperial Guard, from Burgos across the Pyrenees and Rhine; instructions were transmitted to the French ambassador at Warsaw to hasten the formation of three Polish divisions, and co-operate with the Russians in protecting the Grand-duchy of Warsaw and menacing Galicia, while the princes of the Rhenish Confederacy were enjoined to collect their respective contingents at their different rallying-points, and converge towards the general rendezvous of this immense force on the Danube, at Ingolstadt, or Donauwerth. Thus, from all quarters of Europe, from the mountains of Asturias to the plains of Poland, armed men were converging in all directions to the valley of the Danube, where a hundred and fifty thousand soldiers would ere long be collected; while the provident care of the emperor was not less actively exerted in collecting magazines upon the projected line of operations for the stupendous multitude, and providing, in the arming and replenishing of the fortresses, both a base for offensive operations, and a refuge in the improbable events of disaster.†

On the side of the Austrians, preparations not less threatening were going rapidly forward. The regular army had been augmented to three hundred thousand infantry and above thirty thousand cavalry, besides two hundred thousand of the landwehr and Hungarian insurrection. The disposable force was divided into nine corps, besides two of reserve. Six of these, containing nominally one hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom one hundred and twenty thousand might be relied on as able to assemble round the standards, were mustered on the frontiers of Bavaria, besides a reserve in Bohemia, under the immediate command of the Archduke Charles; the Archduke John was intrusted with the direction of two others, forty-seven thousand strong, in Italy, supported by the landwehr of Carinthia, Carniola, and Istria, at least twenty-five thousand men, who, though hardly equal to a shock in the field, were of great value in garrisoning fortresses and con-

* Thib., vii., 207.

† Thib., vii., 206. Pelet, i., 119, 126. Stat., 26, 29.

ducting secondary operations; the Marquis Chastillon was prepared to enter the eastern frontier of Tyrol from the Pusterthal, with twelve thousand regular troops, where he expected to be immediately joined by twenty thousand hardy and warlike peasants; while the Archduke Ferdinand, with thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, was to invade the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and avert the calamities of war from the Galician plains. The total number of troops, after deducting the non-effective and sick, might amount to two hundred and twenty thousand infantry and twenty-eight thousand cavalry, with eight hundred pieces of canon: a prodigious force, when their discipline and efficiency were taken into consideration, and the support which they were to receive, not only from the immense reserves of landwehr in all the provinces, but the general spirit and unanimity of the monarchy. The commencement of hostilities at once in Bavaria, Italy, Tyrol, and Poland, might seem an imprudent dispersion of strength, especially when the tremendous blows to be anticipated from Napoleon in the valley of the Danube are duly weighed; but these, in appearance offensive, were in reality strictly defensive operations. It was well known that the moment war was declared, the French emperor, according to his usual policy, would direct all his forces at the centre of the enemy's power; invasion from Italy, Bavaria, and Poland was immediately to be anticipated; and in maintaining the struggle in the hostile provinces adjoining the frontier, the war was in reality averted from their own vitals.*†

The utmost efforts were at the same time made to rouse the patriotic ardour of all classes, and government in that important duty were nobly seconded by the nobles and people throughout the empire. Never, indeed, since the foundation of the monarchy, had unanimity so universal prevailed through all the varied provinces of the imperial dominions, and never had so enthusiastic a spirit animated all ranks of the people. The nobles, the clergy, the peasants, the burghers, all felt the sacred flame, and vied with each other in devotion to the common cause. The requisitions of government were instantly agreed to; the supplies of men and money cheerfully voted; the levies for the regular army anticipated by voluntary enrolment; the landwehr rapidly filled up with brave and hardy peasants. At Vienna, in particular, the patriotic ardour was unbounded; and when the Archduke Charles, on the 6th of April, marched into the city at the head of his regiment, one swell of rapture seemed to animate the whole population. That accomplished prince added the general ardour by an address to his soldiers on the day of his entry, which deserves to be recorded for the generous sentiments which it contains, as well as the light which it throws on the general reasons for the war.‡§

While these immense military preparations were going on on both sides, the semblance of

diplomatic relations was still kept up at Paris. Metternich, who remained there to the last, rather as a legitimate spy than in any other character, presented a note to the cabinet of the Tuileries on the 10th of March. He there represented it as an undoubted fact, that, since the treaty which followed the evacuation of Braunau, there was no longer any subject of difference between the two powers; and that, although the Emperor of Austria might well conceive disquietude at the numerous movements which had taken place since January, he had no desire but to see Europe in peace. The French cabinet replied, that as unquestionably no subject of difference remained between the two powers; and that, this being the case, the emperor could not conceive, either what the Austrians would be at, or what occasioned their pretended disquietudes. Here terminated this diplomatic farce: it deceived neither party; but both had objects to gain by postponing, for a short time, the commencement of hostilities.*

The original plan of the Austrians was to invade at once Franconia, Lombardy, Austrian plan Tyrol, and the Grand-duchy of War- of the cam- saw. In all these districts they had paign. numerous and active partisans, and they confidently expected a powerful co-operation from their exertions. For this purpose they had accumulated enormous masses of troops, above a hundred thousand strong, in Bohemia, from whence, as a central point, they were in a situation to issue in any direction which might seem advisable. They were, in March, grouped around Prague, in the northwestern extremity of that country, between the Elbe, the Eger, the Moldava, and the Wittawa. The object of this extraordinary concentration of troops was to advance suddenly into the country of Bareuth, lend a helping hand to the numerous ardent spirits and malecontents of that quarter of Germany, fall upon Davoust's corps, which was assembled at Wurtzburg, before it could receive the reinforcements which were hastening to its support, or be electrified by the presence of Napoleon, and, if possible, drive it back by superior forces to the Rhine. Such an event, it was well known, would at once bring to the Austrian standards a vast body of ardent recruits, whom the enormous exactions and grinding tyranny of the French armies had filled with unbounded hatred at their dominion, and at the same time, it was hoped, would overcome the indecision of Prussia, and bring its disciplined battalions to stand by the side of the Imperialists in the great contest for European freedom. This plan was ably conceived, and, if carried into execution with the requisite alacrity and vigour, might have been attended with great results; for the French armies were very much scattered in the end of February, and, by issuing suddenly from the great salient fortress of Feb. 27. Bohemia, and pressing forward towards the Rhine, the Archduke Charles might have entirely separated Oudinot, who lay in Swabia, from Davoust, who was cantoned on the banks of the Main.†‡

* Stat., 34, 40. Pelet, i., 166, 173. Jom., iii., 140.

† See note A.

‡ Stat., 34, 41. Erz. Jom. Feld., 29, 34. Ann. Reg., 1809, 203, 204.

§ See note B.

* Thib., vii., 207, 208.

† Jom., ii., 152, 153. Pelet, i., 189, 195. Stat., 40, 49.

‡ The directions of the Anlic Council for the war in Italy

Last diplomat-
ic communica-
tions at Paris.

March 10.

March 12.

Austrian plan
of the cam-
paign.

Feb. 27.

Plans of Napoleon. April 1.

The Austrians had taken Napoleon, in a certain degree, at unawares: as not only was the flower of his veteran troops in Spain, but the forces which still remained in Germany, though extremely formidable, if once assembled together, were scattered from the Alps to the Baltic, at a great distance from each other. His plan, therefore, contrary to his usual policy, was strictly defensive in the outset, to gain time for the concentration of his troops; and, as he deemed it unfitting that he himself should be at the head of his army before any decisive blows were struck, and where, possibly, disasters might be incurred, Berthier was despatched, early in April, to assume the command of the whole until the arrival of the emperor: a convenient arrangement, as, if his operations proved successful, they would, of course, be ascribed to the intelligence and ability of his superior in command; if the reverse, the whole blame of a miscarriage might be laid upon himself. From the period of his arrival, the whole troops, both French and of the Confederation of the Rhine, were formed into one army, to be called the *army of Germany*. It was divided into eight corps,* commanded by the most distinguished marshals in the French service, and mustered two hundred thousand men. The emperor was indefatigable in his efforts to provide subsistence, clothing, and ammunition for this enormous multitude; among other things, twenty-five millions of ball cartridges were collected. But he enjoined that the system should be rigorously followed out of making war support war, and strictly forbade any stores or provisions being purchased in France for the use of the troops, if they could be procured by requisitions or military contributions on the other side of the Rhine. Rapid concentration of his troops was enjoined to Berthier around the Lech;† but no offensive operations were to be commenced before the arrival of the emperor, who was expected about the middle of April. To all who were acquainted with the character of his movements, it was evident that, the moment he arrived and deemed himself in sufficient

strength, he would commence a furious onset, and pour in concentrated masses down the valley of the Danube.

The cabinet of Vienna took the initiative. On the 8th of April, the Austrian troops crossed the frontiers at once on the Inn, in Bohemia, in Tyrol, and in Italy. Had the original plan of the Aulic Council been followed out, and the Archduke Charles, at the head of a hundred thousand men, debouched from Bohemia, midway between the Main and the Black Forest, and advanced towards Mannheim, this commencement of hostilities might have been attended with most important effects; for dissatisfaction with the French rule was universal in that quarter, and, had a powerful demonstration from England, on the coast of Flanders, seconded this irruption, the seat of war might have been permanently fixed on the middle and lower Rhine.* On the 17th of March, Austria had a hundred and forty thousand men on the two banks of the Danube, within eight days' march of Ratisbon; while Davoust only broke up his cantonments in the north of Germany, on the Oder and lower Elbe, on that day; Massena was still on the Rhine, and Oudinot alone at Augsburg, the Bavarians being on the Iser. Thus the complete separation of the French corps was a matter of perfect certainty, by a rapid advance towards Mannheim at that period. But the successful execution of this well-conceived design required a vigour of determination and alacrity of execution to which the Austrians were as yet strangers; and, by hesitating till the period for striking the blow was past, and the French troops were concentrated on the Danube, Austria lost all the immense advantages of her central threatening position in Bohemia. When it was resolved to attack the French in Bavaria, the Aulic Council committed a second error, still greater than the former: for, instead of permitting the Archduke Charles, from his central position in Bohemia, to fall perpendicularly on the French corps, scattered to the south along the valley of the Danube, at the distance of only six or eight days' march, they ordered him to countermarch the great body of his forces, and open the campaign on the Inn: a gratuitous fault, which gave his troops triple the distance to march, and the enemy triple the time to complete their preparations and concentrate their forces. At length, however, the toilsome and unnecessary countermarch was completed: the Austrian col-

and Tyrol were to concentrate both corps, under the command of the Archduke John, between Villach and Klagenfurth, and then advance in two columns: one by the Pusterthal into the Tyrol, and over the Brenner to Trent; the other by Ponteba to Bassano, and from thence to the Adige; while the care of observing the lower Isonzo was intrusted to the landwehr of Istria. The cabinet of Vienna calculated with much reason upon the expected insurrection in Tyrol to aid and support both these movements.—*STUTTERHEIM*, 56, 57; and *PELET*, i., 196.

* Second corps.....	Marshal Lannes,	50,000 men
Third.....	Davoust,	60,000
Fourth.....	Massena,	50,000
Seventh.....	Lefebvre,	34,000
Eighth.....	Augereau,	20,000
Ninth, Saxon confederation and French.....	Bernadotte,	50,000
Tenth.....	King of Westphalia,	25,000
Imperial Guard.....		22,000
Reserve cavalry.....	Bessières,	14,000
		325,000, and

400 pieces of cannon.

But at least one hundred thousand of them had not yet arrived: the guard and reserve cavalry were on their march from Spain; Bernadotte's corps was still at a distance in the north of Germany; and the contingents of the Confederation of the Rhine were far from being complete. Still a hundred and forty thousand French troops and sixty thousand of the confederation might be relied on for active operations in the valley of the Danube.—*THIBAUDEAU*, vii., 214.

† *Thib.*, vii., 214, 223. *Jom.*, iii., 152, 153. *Stat.*, 58, 64. *Pelet*, i., 197, 209.

* The instructions of the Aulic Council in the outset of the campaign were, "to advance in large masses, and attack the French army wherever it might assemble, either on the Main, the Nab, or the Danube. Should a French corps enter Bavaria, the grand Austrian army was not to swerve from its direction, but trust to arresting the movement on Bavaria, by threatening the advancing corps on the side of Ratisbon or Donauwerth. If Marshal Davoust retired in order to avoid any engagement before the arrival of his reinforcements, the grand Austrian army was, nevertheless, to continue its advance with all possible expedition, and take up a central position between the Black Forest and the Main, and there be regulated by the forces of the enemy, and the chances of successful operations which were afforded. The issue of the war depends on this operation and on the issue of the first battle, which will, in all probability, if successful, rouse the malecontents of Baruth, overawe Saxony, and bring round to the standards of Austria great part of the troops of the Confederation of the Rhine which are now arrayed against her."—*STUTTERHEIM*, 64-69; *PELET*, i., 194.

umns, after being transported a hundred miles back towards Vienna and across the Danube, were arrayed in dense masses on the right bank of the Inn; and the archduke, crossing that river in imposing strength, prepared to carry the seat of war into the vast and level plains which stretch from the southern bank of the Danube to the foot of the Alps. At the same moment, the long-wished-for signals were given from the frontiers of Styria and Salzburg, to the provinces of Tyrol. With speechless transport, the brave mountaineers beheld the bale-fires glowing on the eastern boundaries of their romantic country; instantly a thousand beacons were kindled over all its rugged surface; the cliffs of the Brenner were reddened by the glare, the waters of the Eisach reflected its light; and long before the ascending sun had spread his rosy tint over the glaciers of the Glockner, the inhabitants of his icy steeps were warmed by the glow, which, at the voice of patriotism, called a nation of heroes to arms.*

The instructions of Napoleon to Berthier,† before leaving Paris, were clear and precise, viz., that, if the enemy commenced his attack before the 15th, by which time, it was calculated, the bulk of his forces might be assembled around Ratisbon, the army was to be concentrated on the Lech around Donauwerth; if after that date, at Ratisbon, guarding the right bank of the Danube from it to Passau. On the 12th, however, by means of the telegraph which the emperor had established in Central Germany, he was apprized at Paris of the crossing of the Inn by the archduke and the commencement of hostilities. He instantly set out; and with such precision were the movements of the immense force, which was converging from the mountains of Galicia and the banks of the Oder to the valley of the Danube, calculated, that the last arrived at the general point of rendezvous around Ratisbon at the very moment when the emperor was approaching from Paris. It was high time that he should arrive to take the command of the army; for, in the interim, Berthier had

brought it, by the confession of the French themselves, to the verge of destruction.* Instead of instantly following up the emperor's instructions, by concentrating his forces at Ratisbon or Donauwerth, he scattered them, in spite of the remonstrances of Davoust and Massena, in the dangerous view of stopping the advance of the Austrians at all points. Nothing but the tardiness of their march saved the French army from the most serious calamities. But while Berthier dispersed his troops, as if to render them the more accessible to the blows of the Imperialists, the archduke moved forward with such slowness, as apparently in order to give them time to concentrate their forces before he commenced his attack. They crossed the Inn on the 10th at Braunau and other points, and on the 16th they had only advanced as far as the Iser, a dis- April 16. tance of twenty leagues. On the latter day they attacked the bridge of Landsbut, over that river, and at the same time crossed a division at Dingelfing, farther down its course, which threatened to cut off the communications of General Dero, who commanded the Bavarians placed in garrison at that point, and obliged them to evacuate that important town. The whole line of the Iser was now abandoned by the Bavarians, who fell back in haste towards Ratisbon and Donauwerth; while the Austrians, in great strength, crossed that river at all points, and directed their steps on the great road to Nuremberg, evidently towards the bridges of Ratisbon, Neustadt, and Kellheim, in order to make themselves masters of both banks of the Danube. Yet even then, when their forces were concentrated, and greatly superior to those of the enemy as yet assembled, and everything depended on rapidity of movement, they advanced only two or three leagues a day: so inveterate were the habits of tardiness and delay in the German character.†

The approach of the formidable masses of the Austrians, however, full a hundred and twenty thousand strong, even though advancing with the pace of a tortoise, threw Berthier into an agony of indecision. It then evidently appeared how much the major-general of the army was indebted for the reputation he enjoyed to the directions of the emperor, and how different a capacious talent for the management of details is from the eagle glance which can direct the movements of the whole. Despite all his remonstrances, he compelled Davoust to concentrate his corps at Ratisbon, while, at the very same moment, he ordered Massena to defend the line of the Lech: sepa- April 16. arating thus the two principal corps of the French army by at least thirty-five leagues from each other, and exposing the former, with his magnificent corps, the flower of the army, to be overwhelmed by the archduke before any adequate re-enforcements could be brought up to his support. Orders were at the same time given to Lefebvre, Wrede, and Oudinot, placing them in three lines, one behind another across Bavaria, in so useless and absurd a position,

* Jom., i., 152, 153. Thib., vii., 221. Pel., i., 191, 205. Stat., 60, 64.

† "By the 1st of April," said Napoleon, "the corps of Marshal Davoust, which broke up from the Oder and Lower Elbe on the 17th of March, will be established between Nuremberg, Bamberg, and Bareuth: Massena will be around Ulm, Oudinot between Augsburg and Donauwerth. From the 1st to the 15th, three French corps, 130,000 strong, besides 10,000 allies, the Bavarians in advance on the Iser, and the Wirtenbergers in reserve, may be concentrated on the Danube at Ratisbon or Ingolstadt. Strong *têtes de pont* should be thrown up at Augsburg, to secure the passage of the Lech at Ingolstadt, in order to be able to debouch to the left bank of the Danube; and, above all, at Passau, which should be put into a situation to hold out two or three months. The emperor's object is to concentrate his army as soon as possible at Ratisbon: the position on the Lech is to be assumed only if it is attacked before the concentration at the former town is possible. The second corps will be at Ratisbon by the 10th, and on that day Bessières will also arrive with the reserve cavalry of the guard: Davoust will be at Nuremberg, Massena at Augsburg, Lefebvre at one or two marches from Ratisbon. Headquarters then may be safely established in that town, in the midst of 200,000 men, guarding the right banks of the Danube, from Ratisbon to Passau, by means of which stream, provisions and supplies of every sort will be procured in abundance. Should the Austrians debouch from Bohemia or Ratisbon, Davoust and Lefebvre should fall back on Ingolstadt or Donauwerth."—*NAPOLEON'S Instructions to BERTHIER, April 1, 1809.* PELET, i., 212, 213.

* "The emperor, on his road to the army," says Jomini, "felt the liveliest disquietude at the posture of affairs: Berthier had brought the army within a hair's-breadth of destruction."—JOMINI, iii., 159.

† Jom., ii., 159, 160. Pel., i., 225, 230. Stat., 64, 72.

that more than one of the marshals did not scruple to ascribe it to treachery: a charge, however, from which the whole character of Berthier, and the uninterrupted confidence he enjoyed from the emperor, are sufficient to exculpate him. As it was, however, the scattered position which he gave to the army over a line of forty leagues in extent, with numerous undefended apertures between the corps, was such, that a little more activity on the part of the archduke would have exposed it to certain destruction, and brought the Austrian columns in triumph to the Rhine.*†

Meanwhile the archduke, notwithstanding the tardiness of his movements, was inundating Bavaria with his troops. Hiller had advanced to Mosburg; Jellachich had occupied Munich, from whence the King of Bavaria hastily fled to Stuttgart to meet Napoleon; the two corps left in Bohemia had crossed the frontier, and were approaching by leisurely marches towards Ratisbon; while the archduke himself, with four corps, a hundred thousand strong, was drawing near to Abensberg, Neustadt, and Kellheim, midway between Ratisbon and Donauwerth. Berthier had gone to the former town, where Davoust was stationed with sixty thousand men; but it seemed next to impossible to extricate him from his perilous situation, as Massena was at Augsburg, thirty-five leagues to the southwest, and the centre of the archduke was interposed in appalling strength right between them. The Bavarians under Wrede, Lefebvre, and the reserve under Oudinot, were, indeed, in front of the archduke around Ingolstadt, but they could with difficulty maintain their own ground, and were in no condition to extricate Davoust, who, threatened by a hundred thousand Austrians under the archduke on the south of the Danube, and forty thousand descending from Bohemia on the north, seemed destined for no other fate than that of Mack four years before at Ulm.‡

Matters were in this critical state when Napoleon, early on the morning of the 17th, arrived at Donauwerth. Instantly he began inquiring of every one concerning the position, destination, and movements of the Austrian corps; sent out officers in all directions to acquire accurate information, and next morning despatched the most pressing orders to Massena to hasten, at least with his advanced guards and cavalry, to Pfaffenhofen, a considerable town nearly half way from Augsburg, to the seat of war around Neustadt and Kellheim.§ Davoust,

at the same time, received orders to move on the 18th in the direction of Neustadt, so as to form a junction with the Bavarians and Wirtembergers under Lefebvre, who had retired to that quarter before the Archduke Charles; so that in the next twenty-four hours these two marshals would be twenty leagues nearer each other, and, having the troops of the confederation in the interval between them, might almost be said to be in communication. At the same time, dissembling his fears, the emperor addressed to his soldiers a nervous proclamation, in which, loudly reproaching the Austrians with the commencement of hostilities, he promised to lead them to yet more glorious fields of fame.*†

Notwithstanding the pressing instance of the emperor, and their own sense of the urgency of the case, Davoust and Massena could not reach the places assigned to them so early as he had anticipated, and the former, in consequence, was exposed to the most imminent danger. The messenger ordering Davoust to draw towards the Lech had been despatched from Donauwerth at two o'clock in the morning of the 17th; and his instructions were to march forthwith on Ingolstadt, while Wrede, with his Bavarians, was stopped in his retreat at Neustadt, and ordered to concentrate with the Wirtembergers behind the Abens. Davoust received his orders at midnight of the 17th, but his divisions were dispersed in the villages around Ratisbon, as well as in that town, and could not be instantly put in motion; while the bulk of Massena's forces, being six or eight leagues behind Augsburg, could not be concentrated till the night of the 18th, even at that town, or reach Pfaffenhofen till late on the following evening. Davoust, having collected his whole force during the 18th, commenced the evacuation of that town at daybreak on the following morning; and by midday on the 19th was already approaching Neustadt, leaving only a

Movements of the two armies towards each other.

April 18.

April 19.

to reach Ascha, or at least get on as far as they can on the road from Augsburg to Ascha. One word will explain to you the urgency of affairs. Prince Charles, with 80,000 men, debouched yesterday from Landsbut on Ratisbon, the Bavarians contended the whole day with his advanced guard. Orders have been despatched to Davoust to move with 60,000 in the direction of Neustadt, where he will form a junction with the Bavarians. To-morrow (19th) all your troops who can be mustered at Pfaffenhofen, with the Wirtembergers, a division of cuirassiers, and every man you can collect, should be in a condition to fall on the rear of Prince Charles. A single glance must show you that never was more pressing occasion for diligence and activity than at present. With 60,000 good troops, Davoust may, indeed, make head against the archduke, but I consider him ruined without resource, if Oudinot and your three divisions are on his rear before daybreak on the 19th, and you inspire the soldiers with all they should feel on so momentous an occasion. In the 18th, 19th, and 20th, the whole affairs of Germany will be decided."—NAPOLEON TO MASSENA, Donauwerth, 18th April, 1809; SAVARY, iv., 51, 52.

* Sav., iv., 50, 51. Pelet, i., 263, 267. Thib., vii., 226, 227.

† "Soldiers! the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine has been violated. The Austrian general supposes that we are to fly at the sight of his eagles, and abandon our allies to his mercy. I arrive with the rapidity of lightning in the midst of you. Soldiers! I was surrounded by your bayonets when the Emperor of Austria arrived at my bivouac in Moravia; you heard him implore my clemency, and swear an eternal friendship. Conquerors in three wars, Austria has owed everything to our generosity; three times she has perjured herself! Our former successes are a sure guarantee for our future triumphs. Let us march, then, and at our aspect let the enemy recognise his conquerors."—*Moniteur*, 26th April, 1809, and THIBAUDEAU, vii., 224.

‡ Pelet, i., 262, 263. Thib., vii., 225, 226. Jom., ii., 160. Stut., 72, 80. Sav., iv., 44, 45.
§ "It is indispensable that Oudinot, with his corps, and your three other divisions, with your cuirassiers and cavalry, should sleep at Pfaffenhofen to-morrow night; those in the rear, who are still at Landsberg, should do their utmost

* Pelet, i., 240, 249. Thib., vii., 221, 224. Jom., ii., 159, 160. Sav., iv., 44, 45.

† "You cannot imagine," said Napoleon, "in what a condition I found the army on my arrival, and to what dreadful reverses it was exposed, if we had had to deal with an enterprising enemy. I shall take care that I am not surprised again in such a manner." And to Berthier himself he wrote from Donauwerth, the moment he arrived on the 17th: "What you have done appears so strange, that, if I was not aware of your friendship, I should think you were betraying me: Davoust is at this moment more completely at the disposal of the archduke than of myself."—PELET, v., 248. THIBAUDEAU, vii., 224. SAVARY, iv., 44.

‡ Pelet, i., 262, 263. Thib., vii., 225, 226. Jom., ii., 160. Stut., 72, 80. Sav., iv., 44, 45.

§ "It is indispensable that Oudinot, with his corps, and your three other divisions, with your cuirassiers and cavalry, should sleep at Pfaffenhofen to-morrow night; those in the rear, who are still at Landsberg, should do their utmost

single regiment, three thousand strong, to guard the important bridge of Ratisbon. On the same day the archduke divided the army which he commanded in person into two parts, and while he left the Archduke Louis with fifteen thousand men to watch the troops of the confederacy on the Abens, he himself, with twenty-five thousand, moved towards Ratisbon, in hopes of making himself master of that important passage over the Danube during the absence of Davoust's corps, and thus at once gain possession of both banks of that river, and open up a secure communication with his two corps, under Klenau, on its opposite bank. The worst was to be apprehended for Davoust, if, in the course of his march to Neustadt, he had encountered this enormous mass, moving in a direction almost perpendicular to his flank, and not more than a few leagues distant. The two armies crossed without the bulk of the forces meeting.*

Napoleon's plan was now clearly formed: it was to concentrate his whole army as rapidly as possible on the Abens, in advance of Pfaffenhofen; and, drawing back his left, to throw his right, under Massena, forward, so as to drive back the Archduke Louis; separate altogether the grand army under the Archduke Charles from Jellachich and Hiller, and force it up into the narrow space formed by the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon, and there either compel it to surrender, from the impossibility of finding an egress, if that town was still held by the French troops, or at least induce the sacrifice of its artillery and baggage in the confusion of defiling in front of a victorious army over the narrow bridge which it commanded. But the execution of this plan was exceedingly hazardous, and in presence of an enterprising enemy might have led to fatal results. Abensberg was the vital point: whoever reached it first in sufficient strength gained the means of preventing the concentration of his adversary. Davoust, to reach his destination, required to traverse the defiles of Abach and Portaál, within two leagues of Abensberg, and this defile was much nearer the camp of the Archduke Charles on the 18th at Rohr, than the point from which Davoust set out from Ratisbon. Eighty thousand Austrians might with ease have occupied the important posts of Abensberg and Portaál, which would have effectually barred the way to Davoust's corps, and thrown him back upon Ratisbon, and the *cul-de-sac* formed by the bend of the Danube, over which there was no other bridge: the very fate which Napoleon designed for the army of Prince Charles. When, therefore, instead of pushing on with an overwhelming force to this vital point, the Archduke Charles, when within a day's march of it, divided his army on the 18th, and bent his course, with the bulk of his forces, for Ratisbon, now almost destitute of defenders, Napoleon had some reason to say that his star had not yet deserted him.†

* Stut., 76, 81. Sav., iv., 50. Thib., vii., 226, 228. Pel., i., 281, 293.

† Jom., iii., 164, 165. Thib., vii., 227. Pel., i., 286, 295.

‡ Napoleon's plans at this critical juncture are clearly developed in the letter which he wrote to Massena at twelve o'clock noon on the 19th. "Prince Charles, with his whole army, was this morning a day's march from Ratisbon, having his base and communications on Landshut. Davoust has evacuated Ratisbon to move upon Neustadt, and join the

The covering troops of Davoust, however, encountered and had a rude shock with those of the archduke, near the village of Thau. St. Hilaire and Friant had arrived on the heights of Saalhaupt and Tengen, where they were stationed in order to protect the French left, and cover the march of the remainder of the corps, with its artillery and trains, through the important defile of Portaál, when the light cavalry of Hohenzollern appeared in sight, whose province in like manner was to cover the left of the Austrian army, and secure their march to Ratisbon. Fresh troops were successively brought up by either party as the day advanced, and before the evening twenty thousand men were engaged on both sides. The combat soon became extremely warm: some woods on the field were successively taken and retaken, and the greatest valour was mutually displayed. At length a violent thunder-storm, which came on at six o'clock, separated the combatants, after each had sustained a loss of three thousand men, without either being able to boast of a decisive advantage; but although both retained their positions, yet as the French, under cover of their resistance at this point, succeeded in passing unmolested through the important defile, and before nightfall reached the vital point of Abensberg, they with reason claimed the victory.*

Reassured by the junction effected by Davoust with the Bavarians under Lefebvre, at this point, as to the security of his centre, Napoleon resolved to commence a vigorous offensive, and, by advancing his right against Landshut, both threaten the archduke's communications, and throw him back into the net prepared for him by the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon. Early on the morning of the 19th, when this bloody combat was engaged on the banks of the Danube at Thau, Massena had encountered a body of five thousand infantry and cavalry at Pfaffenhofen, and defeated it in a few minutes, with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded. In the course of the day he had concentrated all his corps at that place: Oudinot was still farther in advance towards Freysing, with his light troops stretching along the Iser so as to intercept all communication between the archduke and his left wing at Munich; Davoust was grouped in the villages around Abensberg, while Lefebvre, Wrede, and Vandamme, with the troops of the confederation, were at Neustadt and Bidourg. Thus the whole French army, at length concentrated in a line of ten leagues broad, was in a condition to take part in any general battle, or in common

Actions between Davoust and Hohenzollern at Thau. April 19.

Positions of the two armies on the night of the 19th.

Bavarians; I look, therefore, for an affair every minute; nevertheless, it is now noon, and I have not heard the cannon. You will perceive at a glance that I am refusing my left to throw forward my right, which you form, and which to-day should enter into action. Push Oudinot forward to Neustadt. From thence I shall probably direct the 4th corps to Landshut; and then Prince Charles, attacked on his left, will find he has lost his line of operations upon the Iser. Everything will be cleared up to-day; the moments are precious; hours must be counted. Twelve or fifteen thousand of such rabble as you have defeated this morning should be easily disposed of by six thousand of our people."—NAPOLEON TO MASSENA, 19th April, 1809; *PEL.*, i., 295, 286.

* *PEL.*, i., 294, 300. *Stut.*, 84, 89. *Jom.*, iii., 165.

operations, on the following day. The Austrian army was assembled in the narrow space formed by the Iser as a base, and the bend of the Danube at Ratisbon as a curve; Lichtenstein was at Eglossheim, Hohenzollern at Hausen, Rozenberg at Dinzing, and the remainder in the villages from Mainburg on the south to the neighbourhood of Ratisbon on the north; but their principal masses were grouped around ECHMUHL. They were less prepared than the French, however, for a decisive affair on the morrow, being spread over a surface at least sixteen leagues in extent; and, what was still worse, the great mass under the archduke was separated, by an unoccupied space four leagues in breadth, from the corps of General Hiller at Mosburg; and two powerful corps under Kleinau were uselessly lost on the northern bank of the Danube, where there was not an enemy to oppose them.*

Being well aware, from the position of the respective armies, that a decisive affair was at hand, Napoleon adopted the generous, and, at the same time, prudent policy, of combating in person at the head of the troops of the confederation, leaving the native French to their inherent valour, their experienced skill, and the direction of their veteran marshals. He repaired to the headquarters of their commanders, and, according to custom, visited at daybreak the bivouacs of the troops, which he traversed from right to left along their whole extent, accompanied only by the officers and generals of the Bavarians. He was received with the loudest acclamations, and a transport rivaling that of his own veteran soldiers, so contagious is the feeling of military ardour, and so winning the confidence with which the mighty conqueror threw himself on the support of his new allies. Clapping the Prince Royal of Bavaria on the shoulder, he exclaimed, when the inspection was finished, "Well, prince royal, this is the way in which one must be King of Bavaria; when your turn comes, all the world will follow you if you do the same; but if you remain at home every one will go to sleep: adieu empire and glory." To the Wirtembergers, at the same time, he spoke of the glories they had acquired by combating the Austrians in the wars of the Great Frederic, and of the laurels which they had won in the last campaign in Silesia. These words, translated into German by their respective officers, excited great enthusiasm, which was soon raised to the very highest pitch by the proclamation read to the troops, in which the emperor declared that, without any French to aid them, he was to combat that day at their head, and announced a glorious destiny to their countries.† Per-

ceiving that the spirit of the troops was now roused to the highest point, the emperor gave the signal to engage.*

Notwithstanding, however, the deserved confidence which he placed in the Ger- Combats of Abensberg. April 20. man troops, Napoleon did not trust the result of the day exclusively to their exertions. Lannes, who the day before had joined the army from Saragossa, was intrusted with the command of two French divisions, drawn from Massena's corps, which formed the left of the centre, under Napoleon's immediate command, and was to advance on the great road from Kellheim to Landshut; the Wirtembergers, under Vandamme, were in the centre; the Bavarians on the right, directly opposite to ABENSBERG, under Wrede. Had two of the Austrian corps been concentrated, they might successively have combated this aggregate of allied troops, whose total strength did not exceed sixty-five thousand men; but, unfortunately, they were so much dispersed as to be incapable of opposing any effective resistance to the enemy. Hiller, with twenty-two thousand, was in march from Mainburg to Pfaffenhausen; the Archduke Louis, with ten thousand, guarded Siegenburg, with its bridge over the Aber; the Prince of Reuss, with fifteen thousand, lay in the rear at Kirchdorf; General Thierry, with five thousand, at Offensteller. Thus, above fifty thousand were in front of the French, but scattered over a space several leagues broad, without any centre or plan of operations. Not expecting an attack on that day, they were leisurely performing the various movements assigned to them, with a view to the concentration of their troops for the morrow, when they were simultaneously attacked by the enemy at all points, who passed at once from cautious defensive to furious offensive operations. They made, in consequence, but a feeble resistance; or, rather, they were attacked at so many different points, and so much in detail, that no one general could take upon himself the responsibility of halting to give battle; and the day was a sort of running fight, in many detached places, rather than a regular engagement. It proved, however, very disastrous to the Austrians. Thierry, whose troops had not recovered the rout of the preceding day, assailed by Lannes with greatly superior forces, was thrown back in confusion upon Hiller's troops at Rottenburg, who, coming up in haste from Mainburg, instead of stopping, increased the general disorder, and the whole were driven across the bridge of the Laber, which Lannes traversed with bayonets fixed and colours flying; the Prince of Reuss and Bianchi, attacked in front by Lefebvre and in flank by Vandamme, with the Wirtembergers, deemed themselves fortunate in being able to escape to Pfaffenhausen, without any serious loss; whither they were immediately followed by the Archduke Louis, who had been driven from the bridge of Siegenburg, closely pursued by Wrede and the Bavarians, who on this occasion emulated the vigour and rapidity of the French

partitioned your country into baronies, and divided you among her regiments. Bavarians! this war is the last which you will have to sustain against your enemies: attack them with the bayonet, and annihilate them."—THIBAUDEAU, vii., 230, 231.

* Sav., iv., 49. Thib., vii., 229, 231. Pel., ii., 8, 10.

* Jom., iii., 164, 165. Pel., i., 305, 306. Stat., 90, 92.

† "Bavarians! I do not come among you as the Emperor of the French, but as chief of the Confederation of the Rhine and protector of your country. You combat to-day alone against the Germans; not a single Frenchman is to be seen in the first line; they are only in reserve, and the enemy are not aware of their presence. I place entire confidence in your valour. I have extended the limits of your country, but I now see that I have not done enough. Hereafter I will render you so great that, to sustain a war against Austria, you will no longer have need of my assistance. Two hundred years the Bavarian banners, protected by France, resisted Austria; now we are on the march for Vienna, where we shall punish her for the mischief which she has always done to your forefathers. Austria intended to have

troops. The Austrians were not routed at any point, and no artillery was taken; nevertheless, they had to lament the loss of eight thousand men; the line to Landshut was thrown open to the enemy; they had lost the advantage of the initiative; and, what is of incalculable importance, had been unsuccessful in the first considerable action of the campaign.*

Napoleon was not slow in following up the important blow thus struck in the outset of operations. His great object was to throw himself upon the archduke's communications; and the success thus gained against the covering corps of his brother Louis, by opening up the great road to Landshut, rendered that undertaking an easy task. To cover the movement and distract his attention, Davoust received orders to threaten the enemy on the side of Ratisbon, where the bulk of his forces were assembled; but the serious operations were conducted by the emperor in person, against the retiring columns of Hiller, Bianchi, and the Archduke Louis. Uniting their shattered troops, these generals had fallen back in the direction of Landshut, in the hopes of preserving that important passage in the rear, with the immense stores of baggage and ammunition which it contained, from the attacks of the enemy. Thither, however, they were instantly followed by Napoleon, who, putting himself on horseback at daybreak on the 21st, moved every disposable bayonet and sabre in the direction of Landshut, while Massena, on his right, still farther in advance, manœuvred in such a way, between Pfaffenhofen and Mosburg, as to render a retreat upon that town a matter of absolute necessity, to avoid the communications of the Grand Army being instantly cut off; while Davoust, on the left, was to engage the attention of the Archduke Charles so completely as to prevent him from rendering any effectual assistance.†

These movements, admirably combined, and executed with uncommon vigour and precision, proved completely successful. The rear-guard of the Archduke Louis, warmly attacked on different occasions during the night, was thrown back in disorder in the morning on Furth and Arth, by roads already choked with baggage-wagons, and all the immense *materiel* of the grand Austrian army. Their confusion became altogether inextricable when they approached the valley of the Iser and the bridges of Landshut, which are traversed only by two *chaussées*, passing for a considerable distance on the western side through low swamps, altogether impassable for artillery or chariots. To strengthen the rear-guard while the retiring columns were defiling through those perilous straits, Hiller ordered General Vincent to hold firm with the cavalry at their entrance; but at that very moment Napoleon, accompanied by a powerful train of artillery, and the cuirassiers of Nansouty, arrived on the ground; and instantly, under cover of a tremendous fire of cannon, the French horse thundered in a charge. Vincent's dragoons were unable to withstand the shock: horse, foot, and cannon were thrown together in wild

disorder on the *chaussées*, and a vast quantity of artillery and baggage abandoned by the Austrians, who crowded in utter disorder into Landshut. But, even behind its ramparts, they were no longer in safety; for, on the same morning, Massena had gained possession of the bridge of Mosburg, and was rapidly advancing, agreeably to his orders, down the right, or eastern bank of the Iser. Alarmed by his approach, the Austrians put the torch to the long wooden bridge which leads into the town, and kept up a heavy fire upon it from the neighbouring houses and churches; but General Moulon, at the head of the French grenadiers, advanced through a shower of balls, amid the flames, to the portcullis, which was speedily demolished, and the heroic assailants burst into the town. Hiller no longer fought but to gain time to draw off his artillery and chariots; but such was the rapidity of Massena's advance, whose dense columns now covered the opposite side of the river, and had reached to within a mile of the town, that a large part of them required to be sacrificed. Hiller at length, after having made a most gallant resistance, drew off towards the Inn in the direction of Oetting, where he crossed on the following day, having lost nearly six thousand men, twenty-five pieces of cannon, six hundred ammunition-wagons, a pontoon train, and an enormous quantity of baggage, in this disastrous affair.*†

The task assigned to Davoust, while Napoleon was in this manner destroying the left wing of the Imperialists, and laying bare their vital line of communications to Landshut and the Inn, was to occupy the attention of the Archduke Charles, who, with the whole centre of the army, had diverged to Ratisbon, in order to make himself master of the important bridge at that place, and open up the communications with the two corps of Klenau and Bellegarde on the opposite side of the Danube. Rightly judging that the best way to impose upon his adversary, and inspire him with a mistaken idea of his own strength, was to assume the offensive, the French marshal, early on the morning of the 21st, commenced an attack in the woody country which lies on the banks of the Laber, and, after a warm contest, drove the Austrians across that river. Though their positions were strong and forces numerous, yet Hohenzollern was so much deceived by the vivacity of the French attack, and by the idea that two divisions of their army would never have ventured, unsupported, to hazard an attack upon the dense masses of his own and Rosenberg's corps, that he never doubted that it was only a part of a general movement to pierce the imperial centre, and that he would soon have Napoleon thundering on his flank. He gave orders for them accord-

Operations of Davoust and the Archduke Charles in the centre.

His defeat by the emperor.

executed with uncommon vigour and precision, proved completely successful.

* Stat., 101, 109. Pel., ii., 35, 49. Jom., iii., 170, 171. Thib., vii., 232, 233.

† A singular trait of heroism occurred on this occasion, on the part of an Austrian grenadier, which is recorded with generous eulogy by the French historian Pelet. Two companies of Austrian grenadiers of Teuchmeister were closely pursued by the French cavalry, and on the point of being surrounded. A grenadier ran to an ammunition-wagon and set it on fire; he was instantly blown up with it, but by his death; and the admiration which it inspired in the pursuers, arrested the pursuit, and saved his comrades.—STUTTERHEIM, 108: PELET, ii., 48.

* Stat., 92, 99. Pel., ii., 12, 23. Thib., vii., 232. Jom., iii., 168, 169.

† Stat., 100, 104. Pel., ii., 35, 37.

ingly, at noon, to fall back and take up a new position facing the south, on the right or eastern bank of the Laber, between that river and Dinzling. Forty thousand Austrian foot and five thousand horse were in two hours collected there, where they were soon assailed by thirty-five thousand French and Bavarians, under Davoust, Lefebvre, and Montbrun, whom the emperor, after the victory of Abensberg, had detached to assist in that quarter, while he himself followed up his decisive successes against Hiller at Landshut. The action was warmly contested till nightfall, when both parties maintained their positions; and, though each had to lament the loss of three thousand men killed and wounded, both claimed the victory; but, as the operations of Davoust were intended rather as a feint than a serious attack, and they had completely the desired effect of preventing any re-enforcements being sent from the centre to the left wing under Hiller, then in the act of being crushed by the overwhelming legions of the emperor, the French with reason claimed the advantage.*

While these important events were shaking the Austrian left wing and centre, the Archduke Charles, with the main strength of the army, was pressing the attack on Ratisbon. That town, commanding the only stone bridge over the Danube below Ulm, and opening up a direct communication with the two Austrian corps on its northern bank, was at all times a point of consequence, but it had now become, unknown to the Austrians, of incalculable importance, as forming the only line of retreat for the army now that its communication with the

April 20. Inn was cut off by the capture of Landshut and the alarming progress of the emperor on the left. Fully sensible of the value of such an acquisition, the archduke, as soon as Davoust had left the town, ordered Kollowrath to attack it on the northern, and Lichtenstein on the southern side. The former quickly obeyed his orders, and appeared on the 19th in great strength in the villages at the northern extremity of the bridge, which were carried by assault. Soon after a dense column burst open the gates, and advanced by the great street to the northern end of the bridge, but being there stopped by the palisades, and severely galled by a cross fire from the houses, it was obliged to retire after sustaining a severe loss. In the afternoon, however, Lichtenstein, with the advanced guard of the grand Austrian army, approached from the southern side, and attempts were made by the French garrison to destroy the bridge; but that solid structure, the work of the Romans, composed of large blocks of stone strongly cemented by Pozzuolo cement, was still, after having stood for seventeen hundred years, so entire that it resisted all attempts at demolition by ordinary implements; and the powder of the garrison was so much exhausted that they had not the means of blowing it up. Deeming resistance impracticable, and having nearly expended his ammunition, the French colonel surrendered at discretion. Thus were the successes in the shock of these two redoubtable antagonists in some degree bal-

anced; for, if the French had gained possession of Landshut and the communications of the grand Austrian army with Vienna, they had lost Ratisbon, the key to both banks of the Danube; and if they had five thousand prisoners to exhibit, taken in the combats of Abensberg and Landshut, the Austrians could point with exultation to the unusual spectacle of an entire regiment, nearly three thousand strong, with its eagle and standards, which had fallen into their hands.*

Matters were now evidently approaching a crisis between the archduke and Napoleon, and both these able generals concentrated their forces to engage in it with advantage. Conceiving that the French emperor was at a distance, following up his successes against Hiller, the Austrian general resumed the movement towards Neustadt, which he had so unhappily abandoned three days before, and having brought Kollowrath, with his whole corps, over to the southern bank of the Danube, concentrated eighty thousand men between Abensberg and Ratisbon; Bellegarde, with his corps, above twenty-five thousand strong, was so far removed, without any assignable reason, that he could not approach nearer on that day to the scene of action than Stadt-am-Hoff, at the northern end of the bridge of Ratisbon. The eighty thousand men, however, whom he had assembled, would, in all probability, have been able to make head against all the forces which Napoleon could bring against them, were it not that, instead of grouping them together in one field, the archduke moved Kollowrath and Lichtenstein, forty thousand strong, on the great road to Neustadt, by the defile of Abach, which Davoust had previously traversed, throwing thus the weight of his forces against the French left, and intending to menace their rear and communications in the same way as they had done with the Austrian left, by the capture of Landshut. But Napoleon was in too great strength to be disquieted by such a demonstration, and, leaving only a curtain of light troops to retard the advance of the Austrians in that direction, he concentrated all his forces to bear down upon their centre at Echmuhl and Laichling, the scene of such obstinate fighting on the preceding day. At daybreak on the 22d the emperor set out from Landshut, taking with him the whole of Lannes' and the greater part of Massena's corps, the Wirtemburgers, the reserve under Oudinot, which, coming up from the rear, received in the night that direction, and the guards and cuirassiers just arrived from Spain. Thus one half of the archduke's army, under Rosenberg and Hohenzollern, not forty thousand strong, was to be exposed to the blows of above seventy-five thousand French, flushed by victory and led on by the emperor in person.*

The Austrians, waiting for the arrival of Kollowrath's corps from the north of the Danube, were not in a condition to prosecute their offensive movement to the French left till after midday. They

* Stat., 114, 120. Pel., ii., 24, 32. Jom., ii., 169. Thib., vii., 232.

† Stat., 115, 125. Pel., ii., 59, 75. Jom., ii., 173, 174. Sav., iv., 53.

* Stat., 109, 115. Pel., ii., 49, 57. Jom., ii., 172, 173. Thib., vii., 233. Davoust's Report. Pel., ii., 416.

had arrived at the *défilé* of Abâch, however, and were driving the light troops of Davoust before them, when a loud cannonade at the extreme left announced the arrival of the emperor on that weakly-guarded part of the line. As they arrived on the top of the hills of Lintach, which separate the valley of the Iser from that of the Laber, the French, who came up from Landshut, beheld the field of battle stretched out like a map before them. From the marshy meadows which bordered the shores of the Laber rose a succession of hills, one above another, in the form of an amphitheatre, with their slopes cultivated and diversified by hamlets, and beautiful forests clothing the higher ground. The villages of Echmühl and Laichling, separated by a large copsewood, appeared in view, with the great road to Ratisbon winding up the acclivities behind them. The meadows were green with the first colours of spring: the osiers and willows which fringed the streams that intersected them were just bursting into leaf, and the trees which bordered the roadside already cast an agreeable shade upon the dusty and beaten highway which lay beneath their boughs. The French soldiers involuntarily paused as they arrived at the summit to gaze on this varied and interesting scene; but soon other emotions than those of admiration of nature swelled the breasts of the warlike multitude who thronged to the spot. In the intervals of these woods, artillery was to be seen; amid those villages, standards were visible; and long white lines, with the glancing of helmets and bayonets on the higher ground, showed the columns of Rosenberg and Hohenzollern already in battle array, in very advantageous positions, on the opposite side of the valley. Joyfully the French troops descended into the low grounds, while the emperor galloped to the front, and, hastily surveying the splendid, but intricate scene, immediately formed his plan of attack.*

The plan of Napoleon was to cut the Austrians off from their whole remaining communications with the Iser and Inn, and, by throwing them back upon Ratisbon and Bohemia, as their only line of retreat, sever them entirely from the support and protection of Vienna. With this view he began the action, advancing his right in great strength, under Lannes, who commanded the divisions Gudin and St. Hilaire, belonging to Davoust's corps, who soon commenced a furious attack upon the Austrian left, which his great superiority of force enabled him to turn and drive back. At the same time, the Wirtembergers were brought up to the attack of Echmühl in the centre; but the tremendous fire of the Austrian batteries at that point so shattered their ranks, that, though repeatedly brought again to the charge by their French officers, they were always repulsed, and sustained a very heavy loss. Finding that the village could not be carried by an attack in front, Lannes detached the division Gudin, which assailed the batteries in flank that protected it: this rendered it necessary to draw back the guns, or point them in another direction; and, aided by this diversion, the Wirtembergers at length dislodged their antagonists from this important post. At the same time, Davoust resumed the

offensive on the side of Abach, and, by a vigorous effort, made himself master of Unter Laichling and the woods which adjoin it, so as to prevent the enemy from drawing any support from that quarter to the left, which was principally menaced. The corps of Rosenberg, placed on the high grounds between Echmühl and Laichling, was now hard pressed, being assailed by the Wirtembergers under Vandamme, who issued from the former village on the one side, and the victorious troops of Davoust, who debouched with loud shouts from the latter on the other. But these brave men, fronting both ways, presented an invincible resistance to the enemy: the repeated charges of the Bavarian horse against their batteries were baffled by the valour of the Austrian cuirassiers; and the battle wore a doubtful aspect in that quarter, when intelligence arrived that Lannes had made himself master of a battery of sixteen guns on the left, after sabring the cannoniers, who gloriously fell beside their pieces.*

Rightly supposing that the archduke would suspend his attack on the right, in consequence of this check on the left, against which the constantly increasing masses of the enemy were now concentrating, and that a general retreat would take place, Napoleon conceived that the decisive moment had arrived, and therefore brought up the reserve cavalry, which hitherto had not taken a part in the action, and sent it forward, at a rapid pace, along the high road to Ratisbon, to harass their retreat, while a general advance took place along the whole line—Lannes on the right, Lefebvre and Vandamme in the centre, Davoust on the left, Massena and Oudinot with the guards in reserve. A general order to fall back was now given by the archduke, or, rather, a change of front took place, the left retiring rapidly, and the whole wheeling back to a certain degree on the point of the right, which held firm at Abach, so as to present a new front oblique to the former, but still barring the great road to Ratisbon to the enemy. His troops were disposed in echelon, from Santing to Isling, in a sort of column parallel to the highway, at the distance of a mile and a half from it; while on that *chaussée* he left only the grenadiers, who were still untouched, and in the rear of all the undaunted cuirassiers. These dispositions, though based on the abandonment of the field of battle and the victory to his antagonists, were admirably calculated to preserve the troops from disaster in the hazardous operation of retiring before a victorious enemy: the great object to which the attention of the archduke was always directed. The movements on the part of the Imperialists were at first performed with firmness and regularity;† but by degrees their infantry fell into confusion, in consequence of the frequent woods which interrupted their line of march, and the close pursuit of the enemy, which prevented the ranks, once broken, from being ever thoroughly regained.

The consequences might have been disastrous in the level and open plains which ensued when the retreating columns approached the Danube, had not the archduke placed twelve

Desperate cavalry action in front of Ratisbon.

* Pel., ii., 76, 77. Personal observation.

* Stat., 139, 145. Pel., ii., 79, 85. Jom., ii., 174. Thib., vii., 234. † Stat., 146, 148. Pel., ii., 85, 92. Jom., iii., 174.

squadrons of the emperor's cuirassiers and a large body of hussars in front of Eglofsheim, which was garrisoned by six battalions of grenadiers, and supported by several powerful batteries. As the pursuing columns approached this imposing mass of cavalry, they paused till the French horse came up in sufficient strength to hazard an engagement: a variety of charges of hussars then took place on both sides, with various success; but at length the magnificent Austrian cuirassiers bore down with apparently irresistible force upon their pursuers. The French light horse could not withstand the shock, and were quickly dispersed; but their cuirassiers came up, and then two rival bodies, equally heavily armed, equally brave, equally disciplined, engaged in mortal combat. So vehement was the onset, so nearly matched the strength of the combatants, so tremendous the conflict, that both parties, as if by mutual consent, suspended their fire to await its issue; the roar of the musketry subsided, even the heavy booming of the artillery ceased, and from the mêlée was heard only, as from the battles of the knights of old, the loud clang of the swords ringing on the helmets and cuirasses of the dauntless antagonists. The sun set while the contest was still undecided; the moon rose on the deadly strife, and amid her silvery rays fire was struck on all sides by the steel upon the armour, and dazzling sparks flew around the combatants, as if a thousand anvils were at once ringing under the blows of the forgers. Nothing could overcome the heroic courage of the Imperialists, but their equipment was not equal to that of their opponents; and in close fight, the Austrian horsemen, whose front only was covered, were not an adequate match for the cuirassiers of Napoleon, whose armour went entirely round their body. After a desperate struggle, their numbers were so reduced that they were unable any longer to make head against the enemy, and, leaving two thirds of their number on the field, they were driven in disorder along the *chaussée* towards Ratisbon. But their heroic stand, however fatal to themselves, proved the salvation of the army: during the engagement, the artillery and infantry withdrew in safety to the rear, and Napoleon, who perceived that the archduke had brought up the reserve under Lichtenstein, which had not yet been engaged, dreading a reverse like that which befell the Austrians in similar circumstances at Marengo, reluctantly, and against the earnest advice of Lannes, gave orders for the army to halt, and bivouac on the ground which they occupied.*

The situation of the archduke was now very critical: with a victorious army, headed by Napoleon, in his front, and the broad Danube, traversed only by the single bridge of Ratisbon, in his rear. By bringing up his whole forces from the opposite side of the river, and concentrating his troops from Abach and the right, he was still in a situation to compensate the losses of the day, and give battle with eighty thousand admirable troops in front of Ratisbon.† But that field

was imminently hazardous, for a serious disaster there sustained might lead to total ruin; and his army was not only extremely fatigued by the constant combats and marches of five successive days, but considerably affected in its spirit by the reverses it had experienced, and seriously weakened by the loss of the reserve parks and ammunition-train at Landshut. Five thousand men had been killed and wounded, and seven thousand made prisoners, in the battle which had just terminated, besides twelve standards and sixteen pieces of cannon, which had fallen into the enemy's hands; and though Lichtenstein's corps much more than supplied those losses, yet the French guards under Oudinot had just arrived on the field from Spain, and Massena's corps, which had not been engaged at all, was certain to bear the brunt of the next battle which might ensue. Influenced by these considerations, the archduke resolved to retire during the night, and restore the spirit and recruit the losses of his army in Bohemia, before again engaging in active operations. A bridge of boats was immediately thrown over the Danube, some miles above Ratisbon, and over it and the bridge at that town the army defiled without intermission the whole night. With such expedition and order was this critical operation conducted, that, before nine o'clock on the following morning, not only were almost all the soldiers, but all the guns, chariots, and ammunition-wagons safely on the other side; and when the French, who, from the large watchfires kept on the enemy's lines during the night, supposed a decisive battle was intended for the ensuing day, stood to their arms in the morning, they beheld with astonishment the whole plain of Ratisbon deserted,* except by a few broken wagons or gun-carriages, and saw only in the extreme distance dense masses of cavalry protecting the retreat of the last trains within the walls of Ratisbon.†

No sooner did Napoleon discover that the archduke had withdrawn the bulk of his forces during the night, than he moved forward the whole cavalry to attack the rear-guard, drawn up in front of Ratisbon. Notwithstanding all their efforts, they could not prevent great confusion occurring as the last of the carriages withdrew into the town; and nearly a thousand brave horsemen there sacrificed themselves for the safety of the rest of the army. The screen of cavalry which was drawn up around the bridge of boats, happily concealed its existence from the enemy till the troops were all over; but the pontoons them-

Operations against Ratisbon by the French, and wound of Napoleon.

bon the night after the battle: including Bellegarde's corps, which was still on the other side of the Danube, the total force was about eighty thousand. — STUTTERHEIM, 159, and GRUNE'S *Correspondence*.

* Stat., 160, 164. Pel., ii., 93, 99. Jom., iii., 174, 175. Thib., vii., 234, 235.

† The French lost in the battle of Echmühl about six thousand men. The bulletin stated the general loss from the opening of the campaign, at twelve hundred killed, and four thousand wounded; which, according to their usual proportion of admitting only a fourth part of its real amount, would make it about twenty thousand men, which was probably very near the mark. The Austrians, in the whole five days, lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, about thirty thousand, and one hundred pieces of cannon. — See first *Bulletin*, 24th April, 1809; PELLET, ii., 99; and GRUNE'S *Correspondence*, a copy of which the author obtained from the imperial archives at Vienna, through the kindness of his valued friend, Captain Basil Hall.

* Stat., 146, 151. Pel., ii., 85, 94. Jom., iii., 174, 175. Sav., iv., 54, 55.

† He had sixty thousand men around the walls of Ratis-

The archduke retreats across the Danube, and Ratisbon is taken by the French.

selves were burned, or fell into the hands of the victors. At length the rear-guard was all withdrawn within the walls of Ratisbon, the gates closed, and the ramparts lined with infantry. Napoleon at noon arrived on the spot, and, in his anxiety to press the assault, approached so near the walls that a musket-ball struck him on the right foot, and occasioned a considerable contusion. The pain obliged him to dismount from his horse; the report spread that the emperor was wounded; and instantly the soldiers broke from their ranks, and leaving their muskets, their guns, their horses, crowded round their beloved chief. Regardless of the cannon-balls which fell in the dense group, fifteen thousand men of all arms hastened to the spot, every one forgetting his own danger in the intense anxiety concerning their general's welfare. After a few minutes the wound was found to be so inconsiderable, that the emperor again mounted his horse: a rapturous cheer from the warlike multitude announced the joyful event to the army, and soon the rolling of the drums and clang of the trumpets recalled the soldiers in all directions to their arms.*

This perilous incident retarded only for a few minutes the progress of the attack. Its assault and capture. Lannes, who directed the operations, perceiving a large house which rested against the rampart, pointed several guns against its walls, which speedily reduced them to ruins, and formed a sort of breach, by which access might be obtained to the summit. A heavy fire, however, was kept up from the rampart, which rendered the crossing of the glacis highly dangerous; and for long no soldiers could be found who would incur the hazard. Impatient of the delay, Marshal Lannes seized a scaling-ladder, and himself ran forward over the perilous space, swept in every part with the enemy's balls. Animated by this example, the troops rushed on, cleared the glacis, leaped into the ditch, and, crowding up the breach formed by the ruined house, forced their way into the place; LABEDOYERE, reserved for a melancholy fate in future times, was the first man who was seen on the summit. The troops now followed rapidly into the town; the gates, attacked in flank, were seized and opened, and the streets filled with a ferocious multitude of assailants. Still the Hungarian grenadiers maintained their resistance: slowly retiring towards the bridge, they kept up an incessant discharge upon their pursuers; the houses took fire in the conflict; the ammunition-wagons were only rescued from the flames by the united efforts of both friends and foes; and, after losing half their numbers in the desperate strife, they reached the barricades of the bridge, where the cannonade of artillery from the opposite side was so violent as to render all farther pursuit impossible. The French headquarters were established for the night in the Convent of Prull, under the walls; in the course of it the bridge was evacuated, and next day the Austrian rear-guard was discovered beyond Stadt-am-Hoff, covering the retreat of the army to the woody heights of the Bohmerwald.†

The advantages gained by these brilliant operations: to Napoleon were very great. Twelve days only had elapsed since he left Paris, and already he had reassembled the army after its imprudent dispersion by Berthier, combated the Austrians on four successive days, separated Hiller and the Archduke Louis from the Archduke Charles, thrown the two former back upon the Inn, in too inconsiderable strength to be able to cover Vienna, and driven the latter to an eccentric retreat into the Bohemian Mountains. Thirty thousand Austrians had fallen or been made prisoners in these disastrous engagements; a hundred pieces of cannon, six hundred ammunition-wagons, two pontoon trains, and an incalculable quantity of baggage taken; and the spirit of the vanquished so thoroughly broken as to render them incapable for some time of engaging in active operations. The road to Vienna lay open to the conqueror: it was a matter of mere convenience to him, when he should step forward and seize the capital of the monarchy, its magnificent arsenal, and boundless resources of every kind. Twenty thousand men were lost to the French army; but what were they among such a host, and what such a diminution, compared to the incalculable moral influence upon his own troops and those of the allies, in consequence of such a series of successes at the very outset of the campaign? If ever the words of Cæsar, *Veni, vidi, vici*, were applicable to a modern conqueror, they might have been used by Napoleon on this occasion.*

It was by indefatigable activity and the nicest calculation of time that these astonishing results had been obtained; and never had the emperor displayed in a more striking manner the indefatigable energy of his character. Unwearied by a rapid journey, night and day, for six successive days from Paris, he no sooner arrived at Donaauwerth, than he began the incessant questioning and correspondence which, with him, were the invariable preludes to great achievements. His letters to his lieutenants during the next five days would, of themselves, make a volume. His calculation of time was so exact, and the habits of precise obedience on the part of his generals so complete, that his divisions invariably arrived on the ground assigned them at the very moment on which he relied, and when their operation was required; and generally again marched and combated on the day following, without any intermediate repose. By this means, though his forces were not, upon the whole, more numerous, at least at that period, than those of the Austrians, they were almost always greatly superior at the point of attack. Nor did the emperor shun the fatigue which he thus imposed upon his soldiers: on the contrary, not one of them underwent anything like the mental and bodily labour to which he subjected himself. From the morning of the 19th, when the battle of Abensberg began, till the night of the 23d, when that of Ratisbon terminated, he was on horseback, or dictating letters, at least eighteen hours a day: he had outstripped his own saddle-horses by the rapidity of his journey, and knocked up those of the King of Bavaria, by the

Great results of these actions.

Indefatigable activity of Napoleon and his soldiers was the principal cause of these successes.

* Sav., iv., 56, 57. Pel., ii., 103, 105.

† Stat., 162, 169. Jom., ii., 176, 177. Pel., ii., 103, 111. Phib., vii., 235, 236. Sav., iv., 57, 58.

* Jom., iii., 177.

fatigue they had undergone; and, when all around him were ready to drop down with exhaustion, he began to read and dictate despatches, and sat up half the night receiving reports from the generals and marshals, and completing the directions for the succeeding day. He has himself told us that his manœuvres at this period in Bavaria were the most brilliant of his life;* and without going the length of so extraordinary an eulogium, it may safely be affirmed, that they never were excelled by the operations either of himself or any other general.†

On the day following the emperor reviewed a great part of his army at Ratisbon, and one of those imposing spectacles was exhibited which, almost as much as his military talents, contributed to his astonishing successes. As each regiment defiled before him, Napoleon demanded from the colonel who were the most deserving among the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, and in presence of the army conferred their honours and distinctions upon them. On these interesting occasions he decided alone, and often conferred the reward on a common soldier in preference to those of higher grade who were recommended. He recognised some of the veterans of Marengo or the Pyramids as they were presented to him, and, when conferring the cross, gave them a signal of recognition by a slight tap on the cheek or clap on the shoulder, accompanied by a kind expression, as, "I make you a baron or a chevalier." One of these veterans, on being presented, asked the emperor if he did not recognise him. "How should I?" answered Napoleon. "It was me," replied the soldier,

Impressive scene in the conferring of military honours at Ratisbon.

"The greatest military manœuvres I ever made, and those for which I give myself most credit, were performed at Ecmühl, and were infinitely superior to those at Marengo, or to any other of my actions."‡ "On this day I heard the emperor repeat what I had often previously heard him say, that the finest manœuvres of his life were those which preceded the battle of Ecmühl."—LAS CASAS, v. 168, 169.

The details of the grounds on which this striking opinion is formed are thus given by Pelet, and quoted by Las Casas: "In four days of combats and manœuvres, were completed the destinies of the Austrian army—of that army, recently so numerous and arrogant, the most formidable and perfectly equipped which Austria had ever sent forth. By his first dispositions Napoleon had organized the plan of his great battle, secured his outposts, and reconnoitred the ground for a battle in front of Augsburg, according to the direction which the enemy's columns seemed disposed to take. He had corrected the false dispositions of Berthier, and collected his forces in such masses on each wing, as to preclude the danger which he had induced. On the 18th of April he arrived on the ground and made his dispositions, and announced that in three days all would be accomplished: on the 19th it commenced, and the junction of the wings took place under the cannon of the archduke; on the 20th he broke the enemy's centre at Abensberg, and entirely separated their left wing from their centre; on the 21st he routed the left wing at Landshut, got possession of its magazines, park equipages, and communications. Quick as lightning, he returned on the 22d to Ecmühl, to deal out his final blows to the army of the archduke; the remains of which with difficulty saved themselves behind the walls of Ratisbon and the mountains of Bohemia. Had Massena, as he was ordered, attacked Landshut on the 21st, on the right bank of the Isar, at the same moment when Napoleon pressed him on the left bank, the remains of Hiller's corps would have been entirely destroyed: had Ratisbon not been delivered up to the archduke, the remains of his army, cooped up in the bend formed by the Danube at that place, would have been utterly ruined. Thus, but for these untoward incidents, the vast army of the archduke would have been cut to pieces in these four days: as it was, it was severed in two, and found salvation only in flight."—LAS CASAS, v. 196.

† Sav., iv., 53, 59. Thib., vii., 234. Pel., ii., 120, 121.

* O'Meara, ii., 206.

"who in the desert of Syria, at the moment of your utmost necessity, gave you a portion of my rations." Napoleon at once recognised him, and said, "Oh! I recollect you perfectly, and make you a knight, with an annual endowment of twelve hundred francs" (£50). These heart-thrilling scenes excited the usual transports among the French soldiers; but in the troops of the confederation, upon whom honours and bounties were prudently and profusely showered, and to whom they were perfectly new, they produced an unbounded impression; and it then appeared how strongly the German heart was capable of being moved by those appeals to honour and generous feeling, of which the allied sovereigns in after times so largely availed themselves. At the same time, forty of the most deserving of the 65th regiment, which had capitulated at Ratisbon, were admitted into the old guard, to show that the emperor entertained no displeasure at that corps for that untoward event; and a proclamation was addressed to the army, which, with just pride, though in exaggerated terms, recounted their great exploits.*†

But, though these splendid triumphs attended the arms of Napoleon where he commanded in person, the fate of the Bavar-
Hiller. April 24.

war was very different in other quarters, and already were to be seen convincing proofs, from the disasters attending them under the direction of his lieutenants, that the invincible veterans of the Republic were fast wearing out, that the conscripts of the Empire possessed no superiority over the now improved and invigorated armies by which they were opposed, and that the successes, where he in person commanded, were owing to the talent of his combinations or the terrors of his name. Hiller, who had retired to the Inn after the disaster of Landshut, finding that he was not pursued by the French troops, and having ascertained that Napoleon had diverged with the bulk of his forces in another direction, deemed it a favourable opportunity to take vengeance on the Bavarians, by whom he had been somewhat incautiously pursued, for the losses which he had experienced. Having collected some small re-enforcements on the Inn, and divided his troops, about thirty thousand strong, into three columns, he remeasured his steps, and suddenly attacked the Bavarians under Wrede, who, along with the reserve under Bessières, were advancing beyond the defile of Neumarck, and had taken post on the heights in front of St. Verti. The Bavarians made at first a stout resistance, but

* Pel., ii., 111, 112. Thib., vii., 237.

† "Soldiers! You have justified my anticipations: you have supplied by bravery for the want of numbers, and marked the difference which exists between the soldiers of Cæsar and the armed rabble of Xerxes. Within the space of a few days we have triumphed in the battles of Thau, of Abensberg, and Ecmühl, and in the combats of Peissing, Landshut, and Ratisbon: one hundred pieces of cannon, forty standards, fifty thousand prisoners, three bridge equipages, three thousand baggage-wagons with their horses, all the caissons or regiments; such are the fruits of the rapidity of your marches and of your courage. The enemy, seduced by a perjured cabinet, appeared to retain no recollection of you: his wakening has been speedy, for you have appeared more terrible than ever. Late he crossed the Inn and invaded the territory of our allies; lately he talked of nothing less than carrying the war into the bosom of our country: now defeated, dispersed, he flies in consternation. Already my advanced guard has passed the Inn: in a month we shall be at Vienna."—NAPOLEON to his Troops, April 24, 1809; PELET, ii., 115.

being outnumbered and outflanked, they were soon driven back; and, though Molitor came up to support them with some regiments of the Imperial Guard, they too were compelled to retreat, and sustained a considerable loss. Before night the French and their allies were entirely driven off the field, with the loss of fifteen hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners; but the intelligence which Hiller received in the night of the battle of Ecmuhl and retreat of the archduke upon Ratisbon, induced him to halt in the career of victory,* and remeasure his steps to the Inn, in order to cover the approach to Vienna.

A disaster of a still more serious description was sustained about the same period by the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnois in the Italian plains. On the same day on which the Archduke Charles crossed the Inn, his brother, the Archduke John, passed the mountain frontier of the kingdom of Italy with forty-eight thousand men, and, after crossing the Isonzo at Gorizia, and passing Udina, poured down on the Italian plains, and took post in front of Passeriano, already famous in the diplomacy of Napoleon.†

The viceroy had above forty-five thousand men to oppose the invader; but they were, in great part, of Italian extraction, and could hardly be relied upon to withstand the shock of the transalpine forces. This inferiority speedily appeared in the first actions of the campaign. Eugene fell back across the Tagliamento, and established his headquarters at Sacile.‡

The Austrians, two days after, came up in great force, and surprised the 35th French regiment at Pordenone, which, with its eagle and four pieces of cannon, fell into the enemy's hands. Stung to the quick by this disgrace, and fearful of the effect of any farther retreat upon the spirit of his multifarious troops, the viceroy determined to hold firm and give battle to the enemy. Orders, accordingly, were given for the whole army to suspend its retreat, and retrace its steps on the 15th; and on the day following he made an attack on the Imperialists between Sacile and Pordenone.‡

The field of battle, which lay between Vignuova and Porcia, on the gentle slopes where the Alps of Roveredo melt into the Italian plains, was singularly favourable for the operations of cavalry, in which arm the Austrians had considerably the advantage. So little did they anticipate, however, an attack, that at the moment when it commenced, the Archduke John was engaged in hearing mass at Pordenone, and one of his corps was considerably in the rear at Palse. The best dispositions, however, which circumstances would admit, were made to repel the enemy, and, as the troops in the rear successively came up, they were passed on to the plain of Vignuova, so as to menace the communication between Eugene and the bridge of Sacile. The combat was very warm, and in the first instance, before the corps of Chastellar came up, Prince Eugene had the advantage; and at the village of Porcia in particular, and which was repeatedly taken and re-

taken, a frightful carnage took place. Gradually, however, the Austrians, who had outflanked their opponents, cooped up their line within very narrow limits, and at length it was driven into the space between Fontana, Fredda, and Porcia, which did not exceed two miles in breadth. Fearful of the consequences of any disaster upon troops restrained within such narrow limits, Eugene gave the signal to retreat, which was effected at first by squares in echelon, which arrested their pursuers by alternate volleys as on a review day; but, at the defile occasioned by the bridge of the Levinza and the marshes on either side of the stream, they fell into disorder, which was soon augmented by the intelligence that seven thousand men of the corps in reserve had passed them, and already occupied Sacile. The whole army, upon this, fell into confusion. Horse, foot, and cannon became blended together in frightful disorder, and fled towards the Adige, without either direction or farther attempt at resistance.* The approach of night alone saved them from a total overthrow; but as it was, they lost four thousand killed and wounded, and an equal number of prisoners, besides fifteen pieces of cannon; while the Austrians had not to lament the loss of half the number.

This important victory in the outset of the campaign was likely to prove decisive, as that of Magnano in 1799,† of the fate of Italy, and would have been attended with not less material results upon the general issue of the war, had its effects not been obliterated, and the career of success in the plains of Lombardy arrested by the rapid and overwhelming advance of Napoleon to Vienna. As it was, however, and even though the Archduke John was far from following up his success with the vigour which might have been expected, the results of the battle were in the highest degree important. Eugene, re-enforced by some battalions which he had left at Verona, succeeded in at length reorganizing his army, and took post behind the fortified line of the Adige, already immortalized in the campaigns of Napoleon. The archduke, though obliged to send three divisions at this period to observe Marmont in Dalmatia, and considerably weakened by the necessity of making large detachments to observe Venice and Palma-nuova, in which the enemy had large garrisons, followed his retreating adversary, and took post, with thirty thousand excellent troops, in the famous position of Caldiero, a few miles from Verona. But the spirit of the two armies was essentially changed: the Italians, depressed and weakened by defeat, felt the old superiority of the Tramontane forces, and were prepared to fall back, as in the time of Suwarrow, to the farthest verge of the Italian Peninsula;‡ while the Austrians, roused to the highest degree by their early success, confidently anticipated a repetition of the glories of Novi and the Trebbia. But the expectations of both parties were traversed by the extraordinary progress of Napoleon down the

* Stat., 172, 176. Jom., iii., 178. Pel., ii., 166, 170.

† Ante, i., 465.

‡ Erz. Jom. Feld., 44, 52. Pel., iii., 141, 152.

* Erz. Joans Feldzug in Jahre 1809, 44, 52. Pel., iii., 141, 163. Jom., iii., 179, 180. Stat., 164, 169.

† Ante, ii., 17.

‡ Erz. Joau. Feldz., 53, 57. Pel., iii., 163, 167. Stat., 179, 182. Jom., iii., 180, 181.

Important effects of this victory on the Italian campaign.

valley of the Danube, which soon rendered necessary the concentration of the whole forces of the monarchy for the defence of the capital.*

Thus, though Napoleon's successes had been great on the Bavarian plains, he had by no means gained any decided advantage: his armies had been routed, or run the most imminent hazard, wherever he did not command in person; and disasters which would have been decisive in any other warfare had been experienced by his lieutenants on the Italian frontier. It was evident that the forces of the contending parties were approaching to an equality: the wonted vehemence of the Republican armies had disappeared when led by the marshals of France; the Austrians had clearly proved their superiority to the allies who swelled their columns, and it was the consummate talents, overwhelming force, and paralyzing renown of Napoleon that alone still chained victory to the standards of the Grand Army. Reversing the principles of both

Hopes which the commencement of the campaign afforded to the allies.

parties in the contest, the fortunes of France had come to depend on the genius of a single man, the pyramid rested on its apex; while, driven by necessity to a more enlarged policy, Austria was reaping the fruits of popular enthusiasm, and successfully combating the Revolution with the arms which itself had created. The aristocratic power, generally successful, failed only from the want of a leader adequate to the encounter of the popular hero; the Democratic, generally defeated, prevailed through the extraordinary abilities of one man. Such a state of matters might promise little for present success, but it was pregnant with hope for future deliverance. Great as may be the ascendancy, unbounded the activity of a single leader, they cannot, in the long run, compensate general disaster; and, in all prolonged contests, that power is ultimately destined to victory which, appealing to principles which find a responsive echo in the human heart, rests upon the organized and directed efforts of the many, rather than the abilities, how splendid soever, of the few.

CHAPTER LIV.

CAMPAIGN OF ASPERN.

ARGUMENT.

Measures of Napoleon for a grand concentric Attack upon Vienna.—Defensive Steps of the Archduke Charles.—Napoleon advances to the Borders of the Traun.—Description of the Position of Ebersberg, and of the Austrian Corps which occupied it.—Massena resolves to attack.—Devoted Gallantry of the French.—After a desperate Struggle, they gain the Pass.—Hiller falls back towards Vienna.—Advance of the French Army towards that Capital.—Ineffectual Attempt to defend it.—The Archduke Maximilian abandons Vienna, which Capitulates.—Position of the different Corps of the French Army in the Middle of May.—Movements of the Archduke Charles, and Positions of his Army.—Retreat of the Archduke John in Italy.—Battle of the Pieve, and Defeat of the Austrians.—Retreat of the Austrians from Italy into Hungary.—Capture of the Mountain Forts of Styria and Carinthia by the French.—Capture of the Col di Tarwis, and other Forts.—Fall of Trieste, Laybach, and the whole Frontier Defences of Austria.—Total Defeat of Jellachich in the Valley of the Muhr.—Junction of Eugene with Napoleon at Vienna.—Chances of the Conflict under its Walls to either Party.—Napoleon resolves to cross the Danube and attack the Enemy.—Description of its Islands near Vienna, and the different Channels of the River.—Napoleon's Preparations to effect the Passage.—Failure at Nussdorf.—His vigorous Efforts to effect a Passage at Lobau.—Passage of the River.—Operations of the Archduke Charles on the Upper Danube at Lintz and Krems.—He resolves to Attack that Portion of the French which had crossed the River.—Austrian Plan and Order of Attack.—Position and Dangers of the French Army.—Napoleon is surprised, but resolves to give Battle.—Austrian Plan of Attack, and Forces on both Sides.—Desperate Conflict at Aspern, which is at length Carried by the Austrians.—Grand Charge of French Cavalry in the Centre.—Bloody Attack on Essling, which proves unsuccessful.—Feelings with which both Parties passed the Night on the Field of Battle.—Renewal of the Action on the 22d.—Aspern and Essling are again obstinately disputed.—Napoleon makes a grand Attack on the Austrian Centre, which is at first successful.—Desperate Resistance of the Austrian Centre.—Success of Hohenzollern, and Rupture of the Bridges of the Danube.—The French retire to the Island of Lobau.—Last Attack of the Austrians, and Fall of Marshal Lannes.—Results of the Battle and Loss on both Sides.—Deplorable Situation of the French

Army in the Island of Lobau on the Night of the 22d.—Council of War held in the Island, in which it is resolved to maintain the Position there.—Reflections on the Conduct of Napoleon in this Battle.—Observations on the French method of Attack in Column.—Glorious Character of the Resistance of the Austrians at Aspern.—Disastrous Effect of the Archduke John's Disobedience of his Orders.—Immense Importance of Central Fortresses on the Defence of Nations.—Infatuation of England in this Respect.

IMMEDIATELY after the battle of Echmuhl, Napoleon, clearly perceiving the expediency of striking at the heart of his enemy's power before the consternation consequent on the disasters in Bavaria had subsided, issued orders in all directions for the concentration of his forces upon the Austrian capital. Orders were despatched on the 24th to Eugene to press forward in the Italian plains; to Bernadotte, who had assumed the command of the Saxons at Dresden, without a moment's delay to enter Bohemia by the northern frontier; and to Poniatowski, who commanded the Polish army, to invade Galicia, and endeavour to excite an insurrection in that province against the Austrian dominion.* Every preparation was also made for moving the whole Grand Army, with the exception of Davoust's corps, which was left at Ratisbon to observe the archduke, down the valley of the Danube, into the interior of the monarchy; and by daybreak on the 26th a hundred thousand men were in

Measures of Napoleon for a grand concentric attack upon Vienna.

* To Eugene he wrote: "Advance in full confidence; the emperor is about to move into the interior of Austria; the enemy will not keep their ground before you any more than they have done in Bavaria. This army, defeated in its most cherished projects, is totally demoralized." To Bernadotte at Dresden: "Napoleon is about to march upon Vienna, and he expects, with the greatest impatience, your arrival in Bohemia, to co-operate with the Grand Army, which will at once render disposable the corps of Davoust, now left in observation at Ratisbon." To Poniatowski: "That he fully relied on his zeal in the common cause, and that, as the emperor was now to march upon Vienna, now was the moment for him to enter Galicia."—See the original Letters in Pelet, ii., 172, 173.

* In the order of time, the war in Tyrol should be treated of immediately after the opening of the campaign in Italy; but the vast moral importance of that contest, as well as its romantic character, require a separate chapter, and will be treated of in that which follows previous to the battle of Wagram.

full march for the Inn and Vienna. At the same time, to impose upon Prussia and overawe the numerous malecontents in the north of Germany, a corps of observation was formed, under the orders first of Kellerman, and afterward of Junot, which, though consisting only of fourteen thousand men, was pompously announced in the bulletins as numbering fifty thousand combatants.*

The situation of the Archduke Charles was now embarrassing in the highest degree. By having been driven off from the valley of the Danube, and compelled to take refuge in the mountains of Bohemia, the approach to the capital was left unguarded, save by Hiller's corps and the Archduke Louis, thirty-five thousand strong, which were wholly inadequate to arrest the march of the mighty conqueror. An ordinary general, indeed, responsible to his superiors, would hesitate to advance into the interior of the Austrian monarchy, having seventy-five thousand men on one flank in the Bohemian Mountains, and the insurgent Tyrol, secure in inaccessible alps, on the other, to menace or cut off his lines of communication. But it was not the character of Napoleon to be deterred by such obstacles. On the contrary, it was distinctly foreseen, what the event speedily proved was the case, that the French emperor, relying on the power and terror of the army under his immediate command, would hurry forward to the capital, and trust to his never-failing resources to dissipate any assemblages on his flanks or rear by which his communication might be threatened. Impressed with these ideas, Prince Charles despatched April 23. orders on the 23d to Hiller to retard, as much as possible, the advance of the enemy; to the Archduke John to retreat towards the hereditary states; while he himself, after forming a junction with Bellegarde, exerted himself to the utmost in reorganizing his army, and, with the consent of the Emperor Francis, despatched a courier with a dignified April 28. letter proposing an exchange of prisoners, and hinting at more important negotiations to Napoleon, which arrived, however, at the French headquarters after they had already been established in Upper Austria, and too late to arrest the dreaded march of the conqueror to Vienna.†

* Pol., ii., 171, 173. Thib., vii., 243. Sav., iv., 59.

† Erz. Joan., 49. Stat., 178, 182. Pel., ii., 173, 179.

“To his brother, the emperor, the archduke observed: “Finding it impossible to keep my ground with a river such as the Danube in my rear, against a victorious army in front, I have deemed it expedient to cross to the northern bank and form a junction with Count Bellegarde. You are aware that all the operations of the campaign were based on the probability of an early success, and on the co-operation of the troops of the Rhenish Confederacy, who, in fact, declared against us. Would it not be expedient, then, to try the result of a negotiation, before the enemy has invaded Austria, and while, in Italy and Tyrol, there remain successes to counterbalance his advantages?” The emperor despatched Count Stadion with his reply, which approved of overtures by the archduke, provided they did not compromise his dignity. The latter, accordingly, wrote to Napoleon on the 30th April: “Your majesty has announced your arrival by a salvo of artillery: I had no time to reply to it; but, though hardly informed of your presence, I speedily discovered it by the losses which I experienced. You have taken many prisoners from me, and I have taken some thousands from you in quarters where you were not personally present. I propose to your majesty to exchange them, man for man, rank for rank; and, if that proposal proves agreeable with you, point out the place where it may be possible

The emperor's dispositions being all completed, the Grand Army was, to a certain extent, divided: Davoust, whose corps, exhausted by the fatiguing marches it had undergone, and seriously weakened by the losses of the campaign, stood in need alike of re-enforcements and repose, was left at Ratisbon to guard the passage of the Danube, and watch the retiring columns of the archduke; Lefebvre, with the Bavarians, was detached into the Tyrol, to make head against the insurrection in that province, which was daily assuming a more menacing aspect; while the emperor himself, at the head of the corps of Massena, Lannes, and Bessières, still, notwithstanding all the losses of the campaign, above eighty thousand strong, proceeded direct by the great road along the southern side of the Danube to Vienna. Vandamme followed at a little distance, with the troops of the confederation, eighteen thousand more; and as soon as Bernadotte, with the Saxons, who was toiling round the external frontier of the Bohemian Mountains, relieved Davoust at Ratisbon, he, too, was to follow in the same direction with his corps, still numbering forty thousand men. Every disposition being thus made to secure his rear, and station his troops in echelon, so as to ensure his communications, Napoleon left Ratisbon on the 26th, and arrived the same day at Landshut, where he found April 26. the whole guard, both horse and foot, assembled, having just come up from Spain. This veteran corps, full twenty thousand strong, proved a most important addition to his invading force; and when it is recollected that in the beginning of January it was at Astorga, at the foot of the Galician Mountains,* it must be admitted that few more rapid marches are on record in the whole annals of military achievement. Meanwhile the vanguard pressed on with ceaseless vigour, and soon the advanced posts were on the Inn. The rocky banks of that river, flanked by the ramparts of Braunau and Passau, afforded an apparently favourable situation for arresting the advance of the enemy; April 28. but the vast line, above thirty leagues in length, would have required a hundred thousand men for its defence, and the Austrian general had not above a third of that number at his disposal. For the same reason, he contented himself with breaking down the bridges over the Salza, which had the effect of retarding, by two days, the advance of the French army. Napoleon arrived at Braunau on the 1st of May, and pressed on with ceaseless activity the May 1. march of his troops; while Hiller, abandoning the woody range and unformed intrenchments of the Kirchbergwald, took post at the formidable

to carry it into effect. I feel flattered, sire, in combating the greatest captain of the age; but I should esteem myself more happy if Heaven had chosen me to be the instrument in procuring for my country a durable peace. Whatever may be the events of war, or the chances of an accommodation, I pray your majesty to believe that my desires will always outstrip your wishes, and that I am equally honoured by meeting your majesty either with the sword or the olive branch in your hand.” But all this graceful flattery was thrown away; for, before it reached Napoleon, he was far advanced in the valley of the Danube, and the terrible combat of Ebersberg had opened to him the gates of Upper Austria, when nothing remained to stay his triumphant march to Vienna.—ERZB. JOANS FELDZUG IN JAHR 1809, 55, 56; and PELET, ii., 176, 179.

* Ante, iii., 104.

position of EBERSBERG, to defend the passage of the Traun, and cover the wooden bridge, which at Mauthausen, or a little farther down the Danube, formed an important line of communication with the northern bank of the river. It was of the most vital consequence to gain possession of this post, for a few hours would suffice, with a corps such as Hiller's, to put it in a posture of defence; and if the archduke, who was following by Budweiss down the left bank, should arrive before it was forced, it might retard, or altogether defeat the projected march upon Vienna.*

Descending from the lofty summit of the Alps by lateral branches to the great valley of the Danube, several mountain streams between Munich and Vienna present scenes, the beauty of which is forever engraven on the mind of the traveller, and afford, at the same time, favourable positions to dispute the advance of an invading army. Of these, the most impetuous and savage in its character is the Traun, which, issuing from the wild cliffs of the Alter and Abersees, and descending through the wooded steepes of the Traunese, makes its way through narrow ravines and steep, pine-clad hills, to the Danube, a little below Ebersberg.† A long wooden bridge crosses the stream in front of that place, which is commanded by the precipitous heights and old castle on its right or western bank: another bridge existed some leagues higher up, at Wels; but the road over it crossed, a little farther on, another mountain torrent, the Krems Munster; and as all these bridges were of wood, which were easily destroyed, and required a considerable time for their reparation, the wing of the invader's army, which attempted the passage by that circuitous route, was liable to very serious interruption. Everything, therefore, recommended an immediate attack upon the bridge of Ebersberg; and Massena, who commanded the advanced guard, and was perfectly alive to all these considerations, resolved to pursue the enemy with such vigour that they would not have time to apply the torch to the combustible arches.‡

The prudence of this determination, considering the vital importance of anticipating the archduke at the bridge of Mauthausen, could not be disputed; but when the French arrived on the left bank of the Traun, beyond Scharlantz, in front of Ebersberg, the spectacle which presented itself was sufficient to daunt the most intrepid breasts. Right in front of them lay the bed of the impetuous Traun, nearly eight hundred yards broad, intersected by many sand-banks and islands, clothed with stunted wood, traversed only by a single *chaussée*, terminating in a bridge three hundred yards long, over the largest arm of the river, which flows in a deep and rapid torrent close to the right bank. The bridge, closed at its western extremity by the gate of Ebersberg, was enfiladed by the houses of the town, which were all filled with musketeers, and commanded along its whole extent by a plentiful array of

artillery disposed on the heights above. On the summit of the whole stood the old square castle, its walls bristling with bayonets and artillery planted on its mouldering battlements to command the bridge, at the distance of a hundred toises. The hills, or, rather, swelling eminences next the river, were covered with deep masses of infantry, interspersed with powerful batteries of cannon, who stood prepared to dispute the passage; while immediately in their rear rose a second range of heights, considerably more elevated than the former, clothed with pines, over which, equally with those in front, the road passed, and which afforded another position stronger than the first, to which, if driven from their original ground, the enemy might retire.*

It required no ordinary resolution to attack with no greater force thirty-five thousand men, supported by eighty pieces of cannon, in such a position; but Massena, who burned with desire to illustrate his name by some brilliant exploit in a campaign where hitherto he had not had an opportunity to signalize himself, and who was in hopes that, if the combat should be prolonged for any length of time, he would be aided by a flank attack from Marshal Lannes, who was to cross at Wels and force his way across the lesser streams in his front, resolved to hazard an attack. The French troops, at that period, were in such a state of exultation from their triumphs, that, under the eye of the emperor at least, nothing was impracticable to their audacity. Four battalions of Austrian grenadiers had been injudiciously left on the left bank, occupying some houses and walled enclosures, which formed a sort of *tête-du-pont* to the bridge. Upon them the attack was first made, and, being speedily overwhelmed by numbers, they were driven, at the point of the bayonet, along the *chaussée*; and, in spite of a gallant resistance, all the islands and little bridges over the branches of the torrent were wrested from the enemy. But when the pursuers reached the long bridge over the principal branch of the Traun, the fire of grape and musketry from the batteries and houses on the opposite side was so violent that the head of the column hesitated and recoiled. Instantly General Cohorn, a descendant of the illustrious engineer of the same name, is at their head, and, animated by his gallant example, the French troops return to the charge. A frightful scene, exceeding in horror even the terrible passage of the Bridge of Lodi, ensued; at the point of the bayonet, amid showers of balls, the heroic French, headed by Cohorn, pursued the retiring Austrians; while the troops on the opposite bank, seeing the enemy's colours advancing through a cloud of smoke, and in the midst of a frightful contest, closed the gate at the farther end, and fired incessantly with grape, round shot, and canister, indiscriminately on friend and foe. Numbers of the Imperialists, threatened with death on both sides, threw themselves into the water, and were swept away by the impetuous torrent; others were trampled down by the advancing columns, or sought refuge in the wooded islands,

And of the Austrian corps which occupied it.

ering the vital importance of anticipating the archduke at the bridge of Mauthausen, could not be disputed; but when the French arrived on the left bank of the Traun, beyond Scharlantz, in front of Ebersberg, the spectacle which presented itself was sufficient to daunt the most intrepid breasts. Right in front of them lay the bed of the impetuous Traun, nearly eight hundred yards broad, intersected by many sand-banks and islands, clothed with stunted wood, traversed only by a single *chaussée*, terminating in a bridge three hundred yards long, over the largest arm of the river, which flows in a deep and rapid torrent close to the right bank. The bridge, closed at its western extremity by the gate of Ebersberg, was enfiladed by the houses of the town, which were all filled with musketeers, and commanded along its whole extent by a plentiful array of

* Jom., iii., 181. Pel., ii., 181, 199. Sav., iv., 60, 61. Stut., 182, 187.

† Pel., ii., 189, 203. Stut., 176, 185. Jom., ii., 181. Personal observation.

Personal observation.

* Personal observation. Pel., ii., 202, 205. Stut., 192, 195.

and were made prisoners; several ammunition-wagons blew up in the middle of the bridge, and the dauntless foemen were scattered in the air by the tremendous explosion. But nothing could withstand the enthusiastic gallantry of the French. Side by side, Cohorn and Campy, aid-de-camp to Massena, head the column: soon the gate and palisades flanking it are levelled by the pioneers, and the assailants penetrate into the town. Here, however, they are exposed at once to a plunging fire from the castle and a flanking one from the houses, while fresh battalions assail them in front. Torn in pieces by the terrific discharge, to which in the crowded streets of an ancient village they could make no reply, they speedily fall victims to their daring valour. In a few minutes two thirds of their number are stretched upon the pavement; the survivors are driven back in confusion to the entrance of the bridge; its barricades, hastily re-established, are closed, lest it should again fall into the hands of the enemy, and the Austrians are preparing a column to clear it of the assailants and set fire to the combustibles already provided, which, in the suddenness of the former assault, had not been fired.*

Massena, however, who had now come up to the opposite bank, was well aware of the importance of following up the extraordinary advantage gained by the brilliant temerity of his advanced guard. He instantly, accordingly, despatched powerful succours to Cohorn and his handful of heroes, now cooped up between the gate at the end of the bridge and the rapidly-increasing forces of his assailants. Three fresh brigades, headed by Claparede, were soon passed over, and at length the division Le Grand having come up, it also was sent forward,† through a storm of grape and musketry, over the bridge, and lent its powerful aid to the attacking force. Strengthened by such assistance, Claparede regained his ground in the village, and gradually forced his way up the narrow lanes leading to the castle, and stormed that stronghold itself. Hiller, however, recovered from his first surprise, renewed his efforts to regain the post: two fresh divisions came up, drove the French out of the chateau, and forced them down again into the low streets adjoining the bridge. Again the French returned to the assault: Massena ordered a division to cross over farther up the river to the right, in order to attack the left of the Imperialists while engaged with their unwearied antagonists in front. Amid a frightful storm of shot, Le Grand swiftly passed over the narrow open space which separated the town from the castle; but, even in that distance of two hundred yards, the path of every regiment was marked by a long and melancholy train of slain: arrived at the gates, they were found to be closed, and the whole head of the column was swept away by the plunging fire from the battlements. Again re-enforced, Le Grand returned to the assault under cover of a tremendous fire of all arms,

which brought down every exposed limb on the castle; the sappers rushed up to the gates, which they broke through, and the heroic garrison, cut off from all external support by the columns which had got round it on the eastern side, laid down its arms.*

Hiller now, seeing the key of the position carried, gave the signal for retreat; but to troops so intermingled and closely engaged with the enemy it was no easy matter to obey this order, and the division which had crossed farther up the river already threatened their left flank; for in the hurry of this sudden attack there had not been time to break down the bridges of the Krems Munster, and other streams which discharged themselves into the Traun above Ebersberg, and which, if destroyed, would, for some hours at least, have secured that flank from attack. With great difficulty, the Austrians withdrew to the position behind the town, where another combat, not less obstinate and bloody, took place. Every road, every pathway leading up the ascent was the scene of a desperate struggle; the pastures, the corn-fields, the pine woods on the crest of the ridge, were all the theatre of mortal combat; while the flames of Ebersberg in the hollow behind, the trampling of horsemen over the dead and dying, the cries of the wounded, and the cheers of the soldiers who successively arrived on the opposite bank, formed a scene surpassing all but the field of Eylau in circumstances of horror. The combat, however, was too critical and violent to admit of any relaxation, and as the French cavalry of the guard came up to the opposite side, they were hastily hurried forward, and, trampling under foot the dead bodies and wounded of either army, forced their way through the burning houses with loud shouts, swords glittering, banners waving, and all the animation of war, to the front of the battle. Still the Austrians, with invincible resolution, made good the post on the ridge behind; but as evening approached, the masses on their left flank, which had crossed at Wels and other places in the upper part of the stream, became so threatening that Hiller drew off his troops and fell back in the night to Enns, where he burned the bridge over the river of the same name, and continued his retreat towards Amstetten. In this terrific combat few trophies were taken by the victors;‡ the French could only boast of four guns and two standards wrested from the enemy, while on each side six thousand brave men had fallen a sacrifice to their heroic sense of patriotic duty.†

This severe loss altogether disabled Hiller from making any farther resistance to the advance of the invading army to Vienna, and he accordingly fell back, as fast as the encumbrance of so many wounded would permit, to the neighbourhood

Hiller falls back towards Vienna.

Advance of the French army to Vienna.

* Pel., ii., 202, 209. Stat., 194, 199. Sav., iv., 61, 62. Jom., ii., 181, 182.

† As Le Grand debouched from the bridge, the French general in command there rather officiously tendered his advice: "I want none of your advice," said he, "but room for the head of my column;" and instantly passed on to the attack of the castle.—PELET, ii., 211.

* Pelet, ii., 209, 213. Stat., 203, 205. Norv., iii., 209. † Pel., ii., 209, 215. Stat., 202, 207. Norv., iii., 209 Jom., ii., 182, 183.

‡ The author has been the more particular in the description of this combat, not only from its peculiar and terrible character, but because the castle and bridge of Ebersberg form well-known objects to every traveller who has visited Vienna; and it is desirable that the multitude of English who frequent that capital in quest of pleasure or amusement should be aware of the heroic deeds of which the Gothic castle, under whose walls they pass, has been the theatre.

of the capital. Napoleon arrived on the opposite side of the Traun to Ebersberg during the latter period of the combat, and passed through the town soon after it had ceased. How much soever inured to scenes of carnage, he was strongly impressed by the unwonted horrors which there presented themselves, where brave men by thousands lay weltering in their blood, amid burning rafters and smoking ruins; and the first who had fallen were thrown into the river, or crushed under the feet of the horses, or by the wheels of the artillery which had since passed over them;* and testified considerable displeasure, both at Massena for provoking so desperate a contest, where a flank movement might have rendered it unnecessary, and at Lannes, whose corps was to cross at Wels, farther up the river, for not having made his dispositions so as to be up in time to take a part in the strife by attacking the flank or rear of Hiller's corps. After passing Ebersberg, however, being uncertain of the movements of the archduke, and fearful of advancing into the interior without being aware of the position of

his principal adversary, he halted
From May 4 to May 7.

for two days at Enns, re-established the bridge there, and collected a number of boats, which he already foresaw would be required for the difficult operation of crossing the Danube in front of Vienna, while his advanced guard, under Lannes and Massena, pursued their route by the great road to the capital. Anticipating a battle on the woody ridge which lies between St. Polten and Vienna, he concentrated his troops before attempting the passage of that defile; but the precaution was unnecessary. Hiller had received orders to cross the Danube, and fall back, with all his forces, to the neighbourhood of the metropolis, and occupy the islands until the arrival

of the archduke. Meanwhile the emperor, continuing his advance along the Danube, perceived, from the Abbey of Melk, situated on a high rock, a considerable encampment of soldiers on the left bank of the river. Devoured with anxiety to know to which army they belonged, he despatched a sergeant of the old guard and six chosen men, who soon made their way across in a boat, and brought over three Austrian soldiers, who reported that they belonged to the archduke's army, and that he was advancing, by forced marches, in hopes of

arriving at the capital before the enemy. This important intelligence made the emperor redouble his activity:† orders were given to Massena to watch, with the utmost vigilance, all the points where a passage of the Danube could be effected, while Lannes and Bessières were directed to advance with increased celerity to the capital. All arms, accordingly, pressed on with the utmost

expedition; and on the 10th of May,

* During this terrible action the bridge and street immediately leading from it were so encumbered with the wounded, that Massena was driven to the cruel necessity of commanding the fresh troops which came up to throw their maimed comrades into the river; and such of them as were struck down were treated in the same manner by those who next came up to the attack. There was no alternative, for else the causeway would soon have become impassable, and the division in front been entirely cut off.—See CADET DE GRASSECOURT'S *Voyage en Autriche à la suite de l'Armée Française*, 1809, p. 137.

† Pel., ii., 220, 254. Stut., 203, 212. Jom., ii., 182, 186

being exactly a month from the time when the Austrian standards crossed the Inn, the French eagles appeared before the walls of Vienna.*

Though deprived, by the passage of Hiller to the northern bank of the Danube, of the corps on which it had chiefly relied for protection, Vienna was by no means destitute of resources. The external barriers, indeed, were not in a condition to make any defence; and the Archduke Maximilian, to whom the command was intrusted, withdrew at once from the rich and extensive suburbs into the ancient walled capital. They were constructed, however, of solid granite, well armed with artillery, and capable of being supplied to any extent from the inexhaustible resources of the arsenal; while four thousand regular troops and eight thousand landwehr and Milan volunteers were in arms in the city. Great efforts were made to electrify the inhabitants, and patriotic ardour was at its highest pitch. The people talked of their glorious resistance, one hundred and thirty years before, to the Turks, and loudly proclaimed their resolution to emulate the heroic defence of Saragossa in more recent times. But all history demonstrates that there is one stage of civilization when the inhabitants of a metropolis are capable of such a sacrifice in defence of their country, but only one; and that, when past, it is never recovered. The event has proved that the Russians were in the state of progress when such an heroic act was possible, but that the inhabitants of Vienna and Paris had passed it. Most certainly the citizens of London would never have buried themselves under the ruins of the Bank, the Treasury, or Leadenhall-street before capitulating to Napoleon. In fact, without supposing that the members of a highly-civilized and opulent community have altogether lost their patriotic spirit, it is evident that the sacrifices which are unavoidable, if obstinate resistance is attempted by a city in the later stages of society, where wealth is concentrated,

* Riding from Melk towards St. Polten, with Berthier and Lannes, the emperor's eyes were riveted on the Gothic towers of Dierstein, the scene of the captivity of Richard Cœur de Lion, which rose, in gloomy magnificence, at some distance on the other side of the Danube. He could speak for long on no other subject. "He, also," said Napoleon, "had been a warrior in Syria and Palestine. He was more fortunate than us at St. Jean Acre, but not more valiant than you, my brave Lannes. He beat the great Saladin. And yet hardly had he returned to Europe than he fell into the hands of persons who certainly were of a very different calibre. He was sold by a duke of Austria to an emperor of Germany, who has been rescued from oblivion by that act alone. The last of his court, Blondel, alone remained faithful to him; but his nation made great sacrifices for his deliverance." Still keeping his eyes riveted on the towers, he continued: "These were barbarous times, which they have the folly to represent to us as so heroic: when the father sacrificed his children, the wife her husband, the subject his sovereign, the soldier his general, and all without shame or disguise, for the mere thirst of gold or power! How much are times changed now! what progress has civilization made in our time! You have seen emperors, kings, in my power, as well as the capitals of their states, and I exacted from them neither ransom nor sacrifice of honours. And that successor of Leopold and Henry, who is already more than half in our power, will not be worse treated on this occasion than the preceding!" How deceitful is self-love! The ransom which Napoleon had exacted, on the very last occasion—on Austria £5,000,000, and on Prussia £16,000,000—exceeded all that feudal cupidity had ever extorted; and in the dark annals of Gothic crime and treachery, nothing exceeded the cruelty of the French Revolution, or the perfidy of his own seizure of the throne of the Spanish Peninsula.—See PELET, ii., 246, 247.

credit universal, and hundreds of thousands would at once be reduced to beggary by its stoppage, are so great, that no moral courage, how intrepid soever, can be equal to the responsibility of incurring them. Napoleon wisely trusted to two methods to effect the reduction of the city—the cutting off its communication with the northern bank of the river, and the terrors of a bombardment. With this view, he directed Massena to make himself master of the island of Prater, while a similar attack was made on that of Jagerhaus by Lannes, so as to reach from both sides the great bridge of Spitz and Thabor. These attacks were entirely successful, for the archduke had not forces sufficient to defend them; and such had been the confident security of the Aulic Council, that they had not taken the simple precaution of connecting the works of the place with the bridges of the Danube. At the same time, a battery of twenty mortars was established nearly on the same ground from which the Turks had, a hundred and forty years before, bombarded the city, and with such vigour were they served, that in the next ten hours they discharged three thousand projectiles into the capital; and already, in the course of the night, it was in flames in several quarters.*

At that period, there lay sick in the imperial palace, directly opposite to the French batteries, and incapable of removal to a place of safety, a young princess, daughter of the illustrious house of Hapsburg. It was by the thunders of artillery, and the flaming light of bombs across the sky, that Napoleon's first addresses to the archduchess, *MARIE LOUISE*, were made. Informed of the dangerous situation of the noble captive, he ordered the direction of the pieces to be changed, and while the midnight sky was incessantly streaked by burning projectiles, and conflagration was commencing in every direction around her, the future Empress of France remained secure and unharmed in the imperial palace. Strange result of those days, not less of royal than national revolution! that a daughter of the Cæsars should be wooed and won by a soldier of fortune from Corsica; that French arms should be exerted to place an Austrian princess on the throne of Charlemagne; that the leader of a victorious invading host should demand her for his bride; and that the first accents of tenderness should be from the deep booming of the mortars which, but for his interposition, would have consigned her father's palace to destruction!†

Aware of the danger of his situation, if cut off from all communication with the Danube and the powerful armies on the north bank of that river, the Archduke Maximilian made an attempt, at one in the morning of the following day, to regain the Lusthaus, an important point, which would have hindered the formation of the bridge the French were preparing from the southern bank to the first island; but the attack, not supported with adequate force, was speedily repulsed. Despairing,

after that check, of being able to maintain his ground in the capital, and intimidated by the sight of the flames which were bursting forth in many quarters, the archduke resolved to abandon it to its fate. The troops of the line, accordingly, with the exception of a few hundred invalids, were withdrawn to the north bank by the great bridge of Thabor, which was immediately afterward burned. They were just in time; for so rapid was the progress of the French troops between the batlements and the river, that in a few hours more their retreat would have been irrevocably cut off, and the bridge gained. General O'Reilly, who was left in command, now lost no time in signifying his readiness to capitulate; and the terms were soon agreed to, and ratified early on the following morning. They were the same as those granted in 1804, guaranteeing the security of private property of every description, but surrendering all public stores, and, in particular, the magnificent arsenal, containing four hundred pieces of cannon, and immense military stores of every description; fifty guns in addition, which were on their route for Hungary, were captured by Massena, before they had got many miles from the capital.*

The capture of Vienna was a prodigious stroke for Napoleon, affording him, as it did, a fortified post on the Danube, amply provided with military stores of every description, and which it was impossible to starve out, for fear of destroying the inhabitants of the metropolis. The French troops took possession of the gates at noon on the 13th, and at that period the positions of the different corps of their army were as follows: The corps of Lannes, with four divisions of cuirassiers of the reserve cavalry, and all the guards, were stationed at Vienna; Massena, between that capital and the Simmering, with his advanced posts occupying the Prater, and watching the banks of the Danube; Davoust, who had come up from Ratisbon, was advancing in echelon along the margin of that river, between Ebersberg and St. Polten, with his headquarters at Melk; Vandamme, with the Wirtemburgers under his orders, guarded the important bridge of Lintz; while Bernadotte, who had at length completed his circular march round Bohemia, with the Saxons† and other troops of the Confederation, about thirty thousand strong, had arrived at Passau, and was advancing to form the reserve of the Grand Army. Lefebvre, with the Bavarians, was fully engaged in a desperate strife in the Tyrol; but, independent of that corps, the emperor had a hundred thousand men concentrated between

The Archduke Maximilian abandons Vienna, which capitulates.

Positions of the different corps of the French armies in the middle of May

* Stat., 217, 224. Pel., ii., 276, 289. Jom., iii., 188. Sav., iv., 67, 68.

† Napoleon was exceedingly displeased at the tardy movements and inefficient condition of the Saxons during this period, and shortly before had addressed the following letter to their general, Bernadotte, on the subject: "The foot artillery of the Saxons is extremely defective. What I want is warlike troops, and experienced generals to direct their movements. The Saxons are incapable of acting by themselves. There is not one of their generals to whom I can venture to intrust a detached operation. With Frenchmen I can rely on energy and experience in the troops, but the Saxons can do nothing. It is indispensable that they should be strengthened and stimulated by the example of troops more warlike than themselves."—FELET, ii., 241.

* Pel., ii., 262, 278. Thib., vii., 255. Jom., iii., 187. Stat., 209, 218. Sav., iv., 65, 69.

† Pel., ii., 278. Thib., vii., 255. Norv., iii., 211, 212.

Lintz and Vienna, besides a reserve of thirty thousand approaching to re-enforce them from the Upper Danube.*†

While these rapid successes were achieved by the Grand Army, the Archduke Charles, with a tardiness which is to this day inexplicable, was pursuing his route from Bohemia towards the capital. After his retreat from Ratisbon, on the 23d of April, he retired to Horasidowitz, in the southern parts of that province, and was followed by Davoust as far as Straubing, who so far imposed upon the prince as to make him believe that he was pursued by the whole French army. This natural, but unfounded illusion, was attended with the most unfortunate consequences. Conceiving that Hiller would be perfectly adequate to restrain any incursion of a detached corps towards the capital, he made his dispositions so as to draw upon himself the weight of the invading army, deeming that the most effectual way to ward off the danger from the capital. No sooner was he undeceived in this particular, than he despatched the most pressing orders to Hiller to defend his ground as long as possible, so as to give him time to join him by the bridges of Lintz or Mauthausen, and he himself set out by forced marches to join him at one or other of these points. It was to gain time for the effecting of this junction that Hiller, who had not force sufficient to make head at Lintz, maintained so desperate a resistance at Ebersberg. But that action took place on the May 3.

3d of May, and on the evening of the same day the archduke arrived at Budweiss with the bulk of his army, about forty leagues to the northwest of Vienna. At that place he remained for three days: a delay which was the more inexplicable, as he heard, in the course of the 4th, of the forcing of the bridge of Ebersberg, which, in effect, opened the road to the capital to the French army. In truth, he was impressed with the idea that Napoleon would never advance to Vienna while so formidable an army menaced his line of communication; and, accordingly, instead of hastening towards it, he merely pushed on Kollowrath with twenty thousand men towards the bridge of Lintz, and sent orders to the Archduke John to abandon Italy, and make for the same point: vainly hoping that the concentration of such forces in his rear would compel Napoleon to abandon his attack on the capital. Awa-

kened, at length, by the pressing representations of the Archduke Maximilian, to the necessity of instantly providing for the protection of Vienna, he ordered Hiller, who, in obedience to his orders, had passed over, after the combat at Ebersberg, by the bridge of Mauthausen to the northern bank, to advance by forced marches to the metropolis; and, breaking up from Budweiss on the morning of the 8th, he himself followed in the same direction. But it was too late: the repose of three days at that place had given his indefatigable adversary the start of him by a day. Hiller received his orders on the 10th, at two in the morning, and, marching twelve leagues that day, reached, with his advanced guard, Nussdorf, a league from Vienna, before night, but found the town already invested; while the archduke advanced by Twetel towards Krems, hoping still to be in time to throw himself between the invader and the capital. Notwithstanding all their efforts, however, May 13. they were too late. Hiller, indeed, occupied the isles of the Danube on the 11th, the day before the Archduke Maximilian withdrew from the city, but too late to prevent its complete investiture; and the advanced guard of the Archduke Charles reached the northern extremity of the bridges late on the evening of the 15th, when the enemy was already fully established in Vienna. But for the delay at Budweiss, and the order to Hiller to cross May 16. over to the northern bank, the army would have been up in time to combat for the capital; for on the 16th, the junction was fully effected with Hiller a few miles to the north of Vienna, on the left bank of the river;* and as from Budweiss to that place is just six days' march, Prince Charles, who arrived at this first town on the 4th, might have reached the capital with ease on the evening of the 11th, twenty-four hours before it actually surrendered, and long before, if garrisoned by the united forces of Hiller and Maximilian, consisting of thirty thousand good troops, it could possibly have been reduced.

The disasters in Bavaria, and the rapid advance of Napoleon to Vienna, produced an immediate change in the Archduke aspect of affairs in the Italian John in Italy. plains. Cut short in the career of victory, not less by the necessity of making considerable detachments to the right and left, to watch the progress of Marmont in Dalmatia, and aid the insurrection in Tyrol, than by the peremptory orders of the Archduke Charles to draw near to the hereditary states for the defence of the capital, the Archduke John broke up from the position of Caldiero on the Adige. In order to conceal his real intentions, he made, April 29. on the 29th, several attacks on the enemy, but without effecting his object; for Eugene was aware of the events in Bavaria, and had concentrated his troops to resume the offensive the moment that his adversary retired. Orders arrived on that day from Vienna to suspend as little as possible his offensive operations in Italy, but to open a communication with Hiller, who was to fall back to the Enns; and to be prepared to maintain himself in Styria,

* Pel., ii., 286, 288. Jom., iii., 188, 190.

† On entering Vienna, Napoleon addressed the following proclamation to his troops: "Soldiers! In a month after the enemy passed the Inn, on the same day, at the same hour, we entered Vienna. Their landwehrs, their levies *en masse*, their ramparts, created by the impotent rage of the princes of the house of Lorraine, have fallen at the first sight of you. The princes of that house have abandoned their capital, not like soldiers of honour, who yield to circumstances and the reverses of war, but as perjurers haunted by the sense of their own crimes. In flying from Vienna, their orders have been murder and conflagration: like Medea, they have, with their own hands, massacred their own offspring. Soldiers! the people of Vienna, according to the expression of a deputation of the suburbs, abandoned, widowed, shall be the object of our regard. I take its good citizens under my special protection; as to the turbulent and wicked, they shall meet with exemplary justice. Let us exhibit no marks of haughtiness or pride, but regard our triumphs as a proof of the Divine justice, which punishes by our hands the ungrateful and the perjured."—THIBAUD-BAU, vii., 256; *Moniteur*, 29th May, 1809.

* Pel., ii., 253, 258. Jom., iii., 183, 185. Stut., 230, 235.

Carinthia, and Tyrol, as a vast fortress, where he could keep his ground though detached altogether from the other imperial armies. The Archduke John, however, was of an opposite opinion, and, deeming it indispensable to concentrate all the forces of the monarchy in the centre of the hereditary states, he stated his acting differently in a despatch to the Emperor Francis on the 30th of April, and on the 1st of May commenced his retreat by Friuli. Eugene followed the enemy leisurely, and the Austrians reached the Brenta without sustaining any loss, where Prince John was distracted by new orders to the same effect, from the Archduke Charles, dated Cham, 29th April, directing him to co-operate with the intended movement of the general-in-chief, from the north bank of the Danube upon Lintz, so as to threaten the enemy's communications. But the progress of events both on the Danube and the Italian plains disconcerted all these projects, and rendered a retreat upon Vienna, in Prince John's opinion, a matter of necessity.*

Retired behind the Piave, the archduke conceived it practicable to defend the course of that torrent, and thereby both arrest the enemy's progress in that quarter, and maintain a position from which either the projected lateral movement upon Lintz, or the ultimate retreat upon Vienna, might be effected. Like all the other streams which, in the lower parts of Lombardy, descend from the summits of the Alps to the Italian plains, this river flows in the middle of an immense gravelly bed, elevated for the most part above the adjoining meadow, and fordable in all parts except after heavy rains. At that season, however, the melting of the snows in the higher Alps rendered the torrent swollen, and any attempt to cross a hazardous operation. Finding, however, that the spirits of his troops had been most powerfully elevated by the triumphs of the Grand Army, Eugene resolved to attempt the passage by main force; and hoped, by rivalling the brilliant exploit of Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento,† to wipe out the disgrace of his defeat at Sacile. The attempt was made on the 8th of May at two points, viz., the fords of Toreillo and St. Nichol, distant two miles from each other, in front of Lovadina. Desaix, with six battalions, crossed at the first of these points at daybreak; but he had no sooner drawn up his troops in square, on the opposite bank, than they were charged with great vigour by three thousand Austrian horse. The imperial cavalry, notwithstanding the most gallant exertions, were unable to break that solid mass of infantry. Had a body of foot-soldiers been at hand to support their attacks, or cannon to break the firm array of the enemy, without doubt their efforts would have proved successful; but the infantry, considerably behind, could not get up in time; and meanwhile, Eugene succeeded in bringing up a large body of French horse, which quickly passed over, and, by charging the imperial cavalry in their turn, relieved the grenadiers, now almost sinking under the fatigues of the continued combat, of the weight which had oppressed them. Wolfskehl, however, who commanded

the Austrian dragoons, turned fiercely on these new assailants: the imperial horsemen, the flower of their army, fought bravely; a terrible combat ensued, in which their gallant commander was slain; and it was not till half their number were stretched on the plain, and an overwhelming superiority of force had rendered farther resistance unavailing, that these intrepid cavaliers fell back upon their infantry, who were slowly advancing to the charge. The foot-soldiers were ridden over and thrown into confusion by the flying dragoons; disorder speedily spread in the columns; several cannon and large quantities of baggage were taken; and it was only by bringing up in person the reserve of grenadiers that the archduke succeeded in arresting the rout. Meanwhile, as the waters of the Piave still continued to rise from the melting of the snows in the mountains, Eugene hastily constructed a bridge of boats, by means of which Macdonald's division was crossed over, which was soon followed by that of Grenier and the rest of the army; Desaix, with his unconquerable square, still keeping his ground in front, and covering the deploying of the columns to the right and left. At two in the afternoon, Eugene, having collected thirty thousand foot and six thousand horse on the left bank, marched forward to attack the enemy; but the archduke was already in full retreat by the great road of Cornegiano, which was effected in excellent order, though not without much bloody fighting; the numerous canals, dikes, and hollow ways of the country affording every facility for arresting the progress of the enemy. In this disastrous affair, in which the Austrian commanders vainly attempted to defend seven leagues of a fordable river, and uselessly sacrificed their noble cavalry, by bringing it into action against infantry without the aid either of foot or cannon, the Archduke John lost nearly six thousand men, fifteen guns, and thirty caissons, while the French had not to deplore the fall of more than four thousand. But, what was far more important, he lost the whole moral influence of the victory of Sacile; and the *prestige* of success, with all its incalculable effects, had passed over to the enemy.*

After this check, the Archduke John retired without any farther struggle, and without being disquieted in his retreat to Villach, in Carinthia. The strong forts which he had constructed at Malborghetto, Tarwis, and Prediel, on the roads to that town, and at Prevald, on that to Laybach, gave him the means of effecting this movement without any molestation. Arrived at Villach, he received intelligence of the fall of Vienna, and, at the same time, a letter of the Archduke Charles, of the 15th of May, directing him to move with all his forces upon Lintz.† Conceiving that these

Retreat of the Austrians from Italy into Hungary. May 17.

* Erz. Joan. Feldzug, 1809, 99, 110. Pel., iii., 196, 207. Jom., iii., 225, 227. Thib., vii., 265.

† The orders, dated Enzersdorf, 15th of May, 1809, were quite precise: "To march from Villach by Spital and Salzburg, on the Danube; to summon to his aid the corps of Jellachich, and to lend a hand to Kollowrath, who, at the same period, was to be before Lintz, on the left bank of the river, and to act in unison on the rear and communications of Napoleon, now master of Vienna." It was eight days' march from Laybach to Lintz: Prince John, therefore, might have been there by the 24th or 25th, where no one

* Jom., iii., 224, 225. Pel., iii., 180, 195. Erz. Joan. Feldz., 104, 107.

† *Ante, i.*

orders had now become impracticable, and that the reduction of the capital had totally extinguished the object for which they had been framed, the archduke, unfortunately, thought that he must act for himself, and take council from the disastrous circumstances in which the monarchy was placed. Impressed with these ideas, instead of turning his face towards Lintz, he directed his march to Gratz, and sent orders to Jellachich, who had been detached in the first instance to the northward, towards Salzburg, to open up a communication with Hiller and the corps which might operate towards Lintz: to retreat in the same direction, by following the romantic defiles of the Muhr. There he arrived on the 24th, without any farther engagement, and descended into the plains of Hungary; having abandoned the Tyrol with its heroic defenders, the forts on the crest of the mountains which had covered his own retreat, with their gallant garrisons, and the whole projected operations on the Upper Danube, to their fate.*

The French advanced guard crossed the frontier of the Austrian States on the 14th, on the Ponteba, and speedily, in great strength, surrounded the fort of Malborghetto. When summoned to surrender, the commander replied "that his orders were to defend himself, and not to negotiate;" and the intrepidity of the defence corresponded with such an announcement. The works consisted of a rampart of wood, surmounting a ditch, and enclosing a wooden tower three stories high, all of which were filled with musketeers; and, as the assailants had only been able to bring up guns of a light calibre, they presented, when defended by brave men, very formidable obstacles. By climbing, however, to the summit of the cliffs by which they were overhung, at the same time that several regiments assailed them on the lower side, the besiegers succeeded in entirely surrounding the enemy, and exposing them to a plunging fire, to which they could make no adequate reply, from the heads of their adversaries being only seen behind the rocks. Still, however, the brave Imperialists refused to surrender; their heroic commander, Henzel, fell desperately wounded while exclaiming, "Courage, my comrades!" Rauch, who succeeded him in the command, defended himself like a lion. But nothing could, in the end, withstand the impetuosity of the French. Irritated by the prolonged resistance and firm countenance of the enemy, they rushed headlong against the rampart, and crowding up on each other's shoulders, and mounting on the dead bodies which encumbered the ditch, at length succeeded in forcing their way in at the embrasures. Still the central tower, from its three stages, vomited forth a furious and incessant fire; but the external rampart being carried, its gates were at last forced; and it was only by the noble efforts of Eugene and his officers, who were penetrated with admiration at the

heroic defence of their antagonists, that the lives of the few survivors of this desperate conflict were spared.*

This brilliant success proved decisive of the fate of all these mountain fortifications. The Col di Tarwis, already the theatre of glorious strife in 1797, was defended by a long rampart running the whole way across the summit of the pass, from the mountain of Flitschel to that of Burgeburg, strengthened by sixteen redoubts. It was attacked at the same time as the forts of Malborghetto, and Guilay successfully defended himself for two days against very superior forces; but the fall of the forts enabled the enemy to turn this strong line and take the defenders in rear, which Eugene was already preparing to do; so that the archduke, on the 16th, sent orders to Guilay to evacuate his post, and effect his retreat in the night down the valley of the Save. This order was promptly obeyed; but at daylight discovered the evacuation, and pressed on in pursuit. They overtook the retiring Austrians in front of Weissinfels, and put them to the rout, taking eighteen guns and two thousand prisoners. Another mountain fort, on the Prediel, blocked up the road from Gorizia to Tarwis, and so arrested the march of Serras with the centre of the French army. Its garrison was only three hundred men, with eight pieces of cannon; but they were commanded by a hero, Hermann, who had inspired his handful of followers with the resolution of the defenders of Thermopylæ. When summoned to surrender, and informed of the retreat of the archduke and the fall of Malborghetto, he replied, nothing daunted, that "he was resolved to lay down his life for his country." Nor did his defence derogate from these heroic sentiments. Though assailed by forces twenty times as numerous as his own, he persevered in the most desperate resistance, made good the external rampart as long as a man was left upon it who could hold a bayonet, and, when its defenders were all maimed or slain, fell back, alone, to the blockhouse in the centre, and, when it was set on fire, sallied forth at the head of a band of devoted followers, and fell, gloriously pierced by innumerable wounds.† Macdonald, who, with the right wing, was to advance farther to the south across the Isonzo and the mountains of Prevald, encountered a less serious opposition. On the 14th he effected the passage of the swollen torrent of the Isonzo near Gorizia, and at that place made himself master of the battering-train destined for the siege of Palmanova. Two thousand men were stationed in the forts of the Prevald, constructed on the same plan of those of Malborghetto, and, like them, commanding entirely the summit of the pass. Several assaults were in the first instance repulsed by the garrison; but, when the besiegers' artillery was brought up, and the occupation of the adjacent heights exposed them

* Pel., iii., 224, 230. Erz. Joan. Feldz., 104, 111. Jom. iii., 228.

† The Archduke John was so impressed with the gallantry of the Austrian commander on this occasion, that he wrote a letter to Hermann's father, consoling him, as he best could, for the loss of so heroic a son.—ERZ. JOHANNES FELDZUG, 129.

remained but Bernadotte with the Saxons. Of what incalculable importance would such a concentration of 50,000 men have been on the direct line of Napoleon's communications immediately after his defeat at Aspern, which took place on the 22d!—See PELER, iii., 221, 222.

* Pel., iii., 214, 223. Jom., iii., 227, 229. Erz. Joan. Feldz., 124, 125.

without resource to a plunging fire, against which their fortifications were no protection, they deemed farther resistance useless, and capitulated with the whole artillery at their disposal, consisting of fifteen pieces.*

Meanwhile Trieste, which was unarmed, and incapable of resistance, fell an easy prey to General Schilt, with the light troops of Macdonald's division; and the artillery taken at Gorizia and the Prevald was forthwith forwarded to that important seaport, to place it in a posture of defence against the English cruisers, who were then blockading some Russian ships of war. Rapidly following up his advantages, Macdonald, immediately after making himself master of the Prevald, turned towards Laybach, where an entrenched camp, armed with fifty pieces of cannon, commanding the approach to the capital of Carniola, was garrisoned by five thousand landwehr. Joining conduct to vigour, the French general, at the same time that he approached the intrenchments with the bulk of his forces in front, detached Broussier with two brigades, which threatened to cut off their line of retreat towards Croatia, while several squadrons on the left bank of the Save made preparations for crossing that river, and assailing them on the other side. Alarmed at the simultaneous appearance of the enemy's forces in so many different directions, and deeming farther resistance useless, now that Vienna had surrendered, the commander of the intrenched camp laid down his arms, with nearly five thousand militia and sixty pieces of cannon. This important success ensured the submission of all Carniola, and left Macdonald at liberty to follow the forward movement of the victory towards Vienna; while the occupation of Trieste, and the passes leading to it, opened up a communication with Marmont in Dalmatia, who was already preparing to effect the junction, and concur in the operations of the Grand Army. By these successes, the whole frontier fortifications of the hereditary states were forced, with the loss to the Austrians of ten thousand men, and ninety pieces of cannon; but they were dearly purchased, for at Malborghetto, Tarwis, and Prediel, nearly half that number of French had fallen.†

These disasters, however, considerable as they proved, were not the only nor the greatest which befell the retreating army. Jellachich, who had advanced towards Salzburg, in order to prepare the way for the prescribed lateral movement of the Archduke John towards Lintz, having received counter orders from that prince to descend by the valley of the Muhr towards Gratz, in order to form a junction with the bulk of the Italian army, encountered, at the bridge of St. Michel, Serras, with his powerful division, who, after forcing the barrier of the Prevel, was descending the narrow defiles of the Muhr, on the road to Leoben. The Austrian general was following the lateral vale of Lessing, which unites at right angles with that of the Muhr at St. Michel; and

the two divisions came suddenly and unexpectedly in contact in that romantic spot. The Imperialists at first made a vigorous resistance, and Jellachich, arranging his troops on the road at the foot of the rocks on each side of the bridge, kept up so heavy a fire, that for two hours all the French columns which presented themselves were swept away. Attracted to the front by the cannonade, the viceroy came up, and immediately detached several battalions on the road to Mautern, on the other side of the Muhr, who speedily scaled the mountains in the rear of the Imperialists, and commenced a plunging fire upon them from behind. Panic-struck by this unexpected apparition, which they conceived was a second army come to complete their destruction, the Austrians broke and fled: some by the road of St. Michel, where they were pursued without mercy, and, for the most part, either cut down or made prisoners; some by the valley of Lessing, where they fell into the hands of a French brigade under General Valentin. Nearly two thousand Imperialists were killed or wounded, and above three thousand made prisoners, in this disastrous affair; and such was the terror now inspired by the French armies, and such the depression arising from the fall of their capital, and their multiplied defeats, that on the road from Salzburg to Leoben four hundred recruits, and twice that number of militia, laid down their arms to a captain, followed by a single dragoon.*

Jellachich, having lost all his baggage and cannon, with difficulty escaped at the head of two thousand men, by cross mountain paths, to Gratz, where his arrival, and the woful condition of his troops, excited such consternation, that the archduke forthwith set out in the direction of Kormond, in Hungary, abandoning all attempt to bar access to the capital to the invader. Relieved by this retreat of all farther molestation in his advance, Eugene moved on rapidly in the footsteps trod twelve years before by Napoleon, to Judenburg and Leoben; and next day, amid shouts of joy from both armies, his advanced posts fell in with the patriots of Lauriston, who belonged to the Grand Army, on the Simmering; and on the day following the junction of the two armies was fully effected, while the army of the Archduke John, driven to a circuitous and eccentric retreat into Hungary, was entirely lost for the present to the forces of the monarchy.†

The eyes of all Europe were now fixed with absorbing interest on the shores of the Danube, near Vienna, when a hundred thousand men on either shore stood prepared for mortal, and, to all appearances, decisive conflict. Defeat to either party seemed fraught with irreparable ruin; for, if the Austrians had no other army or reserves to fall back upon if the archduke's army were defeated in the heart of the monarchy, the French, on their side, had a disastrous retreat to the Rhine to anticipate if their arms should prove unsuccessful: Prussia and the north of Germany, it was well

Eugene advances to Vienna, and joins Napoleon. May 26.

May 27.

Chances of the conflict under the walls of Vienna to either party.

Total defeat of Jellachich in the valley of the Muhr. May 24.

Erz. Joan. Feldz., 120, 124. Pel., iii., 236, 239. † Erz. Joan. Feldz., 120, 129. Pel., iii., 236, 243. Jom., iii., 227, 229.

* Pel., iii., 242, 245. Erz. Joan., 129, 135.

† Pel., iii., 242, 247. Erz. Joan. Feldz., 129, 137. Jom., iii., 229, 230. Thib., vii., 266, 267.

known, would start up the moment that a serious reverse befell their eagles; and, though the contest took place under the walls of the Austrian capital, it was, in reality, one of life and death for the French Empire. Nor were the chances so unequal as they might at first sight appear; for, though the Austrian armies had been driven back, separated from each other, and repeatedly defeated, yet their physical strength was not reduced in a much greater proportion than that of their antagonists; and though their capital was taken, still this had been accomplished only by a bold irruption, which exposed the invader to nearly the same peril as the invaded. Every one felt, what Napoleon at the time admitted to be true, that a single defeat on the Danube would soon bring the Imperialists to the Rhine;* and, though the Archduke Charles could not lay claim to the transcendent military talents of his opponent, yet he was second to none of the other generals of Europe in scientific ability. And it was no small military skill which, after so desperate a shock on the plains of Bavaria, could still array a hundred thousand undiscouraged warriors for the defence of their country on the banks of the Danube.†

During the week which immediately followed the occupation of Vienna, the emperor, being well aware of the crisis which had arrived, was indefatigable in his efforts to station his troops in such a manner in echelon, along his line of communication, as to secure his rear from insult; while, at the same time, innumerable despatches in every direction provided for the supplies of the army. Titles, decorations, ribands, crosses of honour, and pensions, were liberally distributed among the soldiers; splendid reviews reanimated the spirits of the men, which the fatigues of the campaign had somewhat depressed, while confident announcements in the bulletins predicted the speedy destruction of the Austrian monarchy. He had now assembled around Vienna the whole corps of Massena and Lannes, the Imperial Guard and reserve cavalry under Bessières; and though their strength had been much diminished by the losses of the campaign, they could still, after deducting the sick and wounded, bring above eighty thousand veteran troops into the field. Davoust at St. Polten, and Bernadotte at Ebersberg and Enns, kept up his communications, while the viceroy was hourly expected with forty thousand from Italy. Supported by the battlements of Vienna, such a force was beyond the reach of attack from any force the Imperialists could bring against them; but it was neither consistent with the emperor's principles of war nor political policy to remain shut up behind walls while the enemy kept the field, and was accumulating the forces of the monarchy around him, and he resolved, therefore, to attempt, by main force, the passage of the river.‡

* In the council of war, held after the battle of Aspern, when some voices had been expressed for retreating, Napoleon said, "If we retreat, we shall admit in the face of all Europe that we have been defeated. Where shall we retire to? The Traun, the Inn, or the Lech? No! we must fly at once to the Rhine; for the allies, whom victory or fortune has given us, will all turn against our standards the moment we acknowledge a reverse."—PELET, iii., 331.

† Pel., iii., 250. Stat., 160, 162.

‡ Jom., iii., 189, 190. Pel., iii., 251, 255, 259. Thib., vii., 277.

The Danube, which, till it comes within a few leagues of Vienna, flows in a narrow channel, there swells into a wide expanse and spreads over the plain, embracing several islands in its course. Some of these are extensive and richly cultivated, but the greater part are smaller and covered with wood. The island of Prater, with its beautiful umbrageous avenues and much-loved woody recesses; and that of Lobau, at a greater distance down the river, and varied with enclosures and cultivation, are the most considerable. The latter is two miles and a half in length and a mile and three quarters in breadth, covered with rich meadows, swampy thickets, and verdant copsewoods; it has been immortalized in history from the memorable events of which it soon became the theatre. By far the most favourable point for forcing a passage from the right bank is at Nussdorf, half a league above Vienna. There the principal branch of the Danube, a hundred and eighty toises in breadth, flows in a deep and impetuous channel, separated from a smaller branch, fifty toises broad, by an island, which would serve as an advantageous support for assembling and putting under cover the first troops employed in the operation. Another point for attempting the same enterprise was in front of Ebersdorf, across the great island of Lobau. This island is separated from the right bank by another isle about a mile in length and half that distance in breadth, while several smaller islets are scattered in the principal channel of the river. Thus an army attempting the passage at that point has four branches of the Danube to cross, each of which may be considered as a separate river. There is, first, the channel separating the right bank from the lesser island, which is two hundred and forty toises broad; then the main body of the stream, flowing in a deep current a hundred and seventy toises in breadth, which separates it from Lobau, with a small island in its course dividing this main stream into two parts; finally, the northern branch, which lies between the isle of Lobau and the banks of the Marchfeld on the left of the river; it is seventy toises in breadth, and in like manner broken in its course by several smaller islands. Thus, at Ebersdorf many more bridges required to be constructed than at Nussdorf, and a military road across the islands was necessary to connect them together; but these disadvantages were more than compensated by the diminished weight and impetuosity of the stream, in consequence of being separated into so many channels, and the solidity given to the lengthened structure by having such considerable abutments to support it at different points.*

After mature deliberation, Napoleon resolved to attempt the passage at the same time at both points; Lannes was charged with the undertaking at Nussdorf, Massena at Lobau. This double set of operations, it was hoped, would distract the attention of the enemy, and enable the emperor to select, in the end, that one for the real passage where the least difficulties were to be overcome.

Napoleon's preparations to effect the passage. Failure at Nussdorf. May 13.

* Personal observation. Stat., 202, 210. Pel., ii., 259, 267. Jom., ii., 192, 194.

Description of the islands of the Danube near Vienna, and the different channels of the river.

Lannes, in the first instance, attempted to surprise a passage at Nussdorf, and pushed forward six hundred men to the island of Schwarze Lacken, which lies, as already mentioned, near the northern bank at that point; but this advanced guard was speedily beset by superior forces which General Hiller despatched from his side of the river, and, before any fresh succours could arrive from the southern shore, vigorously assailed and compelled to capitulate. This check, joined to the obvious difficulty of establishing such a force as could maintain itself in an island so near the north bank, and separated by so wide and impetuous a current from the southern,* induced the emperor to relinquish all serious intentions of effecting the passage there, and he, in consequence, bent all his attention to the island of Lobau, where Massena was charged with the enterprise.

Indefatigable were the efforts made by all ranks, from Napoleon to the humblest soldier, for the prosecution of this great work: the inexhaustible arsenal of Vienna supplied in abundance all the stores and imple-

ments necessary for its success; and the prudent foresight of the emperor had already provided a flotilla of boats, drawn from many different quarters, and transported by land carriage to the Danube, which were easily converted into the materials of a bridge. Five days were consumed in these preparations: on the sixth,

May 19. everything being in readiness, the enterprise was commenced. So anxious was the emperor for the success of this undertaking, that he stationed himself on the southern bank as the troops were embarking, minutely examined and assigned to each the place they were to occupy in the vessel, superintended the distribution of cartridges to the soldiers, and addressed a few words to almost every individual man. With such secrecy had Massena's preparations been conducted, in the narrow channel of the Danube, near Vienna, and behind the leafy screen of the Prater, that no danger was anticipated by the Austrians in that quarter; and although the posts in the island of Lobau were daily relieved, they had not been particularly strengthened on that occasion.†

At ten at night on the 19th, all things being in readiness, the first boats pulled off the river. from the shore, and, steering round the May 19. intermediate islands, made straight for that of Lobau, where the Imperialists were first apprized of their approach by the keels of the boats striking on the shore. Instantly leaping into the water, the tirailleurs rushed forward into the thickets, and, being constantly fed by re-enforcements from the rear, soon expelled the Austrians from the isle. Masses of infantry were immediately after passed over, who soon secured the lodgment, and rendered this important post safe from attack. At the same time, other detachments in like manner took possession of the intermediate isles, and the material points of the passage being thus secured, all hands were instantly set to the commencement of the bridges which were to connect them with the northern bank. The depth

and rapidity of the current at that period, when the melting of the Alpine snows had already commenced, presented very formidable difficulties, but all were overcome by the ardour and activity of the French engineers. Sixty-eight large boats had been collected, and nine huge rafts; they made the bridge of the most solid materials as far as Lobau, but from that island to the opposite shore of the Marchfeld it was necessary to construct it of pontoons. With such vigour, however, was the enterprise conducted, that by noon on the following day the whole was completed, and the leading columns of Massena's corps instantly began to defile over in great strength to the opposite bank.*

While this important operation was in progress in the neighbourhood of Vienna, the Archduke Charles, relying on the prescribed co-operation of the Archduke John, with the army of Italy, through the

Operations of the archduke on the Upper Danube, at Linz and Krems.

Tyrolean Mountains, had made a serious attack on the bridge of Linz, in the upper part of the Danube. Kollowrath, at May 17. the head of twenty-five thousand men, there commenced an attack on the Wirtembergers under Vandamme, to whom that communication was intrusted. Profiting by their superiority of force, the Imperialists, in the first instance, obtained considerable advantages, and that important post was on the point of falling into the hands of the enemy, when Bernadotte came up with the Saxons, nearly thirty thousand strong. The combat was no longer equal, and Kollowrath, finding himself greatly outnumbered, and having received no advices of the approach of the Archduke John from the direction of Salzburg, was compelled to desist from his enterprise, and sustained a loss of several hundred men and six guns in his retreat.

May 19. Two days afterward, preparations were made for crossing the river by the Austrians at Krems, which gave serious disquiet to Napoleon, who ordered up in haste the whole corps of Davoust, which was stationed in echelon at Melk, and along the road from thence by St. Polten to Vienna. But these demonstrations against his rear, so far from diverting the emperor from his original design of crossing at Lobau, and giving battle to the archduke on the northern bank, only made him more intent upon the immediate prosecution of his enterprise, by showing that the enemy's army was, in part at least, removed from the scene of action, and bringing, at the same time, vividly before his mind the dangers of his situation, with a long line of communication beset by so many dangers in his rear, and the necessity of instantly bringing the war to a conclusion by a decisive victory under the walls of Vienna. He pressed the march of his troops across the bridge of Lobau with the utmost anxiety, they defiled on the 20th, and the whole of the succeeding night, without intermission; and by daybreak all the 21st forty thousand men were already assembled in battle array on the northern side.†

Meanwhile, the Archduke Charles, with the

* Pel., ii., 262, 265. Jom., iii., 195. Stat., 212, 216.

† Pel., iii., 270, 273. Stat., 222, 224.

* Pel., ii., 270, 275. Jom., iii., 196, 197. Stat., 224, 227. Sav., iv., 68, 71, 73.

† Stat., 220, 224. Pel., ii., 268, 270. Jom., iii., 197: Sav., iv., 74.

The archduke resolves to attack the French, who had crossed. great body of his forces, lay on the woody heights of the Bisamberg; the fires of his bivouacs illuminated at night the whole of that quarter of the heavens, and already, by revealing the magnitude of the enemy's force, inspired the French soldiers with gloomy presentiments as to the issue of the contest which was approaching. From this elevated position the plain beyond Vienna towards the Simmering appeared to be enveloped in clouds of dust; but as they at intervals cleared away, the glitter of bayonets and helmets in the sun's rays, even at that distance, all following one direction, indicated a grand movement towards Kaiser-Ebersdorf. In effect, having perceived from that lofty ridge, by means of telescopes, both the preparations made for crossing at Lobau, and the continued march of Davoust's corps along the southern bank of the river, from Melk towards the capital, the archduke conceived, with reason, that a favourable opportunity had now occurred of falling with his concentrated forces upon half the French army before the remainder crossed over, and possibly reducing it to extremities, even in sight of the other portion on the opposite bank, and while yet the columns in rear were only wending their way in toilsome march towards the capital. Impressed with these ideas, orders were sent to the advanced posts on the edge of the Marchfield towards Lobau to fall back; after a merely nominal resistance, the cavalry, which had been all advanced to the edge of the river, were recalled, while the whole strength of the army was collected on the Bisamberg, concealed from the enemy, but ready to fall with its accumulated masses upon the first corps which should be transported across. At the same time, instructions were sent to Kollowrath, Nordman, and the officers in command farther up the river, to collect a quantity of boats, to be laden with heavy materials and combustibles, and, when the proper season arrived, detached, to be borne down by the force of the swollen current against the enemy's bridges. In truth, it was evident that Napoleon's overweening confidence in his good fortune had at last brought him into a situation full of danger, and that, with fatal rashness, he had exposed himself to the most perilous chance in war, that of being attacked by greatly superior forces in an open plain, with a great river traversed by a single bridge, recently constructed and liable to destruction, in his rear.*

Anxiety for the great events which were approaching caused many a noble heart to throb during the night in the Austrian host; and already, as the morning dawned, thousands of aching eyes were turned in the direction of Lobau and the Marchfield, where, even at that early hour, a great accumulation of force was visible. The march of troops across the bridge continued incessant, and all the reports from the outposts announced that the lines in their front were rapidly widening and extending. With exulting hearts, the army received orders at sunrise to stand to arms; the advantages of

their situation were obvious even to the meanest sentinel: the noble array which was pouring across the bridges before them, into the plains at their feet, seemed a devoted host, blindly rushing upon destruction. The vast plain of the Marchfield, stretching from the foot of the Bisamberg to the margin of the Danube, lay spread like a carpet before the front of the line, and appeared, from the absence of every obstruction, to be the destined theatre of some great event. The officers around him urged the archduke to commence the attack early in the morning, and while as yet the whole of Massena's corps was not passed over; but when the enemy was making a false movement was not the moment to interrupt or warn him of his danger. Instead of acceding to their suggestions, that able commander ordered the arms to be piled and the troops to dine: following thus the maxim of the great generals of antiquity, that, even with the bravest troops, it is of the last importance to commence a battle with the strength of the men recently recruited by food. At twelve o'clock, the movement of the enemy being sufficiently pronounced, and retreat in presence of so great a host impossible, the signal to advance was given. The men received it with loud shouts and enthusiastic acclamations: joyful war-songs, accompanied by Turkish music, resounded through the air; long-continued *vinats* arose on all sides, as the Archduke Charles, the saviour of Germany, rode along the lines of the second column, at whose head he had taken his station. Every breast panted with anxious desire and deserved confidence for the decisive moment, and the finest weather favoured the awful scene. The circumstances had spread a noble ardour through every heart. Their much-loved capital, the abode of their emperor, was in sight, polluted by the eagles of the stranger; their homes were the prize of victory; before them was a splendid battle-field, where they would combat for their sovereign, their liberty, and their country, under the eyes of their wives, their parents, their children. Descending from their elevated encampment, horse, foot, and cannon rapidly and eagerly pressed forward towards the enemy;* and soon, to those who yet lingered on the Bisamberg, but a small space of clear green intervened between the volumes of dust which enveloped the extremity of the bridge of Lobau, and the moving clouds which marked the advance of the German host.

Midway between the villages of ASPERN and ESSLING, each situated at the distance of half a mile from the bank of the Danube, the French bridge opened upon the vast plain of the Marchfield. These villages, therefore, formed the bastions on either flank of Napoleon's army, which extended in line across the open space, a mile broad, which lay between them. Built of stone houses, most of them two stories in height, and surrounded by enclosures and garden-walls of the same durable materials, both offered valuable *points d'appui* to the bridges, under cover of which, it was hoped, Massena

* Archduke Charles's Official Account of Aspern, Ann. Reg., 1809. Chron., 382, 383. Stat., 220, 229. Pel., ii., 275, 277.

* Archduke Charles's Official Account of Aspern, Ann. Reg., 1809, 382. Chron. Stat., 230, 235. Pel., ii., 275, 276.

and Bessières would be able to maintain themselves till the remainder of the army could be brought over to their support. Essling had a large stone granary, three stories in height, furnished with loopholes, capable of containing several hundred men; while Aspern, a long, straggling village, above two miles in length, was strengthened, like Eylau, by a churchyard surrounded by a strong wall. A double line of trenches, intended to draw off the water, extended between these two natural bastions, and served as a wet ditch, which afforded every possible security to the troops debouching from the island of Lobau. The whole ground was perfectly level, gently sloping upward like a vast natural glacis, towards Raschdorf; white villages alone, bosomed in tufted trees, rising above the tender green of the plain, which was covered with rich crops at that early season, broke the uniformity of the expanse, among which, on the right, the glittering pinnacles of Breitenlee and the massy tower of Neusiedel were conspicuous;* while on the left, the woody heights of the Bisamberg, resplendent with watch-fires, shut in the scene. The widespread light of the bivouacs along the broad expanse of the horizon, revealed the magnitude of the force to which they were opposed, and inspired an anxious disquietude through the French army.

Uneasy at the situation of the troops which Napoleon is surprised, but resolves to give battle. had crossed over, Napoleon was on horseback by break of day, and in person rode forward to the outposts to satisfy himself as to the amount of the enemy's force by whom he was likely to be assailed. Lannes, with his usual impetuosity, maintained that there was nothing but a curtain of ten thousand men in front, and that they should be attacked without delay; but Massena, instructed by long experience, and who had surveyed the fires of the enemy from the steeple of Aspern the preceding night, gave a decided opinion that the whole Austrian army was at hand. Napoleon saw too good reason to adhere to the latter opinion, and, instantly appreciating the magnitude of the danger, rode back to the bridge to hasten the passage of the troops. Orders were despatched in every direction to assemble the forces on the right bank: the corps of Lannes was already beginning to cross over; that of Davoust, which had arrived at Vienna the evening before, was ordered up with all imaginable expedition; the cuirassiers, the guards, the reserve cavalry, the park of artillery, all received directions to hasten to the bridges. But it was too late: their narrow breadth would only permit a very limited number of soldiers to march abreast upon them; the cavalry and artillery could only be got across with considerable difficulty;† and the one over the main branch of the river was so much damaged by the rise and impetuosity of the stream, that by four o'clock in the afternoon it was almost impassable. Meanwhile the Austrian army, in great strength, eighty thousand strong, of whom fourteen thousand were magnificent cavalry, with two hun-

dred and eighty-eight pieces of cannon, was already upon them.

The Imperialists advanced in five massy columns, preceded by a strong cloud of horse, which concealed their direction and probable points of attack from the enemy. The first, under Hiller, next the Danube, moved by the meadows on the northern bank of that river direct upon Aspern; the second, under Bellegarde, with the generalissimo by his side, advanced upon Leopoldau, and also directed its steps towards the same village; the third, led by Hohenzollern, moved by Breitenlee also upon Aspern; the fourth, commanded by Rosenberg, was to advance by Raschdorf towards Essling; the fifth, also directed by Rosenberg, was to turn the right flank of the enemy by Enzersdorf, and co-operate in the attack upon Essling; the cavalry, all massed together, was to move over the open country between Raschdorf and Breitenlee, so as to assist the head of any column which might find itself assailed by the enemy's horse. No less than eleven of the Austrian batteries were of position, which, as they drew near to the enemy's lines, sent a destructive storm of roundshot through their ranks. The French were far from having an equal force at their disposal, and they were particularly inferior in the number and weight of their artillery; but, by two o'clock in the afternoon, when the opposing hosts came into collision, seven divisions* of native troops,† besides the guards of Wirtemberg, Hesse Darmstadt, and Baden, in all fifty thousand men, were in a line; and from the known character of the soldiers, as well as the firmness of their leaders, a desperate resistance was to be anticipated. Massena, with two strong divisions, was around Aspern; Lannes, with a third, was in Essling; the intermediate space was occupied by the remainder of Massena's corps, the Imperial Guard, and German auxiliaries, with the formidable cuirassiers of Bessières glittering in their front.

Aspern, into which Massena had not had time to throw an adequate garrison, was, in the first instance, carried by the advanced guard of Hiller under Guilay; but the French marshal having quickly attacked it with the whole division of Molitor, it was not only retaken, but the Imperialists pursued to a considerable distance to the northward; till the broad and deep columns of Hiller, Bellegarde, and Hohenzollern advancing to their support, warned the skilful French commander of the necessity of withdrawing all his troops to the defence of the village itself. The prospect which now presented itself was capable of daunting the most intrepid hearts. On the left, three broad and deep columns were seen con-

Desperate conflict at Aspern, which is at length carried by the Austrians.

* Archduke Charles's Account of Aspern, Ann. Reg., 1809, 384, 385. Pel., ii., 291, 295. Stat., 231, 235. Jom., iii., 208.

† Viz., Molitor's, Le Grand, Boudet, Ferrand, Nansouty, Espagne, and Lasalle. The first four were infantry, the last cavalry of the reserve and cuirassiers. Their united strength, with the German auxiliaries, must have been at least fifty thousand men, as Molitor's and Boudet's were twelve thousand each. The French, however, will only admit that they had thirty thousand native troops in action on the first day.—See ARCHDUKE CHARLES'S *Official Account of the Battle of Aspern*, Ann. Reg., 384; App. to Chron., 384; and PELET, ii., 287.

* Personal observation. Archduke Charles's Account, Ann. Reg., 1809, 383. Pel., ii., 283, 287.

† Nap. in Month., ii., 77. Archduke Charles's Account, Ann. Reg., 1809, 383, 384. Chron. Pel., ii., 283, 287. Stat., 240, 247. Jom., iii., 200.

verging towards Aspern; at a greater distance on the right, vast clouds of dust announced that other masses were threatening Essling; while along the whole front a formidable array of artillery, vomiting forth fire and smoke, steadily advanced, rendering more awful the scene by the obscurity in which it involved all behind its traces. But this suspense was of short duration, and in a few minutes the Austrian battalions of Hiller, with loud shouts, advanced to the attack. If, however, the assault was impetuous, the defence was not less heroic; and never had the experienced skill and invincible tenacity of Marshal Massena been so conspicuously displayed. Stationed in the cemetery of Aspern, under the boughs of the great trees which overshadow the church, he calmly awaited the result, directing the movements of his troops, and giving his orders to support the points which most required it, with the coolness and precision of veteran courage, while the crash of the boughs above his head, and the incessant clatter of grapeshot on the steeple, told how near the enemy's batteries had approached. Both parties were aware that the fate of the day mainly depended on the possession of this important point, and incredible efforts were made on either side to attain it. For several hours the murderous conflict continued: fresh troops were brought up on both parts to supply the place of those who had fallen, or were exhausted in the strife; the Austrian infantry, the Hungarian grenadiers, the volunteers of Vienna, rivalled each other in courage and perseverance in the assault, while the different divisions of Massena's corps nobly in succession sustained the defence. Every street, every house, every garden of the village, became the theatre of mortal combat: the shouts of transient success, the cries of despair, were heard alternately from both parties; an incessant shower of bombs and cannon-balls from the concentric batteries of the Imperialists spread death on all sides, alike among friend and foe, while great part of the village took fire, and the flames of the burning houses afforded, as night approached, a ghastly light wherewith to continue the work of destruction, and illuminated the whole field of battle. A desperate conflict at the same time continued in the marshy plain between Aspern and the river, where the wet ditches leading to the Danube athwart their front, and the thickets of alder bushes, gave the French the advantages of a natural fortification. For long the superior numbers of the Austrians impeded each other, as the position of the French centre prevented them from attacking the village on more sides than one; but at length, at eleven at night, their line having gained ground in that quarter, a combined attack was made by Hiller in front, and Vacquant, commanding part of Bellegarde's corps, which had just repulsed a formidable charge of cavalry in flank; and in spite of the most heroic efforts on the part of Massena, Molitor, and his officers, the village was carried amid deafening shouts, which were distinctly heard above the roar of the artillery along the whole line. The French marshal made a gallant effort to regain his ground, and succeeded with Le Grand's division, which had succeeded Molitor's in their tremendous strife, in wresting some of the

houses from the enemy; but the churchyard, and the greater part of this bloodstained village, remained through the night in the hands of the Imperialists.*

While this tremendous struggle was going on in Aspern, the central space between it and Essling was almost denuded of infantry; the numerous and formidable Austrian batteries in that quarter being chiefly guarded by cavalry, with Hohenzollern's infantry in their rear, while the splendid horsemen of the French Guard concealed on the opposite side the weakness of their infantry in the centre of the line. So severely, however, were his troops in both villages, and even in the most distant reserves, galled by the sustained and incessant discharge of this tremendous array of guns, that Napoleon ordered a grand charge of cavalry in his centre to wrest them from the enemy. Bessières first sent forward the light horse of the guard: they made repeated charges, but were unable to withstand the terrible discharges of grape which were vomited forth by the Austrian batteries. Upon their repulse, the French marshal ordered the cuirassiers of the guard to charge. These gallant horsemen, cased in shining armour, whose weight the English felt afterward so severely at Waterloo, advanced at the gallop, shaking their sabres above their heads, and making the air resound with cries of "*Vive l'Empereur!*" So swift was the onset, so vehement the attack, that the Imperialists, who saw at once the danger of the artillery, had barely time to withdraw the guns, and throw the foot-soldiers in their rear into squares, when the clattering tempest was upon them. In vain, however, Bessières, D'Espagne, and Lasalle, at the head of these indomitable cavaliers, swept round the now insulated foot, routed the Austrian cavalry of the reserve under Lichtenstein, which was brought up to oppose them, and enveloping the infantry formed in squares of battalions on all sides, summoned them in the pride of irresistible strength to surrender. Cut off from all other support, the brave Hungarians stood firm, back to back, in their squares, and kept up so vigorous and so sustained a fire on all sides, that, after having half their numbers, including the gallant D'Espagne, stretched on the plain,† the French cuirassiers were obliged, shattered and defeated, to retire to their own lines, and both parties at this point slept upon the field of battle.

Rosenberg's columns followed the course prescribed to them; but as the fifth corps, which was to make the circuit towards Enzersdorf and attack Essling on the extreme flank, necessarily required more time for its movement than the fourth, which advanced direct by Raschdorf upon the same point, the latter retarded their march, and the combined attack did not take place till five in the afternoon. Enzersdorf was evacuated by the enemy upon the approach of the Imperialists; and Lannes, at the head only of a single division, was threatened with an attack by forces more than double

Grand charge of the French cavalry in the centre.

Bloody attack on Essling, which proves unsuccessful.

* Archduke Charles's Account, Ann. Reg., 1809, 385, 386. Stat., 230, 239. Pel., ii., 295, 305. Jom., iii., 201, 202.

† Pel., ii., 298, 302. Archduke Charles's Account, Ann. Reg., 1809, 387. Jom., iii., 201.

his own, both in front and flank. The fourth column, which attacked the village on the western side, was vigorously charged in flank in its advance by a large body of French horse, detached by Bessières from the centre of the line; and the necessity of forming squares to resist these attacks, retarded considerably the assault on that side. At length, however, the unsuccessful charge on the Austrian central batteries having thrown back the French cuirassiers in that quarter, and the reserve dragoons of Lichtenstein having been re-formed and brought up in great strength to the support of the centre, the archduke ordered a general advance of the whole line, at the same time that a combined attack of Rosenberg's two columns, now perfectly able to co-operate, was made on Essling. In spite of the utmost efforts of Napoleon, the centre of the Austrians sensibly gained ground, and it was only by the most devoted gallantry on the part of the French cuirassiers, who again and again, though with diminished numbers, renewed the combat, that he was able to prevent that part of his line from being entirely broken through. The violence of the flanking fire of grape and musketry, however, which issued from Essling, was such as to arrest the Imperialists when they came abreast of that village; and although many assaults were made upon it by Rosenberg's columns, and it was repeatedly set on fire by the Austrians' shells, yet such was the intrepid resistance of Lannes, with his heroic division, who defended with invincible obstinacy every house and every garden, that all the assailants could do was to drive them entirely within its walls; and, when darkness suspended the combat, it was still in the hands of the French.*

The night which followed this desperate conflict was spent with very different feelings in the two armies. On both sides, indeed, the most strenuous efforts were made to repair the losses which had been sustained, and prepare for the conflict on the morrow; but it was with very different emotions that the soldiers' breasts were agitated in the opposite hosts. On the side of the French, to the proud confidence of victory had succeeded the chill of disappointment, the anticipation of disaster; the wonted shouts of the men were no longer heard; a dark feeling of anxiety oppressed every breast; the brilliant meteor of the Empire seemed about to be extinguished in blood. They could not conceal from themselves that they had been worsted in the preceding day's fight. Aspern was lost; Essling was surrounded; the line in the centre had been forced back; the enemy slept among the dead bodies of the French, while the multitude of slain, even in the farthest reserves of their own lines, showed how completely the enemy's batteries had reached every part of their position. The Austrians, on the other hand, were justly elated by their unwonted and glorious success: for the first time, Napoleon had sustained a decided defeat in the field; his best troops had been baffled in a pitched battle; his position was critical beyond example, and the well-known hazard of the bridges diffused the hope

that, on the morrow, a decisive victory would rescue this country from the oppressor, and at one blow work out the deliverance of Germany. But, though anxiety chilled the hopes, it noways daunted the courage of the French. Stretched amid the dead bodies of their comrades, they sternly resolved to combat to the last man on the morrow, for their beloved emperor and the glory of their country. Sleep, induced by extraordinary fatigue, soon closed the eyes of the soldiers: the sentinels of either host were within a few yards of each other; Napoleon lay down in his cloak on the sand of the Danube, within half a mile of the Austrian batteries. But no rest was taken by the chiefs of either army: both made the most strenuous efforts to improve their chances of success for the following day. During the night, or early in the morning, the infantry of the Imperial Guard, the corps of Lannes, and the troops of Oudinot, were, with much difficulty, got across the bridges, so as to give Napoleon, even after all the losses of the preceding day, full seventy thousand men in line; while Davoust, with thirty thousand more,* was just commencing the passage of the bridges. The archduke, on his side, brought up the reserve, consisting of the grenadier corps of the Prince of Reuss, from the Bisamberg to Breitenlee, a mile in the rear of the field of battle. "*Ejus prolii eventus utrumque ducem, diversis animi motibus, ad maturandum summæ rei discrimen exivit. Civilis instare fortunæ; Cerialis abolere ignominiam. Germani prosperis feroces; Romanos pudor excitaverat.*"†

Short as the night was at that season on the banks of the Danube, that period of rest was not allowed to the wearied soldiers. Long before sunrise, the moment that the first gray of the summer's dawn shed a doubtful light over the field of battle, the Austrian columns of Rosenberg again assailed Essling in front and flank, and Massena, with strong re-enforcements, renewed his attacks on the churchyard of Aspern. Both assaults proved successful. Essling, for the first time, was carried by the archduke's regiment of grenadiers in the early twilight, and the Imperialists, following up their success, forced the French lines on their left back towards the Danube, and straitened them considerably in that quarter; but this important success was counterbalanced by the loss of Aspern, which at the same moment was taken, with the battalion in the churchyard and four pieces of cannon, by the French division of Cara St. Cyr. Both parties made the utmost efforts to retrieve these momentous losses. St. Hilaire came up with his division of Lannes's corps to the assistance of that gallant marshal, who was now

Renewal of the action on the 22d. Aspern and Essling are again obstinately disputed.

* These numbers are ascertained in an authentic manner. Napoleon admits that "the French army on the second day, on the two banks of the Danube, was 20,000 men superior to that of the archduke, who had 100,000 men in the field." Davoust's corps was, at the utmost, not above 40,000 men after the losses it had undergone: at this rate, therefore, the French army, which was all across, excepting that marshal's corps, would have been 80,000; and, deducting 10,000 for the losses of the preceding day, 70,000 must have remained in the field on the 22d.—See NAPOLEON in MONTGOMERY, ii., 78.

† Tacit., Hist., v., 15. Archduke Charles, Ann. Reg., 1809, 389. Pel., ii., 308, 309. Sav., iv., 75, 76.

* Stat., 239, 250. Archduke Charles's Account, Ann. Reg., 1809, 388-389. Pel., ii., 296, 299. Jom., iii., 202.

driven out of all parts of Essling except the great granary, and, by a sudden effort, expelled the Austrians, who were never able again to recover their footing in that important village, though the most desperate conflict, both of foot and horse, went on the whole day in its immediate neighbourhood. The regiment of Klebeck rushed, about the same time, with fixed bayonets into the burning ruins of Aspern; the French of St. Cyr were expelled by the violence of the shock, but they returned to the charge, re-enforced by several battalions of the Imperial Guard, and, after a struggle of an hour's duration, again drove out the Imperialists and got possession of the churchyard, which by this time was literally covered with the dead. Hiller, however, was not to be outdone in this tremendous struggle. Again forming a column of attack, in conjunction with part of Bellegarde's corps, he himself led on the charge at the head of the regiment Benjossky: trampling under foot the dead and the dying, these heroic assailants advanced through burning houses and a storm of shot, and by great exertions succeeded in driving the French entirely out of the village. The Austrian commander instantly ordered the pioneers to pull down the walls of the churchyard, and burn the church and parsonage-house, so as to prevent these important points from being again rendered a shelter to the enemy. Some additional regiments were soon after brought up under General Bianchi, which enabled the Imperialists, not only to maintain themselves till the close of the battle in this obstinately-contested village, but to advance in the evening somewhat beyond its limits, and direct the fire of their artillery upon the flank of the French lines, drawn up between it and Essling, which played till nightfall with tremendous effect upon the dense masses who were there accumulated on a space of little more than a mile in extent.*

These bloody contests in the villages were not such as by any means suited the Napoleon makes a grand attack on the Austrian centre, which is at first successful. ardent and impetuous mind of Napoleon. Relieved from the necessity of remaining on the defensive, by the important accessions of force which he had obtained during the night, he was preparing a grand attack in the centre. For this purpose, instructions were sent to Massena, who had not yet been expelled from Aspern, to maintain himself in that village; Davoust was to debouch from the bridges in the direction of Essling; while Oudinot and Lannes, supported by the infantry and cavalry of the guard, were to make a united attack on the archduke's centre, which it was hoped might be thus driven back, and entirely separated from the wings engaged in the combats around the villages. From his station behind the centre of the French line, Napoleon pointed out with his finger, at seven in the morning, to Lannes, who was on horseback beside him, the direction which his corps should follow in their advance, which was where the Austrian line appeared weakest, between the left of Hohenzollern and the right of Rosenberg. The emperor soon after rode through the lines of the

troops who were to advance, and was received with enthusiastic shouts of *Vive l'Empereur*. Attracted by the sound, the enemy's cannon concentrated their fire in that direction, though the fog which still lingered on the banks of the Danube concealed him from their sight, and General Monthion was killed by his side. Instantly the necessary orders were given, and in a few minutes the whole of Lannes's corps were thrown into open column, which advanced at a rapid pace, the right in front, the cavalry in reserve, immediately behind the infantry, while two hundred pieces of cannon, arrayed in the front of the whole line, distracted the attention of the enemy by a fire of unprecedented severity. As soon as Lannes, on the right, had made some progress, the remainder of the French centre, to the left, also advanced: Oudinot's troops formed the first columns, with the cuirassiers immediately behind them, and the Imperial Guard in reserve; so that the whole French line between Essling and Aspern moved forward in echelon, the right in front, and preceded by a tremendous array of artillery. The shock was irresistible: the heads of Lannes's columns, skilfully directed against the weakest part of the Austrian line, soon forced their way through, and threw some battalions into disorder; into the opening thus formed, the cavalry rushed with appalling fury, and soon a huge gap appeared between Rosenberg and Hohenzollern, and the foremost of the squadrons penetrated even to Breitenlee, where the Austrian reserve of the Prince of Reuss was stationed, while the fugitives from the broken battalions spread in all directions the report that the battle was lost.*

The archduke now felt that the decisive moment had arrived; the battle, the Desperate resistance of the Austrian centre. monarchy were at stake. In this extremity that gallant prince displayed alike the skill of a consummate commander and the heroism of a common soldier. The reserve grenadiers, under the Prince of Reuss, were hastily thrown into square, and brought up to the menaced point; the numerous dragoons of Prince Lichtenstein advanced immediately behind them; and the archduke himself, seizing the standard of Zach's corps, which had begun to give way, addressed a few energetic words to the men, and led them back against the enemy. The generals around him emulated the noble example, but most of them were killed or wounded at this dreadful moment: General Colloredo received a ball in the head, close by the archduke's side, and the diminished numbers of his personal staff showed how desperate was the strife in which the generalissimo was engaged. But these heroic efforts restored the battle: reanimated by the heart-stirring example of their chiefs, the soldiers stood their ground; the dreadful column of Lannes was arrested in its advance, and the squares among which it had penetrated, pouring in destructive volleys on all sides, soon occasioned hesitation and anxiety through the dense array. The Austrian batteries, playing at half musket-shot, occasioned a frightful carnage in the deep masses of Napoleon's troops, which,

* Archduke's Account, Ann. Register, 1809, 390, 391. Chron. Stat., 250, 251. Jom., iii., 203, 204. Pel., ii., 310, 311. Nap. in Month., ii., 78, 79.

* Pel., ii., 310, 316. Jom., iii., 204. Stat., 241, 250. Archduke Charles's Account of Aspern, Ann. Reg., 1809, 391, 392. App. to Chron. Sav., iv., 75. Nap. in Month., ii., 78, 80.

unable either to deploy under so terrific a fire, or return it to advantage from the edges only of their columns, were swept away without making any serious resistance. From the moment that the irruption of Lannes's column was stopped, and the regiments behind were compelled to halt, the French soldiers felt that the day was lost.* In vain the cuirassiers were brought forward, who dashed, as at Waterloo, through the intervals of the squares; in vain those brave horsemen rode round the steady battalions, and charged them repeatedly to the bayonets' points;† not one square was broken, not one column gave way, and the horsemen, grievously shattered by the terrible fire, were soon after charged by the enemy's reserve cavalry, under Lichtenstein, who came up with loud shouts from the rear, and driven back in disorder to their own infantry.

At this critical moment, Hohenzollern, perceiving a considerable opening on the right of the French line, occasioned by the unequal advance of some of their regiments, seized the favourable opportunity to dash in with Troluk's regiment, and occupy the space; it sustained itself there against all the attacks of the enemy, till the archduke, who at once saw the importance of this movement, supported that gallant corps, when almost overwhelmed by fatigue and numbers, by six regiments of Hungarian grenadiers. These fresh troops pressed forward, intersecting the whole French line, overthrowing everything which opposed them, and even reached the batteries in the rear, near Essling, where they were assailed by such a destructive fire from that village, that nothing but the presence of the archduke, who hastened to the spot, enabled them to maintain their ground. At the same time, the want of ammunition began to be sensibly felt in the French army, especially by the artillery, the supplies of which were nearly exhausted by the incessant firing of two days; and accounts began to circulate, and soon spread like wildfire through the ranks, that the bridges were broken down, and all communication with the reserve posts, and two thirds of Davoust's corps, still on the southern bank, cut off. In effect, at half past eight, the alarming intelligence reached the emperor that the fire-ships and heavy barks laden with stones, sent down by the archduke, had, with the swelling of the river, produced the desired effect,‡ and that a considerable part of the bridge over

the main stream of the Danube had been swept away.

In this terrible moment Napoleon's courage did not forsake him. Grave and thoughtful, but collected, he allayed the alarm of those around him, and immediately gave the necessary orders to suspend the attacks at all points, and fall back towards the island of Lobau. Before they could reach the columns in front, however, the advance was already arrested by the violence of the enemy's fire, and several battalions, melting away under the destructive storm, had already begun to recede, or stood in a state of hesitation, unable to go on, unwilling to retire. The Austrians, perceiving those symptoms of vacillation, resumed the offensive at all points, and, forming two fresh columns of attack under Dedowich and Hohenlohe, made a sudden assault on Essling, which was carried, with the exception of the great granary, at the very moment that the French centre, slowly retiring, re-entered the narrow plain between that village and Aspern, from which they had issued in all the confidence of victory in the morning. This important success rendered the situation of Napoleon well-nigh desperate, and disorder was rapidly spreading through the ranks; for Aspern, in spite of the most heroic efforts of Massena and Le Grand, was in great part already lost, and the capture of the second village precluded almost entirely the possibility of a retreat to the river side. He made the utmost exertions, therefore, to regain it, and General Mouton, at the head of a brigade of the Imperial Guard, being intrusted with the attack, advanced in double quick time, and drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet. Again the Austrians returned, and, pushing up to the very foot of the granary, fired, and thrust their bayonets into the loopholes from which the deadly fire issued which thinned their ranks. In the tumult, the upper part of the building took fire, but still the invincible French soldiers maintained themselves in the lower stories, amid the roar of musketry and the crash of burning rafters. Five times did the Hungarian grenadiers rush up to the flaming walls, and five times were they repulsed by the unconquerable firmness of the Old Guard. At length, Rosenberg, finding that the enemy was resolved to maintain himself in that post at all hazards, and that the combat there was constantly fed by fresh reinforcements of the flower of the French army, drew off his troops; and, desisting from all farther attack on the village, confined himself to an incessant fire of grape and round shot upon the French columns, which, now in full retreat, were massed together in such extraordinary numbers at the entrance of the bridges leading to Lobau, that every shot told with fatal effect on men or horses.*

Anxious to crown his glorious efforts by a decisive attack, the archduke now brought forward his last reserves of Hungarian grenadiers, and, putting himself at their head, advanced with an intrepid step against the re-

* "We persisted," says Savary, an eyewitness, "in penetrating into the checker of squares which formed the enemy's line, when the extreme severity of the fire of grape and musketry obliged us to halt, and begin exchanging volleys with our antagonists under very disadvantageous circumstances. Every quarter of an hour which we passed in that position rendered our disadvantage greater. Our troops were all in mass or column, and could not deploy to return the fire with which they were assailed. From that moment it was easy to foresee, not only that the day could not have a favourable issue, but even that it would probably terminate in some disaster. They tried in vain to restore these disadvantages by charges of cuirassiers, which took place in several directions, but they had hardly pierced through the openings of the enemy's squares, when they were assailed by the Austrian horse, three times more numerous, and driven back upon our infantry." This was before the rupture of the bridges, which is afterward mentioned by the Duke of Rovigo.—See SAVARY, iv., 77.

† Sav., iv., 77. Stat., 249, 251. Pel., ii., 318, 320. Archduke Charles's Account, Ann. Reg., 1809, 391, 392.

* Nap. in Month., ii., 77, 79. Sav., iv., 78, 79. Pel., ii., 318, 325, 326. Stat., 260, 268. Arch. Charles, Ann. Reg., 1809, 392, 393.

Last attack of the Austrians, and fall of Marshal Lannes.

treating French columns, while the whole artillery, rapidly advancing in front and rear, contracting into a semicircle round the diminished host, kept up an incessant and destructive fire. The most vivid disquietude seized the French generals when they beheld their weary bands assailed by fresh troops, which seemed to spring up from the earth at the conclusion of this fight of giants. But Lannes arranged his best men in the rear of the columns, and, supporting them by the infantry and cuirassiers whom Napoleon sent up to his assistance, prepared to resist the attack; while Massena, on his side, sometimes on foot, sometimes on horseback, with his sword in his hand and fire in his countenance, seemed to multiply as necessity required his presence. Reserving their fire to the last moment, the French veterans, when the Hungarians were within pistol-shot, poured in so close and destructive a volley, that the advance of the enemy was checked, and a close combat with firearms commenced. At that moment Lannes, who had dismounted from his horse to avoid the dreadful fire of the artillery, which swept off everything above the heads of the soldiers, was struck by a cannon-ball, which carried away both his legs. As Napoleon was engaged in the island of Lobau in directing the position of some batteries to protect the passage into that island from the field of battle, he saw a litter approaching, on which, when it came up, he beheld the heroic marshal, his early companion in arms in Italy, extended in the agonies of death. Lannes seized his hand, and said, with a voice tremulous only from loss of blood, "Adieu, sire! Live for the world; but bestow a few thoughts on one of your best friends, who in a few hours will be no more." On his knees, beside the rude couch of the dying hero, Napoleon wept: "Lannes, do you not know me? it is the emperor: it is Bonaparte, your friend: you will yet be preserved to us." "I would wish to live," replied Lannes, "to serve you and my country; but in an hour I will be no more." Napoleon was deeply affected; he had never before evinced such emotion. "Nothing," said he to Massena, "but so terrible a stroke could have withdrawn me for a moment from the care of the army." Shortly after, Lannes was relieved from his sufferings by a faint, which, after some days, terminated in death. St. Hilaire, at the same time, was brought in mortally wounded.* It was time that this terrible carnage should cease: the generals and superior officers were in great part

struck down; the artillery horses were almost all killed, and the guns drawn by the foot-soldiers; the infantry and cannon had exhausted almost all their ammunition; the cavalry were already all withdrawn into the island of Lobau; but still the rear-guard, with unconquerable resolution, maintained the combat. The Austrians were nearly as much exhausted as their opponents; and, desisting from all farther attacks, maintained only a tremendous fire from all the batteries till midnight, when, the last of the enemy having withdrawn from the field of battle into the island, exhausted by fatigue, the artillerymen sunk into sleep beside their guns.*

Such was the famous battle of Aspern, the most glorious in the Austrian annals—forever memorable in the annals of military fame. It was the first great action in which Napoleon had been defeated; for at Eylau, though, as the event ultimately proved, he had been worsted, yet, in the first instance, he remained master of the field of battle. The loss on both sides was enormous, but that of the French was much greater than that of their opponents, owing to their decided inferiority in numbers, and especially artillery, on the first day, and the tremendous effect of the concentric fire of three hundred pieces of cannon, on the second, upon the dense columns of attack, whom the narrow extent of the ground, the awful cannonade, and the obstinate resistance of the imperial squares, prevented from deploying into line. Eighty-seven superior officers and four thousand two hundred privates were killed, besides sixteen thousand three hundred wounded, on the side of the Imperialists: a loss which, how great soever, the archduke, with true German honesty, had the magnanimity at once to admit in his official account of the battle. The French lost above thirty thousand men, of whom seven thousand were buried by the Austrians on the field; a few guns and some hundred prisoners were taken on both sides: five thousand wounded fell into the hands of the Imperialists. For several days after the battle the Austrians were constantly occupied in burying the dead; innumerable corpses were found in the smaller channels of the Danube; the waters even of that mighty stream were for some days poisoned by the multitude of slain which encumbered its banks, and a pestilential air was wafted down the theatre of death.††

* Pel., ii., 326, 327, 336. Sav., iv., 79, 80. Thib., vii., 289, 290. Stut., 272, 281. Nap. in Month., ii., 78, 79.

† Archduke Charles, Ann. Reg., 1809. Chron., 394. Pel., ii., 358. Thib., vii., 295.

‡ The tenth bulletin acknowledged a loss daily of fifteen hundred killed and three thousand wounded: a list of casualties so obviously disproportioned to the magnitude and obstinacy of the conflict, as to excite the ridicule of all Europe. Subsequently, Napoleon admitted he had four thousand killed, which would imply a total loss of above twenty thousand. The Austrian official account, which derives credit from the candour with which it admitted their own casualties, estimates the French loss at thirty-six thousand, on the authentic grounds that seven thousand French were buried on the field of battle, and twenty-nine thousand seven hundred and seventy-three wounded were carried to the hospitals at Vienna. The experience of the British in the Peninsular war, especially at Talavera and Albuera, warrants the assertion that two armies of from sixty thousand to eighty thousand on each side, could not combat in so obstinate a manner for two days under the fire of five hundred pieces of cannon, all crossing each other, without a loss of above twenty thousand to the victorious and superior, and thirty thousand to the vanquished and weaker party.—See 10th Bulletin; Mon-

* These officers were among the most esteemed of all Napoleon's generals: "'Lannes,' said he, 'was wise, prudent, and, withal, audacious, gifted with imperturbable sang froid in presence of the enemy. He had received little education: all his qualities were derived from Nature.' Napoleon, who witnessed, from his outset in the Italian campaigns, the extension of his understanding, often remarked it with surprise. He was superior to all the French generals on the field of battle, in directing the movements of twenty-five thousand infantry. He was still young when he had thus risen to perfection; perhaps he would have ultimately risen to the same eminence in strategy, which he did not as yet comprehend. St. Hilaire was remarkable, ever since the battle of Castiglione, in 1796, for his chivalrous character; he was a good brother and parent, and was devoted to the emperor ever since the siege of Toulon. He was called, in the army, the chevalier without fear and without reproach. Napoleon shed bitter tears at his death and that of Lannes. They would not have been wanting in constancy in misfortune, nor have been faithless to the glory of France."—NAPOLEON in MONTMOLIN, ii., 83, 84.

Driven back, with all his army, into an island in the Danube, after sustaining this frightful loss, the French emperor, at ten at night, hastily called a council of war on the margin of the river. Seated under a tree which overhung the stream, Napoleon beheld the great bridge in the central channel entirely swept away, and the lesser one of pontoons to the intermediate island of Reduit also in ruins. Retreat to the southern bank from the island of Lobau was evidently impossible; for the Danube, which had risen fourteen feet during the three preceding days from the melting of the snows in the Alps of Tyrol, was rolling impetuously in a raging flood, which had carried down every boat in the main channel, overflowed the whole low grounds in the island, and rendered even the narrow branch which separated them from the Marchfeld, usually only a few feet deep, a rapid and dangerous torrent. Never was an army assembled under more disastrous circumstances than the French on that memorable night. To the deep roar of artillery, the shouts of the combatants, and the incessant clang of musketry, had succeeded a silence yet more awful, interrupted only by the challenges of the sentinels as they paced their melancholy rounds, or the groans of the wounded, who, without covering or shelter of any kind, lay scattered on the humid surface. Above twenty thousand brave men were there, weltering in their blood, or murmuring in their last moments a prayer for their mother, their children, their country. Gloom had seized on every mind, despair had penetrated the bravest hearts. It was universally known that the artillery ammunition was exhausted and the communication with the southern bank cut off, and it was difficult to see how an attack from the enemy on the succeeding day could be resisted with any prospect of success. Nearly half the combatants had fallen: every one, even though unhurt himself, had to deplore the death of a friend, a comrade, a benefactor. Provisions there were none in the island: succour for the wounded, burial for the dead, were alike beyond the strength of the wearied survivors. A few were still buoyant with hope, and, protesting they had not been defeated, vociferously demanded a renewal of the combat on the morrow; but the great majority, in gloomy silence, mused upon their fate, and not a few openly murmured against the chief whose imprudence and obstinacy had brought them into a situation where victory was hopeless and retreat impossible.*

The influence of these gloomy feelings strongly appeared in the opinions of the chiefs who attended Napoleon at his council of war on the banks of the island of Lobau. The bravest marshals of the army, Massena, Davoust, Berthier, Oudinot, were there; but they unanimously and strongly expressed the opinion that it was necessary to retire entirely to the right bank of the river. Napoleon heard them all, and then observed, "But, gentlemen, when you advise

me to withdraw across the river, it is the same thing as desiring me to retreat to Strasburg. We can no longer cross but in boats, and that is to say it is nearly impracticable, and could not be effected without abandoning the wounded, the artillery, the horses, which would entirely disorganize the army. Shall we abandon the wounded? Shall twenty thousand brave men add to the trophies of the enemy? Shall we thus openly proclaim, in the face of Europe, that we have been vanquished? If we repossess the Danube the enemy will instantly do the same, and then we shall never find rest till we are under the cannon of Strasburg. Is it on the Traun, the Inn, or the Lech, that we can make a stand? No, we shall speedily be driven behind the Rhine, and all the allies whom victory has given us will at once pass over to the enemy. Shall we add to the losses of these two days that of the men who are now dispersed among the woods of these islands? If I retire to Vienna, the archduke will pass the Danube at Lintz, and I shall be under the necessity of marching to meet him, and sacrificing twenty thousand more in the hospitals, one half of whom, if I remain here, will rejoin their standards in a month. In a few days Eugene will descend from the Alps of Styria; the half of Lefebvre's corps will be disposable from the Tyrol; and even if the enemy, by passing at Lintz, should menace our existing retreat, we will have a clear route open into Italy, where, with eight corps assembled,* we shall speedily regain our ascendancy. We must, therefore, remain at Lobau: you, Massena, will complete what you have so gloriously begun; you can alone restrain the archduke, and prevent his advancing, during the few days which are necessary to re-establish our communications."

The marshals, struck by the justice as well as fortitude of these remarks, all assented to the emperor's opinions; and it was resolved to defend the isle of Lobau to the last extremity. The whole engineers and sappers in the island were immediately embarked for the right bank, and at midnight the emperor committed himself to a frail bark with Berthier and Savary, and was ferried across the roaring flood to Ebersdorf. He leaned on Savary's arm in passing from the bark to the village; but, though his mind laboured, he was not agitated. Exhausted by fatigue, he threw himself on some straw and took a few hours' sleep, but shortly after day-break he was again on horseback, actively organizing the transmission of provisions to the troops in the island and preparing the means of re-establishing the bridges.†

The conduct of Napoleon in provoking an engagement with inferior forces in so hazardous a situation as the Marchfeld, with a single and insecure bridge in his rear, has been the subject of keen discussion by the French military writers, and three of the most distinguished of them have undertaken its defence, and pleaded it with all their wanted

Reflections on the conduct of Napoleon in the battle of Aspern.

* Viz., Eugene, Marmont, Macdonald, Lefebvre, Bernadotte, Davoust, Oudinot, Massena, besides the guard and reserve, in all, notwithstanding their losses, a hundred and forty thousand men.—JOMINI, iii., 213.

† Sav., iv., 81, 85. Pel., ii., 330, 333. Jom., iii., 213.

‡ See note B.

iteur, June 6, 1809; ARCHDUKE CHARLES'S *Official Account*, Ann. Reg., 1809, 394; App. to Chronicle; THIBAudeau, vi., 295.

* Sav., ii., 81. Pel., ii., 337, 339.

ability.* But there are some questions so plain that, in discussing them, the strength of a child is equal to that of a giant; and if Napoleon, Cæsar, and Hannibal were to concur in justifying that extraordinary step, they would fail in producing any impression upon the common sense of mankind. The military is not, any more than politics, at least in its leading principle, an abstruse art: whatever directs the proceedings of large masses of mankind must be founded on maxims obvious to every capacity. Napoleon himself has told us that the leading object in strategy is, with a force inferior upon the whole, to be always superior at the point of attack; and that the greatest fault a commander can commit is to fight with no other retreat than by a narrow defile. His main charge against the generalship of Wellington is founded upon the fact of his having fought at Waterloo with a single highway traversing the forest of Soignies in his rear.† Judging by these principles, which are recommended not less by the weight of his authority than their intrinsic justice and sense, what are we to say to the general who, though inferior by twenty thousand men upon the whole to his adversary, on the first day, according to his own account of the matter, exposed thirty-five thousand men to a hopeless contest with eighty thousand; and, on the second, precipitated seventy thousand, in close columns, against a semicircle of batteries containing three hundred guns, every shot from which fell with the certainty of destruction upon their crowded ranks, and that, too, when a vast river, traversed only by a tottering bridge, connected the troops in advance with the reserve of the army, and served as the only possible retreat to either in case of disaster? It is in vain that his defenders argue that eight divisions on the field of battle, with four under Davoust on the right bank, were equal to any force the Austrians could bring against them. Granted, provided always the communication between them was secure; but what is to be said to hazarding two thirds of the army on the left bank, when a narrow bridge, a mile in length, shaking under the flood, separated that portion from the remaining third on the other bank? Napoleon has himself told us that "twice, on the 21st, the bridges were carried away by the flood, and that the Austrian boats were already dashing against the pontoons. At midnight the Danube rose in the most frightful manner, and the passage was a third time interrupted, and not restored till next morning, when the guard and Oudinot's corps commenced their passage."‡ What temerity, then, in such circumstances, to hazard a decisive action on the day following with the whole Austrian army, and precipitate Lannes into the centre of their batteries early in the morning, before either the bulk of Davoust's corps, or the reserve parks of ammunition, had crossed the perilous passage!

Nor is this all: the result of the battle of

Aspern clearly demonstrates that the method of attacking in column in a narrow field, and against a brave enemy, is essentially defective; and that the prodigious loss sustained by Napoleon was owing to his persisting in it under circumstances where it had obviously become inexpedient. The observations of a distinguished French military writer on this subject are convincing and unanswerable. "The battle of Essling was lost," says General Rogniat, "in consequence of our having attacked in column the centre of the Austrian line. That centre skilfully gave ground as the French columns of Lannes and Oudinot advanced, while their wings insensibly approached our flanks. By means of that skilful manoeuvre we soon found ourselves in the centre of a semicircle of artillery and musketry, the whole fire of which converged on our unhappy columns. Cannon-balls, musket-shots, shells, grape, bombs, crossed each other in every line over our heads, and fell on our ranks like a hail-storm. Everything was struck or overturned, and our leading columns were literally destroyed: in the end we were obliged to fall back and yield to that frightful tempest till we again came abreast of Aspern and Essling, the bulwarks of our wings."* It was by a system of tactics precisely similar that Hannibal crushed the Roman centre and gained the battle of Cannæ. "Cuneus Gallorum ut pulsus æquavit frontem primum, deinde nitendo etiam sinum in medio dedit, Afri circa jam cornua fecerant, irruentibus incaute in medium Romanis, circumdedere alas. Mox cornua extendendo, clausere et ab tergo hostes."† The military art is, in its fundamental principles, the same in all ages; and it is highly interesting to see Hannibal's triumph and Napoleon's defeat arise, under the greatest possible difference of ground, arms, and contending nations, from the same simple and obvious cause.‡

The Austrians, indeed, had not yet attained to the incomparable discipline and firmness which enabled Wellington with British troops so often to repel with prodigious slaughter the French attack in column by a single line, three or four deep; but they did on this occasion, as well as at Wagram, successfully resist it by receiving the column in a checker of squares; a disposition extremely similar to that adopted by the British commander at Waterloo, and which the archduke then adopted for the first time, after having read a few weeks before the chapter on the principles of war, by General Jomini, where it was strenuously recommended.§ The dreadful carnage sustained by the French troops in subsequent battles, especially at

Observations on the French method of attacking in columns.

* Rogniat, sur l'Art Militaire, 333.

† Polyb. iii., c. 12. Liv., xcii., 47.

‡ Napoleon saw these principles clearly when judging of the conduct of other generals: "Sempronius," says he, "was conquered at the Trebia and Varro at Cannæ, though they commanded armies more numerous than Hannibal, because, in conformity with the Roman practice, they arranged their troops in a column of three lines, while Hannibal drew up his in a single line. The Carthaginian cavalry was superior in number and quality; the Roman legions were attacked in front, flank, and rear, and, in consequence, defeated. If the two consuls had adopted an order of battle more conformable to circumstances, they would probably have conquered." What a luminous commentary on his own conduct and defeat at Aspern!—See NAPOLEON in MONTH., i., 282, *Melange*. § Jom., Vie de Nap., iii., 201.

* See Nap. in Month., ii., 71, 83. Pelet, ii., 358, 364. Jom., iii., 217, 220.

† "The position of Mount St. John," said Napoleon, "was ill chosen. The first requisite of a field of battle is to have no defiles in its rear. The injudicious choice of the field of battle rendered to the English army all retreat impossible."—Ninth Book of Memoirs of NAPOLEON, 207.

‡ See note C. § Nap. in Month., ii., 77.

Albuera, Borodino, and Waterloo, were mainly owing to the same cause. Doubtless the attack in column is most formidable, and it requires great firmness in a single line to resist a mass to which weight and numbers have given so much momentum; but its success depends entirely on the courage of the leading and flanking files; its concentrated ranks present an unerring mark for the enemy's fire, if they will only stand to deliver it; confusion is apt to arise in the centre from the losses sustained or witnessed by men not warmed by the heat of action, and if it is exposed to a concentric discharge, or meets with opponents as resolute as itself, it becomes liable to a bloody reverse. The same principle applies to breaking the line at sea: that system has done admirably with the French and Spaniards, but let the British admirals consider well before they adopt it in combating the Russians or Americans.

In truth, nothing can be more apparent than that, considered merely in a military point of view, the conduct of Napoleon, in regard to the battle of Aspern, was altogether inexcusable, and that it was the peculiarity and hazard of his political situation which made him persist in so perilous an undertaking. He has told us so himself: "At Aspern, at Jena, at Austerlitz, where I have been accused of acting rashly, I had no option: I was placed in the alternative of victory or ruin."* He felt that his situation, as head of a military Republic, required continual excitement for its maintenance; that he must fascinate the minds of men by rapid and dazzling successes; and that the first pause in the career of victory was the commencement of ruin. Though in possession of the Austrian capital, military resources, and the finest provinces, he still felt that the war must not be protracted, and that, to keep up his character for invincibility, he must cross the Danube, and finish the war by a clap of thunder. Undue contempt for the Austrian troops, or ignorance of the magnitude of the host which they had at hand, led him to hazard the engagement of the 21st, with a most unequal force; and, having once engaged, however imprudently, in the contest, he felt that he must at all hazards carry it on, and, despite of an army divided by the Danube and a precarious retreat, fight for life or death in the plain of the Marchfeld. It is the invariable characteristic of revolutionary power, whether political or military, to be perpetually exposed to this necessity, from the want of any lasting support in the interest and affection of the industrious classes of the people; and it is in the experience of that necessity, not any oblivion of the rules of the military art, that the true explanation and best vindication of Napoleon's conduct, both at Aspern, Moscow, and Dresden, is to be found.

The resolute stand made by the Austrians at Aspern is one of the most glorious instances of patriotic resistance which the history of the world exhibits. Driven back by an overwhelming force into the heart of the monarchy, with their fortresses taken, their arsenals pillaged, their armies defeated, they still continued the contest; boldly fronted the

invader in the plenitude of his power; and, with unshaken resolution, advanced, alone and unsupported, to drive the conqueror of Europe from the capital he had subdued. Contrary to what has usually been experienced in similar cases, they showed the world that the fall of the metropolis did not necessarily draw after it the submission of the Empire; but that a brave and patriotic people can find their capital in the general's headquarters, and reduce the invader to the extremity of peril, in consequence of the very success which he had deemed decisive of the contest. The British historian can hardly hope that similar resolution would have been displayed by the citizens of his own country, or that a battle of Waterloo would have been fought by the English after London and Woolwich had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Contrasting the heroic battles of Aspern and Wagram, after Vienna had fallen, with the unbounded terror inspired at Paris by the advance of the Duke of Brunswick to Valmy in 1792, a hundred and twenty miles from the capital, even when the people were in the highest state of Democratic excitement, it is impossible to avoid the inference, that as much in the conduct of a nation, under such circumstances, depends on the national institutions as on the stage at which they have arrived in social advancement; and in the invincible tenacity and far-seeing sagacity of an aristocratic government is to be found the only guarantee, from the days of Cannæ to those of Aspern, of such an unshaken resolution, under calamities generally considered as utterly destructive of political independence.

Nor would this heroic constancy have failed in obtaining its appropriate reward, if the admirable directions of the Archduke Charles for the conduct of the campaign had been implicitly obeyed. It was the disobedience of his orders by the Archduke John which deprived the Austrians of all the results of the battle of Aspern, and enabled Napoleon to extricate himself with success from the most perilous situation in which he had yet been placed since ascending the consular throne. Had that prince obeyed the instructions which he received from the generalissimo on the 17th of May, and marched direct from Carinthia to Lintz, he would, in conjunction with Kollowrath, who was in that neighbourhood some days before, have formed an imposing mass, at least sixty thousand strong, even on the 23d, to which Bernadotte, with his inefficient corps of Saxons, could have opposed no sort of resistance. Can there be a doubt that the concentration of such a force, directly in his rear, and on his principal line of communication, at the very moment when he was driven with a defeated army into the island of Lobau, would have compelled Napoleon to retreat; and that the battle of Aspern would have been the commencement of a series of disasters, which would speedily have brought the imperial eagles back to the Rhine? The instantaneous effect which a similar concentration of force, from the north and the south at Borissow, produced on Napoleon at Moscow, three years afterward, affords the clearest illustration, both of the importance of this movement, and the prodigious effects which it was fitted to

Glorious character of the Austrian resistance at Aspern.

Disastrous effects of the Archduke John's disobedience of orders.

have had, if properly executed, upon the issue of the campaign. No hazard was incurred by such a direction to part of the imperial forces; for the Tyrol afforded a vast fortress, in which, aided by its gallant mountaineers, the detached corps, though separated from the main forces of the monarchy, might have long maintained themselves against all the efforts of the enemy. And it is impossible to estimate too highly the fortitude and talent of the illustrious general, who, when still reeking with the slaughter of a recent defeat, could conceive so admirable a plan for the circumvention of the enemy, and, undismayed by the fall of the capital, see in that catastrophe only the lure which was to seduce the invader to his ultimate ruin.

From the important consequences which followed the occupation of Vienna, and the seizure of its immense military resources by the French, may be derived one conclusion of lasting value to every independent state. This is the incalculable importance of every metropolis either being adequately fortified, or possessing, in its immediate vicinity, a citadel of approved strength, capable of containing twenty or thirty thousand soldiers, and of serving as a place of secure deposite for the national archives, stores, wealth, and government, till the national strength can be fairly roused for their rescue. Had Austria possessed such a fortress, either in or near adjoining to Vienna, the invasions of 1805 and 1809 would have terminated in the invaders' ruin; had the heights of Belleville and Montmartre been strongly fortified, the invasions of 1814 and 1815 would have been attended with nothing but disaster to the allied armies. Had Berlin been of as great strength as Dantzic, the French armies, after the disaster of Jena, would have been detained round its walls till the Russian hosts advanced, and six years of bondage saved to the Prussian monarchy. Had the Kremlin been a citadel capable of holding out six weeks, the terrible sacrifice of Moscow would not have been required; had Vienna not been impregnable to the Mussulman arms, the monarchy would have sunk in the dust before the standards of Sobieski gleamed on the Bisamberg; had the lines of Torres Vedras not formed an impassable barrier to Massena, the germe of pa-

triotic resistance in the Peninsula would have been extinguished in the bud; had the walls of Rome not deterred the Carthaginian hero from a siege, the fortunes of the Republic would have sunk after the disaster of Cannæ. It is by no means necessary for these important ends that the whole metropolis should be confined by fortifications: it is enough that a citadel of great strength is at hand to contain all the warlike and civil resources of the kingdom.

Let no nation imagine that the magnitude of its resources relieves it from this necessity, or that the effulgence of its glory will secure it from ultimate danger: it was after the battle of Austerlitz that Napoleon first felt the necessity of fortifying Paris;* it was in five short years afterward that the bitter consequences of the national vanity, which prevented his design from being carried into effect, were experienced by the Parisians. England now slumbers secure under the shadow of Trafalgar and Waterloo; but let not her infatuated children suppose that they are forever removed from the chances of disaster, or that the want of citadels to surround the vast arsenals of Woolwich, Chatham, and the Tower, will not, ere long, be bitterly felt either against foreign or domestic enemies. These ideas, indeed, are not popular with the present age, with whom foresight is the least cultivated of national virtues, and in which the Democratic character of the Legislature has tinged the government with that disregard of remote consequences which is the invariable characteristic of the masses of mankind; and, doubtless, if any minister were now to propose the expenditure of one or two millions on such central fortifications, it would raise such a storm as would speedily prove fatal to the administration. It does by no means, however, follow, from this circumstance, that it is not a measure which wisdom dictates and national security enjoins; and in despair of effecting, at present at least, any change on public opinion on this particular, the historian has only to bequeath this counsel, as Bacon did his reputation, to the generation after the next, and mark these words, if they should live so long, for the judgment of the world at the expiration of two centuries.

* Nap. in Month., ii., 278, 280. *Ante*, ii., 282, 283.

Immense importance of central fortresses on the defence of nations.

Infatuation of England in this respect.

CHAPTER LV.

WAR IN TYROL, NORTHERN GERMANY, AND POLAND.

ARGUMENT.

Extraordinary Interest of the Tyrolese War.—Description of Tyrol.—Opposite Character of the Northern and Southern Sides of the Mountains.—Description of the great Valleys and Rivers of the Country.—Castles of Tyrol.—Superstitions of the Country.—Their Religious Feelings and Impressions.—Omens which were observed on the Approach of the War.—Powerful Religious Feelings of the People.—Practical Utility of the Priests.—Remarkable Difference in this Respect of Ancient and Modern Times.—Influence of Religion in producing it.—National Character of the Swiss compared with that of the Tyrolese.—Love of Freedom which animates the People.—Their Character and Manners.—Practical Freedom which the People have always enjoyed under the Austrian Government.—The Peasants are all Owners of their Land.—Its great Influence on their Character.—Astonishing Industry of the People.—Discontent of the Inhabitants under the Bavarian Government.—Preparations of Austria to take Advantage of these Discontents.—Military Description of the Country.—Character of Hofer.—Of Spechbacher.—Of Joseph Haspinger.—Of Martin Teimer.—Brave Preparations of the People for the Contest.—Insurrection in Tyrol.—Its early and complete Success.—Successes in the Pusterthal.—Defeat of the Bavarians at Sterzing Moos by Hofer.—Capture of Innsbruck by the Peasants of the Upper Inntal.—Striking Incidents which occurred on its Capture.—Arrival, Defeat, and Surrender of Bisson's Division from Sterzing.—Capture of Hall by Spechbacher.—Result of these Successes.—Entire Deliverance of the Tyrol.—Measures of Napoleon and Chastellar in the Country.—Actions in the Southern Tyrol, which is evacuated by the French.—Combats of Feuer Senger and Worgl.—Innsbruck is retaken by the Bavarians.—Desperate State of Affairs in Tyrol, and Firmness of the Peasantry.—Preparations for the Battle of Innsbruck.—Battle there, and total Defeat of the Bavarians.—Bloody Actions of Spechbacher and Haspinger.—Results of these Actions, and the entire Deliverance of the Tyrol.—Rise of the Insurrection in the North of Germany.—Its first Outbreak on the Approach of the Austrian Grand Army.—Enterprise and early Success of Schill.—Fails in his Attempt on Magdebourg.—Retires to Stralsund.—His Prospects there.—He is defeated and killed.—Movement of the Duke of Brunswick.—Operations in Poland, and their Object, by the Archduke Ferdinand.—Forces of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw to oppose him.—Success of Ferdinand and Fall of Warsaw.—Skillful Measures of Poniatowsky to prolong the Contest in the Grand-duchy.—Discovery of the secret Leaning of the Russians towards Austria.—Secret Negotiation between Austria and Prussia.—Particulars of its Progress.—The exorbitant Demands of Prussia cause it to fail.—Operations in Italy, and Diversion from Sicily, and in the North of Europe.—Situation and Prospects of Napoleon after the Battle of Aspern.—Duke of Brunswick takes Dresden, and threatens all the North of Germany.

It is neither on the greatest fields of battle, nor extraordinary places where the most calamitous interest of the bloodshed has taken place, that the Tyrolese war, recollection of future ages is chiefly riveted. The vast theatres of Asiatic conflict are forgotten; the slaughtered myriads of Timour and Genghis Khan lie in undistinguished graves; hardly a pilgrim visits the scenes where, on the fields of Chalons and Tours, the destinies of civilization and Christendom were fixed by the skill of Aëtius or the valour of Charles Martel. It is moral grandeur which produces a durable impression; it is patriotic heroism which permanently attracts the admiration of mankind. The pass of Thermopylæ, the graves of Marathon, will warm the hearts of men through every succeeding age: the chapel of Tell, the field of Morgarten, still attract the generous and brave from every civilized state; the name of Wallace, the plain of Bannockburn, have rendered Scottish story immortal in the annals of the world.

The time may come when the vast and desolating wars of the French Revolution are dimmed by the obscurity of revolving years; when the great name of Napoleon is recollected only as a shadow of ancient days, and the fields of his fame are buried in the waves of succeeding change; but even then the siege of Saragossa will stand forth in undecaying lustre amid the wreck of ages; and the war in Tyrol, the strife of La Vendée, survive unshaken above the floods of time.

The country now immortalized under the name of Tyrol, the land of Hofer and Spechbacher, lies on the southern frontier of Germany, and is composed of the mountains which, stretching eastward from the Alps of Switzerland, are interposed between the Bavarian plains and the fields of Italy. Less elevated than those of the Helvetian cantons, without the awful sublimity of the Alps of the Oberland, those of Tyrol are still more romantic, from the wild and savage character which they in general bear, and the matchless beauty of the narrow valleys, or rather clefts, which are interspersed around their feet. Their summits, though sometimes little inferior to the Jungfrau or Titlis,* are more rugged than those of Switzerland, from being, in general, somewhat lower, and, in consequence, less charged with snow, and exhibiting their various strata, ravines, and peaks, in more undisguised grandeur than where a silver mantle has been forever thrown over the higher regions. The general level of the country is less elevated than the central parts of Helvetia, and hence it is often more beautiful: the pine and larch do not appear in such monotonous masses; but noble forests of beech and oak clothe the mountain sides to a greater height than any hills in Britain, and a dark zone of pine separates their brilliant hues from the gray piles of rock, or snow-bespinkled peaks, which repose in undisturbed serenity on the azure firmament.†

The northern and southern slopes of the Alps exhibit here, as elsewhere on the sides of the great stony girdle of the globe, the same remarkable difference in the productions of nature, the character of the landscape, and the disposition of the human species. To the north of the central chain of the Brenner, everything wears a frigid aspect: vast forests of pine and fir clothe the middle regions of the mountains; naked rock or masses of snow compose their highest peaks; extensive pastures afford nourishment to numerous flocks and herds; barley and oats constitute the principal food of the inhabitants, and Indian corn is cultivated only in the rich and sheltered vale of the Inn. The inhabitants, like all those of Germanic descent, are brave, impetuous, and honest; tenacious

Opposite character of the northern and southern sides of the mountains.

* The Gross Glochner is 12,400, and Orteler-Pitz 14,500 feet high: those on the frontiers of Salzburg of little less elevation.—MALTE BRUN, vii., 511, and INGLIS'S Tyrol, ii., 250.

† Personal observation. Malte Brun, vii., 510, 511. Inglis's Tyrol, i., 241.

cious of custom, fearless of danger, addicted to intemperance. But to the south of the range these rigid features insensibly melt away under the increasing warmth of a more genial climate: maize and wheat are reared with assiduous care in the few level spots which are interspersed among the rocks; walnut and cherry trees next give token of the approach of a milder atmosphere; beech and sweet chestnut succeed to the sable pine in the woody region above; the vine and the mulberry are found in the sheltered bosoms of the valleys; and at length the olive and the pomegranate nestle in the sunny nooks, where, on the margin of the Lake of Garda, the blasts of winter are averted by a leafy screen of almost perpetual verdure. But, if the gifts of nature improve as the traveller descends to the plains of Lombardy, the character of man declines: with the sweet accents of the Italian tongue, the vices of civilization, the craft of the south, have sensibly spread; the cities are more opulent, the churches more costly, the edifices more sumptuous; but the native virtues of the German population are no longer conspicuous; the love of freedom, the obligation of truth, the sanctity of an oath, are more faintly discerned; iron bars on the windows of the poor tell but too clearly that the fearless security of general virtue is no longer felt, and the multiplication of criminals and police* bespeak at once the vices and necessities of a corrupted society.†

Switzerland contains some spacious and fertile plains, and extensive lakes diversify the generally rugged aspect of the great valleys and rivers of Tyrol. The nature of the Tyrol is a country of mountains, intersected only by a few long and spacious valleys. Of these, those of the Inn, the Eisach, the Adige, and the Pusterthal, are the most considerable. The first is formed by the River Inn, which, rising on the eastern slope of the mountains of Grisons, flows nearly a hundred miles almost in a straight line, in a northeasterly direction, and under the successive names of the Engadine, the Upper and the Lower Inn. That extends from Funsterminz, on the frontiers of Switzerland, to Kufstein, at the opening of the Bavarian plains. It is at first a cold and desolate pastoral glen, gradually opening into a cultivated vale, shut in by pine-clad hills, of savage character, and for the last fifty miles expands into a spacious valley, varying from two to six miles in breadth, whose fertile bottom, perfectly flat, shut in on either side by precipitous mountains, seven or eight thousand feet in height, is adorned with numerous villages, churches, and towns, and maintains a dense and industrious population. The valley of the Eisach, formed by the confluence, at Brixen, of the torrents which descend from the snowy summits of the Brenner and the Grosse Terner on the one side, and the mountains of the Pusterthal on the other, descends beside an impetuous stream, through the narrow passes and chestnut-clad steepes between Brixen and Bolsano, and is lost, at the latter place, in the larger valley of the Adige, which, stretching out to the south in a wide expanse between piles of fir-clad mountains to Trent and Roveredo, gradually warms under the Italian sun, till, after passing the

frightful gorge of the Italian China, it opens into the smiling hills and vine-clad slopes of Verona.* The valley of the Etch, or Adige, descending from the cold and shivering Alps of Glarus, widens into the Passeyrthal, the original seat of the counts of Tyrol, still containing their venerable castle, and which has been immortalized by the birthplace of Hofer. It is distinguished by an awful rapid, which, more nearly than anything in Europe, resembles those of the great American rivers, equalling even the fall of Schaffhausen in sublimity and terror;† after descending this foaming declivity, and forcing its way through stupendous rocks, the Adige joins the vale of the Eisach at Bolsano. These are the principal valleys of Tyrol; but the upper parts of several others belong to the same country; in particular, those of the Drave, the Salza, and the Brenta, the first two of which, descending from opposite sides of the Gross Glochner, find their way into the open country through long defiles of matchless beauty; the former, after washing the battlements of Klagenfurt, to the Hungarian plains; the latter, beneath the towers of Salzburg, to the waters of the Danube; while the Brenta, after struggling through the narrow clefts and romantic peaks of the Val Susana, emerges in still serenity into the Italian fields under the mouldering walls of Bassano.‡

With the exception of the Grisons, Switzerland contains few ruined castles: the moral earthquake which, five centuries ago, overthrew the feudal power of Austria in the forest cantons, cast down, in its subsequent shocks, the authority of the barons in its simple valleys. But the case is otherwise in Tyrol. Though enjoying, practically speaking, popular privileges of the most extensive kind, and yielding in no respect to the descendants of Tell in the ardent love of freedom, the Tyrolese have never gone so far as to expel the great proprietors; and, though few of them are still resident in the country, the remains of their immense castles constitute one of its most peculiar and characteristic features. In every valley they are to be seen, rising in imposing majesty on wooded heights, perched on crags overhanging the floods, or resting on cliffs to all appear-

* This noble scene, one of the most striking gorges in the Alps, has been immortalized in the lines of Dante:

"Era lo loco ove a scinder la riva,
Venimmo, Alpestro, e per quel ch'iv'er anco
Tal ch'ogni vista a sarebbe schiva.
Qual 'e quella ruina che nel franco.
Di qua da Trento, l'Adice pereoasso,
O per tremuoto o per sostegno manco;
Che da cima del monte, onde se mosse,
Al piano e si la roccia discosse
Ch' alcuna via darebbe a che su fosse."

DANTE, *Inferno*, canto xii.

† This remarkable rapid, the only one which conveys to a European traveller an idea of this striking feature of transatlantic scenery, is thus described with graphic power and perfect fidelity by a distinguished traveller, now, unfortunately, no more: "At this spot the River Adige presents one of the most magnificent spectacles that are to be met with in Europe—a rapid, almost a cataract, nearly a mile in length—one continued sheet of foam, rushing with a deafening noise and resistless force between green pastoral banks more resembling the snores of a gentle lake than of a cataract. There is no fall of water in Switzerland that will bear a comparison with this; it is not, indeed, strictly a cataract, but a waterfall of the most stupendous and imposing kind, more striking even than the celebrated falls of Schaffhausen."—INGLIS'S *Tyrol*, ii., 240. On a miniature scale, the falls of Kilmorag, beyond Inverness, somewhat resemble those sublime rapids.—*Personal Observation*.

‡ *Personal observation*. Inglis's *Tyrol*, i., 289, 290. Make-Brun, vii., 511.

* Inglis's *Tyrol*, ii., 246, 290. *Personal observation*.

† Out of eighty prisoners in Innspruck jail in 1832, fifty-five were from the Italian Tyrol, though its population is only one hundred and sixty-three thousand, while that of the German portion is five hundred and ninety-eight thousand.—INGLIS'S *Tyrol*, i., 185, and MALTE BRUN, vii., 550.

ance inaccessible to human approach. The effect of these venerable and mouldering remains, surmounting the beautiful woods, and throwing an air of Gothic interest over the wildest ranges of the mountains, is inexpressibly charming; and they go far to compensate the absence of lakes, which are alone wanting to render the scenery of this country the most enchanting in Europe.* Almost all of these castles have their legends or romantic incidents, many of them connected with the Holy Wars, which are fondly dwelt on by the inhabitants; in several, the weapons and armour of the heroes of the crusades are still preserved; and the traveller, in treading their long-deserted halls, feels himself suddenly transported to the age of Godfrey of Bouillon, or Richard of England, and all the pomp and interest of chivalrous exploits.†

In every part of the world, mountainous regions have been the nursery of superstitious feelings. The greatest works of man there appear as nothing compared to the magnificence of nature, and the individual is left, in solitude, to receive the impressions which the sublime scenery in which he is placed is fitted to produce. Upon minds so circumstanced, the changes of external nature come to be considered as the immediate work of some invisible power: the shadows that fall on the lakes at sunrise are interpreted as the approach of hostile bands; the howl of the wind through the forests is thought to be the lamentations of the dead, who are expiating their sins; and the mists that flit over the summits of the mountains seem to be the distant skirts of vast armies, borne on the whirlwind and treading on the storm. The influence of these feelings is strongly felt in Tyrol, and the savage mountains or ruined castles with which it abounds have become peopled with the phantoms of a romantic superstition. Lights are said to have been often observed at night in towers which have been uninhabited for centuries, and bloody figures distinctly seen to flit through their deserted halls. The armour which still hangs on the walls in many of the greater castles has been observed to move, and the plumes to wave, when the Tyrolese arms were victorious in war. Groans, they affirm, are still heard in the neighbourhood of the dungeons, where the victims of feudal tyranny were formally sacrificed; and the cruel baron, who persecuted his people in his savage passion for the chase, is often heard to shriek in the forests of the Unterberg,‡ and to

howl as he flies from the dogs whom he had trained to the scent of human blood.*

Superstitions, too, of a gentler and more holy kind have arisen from the devout feelings of the people, and the associations connected with particular spots, where persons of extraordinary sanctity have dwelt. In many of the farthest recesses of the mountains, on the verge of perpetual desolation, hermits in former times had fixed their abode; and the imagination of the peasant still fancies that their spirits hover around the spots where their earthly trials were endured. Shepherds, who have passed in the gloom of the evening by the cell where the bones of a saint are laid, relate that they distinctly heard his voice as he repeated his vesper prayers, and saw his form as he knelt before the crucifix which the piety of succeeding ages had erected in his hermitage. The image of many a patron saint has been seen to shed tears when a reverse has happened to the Tyrolese arms, and the garlands which are hung round the crosses of the Virgin wither when the hand which raised them has fallen in battle. Peasants, who have been driven by a storm to take shelter in the little chapels which are scattered over the country, have seen the crucifix bow its head, and solemn music is heard at vespers in the higher places of worship of the mountains. The distant pealing of the organ, and the chant of innumerable voices, are there distinctly heard; and the peasant, when returning at night from the chase, often trembles when he beholds funeral processions clothed in white, marching in silence through the gloom of the forests, or slowly moving on the clouds that float over the summits of the mountains.†

It may easily be imagined how strongly these feelings were excited by the approach of the war of deliverance in 1809. The emissaries of Austria had long before prepared the people for revolt; foreign oppression had led them to desire it with passionate ardour; unknown to Bavaria, the whole population were impatiently expecting the signal to rise. During this period of anxious expectation, the excited minds of the people clothed the air with an unusual number of imaginary appearances. In the gloom of the evening, endless files of visionary soldiers, clad in the Austrian uniform, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, were seen to traverse the mountain tops. The creaking of the wheels, the tramp of the horses, the heavy tread of marching columns, intermingled with wild bursts of laughter and shouts of triumph, were distinctly heard; but all was hushed, and the spectres melted into mist and vapour when the anxiety of the spectators inclined them to approach too nearly. The Tyrolese, nay, the Bavarian sentinels themselves, often beheld the emperor's tower in the fortress of Kufstein surrounded with lambent fire, and the Austrian banners, wrapped in flames, were seen to wave at night over the towers of Sterzing. Withered arms were seen to stretch themselves from the rocks in the most secluded recesses of the mountains; vast armies of visionary soldiers, with banners flying, and all the splendour of military triumph, were seen at sunrise reflected in the lakes which lay on the Salzburg and Bavarian frontiers; and when the widows and

Omens which were observed on the approach of the war.

* Tyrol proper has no lakes, though the adjoining countries of Styria, Salzburg, and Bavaria have several. Two most beautiful ones, the Kochel-see and Walchen-see, adjoin the great road from Munich to Innspruck, and give token to the enraptured traveller of his approach to the mountain region. The first, which much resembles, though on a grander and more perfect scale, Loch Katrine in Scotland, is described by an author who has transferred into romance the hues and colouring of nature, Mr. JAMES IN GLIS, vol. ii., 374.

† Personal observation.

‡ Eight-and-twenty colossal bronze statues of princes and paladins of the dark ages, in armour, stand around the tomb of Maximilian I., in the Church of Holycross in Innspruck, and the effect of the group is extremely impressive, though hardly equal to that of the simple tomb of Huffer, which it also contains, whose remains were brought there from his grave at Mantua, in 1823. The Castle of Ambras, near Innspruck, formerly contained a unique collection of ancient armour, which, when the author visited it in 1816, was one of the most interesting spectacles in Europe; but the greater part of these precious remains have now been removed to the imperial museum at Vienna.—See INGLIS'S *Tyrol*, i., 200, 219, and EUSTACE'S *Italy*, i., 91.

§ A romantic mountain, six miles from Salzburg, at the entrance of the beautiful valley of Borchtolsgradden.

* Barth., *Krieg von 1809*. Personal observation. *Gesch. And. Hofer*, 32, 36.

† Barth., *Krieg von 1809*, 382, 394. Personal observation.

orphans of the fallen warriors knelt before the Virgin, the flowers and garlands placed round the image, according to the amiable custom of Catholic countries, and which had remained there till they had withered, burst forth in renovated beauty, and spread their fragrance around the altar, as if to mark the joy of the dead for the approaching deliverance of their country.*

The most remarkable feature in the national character of the Tyrolese is their uniform piety: a principle which is of the people—nowhere more universally diffused than in their sequestered valleys. The most cursory view of the country is sufficient to demonstrate the strong hold which religion has taken of the minds of the peasantry. Chapels are built almost at every half mile, on the principal roads, in which the traveller may perform his devotions, or which may awaken his thoughts to a recollection of his spiritual duties. The rude efforts of art there have been exerted to portray the events of our Saviour's life, and innumerable figures, carved in wood, attest, in every part of the country, both the barbarous taste of the people and the fervour of their religious impressions. Even in the higher parts of the mountains, where hardly any vestiges of human cultivation are to be found, in the depths of untrodden forests, or on the summit of seemingly inaccessible cliffs, the symbols of devotion are to be found, and the cross rises everywhere amid the wilderness, as if to mark the triumph of religion over the greatest obstacles of nature. Nor is it only in the solitudes or deserts that the proofs of their devotions are to be found. In the valleys and in the cities it still preserves its ancient sway over the people. On the exterior of most houses, the legend of some favourite saint, or the sufferings of some popular martyr, are delineated; and the poor inhabitant deems himself secure from the greater evils of life under the guardianship of such heavenly aid. In every valley numerous spires are to be seen rising amid the beauty of the surrounding scene, and reminding the traveller on the eastern frontier and in the Styrian fields, by the cupola form in which they are constructed, of his approach to the regions of the East. On Sunday, the whole people flock to church in their neatest and gayest attire; and so great is the number who thus frequent these places of worship, that it is not unfrequent to see the peasants kneeling on the turf in the churchyard where mass is performed, from being unable to find a place within its walls. Regularly in the evening prayers are read in every family; and the traveller who passes through the villages at the hour of twilight, often sees through their latticed windows the young and the old kneeling together round their humble fire, or is warned of his approach to human habitation by hearing their hymns stealing through the silence and solitude of the forest.†

Nor has their religion become corrupted by many of the errors which, in more advanced civilization, have dimmed the light or perverted the usefulness of the Catholic Church. Mingled, indeed, with a large intermixture of superstition, and interwoven as it is with innumerable legends and visionary tales, it yet preserves enough of the pure spirit of its divine origin to influence, in a great de-

gree, the conduct of their private lives. The Tyrolese have not yet learned that immorality in private may be absolved by ceremony in public, or that the profession of faith can win a dispensation from the rules of obedience. The purchase of absolution by money is there almost unknown: it is never conferred, unless accompanied, according to the true Catholic principle, by the profession, at least, of genuine repentance. In no part of the world are the domestic or conjugal duties more strictly or faithfully performed: "*Nec corrumpere et corrumpi, seculum vocatur.*"* In none do the parish priests exercise a stricter or more conscientious control over the conduct of their flocks. Their influence is not weakened, as in a more advanced state of society, by a discordance of religious tenets; nor is the consideration due to their sacred function lost in the homage paid to rank, opulence, or power. Placed in the midst of a people who acknowledge no superiors, and who live almost universally on the produce of their little domains; strangers alike to the arts of luxury and the seductions of fashion, the parish priests are equally removed from temptation themselves, and relieved from the necessity of guarding against the great sources of wickedness in others. Each pastor is at once the priest and the judge of his parishioners, the infallible criterion in matters of faith, and the general umpire in the occasional disputes which occur among them. Hence has arisen that remarkable veneration for their spiritual guides by which the peasantry are distinguished; and it is to this cause that we are to ascribe the fact, common to Tyrol with La Vendée, that, while their nobles were generally absent or lukewarm in the cause, the people followed with alacrity the call of their pastors to take up arms in behalf of their religion and ancient princes.†

In ancient times the Alps were inhabited by fierce and barbarous tribes, and the classical writers have exhausted their eloquence in painting the horrors of the climate and savage manners of the inhabitants of those unexplored regions. "*Nivesque celo prope immixtæ, tecta informia imposita rupibus, pecora jumentaque torrida frigore, homines intonsi et inculti, animalia inanimaque omnia rigentia gelu; cetera visu, quam dictu, fœdiora, terrorem renovarunt.*"‡ Many Roman legions were impeded in their progress, some thinned in their numbers by these cruel barbarians; and even after the mountaineers of the Rætian Alps had been reduced to subjection by the expedition of Drusus, it was still esteemed a service of the utmost danger to deviate from the highways, and even an affair of considerable peril to traverse the passes by the great roads themselves. Almost all the inscriptions on the votive offerings which have been discovered in such numbers, around the ruins of the Temple of Jupiter Penninus, on the Great St. Bernard, and which come down to the latest periods of the Empire, are filled with warm expressions of gratitude for having escaped the extraordinary perils of the passage. Hence the singular fact, almost incredible in modern times, that even in the days of Pliny, several hundred years after the first passage of the Alps by the Roman troops, the sources both of the Rhine and the Iser were un-

Remarkable difference in this respect of ancient and modern times.

* Personal observation. Barth., Krieg von 1809, 474, 482.

Gesch. And. Hofer, 17, 32.

† Personal observation. Barth., Krieg du Tyroler Land-
eute, 64, 72.

† Tacitus, De Mor. Germ.

‡ Personal observation. Barth., Krieg von 1809, 24, 31.

‡ Liv., lib. xxi.

known; and that the naturalist of Rome was content to state, a century after the establishment of a Roman station at Sion, in the Vallais, that "the Rhine took its rise in the most hidden parts of the earth, in the region of perpetual night, amid forests forever inaccessible to human approach." Few attempts appear to have been made by any of the Romans in later times to explore the remoter recesses of the mountains, now so familiar to every traveller, none to reclaim or humanize their inhabitants: their reduction, even by the legions, is enumerated with pride, as one of the greatest exploits of the emperors.* Magnificent highways, constructed across their summits, connected Italy with the northern provinces of the Empire; but they suffered the valleys on either side to remain in their pristine state of barbarism, and the Roman colonists hastened into more distant regions to spread that cultivation of which the Alps, with their rude inhabitants, seemed to them incapable. This inability to civilize a vast amphitheatre of mountains in the heart of their empire would appear inconceivable in so great a people as the Romans, did we not perceive the counterpart of it in the present condition of the Caucasian range, the inhabitants of which maintain a savage independence, in the midst of all the civilization and power of the Russian Empire, and whose predatory habits are sufficiently evinced by their proverbial expressions, notwithstanding all the efforts of modern enthusiasm or credulity to represent them in more interesting colours.†

What is it, then, which has wrought so surprising a change in the manners and habits in Europe of the inhabitants of the great mountain girdle of the earth? What is it which has spread cultivation through wastes deemed, in ancient times, inaccessible to improvement, and humanized the manners of a people remarkable only, under the Roman sway, for the ferocity and barbarism of their customs? What but the influence of religion; of that faith which has calmed the savage passions of the human mind, and spread its beneficial influence among the remotest habitations of men, and which prompted its disciples to leave the luxuries and comforts of southern civilization to diffuse knowledge and humanity through inhospitable realms, and spread, even amid the regions of desolation, the light of knowledge and the blessings of Christianity? Impressed with these ideas, the traveller, in crossing the St. Bernard, and comparing the perfect safety with which he now can explore the most solitary parts of these mountains, with the perils of the passage attest-

ed by the votive offerings, even in the days of Adrian and the Antonines, will think with thankfulness of the religion by which this wonderful change has been effected, and with veneration of the saint whose name has for a thousand years been affixed to the pass where his influence first reclaimed the people from their barbarous life; and in crossing the defile of Mount Brenner, where the Abbey of Wilten first offered an asylum to the pilgrim, he will feel, with a late amiable and eloquent writer, "how fortunate it is that religion has penetrated these fastnesses, impervious to human power, and, where precautions are impossible and resistance useless, spread her invisible ægis over the traveller, and conducts him secure under her protection through all the dangers of his way. When in such situations he reflects upon his security, and recollects that these mountains, so savage and so well adapted to the purposes of murderers and banditti, have not in the memory of man been stained with human blood, he ought to do justice to the cause, and gratefully to acknowledge the influence of religion. Impressed with these ideas, he will behold with indulgence, perhaps even with interest, the crosses which frequently mark the brow of a precipice, and the little chapels hollowed out of the rock where the road is narrowed; he will consider them as so many pledges of security, and rest assured that, so long as the pious mountaineer continues to adore the 'good shepherd,' and to implore the prayer of the afflicted mother,* he will never cease to befriend the traveller nor to discharge the duties of hospitality.†"

Though inhabiting the same mountain range, and under the influence of the same climate as the Swiss, the Tyrolese are distinguished by a totally different national character: a striking example of the undying influence of that difference of race which appears to stamp indelible features on the remotest generations of men. Both have the usual qualities of mountaineers, a bold and intrepid character, a frame fitted to endure toil, a soul capable of despising danger: both are distinguished by their uniform and enthusiastic love of freedom, and both have been illustrated in every age by their heroic and martial exploits. But, nevertheless, the fundamental principles of their life are different. The Tyrolese is animated with an ardent and enthusiastic loyalty; attachment to the house of Austria has ever distinguished him; he mingles prayers for his beloved Kaiser with his supplications for his family and his country; the Swiss, nursed in Republican ideas, abhors the very name or emblems of royalty; the Tyrolese is ardent, impetuous, sometimes inconsiderate; the Swiss, grave, reflecting, always tenacious: the former seldom quits his native valleys, and has never sold his blood in mercenary bands; the latter is to be found in the remotest countries of Europe, and has in every age prostituted his valour for foreign gold: patriotic devotion strongly animates both; but in the Tyrolese it is dignified by disinterested attachment to

National character of the Tyrolese compared with the Swiss.

* Plin., iii., 24.

† See SPENCER'S *Circassia, passim*. The eloquent author of these interesting travels has given a glowing account of the virtues and character of the tribes who dwell in the recesses of the Caucasus; but it is evident, even from what he says, that they are nothing better than gallant robbers. The common expression which he tells us is used by a Circassian maiden to a lover whom she despises, "Him! he has never yet stole a Tchernemorsky cow," speaks volumes as to the real character of this people, and corroborates the unfavourable picture of their customs, drawn by a much more experienced and judicious observer, Clarke, who describes them as a nest of freebooters. "The Circassians are almost all robbers by profession. The descriptions given of natives in the South Seas do not represent human nature in a more savage state than its condition exhibits among the Caucasians. Instructed from their infancy to consider war and plunder not only as a necessary, but as an honourable occupation, they bear in their countenances the most striking expressions of ferocious valour and of duplicity."—See CLARKE'S *Travels*, chap. i., vol. ii., 34, 35.

* Eustace's *Travels*, i., 98.

† It is to the unceasing efforts of the clergy, during the many centuries that elapsed between the fall of the Roman Empire and the revival of knowledge, that the judicious historian of Switzerland ascribes the early civilization and humane disposition in modern times of the Helvetic tribes, and invariably the first traces of order and industry appeared in the immediate neighbourhood of the religious establishments.—See PLANTA'S *Switzerland*, i., 17, *et seq.*

† Personal observation.

the throne; in the Swiss, somewhat dimmed by its union with the thirst for individual aggrandizement.

Notwithstanding, however, the long-established and hereditary loyalty of the Tyrolese, there is no part of Europe where the love of freedom is more strongly felt, or its practical blessings have been more uninterruptedly enjoyed. In every part of the country, the bold and martial air of the peasantry, their athletic form and fearless eye, bespeak the liberty and independence which they enjoy. Often the people carry arms, universally they possess them; on Sundays or holidays they usually appear with costly weapons in their belts or slung around their shoulders, as a mark at once of their wealth and privileges. Frequent exercise of the chase, and the universal practice of firing at targets and serving in the militia or trained bands, have given them an extraordinary proficiency in the use of firearms, of which the French and Bavarians, in the course of the war, had ample experience. It was in a great degree in consequence of the extraordinary perfection of the Tyrolese marksmen, that the inhabitants of the province, with little aid from the Austrian armies, were enabled for so long a period to make head against the united force of France and Bavaria. Their dress is singularly calculated to add to this impression. That of the men consists, for the most part, of a broad-brimmed hat, sometimes ornamented by a feather; a jacket, tight to the shape, but generally worn open, and exhibiting a red or green waistcoat; a broad girdle, richly ornamented, fastened in front by a large buckle of costly workmanship; embossed braces worn over the waistcoat, and supporting tight breeches, which, with gaiters up to the knee, are invariably made of black leather. The colours of the attire, especially about the breast, are brilliant and varied, and, with the pistols or knife stuck in the girdle, bespeak a degree of opulence rarely to be met with in the actual cultivators of any other country. But everything about them indicates a general and long-established well-being, and demonstrates that the opulence which industry had won has been fearlessly and habitually displayed by the possessors. They are courteous and hospitable in their manner towards strangers; but they expect a similar treatment on their part, and in no country of Europe is an insult more likely to be avenged, or is the peasant more ready to redress with his own hands any wrong, whether real or imaginary, which he may have received. Honest, sincere, and brave, the people are yet warm in their temperament, and, acknowledging no superiors, and being but little habituated to gradation of rank, they expect to be treated on all occasions on the footing of respect and equality. But, if this is done, in no part of the world will the foreigner experience more courteous reception, or can he repose with more perfect security on the honesty and fidelity of the inhabitants.*

The two circumstances which have mainly contributed to nourish these independent and masculine feelings in the Tyrolese peasantry, are the practical freedom of their government, and the circumstance of their being, in general, proprietors of the lands which they cultivate. Though form-

practical freedom which the people have always enjoyed under the Austrian government.

ing part, ever since their acquisition by Austria, by inheritance in 1363, of a despotic monarchy, the Tyrolese have uniformly been in the practical possession of all the blessings of freedom; and from the earliest times they have enjoyed the two grand privileges of representative assemblies, and not being taxed without their own consent.* Impressed with the bold and impetuous character of these fearless mountaineers, as well as the vast importance, in a military point of view, of their country to the defence of the hereditary states, the Austrians not only never made any attempt to infringe their privileges, but treated the inhabitants with such lenity, that they knew government only by the protection and benefits which it afforded. The taxes were so light as to be almost imperceptible; civil appointments were almost all filled by natives; municipal officers were elected by the people; custom-house restraints were hardly felt; the conscription was unknown. Four battalions of light-armed troops were all that was required by government from the province, though it contained seven hundred thousand souls—a requisition rather felt as a privilege than a burden, as it afforded a vent to their numerous and warlike youth—and were always filled with volunteers. But the whole male inhabitants were enrolled in the militia, and regularly instructed in the rudiments of military art and ball practice; twenty thousand men, capable of being augmented to double that force in case of need, were at all times ready to defend their mountains, and often, by their hardihood and valour,† rendered essential service to the monarchy in the most critical periods of its history.

In the German Tyrol, the peasantry are almost all owners of the land they cultivate: a state of things of all others the most favourable to social happiness, when not brought about by the spoliation of others, and accompanied by a tolerable administration of government. It is much less so on the Italian side of the mountains: there, great proprietors, with their attendant evils of non-resident gentry and resident middlemen, are to be found. Hence, in a great degree, as well as in the original difference of race, the wide distinction between these two great divisions of the country in the character and independence of the people. Their look, their customs, their character, are essentially distinct: in the German Tyrol are to be seen a national dress, primitive usages, early hours, independent character, intrepid resolution; in the Italian, polished manners, an harmonious accent, opulent cities, selfish craft, enervating luxury. The line between the two, however, is not to be drawn merely according to the flow of the waters into the Danube or the Po: the German population has overspread the crest of the mountains,

The peasants are all owners of their land. Its great influence on their character.

* In Tyrol, as in Sweden, the four orders of nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants, met in a general convocation at Innsbruck, where the president was chosen by the suffrages of the united body. The bishops of Trente and Brixen were usually elected alternately for that situation. In these assemblies, all matters relative to taxation, as well as the calling out the militia, were settled; and, in order to facilitate the latter, a sort of conscription was established, and the days of service, being in general forty-two, fixed upon. These days were a period of festivity and recreation to the youth upon whom the lot fell. To the latest times, previous to the cession of the province to Bavaria in 1805, these privileges had been religiously observed by the Austrian government.—MULLER'S *Gesch.*

† Malte Brun, vii., 516, 517. *Gesch. And. Hofer*, 14, 15. Barth., 64, 72.

* Malte Brun, vii., 516. Personal observation. *Ingli's Tyrol*, i., 162, 164.

and come far down towards the Italian plains; all the valleys of the Adige and the Eisach above Bolsano are inhabited by the northern brood, who, with the harsh language and fair hair, have preserved the virtues and customs of their fathers. The population of German is nearly four times that of Italian descent; and in all struggles for freedom or independence, though the latter has not been wanting in energetic characters, the weight of the contest has fallen upon the Gothic race.*

To complete the picture of this highly interesting people, it is only necessary to observe, that they are all frugal and industrious, that domestic manufactures are to be found in many of their cottages, and valuable salt-mines at Hall, on the Lower Inn, but that the great reliance of the people is on the resources of agriculture. The wonderful effect of a general diffusion of property in stimulating the efforts of individual industry, is nowhere more conspicuous: the grass which grows on the sides of declivities too steep for pasture, is carefully cut for the cattle; the atmospheric action on rocks is rendered serviceable by conveying their debris to cultivated fields, and the stranger sometimes observes with astonishment a Tyrolese peasant, with a basket in his hand, descending inaccessible rocks by means of a rope, in order that he may gain a few feet of land at the bottom, and devote it to agriculture. All the family labour at the little paternal estate; the daughters tend the cows, or bring in the grass; the sons work with the father in the field, or carry on some species of manufacture within doors. Notwithstanding this universal industry, however, the country is too sterile to maintain, from its own resources, its numerous inhabitants: a large proportion of it is covered with forest, a still larger is desert rock or snow, tenanted only by the chamois and the marmot; and a considerable portion of the people are yearly induced to seek the means of bettering their condition in the neighbouring and richer countries, from whence such of them as prosper return, after many years of absence, to purchase a little domain in their beloved valleys.†

To a people of such a character, and enjoying such advantages under the paternal government of their ancient princes, the forcible transference to the rule of Bavaria by the treaty of Presburg had been the subject of inextinguishable aversion. The cabinet of Munich, little acquainted with the character of the inhabitants, ignorant of the delicacy requisite in the management of free-born mountaineers, and relying on the powerful military aid of France and the Rhenish Confederacy, adopted the dangerous policy of coercing their discontents by force. Though all their privileges were solemnly guaranteed by Bavaria, in the treaty of Presburg in 1805, yet no sooner were the Bavarian authorities established in the country, than all these stipulations were basely violated. The court of Munich seemed intent only on making the utmost of their

new acquisition, as if under a presentiment that their tenure of it was not destined to be of very long duration. The constitution, which had subsisted for ages, was overthrown by a royal edict, the representative estates were suppressed, and the provincial funds seized. No less than eight new and oppressive taxes were imposed, and levied with the utmost rigour: the very name of the country was abolished; and, after the model of revolutionary France, Tyrol was divided into the departments of the Inn, the Etch, and the Eisach; the dramatized legends, which formed so large a part of the amusement of the people, were prohibited; all pilgrimages to chapels or places of extraordinary sanctity forbid. The convents and monasteries were confiscated, and their estates sold; the church plate and holy vessels melted down and disposed of; the royal property was all brought into the market; even the ancient castle of Tyrol in the Passeyrthal was not spared. New imposts were daily exacted without any consultation with the estates of the people; specie became scarce, from the quantity of it which was drawn off to the royal treasury; the Austrian notes were reduced to half their value, and the feelings of the people irritated, almost to madness, by the compulsory levy of men to serve in the ranks of their oppressors. It was even attempted to change the very name of the country, and incorporate it with the Bavarian provinces; and the use of their mother tongue was only to be permitted to the southern provinces for a few years.*†

The existence and wide diffusion of these discontents was well known to the Austrian government, by whom a constant correspondence with the disaffected leaders had been maintained in secret ever since that valuable province had been reft from their dominion. Sensible of the immense error committed in 1805, in stripping the country of regular troops at the very time when the advance of the French to Vienna rendered it of the last importance that this great natural fortress should be strengthened on their flank, the cabinet of Vienna resolved not to fall a second time into the same mistake, and made every preparation for turning to the best account the martial qualities and excited feelings of the people. The Archduke John, who commanded the army destined for the Italian campaign, and then stationed at Villach and Klagenfurth, had made frequent excursions, in former years, through the Tyrol; and, in the course of his rambles, had become as much attached to those spirited mountaineers as they had acquired confidence in his patriotism and ardour. An active correspondence was carried on between the archduke and the Tyrolese leaders, from the moment that war had been resolved on by the cabinet of Vienna, till it actually broke out; but although that accomplished prince was thus, in

* Müller's Gesch., 671. Gesch. A. Hofer, 17, Introduction. Barth., 24, 32.

† Beaulieu, by an order dated Moscow, September 24, 1812, only permitted to some of the southern districts the use of their mother tongue for six years longer.—*Quarterly Review*, xvii., 351. The date is singular and ominous. Napoleon afterward was well aware of how much the Tyrolese revolt was owing to the mismanagement of the Bavarians, and said to Count Bubna, "The Bavarians did not know how to govern the Tyrolese, and were unworthy to rule that noble country."—*GESCH. AND. HOFER*, 16. In truth, however, it was the magnitude and weight of his own exactions, in men and money, from that subject power, which drove the cabinet of Munich to the severe measures which had so powerful an effect in bringing about the insurrection.

* Malte Brun, vii., 550. Inglis, i., 164, 167. Personal observation.

† *Gesch. A. Hofer*, 21. Malte Brun, vii., 514, 515. Barth., *Krieg*, von 1809, 74, 78.

‡ See note A.
§ "The above-mentioned countries (Tyrol and Vorarlberg) shall be enjoyed by his majesty the King of Bavaria in the same manner, and with the same rights and prerogatives, as the Emperor of Germany and Austria and the princes of his house enjoyed them, and no otherwise."—*Treaty of Presburg*, Dec. 26, 1805, Art. 8. MARTENS, *Sup.*, iv., 315.

a great degree, instrumental in producing that general insurrection in the province which afterward took place, yet he was fated never to return to it till the contest was over, nor to take part in a struggle in which he would willingly have pledged his fortune and his life.*

The Tyrol, notwithstanding its rugged aspect, is, in a military or strategical point of view, a very simple country. There are very few practicable roads. The great chain of mountains which forms the southern barrier of the valley of the Inn, and which, beginning with the snowy peaks of the Orteler Pitz, stretches through the Geffron to the huge mass of the Gross Glochner, is traversed only by one road, which, from time immemorial, has formed the chief communication between Germany and Italy. Setting out from Munich, it crosses the northern barrier of the Innthal by the gorge of Scharnitz, descends to Innspruck, and, after crossing the southern bulwarks of the valley by the pass of the Brenner, descends the course of the Eisach to Sterzing, Brixen, Botzen, Trent, and Roveredo, below which it emerges at Verona into the Italian plains. From Trent, branch out two lateral roads, the first, after surmounting an inconsiderable ridge, descends, by the waters of the Brenta, through the romantic defiles of the Val Sugana to Primolano, and loses itself in the plains of Verona at Bassano; the second, after crossing the high Sarea, winds down by Chiesa and the lake of Idir to the Brescian fields. From Botzen, or Bolsano, a great road ascends the whole course of the Adige, called, in its upper or German parts, the Etch, and penetrates into the cold and cheerless pastures of the Engadine, in Switzerland, at Nauders. From Brixen branches off the great road to Carinthia and Klagenfurth, through the Pusterthal and down the valley of the Drave; and the route communicates with Salzburg by a cross-road, which surmounts the great central ridge by St. Michel and Tauern, till it reaches Rastadt and the waters of the Salza. Another great road crosses Tyrol in its whole breadth, along the valley of the Inn, communicating on the west with Switzerland by Feldkirch and Bregentz; on the east by Rattenburg to Salzburg, Enns, and Vienna. The Brenner is thus by far the most important position in Tyrol, because whoever has the command of it is the master of the only communication from Germany and the northern, to Italy and the southern Tyrol, and the bridge of Ladtch, at the junction of roads leading to Innspruck, Carinthia, and Verona. Rude fortifications are erected on the principal passes leading into the province on all sides from the adjoining states; but they were of no great strength, and incapable of holding out against a numerous and enterprising enemy. The true defence of the Tyrol consisted in its rugged and inaccessible surface, which rendered it for the most part wholly impervious to cavalry;† in the number of woods and defensible positions which it contains, and, above all, the indomitable spirit of its inhabitants.

When the peasantry of Tyrol, at the summons of Austria, took up arms, they had no fixed or authorized leaders; but several persons had acquired such consideration among them as naturally placed them at the head of affairs. The

first of these was ANDREW HOFER, a native of St. Leonard, in the valley of Passeyr: a name, like that of Tell and Wallace, now become immortal in the history of the world. Like his ancestors for many generations, he carried on the business of an innkeeper, on his paternal property on the banks of the Adige: a profession which is one of the most respectable among that simple people, from the intercourse with strangers and wealth with which it is commonly attended. He was born on the 22d of November, 1767, so that he was in the forty-second year of his age when the insurrection broke out. His frame was Herculean, his shoulders broad, his strength surpassing; but, like most persons long habituated to climbing mountains, his carriage was somewhat impaired by an habitual stoop. His education and means of improvement had been superior to those of most persons in his rank of life, from his frequent intercourse with travellers, as well as the traffic which he carried on in wine and horses, in the course of which he had visited most of the principal cities on the southern side of the mountains, and become a fluent master of the Italian language, though in the low Venitian dialect. His dress was the common habit of the country, with some trifling variation: a large black hat, with a broad brim, black ribands, and a dark curling feather, a green jacket, red waistcoat, green braces, black leathern girdle, short black breeches of the same material, and red or black stockings. About his neck was always to be seen a crucifix and a silver medal of St. George, to which was afterward added a gold medal and chain, sent him by the emperor. He never, however, obtained any rank in the Austrian army, and was indebted for his influence among his countrymen to his well-known probity of character and disinterested disposition, as well as the secret connexion which he maintained with the Archduke John, with whom he had formed an acquaintance in the course of that prince's scientific rambles in the Tyrol, which led to his being chosen as a deputy from his native valley to confer with him at Brunecken, in November, 1805, and Vienna, in January, 1809. His talents and acquirements were of a superior order, as was sufficiently evinced by his having been selected by that discerning prince on occasions of such importance for the discharge of difficult duties; but his parts were solid rather than brilliant, and he evinced, in its merits equally as its defects, the true German character. Honest, sincere, and confiding, tenacious of custom, attached to antiquity, ignorant of present times, benevolent in disposition, he was at the same time pious and patriotic, and ready to lay down the last drop of his blood in defence of his religion and emperor. It was easy to excite him to severe measures; but, when their execution commenced, he was readily diverted from his purpose, and his native gentleness of disposition speedily caused the sterner mood to relent. His attachment to the Catholic faith and his patriotic ardour were unbounded; and the bare recital of a victory gained by Austria in former times, or allusion to the classical days of Tyrol, a word in favour of the sacred person of the emperor, or the Archduke John, were sufficient to fill his eyes with tears. Though slow, and sometimes vacillating in decision, he was capable, when he applied to a subject, or just discrimination; and when invested, during a few months in autumn, 1809, with the entire government of the province, his measures were

* *Gesch. A. Hofer*, 19. *Inglis's Tyrol*, ii., 163, 164. *Barth.*, 52, 54. † *Pel.*, iii., 375, 382; and personal observation.

judicious to a degree that could hardly have been expected from his limited means of information. Fond of conviviality, sometimes addicted to intemperance, he was often carousing with his friends when the troops were engaged in action; and, though repeatedly victorious, and fearless in danger, he was only once under a hot fire during the war, though then he acted with the utmost gallantry. But his energy in conduct and well-known patriotic ardour obtained for him the attachmnet of his countrymen, whom he constantly led to victory; and the intrepidity of his conduct in his last moments has secured for him a lasting mausoleum in the hearts of his countrymen.*

Inferior to Hofer in general government, and unversed in the threads of political negotiation, SPECHBACHER was greatly his superior in the energy and conduct of actual warfare. He was a substantial yeoman, having inherited from his father a farm of some value in the village of Gnadenwald, in the Lower Innthal. Born in the year 1768, he was left an orphan at the age of seven years; and, though his relations bestowed all the care upon his education which circumstances would admit, he showed little disposition for study or any sedentary pursuit. From an early age he was found from morning till night among the mountains, with his rifle over his shoulder, pursuing the roe or engaging the lammergeyer. As he advanced in years, these pursuits had such attractions for him, that, abandoning altogether his paternal estate, he associated with a band of hunters, who set the forest laws at defiance, and ranged the mountains of the Upper and Lower Innthal, the Oetzthal, and the rugged forests of the Bavarian Tyrol. By this wandering mode of life, as he afterward himself admitted, he became acquainted with every pass and glen on the frontiers of Tyrol and Bavaria, from Feldkirch to Kufstein: a species of knowledge which was of essential importance in the conduct of the partisan warfare with which he was afterward intrusted, while at the same time it nourished in his mind that inextinguishable hatred towards Bavaria which is felt more or less by every inhabitant of the northern Tyrol. His grandfather had distinguished himself in the war against the Bavarians, under Maximilian Emmanuel; "and when I was a child," said Spechbacher in after days, "and listened to him as he told us the history of those times, I longed to have an opportunity of fighting against them as he had done." He was diverted, however, from this dangerous course of life by the impression produced by seeing one of his companions shot in a rencounter with a band of chassseurs, and returning, at the age of twenty-eight, to his native village, he married a young woman with some property, entered into a contract to supply the salt-works of Hall with wood, made himself master of the elements of education, and continued for twelve years to lead a laborious, inoffensive life, till the trumpet of war from Austria roused him to danger, and glory, and immortality.*

JOSEPH HASPINGER was a Capuchin friar, and buried in the seclusion of a monastic life, till the war broke out. Though the friar, reckoned with justice one of the most formidable of the Tyrolese leaders, he carried with him into the field of battle only the spiritual

weapons which he brought from the cloister. Clothed in his brown garment and rope girdle, he bore in his hand a large ebony crucifix, with which, it is said, in close combat, he sometimes exchanged blows with the enemy; and, being endowed with prodigious strength, nearly as many wonders are recounted of his personal feats as miracles won by his faith and devotion. When a student in the faculty of theology, he had borne arms against the French, and won a silver medal, which he consecrated, on entering the order of St. Francis, to the miraculous crucifix at Eppen, near Bolsano. He was distinguished by a flowing beard of a red colour, which gave him the surname of *Rothbard*; and often the massy crucifix and animated voice of the friar restored the combat, when his countrymen were sinking under numbers or fatigue.*

MARTIN TEIMER, though a brave and active leader, was not so celebrated as the other chiefs among the peasantry; but, from his military talents, skill in negotiations, and a certain degree of aristocratic favour which it induced, he received marks of distinction from the emperor which the others never enjoyed, and was made a baron, with the cross of Maria Theresa, to which Hofer never attained. Teimer, however, was Hofer's superior in conduct and understanding, though, from not being so great a favourite with the people, he never enjoyed the same influence or celebrity. He was born on the 14th of August, 1778, at Schländers, in the Visitschgau, and had a countenance in which the prominent forehead and sparkling eye clearly indicated the ascendancy of talent. He served in the militia in the war of 1796, and raised himself, by his abilities, from the ranks to the station of major, having distinguished himself in several actions under Laudohn in that year, and Bellegarde in 1799. In 1805, he was again made captain in the militia, and subsequently kept a shop at Klagenfurth. Like Hofer, his disposition was phlegmatic, and he was fond of conviviality; but, when roused by danger and placed at the head of his troops, he displayed equal courage and capacity, and contributed with the peasants of the Upper Innthal, whom he commanded, to some of the greatest successes of the war. It was only unfortunate that the favour of the emperor occasioned a certain jealousy between him and Hofer, which in some degree dimmed the glory and impaired the usefulness of both. Baron Hormayer, one of the few nobility of the country who appeared in arms for their country, was early appointed by the Austrian cabinet governor of the province; and he showed his judgment by delegating his authority at a very early period to Hofer, by whom the movements of the peasants were practically directed till the close of the contest.†

Such were the simple leaders under whose guidance the Tyrolese engaged in the formidable contest with the united power of France and Bavaria. It was from no ignorance of the perils which awaited them, but a brave determination to disregard them, that they stood forth with such unanimous gallantry for their country's deliverance. In former wars, they had both witnessed and felt the weight of the French arms: in 1796, they had seen it roll past them in the

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 44, 52, 53. Barth., 42, 47. Inglis, ii., 165, 166. † Barth., 36, 42. Inglis, ii., 179, 180.

* Barth., 52, 54. Inglis, ii., 180, 181.

† Barth., 52, 54. Inglis, ii., 181. Gesch. A. Hofer, 59, 60.

Italian, in 1805 on the Bavarian plains; in 1797, their valleys had been penetrated from the south by Joubert,* in 1805 invaded from the north by Marshal Ney;† and they were well aware that the probabilities were, that, if a serious reverse happened to the imperial arms, the forces of the Empire would, as on former occasions, be concentrated for the defence of the capital, and they would be left without external aid to make head against their numerous and disciplined enemies. Still they unanimously stood forth in the contest. Every man took leave of his family and his friends as those who might never meet again. They prepared themselves, after the manner of their country, for what they deemed a pious warfare, by the most solemn rites of their religion. The priest, in many parishes, assembled those who were to join the army, and animated them by his exhortations, and blessed those who might die in defence of their country. Every family assembled together, and prayed that the youths who were to leave it might support their good name in the hour of danger, and die rather than dishonour their native land. In many instances even the sacrament was administered as for the last time in life, and accompanied with the solemnities which the Catholic Church enjoins for the welfare of a departing soul. It was with such holy rites, and by such exercises of family devotion, that these brave men prepared themselves for the fearful warfare on which they were entering; and it was the spirit which they thus inhaled that supported them when they were left to their own resources, and enabled them, even amid all the depression arising from the desertion of their allies, to present an undaunted front to the hostility of combined Europe.

All things being in readiness, and the Austrian troops, under the Archduke Charles, having crossed the Inn, the signal of insurrection was given by the Archduke John, in a spirited proclamation, from his headquarters at Klagenfurth, from whence the Marquis Chastellar set out to take the command of the regular troops which were to enter the province to direct and support the operations of the peasants.‡ So unanimous, however, was the feeling with which the country was animated, that, at the first intelligence of hostilities having commenced, it burst forth at once with uncontrollable fury in all quarters. The night of the 8th of April was fixed for the event on which the destinies of the Tyrol were to depend. The signal agreed on was throwing sawdust into the Inn, which floated down, and was soon discovered and understood by the peasants. In addition to this, a plank with a little pennon affixed to it was launched in the Upper Innthal, and safely borne down the stream, amid the throbbing hearts of all who witnessed it. Bale-fires at the same time were lighted on a hundred hills, and many a ruined castle blazed with a long-unwonted glow. The peasantry of the Innthal were warned, besides, by women and children, who carried from house to house little balls of paper, upon which were written the words "*s'ist zeit*," it is time. Roused by these various methods, the inhabitants everywhere rose on the 8th of April as one man, and with their redoubted rifles on their shoulders descended every lateral glen and ravine, till their accumulated force, gaining strength at every step as it advanced,

rolled in an impetuous torrent down the great valleys of the Inn, the Eisach, and the Adige.*

Marquis Chastellar, with the regular troops under his command, about ten thousand, Successes in sand strong, but very deficient in cavalry, the Pusterthal, was on the Klagenfurth frontier, to take advantage of and support these enthusiastic movements, and crossed the frontier at daybreak on the 9th. Their march through the Pusterthal resembled rather the triumph of a victorious than the advance of an invading army: mothers brought their children out to look at them; blind old men were led out of their cottages, that they might hear and bless their gallant countrymen; all endeavoured to get near, that they might touch their clothes, or even kiss their horses. But more serious occupation awaited them. On arriving in the neighbourhood of St. Lawrence, in their way down towards Brixen, they found the peasants in considerable numbers already engaged with the enemy. The rising there had been precipitated two days before the time agreed on, by an attempt of the April 9. the Bavarians on the important bridge at that place, which commanded the communication between Brunecken and the upper part of the valley: the peasants rose to prevent its destruction, and Wrede, aware of the importance of suppressing such a revolt in the outset, immediately marched to the spot, with two thousand men and three guns, from Brixen. With these, however, he made no impression on the assembled peasants stationed in the woods and rocks; but, being joined on the day following by a re-enforcement of a thousand foot-soldiers and six hundred horse, he renewed his attacks with better success, and the Tyrolese, unable to block up the main road against such formidable odds, were beginning to give way, when the arrival of seventy light horse, and a few companies of chasseurs, the advanced guard of Chastellar, who instantly charged with loud shouts, changed the fate of the day. The Tyrolese, suspending the combat, fell on their knees to return thanks, or embraced the Austrians with tears of joy; while the Bavarians, thunder-struck at this unexpected apparition, fled in disorder down the valley, and when they arrived at the tremendous bridge of Laditch,† broke into two divisions, the first of which, under Bisson, hotly pursued by the peasants, ascended the Eisach towards Sterzing, while the second, two thousand strong, under General Lemoine, followed the course of that river down to Bolsano. Here, however, they were met by the landsturm of the valley of the Adige, which had descended to that place in great strength, from the upper part of the Etchthal; and, though some forced their way through to Trent, the greater part, with the general himself, were made prisoners.‡

While these events were going on below Brixen, the Bavarian regiments, which had ascended to Sterzing, encountered Hofer with the landsturm of the Passetthal and the Vinchtgau, on the plain of Sterzing Moos, near the town and castle of that name. The Bavarians advan-

Defeat of the
Bavarians by
Hofer at Ster-
zing Moos.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 77, 80. Ingles, ii., 168, 169. Barth., 62, 84.

† A well-known bridge, composed of a single arch, between tremendous rocks, at the point where the road from Innsbruck over the Brenner, from Carinthia by the Pusterthal, and from Italy up the Eisach, unite.—GESCH. AND. HOFER, p. 64, 78, and personal observation.

‡ Gesch. A. Hofer, 79, 81. Barth., 92, 96. Pel., iii., 86, 87.

* Ante, i., 460.

† Ante, ii., 358.

‡ Personal information. Barth., 86, 90. § See note B.

ced in good order and with an intrepid air over the open ground which lay between them and the enemy; but as they approached the Tyrolese, who were posted on rocks and in thickets around its outer circumference, they were staggered by the close and deadly fire of the rifles, and fell back in confusion. The guns were next brought up; but they could produce little impression on the peasants scattered among, and in great part concealed in, the broken ground and woods, and the gunners were soon laid prostrate by the unerring aim of the mountain sharpshooters. Encouraged by this success the Tyrolese now burst from their covert, and rushing forward, like the La Vendée peasants, in loose array, but with desperate resolution, using their spears, halberts, and the butt ends of their muskets, fell with loud shouts upon the enemy. After a violent struggle of a few minutes' duration, the Bavarians gave way, and, being enveloped on all sides, laid down their arms to the number of three hundred and ninety, besides two hundred and forty who were killed or wounded in this sanguinary combat. The column which succeeded, however, under Bisson and Wrede, contrived to force its way, by a circuitous route, up the pass of the Brenner; but it was grievously harassed in the defile of Lueg by the peasants, who broke down bridges, and barricaded the highway, by heaps of trees thrown across the road, and only penetrated through to the neighbourhood of Innspruck, after sustaining a heavy loss. All these columns, in their retreat, committed the greatest excesses, burning houses and massacring the peasantry wherever they had it in their power; while the Austrian authorities exhibited, at the same time, the noble contrast of a proclamation, issued expressly to restrain the feelings of revenge arising in the breasts of the people.*†

On the same day, the peasantry of the Upper and Lower Inntal rose in arms; and so active were the exertions made, that, early on the morning of the 11th, twenty thousand armed men, directed by Teimer, were assembled on the heights around Innspruck. In no condition to resist so formidable an assemblage, the Bavarians, who had only fifteen hundred men and a few guns in the place, withdrew into the town; but there they were speedily assailed by a furious crowd of peasants, who carried successively the external barriers, the bridge of the Inn, the artillery, and finally penetrated into the principal square, shouting out, "Long live the Emperor Francis! Down with the Bavarians!" and made themselves masters of the place. A frightful scene ensued; the Bavarians in some places surrendered, and begged for quarter; in others, continued the combat with undaunted resolution; and

in the *mêlée* several bloody deeds were committed, which, in their cooler moments, the Tyrolese would have been the first to condemn. General Kinkel, after making a brave resistance, was slain: Colonel Dietfurth, who atoned for his former conduct by the gallantry of his last hours, desperately wounded, was made prisoner, and soon after died; and the whole garrison of Innspruck, consisting of one entire regiment, four guns, a few cavalry, and several depôts of battalions, either taken or slain.*

An event here took place which strongly marked the peculiar character of the warfare which had commenced. Dietfurth, the Bavarian colonel, had made himself peculiarly obnoxious in the province by the severity of his public and licentiousness of his private conduct, as well as the contemptuous expressions which he had used towards the people.† As he lay half fainting, from loss of blood, in the guard-house of Innspruck, he asked who had been the leader of the peasants. "No one," they replied: "we fought equally for God, the emperor, and our native country." "That is surprising," said Dietfurth, "for I saw him frequently pass me on a white horse." The report of this incident produced an extraordinary impression upon the peasants, by whom it was universally believed, thenceforth, that St. James, the patron of the town of Innspruck, and who was always represented, in the battles with the Moors, mounted on a white horse, had combated at their head. The cavalry which escaped from Innspruck took refuge in a convent near the bridge of Volders, but Spechbacher, having assembled a body of peasants from the Lower Inntal, burst open the gates on the day following by means of April 12. an immense fir-tree which was rolled up on wheels to the massy portal by fifty of his strongest peasants, and every man was made prisoner. The Tyrolese, after these brilliant successes, set no bounds to their rejoicings: the great imperial eagle was taken down from the tomb of Maximilian in the High Church of Innspruck, decorated with red ribands, and carried, amid deafening acclamations, through the streets, the peasants flocking in crowds to gaze at and kiss it; while the pictures of the Archduke John and the emperor were placed on a triumphal arch, surrounded by candles kept constantly burning, every one that passed stopping an instant, bending the knee, and exclaiming, "Long live the emperor!"‡

In the midst of these rejoicings the Tyrolese were called to more serious duties. The victorious peasants, who had fallen asleep in the streets or in the orchards around the town, were alarmed, at three o'clock in the morning of the 12th, by the intelligence that the enemy was approaching. It proved to be the division of Bisson, which, having forced its way through the pass of Lueg and over the Brenner, from Sterzing and the valley of the Eisach, had reached Mount Isel and the neighbourhood of the Abbey of Wilten, on its way to

Striking incidents which occurred on the capture of Innspruck.

April 12.

Arrival, defeat, and surrender of Bisson's division from Sterzing. April 12.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 81, 82. Pel., iii., 87. Barth., 98, 100.

† "Tyroleans! you have proved yourselves worthy to be free, and of that constitution which the Bavarians promised to respect, but have violated. You have proved yourselves worthy of liberty: do not, therefore, give way to your indignation, and become ungovernable, but act with unanimity and coolness, determined to die or be free. To injure the feeble is contemptible: no real Tyrolese will allow himself to be accused of such a deed. To follow the example of those who have nothing to lose, who molest and plunder the peaceful and inoffensive, would inevitably sow the seeds of dissension among us, and cause our ruin. Without discipline, order, and obedience, nothing will prosper: in the name of the emperor and the archduke, I will punish every one who disobeys his orders, and treat every one who commits excesses as an enemy to his country."—JOSEPH BARON HORWAYER. See GESCHICHTE AND. HOFER, 87, 88.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 88, 91. Barth., 100, 106. Pel., iii., 87, 88.

† He had publicly boasted at Munich, "that, with his regiment and two squadrons, he would disperse the ragged mob;" and had been promoted instead of reprovod for his oppressive and licentious conduct.—GESCH. A. HOFER, 90, 91.

‡ Gesch. A. Hofer, 92, 93. Inglist, ii., 169, 173. Barth., 104, 106.

the northern Tyrol and Bavaria. The gates were immediately barricaded with casks, wagons, carts, and everything that could be found for that purpose, and the approaches to the city filled with armed men, ready to give the enemy a warm reception. But the Bavarians, who were descending the Brenner, were in still greater consternation than their opponents at the circumstances of their situation. With difficulty, and constantly harassed by a cloud of peasants in their rear, they had reached the heights of Mount Isel, and now they found Innsbruck, their sole point of retreat, where they expected to find succour, rest, and security, occupied by twenty thousand peasants. General Kinkel, who perceived the hopelessness of their situation, wrote to General Bisson, urging him to send some confidential person into the town who might report the state of affairs; and, in pursuance of this advice, Wrede, with a large escort, soon made his appearance, and they were immediately taken into custody. Wrede was detained, the remainder being allowed to return to their comrades. The situation of the French and Bavarians was now almost desperate. Chastellar, with a body of armed peasants, as well as a few regular troops, was descending the Brenner, and already menaced their rear, while the rocks and thickets in their front and flanks were bristling with the peasants of the Innthal, who, in great strength, obstructed their advance. After some unsuccessful parleying, in the course of which Bisson expressed the utmost dread of the vengeance of Napoleon if he laid down his arms, the fire began, and a close discharge, admirably directed, thinned the ranks of the French grenadiers, while the shouts with which the mountains resounded on all sides were so tremendous that they were completely panic-struck, and compelled their commander to consent to an unconditional surrender. Bisson laid down his arms with all his troops, including the division at Schwartz, which was to be delivered up to the Austrians there: nearly three thousand men on this occasion fell, in all, into the hands of the enemy.*†

The only post of importance in the Tyrol now occupied by the Bavarians was Hall in the Lower Innthal, and it soon yielded to the enterprise and skill of Spechbacher. The women and children who remained on the left bank of the Inn lighted fires on all the hills bounding the valley on that side; and this stratagem induced the Bavarian garrison to believe that, if the town were attacked at all, it would be from the northern quarter. Thither, accordingly, they all crowded, carefully manning the ramparts and watching the approaches. Meanwhile, Spechbacher with his men silently advanced in ambush to the other side, and, when the drawbridge was let down and the gate opened, upon the bell ringing for matins, they rushed in, overpowered the guard, and made themselves masters of the town. The

Bavarian prisoners, about four hundred in number, were immediately marched off under an escort consisting chiefly of women. Considering this as a studied insult, the captives were exceedingly indignant; but, in truth, it was the result of necessity, the whole male population having been marched off towards Innsbruck, and, for the same reason, a similar service was often assigned to the female sex during the war.*

Thus did the Tyrolese, in one week after the insurrection broke out, by means solely of their own valour and patriotism, aided by the natural strength of the country, entirely deliver the province from the enemy, recover all the fortresses except Kufstein, which were in the hands of their oppressors, and entirely destroy above ten thousand regular troops of the enemy, of whom six thousand were made prisoners! These extraordinary successes, too, were gained almost exclusively by the unaided efforts of the people; for, though the Austrian regulars came up most opportunely in the first contest, at the bridge of San Lorenzo, yet they had no share in the subsequent triumphs, which were achieved long before their arrival at the scene of action, by the assembled peasantry: a memorable instance of what may be effected by unanimity and vigour, even in opposition to a formidable military force. The effect of the victories of the peasantry was to liberate the southern as well as northern Tyrol; for the French troops were so much discouraged by their reverses, that they evacuated both Trent and Roveredo, and fell back to the neighbourhood of Verona. The insurrection gained all the Italian Tyrol, and even spread into the valleys of the Oglio and the Mella, where the people were highly discontented with the government of the kingdom of Italy. Numerous bodies of partisans appeared to the north, in the Bavarian plains, and the Swabian hills, and on the south, in the neighbourhood of Brescia and Verona; they communicated with the Archduke John, whose victory at Sacile excited extraordinary enthusiasm, by the vale of the Piave; and symptoms of revolt were already manifesting themselves in all the southern valleys of the Alps as far as Piedmont, where the people only waited for the Austrian standards to cross the Adige to break out into open insurrection. Nor was it the least honourable circumstance in this glorious contest, that, though the population were strongly excited by a long course of previous injuries, and almost entirely destitute of military officers to restrain their impetuosity, they were as much distinguished by their humanity as their valour, and, with a few exceptions, originating in the heat of assault, conducted their hostilities with as much moderation as regular soldiers.†

Meanwhile Napoleon, who was exceedingly irritated at this unlooked-for series of disasters in the Tyrol, and, notwithstanding all in his power, was not able altogether to conceal them even from his own subjects, let his exasperation exhale in furious invectives against the Marquis Chastellar, to whom he ascribed both the exciting of the revolt in Tyrol, and the cruelties which he alleged had been committed by the peasantry. The latter charge, founded upon some isolated acts of revenge perpetrated

* Barth., 116, 120. Gesch. A. Hofer, 101, 102.

† Pel., iii., 91, 95. Gesch. A. Hofer, 100, 101, 102.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 97, 99. Pel., iii., 90. Barth., 106, 108.
† Upon signing this capitulation, Bisson exclaimed, "This day will be my last: the grave of my honour and military reputation. Never will Napoleon believe that this disaster might not have been averted; even were I merely unfortunate, he would impute it to me as a crime." In this, however, the French general was mistaken: it was for the interest of the emperor to conceal this check, and the lustre of subsequent events enabled him to accomplish this object; Bisson was not disgraced, and, by a singular revolution of fortune, was the governor of Mantua when Hofer was shot in that fortress.—Gesch. A. Hofer, 97, 98.

in the assault of Innsbruck, was wholly unfounded as against the Tyrolese in general; and against Chastellar, in particular, was in an especial manner false, as at the time of the acts complained of on the banks of the Inn he was still at Brixen, sixty miles distant, to the south of the Brenner, and even ignorant of the whole operations to the north of that mountain. But this sentence of outlawry against Chastellar and Hormayer, both of whom were ordered to be delivered to a military commission as soon as taken, and shot within twenty-four hours, was of a piece with the invariable policy of Napoleon in such circumstances. Whenever a disaster had occurred to his arms, or an event had taken place likely to rouse an enthusiastic moral feeling against his government, he instantly propagated some falsehood against its authors, or exaggerated some trifling incident into a mighty enormity; and by the vehement abuse of the persons by whom his power had thus been assailed, often succeeded, at least with his own be-nighted subjects, in withdrawing public attention altogether from the calamities on his own part, or virtues on those of others which he sought to conceal.*

Chastellar, for a fortnight after the Tyrol was evacuated by the enemy, laboured assiduously to give something like military consistency to the tumultuary efforts of the peasantry. He succeeded in equipping a small body of cavalry, to whom he gave arms: a species of force of which these poor mountaineers stood much in need, and organized several battalions of excellent foot-soldiers; and, having put matters in a train to the north of the mountains, re-crossed the Brenner with his regular troops, and, descending the valley of the Eisach and Adige,

April 23. came up with the enemy in front of the famous defile of La Pietra, between Roveredo and Trent. The French, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, six thousand strong, were there posted, in a well-known position of uncommon strength, and held firm, to give the main body of their army under Eugene time to retreat in order to the banks of the Adige, after the disastrous battle of Sacile. The Austrians, having April 24. imprudently commenced an attack when worn out with the fatigue of a long march, were worsted and driven out of the defile with loss; but the French, notwithstanding, continued their retreat to the neighbourhood of Verona, and Chastellar took up his quarters in Roveredo. From thence, however, he was soon recalled to the north of the Brenner, by the threatened invasion of the province by the French troops after the disastrous battles in Bavaria.†

Jellachich, as already noticed,‡ after the defeat of Hiller at Landshut, had retired from Salzburg front- April 29. the 24th of April. Thither he was followed by Marshal Lefebvre with his corps, consisting chiefly of Bavarians. The Austrian general took up a strong position in front of Salzburg, where he endeavoured to arrest the advance of the French troops; but the numbers of the French were so superior that he was unable to effect his object, and was driven into the town with the loss of several hundred prisoners and three guns. The victors entered pell-

mel with the vanquished, and Jellachich, continuing his retreat in great disorder to the south, ascended the valley of the Salza, and, crossing the mountains behind Rastadt, made the best of his way towards Villach and Carinthia, abandoning the eastern districts of Tyrol to their fate. Thither Lefebvre shortly after bent his steps, having remained in Salzburg only long enough to put the town in a sufficient posture of defence, and establish the magazines necessary for the operations in that quarter. On the May 10. 10th of May he broke up and advanced to Reichenhall, a considerable burgh still in the open country, but within a mile of the mountains, which there rise in awful majesty abrupt and sheer from the plain, to all appearance impervious to human approach. On the May 11. day following, the French in great force advanced to the entrance of the passes. Notwithstanding their immense superiority of numbers, such was the natural strength of the defiles,* that it is doubtful if they would have succeeded in making good their entrance had the Tyrolese guards been all at their stations; but it was Ascension-day, and a large proportion of the peasants were absent at church, or engaged in their devotions or sports on the holiday: so that the contest fell on four hundred regular troops and a few companies of sharp-shooters, who, notwithstanding, for several hours kept at bay a whole Bavarian division. At length the barricades and formidable defences in the tremendous defile of Strub were forced, and the Tyrolese driven, combating all the way up the frightful gorges of the Achen, back to the neighbourhood of Worgl. There they stood firm, as they were re-enforced by Chastellar with a few thousand regular troops; but on the same day intelligence arrived that the passes of the Inn, at the entrance of the plain, had been forced by Deroy with another Bavarian division, the Thierseebach crossed, and that the enemy's outposts had already appeared before Kufstein.†

Finding himself thus threatened both from the side of Salzburg and Kufstein, Chas- Combats at tellar, who had only three thousand Feuer Singer regular troops at his disposal, the re- and Worgl. mainder being a body of as many Tyrolese peasants, without any other discipline than what they

* No defiles in Europe exceed in romantic interest those which lie between Reichenhall and Worgl, through which the high road passes. Winding by the side of torrents, through narrow ravines shut in by walls of rocks, which barely leave room for a carriage-way; often blown out of the mass, between precipices a thousand or fifteen hundred feet high; scaling heights to appearance almost perpendicular, by an angle of elevation unknown in any other European road; descending break-neck declivities by the side of roaring streams, in the midst of forests of matchless beauty, surmounted by romantic peaks, starting up into endless fantastic forms, six or seven thousand feet in height, they possess a degree of interest to the lover of the picturesque exceeding even the far-famed passage of the Simplon. The most ardent imagination, furnished with the widest recollection of romantic scenery, can figure nothing approaching to the sublimity of the defile of Strub, where the road, apparently blocked up by a wall of rock two thousand feet in height, is cut through a narrow passage beside the roaring stream, and then winds its devious way amid overhanging forests of dark pine, intermingled with huge crags of brilliant colours, and surmounted by bare peaks silvered with snow. The most beautiful points in the vast amphitheatre of the Alps, as the author can testify, after having visited most parts of them, are the valley of Berchtesgaden; the Königsee and defile of Strub, near Salzburg; the Via Mala in the Grisons; the defile of Gondo on the route of the Simplon; the valley of Gasteren and Oeschinen in the vale of Kandersteg, near the Gemmi; and the approach to the Grande Chartreuse in Savoy.—*Personal observation.*

* Pel., iii., 95, 96. Gesch. A. Hofer, 105, 106.

† Pel., iii., 169, 171. Barth., 132, 136. Gesch. A. Hofer, 114, 121, 128, 136

‡ Ante, iii., 187.

† Pel., iii., 99, 100. Barth., 138, 142. Gesch. A. Hofer, 157, 159.

had acquired in their native valleys, resolved to take the initiative, and combat Lefebvre in the first instance, before Deroy came up. With this view, he occupied the defile of Feuer Singer, which lies between the ravines of the Achen and the pass of Strub, and strengthened the gorge with some rude fieldworks; but the impetuous attack of the Bavarians, flushed with the victory of Abensberg, overcame every obstacle, and the Austrians, after a bloody struggle, were driven back at the point of the bayonet to their reserves, posted at the important position of Worgl. Stationed there behind a rivulet, in a situation which commanded the junction of the roads from Kufstein and Salzburg, and barred the only access to Innspruck, Chastellar stood firm, and, with four thousand regular troops and six thousand peasants, gave battle to the enemy. The open and desolate plain of Worgl, however, was unfavourable to the operations of the new levies, who were dispirited at finding themselves driven into the open country from the fastnesses which they had deemed impregnable; and their total want of cavalry rendered them incapable of opposing with success the numerous and powerful squadrons of Linange. The Bavarians were greatly superior in number, being eighteen thousand strong, with thirty pieces of cannon, while the united Tyrolese and Austrians did not amount to half that number. After a short combat the Austrians were entirely defeated, with the loss of all their baggage, ammunition, and guns, seven in number; which, with five hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the enemy.*

Nothing now remained to prevent the conquest of the Lower Innthal by the Bavarians; and if they had pushed on with vigour and rapidity, they might have struck a seasonable terror into the insurgents by the capture of their principal leaders and magazines at Innspruck. But they advanced so tardily that they gave the Tyrolese time to recover from their consternation: re-enforcements poured down the Brenner, and the mountains of Scharnitz, to the fugitives from Worgl; and Chastellar, who narrowly escaped being made prisoner by the enemy, met with Hormayer at Steinach, and concerted measures for future operations. Slowly moving up the valley of the Inn, Lefebvre found the resistance of the people increase with every step he advanced: Schwartz was only carried by assault after a desperate resistance, and burned, in the struggle, to the ground. Frightful atrocities marked the steps of the invaders: the Bavarians wreaking their vengeance on the unhappy peasants, for the real or imaginary injuries they had received, by the perpetration of the most revolting military cruelties. Old men, women, and children were massacred indiscriminately, and every village from which a shot had issued committed to the flames. Meanwhile, Chastellar, who had been strongly irritated at the Tyrolese, on account of the furious conduct of some drunken peasants at Hall, who tried to pull him from his horse from indignation at his retreat, had re-passed the Brenner, and the Innthal was again reduced to its own resources. On the 19th, Lefebvre appeared before Innspruck, which submitted without resistance: the minds even of the heroic leaders of the insurrection being stunned by the misfortunes which

were now accumulating around them on all sides, and justly considering a prolonged resistance hopeless after Vienna had opened its gates to the enemy, and the Archduke John had evacuated the Carinthian Mountains.*†

Affairs in Tyrol were now wellnigh desperate; for, at the very time when these disasters were accumulating on the north of the Brenner, a strong French force of fifteen thousand men, under Baraguay d'Hilliers and Rusca, detached by Eugene after his victory on the Piave, to which the peasants, now stripped of the regular troops for the defence of the Innthal, had nothing to oppose, was rapidly advancing up the valley of the Adige, and had already occupied Roveredo and menaced Trent. Chastellar, despairing of success, had made arrangements for leaving the country; and Hormayer, who, with unshaken resolution, was still endeavouring to rouse the peasantry in the lateral valleys of the Innthal, found them in most places indignant at the retreat of the Austrians, and fast returning to their homes. General Buol, indeed, with two thousand five hundred men and six guns, still occupied the crest of the Brenner; but he was in a wretched condition, starving with cold, destitute of ammunition, and almost without provisions. In these mournful circumstances, it was the invincible tenacity of the peasantry in the Upper Innthal, and elevated parts of the Brenner and Scharnitz ranges of mountains, which restored the fortunes of the campaign. Eisensticken, aide-camp to Hofer, Spechbacher, and Friar Haspinger, vied with each other in the indefatigable ardour with which they roused the people; and even the first fell himself on his knees to General Buol, when he was preparing to abandon the Brenner, and by the vehemence of his entreaties prevailed upon him to keep his ground on that important position. Hofer, who, in the first instance, was thrown into the deepest dejection by the misfortunes impending over his country, and rendered incapable of active exertion, was roused by their example to nobler efforts, and, appearing at the head of his peasants, forced the Passeyrthal, commenced a fierce attack on the Bavarians at Presburg, near Mount Isel, which, although unsuccessful, struck no small

Desperate state of affairs in Tyrol, and firmness of the peasantry.

May 25.

* Moniteur, June 8, 1809. Pel., iii., 104, 106. Gesch. A. Hofer, 158, 165.

† The Archduke John, on occasion of his first disaster on the Piave, on the 30th of April, wrote to Hofer in these words: "Do not allow the misfortunes of Germany to make you uneasy: we have done our duty, and will defend the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Salzburg, to the last drop of our blood. It is in that fortress, aided by our brave mountaineers, that we ought to conquer or die, for the glory of our ancestors and our arms: *I shall not retire to Hungary.*" And on the 3d of May he wrote to Chastellar: "Our misfortunes in Germany have obliged me to abandon the offensive, and to direct my attention to the provinces, which are of so much consequence to Austria. Do not be alarmed: the Tyrol shall never be forsaken; *I will defend it and the interior of Austria to the last extremity.*" It would have been well for the Archduke John and the Austrian monarchy if he had adhered to these resolutions, and thrown himself into the Tyrol when obliged to evacuate Italy by the disasters at Bavaria, as in that case he would have been in a situation to have taken part in the important and probably decisive operation projected by the Archduke Charles at Lintz on the 22d of May, and protected the interior of the monarchy as effectually as under the ramparts of Vienna. Instead of this, he at once disobeyed his brother's orders, and those of the Aulic Council, and violated his own promises by retiring into Hungary, and thereby not only caused the whole fruits of the battle of Aspern to be lost, but saved Napoleon from a disastrous retreat.*

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 157, 159. Pel., iii., 101, 102. Barth., 142, 148.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 140, 141.

alarm into the enemy, from the gallantry with which it was conducted. This combat renewed the warlike ardour of the Tyrolese, who flocked from all quarters in great strength to the general place of gathering on Mount Isel, which ancient prophecy led them to expect was to be the theatre of great events to the Tyrol; while Lefebvre, who deemed the affairs of the provinces settled by the capture of Innspruck, and submission of the authorities in that place, had set out for Salzburg, leaving Deroy at the capital with eight thousand foot, eight hundred horse, and twenty pieces of cannon.*

The forces engaged on the 29th of May, on the heights of Mount Isel, were, in numerical strength, very unequal: the Tyrolese having nine hundred infantry, seventy horse, and five guns of the Austrian troops, besides a motley assemblage of peasants, to the number of twenty thousand men; individually brave and skilled in the use of arms, but altogether undisciplined and unaccustomed to act together in large masses; while the Bavarians had only eight thousand foot, eight hundred horse, and twenty-five guns. The numerical superiority, however, of the former was fully counterbalanced by their great inferiority in discipline, cavalry, and artillery, so that the real military strength of both sides might be considered as very nearly equal. Hofer did his best to compensate his weakness in cavalry by stationing his followers, as much as possible, in the wooded heights at the foot of Mount Isel, where horsemen could not penetrate; but the town was not to be carried by such a blockade, and the impetuous spirit of the peasantry led them to demand an immediate assault. Their spirits had been elevated to the highest degree by the intelligence of the battle of Aspern, which had been communicated with extraordinary rapidity to the most secluded valleys, and by a proclamation issued by the Emperor Francis the day after that glorious event, dated Breitenlee, 23d of May, in which he solemnly engaged "never to lay down his arms till Tyrol was reunited to the Austrian monarchy."[†]

The attack on Innspruck was combined with more military skill than could have been anticipated from the untutored character of the leaders by whom it was conducted. Spechbacher, who, in spite of the utmost vigilance of the Bavarians, had contrived to warn the peasants on both sides of the Inn of the approaching gathering,§ menaced the bridge of Hall, and the line of retreat down the valley of the Inn from the northern side, while Colonel Ressenfels co-oper-

ated in the same direction from the southern valleys, by a descent along the right bank of the Sill, and attack on the castle of Ambras; Hofer descended with all the strength of the southern and central valleys of Tyrol, from the Brenner and Mount Isel; while Teimer, with a small band of six hundred resolute followers, was sent by a circuitous route to the heights of Hottingen, on the north of the town, and in the rear of the Bavarians, to make his appearance in the middle of the action, and spread terror among the enemy, from the belief that they were beset on all sides. Thus the battle consisted of a variety of detached combats in different directions around Innspruck, contemporary with the now furious struggle at the foot of Mount Isel, between the main body of the combatants on either side. By daybreak Spechbacher was at the post assigned to him, and amid loud shouts, carried the important bridge of Hall with such vigour, that it gained for him the surname of "*Der Feuer-Teufel*," the *Fire Devil*. The castle of Ambras soon after yielded to the impetuous assault of Reissensfels, and the whole right bank of the Sill was cleared of the enemy; but they long held their ground at the bridge of Passberg, commanding the passage of that torrent by the great road on the south of the Inn. From this position, however, they were at length driven, about noon, by the more skilled attacks of Captain Dobrawa; and the left flank of the enemy being thus completely turned, and their retreat down the Inn cut off, they were thrown back in great disorder to the village and abbey of Wilten.*

While affairs were proceeding so prosperously on the east of Innspruck, a more Bloody action of Spechbacher and Haspinger. dubious conflict was raging in the centre and on the left, at the foot of Mount Isel. Haspinger, with a huge wooden cross in his hand, here led on the attack, and animated his followers not less by his example than the assurances of Divine protection which he held forth; he was followed by Colonel Ertel with the most disciplined part of the Tyrolese, two thousand strong; while Hofer, with the peasants of the Passeyrthal, descended from Mount Isel by the great road direct upon Innspruck; his brave but tumultuous array shouting aloud, "For God, and the Emperor, and our Fatherland!"[†] The outposts of the enemy were speedily driven in by the superior numbers and unerring aim of the Tyrolese riflemen; but when they advanced out of the woods and broken knolls to the open ground in front of the town, where the Bavarians were drawn up in line in admirable order, the usual superiority of discipline and organization became apparent, and the peasants were driven back. Rallying, however, among the rocks and thickets, they again poured down a destructive shower of balls on their assailants, and both sides maintained the contest with the most undaunted resolution. The ammunition of the Tyrolese, with which they were very scantily provided, at length began to fail: they were compelled to reserve their fire till it could be given with decisive effect; and balls could be obtained only by women and children, who picked up those of the enemy

* Pol., iii., 106, 107; iv., 31, 32. Gesch. A. Hofer, 217, 229. Barth., 138, 150.

† Pol., iv., 31. Gesch. A. Hofer, 231, 232. Schoel, Hist. des Trait. de Paix, 9, 257. Erz. Johan. Feldzug, 1809, 162.

‡ Hofer addressed the following characteristic letter to the inhabitants of the Upper Innthal: "Dear brethren of the Upper Innthal! For God, the Emperor, and our Fatherland! To-morrow, early in the morning, is fixed for the attack. With the help of the blessed Virgin, we will seize and destroy the Bavarians, and confide ourselves to the beloved Jesus. Come to our assistance; but, if you fancy yourselves wiser than Divine Providence, we will do without you.—ANDREW HOFER.—GESCH. A. HOFER, 238.

The proclamation of the Emperor Francis to the Tyrolese, dated the 1st of June, 1809, bore: "Operations at all points are about to recommence: I will send you a helping hand. We will combat together for our country and our religion. Your noble conduct has sunk deep into my heart: I will never abandon you. The Archduke John will speedily be among you, and put himself at your head."—ERZHER. JOHANNES Feldzug in Jahre, 1809, 162.

§ See note C.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 240, 245. Barth., 192, 196. Inglis, ii., 183.

† "Für Gott, den Kaiser, und Vaterland."

‡ Spechbacher was attended in the battle by his little son Andrew, a boy of ten years of age. When the fire grew warm, his father ordered him to quit the field; the boy did so, but soon returned, and was again at his side. Irritated at this disobedience, Spechbacher struck him, and ordered him to withdraw. He did so; but, without retiring out of

which fell in the rear of the combatants. In this anxious moment, Teimer's bands appeared on the heights of Hottingen in the rear of the Bavarians; and though their attack was restrained by the troops which Derooy sent to oppose his progress, yet this circumstance, joined to the disastrous accounts of the progress of Spechbacher on the left, determined Derooy to retreat. At four in the afternoon, a sort of suspension of arms was agreed to by the leaders on both sides; and as soon as it was dark the Bavarians commenced their retreat by the left bank of the Inn, and, evacuating Innspruck and the great road, withdrew by mountain paths amid rocks and forests to Kufstein, from whence they continued their march to Rosenheim, in the Bavarian plains.*

In this battle the Bavarians lost four thousand men; but, what was of still more importance, they were deprived of it of the possession of the whole Tyrol. Intoxicated with joy, the peasants crowded into Innspruck in such numbers that they were an oppression, rather than a source of strength, to the Austrian commanders, who were totally destitute of ammunition or military arms for the ardent multitude. A proclamation was immediately issued, calling on all persons to bring forth their little stores of money and powder for the use of the troops, and considerable supplies were obtained in this way, though in no degree proportionate to the wants of the people. The desperate struggle in the heart of Austria required every sabre and bayonet around the walls of Vienna; the intervening country was all in the hands of the enemy, and not a dollar or a gun could be obtained from that quarter. Such, however, was the native vigour of the inhabitants, that, without any external aid or the support of regular troops, they not only cleared their territory of the enemy, but carried their incursions into the adjoining provinces of Swabia, Bavaria, and Lombardy. On May 29. the west, the peasantry of the Vorarlberg repulsed a body of French and Wirtembergers, who attempted to penetrate into Bregentz; on the east, Chastellar, who had collected four thousand regular troops, raised the blockade of Sachsenburg, and drove the enemy back to Villach; in the south, Leinenzen cleared the whole valley of Trent of the enemy, and then turning to the left, descended the defile of the Val Sugana, and made himself master of Bassano at the entrance of the plains of Treviso. Returning from thence to the banks of the Adige, he threw himself into the castle of Trent, where he was soon besieged by a division of Eugene's Italian army. June 9. The landsturm of the Upper Adige, however, flew to his relief: the Italians, overwhelmed by numbers, retired, with considerable loss, to Dolce, and the whole valley of the Adige, as far as Verona, was cleared of the enemy. The Vorarlberg followed the example of Tyrol: all the

valleys took up arms, and seven thousand well-armed marksmen, besides a landsturm of equal force, carried terror and devastation over all the adjacent provinces of Germany. Moeskirch and Memmingen were successively occupied, and laid under contribution; Constance fell into their hands; their victorious bands appeared even at the gates of Munich and Augsburg; June 29. and, in conjunction with the inhabitants of Swabia, who were highly discontented with the exactions and tyranny of the French troops, delivered no less than seventeen thousand of the prisoners taken at Echmuhl, Ebersberg, and Vienna, who found refuge in the valleys of Tyrol, and were speedily formed into fresh battalions. To the south of the Alps, Bassano, Belluno, Feltre, were repeatedly in their possession; they communicated with the Austrian regulars in Carniola; levied contributions to the gates of Verona, Brescia, and Como; and, spreading the flame of insurrection from the Black Forest to the plains of Lombardy, and from Salzburg to the Grisons, soon had twenty thousand infantry and eight hundred horse, regularly organized and equipped, under arms, besides a still greater number of brave men, undisciplined, indeed, but skilled in the use of arms, ready, in case of invasion, to defend their native valleys.*

While this heroic contest was going forward in the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, the generous flame had extended to the north of Germany, and the indignant feelings of an insulted people had well-nigh induced a general revolt against the French authority in Saxony and Westphalia.

It has been already mentioned with what ardent though inconsiderate enthusiasm the people of Prussia had rushed into the contest in 1806, and what oppressive burdens were laid upon them after its disastrous termination.† Since that time, the continued presence of the French troops, and the enormous plunder levied by their command under the name of contributions, had still farther spread the flame of discontent: dear-bought experience had dispelled all the illusion in favour of French principles, and the people were nowhere so ready to throw off the yoke as in those principalities where separate thrones had been erected in favour of members of the Bonaparte family. Such was the weight of the oppression under which they laboured, that the ramifications of a secret and most formidable insurrection were spread over all the north of Germany. The ancient Gothic blood, slow to warm, but enduring in purpose, was everywhere inflamed: the feeling of patriotism, a sense of duty, the precepts of religion, all concurred to rouse a disposition to resistance; the selfish mourned over the visible decrease of their substance under the withering contributions of Napoleon; the generous over the degradation of their country, and the slavery of the human race. Everywhere the Tugendbund was in activity: Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, and Westphalia, in an especial manner, were agitated from the enormous weight of the burdens imposed on their inhabitants by the French government. Twenty thousand disbanded soldiers were scattered over the former dominions of England in the German Empire, ready, at the first signal, to compose an army; as many ardent and discontented spirits

reach of the shot, observed where they struck the ground, and, bringing his hat full of them next morning to his father, begged that they might be used against the enemy. The wounded in this battle refused to be carried from the field, lest those who conveyed them to a place of safety should weaken the combatants; and numbers of women, throughout the day, were to be seen behind the ranks, bringing up ammunition, water, and refreshments to the wearied men.—See BARTH., *Krieg.*, 1809, 204-216; *GESCH. A. HOFER*, 248.

* *GESCH. A. HOFER*, 238, 249. Barth., 202, 212. Inglis, ii., 183, 184. Pel., iv., 34, 36. Bavarian account of battle, *Moniteur* June 22, 1809.

* Pel., iv., 38, 39. *Ann. Reg.*, 1809, 218. *GESCH. A. HOFER*, 259, 277. Barth., 212, 220.

† *Ante*, ii., 433, 584, 585.

existed in Cassel and Westphalia, awaiting only the first success of the Austrian arms to declare openly in their behalf. From the Thuringian forest to the banks of the Vistula, from the Bohemian Mountains to the shores of the Baltic, the threads of a vast association existed, held together by the sacred bond of patriotism, to devote themselves to their fatherland. Though the court of Berlin did not venture openly to fan the flame, yet in secret they could not but wish for its success; and several of the most energetic members of the cabinet awaited only the advance of the Austrian banners to urge Frederic William to join the great confederacy for European freedom.*

It was chiefly with a view to give support and consistency to this enthusiastic spirit that the grand Austrian army, in the opening of the campaign, advanced towards Bareuth and Franconia; and it was owing to the unfortunate abandonment of that design, and the return of great part of these troops, when already on the borders of Franconia, to the banks of the Inn, that the early disasters of the campaign, as already noticed, were owing.† Two of the archduke's corps were far advanced towards the Rhine, and could not be recalled in time to share in the battles of Abensberg and Echemuhl; while the concentrated masses of Napoleon were thrown upon the imperial army, weakened in the centre by the advance of the van in one direction, and the retreat of the rear in another. But this early irruption of the Austrians towards Franconia and Saxony excited a prodigious sensation in the adjoining provinces under the immediate control of the French authorities, and early in April a spark blew up the flame

on the banks of the Elbe. Katt, a Prussian officer, had the honour of first raising the standard of independence in the north of Germany; but the effort was premature, and, having failed in an attempt upon Magdebourg, he was compelled, by the active pursuit of the Westphalian horse, to take refuge in the Prussian States. The next outbreak took place three weeks after, when Dornberg, the colonel of a regiment of Westphalian horse, was commanded by King Jerome to march against a body of insurgents. Conceiving himself discovered, he left his colours and put himself at their head. Evincing, in these critical circumstances, a spirit worthy of his family, though far beyond his ordinary character, Jerome assembled his

guards, two thousand strong, and assuring them that he confided in their honour, and threw himself upon their support, succeeded in attaching even the most disaffected, by the bond of military honour, to his cause. Eble, the minister at war, and Rewbell, governor of Cassel, displayed the greatest vigour and firmness of character; and by their energetic measures saved the kingdom when on the verge of destruction, and prevented a general insurrection breaking out in the north of Germany. Dornberg, at the head of several thousand insurgents, marched upon the capital; but having been encountered near its gates by a part of the garrison, whom he was unable to bring to a parley, his undisciplined followers were dispersed by a few discharges of cannon, and he himself fled with a few followers to the Hartz Mountains. His pa-

pers were seized at Homberg, and among them were some which compromised several persons in the service of other powers, particularly SCHILL, at that time a colonel in the Prussian army.*

This enthusiastic officer, an ardent member of the Tugendbund, and heart and soul devoted to his fatherland, was the early success first Prussian officer who had entered Berlin, at the head of a native force, after its evacuation by the French troops; and the impression made upon his mind by the universal transports which prevailed on that occasion had never been effaced. His intentions were fixed; but the ardour of his disposition was tempered by a rare prudence, and but for the accidental discovery of his name among the papers of Dornberg, his enterprise would in all probability have been delayed till the period for its successful prosecution had arrived. Almost every day he led his regiment out of Berlin, in full marching order, to reviews, marches, and mock-fights, which so completely imposed upon the ministers of Russia, France, and Westphalia, that, with all their vigilance, they never suspected him of being engaged in any sinister design, while his engaging manners and martial qualities rendered him the idol of the soldiers under his command. Denounced, at length, by the King of Westphalia to the King of Prussia, who was then at Königsberg, he was summoned by the latter to the royal presence to give an account of his conduct. Perceiving now that he was discovered, he boldly threw off the mask, marched at the head of six hun-

dred men out of Berlin, under pretence of going to manoeuvre, and at once erected the standard of war against France. He was speedily re-enforced by three hundred more, who joined him during the night; the whole inhabitants of the capital applauded his conduct; and such was the ferment in the garrison, that it was with the utmost difficulty that they could be prevented from proceeding in a body to his standard. The cabinet of Berlin, whatever may have been their secret wishes, were too much overawed by the influence of Napoleon, and the intelligence recently received of his astonishing victories in Bavaria, to sanction this hazardous proceeding. Schill was indicted for disobedience of orders, and outlawed for non-appearance; and Lestocq, Tauenzein, and Scharnhorst, who were known to be at the head of the war party, sent in their resignation. The two former were brought to trial, but acquitted, there being no evidence to connect them with Schill's enterprise.†

Meanwhile, Schill, having collected about twelve hundred men, presented himself before Wittemberg, where there was known to be a considerable magazine of arms and ammunition, but he was refused admittance by the governor. He next moved towards Magdebourg, which at that period was garrisoned only by two companies of French and three of Westphalian voltigeurs. Had he succeeded in gaining possession of that important fortress, all the north of Germany would have been in a blaze; for it contained five hundred pieces of cannon, and a hundred and twenty thousand stand of arms, besides ammunition in proportion; and the news of so vast an acquisition

* Hard., x., 325, 326. Pel., iii., 10, 13. Ann. Reg., 1809, 212, 213.

† Ante, iii., 188.

* Pel., iii., 14, 19. Hard., x., 326. Jom., iii., 239.
† Hard., x., 327, 328. Pel., iii., 17, 25. Jom., iv., 233.
234. Thib., vii., 274.

Fails in his attempt on Magdebourg—retires to Stralsund.

would speedily have brought thirty thousand men to his standards, whom its impregnable ramparts would have given the means of disciplining in security. It is the more to be regretted that he did not attempt a *coup de main* against it, as the urban guards would speedily have given him the means of defending its walls, and numerous partisans within the town were already prepared to favour his entrance. Ignorant, however, of

May 7. these propitious circumstances, he turned aside upon the first appearance of resistance, at the distance of a mile from the glacis, and retired to Domitz on the other side of the Elbe, having by an equally unfortunate accident diverged from the Hartz Mountains, where he would have united with the remains of Dornberg's corps, which had taken refuge in their fastnesses, and together formed a body of disciplined men adequate to the encounter of the whole forces of Westphalia, which at that period contained hardly two thousand regular soldiers. His unfortunate direction, however, down the Elbe, deluded by the hope of obtaining succour from the English cruisers on the coast, led

May 25. him far away from all assistance; and at length, being pursued, though slowly, and at a respectful distance, by a considerable body of Dutch and Westphalian troops, he threw himself into Stralsund, of which he gained possession without much resistance, the greater part of the garrison having joined his standard.*

He was now at length in a renowned fortress, abundantly provided with provisions, and communicating with the sea: His prospects there. the isle of Rugen seemed to offer a secure asylum in case of disaster, and he had the good fortune, the day after his arrival, to capture a convoy of seven hundred barrels of powder, on its road to Denmark. But its defences had been almost entirely dismantled by order of Napoleon: only twenty rusty guns were mounted on the ramparts; the palisades were levelled with the ground; and the ditches, half choked up by luxuriant vegetation, presented hardly any obstacle to an enemy. Still Schill had considerable means of resistance at his disposal: his troops had swelled to two thousand infantry and twelve squadrons of cavalry; two companies had been formed of students from the universities, armed, as yet, only with pikes; and the landwehr of Pomerania, five thousand strong, might be expected to augment his forces, if he could hold out for a few days, in order to give them time to assemble. Where, where was England then? A single brig, with her pendant, would have inspired such spirit into the garrison as would have rendered them invincible: three thousand men and a few frigates would have rendered Stralsund the base of an insurrection which would speedily have spread over the whole of Northern Germany, determined the irresolution of Prussia, thrown eighty thousand men on Napoleon's line of communication, and driven him to a disastrous retreat from Aspern to the Rhine. But the English government, as usual, insensible to the value of time in war, had made no preparation to turn to good account this universal demonstration in their favour in the north of Germany; and, as with the Vendéans at Grand-villet in 1793, did not appear on the theatre till the standards of their allies had sunk in the conflict. In vain all eyes were turned towards the

ocean: in vain every steeple was crowded with gazers, anxiously surveying with telescopes the distant main: not a friendly sail appeared, not a pendant of England brought hope and consolation to the besieged.*

Deprived of the hoped-for succour, on which he had mainly relied in directing his steps to the seacoast, Schill did all that His defeat and death. prudence and energy could effect to strengthen his position. Palisades were hastily erected; the vicinity of the gates armed; barricades thrown up behind the breaches and in the streets; and the external defences put in some sort of order. But, before his preparations could be completed, the hand of fate was upon him. The French authorities, now everywhere thoroughly alive to the dangers of this insurrection, made the most vigorous efforts to crush it in the bud: troops marched from all sides to May 31. the neighbourhood of Stralsund; the Dutch and Danish soldiers were united to all the French who could be hastily drawn together; and on the 31st of May, General Gratien, with six thousand men, commenced the assault. The patriots made a gallant defence; but the dismantled walls presented huge breaches on all sides, through which, despite the utmost resistance, the assailants penetrated, and the interior barricades were forced. Still every street was obstinately contested. The result was yet doubtful, when Schill was killed, and his heroic band, disheartened, and without a leader after his loss, dispersed. The insurrection in the north of Germany was extinguished, and on the same day on which General Gratien had hoisted the French colours on the walls, the English cruisers approached the harbour.† Arrived a few hours sooner, the place had been secured, the insurrection spread over the whole north of Germany, and Wagram had been Leipsic! Such is the value of time in war.

The Duke of Brunswick Oels, who, at the same time that Schill left Berlin, Movement of the Duke of Brunswick. May 4. had, with a small Austrian force, advanced out of the Bohemian frontier, and made himself master of Leipsic and other considerable towns in Saxony, being unable to effect a junction, either with Schill or Dornberg, and surrounded by superior forces, was obliged to retire by Zittau May 22. into Bohemia, from whence, after the battle of Wagram, he contrived to make his way across all the north of Germany, and was ultimately taken on board the English cruisers, and conveyed, with his black legion, still two thousand strong, to the British shores. The insurrection was thus everywhere suppressed; but such was the impression which it produced upon Napoleon, that the whole corps of Kellerman, thirty thousand strong, which otherwise would have been called to the support of the Grand Army, was directed to the north of Germany.‡

This gigantic contest stained also the waters of the Vistula with blood. It has been already mentioned that the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of a corps of the Austrian army, mustering in all thirty-two thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, with

Operations in Poland, and their object, by the Archduke Ferdinand.

* Pel., iii., 34. Hard., x., 330. Jom., iii., 234.

† Pel., iii., 35. Hard., x., 330, 331. Jom., iii., 234. Ann. Reg., 1809, 213.

‡ Ann. Reg., 1809, 213. Pel., iii., 26. Jom., 235

§ Ante, iii., 180

* Pel., iii., 23, 31. Jom., iii., 234. Hard., x., 330, 331. Ann. Reg., 1809, 213.

† Ante, i., 266.

fortresses in a respectable posture of defence; and, having done so, he boldly, by the directions of Napoleon, left the enemy in possession of the capital and three fourths of the territory of the grand-duchy, and threw himself upon the right bank of the Vistula, remounting that stream, towards Galicia, whither Prince Gallitzin, at the head of twenty thousand auxiliary Russians, was slowly bending his steps. Meanwhile, the

May 13. Archduke Ferdinand more rapidly descended the left bank, and in the middle of May appeared before Thorn. In the course of this movement, Poniatowsky obtained intel-

May 14. ligence that an Austrian division had crossed over to the right bank of the Vistula, and lay unsupported at Ostrowck, in front of Gora. Rapidly concentrating a superior force, he suddenly attacked the enemy, routed him, and made fifteen hundred prisoners. Thus the opposing armies mutually passed and crossed each other: Poniatowsky, relying on the support of the Russians, menaced Galicia and the Austrian provinces, while the Austrians penetrated to the Lower Vistula, raised the standard of insurrection in the old Prussian provinces, and threatened Dantzic itself.*

An event occurred, in the course of this expedition of the Archduke Ferdinand's light troops across the Vistula, attended, in the end, with more important consequences than any other in the Polish campaign. In pursuing the Austrians on the right flank of the river, a courier was taken by the Poles with despatches from the Russian general Gortchakoff, who lay with his division at Brzysc, to the archduke, in which he congratulated him on his victory at Raszyn and capture of Warsaw, expressed hopes for his ulterior success, and breathed a wish that he might soon join his arms to the Austrian eagles. This letter was immediately forwarded to Napoleon, who received it at Schönbrunn in the end of May. He was highly indignant at the discovery, and transmitted the letter without delay to St. Petersburg, accompanied by a peremptory demand for an explanation. The Russian cabinet hastened to make every reparation in their power: Gortchakoff's letter was disavowed, and he himself recalled from his command, while CZERNICHEFF, aid-de-camp to Alexander, who was the military chargé d'affaires for the Czar at the headquarters of the French emperor, exerted all his skill to remove the unfavourable impression produced by this unlucky discovery. Napoleon, who, after the battle of Aspern, had no need of another powerful enemy on his hands, feigned to be satisfied, and the approach of the Russian troops to the theatre of war soon after, caused the affair to be hushed up; but the impression made on his mind was never effaced: he saw that the ascendant of Tilsit was at an end, and frequently repeated to those in his immediate confidence, "I see that, after all, I must make war on Alexander."[†]

The most important political effect, however, which flowed from the battle of Aspern was the commencement of a secret negotiation between Austria and Prussia, which, though, from the tardiness of England, unsuccessful at that juncture, was not without its effect in future times, and showed that the ancient jealousies which had wrought such wonders for French supremacy, were fast giving way under the pressure of common danger.

Even before that great event, a vague correspondence had been kept up between the two courts; and, in consequence of distant overtures transmitted first through the Count de Goltz, and subsequently the Prince of Orange, Colonel Steigenstesch had been sent by the cabinet of Vienna to Königsberg, where the King of Prussia then was, with a letter from the Emperor of Austria, in which he earnestly invited that monarch to declare openly for the common cause, and enter upon a concerted plan of military operations. Early in June, the Emperor of Austria, in reply to a letter of the King of Prussia, wrote to the cabinet of Berlin, announcing that "the bearer was authorized to regulate the proportions of the forces to be employed on both sides, and the other arrangements not less salutary than indispensable for the security of the two states, in conformity with the overtures made by Count de Goltz." The proposals of Colonel Steigenstesch were, that, as the war in which they were now engaged was of such a kind as to decide forever the fate of the respective monarchies, they should mutually support each other by their whole forces; that the general directions of the campaign should be intrusted to the imperial generalissimo; that they should mutually engage not to conclude a separate negotiation; and that the peace to be ultimately concluded should embrace not only their own, but the interests of the adjoining states. These propositions were warmly supported by Scharnhorst and Blucher, and the whole war or patriotic party in the Prussian dominions. The former offered in a fortnight's time to have fifty, in a month a hundred and twenty thousand disciplined soldiers under arms; he assured the king of secret intelligences which would secure for him, on the first signal of hostilities, Magdebourg and several other important fortresses; and strongly supported the justice of Count Stadion's opinion, so clearly expressed in his despatch,* that the fate of Prussia was inseparably wound up with that of Austria, and that the two monarchies must stand or fall together.

On this occasion, the cupidity and exorbitant demands of the Prussian cabinet again marred the prospect of a European alliance, and prolonged, for four years longer, the chains and

The exorbitant demands for Prussia cause it to fail.

not deceive ourselves: they have all fixed a rendezvous on my tomb, but they have not courage openly to set out thither. That the Emperor Alexander should not come to my assistance, is conceivable; but that he should permit Warsaw to be taken in presence almost of his army, is, indeed, hardly credible; it is plain that I can no longer reckon on an alliance in that quarter. Perhaps he thinks he does me a great favour by not declaring war; by my faith, if I had entertained any doubt on that subject before engaging in the affairs of Spain, I should have cared very little for the part which he took. And yet, after all, they will probably say that I am wanting to my engagements, and cannot remain at peace."[‡]—SAVARY, *ibid.*, 92, 93.

* Stadion to Wusserberg, June 9, 1809. Hard., x., 321, 325. Thib., vii., 306, 307.

* Pel., iii., 63, 71. Thib., vii., 309, 310. Jom., iv., 238.

† Sav., iv., 92, 93. Pel., iii., 71, 72. Thib., vii., 310.

‡ Conversing with Savary on this subject at Ebersdorf, who was in a peculiar manner admitted to his inmost thoughts, from having been formerly ambassador at St. Petersburg, he said, "I was perfectly in the right not to trust to such allies. What worse could have happened if I had not made peace with the Russians? What have I gained by their alliance? It is more than probable that they would have declared openly against me if a remnant of regard to the faith of treaties had not prevented them. We must

misery of their country. Still clinging to the idea that victory must be clearly pronounced before they declared themselves, and that they might turn to some good account the dangers and distresses of Austria, the Prussian government replied that they had every disposition to assist Austria, but that they were in want alike of arms, ammunition, and money; that they could not take a part in the contest till the views of Russia in regard to it were known; and that they must have the guarantee of a treaty for the intentions of Austria, in the event of success, before they took a place by her side. To the envoy of the imperial government, however, it was insinuated that "a great stroke would determine the irresolutions of the cabinet of Berlin;" but that, in that event, they would expect not merely the restoration of all the Prussian provinces of Poland, but also the *Austrians' share in the partition*, Anspach, Bareuth, a part of Saxony, and various lesser provinces, ceded at different times to France or other powers. It was, of course, beyond Colonel Steigenstesch's powers to accede to such extravagant demands: they

June 23. were referred, with the proposal for a separate treaty, to the cabinet of Vienna; and, meanwhile, the negotiation, notwithstanding all the care of those engaged in it, to a certain degree transpired;* a joint requisition was made by the ministers of France and Russia for a communication of the proposals of Austria, and, although this inconvenient demand was eluded at the moment, Steigenstesch was obliged to quit Berlin, and before diplomatic relations could be established in any other channel, of which the King of Prussia still held out the prospect, the battle of Wagram had taken place, and Austria, beset on all sides, and unsupported by any Continental power, was driven to a separate accommodation.†

Affairs wore a menacing aspect for the interests of Napoleon in more distant parts of his vast dominions. England, seeming to rise in vigour and resources as the contest advanced, was making her giant strength be felt in more than one quarter of Europe. Wellington had again landed in Portugal; the consternation produced by the Corunna retreat had passed away; and Soult, defeated on the banks of the Duoro, had with difficulty escaped from the north of Lusitania by the sacrifice of all his artillery and baggage. The Spanish armies were again assembling in the south of Castile, large forces were collecting in the plains of La Mancha, and everything indicated that, ere long, a formidable demonstration against the Spanish capital would be made by the united English and Peninsular forces. A considerable expedition was preparing in the harbours of Sicily to transport a large body of English and Sicilian troops into the south of Italy, where it was well known their presence would speedily produce a general insurrection; which was the more to be dreaded, notwithstanding the well-known imbecility of the Italians in military operations, that the recent annexation of the whole ecclesiastical states to the French Empire had aroused, as might have been expected, the most vehement hostility on the part of the Roman See and its numerous adherents in the Italian States; while General Miollis, the French governor of Rome,

had so small a force at his command, that it would be compelled, in all probability, to yield to the first summons of the Anglo-Sicilian forces. Lastly, the English, not content with their exertions in other quarters, were, it was well known, preparing an expedition of unprecedented magnitude in the harbours of the Channel; fame had magnified to a hundred thousand armed men and forty sail of the line the forces to be employed on the occasion; the Scheldt, the Elbe, the Seine itself, were alternately assigned as the probable destination of this gigantic armament; and Napoleon, with all his resources, was too clear-sighted not to perceive that he might, ere long, be overmatched by the strength of a more formidable confederacy than he had yet encountered; that the English standards would soon rouse the might of Northern Germany into mortal hostility; and that a second reverse on the shores of the Danube would at once dissolve his splendid dominion, and bring the forces of Europe in appalling strength to the banks of the Rhine.*

The impression produced over the Continent by the battle of Aspern was immense: it dissipated, in a great degree, the charm of Napoleon's invincibility, and, more even than the battle of Eylau, diffused a general hope that the miseries of foreign domination were approaching their termination, and that a second victory over the remains of the French army, now shut up in the island of Lobau, would at once restore freedom to an injured world. While the English nation abandoned themselves to transports of joy at the prospects which were thus dawning upon Europe, active endeavours were made by Austria to turn to the best account the extraordinary prosperous change which had taken place in their fortunes. Not discouraged by the failure of former attempts to rouse the north of Germany, the Duke of Brunswick Oels again advanced from Zittau, at the head of his gallant band of volunteers, towards Westphalia; while a considerable body of imperial landwehr from Bohemia, under General Amende, June 1. invaded Saxony, and another, under Radivojivich, five thousand strong, overran Franconia and penetrated to Bareuth. The forces of that kingdom, chiefly drawn under Bernadotte to the banks of the Danube, were in no condition to oppose this irruption; and the royal family, flying from their dominions, took refuge in France. Dresden and Leipsic were occupied by the Austrian troops; Bareuth and Bamberg fell into their hands; insurrections spread over all Franconia and Swabia; symptoms of disaf- June 12. fection were breaking out in Saxony and Westphalia; and a chain of Austrian posts, extending from the Elbe, by Nuremberg and Stockach, to the mountains of Tyrol, entirely cut off the communication between France and the Grand Army. Meanwhile, the most June 22. energetic appeals were everywhere made by the Austrian commanders to the people of their own, and all the adjoining countries,† to take up arms; while Napoleon, weakened by a disastrous battle on the banks of the Danube, could maintain himself only by a concentration of all his forces under the walls of Vienna.‡

Situation and prospects of Napoleon after the battle of Aspern. Duke of Brunswick takes Dresden.

* Hard., x.

† Thib., vii., 308, 309. Jom., ii., 41. Hard., x., 326.

* See chap. lvii. and lviii., infra, where these events are narrated.

† See note D.

‡ Pel., iv. 18, 22, 26. Hard., x., 393, 394.

CHAPTER LVI.

CAMPAIGN OF WAGRAM.

ARGUMENT.

Views and Policy of Napoleon at this Juncture.—Forces he had assembled in the Island of Lobau.—Forces and Views of the Archduke Charles at the same Period.—Napoleon's Projects for passing the River.—Prodigious Works executed in the Island of Lobau by the French Emperor.—Hidden real Designs of Napoleon as to the Point of Passage.—Defensive Preparations of the Austrians.—Measures of Napoleon to clear his Rear and Flanks.—The Austrians are checked in their Attempt to Force a Passage at Presburg.—Retreat of the Archduke John to Raab, and Position he took up there.—Battle of Raab.—Varied Success, but final Victory of the Viceroy.—Defeat and Losses of the Austrians.—Siege and Capture of Raab.—Operations of Marmont and Macdonald in Illyria, Carinthia, and Carniola.—Extraordinary Difficulties which they encountered.—Operations of Glulay in Carinthia, Carinthia, and Styria.—Attack on Broussier, near Gatz.—Junction of Eugene to the Grand Army, and Reconquest of Croatia by the Austrians.—Operations in Poland, and Successes of the Polish Detachments at Sandomir and Zamosc.—Recapture of Warsaw by the Poles, and Retreat of the Archduke Ferdinand.—Concluding Operations of the Campaign in Poland.—Extraordinary Concentration of the French Force in the Island of Lobau.—Force and Disposition of the Austrian Army.—False Preparations for a Passage in front of Aspern.—Extraordinary Passage of the Danube by Napoleon.—Vast Advantages gained by this Manœuvre to the French.—Retreat of the Austrians to the Position of Wagram.—Its Description.—Advance of the French over the Marchfeld.—Their unsuccessful Attack on the Plateau of Wagram.—Position and Plan of Napoleon for the Battle on the following Day.—The Archduke resolves to assume the Offensive.—His Plan of Attack.—Commencement of the Battle of Wagram.—Defeat of Massena in the Centre.—Napoleon's Measures to arrest the Disorder.—Splendid Progress of the Austrian Right towards Essling.—Success of Davoust against the Austrian Left Wing.—Neusiedel is taken, and the Austrian Left Wing driven back.—Grand Attack by Napoleon from the Centre.—Decisive Advance of Macdonald in that Quarter.—Measures of Napoleon to Support that Attack.—Retreat of the Archduke, and bloody Encounters in the Course of it.—Tardy Approach of the Archduke John.—Vital Importance of his Co-operation.—Results of the Battle.—Loss of the Battle was owing to the Archduke John's Neglect of Orders.—Napoleon visits the Field of Battle, and makes Macdonald a Marshal.—Appointment of Oudinot also a Marshal.—Disgrace of Bernadotte.—The Austrians retire towards Bohemia.—Retreat of the Archduke to Znaim, and his Position there.—Combat of Znaim.—Advance of Marmont, and Conclusion of the Army's Retreat to Znaim.—Motives which led the Austrians to this Step.—Arguments for and against the Amnesties at the French Headquarters.—Limits assigned to the two Armies by the Amnesties.—Hesitation of the Emperor of Austria to sign it, which is only done on the 18th.—Heavy Contribution levied on the Imperial Dominions.—Comparison of Wagram, Canne, and Waterloo.—Reflections on the Campaign, and its glorious Character to Austria.—Proof thereby afforded of the practical Goodness of the Austrian Government.—Causes of the extraordinary public Virtue exhibited by Austria at this Time.—Remarkable Contrast afterward exhibited by France.—Elevation of the Austrian Character from past Calamities.

Both the military and political position of Napoleon was now full of peril, and it was obvious to all the world that a single false step, one additional defeat, would expose him to certain ruin. But it was precisely in such circumstances that his genius shone forth with the brightest lustre, and that he was most likely by a sudden blow to reinstate his affairs, and overturn all the calculations of his enemies. No man ever saw so clearly where was the decisive point of the campaign, or so firmly made up his mind to relinquish all minor advantages, in order to accumulate his forces upon that vital quarter, where

defeat to his antagonists would prove certain ruin. In doing so, he followed the natural bent of his genius, which was never inclined to owe to combination what could be effected by audacity; but he was powerfully aided by the despotic nature of the authority which he wielded, and the irresponsible character of the command with which he was invested; for many other generals might have seen equally clearly the policy of concentrating all their strength for a blow at their adversary's heart, without possessing either the power to effect such a concentration, or the independence of others necessary to incur its responsibility. In the present instance, he saw at once that the vital point of the war was to be found under the walls of Vienna; and that, if he could succeed in defeating the Archduke Charles on the plain of the Marchfeld, he need not disquiet himself either about the victories of the Tyrolese in their Alpine valleys, the insurrection of the Germans on the banks of the Elbe, or the distant thunder of the English on the shores of the Scheldt. Fixing all his attention, therefore, upon the restoration of his bridges, the concentration of his forces, and the reanimating of his soldiers in the centre, he gave himself little disquiet about the tardy movements of the coalitions in the vast circumference of hostilities, and wrote to his lieutenants only to keep open the communications of the Grand Army with the Rhine, and he would soon find the means of dissipating the host of enemies who were accumulating round his extremities.*†

The force which remained at the disposal of the French emperor, even after the very serious losses of the battle of Aspern, was still immense. The chasms produced by that disastrous engagement had been more than supplied by the opportune arrival of Eugene's army at the imperial headquarters; while the corresponding forces of the Archduke John were, for the time at least, lost to the Austrian generals by the eccentric retreat of that prince to the Hungarian plains, instead of obeying his instructions and menacing the French communications from the Tyrolese Mountains.‡ From the confidential correspondence of Napoleon with Berthier at this period, which has since been published, it appears that, in the beginning of June, the Grand Army numbered, present with the eagles, no less than one hundred and ten thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand horse, with four hundred pieces of cannon: in all, at least a hundred and fifty thousand combatants. This was independent of the corps of Marmont in Dalmatia, of Vandamme in echelon, in the rear towards Bavaria, of Le-

* Pel., iv., 76, 77. Sav., iv., 94. Jom., iii., 246, 247.

† On the 6th of June Napoleon wrote from Schoenbrunn to Marshal Kellerman, who commanded the army of reserve in the north of Germany: "Before the enemy can have accomplished anything of essential importance in Saxony, the emperor will have passed the Danube, and be on their rear. But a corps which should approach the line of communication of the Grand Army might really prove dangerous: far more so than anything which could occur in the north of Germany."—*NAPOLEON TO KELLERMAN, 6th June, 1809; PELET, iv., 77, 78.*

‡ *Ante, iii., 202.*

febre in Tyrol, and of Macdonald in Styria. After making every deduction for the portions of these different corps which might be requisite to keep open the rear and maintain communications, at least fifty thousand men might be ordered up to support the Grand Army; and thus, after deducting for the sick and absent, a hundred and eighty thousand men could be assembled in a month's time under the walls of Vienna, of whom thirty thousand were cavalry, with six hundred pieces of cannon: a greater force, if the quality and equipment of the troops is taken into consideration, than had ever in the world before been assembled in a single battle. Nor was this all: immediately in their rear they had a fortified capital amply stored with provisions, and containing abundant supplies of all sorts for the use of the army; and the great arsenal of the Austrian monarchy, overflowing with artillery, arms, ammunition, pontoons, and every species of equipment that could be desired for the most extensive military operations.*

The inhabitants of the other countries of Europe, electrified by the intelligence of the battle of Aspern, and the retreat of the French army into the island of Lobau, entertained the most sanguine hopes that they would immediately be assailed there by the victorious Austrians, and either driven to the right bank of the Danube, and forced to evacuate the capital, or compelled to lay down their arms in that crowded and untenable position. Possibly, if the Archduke Charles had been aware of the magnitude of the losses which the French army had sustained, and the almost total exhaustion of their ammunition, he might, on the day after the battle, have made good a descent upon the island, and achieved the most glorious success. Such an enterprise, however, would at best have been attended with considerable hazard; for, although the French actually in the island the morning after the battle did not exceed forty thousand men, yet an equal force was under the command of Davoust on the right bank around Vienna, and thirty thousand more, under Vandamme and Bernadotte, were only a few marches in the rear from St. Polten to Lintz. On the other hand, the Imperialists, exhausted by the fatigues of a battle of two days' duration of unexampled severity, and weakened by the loss of nearly twenty-five thousand killed and wounded in the strife, were too happy to have escaped without destruction from so dreadful a contest, to think of immediately recommencing active operations. The force at the command of the archduke, though rapidly augmenting, was not at first, after the battle, very considerable. Fifty thousand of the warriors who had borne a part in the glorious strife alone remained unhurt; Kollowrath might soon bring up twenty thousand more from Lintz, and, when the fatal detour of the Archduke John was completed, he, it was hoped, would be able to add thirty thousand veteran troops from the Hungarian plains. Thus a hundred thousand regular troops, of which about twenty thousand were cavalry, might be reckoned on for the decisive battle which was to decide the fate of the monarchy; and, as this force would probably be swelled by fifty thousand landwehr, or reserves from the eastern and northern provinces of the monarchy before the end of June, the forces on the opposite sides were not materially different,

so far as numerical strength went; and the superior number of regular and veteran soldiers in the French ranks might be considered as compensated by the advantage which the German host derived from the homogeneous quality of its troops, the animation with which they were inspired in behalf of their country, and the enthusiasm which they generally felt at the glorious result of the late memorable battle in which they had been engaged.*

While remaining in a state of apparent inactivity at Schoenbrunn, Napoleon's Napoleon's project was chiefly directed to acts for cross- three objects: first, to convert the ing the Danube. island of Lobau into a vast fortress, rendered impregnable to attack by a plentiful array of heavy artillery, and connected with the right bank by strong bridges, from whence he might at any moment issue forth to attack the Archduke Charles, and, at the same time, find a secure refuge in case of disaster. Next, to secure and keep open his communication with the Rhine by means of a chain of posts, occupied by strong detachments, and a skilful disposition of the troops of the Rhenish Confederacy, under Lefebvre, Bernadotte, and Vandamme, all along the menaced districts in the valley of the Danube. Lastly, to clear his right flank of the enemy, drive the Archduke John still farther into the Hungarian plains, and throw back upon the left flank the corps which the Austrian generalissimo was pushing forward to endeavour to open up a communication with the Italian army. To accomplish these various objects, however, and at the same time retain a sufficient number of troops at headquarters to keep the great and rapidly-increasing army of the Archduke Charles in check, required an immense accumulation of forces. Every effort, therefore, was made to strengthen the Grand Army: Marmont received orders to hasten his march from Dalmatia with his whole corps; Macdonald, with his numerous divisions of the Italian army, was directed to advance from Styria, and the most pressing instructions were sent to the rear to order up every man and horse which could be spared from the dépôts and garrisons in the interior, to the headquarters of the Grand Army.†

The works in the island of Lobau were of the most gigantic description, and still remain an enduring monument of the great designs of the Emperor Napoleon, and the persevering energy and skill of his engineers. Never, since the days of the Romans, had works so vast been erected in the field in presence of the enemy. Three solid bridges connected the island of Lobau with the right bank of the Danube; and, in addition to this, a fourth, which ran across all the islands from shore to shore, over an extent of two hundred and forty fathoms. The most extraordinary pains were taken to render this bridge secure against the misfortune which had befallen the last: immediately above the bridge of boats was one on

Prodigious works executed in the island of Lobau by the French emperor.

* Pel., iv., 78, and Appendix, table 2d. Vict. et Conq., xix., 127. Jom., iii., 245.

† Pel., iv., 77, 78. Stut., 240, 242. Vict. et Conq., xix., 126.

‡ To such perfection were the movements of these distant and numerous bodies brought, that on each despatch was marked the hour and minute when the courier set out, with the hour when the troops were required to be at the general rendezvous in the island of Lobau; and they all arrived, many from the distance of some hundred miles, at the precise time assigned to them.—SAVARY, iv., 99.

* Pel., iv., 77, 78. Jom., ii., 246. Stut., 233, 236.

piles, which served as a barrier both against the violence of the current and the machinations of the enemy; and close adjoining to it, on the other side, one on pontoons, which also contributed to the strength of the whole, and served as an additional line of passage for the columns of infantry and light chariots. Both extremities of these bridges were fortified by strong *têtes-du-pont*: that on the northern extremity, where it was exposed to the attacks of the enemy, soon became a complete fortress, with rampart, wet ditches, ravelins, and lunettes, armed with eighty pieces of heavy cannon, drawn from the arsenal of Vienna. All the prominent points of the intermediate islands were also fortified and mounted with artillery, and boats collected and manned with marines brought from Brest by the provident foresight of the emperor, before the opening of the campaign, to be in readiness to intercept and turn aside any fire-ships or loaded barks that might be directed against it by the enemy. The emperor was indefatigable in urging forward these important operations: every day, for the first fortnight, he was to be seen in the island of Lobau, animating the men, conversing with the engineers directing the works; and such was the vigour which his presence and exertions inspired into his followers, that, in a fortnight after the battle of Aspern, the works were beyond the reach of the enemy's attack, and in a month they were entirely finished.*†

Immense as these preparations were, it was not to them that the emperor alone trusted for the grand operation of crossing the river. He was well aware that such gigantic works would speedily fix the attention of the enemy, and he daily beheld rising before his eyes vast intrenchments running through Essling and Enzersdorf, by which the Austrians hoped to bar the entrance to the Marchfeld from the bridge, and confine the enemy within the fortifications they had constructed. Like the vast armament of armed gunboats collected in 1805 on the shores of the Channel, these great operations were intended only to mask his hidden designs, and conceal from the enemy the real point of attack. While these prodigious bridges and fortifications attracted all the attention of the Austrians to the anticipated passage in front of Essling, there were secretly collected in one of the narrow channels behind the island of Lobau, in a situation entirely concealed from the enemy, the materials for three other bridges over the narrow arm of the river which separated that island from the northern bank, and which were so constructed that they could be transported and put together with extraordinary celerity. One of these bridges was composed of a single piece, sixty fathoms in length; the second, of the materials of the old bridge which had given way on the 22d of May, reconstructed with more skill;

the third, of boats and pontoons drawn from the arsenal of Vienna. The first of these bridges was justly considered so wonderful a piece of art, that a model of it is still preserved in Paris in the hall of the Conservatory of Objects of Art. The intention of the emperor was, that these bridges should be thrown across the arm of the Danube which separates Lobau from the opposite shore, considerably farther down than the great bridge in front of Essling, and in such a situation as to take all the Austrian defence in rear. Thus, the three fixed bridges from the southern bank to the island of Lobau secured the passage of the troops and artillery into that important station; the great bridge from thence to the *tête-du-pont*, on the northern bank, attracted all the attention of the enemy to that point, while the movable bridges, prepared in secret in the channels behind, were calculated to throw the troops speedily across, in a situation where they were not expected, and where they would find themselves in the rear of the whole Austrian intrenchments. To cover the latter design, and at the same time distract the attention of the enemy, preparations, as if for a passage, were made both at Nussdorf and Spitz, on the upper part of the river above the islands; while the whole semicircular shore of the island of Lobau, fronting the northern bank, was lined with heavy artillery drawn from the arsenal of Vienna, and a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, disposed on every headland along the wide circumference, were prepared to cover the formation of the new bridges, and bewilder the Imperialists by their wide-extended fire.*

While Napoleon was engaged in these great undertakings, the Austrians, on their part, were not idle. Directly opposite to the end of the main bridge, where the attack was anticipated, the Archduke Charles erected a vast line of intrenchments, which, running from Aspern across the former field of battle, and through Essling, terminated in the banks of the Danube at Enzersdorf. These immense works, consisting of field redoubts and ravelins, united by a curtain, were strengthened by palisades all along their front, and armed with a hundred and fifty pieces of heavy artillery. The bulk of the Austrian army was stationed about a league in the rear, along the course of the little stream, the Russbach, which provided water for the prodigious multitude. Tranquil behind his formidable intrenchments, the archduke quietly awaited the course of events, while his army hourly received accessions of strength, and improved in discipline and efficiency. The veterans, recovered from their fatigues, burnished their arms, and instructed the young soldiers, who were daily flocking to the camp, in the rudiments of the military art: the chasms in the cavalry and artillery were filled up by numerous supplies from Hungary and Transylvania, where vast public establishments for the breeding of horses had been brought to the highest perfection;† the wounded in great numbers rejoined their ranks; the artillery were augmented to a degree hitherto unheard of in war; and before the end of June a hundred and

Defensive preparations of the Austrians.

* Vict. et Conq., xix., 199. Pel., iv., 79, 80. Sav., iv., 98, 99.

† During this momentous period, the care of the emperor extended, in an especial manner, to the comfort and interests of his soldiers. Walking one day with his marshals on the shores of the isle of Lobau, he passed a company of grenadiers seated at their dinner. "Well, my friends," said Napoleon, "I hope you find the wine good." "It will not make us drunk," replied one of their number; "there is our cellar," pointing to the Danube. The emperor, who had ordered a distribution of a bottle of wine to each man, was surprised, and promised an immediate inquiry. Berthier instantly set it on foot, and it turned out that forty thousand bottles, sent by the emperor, a few days before, for the army, had been purloined and sold by the commissaries. They were immediately brought to trial, and condemned to be shot.—*Victoires et Conquêtes*, xix., 200.

* Sav., iv., 99. Pel., iv., 79, 83. Stut., 240, 246.

† A very interesting account of these vast establishments is given in the first volume of Marshal Marmont's *Travels in Hungary and Turkey*: a work which proves that that veteran commander unites the eye of an experienced observer to the warmth of a philanthropist and the judgment of a practised statesman.—See MARMONT, *Voyage dans l'Orient*, i., 232, and ii., 116.

forty thousand men, of whom twenty-five thousand were splendid cavalry, with seven hundred pieces of cannon, were assembled round the Austrian standards, all animated by their recent victory with a degree of spirit and enthusiasm never before witnessed in the imperial armies.*

The situation of the respective parties required that the principal attention of the French should be turned to the preservation of their communications clear with the Rhine, and the Germans to the maintenance of their connexion with the eastern provinces of the Empire, where the forces of the monarchy were still untouched, and the great armament called the Hungarian insurrection was daily acquiring a more complete consistency. For this purpose, Napoleon issued the most pressing orders to Bourcier and Rouyer to reopen, with all the forces of the confederation which they could assemble, the great road to the Rhine, and neglecting all minor objects, to concentrate their whole troops upon that vital line of communication; while Kellerman, who was soon afterward succeeded by Junot, was directed to strain every nerve for the accumulation of an imposing force, under the denomination of the army of observation of the Elbe, at Frankfort, and drive the Imperialists from their threatening positions at Bareuth and Nuremberg. These directions were promptly obeyed: early

July 2. in July, Junot advanced into Franconia and Saxony on the one side, while Jerome, relieved by the destruction of Schill's corps from domestic danger, threatened them on the other; and the Duke of Brunswick, with the Austrian commanders, was obliged to retire into the Bohemian Mountains; while Augsburg and

July 7. Ratisbon were retaken by the national guard of Wirtemberg and Baden, and the line of communication both with Strasburg and Frankfort reopened to the Grand Army.†

More important operations followed the attempts of the Austrians to regain, by the circuitous route of Presburg and the east, their communication with the Archduke John and the Hungarian insurrection. The Archduke Charles occupied, with the corps of Bianchi, the town of Presburg, situated six leagues below Vienna, on the left bank of the river, with a *tête-du-pont* commanding the bridge at that place over the Danube. Desirous of dislodging the enemy from this important post, which gave them the means of manœuvring on both banks of the river, and of turning his right flank, Napoleon directed Davoust to march against it. He found the *tête-du-pont* unfinished, and his troops tried to carry it by a *coup de main*, but the sustained fire of the Austrian works repulsed them with loss;

June 3. while the arm of the Danube, twenty toises in breadth, which separated them from the isles occupied by the Imperialists, flowing in a rapid current, rendered it impossible for them to dislodge the enemy from his advanced posts in the river. However, by occupying in force with two strong divisions the village of Engerau, immediately opposite to the southern extremity of the bridge, he rendered the possession of it unavailing to his antagonists; and soon after the rapid succession of more important events in

other quarters deprived this point of the importance which apparently belonged to it.*

The Archduke John, in retiring from Carniola into Hungary, had taken with him part of the landwehr of that province, and detached Giulay into Croatia, where it was hoped he could maintain himself, lest these detached bodies should fall into the enemy's hands, who had now overrun those provinces. With these forces united to his own, he retired to Kormond in Hungary, which is on the right bank of the Danube, so that he was in the disadvantageous situation of being separated by that river from the main Austrian army, and exposed to any accumulations of force which Napoleon, on his side of the river, might choose to direct against him. He had the advantage, however, of having the communication open in his rear with the re-enforcements which were expected from the Hungarian insurrection, and in the middle of June he formed a junction with his brother, the Archduke Pala-

Retreat of the Archduke John to Raab, and position which he took up there.

June 13. tine, who commanded that irregular force at RAAB. Their united forces amounted to twenty-two thousand regular troops and eighteen thousand of the insurrection, and they took post in a strong position on the ridges which lie in front of that town. Their right rested on the village of Szabadhegy, and the heights of the same name; their left was covered by a morass; their centre ran through the farm of Kismeyger; numerous light horse were disposed along the front of the line, while a thousand chosen troops occupied a square stone edifice still farther in advance of the centre, which was loopholed, and strengthened by a few works, besides a deep rivulet, which formed a sort of natural fosse to the post. In this position, the Archduke John resolved to give battle to the enemy, under Eugene Beauharnois, who were now coming up in great strength from the west; although he had just received a despatch from his brother, the generalissimo, containing the sage instructions, by no means to fight in the open plain, but to throw himself into the intrenched camp in his rear, under the cannon of Raab; to blend the inexperienced levies with the veteran troops; accustom them to military discipline, before he trusted them against the enemy; to keep open his communication with the main army at Essling, and detach seven thousand men to Presburg for that purpose; and fight only in the event of the enemy forcing the passage of the Raab, and menacing the left of the intrenched camp. These wise counsels and express injunctions were alike disregarded: the officers of the Archduke John's staff being unwilling to forego the brilliant results which they anticipated from a battle, and he himself reluctant, by placing his force under the immediate direction of his brother, to lose the lustre of a special command.†

The day following, being the 14th of June, was the anniversary of the battle of Battle of Raab. Marengo: the viceroy was natural- June 14. ly anxious to combat on that auspicious occasion, and the Austrian generals made no attempt to frustrate his designs. At ten o'clock the signal for battle was given, and the French advanced with enthusiasm to the attack. Grenier commanded the centre; Baraguay d'Hilliers the left; Momburn, with the light cavalry, Grouchy,

* Stat., 252, 288. Viet. et Conq., xix., 197, 198. Pel., iv., 82, 83.

† Pel., iv., 83, 89. Jom., iii., 246. Stat., 260, 262.

* Pel., iv., 87, 89. Jom., iii., 246. Stat., 246, 248.

† Pel., iv., 90, 95. Jom., iv., 247, 248. Viet. et Conq., xix., 172, 173. Stat., 250, 256.

with the heavy dragoons, were on the right; Pacthod, with his numerous division in reserve, behind the centre and left. Eugene formed his troops in columns of division in echelon, the right in advance; but, before the action had become serious, that order was abandoned by the rapid advance of the centre and left, and the battle became general in parallel lines. His forces were about thirty-five thousand in number, inferior by five thousand to those of the enemy; but this disadvantage was more than compensated by the experienced quality of the men, while nearly half of those opposed to them were raw levies or volunteers who had never encountered a hostile fire. The first troops which came into action were those of Serras, which attacked the square building in advance of Reimegger; the Austrians were speedily driven within the walls, but there they made a desperate resistance, and, while numbers of the assailants fell under the fatal fire from the loopholes, others sunk in the deep marshes of the rivulet, which on three sides encircled the building. In a few minutes seven hundred men perished in this disastrous manner, without one of the defences of the place being carried by the assailants. But, while success was thus arrested around this formidable post, the village of Kismeyger in its rear was menaced by Durutte, who, with a chosen division of infantry, had advanced through the open ground between its houses and the buildings of Szabadhegy, and had already got abreast of the former. But he was there met by the fire of a battery of twelve pieces, the grapeshot from which made wide chasms in his line; and the Austrians, profiting by the hesitation occasioned by this unexpected discharge, made a vigorous onset, which drove back the whole centre in disorder, while, at the same time, Baraguay d'Hilliers, with his Italian division on the left, checked by the murderous fire which issued from the village of Szabadhegy, was also forced to give ground, and already the cries of victory were on the whole of that part of the Austrian line.*

Eugene saw that the decisive moment had arrived, and he hastened to the spot to arrest the disorder. He instantly addressed a few words to the flying Italians, exhorted them to remember their victories and their glory, and, what was still more to the purpose, brought forward the reserve, under General Pacthod, consisting almost entirely of French troops, to their support. The arrival of these veterans changed the face of the day: the Italians, reanimated by this seasonable support, returned to the charge, the centre and right of the enemy were forced, and Szabadhegy carried. Upon this, the Archduke John brought up his reserve, consisting of the flower of his army; Szabadhegy was recaptured, and the Italians driven back in confusion; again Durutte and Pacthod made good their entrance, and a third time the Imperialists expelled them at the point of the bayonet. In following up this last attack, however, the Hungarian new levies extended themselves too far, deeming victory secure, and thinking to outflank their opponents: the experienced French generals saw their error, and returned to the charge with their troops in column, carried, and finally possessed the village which had been so obstinately contested, and threw the whole centre and right of the enemy

into confusion. Meanwhile, a furious combat of horse was going on on the Austrian left, where Montbrun and Grouchy were opposed to the whole weight of the Hungarian horse. This formidable body of cavalry, seven thousand strong, in the first instance overwhelmed Montbrun with his division, who had advanced to support the brigade of Colbert, which was endeavouring to turn the square from a house in front, which still prolonged its defence; but Grouchy came up with his terrible cuirassiers, and charged the enemy, when blown by their pursuit, with such vigour, that they were driven back so far as to leave the heroic defenders of that now isolated post entirely to their own resources.*

Though thus left in the middle, as it were, of the French army, Hammel, and the heroic defenders of the farmhouse, abated nothing of their resolution. Irritated at this prolonged opposition, Serras combined a new attack: he himself, with his whole division, assailed it on one side, while Roussel, with a fresh brigade, recommenced the attack in front. Nothing could resist this last assault: surrounded on all sides, the walls of the building were carried by escalade, the doors cut down with redoubled strokes of the hatchet, and an infuriated soldiery rushed into the building. A frightful massacre commenced. In the tumult the beams took fire; the flames spread with extraordinary rapidity, and, amid the death-struggle between the French and Austrians, the roof fell in with a tremendous crash, and all within, friends and foes, perished. This decisive success established Eugene in a solid manner in the village of Kismeyger and centre of the enemy, who now fought only to secure his retreat. It was conducted with more order than could have been expected after so desperate a struggle, and the archduke took refuge under the cannon of Komorn, abandoning the intrenched camp of Raab, which was immediately evacuated by some battalions of the Hungarian insurrection, by whom it was occupied. In this disastrous contest the Archduke John lost six thousand men, of whom above three thousand were made prisoners, and two pieces of cannon. The loss of the French was not more than half that amount; for, though those who fell were nearly as numerous, they lost few prisoners.†

The battle of Raab, notwithstanding its calamitous result, was in the highest degree honourable to the troops of the Hungarian insurrection, who composed so large a portion of the imperial army, and who, though brought into fire for the first time, for hours disputed the palm of victory with veteran troops. It was attended, however, by very disastrous consequences. Not only was the moral impression of the battle of Aspern sensibly weakened by the loss of the very next serious engagement which took place between the two powers, but the force of the Hungarian insurrection was irrecoverably broken by the ill success of its first essay in arms, and the loss of the fortress and intrenched camp of Raab, which shortly after took place. The former was evacuated immediately after the battle; the latter was shortly after besieged by Lauriston with heavy cannon drawn from the arsenal of Vienna, and taken, with its garri-

* Vict. et Conq., xix., 175, 176. Pel., iv., 97, 99. Jom., iii., 248, 249. Stut., 258, 264. Monit., 23d June, 1809.

† Vict. et Conq., xix., 179, 180. Jom., iii., 249. Pel., iv., 102, 103. Stut., 262, 264.

* 19th Bull., Monit., 23d June, 1809. Vict. et Conq., xix., 175, 176. Jom., iii., 248, 249. Pelet, iv., 95, 105.

son of two thousand men, chiefly militia. June 24. The possession of this fortress, though armed only with eighteen guns, was a material advantage to the French, not only as depriving the enemy of a fortified post on the right bank of the Danube, from which they were likely to derive important advantages in the progress of the campaign, but destroying the shelter of the intrenched camp, where the Hungarian insurrection might have been farther trained in the military art, and brought to render the most valuable service as light troops to the regular forces; while it gave a solid *point d'appui* to the right flank of Napoleon, and put it in his power to call up almost the whole force of Eugene to his own standard in the decisive action which was approaching on the plains of the Marchfeld.*

While these important events were securing the right wing of the French army in the Hungarian plains, Marmont and Macdonald, after severally overcoming every obstacle, were rapidly approaching with its reserves from the Dalmatian shores and the mountains of Styria. The first of these generals, who had remained in command of the Illyrian provinces ever since the treaty of Tilsit, found himself, in the early part of the campaign, entirely isolated from the French armies by the advance of the Archduke John through Carniola and Styria to the banks of the Adige. In the end of

April 23. April, the Austrian general Stoickewich had been detached by that prince with eight thousand men to aid the insurrectionary movements which were preparing in the mountains of Dalmatia against the French authorities; and some skirmishes had taken place between the advanced posts of the opposite parties, in which he had the advantage, and the Imperialists had already descended from the hills and made themselves masters of a considerable extent of seacoast, including the fort of Lusin Picolo, which brought them into con-

May 9. tact with the English cruisers in the Adriatic, when the intelligence of the retreat of the archduke from Italy, and the near approach of Macdonald by Laybach towards their line of communication with Austria, rendered it necessary to commence a retreat. Marmont lost no time in following the retreating corps of the enemy, and a severe action took place on the 23d, on the banks of

May 23. the Lika, without any decisive advantage to either party. In obedience to the orders they had received, the Imperialists continued their retreat; and Marmont, being now summoned up with his whole corps to the support of the Grand Army, pressed on in pursuit. A few days

May 28. after he arrived at Fiume, which was abandoned without opposition, and remained there two days to rest his troops after the laborious mountain marches they had undergone. On the third of June he entered Laybach, which was evacuated on his approach; while the corps of Giulay and Chastellar, which had abandoned the Tyrol by orders from the Archduke John, in order to the concentration of the forces of the monarchy in its vitals, were painfully, and by cross roads, traversing the mountains in his front, in their march towards Gratz and the Hungarian plains.†

These retiring generals had a most perilous task to perform in their marching Extraordinary difficulties which they encountered. eastward through Styria and Carniola, where Marmont, established at Laybach, was ready to fall perpendicularly on their flank; and Macdonald, who was hastening up from Villach, in Carinthia, on the traces of Eugene, threatened their rear. It appeared almost impossible that they could escape so many dangers; but such was the skill of the imperial commanders, and the activity of their troops, that they not only extricated themselves, without any serious loss, from this hazardous situation, but very nearly inflicted an important blow upon their opponents. Chastellar, obliged to evacuate the Tyrol, had descended the valley of the Drave, and assembled his troops at Villach; from thence he made a demonstration against Klagenfurth, where the Italian general, Rusca, had collected a few battalions, and after some sharp fighting he reached the right bank of the Drave, and succeeded, by throwing that river between him and his pursuers, in extricating himself from his dangers. He would have been utterly destroyed if Marmont had been a little more expeditious in his movements; for, had that general arrived two days sooner at Nankles, where the two roads from Klagenfurth and Villach unite, he would have interrupted the only route by which the enemy could have descended the Drave; and if Chastellar had thrown himself across the mountains into the defiles of the Muhr, he would have fallen into the hands of Macdonald, who was descending the rocky banks of that romantic stream. But everything in war depends upon precision of calculation and rapidity of movement, and the most active and vigilant generals are frequently ignorant of what is passing on the enemy's part within a few leagues of their headquarters.*

Giulay, who formed part of the army of the Archduke John, had been detached by that prince with seventeen thousand regular troops into Croatia, of which he was the Ban, to raise the landwehr of that warlike province and of Carniola, and await ulterior orders. Subsequently, the disasters and continued retreat of the Italian army rendered it necessary for the archduke to recall him to his standards; and Giulay had turned to such good account the few weeks which he had spent in his province, that he was prepared now to take the field at the head of twenty thousand men, of whom eight thousand were regulars. With this imposing force he broke up in the beginning of June from Ram and Agram on the Save, and began his march northward for Marburg, with the design of joining the archduke, whom he conceived to be still at Gratz, in Styria. He moved, however, so slowly, that he did not reach Marburg till the 15th, the day after the battle of Raab, though the distance was only eighteen leagues, being not five miles a day. Had he exerted himself as his strength permitted and the crisis required, he might have been on the 14th at Radkersburg, in Hungary, which was forty-two leagues from Ram, in direct communication with that prince, and in time to share in the battle. This only required him to march ten or eleven miles a day, no great undertaking for veteran troops and hardy mountaineers; and

* 21st Bull., Monit., June 30, 1809. *Jom.*, iii., 251. *Vict. et Conq.*, xix., 179, 180. *Pel.*, iv., 103, 104, 142.

† *Pel.*, iv., 106, 117. *Jom.*, iii., 253, 254. *Barth.*, 204, 207.

* *Pel.*, iv., 117, 119. *Jom.*, iii., 254. *Erz. Joan. Feld.*, 232, 237. *Vict. et Conq.*, xix., 153.

June 15. had he done so, the battle of Raab would either not have been fought, or been converted into a victory, and the Archduke John, with sixty thousand undiscouraged troops, would have appeared with decisive effect on the field of Wagram. The first care of a general should be to accustom his soldiers to march: Napoleon's grenadiers were perfectly right when they said it was by their legs more than their arms that he gained his victories.*

A brilliant enterprise, however, though of a subordinate character, awaited the Attack on Broussier, Austrian general. General Broussier, near Gratz, with a French brigade, had been left

June 24. to besiege the fort of Schlossberg, at Gratz, after Macdonald had left that town, and proceeded onward in the trace of the viceroy towards the Grand Army; and Giulay, having learned, as he came up from the southward, the

June 22. exposed situation of the besiegers, conceived the design of surrounding and making them prisoners. On the 24th his advanced posts were at the gates of Gratz; and Broussier, justly apprehensive of being cut off, had, two days before, raised the siege of the castle, and retired to the bridge of Weinzittel, over the Muhr, at the entrance of the valley of Bruck. Having received intelligence, however, in the course of the same day, of the real position of the main body of the enemy's forces, which he conceived to be unable to take any part in the action which was approaching, he sent

June 23. back four battalions under Colonel Gambier, who resumed his former position around the fort, and renewed the bombardment. In this situation the besiegers were attacked by a greatly superior force under Giulay, and, being entirely separated from the remainder of the troops under Broussier, their destruction appeared inevitable. The heroism of Colonels Gambier and Neagle, however, joined to the intrepidity of their troops, extricated them from their dangerous situation: the Croatian landwehr were no match, in close fight, for the French veterans; a decisive charge of the bayonet checked the Imperialists in the first

June 25. onset; when their cartridges were exhausted, the French threw themselves into a churchyard, which they defended with invincible resolution, and, though weakened by the loss of half their numbers, they were still gloriously combating round their eagles, when Broussier, with his remaining four battalions, arrived, and cut his way through to his heroic followers. In this memorable action the French lost eight, the Austrians twelve hundred men; and Napoleon, in just testimony of his sense of the conduct of the troops engaged, made Colonel Gambier a count of the Empire, and gave to his regiment, the 84th, the motto "Un contre Dix." Marmont, who had been summoned by Broussier to his assistance, arrived on the evening of the 26th before the walls of Gratz, and immediately made preparations, in concert with Giulay, for a general assault on the town and suburbs on the following day; but the Imperialists, in no

June 27. condition to withstand so formidable an attack, withdrew in the night, and the junction of the French generals was effected next day without opposition. They left merely a few battalions to continue the siege of the castle, and, pressing on with great rapidity, arrived in the

island of Lobau on the 3d of July, where the whole forces of Napoleon were now assembled for the decisive battle which was approaching.*

The French emperor, at the same time, had called Prince Eugene and the Italian army to his standards. On the 2d of July he received orders to repair without delay to the general rendezvous in the island of Lobau, whither Napoleon had transferred his headquarters from the palace of Schoenbrunn, three days before. Skilfully masking his design by a large body of heavy cavalry, pushed forward to the advanced posts before Komorn, he withdrew his artillery, stores, and infantry, unperceived by the enemy, and late on the evening of the 5th reached the

July 5. island of Lobau, where his arrival swelled the host to a hundred and eighty thousand men, with seven hundred pieces of cannon; while, by an unhappy fatality, the Archduke John, though entirely on the left bank of the Danube, still remained in presence of a deserted camp in the plains of Hungary. This general concentration of the French troops in front of Essling was attended with one secondary but important effect, in restoring the southern provinces of the empire to the dominion of Austria, and opening up a direct communication with the English cruisers in the Adriatic. In proportion as Croatia and Carniola were evacuated by the advance of Marmont to the Danube, those two important provinces were regained by Giulay's troops: several French detachments and dépôts fell into the hands of the Imperialists; Laybach, with some hundred prisoners, was taken; and the communication with the coast having been restored, a subsidy from England was disembarked in Dalmatia, and, after traversing the mountains, arrived in safety in Hungary, to the amount of three hundred and twenty thousand pounds.†

Before the decisive struggle on the Danube commenced, affairs had taken a more propitious turn for the French arms on the shores of the Vistula. The bold stroke of Poniatowsky in throwing himself into the eastern parts of Poland and menacing Galicia, after Warsaw was taken, joined to the tardy, but at length serious approach of the Russian forces, arrested the Archduke Ferdinand in his victorious career on the Southern Vistula. His advanced guard had already reached Thorn, fifty leagues below the capital, when the intelligence of the march of Poniatowsky in the direction of Cracow, joined to the alarming progress of the insurrection excited by Dombrowsky in the neighbourhood of Posen, the indisposition of Prussia to take any decisive part, and the approach of Prince Gallitzin, with thirty thousand Russians, towards Lemberg and the Galician frontiers, warned him of the necessity of retreat. Advancing to Lemberg, Poniatowsky had spread his light troops over the whole of Austrian Poland, exciting everywhere the national enthusiasm, and producing an alarming fermentation by the sight of the much-loved uniforms; his advanced posts had even crossed the Carpathian range, and carried consternation to

Junction of Eugene to the Grand Army, and reoccupation of Croatia by the Austrians.

Operations in Poland, and successes of the Polish detachments at Sandomir and Zamosc.

May 24.

* Vict. et Conq., xix., 184. Pel., iv., 120, 121. Erz. Joan. Feld., 238, 240.

* 24th Bull., Monit., 10th July, 1809. Vict. et Conq., xix., 185, 195. Jom., iii., 255, 256. Erz. Joan. Feld., 284, 302. Pel., iv., 122, 129.

† Pel., iv., 128, 131. Vict. et Conq., xix., 194, 197. Stut., 326, 330.

within a few leagues of the Hungarian frontier; while another of his divisions, under **May 19** Sokolniki, had boldly crossed the Vistula and surprised fifteen hundred Austrians (besides eighteen pieces of cannon) at Sandomir, who were all either slain or made prisoners; and General Pelletier, with a third, by a brilliant *coup de main*, made himself master, by escalade, of Lamosc, though defended by a lofty rampart and deep ditch, and captured two thousand men and an arsenal of fifty pieces of cannon.*

This succession of disasters, and still more, perhaps, the approach of the Russians, under Prince Gallitzin, to the frontiers of Galicia, determined the Archduke Ferdinand to retreat. His generals had, by a sudden attack, made themselves masters of the *tête-du-pont* at Thorn, on the right bank of the Vistula; but the garrison, retiring to the body of the place on the left, burned a part of the bridge, and the Imperialists had neither the means of crossing that ample stream, nor of commencing a siege in form of that fortress. This was the extreme point of their advance.

May 30. On the following day they commenced their retreat, severely harassed by the light troops which the indefatigable Dombrowsky had raised in the Duchy of Posen. The Austrian garrison being withdrawn from Warsaw on the 30th of May, the Polish militia, under Zayonschek, recovered possession of that capital, and Ferdinand slowly retired towards the Austrian frontier. The indecision

June 2. and procrastination of Russia were now at an end, and Alexander professed himself prepared in good earnest to adhere to his engagements at Tilsit and Erfurth. General Schaueroth commanded the advanced division of the Austrians, and Ferdinand, with reason, conceived that he might, in his retreat, avenge the check received at Sandomir, by making prisoners the Polish garrison in that town. Detaching

June 15. Schaueroth, therefore, as a corps of observation, towards Lemberg, he himself, with his main body and heavy artillery, suddenly appeared before it; and, having brought up his guns, burst open the gates, and his grenadiers penetrated into the streets. The Poles, however, under Sokolniki, rallied with admirable courage, and for eight hours kept up an obstinate resistance from street to street, and from house to house, until the Austrians, wearied out and sensible the place could not long hold out, retired, with the loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, and four hundred prisoners. Finding his ammunition exhausted, however, Sokolniki, two

June 17. days afterward, entered into a treaty with the Austrian general, in virtue of which he evacuated the place, and retired to the Polish army.†

Alarmed at the capture of a place of such importance, Poniatowsky now made the most vigorous remonstrances to Prince Gallitzin, and urged the immediate adoption of concerted measures; but, though the Russian general was now so near as materially to influence the fate of the campaign, he could not be prevailed on to take an active part, and exhibited an order of the Emperor Alexander, which forbade him to cross the Vistula. He consented, however, to occupy

the country on the right bank of that river, so as to leave the Poles at liberty to prosecute their operations on the left. Relieved to a certain degree by their presence in that quarter, Poniatowsky suddenly changed his line of operations, and descended the Vistula on the right, in order to connect himself with Zayonschek and Dombrowsky. Meanwhile, the Archduke Ferdinand received orders to direct his steps a second time towards the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, in order to support the efforts which the cabinet

of Vienna at that period were making to rouse Prussia to join the alliance. Having dismantled Sandomir, accordingly, he concentrated his forces, and, while Poniatowsky moved down the right bank of the Vistula, he descended the left, and, with twenty-five thousand men, advanced to Petrikau, on the Pilica. This offensive movement, however, was not of long duration: the Archduke Ferdinand had prepared an

intrenched camp near the sources of that river, at a point where two roads to Austria branch off, the one by Cracow, the other by Olkusz, and was slowly advancing to occupy it, when hostilities were interrupted by the intelligence of the armistice of Znaym. Meanwhile, the Russians advanced to Cracow, and their vanguard had already occupied its gates, when Poniatowsky, jealous of the acquisition of the second city of Old Poland by its most inveterate enemy, summoned all his forces to his standards, and hastened, with twenty-five thousand men, to anticipate Prince Gallitzin in that important conquest. The road was blocked up by Russian troops, who prohibited all farther passage: the Poles insisted on their right to advance; the old and ill-concealed animosity of the two nations was ready to break out, and the advanced posts were already coming to blows, when Prince Gallitzin deemed it prudent to yield, and permitted the occupation of the city by the Polish troops. There they re-

mained during the whole of the armistice, but the military ardour of the Poles was strongly excited by this brilliant termination of the campaign: hopes long smothered began to revive of the possibility of a national restoration; recruits flocked in from all quarters to the national standards, and, before the peace of Vienna, Poniatowsky had forty-eight thousand men on his muster-rolls, besides the troops who were combating under the standards of Napoleon in the Spanish Peninsula.*†

These successes, however, had only a remote and inconsiderable influence on the fate of the campaign: the decisive blows were to be dealt out from the island of Lobau. There, in the first week of July, a prodigious armament was collected, and the French officers, how much soever inured to military prodigies, were never weary of admiring the immense array which the activity and foresight of the emperor had collected for the final struggle. On the 2d of July he mounted on horseback at Schoenbrunn and rode to Lobau, where headquarters were thenceforward established, and at two o'clock on the afternoon of that day the re-enforcements began to arrive there from all quarters; and never in modern times, probably never in the history of the world, was such precision witnessed in the movements of corps converging together from such distant

Extraordinary concentration of the French forces in the island of Lobau.

* *Vict. et Conq.*, xix., 128, 129. *Pel.*, iv., 55, 58. *Jom.*, iii., 238.

† *Pel.*, iv. *Jom.*, iii., 239. *Vict. et Conq.*, xix., 130, 132.

* *Pel.*, iv., 70, 75. *Jom.*, iv., 239, 240. *21st Bull.*, *Monit.*, 29, 30th June, and 8th July, 1809.

† See note A.

quarters. Hardly had Bernadotte arrived with the Saxons from the banks of the Elbe, when Vandamme appeared with the Wirtembergers and troops of the confederation from Swabia and the Rhenish provinces; Wrede with the Bavarians from the banks of the Lech; Macdonald and Broussier next arrived over the Alpine ridges from Carinthia and Carniola: no sooner had they taken the places assigned them, than Marmont's leading columns began to appear from the Dalmatian shores; and, when they had found room in the crowded isle, the veterans of Eugene came up from the Hungarian plains and the neighbourhood of Presburg. By the evening of the 4th the whole were assembled: horse, foot, cannon, and ammunition-wagons had traversed in safety the bridges which connected the island with the southern shore; and a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, thirty thousand cavalry, with seven hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, were collected in a space not exceeding two miles and a half in length, by one and three-quarters in breadth.* This extraordinary concentration of force had inspired the troops with more than their wonted ardour: none doubted of the issue when the military strength of half of Europe was there accumulated on a single point under the guidance of Napoleon; the lines literally touched each other, and each regiment acquired fresh confidence from the animating story of its neighbour's achievements. Never since the Grand Army broke up in 1805 from the shores of the Channel had it been so collected together: many there met who had not shaken hands since they parted on the heights of Boulogne; and many more hearts then glowed with the joy of newly-awakened friendship,† which were destined, in a few hours, to be forever severed from each other in this world.‡

* The French military historians give 150,000 men and 400 pieces of cannon for the total strength of the Grand Army before the battle of Wagram; but we have the authority of Savary (iv., 100, c. 12) for the assertion that they amounted to the number stated in the text; and Napoleon said, on the evening of the 4th of July, to the Austrian general sent with a flag of truce, "Sir, I have no doubt why you have been sent here. So much the worse for your general if he does not know that to-morrow I shall pass the Danube with the whole force you see here: there are 180,000 men; the days are long: woe to the vanquished."—SAVARY, iv., 101. See also *Kausler Atlas der Schlachten*, 379.

† Pel., iv., 153, 154. Sav., iv., 100, 102. Jom., iii., 258, 259.

‡ The utmost pains had been taken by the French emperor, during the interval of hostilities at Vienna, to restore the spirit and enthusiasm of the soldiers, which had been severely weakened by the result of the battle of Aspern. Gratuities to a large extent were awarded to the soldiers' widows, under circumstances the most likely to affect the imagination of the receivers and all who witnessed it. Not only did the emperor himself frequently visit the hospitals, but he made his aids-de-camp regularly inspect them: at stated intervals, and after the recovery of the greater part was in some degree effected, he distributed with great pomp a considerable gratuity to all the soldiers who had suffered. Every private received sixty francs (£2 10s.), and every officer, in proportion to his rank, from 150 to 1500 francs (from £6 to £60). For several days the emperor and his staff were exclusively engaged in this pious duty; and it was accompanied by circumstances which increased the effect which the gratuity, already so considerable, produced upon the mind of the men. The splendid cortège proceeded to the distribution in full uniform, and traversed the long galleries of the hospitals, preceded by the records of the regiments, in which the deeds of each were minutely entered, and followed by servants in full livery, carrying large baskets, in which the money was placed. Twelve or twenty crown pieces were deposited by the bedside of each man, taken, not from the regimental funds, but the private purse of the emperor. Tears rolled down the cheeks of the mutilated veterans as they witnessed the touching scene: many wept with joy who were destined to sink under their

The Austrian army, though not equally re-enforced, had received considerable Force and disposition of the Austrian army. accessions of strength since the battle of Aspern, and was animated by a still more profound feeling. The twenty-five thousand brave men who had fallen or been disabled in that glorious strife were in part recovered, or had been compensated by the corps of Kollowrath, which had come up from the vicinity of Lintz; twenty thousand more had been drawn from the depôts in the interior; and fifty thousand landwehr were incorporated with the regular soldiers, and, from their constant exercise with veteran troops, had acquired a considerable degree of efficiency. Thus, above a hundred and forty thousand men were assembled for the decisive struggle, besides the Archduke John, who, with eighteen thousand regulars and an equal number of the Hungarian insurrection, was at Presburg, ten leagues from the field of battle. If they could all have been brought to bear upon the enemy, their numbers would have equalled even the gigantic host of Napoleon; but they were far from being equally concentrated, and the Archduke Charles was by no means prepared for the extraordinary rapidity and energy which was about to be infused into their movements. On the evening of the 4th, when the whole array of the French emperor was accumulated in Lobau, and the ranks of so many distant armies stood almost in close column on its meadows, the generalissimo had little more than half his force ready for immediate operation. The Prince of Reuss was watching the banks of the Danube, from Stockerau to Vienna, with his headquarters at Stammersdorf; Kollowrath was at Hagenbrunn, on the northwestern slope of the Bisamberg; the reserve of grenadiers were at Gerarsdorf; Klenau at Essling, and in the intrenchments opposite to the bridge of Aspern; while Nordman, with the advanced guard, lay at Enzersdorf, and guarded the course of the Danube as far as Presburg. Bellegarde, Hohenzollern, and Rosenberg were at WAGRAM, or along the course of the Russbach, while the reserve cavalry was at Breitenlee, Aderklaa, and the villages in that neighbourhood. Thus, the archduke's army was arrayed in two lines: the first stretching twenty leagues along the course of the Danube; the second, two leagues in the rear, on the plateau of Wagram and the heights of the Russbach. A courier was despatched, on the evening of the 4th, to summon up the Archduke John to the decisive point; but the distance was so great that he could not be expected to arrive at the scene of action till late on the following evening. Seven hundred pieces of cannon attended the army; but the cavalry had never recovered the fatal ravages of the preceding battles, and the equipment of the artillery was far from being in the perfect state in which it was at the commencement of the campaign, or as the French had become from the resources of the arsenal of Vienna. Never was more clearly demonstrated in war the vital importance of central fortifications: many of the enthusiastic recruits of Austria were now deficient in the most necessary equipments, while the French troops found all their losses amply supplied from the stores of the capital; had Vienna still held out, or its magnificent arsenal been secure from attack, the fate of the campaign would probably

wounds before an opportunity of expending their little treasure could arrive.—See SAVARY, iv., 88, 89.

have been different, and Wagram had been Leipzig. But the whole warlike multitude were animated by an heroic spirit: every one felt that the crisis of the monarchy was at hand, and the glorious result of the battle of Aspern had inspired them all with the most sanguine hopes as to the ultimate issue of the struggle.*

The better to conceal his real designs, Napoleon had some days before made preparations as if for forcing a passage over the great bridge, and through the intrenchments of Aspern and Essling.

On the 2d of July, five hundred voltigeurs were embarked, and transported across to the small island which lay in the middle of the northern branch of the Danube, between these two villages, the Imperialists dispossessed, and the bridge commenced. The archduke, upon the first alarm, hastened to the spot, and a violent fire was opened by the Austrian batteries on the French engineers engaged in its construction: above two hundred cannon-balls fell in the middle of the boats without arresting these brave

men. The bridge was soon completed July 2.

as far as the island from Lobau: nothing but a fordable branch, thirty yards broad, now separated the French from the northern bank. Such was the importance which Napoleon at-

tached to this demonstration, that on the following morning he came himself to the spot, and, in his anxiety to reconnoitre the opposite coast, ascended on the summit of the parapet, and remained there for some minutes, within pistol-shot of the Croatian outposts on the northern bank. He ordered a lunette to be constructed on the western part of this little island, capable of affording protection to a bridge of rafts, which was kept in readiness to be thrown over the last shallow branch of the river, under cover of the parapet.† Thus the French were masters of two bridges leading from the salient angle of the island of Lobau into the field of Aspern; and the Imperialists were so impressed with the idea that the passage was to be attempted at the same point as the former one, that, by daybreak on the morning of the 4th, their massy columns were in motion from the plateau of Wagram, and in two hours after the works, along their whole extent, were gleaming with helmets and bayonets.‡

Napoleon, however, had no intention of forcing the passage at this point, and these extraordinary preparations, so serious in appearance, were but a stratagem to conceal the real point of attack from the enemy. Nothing of importance was attempted during the remainder of the 4th; but towards evening, the troops being all collected, burning with ardour, and the preparations completed, Oudinot commenced the embarkation.

The emperor took his station himself on horseback, on the margin of the branch where the passage was to be attempted, and with indefatigable

energy urged on the movements. With such vigour were they conducted, that in a quarter of an hour the bridge destined for the passage of that corps was thrown across: all hands were immediately turned to the three bridges which had been secretly prepared in the covered channel of the Danube, and the first, composed of a single timber frame, was brought out of its place of concealment, thrown across, and made fast to the opposite shore, in the short space of ten minutes. The transporting and fastening of the other two required a little more time; but with such vigour were the operations conducted, under the immediate inspection of the emperor, who never ceased an instant during the whole night to direct and animate the men, that by three o'clock in the following morning six were completed, and the troops of all arms were in full march across them. A violent fire was, during the whole time, kept up from a hundred and nine pieces of heavy cannon, disposed along each side of the salient angle formed by the northern extremity of the island of Lobau, on the Austrian lines, which fell with unprecedented fury on the village of Enzersdorf, and induced the enemy to open from all their batteries on the bridge of Aspern, in the idea that it was there the passage was going forward. Both shores soon formed a line of flame: the heavens were illuminated by the ceaseless flight of bombs; seldom fewer than twelve of these flaming projectiles were seen at once traversing the air in opposite directions. Vehement, however, as was the contest of men, it was surpassed by the elemental strife on that awful night. A tempest arose soon after it was dark; the wind blew with terrific violence; torrents of rain fell without intermission; the thunder rolled above the loudest roar of the artillery; and the frequent glare of the lightning outshone even the flames of Enzersdorf, which, set on fire by the French bombardment, burned with inextinguishable fury from the gales of the tempest. During this terrible scene, however, the cool judgment of Napoleon never for an instant lost sight of the main object in view: for several hours he walked incessantly, amid mud and water, from one bridge to the other; the passage of the troops was pressed on with indefatigable activity; numerous boats, which incessantly plied to and fro, facilitated the transportation of the foot-soldiers; and such was the unprecedented vigour of all concerned in the operation, that by six o'clock in the following morning, not only were all the bridges firmly established, but a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, thirty thousand cavalry, and six hundred pieces of cannon, were grouped in dense array on the northern shore, between Enzersdorf and the margin of the Danube.*

Great was the surprise of the Imperialists, at daybreak on the 5th, to see not a man passed over by the bridge opposite to Aspern, but the plain farther down, opposite to Enzersdorf, covered with an enormous black mass of troops, drawn up in close column, in the finest array, in such numbers as almost to defy calculation. The tempest had ceased: the mists rolled away as day approached, the sky was serene, and the sun of Austerlitz shone forth in unclouded brilliancy. His rays revealed a matchless spectacle: the shores of the Danube were resplendent with arms; cuirasses, helmets, and bayonets glittered

* Kautzsch Schlacht von Neus Zeit, 381. Jom., iii., 258, 259. Pel., iv., 155, 157, 162. Stut., 348, 350. M. de Grunne's Corresp. Officiel.

† Masséna accompanied the emperor on this occasion, and, as he withdrew from the front, was grievously bruised by a fall of his horse. The army were fearful that they would be deprived of his powerful aid on the field of battle; but he appeared there on the following day in an open calèche. Napoleon exclaimed, when he saw him struggling with pain and exposed to the fire, "Who would fear death, when he sees how the brave are prepared to die!"—PELET, iv., 152, note.

‡ Pel., iv., 149, 163. Vict. et Conq., xix., 201. Jom., iii., 260, 261.

* Sav., iv., 102, 103. Pel., iv., 167, 173. Vict. et Conq., xix., 202, 203. Stut. 302, 309. Larrey, iii., 347

on every side; the bridges, the isle of Lobau, the southern shore, were covered with a countless array of men, drawn up in admirable order, or pressing on in ceaseless march, while long files of artillery presented on the northern bank apparently an irresistible force to the enemy. Then appeared, in the clearest manner, the vast advantage which the French emperor had gained by the unexampled manœuvre of the preceding night: the river was passed, the communications with the opposite shore secured, the left flank of the Austrian position turned, all the intrenchments intended to bar the passage taken in reverse, the labour of six weeks rendered useless, the enemy cut off from his communication with Hungary and the remaining resources of the monarchy, and thrown back, with his face to the east, towards the Bohemian Mountains. The activity and genius of Napoleon had, in a few hours, defeated all the long-meditated designs of the Austrian generals: the plateau of Wagram, chosen, with provident foresight, as the most advantageous central position from whence to fall upon the leading corps which had effected the passage, had lost much of its peculiar value by the river having been crossed in a single night by the whole army; and the rival hosts were reduced to combat on equal terms in the vast plain of the Marchfeld, under circumstances which promised but a doubtful chance of success to the imperial forces.* The French soldiers, rapid beyond any others in Europe at apprehending the chances and dangers of their situation, at once appreciated the advantage they had gained, and casting a look of admiration at the bridges, the *chaussées*, the intrenchments, by which the dangers of the passage had been surmounted, turned in joyous confidence towards the enemy; while their chief had already commenced the formation of gigantic fieldworks to protect the army upon the northern shore.†

Having lost, through the unparalleled activity of their opponents, the favourable opportunity of attacking the French army in the moment of passing the bridges, nothing remained to the Austrians but to retire to the position in the rear of Aspern and Essling, which had been selected, after mature deliberation, by the imperial generals as the most favourable ground whereon to throw the last die for the independence of the monarchy. All their outposts, accordingly, were called in, the whole intrenchments, constructed at so vast a cost of labour in front of the bridge of Aspern, were abandoned, and the army retired to its chosen and last field, on the plateau of WAGRAM. The strength of this position justified the choice of the archduke, and did credit to the prophetic anticipations of the Aulic Council. It consists of an elevated plain, in the form of a vast parallelogram,

which rises at the distance of four miles from the Danube, at the northern extremity of the plain of the Marchfeld. This plateau is bounded, along its southern front, by the stream of the Russbach, which, descending at first through the high grounds which form the northern boundary of the valley, perpendicularly to the Danube, from north to south, turns sharp round towards the east at Deutch Wagram, and flows along the whole front of the position to Neusiedel, at the foot of the heights which form its southern rampart. This stream is six or eight feet broad, and, though everywhere fordable by infantry, can be traversed by cavalry and artillery only at the bridges in the villages, which were carefully guarded. From Neusiedel, the plateau turns sharp to the northward, and has its eastern face clearly defined by a steep ridge descending to the low grounds in that direction for several miles to the north. Thus this plateau formed a great square redoubt, rising on the north of the plain, with a wet ditch running along its front, and strengthened by the villages of Wagram and Neusiedel at each angle. The village of Baumersdorf, situated half a mile to the south of the Russbach, about the centre of the southern front, formed an outwork beyond the wet ditch. Though this important plateau, however, constituted the strength, it was by no means the whole of the Austrian position. Their lines extended also to the westward far beyond Deutch Wagram, along a ridge of heights, arranged as it were by nature for the defensive position of a vast army, as far as Stammersdorf and the eastern slope of the fir-clad Bisamberg: forming, altogether, an elevated position, about fifteen miles in length, on a series of heights facing and slightly curved towards the south.* From their feet to the Danube, distant about nine miles, stretched out the vast and level plain of the Marchfeld. In the concave space included in this curve, at the foot of the heights, about their centre, is the village of Gerarsdorf; and a few miles farther, in the level surface of the Marchfeld, the villages of Aderklaa and Sussenbrunn, which thus lay about midway between the two armies, and became important points of attack, and the theatre of desperate conflict in the battle which followed.

The archduke, in consequence of the dispersed state of his army, rendered unavoidable by the uncertainty which prevailed as to the place where the passage would be attempted, had only the grenadiers and corps of Rosenberg, Bellegarde, and Hohenzollern, sixty thousand strong, on the plateau of Wagram and village of the same name: Klenau and Kollowrath being at a distance on the Bisamberg with the right wing; and the left, under the Archduke John, twenty-five miles off, stretching towards Presburg. No serious resistance, in consequence, was made to the advance of the French over the plain, the Austrian outposts retiring as the French approached towards their central position on the hills. Napoleon's army, after the passage was effected, was drawn up between Lobau and Enzersdorf, perpendicular to the river, with its left touching the water: the concentration of the troops was such, that it resembled an immense close column nearly two hundred thousand strong. Presently, however, the order to

* Pel., iv., 172, 175. Sav., iv., 103, 104. Jom., iii., 260, 261. Vict. et Conq., xix., 202, 203.

† The Austrian generals had, after long consideration, selected the plateau of Wagram as the most favourable ground whereon to throw their last stake for the independence of the monarchy. In the imperial cabinet, the French found, after the battle, a valuable military work on the environs of Vienna, in which the second camp to be taken, in the event of the river being crossed, was precisely that which the archduke occupied on the plateau of Wagram. The chances of both parties were ably calculated; but the skilful engineer had never discovered the vast military importance of the island of Lobau, nor contemplated the possibility of the enemy throwing six bridges from it to the opposite side, and crossing one hundred and eighty thousand men over in a single night.—See SAVARY, iv., 105.

* Personal observation. Pel., iv., 168, 169, 184. Kausler, 54. Jom., iii., 264.

march was given, and the different corps advanced in a semicircular direction, like the folds of a fan, to the north, east, and west, towards Enzersdorf, Essling, Breitenlee, and Raschdorf. Massena was on the left, towards Essling and Aspern; Bernadotte, with the Saxons, towards Aderklaa; Eugene and Oudinot between Wagram and Baumersdorf; Davoust and Grouchy on the right, in the direction of Glinzendorf; while the Imperial Guards, Marmont's corps, Wrede, with the Bavarians, and the heavy cavalry, were in reserve under the emperor in person. Partial combats took place as the Imperialists fell back before this enormous force both at Enzersdorf and Raschdorf, but no serious resistance was attempted, and the two corps of the Austrians which were in advance in the intrenchments on the banks of the Danube, fell back leisurely on the road to Gerarsdorf and Neusiedel. The vast fieldworks between Aspern and Essling were abandoned; the Imperialists retired to the heights in the rear, on which the main body of their forces were stationed; and the French army, spreading out like rays from a centre, overspread, as far as the margin of the Russbach, the immense plain of the Marchfield.*

At six o'clock Napoleon had come up to the plain between Raschdorf and Baumersdorf, in front of the plateau of Wagram; and he then ascertained that the Archduke John had not yet arrived, and could not appear on the field that day. He immediately resolved to profit by his great superiority and commence an attack; for he had a hundred thousand men grouped in his centre, ready for instant operations; while on the plateau beyond Russbach, between Wagram and Neusiedel, the Austrians had not more than sixty thousand under Hohenzollern, Bellegarde, and Rosenberg, to oppose them. Powerful batteries were accordingly brought up, which speedily opened a heavy fire upon the Imperialists' position, to which the archduke's guns, arrayed along the front of the plateau, replied from higher ground, and with more effect. Oudinot's corps came first into action in the centre. He attacked Baumersdorf at the foot of the plateau, which was gallantly defended by General Hardegg; but such was the obstinacy of the resistance, that he was unable either to force the village, carry the bridges, or make his way across the stream in its rear on either side. Eugene was stationed opposite to Wagram: his leading divisions commenced the attack with great spirit, and, fording the Russbach, ascended the heights in gallant style; but, when they arrived at the summit, they were staggered by a murderous discharge of grape from sixty Austrian guns, within half musket-shot, to which the French had nothing but musketry to oppose, as their guns had not been able to get across the stream. Macdonald, Dupas, and Lamarque, who commanded the divisions engaged, kept their ground, and, bringing up their reserves, the action became extremely warm; and at length the Austrian front line was broken and thrown back in confusion upon their second. It was now the Austrian turn to feel alarmed: the enemy had broken in upon their position in its strongest part, and his irruption, if promptly supported, promised to pierce the centre of their extensive line. Several Austrian regiments soon after broke, and the French divisions, continuing

their triumphant advance, took five standards and two thousand prisoners. In this extremity the Archduke Charles hastened in person to the spot, at the head of the regiments of Zach, Vongelsang, and D'Erbach, whose steadiness had stemmed a similar torrent on the field of Aspern, and succeeded, by a determined resistance in front, in arresting the advance of the column: at the same time, Hohenzollern, who had repulsed the attack of Oudinot, charged them vigorously on the right flank with a chosen body of hussars, and Bellegarde poured in destructive volleys from his grenadiers, abreast of whom the French had now arrived, on the left. The struggle was terrible for a few minutes, in the course of which the archduke was wounded; but it terminated in the repulse of the French, which was speedily converted into a rout, as they were driven headlong down the steep, and fled in wild confusion across the stream of Russbach. The Saxons under Bernadotte, who were advancing to their support, in the darkness mistook the retreating host for enemies, and fired upon it; they, in their turn, were overthrown by the torrent of fugitives; the contagious panic communicated itself to the Saxon troops, which suffered most severely both from friends and enemies: one of their battalions disappeared entirely in the confusion, and was never seen again;* and the three French divisions, which had so nearly penetrated the Austrian line, disbanded, and, flying over the plain beyond Raschdorf, spread an indescribable alarm through the French centre as far as the tents of the emperor. In the general confusion the whole prisoners escaped; the taken standards were regained; two French eagles were captured; and, had the Imperialists been aware of the disorder which prevailed, and followed up their success with fresh troops, the consequences might have been fatal to the French army. Ignorant, however, of the prodigious effect produced by this nocturnal irruption, the Austrian generals, at eleven o'clock, sounded a retreat: their troops fell back to their original positions at Baumersdorf, Wagram, and the crest of the plateau;† while the French army, wearied with the fatigues of that eventful day, lay down to rest in the vast plain around Raschdorf, and were soon buried in sleep.

So destitute was the Marchfield, at that period, both of trees and habitation, that there was hardly a fire in the whole French army, from the extreme right to the left of the line. At midnight it became intensely cold, and it was with great difficulty that a few parcels of straw and pieces of wood could be got to make a fire for the emperor. He had advanced with his guard to the front of the first line, during the panic consequent on the rout of the Saxons and Eugene's corps, and his tent for the night was pitched in the middle of the grenadiers and *vieux moustaches*. Though all around were buried in sleep, Napoleon sat up during the whole night, conversing with the marshals and generals of division, receiving reports from the different corps, and impressing upon his lieutenants the designs which he had formed. His army occupied a great right-angled triangle, of which the base rested on Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf: one front faced Stammersdorf, Sussenbrunn, and the slopes of

Position and plan of Napoleon for the battle on the following day.

* Expression in General Dupas's official report.

† Pel., iv., 185, 195. Sav., iv., 106. Vict. et Conq., xix., 204, 205. Jom., iii., 266. 25th Bull., Monit., 15th July, 1809.

* Jom., iii., 265. Pel., iv., 174, 182. Sav., iv., 104, 105.

the Bisamberg; the other the plateau of Wagram and Neusiedel; while the apex, pointing directly at the Austrian centre, was in front of Aderklaa. The project of the emperor was founded on this concentration on his side, and the scattered position of his opponents on the semicircular range of heights, above fifteen miles long, from the Bisamberg to Neusiedel. Refusing and weakening his left, he determined to throw the weight of his attack upon the centre and left of the Austrians: hoping thereby to break their line in the point where it was the weakest, by an enormous mass of assailants, and cut off the Archduke Charles from the army which, he was well aware, would speedily come up, under the Archduke John, from the neighbourhood of Presburg. With this view, a considerable dislocation of troops took place during the night: Masséna, who lay on the left around Essling and Aspern, was moved at two in the morning by his right towards Aderklaa, in front of the plateau of Wagram, leaving the single division of Boudet to guard Aspern and the bridges. Thus the whole strength of the French army was concentrated in the centre and right: Davoust being on the extreme right; Masséna next to him, in front of Aderklaa; Marmont, Oudinot, Eugene, and Bernadotte, in front of the plateau of Wagram; and Bessières, with the Imperial Guards and reserve cavalry, in the rear of the centre around Raschdorf.*

The brilliant success which had crowned the action on the night of the 5th made an important change in the dispositions of the archduke. Perceiving the determined resolution of his troops, and encouraged by the important check which they had given to the enemy, even when possessed of a considerable superiority of force, he resolved to resume the offensive, and anticipate the designs of the French emperor by a general attack with all his forces. This resolution was taken at midnight on the 5th, and at two in the following morning orders were despatched to the Archduke John to hasten up with all his disposable force to the scene of action. He was understood to be at Marchegg, thirteen miles from the right flank of the French army; but he might with ease arrive on the field by one o'clock in the afternoon, when it was hoped his appearance with thirty thousand fresh troops would be attended with the most important effects. Foreseeing, from the attack of the preceding evening, that the principal efforts of the enemy would be directed against the plateau of Wagram, where the ground was naturally strong, the archduke resolved to make his chief effort on his right against Aspern and Essling, in order to menace the bridges and communications of the French army. Success in this direction, combined with the attack of the Archduke John on the same important points from the left, promised entirely to neutralize any advantage which the enemy might gain in front of Wagram; and, in fact, threatened as he would thus be in the rear and on either flank, an imprudent advance in the centre would only augment the dangers of his situation, by withdrawing the main body of the army farther from the means of retreat. With these views, Kollowrath and Klenau were concentrated on the left, on the eastern slope of the Bisamberg, and re-enforced

to fifty thousand men the troops of Lichtenstein and Hiller; Rosenberg, on the left, received orders to descend towards Glinzendorf, in order to form a junction with, and co-operate in the decisive attack of the Archduke John on the left; Bellegarde, during the night, was pushed on to Aderklaa, which the Saxons evacuated in disorder on his approach; while Hohenzollern, and the reserve grenadiers and cavalry, occupied the line of the Russbach and the crest of the plateau, having strong parties both in Wagram and Baumersdorf. Thus the Imperialists, when the shock commenced in the morning, formed an immense semicircle, with their strength thrown into the two wings; the French, an interior convex quadrant, with their columns issuing, like the folds of a fan, from its centre.* The forces of the former were overwhelming on the right, and their left was almost impregnable, from the strength of the plateau of Wagram, so fatally experienced on the preceding evening; but their centre, towards Sussenbrunn, naturally weak, was not so strongly defended by troops as to promise an effectual resistance to the great French force which was concentrated in its front.

It was intended by the archduke that Kollowrath and Klenau, with the right wing, should first commence the attack; but the difficulty of conveying the orders in time to the extreme points of so extensive a line was such, that, before these distant generals could arrive at the scene of action, it had already commenced in the centre and left. At daybreak Napoleon was not yet on horseback, but only preparing the grand attack which he meditated on the enemy's centre, when suddenly the discharge of cannon was heard on his right; and soon after, the increasing roar and advancing smoke in that direction indicated that the Austrian right wing was seriously engaged, and making rapid progress. Immediately after, intelligence arrived that the Russbach was passed, and Glinzendorf threatened by Rosenberg on the right, and Aderklaa, abandoned by Bernadotte on the preceding night, occupied in force by Bellegarde in the centre. Notwithstanding all his activity, the French emperor was anticipated in the offensive, and the direction in which the Imperialists had commenced their attack rendered him apprehensive that the Archduke John had come up during the night, and that his right flank was about to be turned by an overwhelming force. Instantly appreciating the importance of such a combined attack, Napoleon hastened with his guards and reserves of cuirassiers, and drew up the artillery of the guard in such a position as to command the right of Rosenberg's corps, which had now advanced near to Glinzendorf; but hardly had these powerful re-enforcements arrived near that village, when the Austrian advance was arrested. In effect, Prince Charles, finding that the Archduke John had not yet arrived, and that the enemy had moved an overwhelming force in that direction, ordered Rosenberg to suspend his attack, and soon after he withdrew his troops behind the Russbach; but they sustained a considerable loss in their retreat from the charges of the French cuirassiers, and the cannonade of the artillery of the guard on their flank.†

Hardly was this alarm dispelled on his right,

* Pel., iv., 197, 199. Jom., iii., 266. Sav., iv., 106, 107. Vict. et Cong., xix., 205.

VOL. III.—I

* Sav., iv., 199, 200. Vict. et Cong., xix., 205, 206. Sav., iv., 109. Jom., iii., 267. Kausler, 385. Stat., 324, 329.

† Sav., iv., 108, 109. Pel., iv., 203, 207. Jom., iii., 267. Kausler, 385, 386.

Defeat of Mas- when Napoleon received still more
sena in the disquieting intelligence from his
centre. centre and left. The first rays of
the sun had glittered on the bayonets of Klenau
and Kollowrath's corps, as they descended the
verdant slopes behind Stammersdorf, and joined
Hiller and Lichtenstein near Leopoldau, and al-
ready the sound of their cannon towards Brei-
tenlee and Aspern told but too clearly the prog-
ress they were making to turn the left flank of
the French army. But the danger in the centre
was still more pressing. Massena, in executing
his prescribed movements from the left to the
right of the field of battle, had attacked Aderklaa
with his leading division under Cara St. Cyr:
the village was speedily carried by the gallantry
of the 24th regiment; but, instead of merely oc-
cupying the houses, and strengthening himself
in so important a point, St. Cyr pushed through
to the opposite side, and brought his troops with-
in range of a terrible fire of grape and musket-
ry from Bellegarde's corps, drawn up in force
on the plain between that and Wagram. The
French, breathless with their advance, were so
shattered by the discharge that they suddenly re-
coiled, and, being at the same time charged in
flank by the Austrian cavalry, were pushed back
in confusion into Aderklaa. At the same time
the Archduke Charles, who felt the full value
of this post, hastened to the spot with the grena-
diers of Aspre, and charged the assailants with
such vigour that they were driven out of the vil-
lage at the point of the bayonet, broken in the
plain beyond, and thrown back in utter disorder
upon the Saxon, Baden, and Darmstadt contin-
gents, who disbanded and fled in such confu-
sion that they overwhelmed Massena, who, al-
though severely bruised by a fall off his horse,
was in the field in his calèche, to such a degree
that he made the dragoons about his person
charge them as if they had been enemies.*
Transported by the animation of the charge, the
Archduke Charles pushed forward, at the head
of his brave grenadiers, a considerable way in
front of Aderklaa, where he found himself, al-
most alone, so near the enemy, that he heard a
French officer command his voltigeurs to make
him prisoner, and received a ball in the shoulder
before he could regain the breathless ranks of
his followers.†

Napoleon perceived from afar the disorder of
the left of his centre, and instantly
hastened to the spot to arrest it. Di-
recting Davoust to attack Neusiedel
and press the Austrian left, and order-
ing his guards to countermarch as rapidly as
possible from right to left across the whole field,
which they had so lately traversed in the oppo-
site direction, he himself set out at the gallop,
followed by the thundering squadrons of his cui-
rassiers and horse artillery of the guard, and
soon arrived at the spot where Massena, almost
alone in his chariot in the midst of the fugitives
who overspread the plain, was making brave ef-

* A young Saxon colonel, during the rout of the corps, finding his efforts, prayers, and menaces alike ineffectual to prevent his men from dispersing, advanced with his standard in his hand to a regiment of the French Imperial Guard which had just come up, and, throwing himself into their ranks, said, "Frenchmen, I trust to you this standard: you, I am sure, will defend it; my regiment is to be found wherever courageous resistance is made to the enemy." How many instances of heroism in all nations did the Revolutionary war bring forth! What elevation of soul did they occasion!—See *Victoires et Conquêtes*, xix., 218.

† Sav., iv., 109, 110. Pel., iv., 210, 212. Jom., iii., 268. Keusler, 386. Arch. Charles's Account.

forts to arrest the disorder. He instantly alighted from his horse, mounted into the chariot be-
side the marshal, conversed a few seconds with
him, and, pointing to the tower of Neusiedel, the
steeples of Wagram, Sussenbrunn, and Aspern,
made all around him comprehend that a grand
movement was in preparation to check the ene-
my. Order was in some degree restored by the
presence of the emperor and the powerful re-en-
forcement which he brought with him, and im-
mediately the prescribed alteration in the order
of battle commenced: Massena's corps, which
had almost all broken, was re-formed under
cover of the artillery and cavalry of the guard,
and commenced a countermarch by battalions
in close column towards Aspern; while the cui-
rassiers of St. Sulpice, by repeated charges, kept
at a distance the threatening columns of the ene-
my. The French infantry, restored to order by
the efforts of the emperor, executed the prescribed
movements athwart the field of battle with the
most perfect regularity, though torn in pieces all
the way by a terrible fire of artillery from the
Austrian right wing on their flank; but their de-
parture from the neighbourhood of Aderklaa,
before the infantry of the guard and the reserves
had come up from Neusiedel, weakened serious-
ly the French line, which was reduced to the de-
fensive at the most important point of the whole
field, the salient angle running into the Austrian
position, and compelled to remain stationary un-
der a tremendous cross fire of artillery from the
hostile batteries on either side of the angle. The
courage of the soldiers quivered under this dread-
ful trial, where war exhibited all its dangers
with none of its excitement, and several battal-
ions disbanded and fled; but Napoleon, calm
and collected in the midst of the general disqui-
etude, rode backward and forward for an hour
amid a storm of cannon-balls, unmoved by per-
sonal danger, but casting a frequent and anxious
look towards Neusiedel, where the prescribed
attack by Davoust was every moment expected
to appear, from the advancing cannonade and
smoke in that direction. He was mounted on a
snow-white charger called Euphrates, a present
of the King of Persia; and when the firing was
most vehement, he rode in front of the line,
which was too far distant to return a shot. His
suite expected every moment to see him struck
down by a cannon-ball; but, albeit noways in-
sensible to the disastrous consequences which
would in all likelihood attend his fall, he felt too
strongly the necessity of his presence to preserve
order at that important point, to shrink even for
a moment from the scene of danger.*

It was not surprising that Napoleon exposed
himself so much to maintain this
salient angle of his position, with-
out recalling Massena, or weaken-
ing his corps on the right; for the
danger had become so pressing from
the progress of the Austrians on the left, that the
battle appeared irrecoverably lost. At ten o'clock,
Kollowrath and Klenau, preceded by sixty pieces
of cannon, had swept the whole field of bat-
tle: after occupying Breitenlee and Neuwerthaus,
they had fallen with an overwhelming su-
periority of force on Boudet and Le Grand, who,
with eighteen thousand men, had been left to
keep their ground against such fearful odds, put
them to the rout, captured all their artillery and

Splendid progress of the Austrian right towards Essling.

* Sav., iv., 110, 111. Pel., iv., 210, 212. Jom., iii., 268. Vict. et Conq., xix., 208.

four thousand prisoners, and drove them through Aspern into the French *tête-du-pont*, on the edge of the Danube. Following up this important success, the Austrians re-entered the intrenchments in front of the island of Lobau, regained all the redoubts evacuated on the preceding day, occupied Essling, and pushed their advanced posts so near to the bridges leading to Enzersdorf, that the French heavy guns, on the shores of the island, opened their fire to protect the retreat of the army with as much vehemence as they had done forty hours before to cover the passage of the river. Driving the enemy before them, like chaff before the wind, the whole Austrian right, with loud shouts, pressed on towards Enzersdorf. Startled by the unexpected sound, which was soon heard even above the thunder of the artillery in front, the French reserve parks and baggage-trains were seized with a universal panic: fugitives on all sides overspread the rear of the army, and fled to the bridges, which were speedily choked up by the throng; cries of "All is lost! the bridges are taken!" were already heard in the ranks; while the anxious crowds who thronged the steeples of Vienna, and with beating hearts and speechless emotion watched the advancing fire of their columns, above all the roar of the artillery heard the Austrian cheers, and already the thrilling voice was heard in the capital, "The country is saved!"*

But Providence had decreed it otherwise, and four years more of bondage and misery were destined to punish the faults and unite the hearts of Germany. While this splendid success attended the efforts of the Austrian right, their left, against which Napoleon had accumulated his forces under Davoust, had undergone a serious reverse. This illustrious chief, who had fifty thousand admirable troops at his command, including three divisions of the reserve cavalry, had no sooner received Napoleon's directions to attack the Austrians on the plateau, than he despatched Friant and Morand, with the veterans who had gained the day at Auerstadt, to cross the Russbach below Glinzendorf, ascend the valley above Neusiedel, and turn the extreme left of the enemy; while he himself, with the two other divisions, attacked that village in front; and Oudinot was ordered to keep Hohenzollern in check, in the centre of the plateau behind Baumersdorf. It required some time to execute, out of the range of the enemy's cannon, this sweep round the extremity of his position; for sixty pieces of cannon, disposed along the front and eastern face of the plateau, swept the whole level ground at its feet, as far as the guns would carry. At ten o'clock, however, the two divisions of Friant and Morand had crossed the Russbach, supported by a numerous artillery and ten thousand horse, under Grouchy, Montbrun, and Arighi. Rosenberg, meanwhile, perceiving the danger with which he was threatened, had accumulated his forces in strength at Neusiedel and the angle of the plateau behind it, and, with his troops drawn up, facing outward, on the two sides of a right-angled triangle, was prepared to maintain his important position against the formidable odds which was about to assail him; while the guns on the crest of the plateau behind his lines replied to the more numerous batteries of the enemy in the plain below with vigour and effect.

Morand's division came first into action, and boldly mounted the heights, but, notwithstanding the gallantry of their attack, they were driven back in disorder by the destructive fire of the Austrian cannon, and the rapid discharges of their musketry; but Friant came up to his support, and Morand, rallying under cover of his lines, recommenced a furious assault on the enemy, and, after a desperate resistance, succeeded in ascending the plateau on its eastern front. Friant, at the same time, passing farther on, made his way to the summit. The tower of Neusiedel, however, still held out, though a powerful French battery thundered against it from an adjoining height to the eastward; and the Austrian cavalry, who were drawn up at the foot of the ascent, essayed several charges against the ponderous steel-clad cuirassiers of Arighi and Grouchy. The shock was terrible, but the French proved at first victorious, and routed Rosenberg's horse with great slaughter; Hohenzollern's cuirassiers next came up to avenge the disaster, and Grouchy, in his turn, was broken and forced back; Montbrun then charged the victorious Austrians, when blown by their rapid advance, with decisive effect; and, after desperate acts of gallantry on both sides, they were compelled to follow the retrograde movement of their infantry, and abandon the eastern front of the plateau.*

While this important advantage was gained on the extreme left, a furious combat on the right was raging around Neusiedel. Davoust in person there led on the divisions of Gaudin and Pacthod to the attack with extraordinary vigour: the resistance by the Prince of Hesse-Homburg was equally obstinate, and some re-enforcements despatched by Hohenzollern long enabled that gallant officer to maintain his ground against greatly superior forces. At length, however, the Austrians were driven by main force from the houses, and pushed back to the foot of the plateau: there they again made a stand, and for long strove with desperate resolution to make good the tower, and prevent Davoust from debouching from the village. In this terrible strife Nordman and Veczay were killed; Hesse-Homburg, Muger, Wartheachben, and almost all the Austrian generals wounded, while on the French side Gaudin received four wounds, and almost all his generals were struck down. At length the tower was carried by assault, and the enemy's infantry driven in disorder from the ground they had so long defended in its rear. Davoust, upon this, ordered the cuirassiers of Arighi to charge the retreating lines, and soon the slope of the plateau glittered with the dazzling light of their helmets; but they got entangled in broken ground among the huts of the Austrian bivouacs, and the few who reached the summit were so grievously shattered by the pointblank fire of their guns, that the whole were driven headlong down, with severe loss, into the plain. Notwithstanding this success, however, Rosenberg was unable to keep his ground on the angle of the plateau, above Neusiedel, after the tower had fallen: his left was turned by Morand and Friant, who had established themselves on the crest of the plateau; and on the other side, Oudinot, transported by the enthusiasm of the moment, had converted his feigned into a real

Neusiedel is taken, and the Austrian left driven back.

* Archduke Charles's Official Account of Wagram, Ann. Reg., 1809. App. to Chron. Sav., iv., 110. Pel., iv., 213, 214. Vict. et Cong., xix., 208.

* Kausler, 387. Jom., iii., 272, 273. Pel., iv., 225, 226. Vict. et Cong., xix., 209.

attack, and, though repeatedly repulsed, had at length made his way across the Russbach near Baumersdorf, and, despite all the efforts of Hohenzollern, who was weakened by the succours sent to Neusiedel, reached the crest of the plateau.* Threatened thus on both flanks, Rosenberg drew back in excellent order, still facing to the eastward, and, forming a junction with Hohenzollern, took up a new position towards the centre of the plateau, nearly at right angles to the line of the Russbach, and covering two thirds of its surface; while Davoust, apprehensive of being taken in rear by the Archduke John, whose approach to the field was already announced by the scouts of both armies, showed no disposition to molest him in the new line which he had occupied.

Napoleon was still riding with his suite in the perilous angle in front of Aderklaa, when these alternate disasters and successes were passing on either wing of his army. The accounts which he received from his left were every moment more alarming. Officers in breathless haste arrived every ten minutes, to announce the fearful progress of the enemy in that direction. "The cannon," said one, "which you hear in the rear, is that of the Austrians;" the emperor made no answer. "The division Boudet is driven back into the island of Lobau," said another: still no answer; but his eyes were anxiously turned to the tower of Neusiedel, which was visible from all parts of the plain, and he frequently asked if the fire was on the east or west of that building. At length Davoust's cannon were distinctly seen to pass Neusiedel, and the slopes of the plateau were enveloped with smoke. "Hasten back to Massena," said he to the aid-de-camp, "and tell him to commence his attack: the battle is gained." At the same time, he despatched orders in all directions for offensive operations: Bessières, with ten regiments of the reserve cavalry, was directed to charge the Austrian right wing, which had advanced so far into the French rear, in flank; while Massena, who had now got back to his original ground near Aspern, assailed it in front; Eugene, Marmont, and Bernadotte were to assault Wagram; Oudinot and Davoust to renew their attacks, and, if possible, drive the enemy from the plateau; while the emperor in person prepared the decisive effort, by a grand charge of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the centre. For this purpose, Eugene's corps, which had marched across the field from Baumersdorf, was arranged in close columns of three divisions: Macdonald in the central division, consisting of eight strong battalions; on either flank were six, drawn up in close array; behind them marched Serras's division and Wrede's Bavarians; the light horse of the guard and the cuirassiers of Nansouty covered their flanks; a hundred pieces of cannon, chiefly of the guard, under Drouet, which had now come up from Neusiedel, admirably served, preceded the whole, and spread death far and wide; while the emperor himself, with the cavalry and infantry of the Old Guard, closed the array, on the success of which he had staked his crown and his life.†

Napoleon himself gave the signal to this terrible column to advance: its instructions were to

move right upon the steeple of Sussenbrunn, leaving Aderklaa to the right. The archduke early perceived the effort which was preparing against his centre, and made every possible disposition to resist it. The lines were doubled; the reserves of cavalry and the right of Bellegarde's corps brought up to the menaced point; artillery on either side planted in great abundance, so as to open a cross fire on the advancing column, while the archduke in person hastened to the spot with his whole staff, to be in a situation to act with promptitude in the terrible crisis which was approaching. Hardly had they arrived, when Lauriston and Drouet's artillery approached: the cannoniers, regardless of the cross fire of the Austrian batteries, advanced at the trot to within half cannon-shot, and then opened a prodigious fire from their hundred pieces, which was sustained with such rapidity, that it forced back the Austrian line immediately in front, and dismounted several of their guns. Taking advantage of the confusion produced by this discharge, Macdonald advanced with his column, directly in at the opening, and pierced the imperial centre: Aderklaa and Breitenlee are soon passed; Sussenbrunn is menaced: moving steadily forward through the wreck of guns, the dead, and the dying, this undaunted column, preceded by its terrific battery incessantly firing, pushed on half a league beyond the front, in other points, of the enemy's line. In proportion as it advanced, however, it became enveloped by fire: the guns were gradually dismounted or silenced, and the infantry emerged through their wreck to the front; the Austrians drew off their front line up on their second, and, both falling back, formed a sort of wall on each side of the French column, from whence issued a dreadful fire of grape and musketry on either flank of the assailants. Still Macdonald pressed on with unconquerable resolution: in the midst of a frightful storm of bullets his ranks are unshaken; the destinies of Europe are in his hands, and he is worthy of the mission. The loss he experienced, however, was enormous: at every step huge chasms are made in his ranks, whole files are struck down by cannon-shot, and at length his eight dense battalions are reduced to fifteen hundred men! Isolated in the midst of enemies, this band of heroes is compelled to halt: the Empire rocked to its foundation: the rout of a similar body of the Old Guard at Waterloo hurled Napoleon to the rock of St. Helena.*

Following with intense anxiety the advance of this column, however, the emperor was at hand to support it. The divisions on the flank, Durutte and Pacthod, which had insensibly fallen behind during the advance of Macdonald with the central column, were ordered to move forward; Serras and Wrede were hastened up to his support, and the young guard, under Reille, detached to support their attack. This last succour, however, almost exhausted the reserves of Napoleon. "Husband your men as much as possible," said he to Reille, as he gave him the command: "I have now no other reserver but the two regiments of the Old Guard." At the same time, Nansouty, with the cuirassiers on the left, and Walther with the dragoons on the right of

Decisive advance of Macdonald in the centre.

* Kausler, 387. Jom., iii., 272. Pel., iv., 229, 231. Vict. et Conq., xix., 209.

† Jom., iii., 272, 273. Sav., iv., 112, 113. Pel., iv., 221, 223. Kausler, 388.

* Kausler, 388. Pel., iv., 221, 224. Sav., iv., 113. Jom., iv., 273. Vict. et Conq., xix., 210.

Macdonald's column, received orders to charge the masses in front of them, and Oudinot, Eugene, and Marmont, to press the enemy as much as possible towards Aderklaa and Wagram.*

The charges of the cavalry proved most unfortunate. Hardly had Bessiéres set off to execute the orders of the emperor when he was struck down by a cannon-shot, which tore his thigh, killed his horse, and so disfigured his whole person that he was taken up for dead. Nansouty succeeded to the command, and led on the charge; but such was the severity of the fire which they immediately encountered, that in a few minutes twelve hundred horsemen were struck down by cannon-balls, and the whole were compelled to halt and retire before they even reached the enemy. The dragoons on the right, under Walther, met with the same fate, and, after sustaining a grievous loss, were driven back under cover of the foot-soldiers. But the infantry were more successful. No sooner did Macdonald perceive that the divisions of Pachtod, Durutte, Serras, and Wrede had come up to his flanks, and that Reille was advancing to his support, than he resumed his forward movement, and the archduke, despairing now of maintaining his position, gave orders for a general retreat. It was executed, however, in the most admirable order: the infantry retiring by echelon, and alternately marching and facing about to pour destructive volleys into the ranks of the pursuers. The field of battle, as seen from the steeples of Vienna, now presented a magnificent spectacle. Massena, upon the retreat of Kolowrath and Klenau, readily regained Essling and Aspern, and the Austrian army, in a line nearly perpendicular to the Danube, slowly and deliberately retired; while the French host formed a vast line of sabres and bayonets, from the banks of the river to the summit of the plateau of Wagram, on which the declining rays of the sun glanced with extraordinary splendour. Vast volumes of smoke at intervals indicated the position of the opposing batteries; a white line of curling smoke marked the advance and line of the infantry; and gleams of almost intolerable brightness were reflected from the helmets and cuirasses of the cavalry. A bloody encounter took place at Gerarsdorf, which the rear-guard of Kolowrath long held with unconquerable bravery, but it was at length carried by the chasers of the guard: Wagram yielded to the impetuous assaults of Oudinot, and two battalions were made prisoners. But, with this exception, the retreat of the Austrians was conducted with hardly any loss: the archduke, with consummate skill, availed himself of every advantage of ground to retard the enemy; and so exhausted were the French by their efforts, that they displayed very little vigour in the pursuit. Neither cannons nor prisoners were taken; the cavalry hardly charged; but for the retrograde movement of one army, and the advance of the other, it would have been impossible to have decided which had gained the advantage in the fight. Napoleon was much chagrined at this indecisive result, and suffered his ill-humour to exhale in open reproaches to the cavalry generals of the guard. "Was ever anything seen like this? Neither prisoners nor guns! This day will be attended with no results." At nightfall, the

Austrians occupied a line along the heights behind Stammersdorf, from which their right wing had descended in the morning, along the great road to Brunn, through Hebersdorf to Obersdorf; while the French bivouacked in the plain, three miles in their front, from the edge of the Danube near Florisdorf, perpendicularly up to Sauring, at the foot of the hills.*

It was towards the close of this obstinately-contested battle that the Archduke John approached the field. Between three and four o'clock his columns came up to Leobensdorf and Obersiebenbrunn, while his advanced posts reached Neusiedel, and even approached Wagram, which the French troops had passed through, not an hour before, in pursuit of the Austrian grand army! Finding, however, upon his arrival there, that his brother had abandoned the field, and was retiring at all points towards the Bisamberg, he justly conceived apprehensions concerning his own situation, left alone with forty thousand men in the rear of the Grand Army, and gave orders to retreat. He marched till after dark, and regained Marchegg before midnight. An incident occurred, however, soon after he retired, which demonstrated in the most striking manner the vital importance of his co-operation, and the decisive effect which might have arisen from it had he come up, as he had been ordered, at an earlier hour of the day. The emperor, worn out with fatigue, had lain down to rest, surrounded by his guards, in the plain between Sussenbrunn and Aderklaa, when cries of alarm were heard from the rear. The drums immediately beat at all points: the infantry hastily formed in squares, the artillerymen stood to their guns, the cavalry saddled their horses. Napoleon himself mounted his horse, and asked what was the cause of the alarm. "It is nothing, sire," replied Charles le Brun, one of his aides-de-camp: "merely a few marauders." "What do you call nothing?" replied the emperor, warmly: "know, sir, there are no trifling events in war; nothing endangers an army like an imprudent security. Return to see what is the matter, and come back quickly to render me an account." Meanwhile he prepared everything for a nocturnal combat, and the aspect of affairs in the rear of the army was such as to call forth all his solicitude. The artillery, baggage-wagons, stragglers, and camp-followers, who crowded the rear, were flying in disorder to the Danube; the plain was covered with fugitives, the entrance of the bridges blocked up with carriages, and many who even had the river between them and the supposed danger, continued their flight, and never drew bridle till they were within the ramparts of Vienna. The alarm spread like wildfire from rank to rank: the guard even was shaken; the victors for a moment doubted of the fate of the day. The ranks presented the appearance of a general rout; and yet the whole was occasioned by a single squadron of the Archduke John's cavalry, which had been far advanced towards Wagram, and seeking to regain, as he retired, the road to Presburg, had cut down some French marauders in one of the villages on the east of the field! So vital was the line of communication on which that prince was intended to act, and so important were the results which must

Tardy approach and retreat of the Archduke John. Vital importance of his co-operation.

* Kausler, 388, 389. Sav., iv., 112, 113. Pelet, iv., 225, 226. Vict. et Conq., xix., 210, 211.

* Kausler, 389, 390. Pelet, iv., 234, 238. Archduke Charles's Official Account, Ann. Reg., 1809. App. to Chron. Sav., iv., 114. Vict. et Conq., xix., 211, 212.

have ensued from his co-operation, if it had taken place, as the generalissimo was entitled to expect, at an earlier period of the day.*

Such was the memorable battle of Wagram, one of the greatest and most obstinately contested of the whole war, and perhaps the most glorious in the whole Austrian annals. The loss on both sides was immense: twenty-five thousand brave men on either part were either killed or wounded, without any decisive result having been obtained. The other trophies were equally balanced: the Austrian right wing had made five thousand prisoners, and two thousand of their own wounded had fallen into the hands of the enemy in the centre of the plain. They were nowhere defeated: no panics disgraced their lines; no columns laid down their arms; slowly, at the command of their chief alone, in regular order they retired from the field, without the loss of either prisoners or cannon, and inspiring, even to the last, dread to the enemy who followed their steps.†

To have maintained such a conflict with greatly inferior forces, against Napoleon at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand men, was itself no ordinary distinction. But this is not all: if their forces had all joined in the action, and they had thereby been restored to an equality with the enemy, there can be no doubt the result would have been different. But for the failure of the Archduke John to come up at the period assigned to him, the battle would have terminated in a glorious and decisive victory. Had that prince made his appearance on the field either at six in the morning, when Rosenberg, in anticipation of his co-operation, advanced to Glinzendorf; or later, when Kollowrath and Klenau had routed the French left wing, and their leading columns were approaching the bridges of Lobau; or even when the fate of Europe hung in suspense on the advance of Macdonald's column in the centre, there can be no doubt that Napoleon would have been totally defeated, and possibly a disaster as great as that of Waterloo would have effected, six years before that memorable event, the deliverance of Europe. Experience in every age

has demonstrated that, after the protracted excitement of a great battle, the bravest soldiers become unstrung,* and, at such a moment, the attack of a few fresh troops often produces the most extraordinary results. It is this which so often has chained success to the effort of a small reserve in the close of an obstinately-disputed day; which made Kellerman's charge at Marengo snatch victory from the grasp of the victorious Austrians; and the onset of Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade on the flank of the Old Guard, at Waterloo, overthrow at once the military fabric of the French Empire. The general terror inspired in Napoleon's rear by the capture of Aspern and Essling in the morning, the marvellous panic occasioned by the charge of a squadron of hussars in their extreme right at night, demonstrated that the disaster at Aspern had inspired the French troops with a nervous disquietude about the bridges in their rear, and that any alarm in that quarter was likely to produce even greater effect than on troops of less military foresight and experience. What, then, must have been the effect of thirty thousand fresh troops suddenly thrown into the rear of the French army, where there was no reserve to oppose them, at the moment when the victorious shouts of Kollowrath's troops, and the ominous sound of the cannon of Lobau, announced that their retreat was all but cut off; or when the heroic column of Macdonald, wasted away to fifteen hundred men, had halted their advance in front of Sussenbrunn? The Archduke John is a most accomplished prince, and, as a private individual, no one has greater title to esteem; but either his jealousy of his brother, or his incapacity to perceive the object of combined operations, twice in that single campaign proved fatal to his country: once when he disobeyed the orders of the Archduke Charles to combine with Kollowrath an attack on the bridge of Linz, on the French line of communication, immediately after the battle of Aspern; and again, by his tardiness in obeying the orders of the same generalissimo to hasten to the theatre of decisive events on the field of Wagram.†

The day after the battle, Napoleon, according to his usual custom, rode over the field of battle. Without the features of horror which had imprinted so awful a character on that of Eylau, it presented some circumstances of a still more distressing description. The plain was covered with the corpses of the

* Jom., iii., 276, 277. Vict. et Conq., xix., 215. Sav., iv., 115.

† The 25th Bulletin says the French took 20,000 prisoners, forty pieces of cannon, and ten standards; and Sir Walter Scott has heedlessly transcribed that statement.* It is, however, grossly inaccurate, and proved to be so, even by the warmest partisans of Napoleon. "The enemy retired," says Savary, who was by the emperor's side through the whole battle, "at four o'clock, and abandoned to us the field of battle, but without prisoners or cannon, and after having fought in such a manner as to render every prudent man cautious of engaging in a rash enterprise: we followed without pressing him, for the truth is, he had not been at all cut up. He made head against us everywhere, and his troops were very numerous, and he had, in reality, no reason for retiring; though, fortunately for us, he did so, and thus gave to France all the moral advantages of a victory."‡ Jomini says, "The archduke retreated during the night, leaving us no other trophies but some thousand wounded or prisoners, and a few dismounted cannon. Their loss was 25,000 men; ours was about the same."§ Sir Walter's Life of Napoleon is a surprising work, considering that it was written in little more than twelve months, by an author whose life had been spent in studies of a different description; but his narrative is often little more than a transcript of the bulletins or Annual Register, and it is not surprising that in less than two years he could not, under severe anxiety and affliction, master what would have required twenty years, in Gibbon's words, "of health, leisure, and perseverance."—See LOCKHART'S Life of Scott, vii., 42.

‡ Kausler, 389, 390. Pelet, iv., 238.

* Scott's Nap., vi., 334.

† Sav., iv., 114, 115, 116.

‡ Jom., iii., 276.

* "The long and fearful excitement of battle once relaxed, leaves the toil-worn frame nerveless and exhausted, and the mind itself destitute of the energy requisite for any renewal of vigorous exertion. A bold onset made by a few resolute men on troops who have maintained, even successfully, a hard day's combat, is almost sure to turn the scale in favour of the new assailants."—Life of WALLENSTEIN, by LIEUT.-COLONEL MITCHELL, p. 259: a work written with the spirit of a soldier, the principles of a patriot, and the penetration of a statesman.

† "If we reflect," says General Pelet, the able historian of this campaign, himself an actor in the mighty events he commemorates, and, withal, an ardent partisan of Napoleon, "on the result of the battle of Fontenoy; if the 1500 who remained of Macdonald's corps had been surrounded and charged by fresh troops assembled from the right and the left, and those who remained on the heights of Stammersdorf, the battle might still have been gained by the Austrians. The emperor had no other reserve at his disposal but two regiments of the Old Guard; the isle of Lobau was threatened, and all around it was in the utmost disorder. The archduke had many more forces not engaged than were required to have made that attack."—Pelet, v., 248.

‡ Kausler, 389, 390. Pelet, iv., 238, 239. Jom., iii., 275, 276.

§ See note B.

slain; the march of Macdonald's column, especially, might be traced by the train of dead bodies which lay along its course. Such was the multitude of the wounded, that they far exceeded all the efforts of the French surgeons, and of the humane citizens of Vienna, for their relief; and, four days after the battle, the mutilated remains of human beings, still alive, were found in great numbers among the rich fields of wheat with which the plain was covered. Some of these unhappy wretches endured for days together the rays of a vertical sun during the dog-days, without either food or water; mutilated, and unable to remove the flies which fastened on their wounds, they literally became, while still alive, the prey of the insects which hover round carcases of animals in hot weather.* The emperor frequently dismounted, and with his own hands administered relief to some of the wounded, and drew tears of gratitude from eyes about to be closed in death.† The knowledge that the victory was their own had restored all their wonted enthusiasm to the French soldiers: the wounded exclaimed *Vive l'Empereur!* as he passed, and hoisted little white flags, formed by putting their handkerchiefs, or an arm of their shirt, on their bayonets, as well to testify their joy as to implore relief. After having traversed the field of battle, Napoleon inspected the soldiers who were about to march in pursuit of the enemy, and distributed rewards in great profusion among the most deserving. In passing, he stopped and held out his hand to Macdonald: "Touch it, Macdonald, without any farther grudge: from this day we shall be friends; and I will send you, as a pledge of my sincerity, your marshal's staff, which you have won so gloriously yesterday." "Ah! sire," replied Macdonald, with tears in his eyes, "we are now together for life and death." And well did the hero of Scottish blood redeem his word! Through every future change of his reign he adhered with unshaken fidelity to the fortunes of his master. He was to be found by his side, alike amid the disasters of Fontenoy, as the triumph of Wagram; and, when all the other objects of his bounty had deserted their benefactor and passed over to the enemy, he remained almost alone to support him: the latest object of his prosperous favour, but the most faithful follower of his adverse fortunes.‡

Oudinot, a general, as the bulletin said, "tried in a hundred battles," and Mar-mont, whose campaign in Illyria and Carniola had so powerfully contributed to the success of the Grand Army, were at the same time elevated to the rank of marshals. Very different was the destiny which awaited Bernadotte, Prince of Pontecorvo, hitherto one of

Appointment of Oudinot marshal of the Empire. Disgrace of Bernadotte.

* D'Abr., xii., 261, 262.

† "The emperor stopped his horse beside a young officer of carabineers, who had had his skull fractured by a cannon-shot; he knelt beside him, felt his pulse, and wiped with his own handkerchief the dust from his lips and brow. A little spirit made him revive; he opened his eyes and fixed them on the emperor; he recognised him, and his eyes filled with tears; but he was too weak to be able to sob, and soon after breathed his last."—SAVARY, iv., 119.

‡ A coldness had long subsisted between Napoleon and this distinguished general. He had not been employed in any considerable command since the battle of the Trebbia, in 1799. Jealousy and malevolence had widened the breach occasioned by Macdonald's original disinclination to join the herd of obsequious flatterers at the Tuileries. How often does difficulty and misfortune bring to the post they are really worthy to fill, those noble minds who disdain the arts by which, in easier times, it is generally won!—SAVARY, iv., 119. § Sav., iv., 119 120. Pelet, iv., 241, 242.

the most favoured of Napoleon's lieutenants. This chief, who had been singularly unfortunate, both in his attack on the heights of Wagram and village of Aderklaa on the evening of the 5th, and his encounter with the Austrian centre on the morning of the 6th, had, with the true spirit of Gascony, his native country, glossed over his defeat by a boasting proclamation to the Saxons on the 7th, in which he professed to convey to them the emperor's approbation for the gallantry which they had evinced on these occasions.* Napoleon, who was both irritated at Bernadotte and the Saxons for the abandonment of Aderklaa, which it required him so much time and bloodshed to regain on the following day, and jealous of any of his lieutenants assuming his own peculiar function in the distribution of praise or blame, immediately prepared and circulated, but among the marshals and ministers alone, an order of the day, reflecting, in very severe terms, both on the conduct of the Saxons and this step on the part of their chief;† and soon after a decree was published in the bulletin dissolving that corps, and incorporating its soldiers with other parts of the army. Bernadotte sought a private interview with the emperor on this painful subject, but in vain: he constantly refused to see him; and the disgraced marshal immediately set out for Paris, where he was soon after employed by the minister at war, without the concurrence of Napoleon, in a very important duty, that of commanding at Antwerp during the English invasion of the Scheldt. No sooner, however, did the emperor learn of this fresh appointment by the government at Paris, than it, too, was cancelled, and Bessières put there in his stead; even although Bernadotte's efforts, during the short period he held the command, had been eminently serviceable to the Empire. These repeated indignities made a deep impression on the mind of the French marshal: they revived that ancient jealousy at the First Consul; which all the subsequent glories of his reign had not entirely extinguished; induced a sullen discontent at the imperial service, which experience had shown was liable to such inconstancy; made him grasp eagerly at the Swedish throne, which fortune soon after proffered to his grasp; and, by investing the disgraced soldier with the power and feelings of an independent sovereign, contributed, in the end, in no inconsiderable degree, to the downfall of the French Empire.‡

Two lines of retreat were open to the arch-duke after he had determined to re- The Austrians
linquish the field: that to Olmutz retire towards
and Moravia, and that to Bohemia; Bohemia.
and so little did the French press their adversaries when the retrograde movement commenced, that the emperor was for some time ignorant which of the two routes they had adopted. There were several reasons, however, which induced him to prefer the latter. Prague July 7.
was, next to Vienna, the greatest military establishment, and contained the largest arsenal of the Empire; and it stood in a country surrounded with a range of hills, which offered favourable positions for retarding the advance of an invading army. Hopes were not wanting, also, that the great naval and military armament, which England had so long been preparing, would soon make its appearance, either in Flan-

* See note C.

† See note D.

‡ Ante, i., 565

§ Rom., viii., 280, 281. Pel., iv., 241, 242. Sav., iv., 123

ders or the north of Germany, and that the indecision of Prussia, notwithstanding the retreat from Wagram, might be determined by such powerful support in the north of Germany. For these reasons, the line of Bohemia was selected for the retreat of the Grand Army, leaving to the Archduke John, with the forces under his command, and the Hungarian insurrection, the care of covering Hungary and the eastern provinces of the Empire. The greater part of the army followed the high road to Znaim; Rosenberg alone, on the extreme left, took that to Brunn by Wolkersdorf. The retreat continued all the 7th without any serious molestation from the enemy; while Napoleon, who was disquieted by the presence of so large a body as the Archduke John's army, still untouched on his right flank, and by the menacing advance of Giulay with twenty-five thousand men from the side of Styria, towards Vienna, separated the immense army which had so lately been concentrated on the field of Wagram. Davoust, Marmont, Massena, with Oudinot, Bessières, and the guards, being directed to follow on the traces of the Archduke Charles; the viceroy's corps, augmented to fifty thousand men by the addition of the Saxons and Wirtembergers, being moved towards Presburg, to observe the Archduke John; while Macdonald's division remained in charge of the bridges of Vienna, and was prepared, with the garrison of the capital, to repel any insult that might be offered by the Ban of Croatia. No less circumspect than adventurous, Napoleon, at the same time, ordered a hundred pieces of heavy cannon to be mounted on the ramparts of Vienna, augmented its garrison to six thousand men, laid in provisions for six months, directed the formation of great new fortifications on the bridgeheads of the capital, especially at Florisdorf, where the road to Brunn and Znaim traversed the Danube, and ordered Passau, Linz, Raab, Melk, and Gottweig, in different directions around the capital, to be put in a state of defence.*

No considerable action took place during the retreat. Massena, however, pressed the Austrian rear-guard with all his wonted activity, and bloody encounters of inconsiderable bodies marked the track of the armies. The archduke conducted the retreat with consummate skill, and in the most admirable order: always protecting the rear-guard, composed of formidable masses of cavalry and infantry, by a numerous artillery skilfully posted on the rising grounds, with which that undulating country abounded. To accelerate his movements, and, if possible, throw him in some degree into confusion, Napoleon moved Marmont's corps, which was following Rosenberg on the road to Brunn, by a cross-road to Laa, by which means he threatened to arrive at Znaim before the main Austrian army. The archduke no sooner received intelligence of this movement, than he fell back with all his forces, and took post at that town, on the banks of the Taya. Nothing can exceed the military position which the environs of Znaim afford: the town itself, surrounded by walls, rests, towards the west, on the rugged precipices which border the river; towards the east on the slopes of the Lischen; the ground descends on all sides to the point of

Schallersdorf, where the river turns sharp by a right angle, and flows towards Tipwitz, and the junction of the Lischen and Taya. These two streams thus enclose, as it were, a vast bastion, with a great natural wet ditch in front, about a mile long, and equally broad. The archduke himself took post at Brenditz, which rendered him master both of the roads to Budweiss, and Bohemia, and Brunn; but the slopes of Znaim were filled with troops, the bridge of the Taya barricaded, and four powerful batteries erected on the heights above to dispute the passage.*

Strong as this position was, it was doubtful whether the Austrians would maintain it at themselves in it. The advanced guards of Massena, indeed, when they first approached the bridge, were arrested by the tremendous fire of grape and musketry which issued from the woods and heights on the opposite side; but the French cannon were soon placed in such a position as to rake the Austrian batteries; the bridge was disengaged by their flanking fire; fords were discovered both above and below; and soon the attacking columns were passed over, and began to ascend the slopes on the opposite side. The archduke withdrew his troops into Znaim, and arranged his artillery in such numbers around its walls, that, when the French leading columns arrived within reach of the fire, on the slope leading to the town, they were checked with so terrible a discharge as to be obliged to retire precipitately with severe loss. Upon this the Austrians issued forth, and took post around the town and in front of the bridge, in great strength, in a position admirable for defence, though cramped for manœuvring, and especially hazardous if a retreat was intended. A dreadful storm arose at noon, which darkened the air, and deluged both armies with such a torrent of rain, that for two hours the discharge of firearms was impossible, and the combat of necessity was suspended. When the atmosphere cleared, Massena renewed his attacks on the grenadiers in front of the bridge; but he was driven back, and the Austrians, pursuing the flying enemy, regained that important passage, and made prisoners a battalion, with three generals, in the village at its opposite extremity. Massena, upon this, brought up the 10th regiment, which again won the village, forced the bridge, and, being followed by a brigade of cuirassiers, who charged with uncommon resolution, drove back the enemy's column to their position in front of Znaim, with the loss of five hundred prisoners; while the French guns were brought up on the left, in great numbers, to Edlepsz, from whence they took in flank the most formidable batteries of the Austrians.†

The progress of the Austrians in front of Znaim did not escape the observation of Napoleon, who had arrived during the storm at Theswitz, and established himself at the headquarters of Marmont's corps. To relieve the pressure on Massena, who was obviously engaged with superior forces, and whose defeat would endanger the whole army, he immediately ordered the former marshal to debouch from Theswitz, to cross the Lischen, and to ascend on the northeastern side the plateau of Znaim. These orders were immediately obeyed, and Marmont crossed the stream and ascended the hill, but

* Pelet, iv., 253, 257. Jom., iii., 279, 280. Napoleon's Orders, 9th July, 1809. Pelet, iv., 408.

* Pelet, iv., 264, 267. Jom., iv., 282. Vict. et Conq., xix., 216, 217.

† Pelet, iv., 269, 273. Jom., iii., 282.

sustained a very heavy fire when he approached the town of Znaym, and came within reach of the formidable Austrian batteries arranged round its walls. Matters were thus in a very critical state; for the two corps of Massena and Marmont were alone engaged with the whole Austrian army, except Rosenberg's corps; and Davoust and Oudinot, destined to support them, could not arrive at the theatre of action till the following morning. Nevertheless, Massena, with his usual impetuosity, was urging the attack on the town, and already the rattle of musketry was heard in the suburbs, when the cry was heard, "Peace, peace; cease firing." Such, however, was the exasperation of the contending parties, that it was with great difficulty the action could be stopped; and when the officers arrived from the headquarters of the two armies to announce the armistice, they were wounded before the troops could be prevailed upon to desist from mutual slaughter.*

In effect, the Archduke Charles had, on the preceding night, sent Prince John of Lichtenstein to the emperor's headquarters to propose an armistice; but Napoleon was unwilling to accept it till he had enjoyed an opportunity of observing in person the situation of the armies. The motives which led the Austrian cabinet to take this step were sufficiently obvious. The policy of that government always has been to avoid coming to extremities: to come to an accommodation before the chances of war had become desperate; to consider the preservation of the army the grand object, and trust, by preserving it entire, to regain at some future time the advantages which might be lost at the moment by yielding to the storm. Considering another battle, therefore, fraught with the existence of the Empire, and the result of the former not so decisive as to induce the enemy to refuse reasonable terms of accommodation, they deemed it the more prudent course to propose an armistice while yet the forces of the monarchy were entire, the more especially as the retreat from Wagram was not likely to induce Prussia to adopt a decisive course, and the long-promised armament of Great Britain had not yet left the harbours of the Channel.†

It was not, however, till Napoleon had himself seen the positions of the contending armies, and was satisfied that the Austrians, at the moment, had the advantage, as well in the position as the concentration of their troops, that he resolved to accede to the suspension of arms.‡ A council of war was afterward held, attended by all the marshals, in the emperor's tent, in which the important point was debated whether the armistice should be agreed to. Opinions were much divided, and the discussion was prolonged till a very late hour. On the one side, it was contended by Berthier, and the advocates for a continuance of hostilities, that it was of the last importance to take advantage of the reinforcements which had already come up, or were likely to arrive during the night, to commence a general attack on the enemy, and finish the war on the following day at a blow; that his

position around Znaym, though strong, was not impregnable; that Austria was the irreconcilable enemy of France under the new régime; and that, unless deprived of the power of again injuring her, she would never cease to violate the most solemn treaties when it suited her own convenience, or there was a prospect of advantage from any, the most flagrant violation of the public faith. That if, by retiring in the night, as present appearances rendered probable, the archduke should succeed in regaining Bohemia, and uniting to his standards the forces of that province, the emperor could summon to his aid the corps of Lefebvre, Junot, and Jerome, and the advantage would still remain on his side. That it was indispensable to put an end to these coalitions perpetually springing up, by dividing Austria, which was the centre of them all; that this was a point of much more importance than finishing the war in Spain; and that no sooner would the emperor, for that purpose, enter the Peninsula, than a new coalition would spring up in his rear, which would embrace all the Northern powers. On the other hand, it was contended by the advocates of peace, that if Prince Charles retreated, as he unquestionably might do, during the night, and gained the Bohemian Mountains, there was every reason to fear a general conflagration in Germany, an open declaration from Prussia, and, probably, the ultimate adhesion of Russia itself; that it was evident from present appearances, not less than past events, that the real danger of France lay in the North; that an entire new system of Russian policy had been brought to light in the course of the contest; and that, in anticipation of the grand and final conflict between the South and the North, which was evidently approaching, it was of the last importance not merely to spare, but conciliate Austria, and, by terminating the war in the Peninsula, not only secure the rear of France, but liberate two hundred thousand of its best soldiers from an inglorious but murderous warfare. The emperor, after hearing, according to his usual custom, both sides patiently, more fully aware than many of his generals of the precarious footing on which he stood with Russia, inclined to the latter side, and broke up the conference with the decisive words, "Enough of blood has been shed: I accept the armistice."*

No great difficulty was experienced in fixing the line of demarcation between the districts to be occupied by the two armies: their relative position, and the principle *uti possidetis*, afforded too clear a rule for drawing the line between them. The French were permitted to retain possession of all Upper Austria as far as the borders of Bohemia, including the circles of Znaym and Brunn; the whole district included by the course of the Morava as far as its confluence with the Taya; thence by the high road to Presburg, including that town; the course of the Danube as far as Raab, the river of that name, and thence by the frontiers of Styria and Carniola to Fiume. On this principle, the citadels of Gratz and Brunn, the fort of Sassenburg, the whole districts of Tyrol and Vorarlberg, were to be surrendered to their arms. It was a third in point of extent, and more than a half in point of military strength, of the whole empire. The armies in Poland were to retain their respective positions: in Western and Northern

Limits assigned to the two armies by the armistice. July 12.

* Pel., iv., 272, 274. Thib., vi., 350. Sav., iv., 124, 125.

† Pel., iv., 274, 275. Stut., 388, 390. Jom., iii., 253.

‡ Oudinot, and the reserve from Wolkersdorf, could not come up till the following morning: it was material not to allow the enemy to perceive his superiority at that moment."

—THIBAUDEAU, vii., 350.

* Pel., iv., 275, 277. Biga., viii., 310. Thib., vii., 390.

Germany, the limits between the two powers were to be those of the states composing the Confederation of the Rhine.*

The armistice was concluded by the Archduke Charles alone, in virtue of the powers reposed in him as generalissimo, but subject to the ratification of the emperor. The cabinet of Vienna, which at that period was assembled at Komorn in Hungary, had considerable difficulty in giving their consent to it. It was proposed to take advantage of the distance of the French troops to act on the right bank of the Danube; to unite the forces of Giulay and the Archduke John with those of the Hungarian insurrection, and move towards Styria and Tyrol, so as to threaten the French communications, while the Archduke Charles, by retreating towards Bohemia, drew the bulk of their forces to a distance from their only base of operations. In pursuance of these views, which, for a few days, prevailed at the imperial headquarters, directions were sent to the Archduke John to "disregard any orders regarding an armistice which were not bearing the sign-manual of the emperor, and take his instructions from him alone." In the course of the two following days, however, Prince Lichtenstein arrived from the headquarters of the Archduke Charles, and inspired more moderate views. The court, yielding to necessity, and desirous of gaining time to recruit its armies, await the progress of events in Spain, and the effect of the long-expected English armament in the north of Germany, gave a reluctant consent; the armistice was signed by the emperor on the 18th, and the flames of war were quenched in Germany, till they broke out with awful violence, three years afterward, on the banks of the Nie-men.†

The Austrian people were not long of receiving a bitter proof of the reality of their subjugation. On the very day after the armistice was concluded, a decree of Napoleon's imposed a war contribution of 237,800,000 francs (£9,500,000) on the provinces occupied by the French armies, which was not a half of the monarchy: a burden at least as great, considering the relative wealth and value of money in the two countries, as an imposition of fifty millions sterling would be on Great Britain.‡

The battle of Wagram bears a striking resemblance to two of the most memorable that have occurred in ancient or modern times—those of Cannæ and Waterloo. In all the three, the one party made a grand effort at the centre of his antagonist, and the final issue of each battle was owing to the success or failure of the measures adopted to defeat this central attack, by a united movement against the wings of the enemy. At Cannæ, as already noticed, it was the advance of the Roman centre, in column, into the middle of the Carthaginian army, followed by the turning of both their flanks by the Carthaginian cavalry, which brought about their ruin. At Aspern, the defeat of the French on the second day was owing to a similar hazardous advance of the French centre in close column into the middle of the Aus-

trian line, which skilfully receded, and brought the French columns into the centre of a converging fire of a prodigious artillery.* At Waterloo, the final defeat of the French was owing to the steadiness of the English guards, which in line arrested the advance of the old Imperial Guard in column, while the concentric fire of the British batteries, now advanced into a kind of semicircle, and the simultaneous charge of a brigade of cavalry on the one side, and a line of infantry on the other, of the attacking mass, completed the final destruction of that formidable body. At Wagram the archduke had, on a still more extended scale, prepared the means of repelling the anticipated central attack of the French in column, and converting it into the cause of total ruin. The batteries and troops in the centre were so disposed, that their awful fire at length arrested Macdonald's intrepid column: Aspern and Essling were captured on one flank; the Archduke John, with thirty thousand fresh troops, was destined to turn the other. To all appearance, the greatest defeat recorded in history awaited the French emperor: when the tardiness of that prince proved as fatal to the Austrians as a similar delay on Grouchy's part was to Napoleon himself at Waterloo, and victory was snatched from the grasp of the Austrian eagles when they seemed on the very point of seizing it.

The campaign of Aspern and Wagram is the most glorious in the Austrian annals; the most memorable example of patriotic resistance recorded in the history of the world. If we recollect that in the short space of three months were comprised the desperate contest in Bavaria, the victory of Aspern, the war in Tyrol, the doubtful fight of Wagram, we shall be at a loss whether to admire most the vital strength of a monarchy which, so soon after the disasters of Ulm and Austerlitz, was capable of such gigantic efforts, the noble spirit which prompted its people so unanimously to make such unheard-of exertions, or the firm resolution of the chiefs who, undismayed by reverses which would have crumbled any other government to dust, maintained an undaunted front to the very last. We admire the courage of Darius, who, after the loss of half his provinces, still fought with heroic resolution against the Macedonian conqueror on the field of Arbela; we exult in the firmness of the Roman Senate, which, yet bleeding with the slaughter of Cannæ, sent forth legions to Spain, and sold the ground on which Hannibal was encamped, when his standards crowded round the walls of the city; and we anticipate already the voice of ages in awarding the praise of unconquerable resolution to the Russian emperor, who, undeterred by the carnage of Borodino, resolved to burn the ancient capital of his empire rather than permit it to become the resting-place of his enemies, and, when pierced to the heart, still stretched forth his mighty arms from Finland to the Danube to envelop and crush the invader. But, without underrating these glorious examples of patriotic resistance, it may safely be affirmed that none of them will bear a comparison with that exhibited by Austria in this memorable campaign.

Other empires have almost invariably sunk upon the capture of the capital. Carthage was crushed by the storm of its metropolis under

* See Armistice Martens, Sup., v., 209. Munit., July 20, 1809.

† Pel., iv., 283, 284. Sav., iv., 126. Jom., iii., 285.

‡ Decree, July 13. Montg., vii., 430.

Reflections on the campaign, and its glorious character to Austria.

* Ante, iii., 213.

Scipio Africanus; Rome sunk at once with the fall of the eternal city before the Gothic trumpet; with the conquest of Constantinople the lower empire perished; the seizure of Berlin by the allies under the Great Frederic was but a transient incursion, its lasting occupation by Napoleon proved fatal to the strength of the monarchy; France, during its Republican fervour, was nearly overthrown by the charge of fifteen hundred Prussian hussars on the plains of Champagne,* and twice saw its strength totally paralyzed by the fall of its capital in 1814 and 1815; Russia survived the capture of Moscow only by the aid of a rigorous climate and the overwhelming force of its Scythian cavalry. Austria is the only state recorded in history which, without any such advantages, fought two desperate battles in defence of its independence AFTER its capital had fallen! To this glorious and unique distinction the imperial annals may justly lay claim; and those who affect to condemn its institutions, and despise its national character, would do well to examine the annals of the world for a similar instance of patriotic resolution, and search their own hearts for the feelings and the devotion requisite for its repetition.

In truth, the invincible tenacity with which both the Austrian nobility and people maintained the conflict, under circumstances of adversity, which, in every other instance recorded in history, had subdued the minds of men, affords at once a decisive refutation of the opinion so industriously propagated and heedlessly received in this country as to the despotic and oppressive nature of the imperial rule, and the most memorable example of the capability of an aristocratic form of government to impart to the community under its direction a degree of consistency and resolution of which mankind under no other circumstances are capable. It was not general misery which caused the Tyrolese to start unanimously to arms at the call of the Austrian trumpet, and combat the invader with stone balls discharged from larch-trees bored into the form of cannon: it was no oppressive rule which called forth the sublime devotion of Aspern and Wagram. No nation ever was so often defeated as the Austrians were during the course of the Revolutionary war; but none rose with such vigour from the ground, or exhibited, in such vivid colours, the power or moral principle to withstand the shocks of fortune, to compensate, by firmness of purpose, the superior intellectual acquisitions of other states, and communicate to men that unconquerable resolution which brings them, in the end, victorious through the severest earthly trials. The aspect of Austria Proper, especially in its mountainous regions, confirms and explains this extraordinary phenomenon. In no other country, perhaps, is so uncommon a degree of well-being to be seen among the peasantry; nowhere are the fruits of the earth divided in apparently such equitable proportions between the landlord and the cultivator; nowhere does ease and contentment prevail so universally in the dwellings of the poor.† When it is recollected that this general prosperity takes place in a country where the taxation is so light as to be almost imperceptible by the great body of the people, and where the proportion of persons instructed is, on an average of the whole empire, equal

to any state of similar dimensions in Europe, and as high as the best-educated nations in some provinces,* it must be admitted that the philanthropist has much cause to linger with satisfaction on its contemplation. It is on a different class, on the middle ranks, and the aspiring children of the burghers, that the restrictions of the imperial sway are hereafter destined to hang heavy; but at this period no heart-burnings arose from the exclusions to which they are subject, and one only passion, that of ardent devotion to their country, animated all classes of the people.

But the example of Austria in 1809 has afforded another and a still more interesting lesson to mankind. That country had, at that period, no pretensions to intellectual superiority: commerce, manufactures, and the mechanical arts, had made little progress over its surface; literature was in its infancy; science flourished only in a few favoured spots under the fostering care of imperial patronage; poetry, history, philosophy, were to the great mass of the inhabitants almost unknown. It had long and painfully felt the consequences of this inferiority in the bloody contests it had been compelled to maintain with the Democratic energy and scientific ability of the French Revolution. How, then, did it happen that a state, so little qualified by intellectual superiority to contend with the gigantic powers of wickedness, should have stood forth with such unparalleled lustre in the contest; should have resisted alone, with such heroic bravery, the military force of half of Europe, guided by consummate ability and trained by unparalleled conquests; and, for the first time since the commencement of the struggle, made the scales hang even between the conservative and revolutionary principles? Simply because she possessed a pure, virtuous, and single-minded people; because, whatever the corruptions of the capital may have been, the heart of the nation was untainted; because an indulgent rule had attached the nobility to their sovereign, and experienced benefits the peasantry to their landlords; because patriotism was there established upon its only durable basis, a sense of moral obligation and the force of religious duty.

And in this respect France, in the days of her adversity, exhibited a memorable contrast to Austria in the hour of her national trial. When the evil days fell upon her, when the barrier of the Rhine was forced, and hostile standards approached the gates of Paris, the boasted virtues of Republicanism had disappeared, the brilliant energy of military courage was found unequal to the shock. Province after province sunk without performing one deed worthy of tradition; city after city surrendered without leaving one trace in the page of history; no French Saragossa proved that patriotism can supply the want of ramparts; no Revolutionary La Vendée that the civic virtues can dispense with Christian enthusiasm; no second Tyrol that even imperial strength may sink before the "might that slumbers in a peasant's arm." The

Causes of the extraordinary public virtue thus exhibited in Austria.

Remarkable contrast afterwards exhibited by France.

* One in fifteen of the population over the whole empire attend the elementary schools: in some provinces, as Upper Austria, Tyrol, and Bohemia, the proportion is as high as 1 to 11. In Switzerland, it is now 1 to 10; in Ireland, 1 to 9; in Scotland, 1 to 11; in France, 1 to 17; in Prussia, 1 to 10; in Spain, 1 to 350; in Poland, 1 to 100; in Russia, 1 to 794.—See MOREAU, *Stat. de la Grande Bretagne*, ii., 333, 334.

* *Ante*, i., 186.

† Personal observation.

strength of the Empire was in the army alone: with the fall of its capital the power of the Revolution was at an end; the marshals and generals, true to the real idol of worldly adoration, ranged themselves on the side of success.* The conqueror of a hundred fights was left almost alone by the creatures of his bounty; and, like the sorcerers who crowded round the statue of Eblis when the idol was pierced to the heart by the son of Hodeirah, "the ocean vault fell in, and all were crushed."

These considerations, in a certain degree, lift up the veil which conceals from mortal eyes the ultimate designs of Providence in the wars which so often desolate the world. If we compare Austria as she was in 1793 with Austria in 1809, we seem not merely to be dealing with a different people, but a different age of

Elevation of the Austrian character from past calamities.

* "The galleries and saloons," says Caulaincourt, "which adjoined the apartment of the emperor at Fontainebleau (in April, 1814), were deserted. The marshals had carried with them their brilliant staffs: the wind of adversity had blown, the glittering crowd had vanished. That solitude thrilled the heart. The redoubted chief, who so lately had never moved but surrounded by a magnificent cortège, the great monarch, who had seen kings at his feet, is now only a simple individual, disinherited even of the interest and care of his friends! All was desolate, all was solitary in that splendid palace. I felt the necessity of withdrawing the emperor from so fearful a torture. 'Have you got everything ready for my departure?' 'Yes, sire!' 'My poor Caulaincourt, you discharge here the functions of grand-marshal: could you have conceived it? Berthier has gone off without even bidding me adieu!' 'What, sire?' exclaimed I, 'Berthier also, the creature of your bounty?' 'Berthier,' replied the emperor, 'was born a courtier: you will see soon my vice-constable mendicant employment from the Bourbons. I feel humiliated, that the men whom I have raised so high in the eyes of Europe, should have sunk so low! What have they made of that atmosphere of glory in which they appeared enveloped in the eyes of the stranger! What must the sovereigns think of all these men illustrated by my reign!' Such was the fidelity and gratitude of the Revolution: its genius, its intellect, its glory! Contrast this with Austria after Aspern—with the devotion of Wagram, and the shepherds of Tyrol.—See CAULAINCOURT'S *Mémoires*, ii., 109, 111.

the world. In the first era is to be seen nothing but selfishness and vacillation in the national councils, lukewarmness and indifference in the public feeling, irresolution and disgrace in military events. But it is well for nations, not less than individuals, to be in affliction. Turn to the same nation in 1809, and behold her undaunted in the cabinet, unconquered in the field; glowing in every quarter with patriotism, teeming in every direction with energy; firm in her faith, generous in her resolutions; maintaining unshaken constancy to her principles amid unheard-of disasters, fidelity to her sovereign amid unbounded temptations. This is, indeed, regeneration, this is true national glory, purchased in the only school of real improvement, the paths of suffering. How many centuries of national existence did Austria go through before this mighty change was effected; how many national sins did she expiate; what a spot of glory, not merely in imperial, but in human annals, has she left! She is to reappear in the contest for European freedom; but she is to reappear as a conqueror, invested with irresistible strength, arrayed in impenetrable panoply: but she shared the glories of Leipsic with Russia and Prussia; the heroism of Aspern, the constancy of Wagram, are her own. Mankind have little concern with the mere conquest of one nation by another: it is the triumph of virtue over misfortune, of duty over selfishness, of religion over infidelity, which is the real patrimony of the human race. The heroic constancy, the generous fidelity of all classes in Austria at the close of the contest was placed by Providence in bright contrast to the treachery and selfishness of the French Revolutionists, as if to demonstrate the inability of the greatest intellectual acquisitions to communicate that elevation to the character which springs from the prevalence of moral feeling, and to show that even the conquerors of the world were unequal to a crisis which religion had rendered of easy endurance to the shepherds of the Alps.

CHAPTER LVII.

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION—PEACE OF VIENNA—SECOND WAR IN TYROL—DETHRONEMENT OF THE POPE.

ARGUMENT.

Vast Capabilities of the Scheldt for Commerce.—Former Grandeur and present Importance of Antwerp.—Napoleon's Designs for its Amplification.—Efforts always made by England to keep this great Stronghold from France.—Extraordinary Infatuation which has led to its Abandonment to France in later Times.—Proposals of Austria for a British Diversion.—Reasons for not sending the grand British Expedition to the North of Germany or Spain.—Reasons for selecting the Scheldt as the Point of Attack.—Unhappy Delay in sending out the Expedition.—It is finally resolved on in the end of May, and on a very great Scale.—Sailing and immense Magnitude of the Expedition.—It lands in Holland, and gains great early Success.—Certainty of entire Victory if Antwerp had been first attacked.—Siege and Capture of Flushing.—The Time lost in reducing it saves Antwerp.—Retention of Walcheren, at first attempted, is finally abandoned as Impracticable.—Blind Injustice which frequently characterizes the Proceedings of the British Parliament.—Pernicious waste of Time in the Debates in Parliament at this Period.—Charges against the Duke of York, and his Resignation.—Debates on the Walcheren Expedition.—Quarrel between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning.—Changes in the Administration.—Youth, and first Introduction to Public Life, of Mr. Canning.—His Character as an Orator and Statesman.—Character of Lord Castlereagh.—Elevated Features of his Character.—Career of Mr. Perceval.—His Character.—Position of France relative to Russia at this Period.—Negotiations between France and Austria.—Napoleon's Reasons for secret Disquietude.—Attempt to Assassinate him by Stabs.—Which leads to the Conclusion of the Negotiation.—Peace of Vienna.—Its Secret Articles.—Jealousy of Russia at the Increase of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw by this Treaty.—The Ramparts of Vienna blown up.—Affairs of the Tyrol after the Armistice of Znaim.—Fresh Invasion of that Province by Marshal Lefebvre.—Renewed Resolution of the Tyrolese to continue the Contest.—Desperate Action at the Bridge of Laidich.—Defeat of Marshal Lefebvre on the Brenner.—Successes in other Quarters.—Total Defeat of Lefebvre at Innspruck.—Hofer's Deliverance, and Government of Tyrol.—Preparations of Napoleon for the Subjugation of the Tyrol.—Successful Invasion of the Country on all Sides.—Hofer Resolves to submit, and publishes a Proclamation to that Effect; and which is soon recalled by him.—Last Invasion of the Tyrol, and desperate Resistance.—Final Conquest of the Country.—Betrayal and Seizure of Hofer.—His Trial and Condemnation, and Execution.—Reflections on this Event.—Adventures of Haspinger and Spechbacher.—Extraordinary Adventures and Escape of the latter.—Affairs of the Holy See.—Original Causes of Discontent on the Part of the Pope at Napoleon.—Dazzling Reception of the Pope at Paris in 1805.—His Request for the Restoration of the Three Marches is refused.—Farther Encroachments of France on the Holy See.—Farther Demands of France, and Resistance of the Pope.—Increased mutual Irritation after the Peace of Tilsit.—Entire Assumption of the Government by the French.—Fresh Outrages, and Confinement of the Pope to his Palace.—Annexation of the Papal States to the French Empire, and Excommunication of Napoleon.—Views of Napoleon in regard to the Pope, and his Transference to Paris.—Arrest of the Pope by General Radet.—Particulars of his Seizure.—The Pope is conducted to Grenoble, and Cardinal Pacca to Fenestrelles.—Complete Fusion of the Roman States with the French Empire.—Prejudicial Effect of these Measures on the Independence of the Church.—Vast and admirable Works undertaken by the French at Rome.—Reflections on the Spoliation of the Pope as connected with Napoleon's subsequent Downfall.

NATURE has formed the Scheldt to be the rival of the Thames. Of equal magnitude and depth with its renowned competitor, flowing through a country excelling even the midland counties of England in wealth and resources, adjoining cities long superior to any in Europe in arts and commerce; the artery at once of Flanders and Holland, of Brabant and Luxemburg, it is

fitted to be the great organ of communication between the fertile fields and rich manufacturing towns of the Low Countries and the other maritime states of the world. If it is not equally celebrated as the Thames in history or romance; if all the vessels of the ocean do not crowd its quays, and its merchants are not sought by the princes of the earth; if it does not give law to all the quarters of the globe, and boast a colonial empire on which the sun never sets, it is not because nature has denied it the physical advantages conducive to such exalted destinies, but because the jealousies and perverseness of man have in great part marred her choicest gifts. Flanders was a great and highly civilized manufacturing state, when England was still struggling between the coarse plenty of Anglo-Saxon rudeness and the insulting oppression of Norman chivalry; even in the days of Edward III. and the Black Prince, the Brewer of Ghent was the esteemed ally of princes, and the political passions of our times had been warmed into being by the long-established prosperity of a commercial community; their territory was the richest, the most peopled, the most adorned by cities in Christendom; and the fine arts, arising in the wane of ancient opulence, had already produced the immortal works of Teniers, Rubens, and Vandyke, when the school of England was as yet hardly emerged from the obscurity of infant years.

ANTWERP, the key of this great estuary, gradually rose with the increasing commerce of the Low Countries, until, at the period of the Reformation, it numbered two hundred thousand inhabitants within its walls, and engrossed the whole trade of those beautiful provinces. Its noble harbour, capable of containing a thousand vessels; its extensive ramparts and citadel, among the strongest in Europe; its splendid cathedral, exceeding even St. Paul's in elevation;* its magnificent quays, bordering a river five hundred yards in breadth, which a seventy-four gun ship might navigate with safety, all conspired to render this city one of the most renowned in Europe. If the seventeen provinces had remained united under one government, and the Scheldt had continued to be the artery of communication between their admirable territory, their noble cities, and the rest of the world, it must, by this time, have been one of the greatest emporiums in existence, and possibly would have borne away the palm from London itself in wealth and grandeur. But religious persecution first rent asunder that beautiful dominion,

* It is 451 feet high; the roof of the cathedral is 360 feet from the pavement; but, more even than for these gigantic proportions, is it fitted to arrest the traveller's admiration by the master-pieces of Rubens, the Taking Down and Elevating on the Cross, which it contains. Sir Joshua Reynolds justly observed, that whoever had not seen the master-pieces of Rubens at Antwerp, could form no adequate idea either of the genius of that great artist or the power of art. The paintings in the museum, especially by Rubens and Vandyke, are inimitable.—MALTE BRUN, viii., 618; REYNOLDS'S *Tour in Flanders*, Works, ii., 264, 300; and *personal observation*.

and political jealousy next completed the bars which Catholic oppression had erected against its advancement. The revolt of Holland was the natural consequence of the atrocities of the Duke of Alva, and the massacre of fifty thousand Protestants, on the scaffold and at the stake, by the Spanish government; the closing of the mouth of the Scheldt, by the political and commercial jealousy of the Dutch, was the inevitable result and deserved punishment of the abominable cruelty which converted their most industrious and valuable subjects into successful rivals and inveterate enemies.*

Amid all its degradation, however, and when its population had sunk to sixty thousand inhabitants, the eagle glance of Napoleon at once discerned the vast natural advantages and incalculable political importance of this city. No sooner had it attracted his attention, than he resolved to make it one of the greatest bulwarks of his dominions: the grand naval and military arsenal of Northern Europe; the advanced post from which he might launch the thunders of his arms against the independence and existence of England. Under his vigorous administration, everything soon assumed a new aspect: the subjection of Holland to the imperial sway had already extinguished, if not the commercial jealousy of the Dutch, at least their power of interfering with the prosperity of their Flemish rival; the vessels which they had sunk at the mouth of the Scheldt, to impede its navigation, were raised; the sandbanks which had accumulated for centuries cleared away; new bulwarks annexed to the works, already formidable, of the citadel; vast wet docks added to the harbour, capable of containing forty ships of the line; and an arsenal adequate to the equipment of half the navy of France constructed. Vast as are these works, however, and durably as they will forever remain, monuments of the grandeur of conception and prophetic spirit of the French emperor, they were but a small part of what he had intended for this favoured bulwark of the Empire. "The works hitherto erected," said Napoleon, at St. Helena, "were nothing to what I intended at Antwerp. The whole sandy plain, which now stretches for miles behind the *Tête de Flandre*, on the left bank of the river, was to have been enclosed by fortifications, and formed into a vast city; the imperial dockyards and basins, the arsenal and magazines, were to have been constructed there; those on the right bank were to have been abandoned to private merchants. Antwerp was to me a province in itself. It is one of the great causes of my exile to St. Helena; for the required cession of that fortress was my principal reason for refusing peace at Chatillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded. France without the frontiers of the Rhine and Antwerp is nothing."[†]

Antwerp is the point from which, in every age, the independence of these kingdoms has been seriously menaced. When the Duke of Parma prepared a land-force in the time of Queen Elizabeth to overthrow the liberties of England and the Protestant faith, it was in the Scheldt and at Ostend that all his preparations were made. It was neither from

Boulogne nor Cherbourg, from Brest nor Toulon, that Napoleon, after his profound naval combinations of 1805 had been defeated, intended to invade the British isles. The Scheldt was the point of attack: Antwerp and Flushing were the strongholds in which sixty sail of the line were to be prepared for the centre of that mighty squadron, which, by a second battle of Actium, was to strike down the mistress of the seas. A vast and skilful system of internal communication had been brought to bear upon this artery, and enabled the French to collect their naval stores and seamen without incurring the hazard of a coastwise navigation. Sensible of her danger, it had been the fixed policy of Great Britain for centuries to prevent this formidable outwork against her independence from falling into the hands of her enemies; and the best days of her history are chiefly occupied with the struggle to ward off such a disaster. It was for this that William fought and that Marlborough conquered; that Nelson died and Wellington triumphed; that Chatham lighted a conflagration in every quarter of the globe, and Pitt braved all the dangers of the Revolutionary war.

It is one of the most singular facts in the history of mankind, that the English government, after having for a hundred and fifty years contended for the attainment of this object, and at length secured it, by the restoration, under the guarantee of the European powers, of the seventeen provinces into one united dominion, should have voluntarily, within twenty years afterward, undone the work of its own hands; aided in the partition of the Netherlands into two separate states, alike incapable of maintaining their independence, one of which necessarily fell under the dominion of her enemies; and at length actually joined her fleets to the Gallic revolutionary armies to restore Antwerp, the great stronghold prepared by Napoleon for our subjugation, to the son-in-law of France, and the sway of the tricolour flag! Such a proceeding would be unparalleled in history, if it were not equalled, perhaps exceeded, by the refusal at the same time to lend any assistance to the grand signor, then reduced to the last straits by the defeat of Koniah, and consequent abandonment of him to the arms of Russia, who failed not, as the price of protection, to exact the humiliating treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and the exclusion of the British flag from the Dardanelles and the Black Sea. Thus, in our anxiety to restore Antwerp, the fulcrum from which our independence is to be assailed in Western Europe, to France, we have surrendered Constantinople, the bulwark of the East, the key of our Eastern dominions, to Russia! The simultaneous occurrence of two such acts on the part of government, without any mark of disapprobation, save from the reflecting few in the country, proves that there are occasions in which, under the influence of faction and in the heat of political contest, a nation may not only lose its reason, but become insensible to the strongest even of all animal instincts, that of self-preservation.

At the commencement of the contest in Germany, the cabinet of Vienna made the most urgent representations to the British government on the subject of a powerful diversion by an English land-force in the north of Germany, whither the imperial Grand Army was originally destined, and where so many ardent spirits,

Extraordinary infatuation which has led to its abandonment in later times.

Proposals of Austria for a British diversion.

* Malte Brun, viii., 618, 619.

† Las Casas, vii., 43, 44, 56, 57.

Efforts always made by England to keep this great stronghold from France.

smarting under humiliation and oppression, were awaiting only the appearance of an external armed force to raise the standard of general insurrection. She proposed that a diversion should be made by an expedition of Anglo-Sicilian troops on the coasts of Italy; that the military operations in the Peninsula should be continued; and that a strong effort should be made towards the mouth of the Elbe. There can be no question that the disposable forces of England, at this juncture, were equal to these operations, how extensive soever; for she had a hundred thousand regular troops, which could be ordered on foreign service, in the British islands; forty thousand of whom, in Spain, under Wellington, forty thousand in the north of Germany, and twenty thousand in the Mediterranean, might have occasioned no small embarrassment to the French emperor, especially after he was obliged to concentrate all his forces from the extremities of his dominions, for the decisive struggle on the banks of the Danube. Domestic danger could not be alleged as a reason for declining to make such an effort, for the British islands, encircled by their invincible fleet, garrisoned by eighty thousand admirable regular, and three hundred thousand local militia, and animated with an enthusiastic military spirit, were beyond the reach of attack. Nor was time wanting, for the British government was, in November, 1808, in full possession of the resolution of the cabinet of Vienna to declare war: it was communicated to the world in the king's speech on the 15th of December of that year; and hostilities were not commenced on the Inn till the 9th of April following, before which time the grand expedition for the north of the vast theatre of operations might have been ready to sail from the British harbours.*

In this momentous crisis, the cabinet of St. James was not wanting to itself, or to the noble post assigned to it in the contest of nations. Undiscouraged by the disastrous issue of Sir John Moore's expedition, they resolved not only to resume the contest with increased vigour in the Spanish Peninsula, but to aid the common cause by a powerful demonstration in the north of Europe. Many reasons concurred, however, in dissuading them from adopting the proposed plan of landing in the north of Germany. Matters were entirely changed since the year 1807, when such a direction of our force was attempted, and, if brought to the scene of action some months earlier, might have been attended with important, perhaps decisive effects. Prussia was then in arms against France; Denmark was neutral; Russia engrossed the attention of their principal army on the Vistula or the Alle; and Austria, collecting her strength in Bohemia, was prepared, on the first serious reverse, to fall with overwhelming force on Napoleon's line of communications. Now everything was changed. The north of Germany, strewn with the wrecks of independent states, with its principal strongholds in the hands of the enemy, could no longer be relied on for efficient co-operation with a regular army; Russia, instead of being the enemy of France, was now her obsequious ally; Denmark was animated by a more than ordinary spirit of hostility to Great Britain; and though the inclination of Prussia to extricate herself from her fetters could not be doubted, yet

her military resources were severely crippled, her strongest fortresses were in the possession of the conqueror, and her government had suffered so severely from their recent ill-advised effort, that there was every reason to fear that they would now adhere to their old system of selfish indecision. A powerful army, if landed at St. Sebastians, might, indeed, paralyze all the imperial forces in Spain, and occasion the evacuation of the whole Peninsula by the troops of Napoleon; but the effect of such remote success would be inconsiderable on the vital line of operations in the valley of the Danube; and, if the French emperor were there successful, he would soon regain his lost footing beyond the Pyrenees, and securely complete, with undiminished strength, from Gibraltar to Hamburg, his vast naval preparations for our subjugation.*

On the other hand, a variety of considerations, equally powerful, concurred to recommend Antwerp as the grand point of attack. Its formidable strength and increasing importance as a great naval station and arsenal; its close proximity to the British shores; the anxiety which Napoleon had evinced for its extension, pointed it out as the quarter from which, more than any other, serious danger was to be apprehended. Its fortifications, though extensive and formidable if in good condition, were in a state hardly susceptible of defence; there was scarce any water in the ditches; the rampart, unarmed with cannon, was in many places dilapidated and tottering; and the garrison, of little more than two thousand invalids and coast-guards, altogether unequal to the defence of its extensive works. The regular army of France was so completely absorbed by the war on the Danube and in the Peninsula, that no considerable force could be assembled for its relief; and although, if operations in form were to be attempted, an immense body of national guards would doubtless converge to the threatened point, yet there was a fair prospect of carrying the town at once by escalade, almost before the intelligence of its danger could reach the government at Paris. Immense would be the effect, moral as well as material, of such a victory. It would demonstrate that even the territory of the great nation, and its strongest fortresses, were not beyond the reach of attack; roll back on France the terrors of invasion; destroy at once the principal naval resources and fleets of the enemy; animate all the north of Germany by the prospect of a powerful army having gained a firm footing on their own shores, and intercept, by pressing dangers at home, a large portion of the re-enforcements destined for the Grand Army. Even if Austria were finally to succumb, still the object gained would be immense: the darling naval establishment of the enemy would be destroyed, the centre of his maritime operations ruined, and his projected naval crusade against Great Britain thrown back for several years, if not altogether rendered abortive. Sound policy, therefore, recommended such a direction of our hostility as, while it powerfully aided our allies, was conducive also to our own safety; and which, increasing the chance of a successful combination against France on the Danube, provided, at the same time, for the case of the imperial eagles returning as heretofore, loaded with the spoils

* Mr. Canning's Speech, *Parl. Deb.*, xvi., 352; and *Ante*, iii. 45.

* Mr. Canning's Speech, *Parl. Deb.*, xvi., 333, 336. Lord Castlereagh's, *ibid.*, 99, 103.

of Germany, to their menacing position on the heights of Boulogne.*

But, though the cabinet of St. James thus judged rightly in selecting Antwerp as the point of attack, and magnanimously in resolving to put forth the whole strength of the British Empire, without sharing in the general panic produced by the calamitous termination of Sir John Moore's expedition, yet in one vital point they still proved themselves novices in combination, uninstructed by the military experience even of sixteen years. Although the Austrians crossed the Inn on the 9th of March, and the battle of Ecmuhl was fought on the 21st of April, and that of Aspern on the 22d of May, it was not till the end of the latter month that any serious preparations began to be made by ministers for an expedition to lighten the load which had for two months fallen on the imperial forces. They were deterred by a communication received from the commander-in-chief, Sir D. Dundas, on the 22d of March preceding, shortly after the broken bands of Sir John Moore's army had returned from Spain, stating that fifteen thousand men could not be spared from the home service for any foreign expedition. That veteran officer, in making, and government in acting on such a statement, proved themselves alike unequal to the station which they occupied in the grand struggle. To accomplish the vital object of beginning the campaign *simultaneously* with the Austrians, and distracting the enemy with a descent on the Scheldt, at the same time that the Archduke Charles entered Bavaria, no sacrifices could have been too great. Even if not a man could be got from the regular army, every man of the guards should have been sent, half of the militia invited to volunteer; and in this way fifty thousand admirable soldiers might with ease have been collected. It was not by never diminishing the usual domestic garrisons, and reckoning none disposable but those who had no home service to perform, that Napoleon carried the French standards to Vienna and the Kremlin.†

No serious steps were taken, after this abortive inquiry as to the disposable British force, to resume the expedition till the 8th of June, when the muster-rolls of all the regiments in the British islands having been obtained, and shown a disposable force of forty thousand men, preparations in good earnest were commenced. It was still possible to bring them to bear with great effect on the vital operations on the Danube; for the news of the battle of Aspern had just reached this country, and, at the same time, it was ascertained, by authentic evidence, that Antwerp was in the most defenceless state; that the garrison consisted only of two thousand four hundred men, of whom only fifteen hundred were soldiers, the remainder being invalids or artificers; that there were two small breaches on the ramparts, and the bastions in general not armed; the wet ditch fordable in some places, and only ten thousand soldiers in Holland, and hardly any in Flanders. But the inherent vice of procrastination still paralyzed the British councils. Though every day and hour was precious, when the Scheldt was defenceless and Napoleon defeated on the Danube,

no orders were given to the ordnance department to prepare battering-trains till the 19th of June; and though their preparations were complete, and the navy in readiness by the end of that month, the expedition did not sail till the 28th of July, upward of a week after the result of the battle of Wagram had been known in the British islands. When it is considered that the sea voyage from the Downs to the Scheldt is not above thirty hours; that the British had thirty-five sail of the line, and transports innumerable at hand for the embarkation; that Marshal Ney embarked twenty-five thousand men, with all their artillery, in ten minutes and a half; that Napoleon, who gave his orders to the Grand Army to break up from Boulogne on the 1st of September, 1805, beheld them on the Rhine on the 23d of the same month, and Mack defile before him as a prisoner, with all his army, on the 20th of October,* it must be admitted that, notwithstanding all they had suffered from this defect,† the British government were still rather influenced by the slowness of the Anglo-Saxon than the fire of the Norman character.

When the expedition, however, even at the eleventh hour, did sail from the British islands, it was on a scale worthy of one of the greatest military powers in Europe. The armament, consisting of thirty-seven ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops, eighty-two gunboats, besides transports innumerable; and having on board thirty-nine thousand sabres and bayonets, equivalent to above forty-one thousand of all arms, with two battering-trains and all their stores complete, contained above a hundred thousand combatants, and was the largest and best equipped that ever put to sea in modern times. What might it not have accomplished if conducted with vigour and directed by skill! With a British force of no greater amount Wellington struck down the empire of France on the field of Waterloo.‡

This stupendous armament, which whitened the ocean with its sails, arrived on the coasts of Holland on the 29th of July. On the following day twenty thousand men were disembarked in the isle of Walcheren, and speedily took possession of Middleburg, its chief town, besides driving the French troops into the walls of Flushing. At the same time, another division landed in Cadsand, and, expelling the enemy from that island, opened the way for the passage of the fleet up the western or principal branch of the Scheldt. Some days afterward, Sir Richard Strachan, who commanded the naval force, disregarding the distant and ineffectual fire of the Flushing batteries, passed the straits with eighteen ships of the line, and soon both branches of the Scheldt were crowded with the British pendants. Nor was the progress of the land-forces less rapid. Ter Vere, a fortress commanding the Veergat, a narrow entrance leading into the

Landing in Holland, and great early success of the expedition. July 30.

* Vide *Ante*, ii., 325, 345, 352.

† Sir T. Triggis's Evid., Parl. Deb., xv., 138, and xvi., 111, 119. Lord Castlereagh's Speech, and Gen. Crawford's, ib., 222.

‡ See the details in Parl. Pap. Deb., xv., 5 and 6.

§ The exact British force, with the king's German Legion, at Waterloo, was: infantry, 29,715; cavalry, 8,219; artillery, 5,434. Total, 43,368 sabres and bayonets, or about 45,000, including officers and non-commissioned officers.—See *Adjutant-general's Returns*, 6th Nov., 1816, quoted in *Jones's Waterloo*, 138; *Near Observer*, vol. ii.

* Mr. Canning's Speech, Parl. Deb., xvi., 338, 347.

† See Sir D. Dundas's Evidence, Parl. Deb., xv., 85, 86, App.

channel which separated South Beveland, was taken, with its garrison of a thousand men : Goes, the capital of the latter island, opened its gates; and SIR JOHN HOPE, an officer destined to future celebrity in the Peninsular wars, with seven thousand men, Aug. 1. pushing rapidly on, appeared before the gates of Bahtz on the evening of the 2d. Such was the consternation produced by the sudden advance and formidable forces, both naval and military, of the invaders, that this important fort, situated at the point of separation of the East and West Scheldt, and the key to both channels, was evacuated in the night by the garrison, and next morning occupied the British troops. The success of the expedition appeared certain : more than two thirds of the distance to Antwerp had been got over in three days; both divisions of the Scheldt were full of British vessels; the British standards were only five leagues from that fortress, and in four days more thirty thousand men might be assembled around its walls.*

It is agreed by all the French military writers, that such was the weakness of Antwerp at that moment, that, if the English general had taken advantage of the first moment of consternation consequent on the rapid advance of his leading column, and pushed across the narrow channel which separates South Beveland from the mainland, and marched up the right bank of the river, he would, in a few hours, have arrived at the gates of the fortress, and, by a *coup de main*, carried it without the possibility of resistance.† By crossing over to the left bank of

* Lord Chatham's Desp., Aug. 2, 1809, Ann. Reg., 474, 479. Appendix to Chron. Vict. et Cong., xix., 247, 254.

† "Had the English advanced rapidly, either by South Beveland to Lillo and Antwerp, or, with their squadron, vigorously pursued ours as it withdrew up the Scheldt, they would have taken by surprise all the forts and defences of the Scheldt. Everything induces the belief that they would have succeeded in burning our arsenals and destroying our fleet. Antwerp, like other places on the frontier, was garrisoned only by the weak depôts of regiments who were combating on the Danube. Not one of them was armed. Monnet had six battalions in Flushing. Rousseau, who commanded on the left bank of the Scheldt, had only three or four thousand recruits under his orders, whom he kept at Ghent on account of the insalubrity of the country. Battalions of grenadiers and chasseurs of the national guards alone were intrusted with the defence of the coasts."—PELET, iv., 319.

"The fortress of Antwerp, ill defended and paralyzed in the first moment of terror, would have easily yielded to a brisk attack."—Vict. et Cong., xix., 254.

"The coast was denuded to such a degree that nothing could have hindered the English to disembark 30,000 men on the left bank of the Scheldt, and in three days arrive, with their numerous artillery, before Antwerp. Meanwhile, the remainder might have entered the Scheldt, to fix our attention on Flushing and the isle of Cadzand. Antwerp had hardly a garrison; our fleet would have been taken by surprise, and its retreat rendered impossible; inasmuch that, by merely occupying the fort of Tête de Flandre, opposite Antwerp, on the left bank of the Scheldt, the success of the enterprise would have been certain."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoléon*, iii., 299, 300.

Napoleon has left a highly important observation on this subject. "The fleet," says he, "when the expedition arrived on the coast of Holland, was moored off Flushing. The great object of Chatham should have been to cut off the fleet from Antwerp, which would necessarily have drawn after it the destruction of both, for Antwerp had only a garrison of 3000 men. This might have been done by pushing on a corps of 6000 men through South Beveland to Bahtz the day the expedition landed; the fleet would thus have been cut off from Antwerp, and both it and that fortress must have surrendered. But, from the moment that the fleet got up to Antwerp, which it did soon after the siege of Flushing began, the failure of the expedition was certain."—NAPOLEON in MONTMOLON, ii., 261; and i., 219. "I am of opinion," said he to O'Meara, "that, if you had landed a

the Scheldt, and occupying the fort of Tête de Flandre, opposite Antwerp, which could hardly have made any resistance, success was certain; for the city has no defences whatever on the left bank of the river, and the fleet could neither have got up above the Tête de Flandre, nor escaped destruction even in the dockyards themselves, from a bombardment from the opposite side, not half a mile distant. The instructions of the commander-in-chief, Lord Chatham, were precise; and they bore, that the main object of the expedition was the destruction of the ships building or afloat in the Scheldt, and of the arsenals and dockyards in Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing; and an ulterior or subordinate object only, the reduction of the island of Walcheren.* But England had not at that period two Wellingtons in her service. Lord Chatham, to whom the expedition was intrusted, neither inherited the energy of his father, the great Earl of Chatham, nor shared the capacity of his immortal brother, William Pitt. A respectable veteran, not without merit in the routine of official duty at home, he was totally destitute of the activity and decision requisite in an enterprise in which success was to be won rather by rapidity of movement than deliberation of conduct; destitute of experience, unknown to fame, of indolent habits, he owed his appointment to court favour, which ministers were chiefly culpable for not resisting to the uttermost of their power. Reversing, in consequence, alike the tenour of his instructions and the dictates of common sense on the subject, he directed his force, in the first instance, to the last object with which he was intrusted; and, instead of pushing on in the outset by forced marches, to seize Antwerp and the forts of the river before the enemy could collect a force for their defence, lost the precious hours, big with the fate of the campaign, in reducing Flushing, valueless as a post in advance after the fleet had entered the Scheldt, incapable of defence after Antwerp had fallen, if required as a support in case of retreat.†

Having adopted this unhappy resolution, Lord Chatham prosecuted the subordinate Siege and object of reducing Flushing with great vigour and success. The garrison were Flushing hotly driven into the works, with considerable loss, on the first approach of the besiegers; several sallies, afterward undertaken, repulsed, and the artillery having been quickly landed, the trenches were armed, approaches commenced and pushed on with great rapidity. On Aug. 13. the 13th the breaching batteries opened their fire on the land side, from fifty-two heavy guns, while seven ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels, kept up a cannonade with uncommon vigour from the sea. It was then found, what subsequent experience has since abundantly verified, that there are no land-batteries, how strong soever, which can withstand, along an equal space in front, the well-supported fire of several ships of the line. The sea defences were speedily ruined, and every gun bearing on the water silenced; the town took fire in several places, and the inhabitants, beset with a flaming tempest both from the north and

few thousand men at first at Williamstadt, and marched direct to Antwerp, you might, between consternation, want of preparation, and the uncertainty of the number of assailants, have taken it by a *coup de main*. But, after the fleet got up, it was impossible."—O'MEARA, i., 255.

* See note A.

† Lord Chatham's Instructions, Parl. Deb., xv., App. No. 1. Jom., *Vie de Nap.* iii., 300.

south, besought the governor, as the only means of avoiding total ruin, to surrender. Such was the consternation produced by the bombardment, that, after it had continued three days, and the English troops had effected a lodgment within musket-shot of the rampart, the French general proposed a suspension of arms, and the town was surrendered on the 16th, with five thousand eight hundred prisoners and two hundred pieces of cannon. The total prisoners taken since the landing of the expedition exceeded seven thousand.*

Hitherto fortune seemed to have smiled on all the efforts of the expedition; but she soon showed that, like others of her sex, she reserved her favours only for the daring and the enterprising. The time lost in besieging Flushing proved fatal to all the other objects of the expedition. Indefatigable were the efforts of the French and Dutch governments, during that precious breathing-time, to direct troops to the menaced point; and in a fortnight it was beyond the reach of attack. On the 12th, the King of Holland

Aug. 12. arrived at the head of his guards and five thousand troops of the line; the generals commanding in Flanders and Picardy despatched an equal number, who arrived from the 14th to the 20th. Meanwhile the fleet was removed above the town, the batteries armed, the ditches cleared out and filled with water, and the national guards of all the surrounding departments poured into the fortress. While these active preparations were going on, twenty thousand admirable troops were kept inactive in South Beveland, almost within sight of the steeples of Antwerp; and so dilatory were the proceedings of the English general, that, though Flushing surrendered on the

Aug. 26. 16th, it was not till the 26th that he advanced the headquarters to Bahtz, a distance not exceeding thirty miles. By that time thirty thousand of the enemy were assembled on the Scheldt; Bernadotte, who had been despatched by the government at Paris to take the command, had put Antwerp in a respectable state of defence; the squadron was in safety; ulterior success impossible; while three thousand of the British troops were already in the hospital, and the pestilential marshes in that unhealthy district were fast exercising their malignant influence on the health of the soldiers. In these circumstances it was rightly judged by Lord Chatham and a council of war, whose opinion was unanimous on the subject, that farther advance was impossible, and orders were given in the beginning of September to withdraw the whole troops into the island of Walcheren.†

It was at first thought that it would have been practicable to have retained possession of this important conquest, and, doubtless, if it had been so, the acquisition would have been of the last consequence, as hermetically closing the Scheldt, and rendering useless all the vast naval preparations of the enemy in that quarter. At that particular moment, it was of the more consequence to retain possession of that island, as the negotiations with Austria were not only not yet brought to a conclusion, but it was sometimes more than doubt-

ful, during their continuance, whether war would not again break out. In that event it would, of course, have been of the greatest importance to keep thirty thousand of the enemy grouped under the walls of Antwerp. Fifteen thousand men, accordingly, were left as a garrison in the island, and the remainder of the troops returned to England. But the malaria distemper of the country, since so well known under the name of the Walcheren fever, proved so fatal in its ravages, that it was deemed impolitic to retain it permanently, especially after the conclusion of peace between the Austrians and French had removed the principal motive for keeping the troops in that unhealthy station. Towards the middle of September, the average number of deaths was from two to three hundred a week, and nearly half the garrison was in hospital. Orders were therefore given to abandon the island: in the middle of November the works and naval Nov. 23 basins of Flushing were destroyed, and before Christmas the whole was evacuated by the British troops; but it appeared, from a Parliamentary return, that seven thousand men were lost in the enterprise, and that nearly half the troops engaged in it brought home with them the seeds of a distemper which few were able entirely to shake off during the remainder of their lives.*†

It is observed by Mr. Hallam, that the state trials of England exhibit the most appalling accumulation of judicial iniquity which is to be found in any age or country of the world, and far exceeding in atrocity anything recorded of legal injustice in the annals even of Eastern despotism.

Blind injustice which frequently characterizes the proceedings of the British Parliament.

The reason, he justly adds, is, that the monarch could not wreak his vengeance, or the contending nobles or parties destroy each other, as in other states, by open outrage or undisguised violence; and that the courts of law were the theatre, and state prosecutions the engines, by which this oppression was perpetrated, and these contests of faction conducted. If the purification of the legal tribunals, which took place at the Revolution, has freed, as it undoubtedly has, the judicial ermine of England from this hideous imputation, it has only, in many cases, transferred it to another quarter; and Parliament is the arena in which, from henceforth, as the contests of party were conducted, the historian is to find the traces of the indelible corruption and weakness of humanity. On no other principle, indeed, can the occasional gross injustice, and frequent political insanity of the English Legislature and people, during the last hundred and fifty years, be explained; and those who hope, by rendering our institutions more Democratical, to remedy these evils, would do well to become still more radical in their cure, and apply their reform to the human heart. It is a common remark in Parliament, that, in party questions, the real motive of the speaker is never divulged in debate; and that the considerations and objects which both sides have most at heart, are those which are with the greatest care withdrawn from the view. All parties have, in this way, come to reduce to perfection, in a practical form, the celebrated saying of Talleyrand, that the "great object of speech is to conceal the thought." The truth of these principles was signally illus-

* Lord Chat. Desp., Ann. Reg., 1809, 490, 493. App. to Chron. Pel., iv., 327.

† Parl. Deb., xvi., App., 321. Lord Chatham's Desp., Sept. 2, 1809. Ann. Reg., 1809, 502. App. to Chron. Jom., iii., 302, 303. Pel., iv., 328, 336.

* Ann. Reg., 1809, 225. Jom., iii., 303, 304.

† The sick, returned at various times to England from Walcheren, amounted to 12,863.—*Parl. Pap.*, No. 24; *Parl. Deb.*, xv., 23, App.

trated, in the two great objects of party contention, during the session of 1809—the accusations against the Duke of York and the Walcheren expedition.

That the spring of 1809 was the grand crisis of the war; that Austria and Spain were then, for the first time, brought to act together in real earnest, and hurl their strength, animated by the highest degree of patriotic enthusiasm, against the enemy; that the military power of Britain had then risen to an unparalleled degree of efficiency, and was prepared, under renowned leaders, to follow up the career of victory recently opened to their arms, was universally known and acknowledged. Every man in the Empire felt that the moment had arrived when Europe was to be disenthralled by one convulsive effort, or their fetters riveted for a time to which no end could be seen, on the enchained nations. What, then, at such a moment, was the grand object of consideration in the House of Commons? Was it to cement the alliance, to pour forth the treasures of England with a profusion worthy of the greatness of the occasion, and increase, by every means in their power, the efficiency of the army upon which such mighty destinies depended? Quite the reverse. The popular party in the House of Commons appeared to value the crisis only in proportion to the means which it afforded them of directing, with additional effect, their attacks upon the government, and augmenting the difficulties experienced in the discharge of its vital duties by the executive. And at the moment when Austria was straining every nerve for the conflict, and Napoleon was preparing the forces which dealt out the thunderbolts of Echmuhl and Wagram, the British House of Commons was, for months together, occupied with no other subject but the secret springs of a few promotions in the army, and the details of the commander-in-chief's intrigue with his artful mistress, Mrs. Clarke!

The attack on the Duke of York's administration of the army was founded upon the allegation of his having disposed of part of the patronage with which he was intrusted, as commander-in-chief, for corrupt or unworthy considerations. The debates and examinations on the subject began in the end of January, and continued, almost without the intermission of a day, till the 17th of March: absorbing thus nearly the whole time both of government and of the country, at the very moment when a concentration of all the national thought and energies were required for the prosecution of the gigantic campaign in progress on the Continent. But this was not all: the time thus spent was not only wasted, but it led to the most pernicious results. Nothing whatever came out against the commander-in-chief but that he had occasionally admitted a designing and artful mistress to a certain share in the disposal of commissions; and that she made use of, and exaggerated this influence to obtain bribes, unknown to him, from the applicants for promotion. If the moralist must ever see much to condemn in the indulgence of habits which never fail, in any rank, to degrade the character of such as become slaves to them, the statesman must admit that a more deplorable waste of time and national interest never occurred than when such details were for months together, at such a crisis, made the subject of le-

gislative investigation. Mr. Wardle, the mover of the inquiry, rose for a short time into a blaze of popularity, and then sunk at once to rise no more. After a fatiguing investigation and debate, which occupies above fifteen hundred pages of the Parliamentary Debates, the charges were negatived by a majority of 241, the numbers being 364 to 123. No man of sense, who reads the proceedings, can now doubt that this decision was well founded in the evidence, and that the Duke of York at that period was the victim of factious injustice; but, meanwhile, the public mind became violently excited; the fury of popular obloquy was irresistible; and government, deeming it necessary to yield to the torrent, the duke sent in his resignation. This took place just four days before the commander-in-chief was officially called upon to report upon the vital point of the force which could be spared for the projected expedition to the Scheldt; and thus, at the very time when the most important military operations ever engaged in by England were under consideration, the ambition of selfish faction, and the fury of misguided zeal, combined to introduce new and wholly inexperienced persons to the direction of the army, and chase from its command the public-spirited prince whose judicious reforms and practical improvements had brought it from an unworthy state of depression to its present state of efficiency and glory. The deplorable postponement of the Walcheren expedition till it was too late to serve as a relief to the heroism of Austria, its calamitous issue when it was undertaken, and the abortive result of the triumphs in Spain, are thus indissolubly connected with this act of national absurdity and injustice.*†

Much in the same spirit were the debates which took place on the Walcheren expedition. No fault, indeed, could here be found with the theme of discussion: the failure of so vast an armament, fitted out at such a cost, adequate to such achievements, formed a subject worthy of the anxious investigation of the Parliament of England; and, if it had elicited either generous feelings or elevated views from those who conducted the accusation, no more useful subject of contemplation to the historian could have been presented. But this was very far indeed from being the case. Though the investigation was conducted with great industry and ability, the views taken on the side of the opposition were so overstrained and exaggerated as to lead to no useful or practical result. Their great object was to show that the whole blame of the failure of the expedition rested with ministers, and ministers alone; that success was at no period, and by no efforts, attainable; that the point of attack was ill chosen, the force ill directed, and the whole cost and blood of the armament misapplied. Nothing can be clearer than that these charges were in great part wholly groundless, as the expedition was clearly directed against the most important point of the enemy's resources; the effects of success immense,

* Parl. Deb., xii., 263, 1057; xiii., 1, 710.

† Mrs. Clarke, the leading character in this maze of scandal and intrigue, was a woman possessed of considerable personal attractions, and no small share of ready wit and repartee. When asked in a subsequent trial, by a cross-examining council, "Pray, madam, under whose protection are you just now?" she immediately answered, bowing to the court, "Under that of my lord chief-justice." The court was convulsed with laughter, in which his lordship heartily joined, and the barrister was silent.

and vital to the national independence of England; the forces employed fully adequate to the object in view; and the general instructions given such as would, if energetically acted upon, have unquestionably led to decisive success.* The real points in which government were blameable, and for which it is impossible to find any adequate excuse, were the long delay which occurred in determining upon the expedition, and not straining every nerve to send it out in April or May, instead of the end of July, and the sanctioning the appointment of an officer as commander-in-chief unknown to fame, and obviously inadequate to the direction of such an enterprise. Yet these points were hardly ever touched on in the course of the debate, so great was the anxiety to throw the whole blame upon ministers, rather than upon a commander known to have owed his appointment to royal favour. After a lengthened investigation and debate, ministers were declared not blameable upon the general policy of the expedition, by a majority, however, of only forty-eight, the numbers being 275 to 227:† a majority which, on the subordinate question of whether the protracted retention of Walcheren was blameable, fell to twenty-three; a division which clearly demonstrated how strongly the calamitous issue of the expedition had come to influence the public mind.

The untoward issue of this expedition, the obloquy which it brought upon government, and the narrow escape which they made from total shipwreck on its result, blew into a flame the ill-smothered embers of a conflagration in the cabinet, and led, at this critical moment, to a change in the most important offices of the state. Mr. Canning, who, since the formation of Mr. Perceval's administration, had held the seals of the foreign office, had long conceived that Lord Castlereagh, who was secretary at war, was unfit to be intrusted with the important and hourly-increasing duties of that department. This opinion, which subsequent events have triumphantly disproved, and which was doubtless chiefly based at that time, in the able but aspiring mind of the foreign secretary, on the illusions of ambition and the whisperings of jealousy, was strongly confirmed by the disastrous issue of the Scheldt expedition: which he ascribed, with how much justice the preceding observations will show, to the ignorance and incapacity of the secretary at war, to whom the direction of its details had been in a great measure intrusted. Early in April 4. April, he had intimated to the Duke of Portland, the nominal head of the administration, that he conceived the public service required that either he or Lord Castlereagh should resign, and offered to remove all difficulties by his own retirement. Anxious to prevent any schism in the cabinet at such a crisis, the duke consulted Lord Camden, and prevailed on Mr. Canning, meanwhile, to suspend his resignation: the king was afterward spoken to on the subject, but he also postponed any definite opinion. A long negotiation subsequently ensued, which, against Mr. Canning's strongest remonstrances, was protracted till the issue of the Scheldt expedition became known; and although some of Lord Castlereagh's friends were made acquainted with what was going on, yet they did not deem it advisable to make him privy to it. At

length, in the first week of September, his lordship was informed of the whole by his friends, farther concealment having become impossible by Mr. Canning's resignation. Lord Castlereagh, under the impression that he had been ill used by Mr. Canning in this transaction, by not having been made acquainted from the first with the steps calculated to prejudice him which he had adopted, immediately sent Mr. Canning a challenge. The parties met; and at the second fire Mr. Canning fell, having received a severe wound in the thigh. Both gentlemen had previously sent in their Sept. 22. resignations; and though a reconciliation was subsequently effected, and their joint services regained for their country, the quarrel had the effect, at the time, of excluding both from administration. After an unsuccessful attempt to effect a coalition with Lords Grey and Grenville, Lord Wellesley was recalled from the embassy of Spain to fill the situation of foreign secretary; Lord Castlereagh was, two years afterward, reinstated in office, and contributed, in an essential manner, to the triumphs and glories of the grand alliance; but Mr. Canning, who aimed at the highest destinies, for long declined offers of employment at home, and did not appear again in official situation till after the peace.*

A general change now took place in the administration. The Duke of Portland, whose health had for some time been declining, resigned his place as head of the government, and as the negotiation with Lords Grey and Grenville had failed in procuring their accession to the cabinet, the ministry was reconstructed entirely from the Tory party. Mr. Perceval filled the place of first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer; the Earl of Liverpool was transferred from the home to the war office; Mr. Ryder became home, and Marquis Wellesley foreign secretary. There can be no doubt that all these offices were filled by men of business and talent; and the cabinet, as so constructed, possessed the inestimable advantage of unity of opinion on all vital questions, and especially on the great one of the prosecution of the war: an advantage so great, that, for its want, no acquisitions, however great, no talents, however splendid, can in the long run compensate. But still the abilities of none of these statesmen, with the exception of Marquis Wellesley, were either of the highest order or the most brilliant character; and it is a remarkable circumstance, indicating the power of unity of purpose and resolution of mind, in a nation and its government, to compensate for the want of the showy qualities of the orator or the practised skill of the Parliamentary debater, that the most glorious triumphs recorded in the history of England were achieved, not only when the persons possessing in the highest degree these qualities were not in the administration, but when they were actively engaged on the side of opposition.†

GEORGE CANNING, whom this abortive intrigue excluded from office for several Youth and first years, was the most finished orator introduction to who had appeared in Parliament public life of since the days of Pitt and Fox. Mr. Canning. Born of respectable, though not opulent parents, descended from an honourable line of ancestors,

* See note B.

† *Parl. Deb.*, xv., App., 1, and xvi., 104, 422.

* *Ann. Reg.*, 1809, 239. Mr. Canning's Statement, Nov. 14, 1809. *App. to Chron.*, 517, 530. *Canning's Life*, i., 56, 83. *Life and Speeches*.

† *Ann. Reg.*, 1809, 239. *Canning's Life*, 84. *Works*, vol. i.

In almost every feature of his character and career, LORD CASTLEREAGH was the reverse of this accomplished statesman; and the mortal hostility which for a time prevailed between them was typical of the struggle between those antagonist principles in the British Constitution so soon destined to come into collision, and whose conflict ere long shook the Empire to its foundation. Born of a noble and powerful family, he did not, like his brilliant rival, owe his elevation to his own unaided exertions, but was wafted into office and public life with all the advantages of birth and connexions. He was early intrusted with high situations in the Irish government; and in the important and arduous matter of the union with England, gave immediate proof of that prompt determination and undaunted courage which ultimately shone forth with such lustre on the great theatre of Europe. An indefatigable man of business, thoroughly acquainted with all the details of office in the situations which he successively held, he was gifted with none of the qualities which are calculated to win the favour of a popular assembly, or captivate the imagination of the great body of mankind. His speeches, always distinguished by strong sense, unflinching energy, and lofty feeling, were generally full of matter, and often abounded with vigorous and conclusive arguments; but they wanted the charm of a poetic fancy, they were destitute of the force of condensed expression, and seldom rose to the height of impassioned oratory. Hence his influence in the house as a debater was inconsiderable; and though he long held important situations, and commanded, from his qualities as a statesman, the respect even of his enemies, he owed less than any minister of the day to the power of eloquence.

But, if the great and ennobling characteristics of a statesman are considered, none of these in English history will occupy a loftier pedestal, or be deemed worthy of more unqualified admiration. Fixed in his principles, disinterested in his patriotism, unbending in his resolutions, he possessed in the highest degree that great quality, without which, in the hour of trial, all others are but as tinkling brass—moral courage and unflinching determination; and they know little of human affairs who are not aware that this is at once the rarest, the most valuable, and the most commanding gift of nature. His courage was not simply that of a soldier who mounts the breach, though none possessed personal bravery in a higher degree: it was that of the general who greatly dares, of the statesman who nobly endures; and this invaluable quality seemed to rise with the circumstances which called for its exertion. Conspicuous in the conduct of the Irish government at the time of the union, it was doubly so

man who will stand highest in the estimation of future ages, if his reputation is rested on his Parliamentary efforts alone. The origin and frequent use of that expression in these times, and the high value attached to it in existing contests, is itself an indication of the assumption of a standard for Parliamentary force in speaking different from that commonly recognised, and not understood by the generality of men. But all such fictitious or conventional standards of excellence will be swept away by the floods of time; and our great statesmen and orators on all sides would do well, while they cultivate this talent, as cultivate it they must for present impression, to anchor their reputation for future ages on the assertion of principles, and the use of expressions of permanent application and universal sway over the human heart.

during the perils and anxieties of the Peninsular campaigns, and shone forth with the brightest lustre in the crisis of Europe during the invasion of France. By his firmness of character, and yet suavity of manner, he mainly contributed to hold together the sometimes discordant elements of the grand alliance; by his energy he brought forth the mighty resources of England, at the decisive moment, with irresistible force; and when the resolution of the bravest hearts in Europe was failing under the responsibility of the last throw of the conflict, he nobly stood forth, and, by his single efforts, mainly brought about the bold determination which hurled Napoleon from his throne. The supporter of rational freedom, he was the resolute opponent of unbridled Democracy; the real friend of the people, he was the unceasing enemy of their excesses; and, while he disdained to purchase popularity by flattering their passions, he risked in their cause the objects to which his life had been devoted, and alone, of all the statesmen of Europe, procured for Poland, amid the maledictions of the Liberals and the delirium of Alexander's victories, a national existence, institutions, and laws: blessings too soon, alas! torn from them, amid the Democratic transports and selfish ambition of later times.

Cut short in his career before these glorious days arrived, MR. PERCEVAL has yet engraven his name deep on the brightest tablets in the annals of

Career of Mr. Perceval.

England. Born of a noble family, and not merely educated for, but eminent in the practice of the bar, he brought to public affairs the acuteness and precision of legal argument, and first rose to eminence in Parliament by his spirit and perseverance in opposition, during the brief period of Mr. Fox's administration, when his party seldom mustered more than twenty or thirty members. But mere intellectual acumen seldom has weight with a mixed assembly; and in the House of Commons, unless their legal talents are merged in the force of public principle or moral feeling, lawyers have seldom risen to any lasting eminence. It was the great objects of philanthropy, for which he contended, which gave Sir Samuel Romilly his well-deserved weight in that assembly and the country; and it was to a principle of a still dearer interest to humanity that Mr. Perceval owed his elevation. He stood forth as the champion of the PROTESTANT FAITH; and, at a crisis when the national heart was violently agitated by the dangers to which, it was thought, the Protestant establishments of the Empire were exposed by the concessions then sought to be forced upon the king, he won the public confidence by the intrepidity and energy with which he appealed to the principles which had placed the house of Brunswick on the throne. Called by the favour of his sovereign to a high place in the cabinet, on the change of ministry in 1807, he conducted the lead in the House of Commons with a skill and ability which surpassed the expectations even of his friends; and when the Duke of Portland resigned, and Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh withdrew, public opinion ratified the royal choice, which placed him at the head of administration.

Without any of the great or commanding qualities of the orator, or the profound views which distinguish the highest class of statesmen, Mr. Perceval maintained himself successfully in this exalted sta-

His character.

tion, by the integrity of his character, the sincerity of his principles, the acuteness of his reasoning, and the spirit with which he combated the multifarious attacks of his enemies. Reversing the situation of the Roman emperor,* he would by common consent have been deemed unworthy of the lead if he had not obtained it. Contrary to what is generally the case, he steadily advanced in reputation to the close of life; and possibly his premature end alone prevented him from rising, during the eventful years which immediately followed, to the very highest place among British statesmen. His measures were decided, his spirit resolute, his heart upright. Of unimpeachable integrity in private life, a sincere Christian, a tried patriot, the nation saw without suspicion hundreds of millions pass through his hands, and he justified their confidence by dying poor. He was adverse to all the liberal doctrines of the age, and anchored his faith, perhaps with too unbending rigidity, on the existing constitution in church and state; but time has since proved that the views are not always narrow which are founded on experience, and that the most liberal doctrines are sometimes the most ephemeral. His favourite maxims were, that concession of political power to the Catholics would infallibly lead, from one step to another, to the overthrow of our Protestant institutions, and that no remedy could be found for the disorders and sufferings of Ireland but in the establishment of a well-regulated system of poor laws; and great was the ridicule thrown upon such professions by many of the most learned and all the most liberal men of his time. Subsequent events, however, have in a great degree justified his penetration, and added another to the numerous instances which history affords of the eternal truth, that the only safe foundation for anticipation of the future is experience of the past, and that those who, from adhering to this principle, are thought to be behind one age, are generally in advance of the next.

While the vast resources of England, poured forth with a profusion worthy of the occasion, were thus lost to the cause of European freedom by the tardiness with which they were brought into action, and the want of vigour with which they were directed in the field, Austria was anxiously protracting a painful negotiation, and watching every gleam in the political horizon, before she finally put the seal to her degradation. The emperor retired to Vienna, where he was soon immersed in the cares of his immense empire; while the immediate conduct of the negotiation was committed, at Altenburg, in Hungary, to Metternich on the part of Austria, and Talleyrand on that of France. The situation of Napoleon was delicate, particularly in relation to Russia, with which he had repeatedly, during the campaign, short as it was, been on terms bordering on hostility; but the battle of Wagram had, as if by magic, restored all the temporizing policy of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and the relations of amity between the two cabinets. When the Emperor Francis, after the conclusion of the armistice, addressed a letter to Alexander, and another to Napoleon, these two sovereigns instantly mutually communicated their despatches and answers to each other. On this side, therefore, no obstacles were

to be anticipated; and although there were at first some difficulties, and no small alarm awakened by the proposal, on the part of the French minister, to unite a portion of Galicia to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, which gave instant umbrage to the cabinet and nobles of St. Petersburg, yet in the end this difficulty, great as it was, yielded to the thirst for territorial aggrandizement. It was agreed to give Russia a share of the spoil of Galicia; the name of Poland was never again to be revived; and the Emperor Alexander suffered himself to be persuaded, or affected to believe, that, even with a considerable addition of territory, the Grand-duchy of Lithuania could never become an object of jealousy to the Czars of Muscovy.†

The cabinet of Vienna, which was stationed at Komorn in Hungary, prolonged the negotiation, from a latent hope that successes in Spain, on the Scheldt, or in the Tyrol, might enable it to resume hostilities with some prospect of success, or obtain some abatement from the rigorous terms which were demanded by the conqueror. These were the immediate suppression of the landwehr, the reduction of the regular army to one half, the expulsion of all French royalists from the Austrian monarchy, and the cession of all the provinces actually occupied by the French armies. To these extravagant demands, which amounted to a total destruction of the monarchy, Count Metternich opposed the equally extravagant proposition that everything should be restored to the *status quo ante bellum*. As the negotiation advanced, Napoleon employed menaces of the severest kind against the imperial government in the event of his being again driven to hostilities, boasted much of his perfect intelligence with the Emperor Alexander, and even dropped some significant hints of his intention, if driven to extremities, to separate the three crowns which now centered on the imperial brows, and bestow two of them on the Archdukes Charles and John. Meanwhile, the utmost care was taken to improve the military position of the army, and make everything ready for a resumption of hostilities: magnificent reviews daily took place at Vienna; troops were incessantly forwarded from the rear to the corps in front; a grand distribution of honours and benefactions to the soldiers was made on the anniversary of the emperor's birthday on the 15th of August,

* Bign., viii., 349, 357. Hard., x., 469, 479.

† "My interests," said Alexander to Napoleon, "are entirely in the hands of your majesty. You may give me a certain pledge of your friendship, in repeating what you said at Tilsit and Erfurth, on the interests of Russia in connexion with the late kingdom of Poland, and which I have since charged my ambassador to confirm." "Poland," said Napoleon to M. Gorgoli, the officer who bore the despatches to St. Petersburg, "may give rise to some embarrassment between us, but the world is large enough to afford us room to arrange ourselves." "If the re-establishment of Poland is to be brought on the tapis," replied Alexander, "the world is not large enough, for I desire nothing farther in it." The ferment was prodigious at St. Petersburg; and it was openly said in some circles that it would be better to die sword in hand, or assassinate the emperor, if he was disposed to yield, than to permit the reunion of Poland to the grand-duchy. Napoleon was not ignorant of these alarming symptoms; and it was at length agreed that France should guaranty to Russia its new possessions, that the name of Poland and the Poles should be avoided, and three fourths of the spoils of Galicia given to Lithuania, and one fourth to Russia. Under a new name, and the sway of the King of Saxony, this was thought not likely to awaken any dangerous ideas as to the re-establishment of Poland.—See BIGNON, viii. 351, 354.

* "Omnium consensu, dignus imperio, si non regnasset." —TACITUS.

accompanied by a decree for the erection of a column of granite of Cherburg, on the Pont Neuf at Paris, a hundred and eighty feet high, with the inscription, "Napoleon to the French people;" a vast fortress was commenced at Spitz, opposite to Vienna, and another at Raab, to serve as impregnable têtes-du-pont for the passage of the Danube; while, by a decree equally agreeable to the French as grievous to the German people, it was declared that, till the 11th of April following, the whole expenses of the Grand Army should be laid upon the conquered territories.*

But, in the midst of all his magnificent preparations and dazzling announcements, the emperor had several causes for disquietude, and was far from feeling that confidence in his position which he declared to the world, and held forth in his conferences with Metternich. The Walcheren expedition held all the Flemish provinces for some weeks in a state of suspense; and there was good reason to believe that, if Antwerp had fallen, the fermentation in the north of Germany would have drawn Prussia into an open declaration of war, which would at once have revived a desperate and doubtful contest on the Danube. The Tyrol was still in arms, and had a third time totally defeated the French invaders, and made the greater part of their number prisoners. Nor were the accounts from Spain of a more encouraging description. The disaster of Soult at Oporto, to be immediately noticed, had been followed by the invasion of Estremadura and the defeat of Talavera; while, at the same time, accounts were daily received of the discord among the generals employed in the Peninsula, and the details of an alarming conspiracy in Soult's army revealed the alarming truth that the Republican generals, like the Roman consuls, dazzled by the thrones which had been won by so many of their number, were not altogether beyond the reach of intrigues which might elevate them from a marshal's baton to a king's sceptre. "It is necessary," said Napoleon, "to hasten at any price to make peace, in order that the enemy may not gain time to profit by his machinations."†

The emperor's desire to bring the long-protracted negotiations to a conclusion was increased by a singular attempt at assassination, which was at this period made upon his person. At the daily parades at Schœnbrunn, the attention of the guards and officers of his household had been more than once attracted by a young man, who threw himself in the way, and importunately demanded to be allowed to speak to the emperor. On the third occasion, one of the gendarmes seized him rudely by the neck to move him back, and, in doing so, perceived that he had something concealed in his bosom. He was searched, and it proved to be a large knife, sheathed in a number of sheets of paper. Being immediately apprehended and brought before Savary, the chief of the gendarmerie, for examination, he at once avowed that his intention was to have taken the emperor's life; alleging, as a reason, that he had been assured that the sovereigns would never make peace with him, and that, as he was the stronger, the grand object of universal pacification could never be attained till he were removed. It turned out that he was the son

of a Protestant minister at Erfurth, and only eighteen years old. He had seen the emperor when he was at that town the year before; and he admitted that he had borrowed his father's horse, without his knowledge, and come to Vienna to execute his purpose. "I had chiefly studied history," said he, "and often envied Joan of Arc, because she had delivered France from the yoke of its enemies, and I wished to follow her example." "The guards who surrounded me," said the emperor, "would have cut you in pieces before you could have struck me!" "I was well aware of that," replied he, "but I was not afraid to die." "If I set you at liberty," said Napoleon, "would you return to your parents, and abandon your purpose?" "Yes," replied he, "if we had peace; but if war continued, I would still put it in execution." Struck with these answers, the emperor, with a magnanimity which formed at times a remarkable feature in his character, was desirous to save his life, and directed Dr. Corvessart, who was in attendance, to feel his pulse, to see if he was in his sound senses. The physician reported that his pulse was slightly agitated, but that he was in perfect health. The young fanatic was sent to prison at Vienna; and though the emperor for some time entertained thoughts of pardoning him, he was forgotten in the pressure of more important events; and after his departure for Paris, he was brought before a military council, condemned, and executed. He evinced in his last moments the same intrepidity which had distinguished his conduct when examined before Napoleon, and his last words were, "For God and the fatherland!"‡

This singular event contributed as much, on the French side, to the conclusion of the negotiations, as the failure of the Walcheren expedition did on that of the Austrian cabinet. There might be more characters in Germany like Stabs: in a country so profoundly agitated, and containing, especially in its northern provinces, so many enthusiastic spirits, it was impossible to measure the personal danger which the emperor might run if hostilities were resumed. These considerations weighed powerfully with the cabinet of Schœnbrunn. Napoleon gradually fell in his demands; and though the orders given were abundantly warlike, and the marshals were all at their posts, yet it was evident to those in the secret of the negotiations that matters were approaching to an accommodation. The demand, on the part of France, of the line from the Danube to the Lake Aller, as the frontier towards Bavaria, gave rise to fresh difficulties, at the very moment when all seemed concluded; for it deprived Austria, on that side, of the mountain ridge which formed its true frontier, and gave the court of Munich the crest of the Hansruck, and part of the slope towards the eastward. But matters had gone too far to recede: the cabinet of Vienna was true to its principle of yielding

* Sav., iv., 141, 145. Pel., iv., 371. Bign., viii., 371, 373.

† An adventure of a different character befell Napoleon at Schœnbrunn during this period. A young Austrian lady, of attractive person and noble family, fell so desperately in love with the *removal* of the emperor, that she became willing to sacrifice to him her person, and was, by her own desire, introduced at night into his apartment. Though abundantly warm in his temperament, so far as physical enjoyments were concerned, and noways disquieted, in the general case, by any lingering qualms of conscience about Josephine, Napoleon was so much struck with the artless simplicity of this poor girl's mind, and the devoted character of her passion, that, after some conversation, he had her reconducted untouched to her own house.

* Pel., iv., 344, 357. Sav., iv., 140, 148. Bign., viii., 355, 361.
† Pel., iv., 345, 346. Hard., x., 470, 471.

when it could no longer resist;* and Prince Lichtenstein, with tears in his eyes, signed the treaty, on the part of the Austrian government, at Vienna, on the 14th of October.

By the peace of Vienna, Austria lost territories containing three millions and a half of inhabitants. She ceded to Bavaria the Inn-Viertel and the Hansruck-Viertel, as well as Salzburg, with its adjacent territory, and the valley of Berchtholsgraden: districts, the importance of which was not to be measured by their extent and inhabitants, but by the importance of their situation, lying on the ridge of mountains which separated the two monarchies, and taking a strong frontier from the one to bestow it upon the other. Portions of Galicia, to the extent of fifteen hundred thousand souls, were ceded to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and of four hundred thousand to Russia; and besides this, the grand-duchy acquired the fortress and whole circle of Zamosc, in the eastern part of the same province. To the kingdom of Italy, Austria ceded Carniola, the circle of Villach, in Carinthia, six districts of Croatia, Fiume, and its territory on the seashore, Trieste, the county of Gorici, Montefalcone, Austrian Istria, Cartua, and its dependant isles, the Thalgeweg of the Save, and the lordship of Radzuns in the Grisons. In addition to these immense sacrifices, the Emperor of Austria renounced, on the part of his brother, the Archduke Antony, the office of grand-master of the Teutonic Order, with all the rights and territories. Tyrol remained to its Bavarian masters, but the Emperor Francis stipulated for his brave and devoted children in that province an absolute and unconditional amnesty, as well in their persons as effects.†

In addition to these public articles, various secret ones were annexed to the treaty, of a still more humiliating kind to the house of Hapsburg. The treaty was, in the first place, declared common to Russia; next, the Emperor of Austria engaged to reduce his army, so that it should not exceed a hundred and fifty thousand men during the continuance of the maritime war; all persons born in France, Belgium, Piedmont, or the Venitian States, were to be dismissed from the Austrian service; and a contribution of 85,000,000 francs (£3,400,000) was imposed on the provinces occupied by the French troops. By a letter of Napoleon to M. Daru, the intendant-general of the army and conquered provinces, it was specially enjoined that, "from the 1st of April to the first of October, every farthing expended on the army should be drawn from the conquered provinces, and all the advances between these periods made from France restored to the public treasury."‡

The treaty of Vienna was received with marked disapprobation by the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and it was attended with a most important effect in widening the breach which was already formed between the two mighty rulers of Continental Europe. In vain Napoleon assured Alexander that he had watched over his interests as he would have done over his own: the Russian autocrat

could perceive no traces of that consideration in the dangerous augmentation of the territory and population of the Grand-duchy of Lithuania, and he openly testified to Caulaincourt his displeasure, referring to the date of his dismissal of General Gortchakoff for decisive evidence of the sincerity of his alliance.* In the midst of all his indignation, however, he made no scruples in accepting the moderate portion of the spoils of Austria allotted to his share; and M. de St. Julian, who was despatched from Vienna to persuade him to renounce that acquisition, found it impossible to induce the cabinet of St. Petersburg to accept the sterile honours of disinterestedness. Napoleon, however, spared no efforts to appease the Czar; and, being well aware that it was the secret dread of the restoration of Poland which was the spring of all their uneasiness, he engaged not only to concur with Alexander in everything which should tend to efface ancient recollections, but even declared that he "was desirous that the name of Poland and of the Poles should disappear, not merely from every political transaction, but even from history." How fortunate that the eternal records of history are beyond the reach of the potentates who for a time oppress mankind!†

Napoleon afterward reproached himself at St. Helena with not having, at the treaty of Vienna, divided the three crowns, secret views in of the Austrian Empire, and there- this treaty. by forever prostrated its power and independence; and it is certain that, at one period of the negotiation, he not only threatened to adopt this extreme measure, but entertained serious thoughts of carrying it into execution. His secret thoughts seem to have been divulged in a despatch to his minister for foreign affairs, of 15th of September, in which he openly avows that his desire is either to separate the three crowns, or to form a sincere and durable alliance with the Austrian Empire. Provided he could obtain a sufficient guarantee for that alliance, he was willing to leave the monarchy entire, but he thought there could be no security for it unless the throne were ceded to the Grand-duke of Wurtzburg.‡ The Emperor Francis magnanimously agreed to the sacrifice, if it could have

* Vide ante, iii., 235.

† Champagny to Alexander, 20th Oct., 1809. Bign., viii., 390.

‡ "I desire nothing from Austria," said Napoleon. "Galicia is beyond my limits: Trieste is good for nothing but to be destroyed, since I have Venice. It is a matter of indifference to me whether Bavaria has a million more or less: my true interest is either to separate the three crowns, or to contract an intimate alliance with the reigning family. The separation of the three crowns is only to be obtained by resuming hostilities: an intimate alliance with the existing emperor is difficult, because I have not an entire confidence in his resolution. I said to Prince Lichtenstein, the other day, 'Let the emperor cede the crown to the Grand-duke of Wurtzburg. I will restore everything to Austria without exacting anything.' M. de Bubna took me at my word, and said the emperor was far from having any repugnance to such a sacrifice: I said I would accept it; that the base put forward at Altenberg was far from being unsuspicious of modifications. Insinuate to Count Metternich, that if the emperor is, on any account, inclined to cede the throne (report says he is weary of royalty), I will leave the monarchy entire. With the grand-duke I will contract such an alliance as will speedily enable me to settle the affairs of the Continent: I have confidence in the character and good disposition of the grand-duke; I would consider the repose of the world as secured by that event. You may say I can rely on the moral probity of the emperor, but then he is always of the opinion of the last person who speaks; such men as Stadion and Baldacci will continue to exercise influence over him. That way of arranging matters would suit me well."—NAPOLÉON TO CHAMPAGNY, 15th Sept., 1809; BIGNON, viii., 365, 368.

* Bign., viii., 360, 365. Pel., iv., 370, 373. Bour., vii., 247, 256.

† See Treaty in Martens. Pel., iv., 468. Ann. Reg., 1809. App. to Chron., 733. State Papers.

‡ Bign., viii., 379, 380.

§ See note C.

the effect of preserving the integrity of the monarchy; but it was not afterward insisted on by Napoleon, who began, in the course of this negotiation, to conceive the idea of connecting himself with the Cæsars in a way still more personally flattering, and likely to be more politically enduring. In truth, he foresaw that a rupture with Russia was inevitable at some future period: it was with the Czar that the real battle for supreme dominion was to be fought, and he clearly perceived the policy of not weakening too far the power which would be his right wing in the conflict.*

No sooner was the treaty of Vienna ratified than Napoleon set out for Paris, and the ramparts of Vienna arrived at Fontainebleau on the 26th of October. Before leaving the Austrian capital, however, in the interval between the signature and ratification of the treaty, he gave orders for the barbarous and unnecessary act of blowing up its fortifications. Mines had previously been constructed under the principal bastions, and the successive explosion of one after another presented one of the most sublime and moving spectacles of the whole Revolutionary war. The ramparts, slowly raised in the air, suddenly swelled, and bursting like so many volcanoes, scattered volumes of flame and smoke into the air; showers of stones and fragments of masonry fell on all sides; the subterranean fire ran along the mines with a smothered roar, which froze every heart with terror; one after another, the bastions were heaved up and exploded, till the city was enveloped on all sides by ruins, and the rattle of the falling masses broke the awful stillness of the capital. This cruel devastation produced the most profound impression at Vienna: it exasperated the people more than could have been done by the loss of half the monarchy. These ramparts were the glory of the citizens: shaded by trees, they formed delightful public walks; they were associated with the most heart-stirring eras of their history; they had withstood all the assaults of the Turks, and been witness to the heroism of Maria Theresa. To destroy these venerable monuments of former glory, not in the fury of assault, not under the pressure of necessity, but in cold blood, after peace had been signed, and when the invaders were preparing to withdraw, was justly felt as a wanton and unjustifiable act of military oppression. It brought the bitterness of conquest home to every man's breast: the iron had pierced into the soul of the nation. As a measure of military precaution it seemed unnecessary, when these walls had twice proved unable to arrest the invader: as a preliminary to the cordial alliance which Napoleon desired, it was in the highest degree impolitic; and its effects were felt by Napoleon, in the hour of his adversity, with terrible bitterness. The important lesson which it has left to the world, is the clear proof which it affords of that great general's opinion of the vital importance of central fortifications: he has told us himself, that, if Vienna could have held out three days longer, the fate of the campaign would have been changed; but, while this truth is, perhaps, the lesson of all others most strongly illustrated by the events of the war, it is the last which the vanity of kings and the thoughtlessness of the people will permit to be read to any useful effect.†

While the cabinet of Vienna was thus yielding in the strife, and the last flames of this terrible conflagration were extinguishing on the banks of the Danube, the Tyrol after the armistice of Znaym continued the theatre of a desperate conflict, and the shepherds of the Alps, with mournful heroism, maintained their independence against a power which the Austrian monarchy had been unable to withstand. Having completely delivered their country, after the battle of Aspern, from the invaders, and spread themselves over the adjoining provinces of Bavaria, Vorarlberg, and Italy,* the brave mountaineers flattered themselves that their perils were over, and that a second victory on the Danube would speedily reunite them, by indissoluble bonds, to their beloved emperor. Kufstein was besieged and on the point of surrendering, July 12. when the news of the battle of Wagram and the armistice of Znaym fell like a thunderbolt on their minds. Many of the insurgents, as was natural in such circumstances, gave up the cause as lost, and retired in deep dejection to their homes, while others, more resolute or desperate, redoubled in ardour, and seemed determined to spill the last drop of their blood rather than submit to the hated yoke of Bavaria. The chiefs of the insurrection and the Austrian generals, who had again entered the country, were at first in a state of great perplexity, from uncertainty whether to yield to the summons of the French generals, who required them to evacuate the country, or the prayers of the inhabitants, who besought them to stand by them and defend it. The uncertainty of the soldiers, however, was removed by an order which arrived after the armistice of Znaym, for them to evacuate both the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, which they immediately prepared to obey; but the insurgents refused to acknowledge the convention, and declared that they would submit to nothing but direct orders from the Emperor of Austria, who, they were confident, would never issue such commands, as he had promised to conclude no peace which did not secure to him the possession of the Tyrol. Such was the fury of the people, that some of the most violent proposed to seize and disarm all the Austrian troops and put all the prisoners to death; and although Hormayer, Martin, and the real chiefs, did their utmost to calm the general effervescence and direct it to some useful object, yet they could not prevent many of the prisoners from falling victims to the ungovernable rage of the peasantry. In the midst of this heroic yet savage bewilderment, the general voice turned to Hofer; and his announcement, at a crowded assembly, that he would stand by them to the last drop of his blood, though it were only as chief of the peasants of Passeyr valley, was answered by a general shout,† which proclaimed him "commander-in-chief of the province so long as it pleased God."

Dangers, however, of the most formidable kind were fast accumulating round the devoted province. The armistice of Znaym enabled the emperor to detach overwhelming forces against the Tyrol, and he immediately set about the final reduction of the country. Marshal Lefebvre, at the head of twenty thousand men, renewed his invasion of the Innthal by the route of Salzburg, while Beaumont, with ten thousand, crossed the

* O'Meara, ii., 199. Las Casas, iii., 139. Bign., viii., 364, 368.
† Jom., iii., 314, 315. Bign., viii., 375, 376.

* Ante, iii., 231.

† Gesch. A. Hofer, 521, 539. Barth., 276, 280.

July 20. ridge of Scharnitz, and threatened Innsbruck from the northern side. Both interruptions proved successful. In the confusion produced by the withdrawing of the Austrian authorities, and uncertain whether or not the war was to be continued, the frontier defiles were left unguarded, and both columns of the enemy appeared without opposition before the steeples

July 21. of Innsbruck. The Archduke John and General Buol, who commanded the Austrian troops, successively issued proclamations to the

July 29. people, announcing to them the conclusion of the armistice and stipulated evacuation of the Tyrol, and recommending to them to lay down their arms and trust to the clemency of the Duke of Dantzie. Finding the people little inclined to follow their directions, Hormayer and Buol evacuated Innsbruck with all the regular troops and cannon, taking the route over the Brenner, leaving the Tyrol to its fate. Innsbruck, destitute of defenders, immediately submitted, and the spectacle of thirty thousand French and Bavarians in possession of its capital, naturally spread the belief that the war in the Tyrol was terminated.*

July 30. This, however, was very far from being the case; and Europe, amid the consternation produced by the battle of Wagram, was speedily roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by the unconquerable resolution and astonishing victories of its gallant mountaineers.

General Hormayer, who was well aware of the influence of Hofer over his countrymen, and despaired, with reason, of any farther success in the contest, had used the utmost efforts to induce that renowned chief to follow him in his retreat, but all his efforts were ineffectual. Many of the chiefs, including even the renowned Spechbacher, had resolved to withdraw with the Austrian generals; but, when he went to take leave of Hofer, the power of patriotic eloquence proved victorious, and he was prevailed on to remain and stand by his country to the last. Even after this acquisition, however, Hofer was still the victim of contending feelings: patriotic ardour impelling him one way, and the obvious hopelessness of the attempt another; and, in the ag-

July 29. ony of indecision, he retired to a hermitage in the valley of Passeyr, where, amid pines and rocks, he spent several days in solitude and prayer. Haspinger was equally undecided; and, meanwhile, the peasants, who were full of ardour and ready on all sides to take up arms, remained inactive for want of a leader to direct them. At length, however, the latter courageous chief had a meeting at Brixen with Martin Schenck, Peter Kemmater, and Peter

Aug. 2. Mayer, at which Schenck, who was the friend and confidant of Hofer, produced a letter from him, in which he implored them to make "one more effort in behalf of their beloved country." These rural heroes mutually pledged themselves to sacrifice their lives rather than abandon the holy cause; and, having concerted measures, Haspinger took the command of the peasants,† while Hofer, who was summoned by the Duke of Dantzie to appear at Innsbruck on the 11th of August, returned for answer, "He would come, but it should be attended by ten thousand sharp-shooters."

Hostilities commenced on the 4th of August

by an attack on the advanced guard of the French and Bavarians, who were descending the southern declivity of the Brenner, on the banks of the Eisach, between Sterzing and Brixen. The Tyrolese, under Haspinger, occupied the overhanging woods and cliffs which surrounded the bridge of Laditch, a little below Mittenwald, where the high road from Bolsano to Innsbruck crosses the Eisach. The French and Bavarians, little suspecting their danger, advanced incautiously down the defile. The woods were silent: no muskets or armed men appeared on the cliffs; but no sooner was a considerable body of the enemy, under General Rouyer, engaged in the defile, than a heavy fire burst forth on all sides, and from amid the leafy screen the deadly bullets of the sharp-shooters brought death with every discharge into the allied ranks. The column halted, fearful to advance, yet unwilling to recede; upon which the Tyrolese, with deafening shouts, burst forth from their concealment, and, mingling with the enemy, a frightful slaughter took place. Fresh troops, however, came up from the rear: courageous discipline prevailed over unskilled valour, and the Bavarian column pushed on towards the bridge. Suddenly a crackling sound was heard: a rattle of falling stones startled the horsemen in advance, and immediately after several gigantic firs, which had been cut, and supported huge masses of rock and heaps of rubbish on the heights above, came thundering down, and crushed whole squadrons and companies at a single blow. So awful was the crash, so complete the devastation, that both parties, for a time, suspended the conflict, and, amid the deathlike silence which ensued, the roar of the Eisach was distinctly heard. Undeterred, however, by this frightful catastrophe, the French again advanced, through a murderous fire, and, surmounting the ruins which obstructed the road and covered the bodies of their comrades, forced their way on to the bridge. Already, however, it was on fire: a Bavarian horseman attempted, with dauntless intrepidity, to cross the arch amid the flames, but the burning rafters gave way, and he was precipitated into the torrent. Separated by the yawning gulf over which there was no other passage, both parties desisted from the combat. Haspinger returned to Brixen to collect his scattered forces, and Rouyer, weakened by the loss of twelve hundred men, re-measured his steps to Mittenwald and Sterzing, at the foot of the Brenner.*†

The successful issue of this extraordinary conflict produced, as might have been expected, a general outbreak in Tyrol. Hofer descended the valley of the Passeyr at the head of several thousand men, and joined Spechbacher on the Gauen, the mountain ridge which overhangs, on the

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 560, 561. Barth., 304, 312

† The scene of this memorable conflict is on the high road from Brixen to Sterzing, about a mile below Mittenwald, shortly before it crosses the bridge of Laditch. Every traveller from Italy to Germany, by Tyrol, passes through it; but how few are aware of the heart-stirring deeds of which the wood-clad precipices, beneath which they roll in their carriages, have been the theatre! Sir Walter Scott places the action in the Upper Innthal, but this is a mistake.—See GESCHICHTE ANDREAS HOFER, 560. The author visited the scene in 1816, and he yet recollects, in all its vividness, the thrilling interest which it excited: the long black furrow, produced by the falling masses, like the track of an avalanche, was even then, after the lapse of seven years, imperfectly obliterated by the bursting vegetation which the warmth of the Italian sun had awakened on these beautiful steeps.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 334, 342. Barth., 280, 290.

† Gesch. A. Hofer, 345, 359. Barth., 294, 302.

Desperate action at the bridge of Laditch. Aug. 4.

Defeat of Marshal Lefebvre on the Brenner. Aug. 4.

west and north, the northern slope of the Brenner, and ten thousand men soon flocked to their standard. The Bavarians, under General Stein-
 Aug. 5 and 6. gel, made several attempts to dis-
 lodge them from this threatening po-
 sition, which menaced the great road by Brixen
 to Italy, but they were constantly repulsed.
 COUNT WITTGENSTEIN, an officer destined to im-
 mortal celebrity in a more glorious war, suc-
 ceeded, however, in again clearing the road up
 the northern slope of the Brenner of the enemy;
 and Marshal Lefebvre, encouraged by this suc-
 cess, put himself at the head of his whole corps,
 with the intention of forcing his way over that
 elevated ridge to the Italian Tyrol. He had not
 advanced far, however, before his column, while
 winding in straggling files up the steep ascent,
 twenty miles in length, which leads to the sum-
 mit of the pass, and when the vanguard had
 reached Steinach, was attacked in numberless

Aug. 10. points at once by the peasantry; and, af-
 ter an obstinate conflict, the whole, twenty
 thousand strong, were routed and driven back
 with immense loss to the bottom of the mountain.
 Such was the disorder, that the marshal himself
 Aug. 11. arrived there disguised as a common
 trooper, on the evening of the 11th, and
 his followers, horse, foot, and cannon, mingled
 together, were rolled down in utter confusion into
 Innsbruck. Twenty-five pieces of cannon and
 the whole ammunition of the army fell into the
 hands of the victors, who, gathering strength like
 a mountain torrent, with every tributary stream
 which crossed their course, soon appeared in
 great force on Mount Isel and the heights which
 overhang the capital.*

Similar successes in other quarters attended the
 efforts of the Tyrolese patriots. A
 Successes in
 other quarters. body of seventeen hundred men, who
 advanced from Landeck through the

Vintchgau, with the intention of falling on the
 rear of Hofer's people at Sterzing, was met at
 Aug. 8. Prutz by a body of Tyrolese sharp-shoot-
 ers, and, after a protracted contest of two
 days, were totally defeated, with the loss of three
 hundred killed and nine hundred prisoners. At
 the same time, General Rusca advanced in the
 Pusterthal from Carinthia to Lienz, with six
 thousand men, where he gave way to the most
 revolting atrocities, massacring every human be-
 ing, of whatever age or sex, that fell in

Aug. 9. his way; until at length a stop was put
 to his career by a body of armed peasants, who
 met him at the Lienzerclause, and, after a bloody
 conflict, drove him back, with the loss of twelve
 hundred men, to Sachsenburg; from which, hotly
 pursued by the increasing fury of the peasantry,
 he retreated across the frontier into Carinthia, so
 that the whole of the Pusterthal was delivered
 from the enemy. At the same time, a body of

Aug. 10. Italian troops, which had advanced from
 the neighbourhood of Verona, with the
 design of co-operating with the corps of Lefebvre
 in its descent from the Brenner, alarmed at the
 general insurrection of the valley of the Adige,
 fell back, harassed by a cloud of peasants, to the
 Italian frontier, and the whole of the Southern
 Tyrol was restored to the arms of the Tyrolese.†

Animated by these unlooked-for successes, the
 patriots no longer stood on the defen-
 sive, but, flocking from all quarters
 to the standard of Hofer, assembled
 Total defeat
 of Lefebvre at
 Innsbruck.
 August 12. in great multitudes on Mount Isel,

the scene of their former triumphs, and destined
 to be immortalized by a still more extraordinary
 victory. Lefebvre had collected his whole force,
 consisting of twenty-five thousand men, of whom
 two thousand were horse, with forty pieces of
 cannon, on the little plain which lies between
 Innsbruck and the foot of the mountains on the
 southern side of the Inn. They were far from
 being animated, however, by their wonted spirit:
 the repeated defeats they had experienced had in-
 spired them with that mysterious dread of the
 mountaineers with which regular troops are so
 often seized, when, contrary to expectation, they
 have been worsted by undisciplined bodies of
 men; and a secret feeling of the injustice of their
 cause, and the heroism with which they had been
 resisted, paralyzed many an arm which had never
 trembled before a regular army. The Tyrolese
 consisted of eighteen thousand men, three hun-
 dred of whom were Austrian soldiers who had
 refused to follow their officers, and remained to
 share the fate of the inhabitants: they were tol-
 erably supplied with ammunition, but had little
 provisions, in consequence of which several hun-
 dred peasants had already gone back to their
 homes. Spechbacher commanded the right wing,
 whose line extended from the heights of Passberg
 to the bridges of Halle and Volders; Hofer was
 with the centre and had his headquarters
 at the inn of Spade, on the Schonberg; Aug. 12
 Haspinger directed the left, and advanced by
 Mutters. At four in the morning, this brave
 Capuchin roused Hofer from sleep, and, having
 first united with him in fervent prayer, hurried
 out to communicate his orders to the outposts.
 The battle commenced at six, and continued
 without intermission till midnight: the Bavarians
 constantly endeavouring to drive the Tyrolese
 from their position on Mount Isel, and they, in
 their turn, to force the enemy back into the town
 of Innsbruck. For long the contest was unde-
 cided, the superior discipline and admirable ar-
 tillery of the enemy prevailing over the impetu-
 ous but disorderly assaults and deadly aim of the
 mountaineers; but towards nightfall the bridge
 of the Sill was carried after a desperate struggle,
 and their left flank being thus turned, the French
 and Bavarians gave way on all sides, and were
 pursued with great slaughter into the town. The
 Bavarians lost six thousand men, of whom sev-
 enteen hundred wounded fell into the hands of the
 Tyrolese, while on the side of the latter not more
 than nine hundred had fallen.*

This great victory was immediately followed
 by the liberation of the whole Tyrol. Lefebvre
 fell back across the Inn on the day after the battle, and, evacu-
 ating Innsbruck, retreated rapidly to
 Kuistein, and from thence to Salz-
 burg, where his whole army was collected on the
 20th. Spechbacher followed them with a large
 body of peasants, and destroyed a considerable
 part of the rear-guard at Schwartz, while Hofer
 made his triumphant entry into Innsbruck, and
 took up his residence in the imperial castle,
 where his presence was very necessary to check
 the disorders consequent on the irruption of so
 large a body of tumultuous patriots into an opu-
 lent city. The entire command of the country
 was now assumed by this chief; proclamations
 were issued and coins struck in his name, as
 commander-in-chief of the Tyrol; and the whole

Hofer's deliv-
 erance and
 government of
 Tyrol.
 August 15.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 361, 367. Barth., 324, 330. Pel., iv., 358.
 † Gesch. A. Hofer, 566, 567. Barth., 330, 334.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 372, 376. Barth., 336, 342. Pel.
 iv., 358.

civil and military preparations submitted to his directions. While exercising these exalted functions, however, he still retained the simplicity of his rustic dress and manners: he wore nothing but his country jerkin and clouted shoes; his long beard was retained, but his broad-brimmed hat was exchanged for one with a plume and inscription to him as the commander-in-chief of Tyrol, the gift of the holy sisterhood of Innsbruck. It soon appeared, however, that their renowned chief was not qualified for the duties of government: he interfered in an irregular and capricious way, though from pure motives, with the administration of justice, and was more occupied with terminating the private quarrels of his countrymen than warding off their public dangers. Among other attempts, he spent much time in endeavouring to reconcile the disputes of married persons, an undertaking which gave him ample employment. Meanwhile, Ersenstecken and Sieberer, who had both distinguished themselves in the commencement of the war, but subsequently retired with the Austrian troops, returned to their countrymen to share at all hazards their fate: the former bore a gold medal and chain, which were presented to Hofer by the Emperor of Austria, with which he was formally invested in the great Church of Innsbruck, at the foot of the tomb of Maximilian, by the Abbot of Wilten, amid the tears and acclamations of a vast concourse of spectators; while two deputies, Müller and Schonecher, who contrived to elude the vigilance of the French sentinels who surrounded the country, and made their way to England to implore the aid of the British government, were received with heartfelt kindness by all classes, and filled the nation, and through it the world, with unbounded admiration for their heroic exploits.*

But darker days were approaching, and the Tyrolese war was destined to add another to the numerous proofs which history affords, that no amount, how great soever, of patriotism, and no prodigies, how marvellous soever, of valour, not even when aided by the enthusiasm of religion and the strength of mountains, can successfully maintain a protracted resistance against a numerous and well-conducted enemy, if destitute of the organization and support of a regular government. Popular enthusiasm, often irresistible in the outset, and while the general effervescence lasts, is incapable of the steady and enduring efforts necessary in combating the forces of an established monarchy. Like the French Vendéans, or the Scotch Highlanders in 1745, the Tyrolese for the most part returned home after the victory of Innsbruck: in their simplicity they thought the contest was over, now that the invaders were again chased from the valley of the Inn; and thus the frontier passes were left guarded only by a few hundred men wholly inadequate to protect them from the incursions of the enemy. Meanwhile, Napoleon, now thoroughly roused, and justly apprehensive of the fatal blow which the continued independence of this mountainous district, in the midst of his dominions, would inflict on his power, was preparing such immense forces for a renewed attack on the country as rendered its subjugation a matter of certainty. In the south, General Peyri, at the head of ten thousand men, received orders to advance from Verona, and make himself master of

Trent at all hazards; Rusca was intrusted with the command of three divisions, eighteen thousand strong, who were to enter the Pusterthal from Villach and Carinthia; while three Bavarian divisions, under Drouet, mustering twenty thousand veterans, were to break in by the pass of Strubs and the Salzburg frontier. These immense forces were the more to be dreaded from their arriving simultaneously in the country at the very moment when all hearts were frozen by the intelligence of the conclusion of a treaty of peace by Austria, in which the Tyrol was abandoned,* and when the first appearance of winter snows was driving the peasants and their herds from the elevated pastures in the mountains to the lower valleys, in which they might be easily reached by the invading columns.

Under such difficult and disheartening circumstances, it was hardly to be expected, and certainly not wished, that the resistance of the Tyrolese should be farther protracted; but such was the unconquerable spirit of the people, that for three months longer they continued obstinately to contend for their independence. Their frontiers were, in the first instance, forced on all sides: Peyri defeated a body of Tyrolese and Austrians at Ampezzo on the Adige, and, after making himself master of Trent and Roveredo, advanced to the celebrated positions of Lavis, from whence the peasants were driven with great loss. On the northern and eastern frontiers affairs were equally discouraging. Spechbacher, who occupied the important pass of Strubs, the only entrance from the Salzburg territory, with a few hundred peasants, was unexpectedly attacked at daybreak on the 18th of October, and defeated with considerable loss; and, what to him was a heart-rending misfortune, his little son Andrew, a boy of eleven years of age, who had escaped from his place of seclusion in the mountains to join his father in the field, was made prisoner, fighting by his side.† Spechbacher himself was struck down, desperately wounded, and only made his escape by the assistance of his brave friends, who, fighting the whole way, carried him up the almost inaccessible cliffs on the side of the pass, where the Bavarian soldiers could not follow them. The invaders now inundated the valley of the Inn: Hofer, almost deserted by his followers, was unable to maintain himself at Innsbruck, but retiring to Mount Isel, the scene of his former victories, still maintained, with mournful resolution, the standard of independence.‡

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 405, 408. Thib., vii., 410. Pel., iv., 480.

† Spechbacher was struck down by repeated blows with the butt-end of a musket, and, when he regained his feet, he found his little son had been carried off from his side. Wounded and bleeding as he was, he no sooner discovered his loss than he called on his followers to return to the rescue; but, for the first time in the war, they refused to follow him. Little Andrew was told his father was dead, and, to convince him that he was so, the Bavarian soldiers produced his sabre and some part of his dress, all bloody, which had been lost in the struggle. On seeing them, he wept bitterly, but soon regained his composure, and marched in sullen silence with his fellow-prisoners. At Munich, he was presented to the king, who treated him with much kindness, and placed him in the royal seminary. In after times, and under happier auspices, this heroic family were reunited, under their much-loved emperor's sway.—See BARTHOLDY *der Krieg der Tyroler Landleute im Jahre, 1809, Berlin, 1814*, p. 378, 379.

‡ Gesch. A. Hofer, 409, 416. Barth., 374, 380.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 376, 405. Barth., 346, 360.

Eugene Beauharnois, who was intrusted with the direction of all the invading columns, now issued a proclamation from Villach, in which, after announcing the conclusion of peace between France and Austria, he called on the people to submit, and offered them, on that condition, an unconditional amnesty for the past. At the same time, the Arch-
 Oct. 25. duke John, in a proclamation, strongly counselled them to relinquish the contest, and with a heavy heart announced that no farther aid or countenance could be given by the Aus-
 Oct. 21. trian government. In these circumstan-ces, Hofer had no course left but that of submission: he withdrew to Steinach, from whence he wrote to General Drouet, offering to make
 Oct. 29. peace; and a few days after issued a proclamation, in which he counselled the people, as peace had been concluded, to lay down
 Nov. 8. their arms, and trust "to the greatness of soul of Napoleon for pardon and oblivion of the past, whose footsteps were guided by a power of a superior order, which it was no longer per-
 Nov. 15. mitted them to resist." But in a few days after, finding that the inhabitants of his beloved valley were still in arms, and that farther resistance was resolved on, he issued another proclamation, in which he ascribed his former intention to the advice of evil counsellors, and called on the people "still to fight in defence of your native country: I shall fight with you, and for you, as a father for his children." War was then resumed at all points, but the forces brought from all sides against the Tyrol were so immense, that no hope remained to the inhabitants but to throw, by deeds of glory, a last radiance around their fall.*

Rusca and Baraguay d'Hilliers entered the Pusterthal from Carinthia with twenty thousand men in the beginning
 Last invasion of Tyrol, and by desperate resistance.
 Nov. 8. overwhelming a force, the Tyrolese fell back, fighting all the way, to the Mulbach-clause, which they made good for two days with the most determined bravery, and were
 Nov. 9. only compelled to evacuate on the third, from their position being turned by a circuitous path through the mountains. All the principal valleys were now inundated by French troops; Brixen was occupied: and the
 Nov. 6. Bavarians from Innspruck having surmounted the Brenner with little opposition, the victorious columns united at Sterzing, and, with fifteen thousand men, threatened the Passeyrthal from the eastward; while an equal force, under Peyri, followed the banks of the Adige and approached the only remaining district in arms by the southern side. Thus the insurrection was at last cooped up within very narrow limits, and, in fact, confined to Hofer's native valley. But, though assailed by forces so immense, and driven by the snow in the higher grounds down to the banks of the Adige, the peasants still showed an undaunted front; and Rusca, having incau-
 Nov. 14. tiously advanced to the old castle of Tyrol, and dispersed part of his forces to obtain the delivery of arms from the inhabitants, he was attacked by Haspinger, aided by Thalgueter and Torggler, two rustic leaders, and totally defeated, with the loss of six hundred killed and wounded, and seventeen hundred prisoners. Thalgueter fell

in this action, in the very moment he was taking an eagle from the enemy.*

This unexpected success again set the whole neighbouring valleys in a flame; but the storms of winter having set in, and the mountains become covered with their snowy mantle, want of provisions compelled the inhabitants to submit. The natives of those elevated regions, who maintain themselves by the produce of the dairy or the sale of their manufactures, were ruined by the exactions of the contending armies, and beheld with despair their families threatened with famine by the burning of their houses by the French soldiers, and stoppage of the wanted supplies of grain from the Italian plains. Before the middle of December, almost all the chiefs had taken advantage of an amnesty, pressed with generous earnestness upon the people by Eugene Beauharnois and Baraguay d'Hilliers, and joined a large party of Tyrolese emigrants at Waradein, while the peasants, in sullen grief, returned to their homes.†

Moved with the respect of true soldiers for a gallant adversary, both these brave generals were unwearied in their efforts to induce Hofer to submit, and they would have done anything to extricate him from his perilous situation. But, though grievously depressed and perplexed, he refused to accompany his friends in their flight, or humble himself by submission to the conquerors. Retiring to his native valley, he long eluded the search of the victors. His place of concealment was a solitary alpine hut, four leagues distant from his home, in general inaccessible from the snow which surrounded it. In that deep solitude he was furnished, by stealth, with provisions by a few faithful followers, and more than once visited by secret messengers from the Emperor of Austria, who in vain used every entreaty to induce him to abandon the Tyrol, and accept an asylum in the imperial dominions. But Hofer steadily refused all their offers, declaring his resolution to be fixed never to abandon his country or family. He even resisted all their entreaties to shave his beard, or use any disguise which might prevent his person from being known to the enemy. At length he was seized by a French force of sixteen hundred men, led by Donay, once his intimate friend, whom the magnitude of the reward induced to betray his benefactor. Two thousand more were in readiness to support them; the column set out at midnight, and, after marching four leagues over ice and snow, surrounded the hut at five in the morning on the 5th of January. No sooner did Hofer hear the voice of the officer inquiring for him than he quietly came to the door and delivered himself up. He was immediately bound, and marched down his beloved valley, amid the tears of the inhabitants and the shouts of the French soldiers, to Bolsano, and thence by Trent to Mantua.‡

On his journey, he was treated by the French officers, and particularly General Baraguay d'Hilliers, with the kindness which true valour ever pays to misfortune, and which, in his case, was well deserved by the efforts he had uniformly made to protect the French prisoners who fell into his

His trial and condemnation.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 424, 436. Barth., 382, 384. Thib., vii., 411.

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 436, 444. Barth., 384, 386.

† Gesch. A. Hofer, 436, 452. Barth., 385, 390. Thib., vii., 412.

‡ Gesch. A. Hofer, 446, 450. Barth., 396, 400.

hands. On his arrival at Mantua, a court-martial was immediately summoned, with General Bison, the governor of the fortress, whom he had formerly vanquished, at its head, to try him for combating against the French after the last proclamation of Eugene Beauharnois offering a general amnesty. The proceedings were very short, as the facts charged were at once admitted by the accused; but, notwithstanding this, a very great difference of opinion prevailed as to the punishment to be inflicted. A majority were for confinement: two had the courage to vote for his entire deliverance; but a telegraphic despatch from Milan decided the question by ordering his death within twenty-four hours, thus putting it out of the power of Austria to interfere. He received his sentence with unshaken firmness, though he had no idea previously that his life was endangered; and only requested that he might be attended by a confessor, which was immediately complied with. By this priest, Manifesti, who never quitted him till his death, he transmitted his last adieus to his family, and everything he possessed to be delivered to his countrymen, consisting of five hundred florins in Austrian bank-notes, his silver snuff-box, and beautiful rosary, which he had constantly carried about with him. In the intervals of religious duty, he conversed eagerly about the Tyrolese war, expressing always his firm conviction that, sooner or later, his countrymen would be reunited to the Austrian government.*

On the following morning he was led out to execution. As he passed by the barracks on the Porta Molina, where the Tyrolese prisoners were confined, they fell on their knees and wept aloud; those who were near enough to approach his escort, threw themselves on the ground and implored his blessing. This he freely gave them, requesting their forgiveness for the misfortunes in which he had involved their country, and assuring them that he felt confident they would ere long return under the dominion of their beloved emperor, to whom he cried out the last "Vivat!" with a clear and steady voice. On the broad bastion, a little distance from the Porta Ceresa, the grenadiers formed a square, open in the rear, while twelve men and a corporal stood forth with loaded pieces. A drummer offered Hofer a white handkerchief to bandage his eyes, and requested him to kneel; but this he refused, saying "that he was used to stand upright before his Creator, and in that posture he would deliver up his spirit to him." Having then presented the corporal who commanded the detachment with his whole remaining property, consisting of twenty kreutzers, and uttered a few words expressive of attachment to his sovereign and country, he faced the guard, and with a loud voice pronounced the word "Fire!" On the first discharge he sunk only on one knee: a merciful shot, however, at length despatched him.†

No event in the history of Napoleon has cast a darker stain on his memory than this ungenerous slaughter of a brave and heroic antagonist. Admitting that the unutterable miseries of civil war sometimes render it indispensable for the laws of all countries to punish even the most elevated virtue, when enlisted on the side which ultimately is vanquished, with death, it can hardly be said

that the resistance of the Tyrolese to the Bavarian yoke partook of that character. It was truly a national contest: the object in view was not to rise up in rebellion against a constituted government, but to restore a long-lost province to the Austrian monarchy. The people had been forcibly transferred, only a few years before, against their will, from the paternal sway of their beloved emperor to the rude oppression of a foreign throne; the dominion of four years could not obliterate the recollections of four centuries. In that very war, Napoleon had himself issued a proclamation calling upon the Hungarians to throw off their allegiance to Austria, and reassert, after its extinction for centuries, their national independence.* Hofer had never sworn allegiance to the French emperor; he had never held office under his government, nor tasted of his bounty; yet what invectives have Napoleon and his panegyrists heaped upon the Bourbons in 1815, for visiting with severity the defection of the leaders of the French army, during the hundred days, who had done both! If Ney was murdered because, after swearing to bring back Napoleon in an iron cage, vanquished by old recollections, he gave the example, himself a marshal at the head of an army, of deserting the sovereign who had elevated him to its command; what are we to say of Hofer, a simple mountaineer, who, without employment or command under Bavaria, merely strove to restore his country to the recollections and the ties of four centuries? Even if his life had been clearly forfeited by the laws of war, a generous foe, won by his bravery, penetrated with his devotion, would only have seen in that circumstance an additional reason for sealing the glories of Wagram by an act of mercy, which would have won every noble bosom to his cause. But, though not destitute of humane emotions, Napoleon was steel-ed against every sentiment which had the semblance even of militating against reasons of state policy; and such was the force of his selfish feelings, that he was actuated by an indelible rancour towards all who in any degree thwarted his ambition. The execution of Hofer was the work of the same spirit which, carrying its hostility beyond the grave, bequeathed a legacy to the assassin who had attempted the life of Wellington.

Peter Mayer, having been tried at Botzen, was also shot, and behaved with equal heroism in his last moments. Haspinger and pinger, who put no faith either in the promises of pardon held out by Eugene or the visions of celestial succour declared by Kolb, a fanatic, who was mainly instrumental in exciting the last unhappy insurrection, succeeded, after a very long time, in escaping into Switzerland, by the way of St. Gall and Einsiedlen, in the dress of a monk, from whence he succeeded, by cross paths through Friuli and Carinthia, in reaching Vienna, where he received protection from the emperor. Spechbacher, after the unfor-

* "Hungarians! the moment has arrived to claim your independence. I offer you peace, the integrity of your territory, of your liberty, and constitutions. Your alliance with Austria has been the cause of all your misfortunes: you form the largest portion of its empire, and yet your dearest interests have always been sacrificed to the interests of the hereditary states. Resume, then, your rank as an independent nation; choose a king who may permanently reside among you, who may be surrounded only by your citizens and soldiers. Hungarians! this is what Europe demands, what I offer you."—*NAPOLEON'S Proclamation to the Hungarians, Vienna, 13th of May, 1809; SCHÖELL, Hist. des Trait., ix., 245.*

* Gesch. A. Hofer, 446, 451. Barth., 396.

† Gesch. A. Hofer, 453, 456. Inglis's Tyrol, ii., 223, 224.

fortunate action at the pass of Strubs, where his son Andrew was made prisoner, was actively pursued by the Bavarians, who set a large price upon his head, and he was frequently obliged to shift his place of concealment to avoid discovery. He was at one time surrounded in a house by a party of Bavarian soldiers, who had been led to his retreat by a faithless wretch; but he escaped upon the roof, and, leaping thence, made his way into an adjoining forest, where he was secreted nearly a month, and endured the utmost pangs of hunger. Wandering in this manner, he by accident met his wife and infant children, like him flying from persecution and death, and perishing of want and cold. They at length obtained a refuge in the house of a generous peasant, in the village of Volderberg, where they were concealed together several weeks; but his retreat having been discovered, Spechbacher was obliged to fly to the higher mountains, where, on one of the summits of the Eisgletscherr, in a cavern discovered by him in former times when pursuing the chamois, he lay for several weeks in the depth of winter, supported by salt provisions, eaten raw, lest the smoke of a fire should betray his place of concealment to his pursuers.*

Happening one day, in the beginning of March, to walk to the entrance for a few minutes to enjoy the ascending sun, an avalanche, descending from the summit of the mountain above, swept him along with it down to the distance of half a mile on the slope beneath, and dislocated his hipbone in the fall. Unable now to stand, surrounded only by ice and snow, tracked on every side by ruthless pursuers, his situation was, to all appearance, desperate; but even then the unconquerable energy of his mind and incorruptible fidelity of his friends saved him from destruction. Summoning up all his courage, he contrived to drag himself along the snow for several leagues, during the night, to the village of Volderberg, where, to avoid discovery, he crept into the stable. His faithful friend gave him a kind reception, and carried him on his back to Rinn, where his wife and children were, and where his devoted domestic, George Zoppel, concealed him in a hole in the cowhouse beneath where the cattle stood, though beyond the reach of their feet, where he was covered up with cow-dung and fodder, and remained for two months, till his leg was set and he was able to walk. The town was full of Bavarian troops; but this extraordinary place of concealment was never discovered, even when the Bavarian dragoons, as was frequently the case, were in the stable looking after their horses. Zoppel did not even inform Spechbacher's wife of her husband's return, lest her emotion or visits to the place might betray his place of concealment. At length, in the beginning of May, the Bavarian soldiers having left the house, Spechbacher was lifted from his living grave and restored to his wife and children. As soon as he was able to walk, he set out; and, journeying chiefly in the night, through the wildest and most secluded Alps, by Dux and the sources of the Salza, he passed the Styrian Alps, where he crossed the frontier and reached Vienna in safety. There he was soon afterwards joined by his wife and children; and the emperor's bounty provided both for them and Hofer's orphan family, with not undeserved munificence, till, on the restoration of the Tyrol to the house

of Hapsburg, they returned to their native valleys, and Spechbacher died at Hall, in 1830, of a weakness in the chest, brought on by these unparalleled hardships. Little Andrew, then a man, who had been kindly treated at the court of Munich, was promoted to an official situation in Tyrol, under the Austrian government; but the widow and children of Hofer remained under their father's roof in the valley of Passeyr.*

Touching as is this record of simple virtue in the mountaineers of Tyrol, another event of still more surpassing interest, of yet more momentous consequences, occurred in this eventful year. This was the dethronement and imprisonment of the pope, and the annexation of the patrimony of St. Peter and of the eternal city to the French Empire.

When Pius VI., contrary to the usage of his predecessors, agreed to leave the Quirinal Hill and cross the Alps in the depth of winter to place the crown on the brows of the French emperor, he naturally expected that some great and durable benefit would accrue to himself and his successors from the unwonted act of condescension. The flattering reception which he met with at Paris, the delicate attentions of all the functionaries of the imperial palace, and the marked regard of the emperor himself, confirmed these flattering illusions; and the papal suite returned into Italy charmed with their visit, and never doubting that, at the very least, the restoration of the three legations in Romagna, torn from the Holy See by the treaty of Tolentino in 1797, might with confidence be relied on.† M. Fontanes, the orator of government, had enlarged, in eloquent and touching terms, on the magnificent spectacle afforded by the reconversion of the first of European states to the Christian and Catholic faith. "When the conqueror of Marengo," said he, "conceived on the field of battle the design of re-establishing the unity of religion, and restoring to the French their ancient worship, he rescued civilization from impending ruin. Day forever memorable! dear alike to the wisdom of the statesman and the faith of the Christian. It was then that France, abjuring the greatest errors, gave the most useful lesson to the world. She recognised the eternal truth that irreligious ideas are impolitic, and that every attempt against Christianity is a stroke levelled at the best interests of humanity. Universal homage is due to the august pontiff, who, renewing the virtues of the apostolic age, has consecrated the new destinies of the French Empire, and clothed it with the lustre of the days of Clovis and Pepin. Everything has changed around the Catholic faith, but it remains the same! It beholds the rise and fall of empires, but amid their ruins, equally as their grandeur, it sees the working out of the Divine administration. Never did the universe witness such a spectacle as is now exhibited: the days are past when the Empire and the papacy were rival powers: cordially united, they now go hand in hand to arrest the fatal doctrines which have menaced Europe with a total subversion: may they yield to the combined influence of religion and wisdom!"‡

It is not surprising that such a reception from

* Barth., 438, 474. Ingli's Tyrol, ii., 227, 236.

† *Ante*, i., 422.

‡ Artaud, *Hist. de Pio VII.*, i., 500 and 504.

* Barth., 438, 450. Ingli's Tyrol, ii., 227, 230.

Affairs of the Holy See.

Original causes of discontent on the part of the pope at Napoleon.

Dazzling reception of the pope at Paris in 1805.

the conqueror who had filled the world with his renown, and such a prospect of reconverting to its pristine faith the first of the European monarchies, should have dazzled the eyes not only of the pope, but of the whole conclave; but amid the universal illusion it did not escape, even at that time, the observation of some of the able statesmen who directed the cabinet of Rome, that, flattering as these attentions and expressions were, they were all general, and bore reference only to the *spiritual* extension of the papal sway. Ardently as some temporal advantages were desired, both the emperor and his diplomatists had carefully avoided holding out any distinct pledge, even the most indirect, of such concessions. Of this a painful proof was soon afforded.*

Shortly after his return, however, Pius VII. transmitted a memorial to Napoleon, in which he enumerated the losses which the Holy See had sustained from the French government during the progress of the war, and strongly urged him

The pope's request for the restitution of the three Marches is refused, Feb. 21, 1805. March 11.

to imitate the example of Charlemagne, and restore all their possessions. "It was no part of the system of Napoleon to permit the imperial eagles to recede from any territory which they had once occupied, and in a careful answer drawn by the emperor himself, while he expressed boundless anxiety for the spiritual exaltation of the Holy See, and even admitted a desire, if "the occasion should offer," to augment his temporal advantages; yet he distinctly announced "that this must not be expected from any interference with existing arrangements, or diminution of the territory of the kingdom of Italy, to which these acquisitions had been annexed." Repeated attempts were afterward made by the papal government to obtain some relaxation or concession in this particular, but they were always either eluded or met by a direct refusal.†

Still more decisive events speedily demonstrated that, amid all Napoleon's professions of regard, which he really felt, for the spiritual authority of the successors of St. Peter, he had no intention of adding to their territorial influence, or of treating them in any other way than as his own vassals, who, in every part of their temporal administration, were to take the law from the cabinet of the Tuileries. In October, 1805, during the course of the Austrian war, the French troops seized upon Ancona, the most important fortress in the ecclesiastical dominions; and the remonstrances of the pope against this violent invasion were not only entirely disregarded, but Napoleon, in reply, openly asserted the principle that he was Emperor of Rome, and the pope was only his viceroy.‡ The haughty and disdainful terms of this letter, and the open announcement of an undisguised sovereignty over the Roman States, first opened the eyes of the benevolent pontiff to the real intentions of

Farther encroachments of France on the Holy See.

Nov. 13, 1805.

Feb. 13, 1806.

* Artaud, ii., 252, 253.

† Pope Pius VII. to Nap., Feb. 21, and Nap. to Pius VII., March 11, 1805. Artaud, ii., 25, 33.

‡ "All Italy must be subjected to my law: your situation requires that you should pay me the same respect in temporal which I do you in spiritual matters. Your holiness must cease to have any delicacy towards my enemies and those of the Church. You are sovereign of Rome, but I am its emperor: all my enemies must be its enemies; no Sardinian, English, Russian, or Swedish envoy can be permitted to reside at your capital."—NAPOLEON TO PIUS VII., 13th Feb., 1806; ARTAUD, ii., 113-118; BIGNON, vii., 137.

the French emperor: he returned an intrepid answer to the conqueror of Austerlitz, that he recognised no earthly potentate as his superior, and from that hour may be dated the hostility which grew up between them.* Napoleon, so far from relaxing in any of his demands, was only the more aroused, by this unexpected opposition, to increased exactions from the Holy See: his troops spread over the whole papal territory; Rome itself was surrounded by his battalions; and, within half a mile of the Quirinal palace, preparations were openly made for the siege of Gaeta.†

Pius VII., however, was unshaken in his determination. "If they choose," said he to M. Alquier, the French envoy, "to seize upon Rome, we shall make no resistance, but we shall refuse them the entry to the castle of St. Angelo. All the important points of our territory have been successively occupied by their troops, and the collectors of our taxes can no longer levy any imposts in the greater part of our territory to provide for the contributions which have been imposed. We will make no resistance, but your soldiers will require to break open the gates with cannon-shot. Europe shall see how we are treated, and we shall at least prove that we have acted in conformity to our honour and our conscience. If they take away our life, the tomb will do us honour, and we shall be justified in the eyes of God and man."‡

The French minister soon after intimated that, if the pope continued on any terms with the enemies of France, the emperor would be under the necessity of detaching the Duchy of Urbino, the March of Ancona, and the seacoast of Civita Vecchia, from the ecclesiastical territories; but that he would greatly prefer remaining on amicable terms with his holiness; and with that view he proposed, as the basis of a definitive arrangement between the two governments: 1. "That the ports of his holiness should be closed to the British flag on all occasions when England was at war with France: 2. That the papal fortresses should be occupied by the French troops on all occasions when a foreign land-force is debarked on, or menaces the coasts of Italy." To these proposals, which amounted to a complete surrender of the shadow even of independence, the pope returned a respectful but firm refusal, which concluded with these words: "His majesty may, whenever he pleases, execute his menaces, and take from us whatever we possess. We are resigned to everything, and shall never be so rash as to attempt resistance. Should he desire it, we shall instantly retire to a convent, or the catacombs of Rome, like the first successors of St. Peter; but think not, as long as we are intrusted with the responsibility of power, to make us, by menaces, violate its duties."

* "Your majesty," said Pius VII., "lays it down as a fundamental principle, that you are sovereign of Rome: the supreme pontiff recognises no such authority, nor any power superior in temporal matters to his own. There is no Emperor of Rome: it was not thus that Charlemagne treated our predecessors. The demand to dismiss the envoys of Russia, England, and Sweden, is positively refused; the father of the faithful is bound to remain at peace with all, without distinction of Catholics or heretics."—PIUS VII. TO NAPOLEON, 12th March, 1806; ARTAUD, ii., 121, 128.

† Artaud, ii., 141. Bign., vii., 137.

‡ M. Alquier's Letter, June 13, 1806. Artaud, ii., 141; 142, and Bign., vii., 137, 148.

§ Artaud, ii., 147, 151. Bign., vii., 151.

The overwhelming interest of the campaign of Jena and Eylau for a time suspended the attention of Napoleon from the affairs of Italy; but no sooner was he relieved, by the peace of Tilsit, from the weight of the Russian war, than he renewed his attempts to break down the resistance of the ecclesiastical government, and was peculiarly indignant at some hints which he had heard that the pope, if driven to extremities, might possibly launch against his head the thunders of the Vatican. A fresh negotiation was, nevertheless, opened: Napoleon insisting that the court of Rome should rigidly enforce the

Berlin and Milan decrees in its dominions, shut the ports against the English flag, permit and maintain a permanent French garrison at Ancona, and allow the march of French columns through their territories. The pope expressed his readiness to accede to these propositions, and submit to their immediate execution, except the actual declaration of war against England. But the emperor had other designs, and mere adherence to the Continental system was far from being now sufficient. On the 2d of February a large body of

French troops entered Rome, which ever after continued to be occupied by their battalions. The formidable military force with which he was surrounded had no effect in subduing the courage of the intrepid pontiff. Calling in M. Alquier on the day of their arrival, he thus addressed him: "The emperor insists on everything or nothing: you know to what articles proposed I will consent: I cannot subscribe the others. There shall be no military resistance: I will retire into the castle of St. Angelo; * not a shot shall be fired; but the emperor will find it necessary to break its gates. I will place myself at the entry; the troops will require to pass over my body; and the universe will know that he has trampled under foot him whom the Almighty has anointed. God will do the rest."†

Insults and injuries continued to be heaped upon the head of the devoted pontiff. The French troops did not, indeed, blow open the gates of the Quirinal palace, but the entire government of his dominions was taken from him. Soon after, the papal government of Rome, an intrepid man, Signor Cavalcini, was seized and carried off by the French troops, and the military government of the capital was confided to the imperial General Miollis; the papal troops were informed, in a letter from Eugene Beauharnois, that he "congratulated them upon their emancipation from the rule of priests; that the Italian soldiers are now com-

manded by men who can lead them into fire; and that they are no longer obliged to receive the commands of women or monks." Champagne officially intimated to the papal government "that the French troops would remain at Rome until the holy father had consented to join the general league, offensive and defensive, with Napoleon and the King of Naples;" while, by an imperial decree shortly after, the provinces of Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and Camerino, about a third of the ecclesiastical territories, were declared to be irrevocably united to the kingdom of Italy.*

Violent as these aggressions were, they were but the prelude to others still more serious. The pope was confined a prisoner to his own palace. French guards occupied all parts of the capital; the administration of posts, the control of the press, were assumed by their authorities; the taxes were levied for their behoof, and those imposed by the papal government of its own authority annulled; the papal troops were incorporated with the French, and the Roman officers dismissed. The pontiff continued, under these multiplied injuries, to evince the same patience and resignation: firmly protesting, both to Napoleon and the other European powers, against these usurpations, but making no attempt to resist them, and sedulously enjoining both his clergy and people to obey the intruded authority without opposition. CARDINAL PACCA, who was appointed secretary of state on the 18th of June, was a prelate of powerful abilities, and that intrepid but discerning character, which, disdaining all minor methods of resistance, aimed at bringing the great contest between the throne and the tiara at once to an issue on the most advantageous ground. He became, on this account, in an especial manner obnoxious to the emperor; and, an attempt having been made by the French officers to carry him off and banish him from Rome, to detach the pope from his energetic and manly councils, his holiness, with great expressions of indignation, took him into his own apartments. They were more successful, however, in their attempt on Cardinal Antonelli, who was on the same day arrested by a sergeant and eight grenadiers, and instantly sent out of the ecclesiastical territories; while a cordon of sentinels was stationed round the Quirinal, and no one allowed to pass out or in without being strictly examined. The head of the faithful was no longer anything but a prisoner in his own palace; but all Napoleon's efforts to overcome his constancy were unavailing. More courageous and better advised than the Bourbon princes of Spain, the venerable pontiff remained proof alike against the menaces and the wiles of the imperial authorities: no resignation could be extorted from him; and, without ever crossing the threshold of his apartments, he calmly awaited the decree which was to consign him to destruction.†

The last act of violence at length arrived. On the 17th of May, a decree was issued from the French camp at Schoenbrunn, which declared "that the states of the pope are united to the French Empire; the city of Rome, so interesting from its recollections, Napoleon.

Entire assumption of the government by the French. April 2. March 16.

* Letter of M. Alquier, Jan. 29, 1808. Bign., vii., 176. Artaud, ii., 178, 180.

† "What," said Napoleon, in a confidential letter to Eugene Beauharnois at that period, "does Pius VII. mean by his threats of denouncing me to Christendom? Does he mean to excommunicate me? Does he suppose the arms will fall from the hands of my soldiers? Would he put a poniard in the hands of my people to murder me? The pope has taken the trouble to come to Paris to crown me: in that step I recognise the spirit of a true prelate; but he expected, in return, to get the three legations from the kingdom of Italy; but that I would not consent to. The pope at present is too powerful: priests are not made to govern. The rights of the tiara consist only in humiliation and prayer. I hold my crown from God and my people; I will always be Charlemagne to the court of Rome, and never Louis the Debonnaire. Jesus Christ has not instituted a pilgrimage to Rome as Mohammed has to Mecca."—Confidential Letter, NAPOLEON to EUGENE, 22d July, 1807; ARTAUD, ii., 166, 167; and BIGNON, vii., 159, 160.

* Bign., vii., 179, 179. Artaud, ii., 179, 182.

† Cardinal Pacca, i., 347, 351. Artaud ii., 196, 202. Bign., vii., 183, 189.

and the first seat of Christianity, is declared an imperial and free city;" and that these changes should take effect on the 1st of June following.

On the 10th of June these decrees were announced by the discharge of artillery from the castle of St. Angelo, and the hoisting of the tricolour flag on its walls instead of the venerable pontifical standard. "Consummatus est!" exclaimed Cardinal Pacca and the pope at the same instant; and immediately, having obtained a copy of the decree, which the dethroned pontiff read with calmness, he authorized the publication of a BULL of EXCOMMUNICATION against Napoleon and all concerned in that spoliation, which, in anticipation of such an event, had been some time before prepared by the secret council of the Vatican. Early on the following morning this bull was affixed on all the usual places, particularly on the churches of St. Peter's, Santa Maria Maggiore, and St. John, with such secrecy as to be without the knowledge or suspicion of the police. It was torn down as soon as discovered and taken to General Miollis, who forthwith forwarded it to the emperor at his camp at Vienna. The pope expressed great anxiety that care should be taken to conceal the persons engaged in printing and affixing on the churches this bull, as certain death awaited them if they were discovered by the French authorities; but he had no fears whatever for himself. On the contrary, he not only signed it with his name, but had transcribed the whole document, which was of great length, with his own hand, lest any other person should be involved, by the handwriting, in the vengeance of the French emperor.*

Napoleon was not prepared for so vigorous an act on the part of the council of the Vatican. He received accounts of it at Vienna, shortly before the battle of Wagram, and immediately resolved on the most decisive measures. For long he had meditated the transference of the seat of the popedom to Paris, and the acquisition to his authority of the immense influence to be derived from a personal control over the head of the Church. He had been much struck by an expression of the Emperor Alexander at Erfurth: "I experience no difficulty in affairs of religion: I am the head of my own church."† Deeming it impossible, however, in modern Europe, to accomplish such a union directly, or place the pontifical tiara openly on the same brows as the emperor's crown, he conceived the design of accomplishing the object indirectly by procuring the transference of the residence of the pope to Paris, and the incorporation of all his possessions with the imperial dominions; so that, both by reason of local position and entire dependance for income, he should be under the influence of the French emperor. By this policy, which, in his view, was truly a master-stroke, he hoped to do more than could have been accomplished by the entire extinction of the papal authority. He did not intend the destruction of a rival power, but the addition of its influence to himself; while the

annexation of the ecclesiastical states to the French Empire, in effect, rendered its sway irresistible over all parts of the Italian Peninsula.*

Accidental circumstances, however, precipitated matters more quickly than Napoleon intended, and gave him possession of the person of the pope. July 5. within a few days after the publication of the bull of excommunication. Measures of the last severity had been taken in vain: the palace of the Quirinal was surrounded with soldiers, a battery of forty pieces of cannon was established directly opposite its gates; but still the spirit of the illustrious captives was unsubdued, and no indication of a disposition to recall the fulminating decree had appeared. Miollis deemed the state of matters so alarming in the beginning of July, that he entered into communication with Murat at Naples, and their united opinion was, that it was indispensable to get immediate possession of the pope's person, and remove him into France. In pursuance of this determination, which, though not expressly known to or authorized by the emperor, was doubtless in conformity with his prior instructions, and known to be agreeable to his wishes, Miollis sent for General Radet on the 4th of July, and communicated to him his design of carrying off the pope, and intrusting the execution of the delicate task to him. Radet, albeit horror-struck with the task thus imposed on him, knew his duty too well to hesitate in obeying his instructions: a strong battalion of troops arrived on the following day from Naples, and the military dispositions were quickly completed. At ten at night on the 5th, the Quirinal was surrounded by three regiments; thirty men ascended the walls of the garden in profound silence, and took post under the windows of the palace; fifty more succeeded in effecting an entrance by the window of an uninhabited room, and, having dispersed some groups of domestics, who, on the first alarm, hastily assembled together, the gates were thrown open, and Radet entered at the head of his troops, who were ordered "to arrest the pope and Cardinal Pacca, and conduct them immediately out of Rome."†

Though the assembly of the troops took place on the preceding night, it was not till six o'clock on the following morning that the entry of the palace itself took place. The pope and Cardinal Pacca were awakened by the strokes of the hatchets which broke down the interior doors, and both instantly rising, perceived, from the tumult in the court, glitter of arms, and troops in all quarters, that the French had effected an entrance into the palace. The holy father expected immediate death: he called for the ring which his predecessor Pius VI. had worn when dying, the gift

of his person. Paris would have become the capital of the Christian world; I would have directed the religious world as well as the political. It was an additional means of uniting all the parts of the Empire, and keeping in peace whatever was beyond it. I would have had my religious sessions as well as legislative; my council would have been the assembly of the representatives of Christianity; the popes would have been nothing but its presidents: I would have opened and closed these assemblies, approved and published their decisions, as Constantine and Charlemagne did. That emancipation of the Church from the court of Rome, that union of the spiritual and temporal powers in the hands of one sovereign, had been long the object of my meditations and wishes.—LAS CASAS, v., 262, 264.

* Cardinal Pacca, ii., 14, 15. Nap. in Las Casas, v., 202. Bot., ii., 347, 348.

† Radet, Narrative de l'Enlèvement de Pie VII., 7, 9. Artaud, ii., 214, 217. Pacca, i., 122, 123.

* Artaud, ii., 202, 209. See Bull., in Pacca, i., 355, 372. Bign., viii., 279.

† Artaud, ii., 170. "By keeping the pope at Paris," said Napoleon, "and annexing the Roman States to my dominions, I had obtained the important object of separating his temporal from his spiritual authority; and, having done so, I would have elevated him beyond measure: I would have surrounded him with pomp and honours; I would have caused him no longer to regret his temporal authority; I would have rendered him an idol: he should have had his residence near

of Queen Clotilda, and, putting it on his finger, looked at it with calm satisfaction. To prevent farther violence, the doors were thrown open, and Radet, with his officers and gendarmes, entered the apartment, where the pope stood between Cardinal Pacca, Cardinal Despuig, and a few other faithful prelates. Radet then, in a respectful manner, pale and trembling with emotion, announced to his holiness that he was charged with a painful duty, but that he was obliged to declare to him that he must renounce the temporal sovereignty of Rome and the ecclesiastical states, and that, if he refused, he must conduct him to General Miollis, who would assign him his ulterior place of destination. The pope, without agitation, replied that, if the obligations of a soldier required of him such a duty, those of a pontiff imposed on him others still more sacred; but that the emperor might "cut him in pieces, but would never extract from him such a resignation, which he neither could, nor ought, nor would subscribe." Radet then ordered him to prepare for immediate departure, intimating that Cardinal Pacca might accompany him on the journey. The pontiff immediately complied; and the French general having assured him that nothing in his palace should be violated, he said, with a smile, "He who makes light of his own life is not likely to be disquieted for the loss of his effects." Their preparations having been quickly made, the pontiff took his place in the carriage with Cardinal Pacca by his side, and, escorted by a powerful body of French cavalry, soon passed the Porta del Popolo, and emerged into the open and desert Campagna. "Cardinal," said the pope, "we did well to publish the bull of excommunication on the 10th, or how could it have been done now?" At the first posthouse he wished to give some charity to a poor person; but, upon inquiry of Cardinal Pacca, he found that between them they had only a papetto, or tenpence. He showed it, smilingly, to Radet, saying, "Behold, general, all that we possess of our principality!"*

The pope was conducted with all possible expedition by Radicofani and Sienna to Florence. During the journey, as nothing was prepared, the illustrious prisoners underwent great privations; and, after nineteen hours of uninterrupted travelling, in the hottest weather, they reached the first of those towns, where a frugal repast and miserable bed awaited them; and at midnight following they arrived at the Chartreuse of Florence. From thence their journey was continued more leisurely to Alexandria, which they reached on the 15th. More than once, in the course of the journey, the pope and Cardinal Doria were obliged to exert their influence with the peasants to prevent a forcible attempt at rescue, which the rural crowds, indignant at this scandalous treatment of the head of the Church, were preparing to make. Before leaving Rome, a well-conceived project had been secretly communicated to Pius VII. for delivering him from his oppressors, and securing his escape on board an English frigate, which was cruising for that purpose off Civita Vecchia; but he refused on any account to leave his post. At Florence he was separated from Cardinal Pacca, who was Aug. 3. conducted by a separate route to Grenoble, and soon after, by a special order

from Napoleon, transferred to the state prison of Fenestrelles in Savoy, where, amid Alpine snows, he was confined to a dungeon a close prisoner till the beginning of 1813, Jan. 30, 1813. when the emperor, after the disasters of the Moscow campaign, finding it for his interest to conciliate the pope, the cardinal was liberated, and joined his captive master at Fontainebleau. The pope himself was hurried across the Alps by Mont Cenis; but, as he approached France, the enthusiasm of the people redoubled; insomuch that, when he reached Grenoble, his *cortège* had rather the appearance of a beloved sovereign who was returning to his dominions, than of a captive pontiff who was on his way to confinement in a foreign land. By a singular coincidence, the enfeebled remnant of the heroic garrison of Saragossa were at that period in Grenoble; they hastened in crowds to meet their distressed father, and, when his carriage appeared in sight, fell on their knees as one man, and received his earnest benediction. A captive pope inspired to these captive heroes a respect which they would never have felt for the mighty conqueror who had enthralled them both! Such, in generous and uncorrupted minds, is the superiority which religion bestows to all the calamities of life.*

Napoleon has protested at St. Helena, and apparently with truth, that he was not ^{Napoleon} Napo- leon ap- privy to the actual seizure of the pope's seizure of the pope; and that, when he first re- ceived the intelligence, he was at a loss what to do with his august captive.† But it required no argument to show that neither Miollis nor Radet would have ventured on such a step unless they had been well assured that it would be conformable, if not to the formal instructions, at least to the secret wishes of the emperor; and he soon gave convincing proof of that, "for as soon as he received advices of the event," says Savary, "he approved of what had been done, and stationed the pope at Savona, revoking, at the same time, the gift of Charlemagne, and annexing the papal states to the French Empire."‡ His holiness remained at Savona for above three years, always under restraint and guarded, though not in prison; but Napoleon, after the Moscow campaign, having received intelligence that a squadron of English frigates was cruising in the Gulf of Lyons, with the design of facilitating his escape, had him removed to Fontainebleau, where he was detained a pris- June 9, 1813: oner till the return of the emperor from the disaster of Leipsic, when his necessities gave rise to important negotiations with the aged prisoner, which will form the subject of future consideration. Canova, who had been sent for to Paris by Napoleon to model the colossal statue which is now to be seen on the staircase of Apsley House, interceded energetically in his behalf; but he could obtain no remission of the severe sentence, the emperor alleging, as insurmountable charges against him, that "he was a German at heart, and had refused to banish the Russians and Eng-

* Pacca, i., 167, 183. Artaud, ii., 241, 245.

† Nap. in Las Casas, v., 261. Month., i., 130.

‡ "It is of little moment," says Thibaudeau, "whether Napoleon ordered the seizure of the pope: he did not disapprove of it; he profited by it, and took upon himself its whole responsibility. His alleged discontent at Schoenbrunn, when he received intelligence of the event, proves nothing: it might be part of his views to make it be believed it was done without his authority, and that he only undertook the scandal of the transaction because it was irreparable."—THIBAudeau, vii., 507.

* Pacca, i., 123, 129. Radet, 12, 42. Artaud, ii., 218, 229.

lish.* So tenaciously did he hold by his prey, that not even the horrors of the Russian retreat could make him relax it; he kept it firm during the campaign of Leipsic, and nothing but the crossing of the Rhine by the allied armies in spring, 1814, procured the liberation of the captive pontiff.

The situation of the city of Rome was unquestionably improved by its transference from the drowsy sway of the Church to the energetic administration of Napoleon. Shortly after the annexation of the Roman States to the French Empire, it was declared the second city in the Empire. To a deputation from Rome, shortly after its incorporation with the French Empire, Napoleon replied, "My mind is full of the recollections of your ancestors. The first time that I pass the Alps I desire to remain some time among you. The French emperors, my predecessors, had detached you from the territory of the Empire, but the good of my people no longer permits such a partition: France and Italy must be governed by the same system. You have need of a powerful hand to direct you. I shall have a singular pleasure in being your benefactor. Your bishop is the spiritual head of the Church, as I am its emperor: I 'render unto God the things that are God's, and unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's.'" The official exposition of the state of

the Empire at the close of the year portrayed in vivid colours the advantages which would arise from the government of all Italy under one system, and proclaimed the fixed determination of the emperor never to infringe upon the spiritual authority, nor ever to permit again the temporal sovereignty of the Church. In pursuance of these views, the Roman territory incorporated with the Empire was speedily subjected to the whole regulations of the imperial régime; the code Napoleon, the conscription, the Continental system, were introduced in their full vigour; préfets and sous préfets were established, and the taxes, levied according to French principles, carried to the credit of the imperial budget.†

Bossuet has assigned the reason, with his usual elevation of thought, why this spoliation of all the possessions of the supreme pontiff, by a secular power, ever must be prejudicial to the best interests of religion. "God had chosen," says he, "that the Church, the common mother of all nations, should be independent of all in its temporal affairs, and that the common centre to which all the faithful should look for the unity of their faith, should be placed in a situation above the partialities which the different interests and jealousies of states might occasion. The Church, independent in its head of all temporal powers, finds itself in a situation to exercise more freely, for the common good and protection of Christian kings, its celestial power of ruling the mind, when it holds in the right hand the balance, even amid so many empires, often in a state of hostility; it maintains unity in all its parts, sometimes by inflexible decrees, sometimes by sage concessions." The principle which calls for the independence of the head of the Church from all temporal sovereignties, is the same which requires the emancipation of its

subordinate ministers from the contributions of their flocks. Human nature in every rank is the same; the thralldom of vice and passion is felt alike in the cottage as on the throne; the subjection of the supreme pontiff to the direct control of France or Austria is as fatal to his character and respectability, as the control of the rural congregations is to the utility of the village pastor. Admitting that the court of Rome has not always shown itself free from tramontane influence, it has, at least, been less swayed than if it had had its residence at Vienna or Paris; supposing that the conclave of the cardinals has often been swayed by selfish or ambitious views, it has been much less exposed to their effects than if it had been wholly dependant on external potentates for support. Equity in judgment, whether in temporal or spiritual matters, can never be attained but by those who are independent of those to whom the judgment is to be applied; coercion of vice, whether in exalted or humble stations, can never be effected by those who depend upon that vice for their support; the due direction of thought can never be given but by those who are not constrained to bend to the thoughts of others. It will ever be the great object of tyranny, whether regal or Democratic, to beat down this central independent authority; to render the censors of morals subservient to the dominant power; and, under the specious pretence of emancipating mankind from spiritual shackles, in effect to subject them to a far more grievous temporal oppression.

But, whatever effects the dethronement and captivity of the pope were likely to have produced, if they had continued long, on the independence and usefulness of the Church, the immediate effects of the change were in the highest degree beneficial on the city of Rome. Vast was the difference between the slumber of the cardinals and the energetic measures of Napoleon. Improvements, interesting alike to the antiquary and the citizen, were undertaken in every direction. The majestic monuments of ancient Rome, half concealed by the ruins and accumulations of fourteen hundred years, stood forth in renovated splendour; the stately columns of the Temple of Jupiter Tonans, relieved of the load of their displaced architrave, were restored to the perpendicular, from which they had swerved during their long decay; the beautiful pillars of that of Jupiter Stator, half covered up with fragments of marbles, revealed their exquisite and now fully discovered proportions; the huge interior of the Coliseum, cleared of the rubbish which obstructed its base, again exhibited its wonders to the light; the channels which conducted the water for the aquatic exhibitions, the iron gates which were opened to admit the hundreds of lions to the amphitheatre, the dens where their natural ferocity was augmented by artificial stimulants, the bronze rings to which the Christian martyrs were chained, again appeared to the wondering populace; the houses which

Vast and admirable works undertaken by the French at Rome.

Prejudicial effect of this measure on the independence of the Church.

* Sav., iv., 131. Artaud, ii., 285, 368. Nap., v., 261, 262. Bign., viii., 286, 288. † Thib., vii., 512, 520.

* The interior of the Coliseum has been again filled up by the papal government, in order to facilitate access to the numerous chapels with which it is encircled; but the highly curious and interesting structures which were brought to light by the French excavations, may be seen faithfully portrayed in several views of Rome, particularly one very interesting plate in Rossini's "Antichità Romane;" a work which, without the inimitable force and grandeur of Piranesi's, is incomparably more accurate, and gives the best idea of the Roman ruins which is anywhere to be met with. —Personal observation.

deformed the centre of the Forum were cleared away; and, piercing through a covering of eighteen feet in thickness, the labours of the workmen at length revealed the pavement of the ancient Forum, the venerable blocks of the Via Sacra, still furrowed by the chariot-wheel marks of a hundred triumphs. Similar excavations at the foot of the Pillar of Trajan disclosed the graceful peristyle of columns with which it had been surrounded, and again exhibited fresh, after an interment of a thousand years, the delicate tints of its giallo antico pillars and pavement. Nor were more distant quarters or modern interests neglected. The Temple of Vesta, near the Tiber, was cleared out; a hundred workmen, under the direction of Canova, prosecuted their searches in the baths of Titus, where the Laocoon had been discovered; large sums were expended on the Quirinal palace, destined for the residence of the imperial family when at Rome. Severe laws, and an impartial execution of them, speedily repressed the hideous practice of private assassination, so long the disgrace of the papal states; a double row of shady trees led from the Arch of Constantine to the Appian Way, and thence to the Forum; surveys were made with a view to the completion of the long-neglected drainage of the Pontine Marshes; and preparations commenced for turning aside, for a season, the course of the Tiber, and discovering in its bed the inestimable treasures of art which were thrown into it during the terrors of the Gothic invasion.*

"What does the pope mean," said Napoleon to Eugene, in July, 1807, "by the threat of excommunicating me? Does he think the world has gone back a thousand years? *Does he suppose the arms will fall from the hands of my soldiers?*"† Within two years after these remarkable words were written, the pope did excommunicate him, in return for the confiscation of his whole dominions; and in less than four years more, the arms *did fall from the hands of his soldiers*;‡ and the hosts, ap-

parently invincible, which he had collected, were dispersed and ruined by the blasts of winter: he extorted from the supreme pontiff at Fontainebleau, in 1813, by the terrors and exhaustion of a long captivity, a renunciation of the rights of the Church over the Roman States; and within a year after, he himself was compelled, at Fontainebleau, to sign the abdication of all his dominions: he consigned Cardinal Pacca and several other prelates, the courageous counsellors of the bull of excommunication, to a dreary imprisonment of four years amid the snows of the Alps; and he himself was shortly after doomed to a painful exile of six on the rock of St. Helena! There is something in these marvellous coincidences beyond the operations of chance, and which even a Protestant historian feels himself bound to mark for the observation of future ages. The world had not gone back a thousand years, but that Being existed with whom a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years. And, without ascribing any deviation from ordinary laws to these events, or supposing that the common Father, "who sees with equal eye, as Lord of all," the varied modes of worship of his different creatures, had interposed in a peculiar manner in favour of any particular church, we may, without presumption, rest in the humble belief that the laws of the moral world are of universal application; that there are limits to the oppression of virtue even in this scene of trial; and that when a power, elevated on the ascendancy of passion and crime, has gone such a length as to outrage alike the principles of justice and the religious feelings of a whole quarter of the globe, the period is not far distant when the aroused indignation of mankind will bring about its punishment.

they fell from their hands; and, destitute of the power of raising them from the ground, they were left in the snow. They did not throw them away: *famine and cold tore them from their grasp.* The fingers of many were frozen on the muskets which they yet carried, and their hands deprived of the circulation necessary to sustain the weight."—SEGUR, ii., 182.

"The soldiers could no longer hold their weapons: they fell from the hands even of the bravest and most robust. The muskets dropped from the frozen arms of those who bore them."—SALGUES, *Mémoires pour Generale Histoire de France sous NAPOLEON*, vol. xx., c. 5.

* Pacca, i., 283.

* Thib., viii., 429, 431. Bign., ix., 382, 383. Bot., iv., 25.

† Ante, iii., 282, note.

‡ "The weapons of the soldiers," says Segur, in describing the Russian retreat, "appeared of an insupportable weight to their stiffened arms. During their frequent falls,

CHAPTER LVIII.

MARITIME WAR, AND CAMPAIGN OF 1809 IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.

ARGUMENT.

Comparative Military Power of France and England at this Period.—Noble Spirit which prevailed at this Time in the British Diplomatic Engagements.—Rejection of the Proposals from Erfurth.—Treaty, Offensive and Defensive, between England and Spain, and with Sweden.—Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey.—Desponding Views on the Peninsular Contest which generally prevailed at this Time in Great Britain.—Argument of the Opposition against the Spanish War.—Argument in support of the War by Ministers.—Result of the Debate.—Lights which these Discussions threw on the real Errors of the Campaign.—The Government resolve to Support the Spanish War, and Sir A. Wellesley is sent out to Lisbon.—Measures adopted to increase the Land-forces.—Budget, and Naval and Military Forces of Great Britain.—French Expedition sails from Brest for Basque Roads.—Position of the French in Basque Roads.—An Attack with Fire-ships is resolved on by the English.—Preparations on both Sides for the Attack and Defence.—Dreadful nocturnal Attack, and Destruction of the French Fleet.—Attack of the Ships ashore, and Destruction of part of them.—Proceedings which followed in England.—Character of Lord Cochrane.—Capture of Martinique and St. Domingo, in the West Indies, and of the Isle of Bourbon in the East.—Reduction of the Seven Ionian Islands by Lord Collingwood and a Land-force.—Fruitless Expedition of Sir John Stuart against the Coast of Naples.—Brilliant Naval Success of Lord Collingwood in the Mediterranean.—State of Affairs in Portugal at this Period, and Forces of the Allies there, and in Spain.—Forces and Distribution of the French in Spain.—Effect in the Peninsula of the English Resolution to defend Portugal and stand by Spain.—Arrangements for the Siege of Saragossa.—Preparations which had been made for the Defence of the Place.—Preparatory Dispositions of Palafox.—Forces of the Besiegers, and Forces at their disposal, before the Trenches were opened.—Assault and Fall of all the external fortified Posts.—Storming of the Convents of Santa Eulracia and the Capuchins on the Ramparts.—Obstinate Defence of the Town after the Walls were taken.—Slow Progress of the Assaults.—Miseries to which the Besieged were exposed from Pestilence.—Able Efforts and Successes of Marshal Lannes on the Left of the Ebro.—Capitulation of the Place.—Cruel Use which the French Generals made of their Victory.—Submission of the whole of Arragon.—Winter Operations in Catalonia under St. Cyr.—Siege of Rosas.—Battle of Cardadeu, and Relief of Barcelona.—Defeat of the Spaniards at Molinos del Rey.—Reding's Plan for a general Attack on St. Cyr with the whole Forces of the Province, to open the Way to Saragossa.—Defeat of the Spaniards at Aguadada.—Languid Operations in Catalonia after this Success, and Retreat of St. Cyr to the North of the Province.—Unsuccessful Attempt on Barcelona.—Renewal of the Contest by Blake in Arragon.—Suchet takes the Command in that Province.—His Character.—His Defeat at Alcaniz.—Approach of Blake to Saragossa.—His Repulse at Maria, near that Town, and disgraceful Rout at Balchite.—Preparations of St. Cyr for the Siege of Gerona.—Unfortunate Supply of Barcelona with Stores by Sea, and its Effect on the Campaign in Catalonia.—Preparations of the Besieged.—Progress of the Siege.—Heroic Constancy of the Garrison.—Obstinate Conflicts of which it was the Theatre.—Efforts of the Spaniards for its Relief.—Fall of Monjuic.—Extreme Distress of the Besieged from want of Provisions.—Their honourable Capitulation.—Termination of the Campaign in Catalonia, and Aspect of the Contest in that Quarter at that Period.—State of Galicia and Asturias after the Embarkation of the English from Corunna.—Advance of Sir R. Wilson to Ciudad Rodrigo.—Ney's Expedition into Asturias and Successes there.—Soul's Preparations for an Invasion of Portugal.—His Progress through Tras-las-Montes.—Bloody Action before Oporto.—Fall of that Place.—First Measures of Sir Arthur Wellesley on landing in Portugal.—Marches against Soult.—Passage of the Douro, and Defeat of the French.—Soul's hazardous Situation, and disastrous Retreat.—Escape into Galicia.—Sir Arthur returns to the Frontier of Estremadura.—Plan of a combined Movement on Madrid.—Forces of Cuesta and the Army of La Mancha at this Period.—Advance of the British into Spain.—Preparations and Forces of the French Generals.—Description of the Position of Talavera.—

Bloody Action on the 27th of July.—Desperate Battle on the 28th.—Imminent Danger of the British, and their heroic Valour.—Final Victory.—Reflections on this Event.—March of Soult, Ney, and Mortier into Sir Arthur's Rear.—His Plan to resist the Attack.—Cuesta abandons Talavera and the English Wounded.—Imminent Hazard and skilful Retreat of the English.—Losses sustained by them in this Campaign.—They retire into Portugal.—Advance of Vanegas in La Mancha.—His total Defeat at Ocaña.—Cuesta's Measures in Estremadura.—His Overthrow at Medellin.—Disastrous State of the Spanish Affairs at this Period.—Reflections on the Campaign.—Immense Forces developed by England in different Parts of the World during its Continuance.—Comparison with what it was at the Commencement of the War, and what it has since become.—Causes of the remarkable Diminution of the National Force in later Times.—Its probable Effect on the future Fate of England.

ALTHOUGH the military power of England and France had never been fairly brought into collision since the commencement of the contest, and both the government and the nation were, to a degree which is now almost inconceivable, ignorant alike of the principles of war with land troops, and the magnitude of the resources for such a conflict which were at their disposal, yet the forces of the contending parties, when a battle-field was at last found, were, in reality, much more equally balanced than was commonly imagined. France, indeed, had conquered all the states of Continental Europe, and her armies were surrounded with a halo of success which rendered them invincible to the hostility of present power; but England and she were ancient rivals, and the lustre of former renown shone, dimly, indeed, but perceptibly, through the blaze of present victory. It was in vain that the conquest of all the armies, and the capture of almost all the capitals of Europe, was referred to by their old antagonists; the English rested on the battles of Cressy and Azincourt, and calmly pointed to the imperishable inheritance of historic glory. Their soldiers, their citizens, were alike penetrated with these recollections; the belief of the natural superiority of the English to the French, in a fair field, was impressed on the humblest sentinel of the army; the exploits of the Edwards and the Henrys of ancient times burned in the hearts of the officers, and animated the spirit of the people. The universal arming of all classes, under the danger of Napoleon's invasion, had spread, to an extent of which the Continental nations were wholly unaware, the military spirit throughout the realm; while the recent campaigns of the army in India had trained a number of officers to daring exploits, habituated them to the difficulties of actual service, and roused again, in the ranks of the privates, that confidence in themselves which is the surest forerunner of victory. The French journals spoke contemptuously of the British conquests in the East, and anxiously invoked the time when "this general of sepoys" should measure his strength with the marshals of the Empire; but this feeling of security, as is generally the case when not derived from experience, was founded on ignorance; the chief who had fronted the dangers of Assaye was not likely to quail before the terrors of more equal encounter,

Comparative military power of France and England at this period.

and the men who had mounted the breach of Seringapatam or faced the cannonade of Laswaree, had no reason to distrust themselves in the most perilous fields of European warfare.

If the occasional faulty direction of the national resources when the land contest began, and, above all, the total ignorance of the value of time in war which universally prevailed, frequently led the British forces into disaster, and rendered abortive their greatest enterprises, the firmness with which the contest was still persevered in by the government and people, the noble spirit which dictated their national engagements, are worthy of the very highest admiration. Shortly after the Peninsular contest broke out, and when it was still rather a tumultuary insurrection than a regular warfare, proposals of peace were addressed by Alexander and Napoleon, from the place of conference at Erfurth. The basis of this proposition was the principle of *uti possidetis*, and it received additional lustre from being signed by both these illustrious potentates, and acknowledging the very principles for which Great Britain herself had formerly contended. In answer to this communication, Mr. Canning, the British minister for

foreign affairs, stated, "he would hasten Oct. 22. to communicate to his allies, the King of Sweden and the existing government of Spain, the proposals which have been made to him. Your excellency will perceive that it is absolutely necessary that his majesty should receive an immediate assurance that France acknowledges the government of Spain as party to any negotiation. With Portugal and Sweden, Great Britain has long had the closest ties; the interests of Sicily are confided to his care; and though he is not as yet bound to Spain by any formal instrument, he has, in the face of the world, contracted engagements not less binding and sacred than the most solemn treaties." To this it was replied by Russia and France, that "they had no difficulty in at once admitting the sovereigns in alliance with England to a congress, but that they could not admit the Spanish insurgents. The Russian Empire has always acted on this principle; and its emperor is now, in an especial manner, called to adhere to it, as he has already acknowledged Joseph Bonaparte king of Spain.*" This answer broke off the negotiation, and the King of

England soon after issued a declaration, in which he announced the rupture of the correspondence, and lamented the adherence of the allied sovereigns to the determination not to treat with the Spanish nation, as the cause of its failure.†

The gallant determination thus expressed by the British government, to admit of no conferences to which the Spanish nation was not admitted as a party, was soon after put to a still more serious trial. Negotiations had for some time been pending for the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between England and the Spanish government, which had been commenced as soon as the formation of the Central Junta offered any responsible party with whom such an engagement could be formed; and they were persisted in with unshaken constancy by the British cabinet, notwithstanding all the disasters which, in the close of the campaign,

had befallen the Spanish armies, and the capture of their capital by the forces of Napoleon. At length, on the 14th of January, Mr. Canning had the satisfaction of signing a treaty of peace and alliance between the two states, by which it was stipulated that the "King of England shall assist to the utmost of his power the Spanish nation in their struggle against the tyranny and usurpation of France, and promises not to acknowledge any other King of Spain and the Indies than Ferdinand VII., his heirs, or such lawful successors as the Spanish nation shall acknowledge; and the Spanish government engages never, in any case, to cede to France any part of the territories or possessions of the Spanish monarchy in any part of the world; and both the high contracting parties agree to make common cause against France, and not to make peace but by common consent." When it is recollected that this treaty was concluded after the Spanish armies had been utterly routed and dispersed by the overwhelming forces of Napoleon, when their capital was taken, more than half their provinces overrun, and on the very day when the British forces embarked at Corunna, after their disastrous retreat from Leon, it must be admitted that the annals of the world do not afford a more sublime example of constancy in adversity and heroic fidelity to engagements on the part of both the contracting powers.*

Faithful alike to its least as its most considerable allies, the British government at this period concluded a new treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Swedish nation, now exposed to the most serious peril from the invasion of their formidable neighbour, and threatened alike in Finland and on the Baltic by an overwhelming force. Shortly after the treaty of Tilsit, and when this danger from Russia was foreseen, a convention was concluded with the court of Stockholm, by which Great Britain and Sweden mutually engaged to conclude no separate peace, and the former power was to pay an annual subsidy of £1,200,000 to the latter; and this agreement was confirmed by an additional convention concluded at Stockholm a year after, by which it was agreed that the subsidy should be paid quarterly, and in advance.† But the pressure of external events prevented the latter treaty from being long carried into execution, and produced a change of dynasty in the Scandinavian Peninsula, fraught with important consequences upon the general interests of Europe, which will be the subject of interesting narrative in a future chapter.‡

Another treaty, attended with important consequences, both present and future, was about the same time contracted between Great Britain and the Ottoman Porte. Since the conclusion of the peace of Tilsit, which delivered over Napoleon's ally, Turkey, to the tender mercies of Russia, only stipulating the lion's share for the French Empire, and the consequent commencement of a bloody war on the Danube, between the two powers, which will hereafter be considered,§ there was, in reality, no cause of hostility between England and the court of Constantinople. They were both at war with Russia, and both the objects of spoliation to France: they were naturally, therefore, friends to each

* See note A.

† Parl. Deb., xii., 93, 105.

* See the treaty in Parl. Deb., xiii., 810, 811; and Martens, Sup., v., 163.

† Infra, ch. lix.

‡ Martens, Sup., v., 2, 9.

§ Infra, lix.

Treaty, offensive and defensive, between England and Spain. January 14, 1809.

Treaty between Great Britain and Turkey. January 5, 1809.

other. Impressed with these ideas, the British cabinet made advances to the Divan, representing the mutual advantage of an immediate cessation of hostilities; and so completely had the desertion of France at Tilsit obliterated the irritation produced by Sir John Duckworth's expedition, and undermined the influence of Sebastiani at Constantinople, that they met with the most favourable reception. A treaty of peace was, in consequence, concluded between England and Turkey, in the beginning of January, at Constantinople, which, relieving the grand signor from all apprehension in his rear, or of the maritime power of Russia, enabled the Turks to direct their whole force to the desperate contest on the Danube. Nor was this treaty of less importance eventually to Great Britain. By re-establishing the relations of amity and commerce with a vast empire, adjoining, along so extensive a frontier, the Eastern states of Christendom, it opened a huge inlet for British manufactures and colonial produce, which was immediately and largely taken advantage of. Bales of goods, infinitely beyond the wants or consumption of the Ottoman Empire, were shipped for Turkey, transported up the Danube, across the barrier of Hungary and the Albanian Hills, and finding their way, carried on mules and men's heads, over the mountain frontier of Transylvania, penetrated through all Hungary and the Austrian Empire. Thus, while Napoleon, intent on the Continental system, which absolutely required for its success the formation of all Europe into one league for the exclusion of British merchandise, flattered himself that by his victory at Tilsit he had effectually attained that object, he had already, in the consequences of that very triumph, awakened a resistance which in a great degree defeated it; and in the aroused hostility of the Spanish Peninsula and Turkey, severally delivered up to his own and Alexander's ambition by that pacification, amply compensated Great Britain for the commercial intercourse she had lost in Northern Europe.*

But, although the constancy and resolution of the British government at this crisis were worthy of the noble cause which they were called upon to support, it was not without great difficulty that they succeeded in prevailing upon Parliament and the people to second their efforts. The dispersion of the Spanish armies, the fall of Madrid, and the calamitous issue of Sir John Moore's retreat, had conspired in an extraordinary degree to agitate and distract the public mind. To the unanimous burst of enthusiasm which had followed the outbreak of the Spanish insurrection, and the extraordinary successes with which it was at first attended, had succeeded a depression proportionably unreasonable; and the populace, incapable of steady perseverance, and ever ready to rush from one extreme to another, now condemned government, in no measured strains, for pursuing that very line of conduct which, a few months before, had been the object of their warmest eulogy and most strenuous support. The insanity of attempting to resist the French power at land; the madness of expecting anything like durable support from popular insurrection; the impossibility of opposing any effectual barrier to Napoleon's Continental dominion; his vast abilities, daring ener-

gy, and unbounded resources, were loudly proclaimed by the opposition party: a large portion of the press adopted the same views, and augmented the general consternation by the most gloomy predictions. To such a height did the ferment arise, that it required all the firmness of ministers, supported by the constancy of the aristocratic party, to stem the torrent, and prevent the British troops from being entirely withdrawn from the Peninsula, and the Spanish war entirely extinguished by its first serious reverses.*

The debates in Parliament on this, as on every other occasion, exhibited a faithful picture of the sentiments entertained by the people, and are interesting, not merely as indicating the views adopted by the leaders of the opposite parties, but affording a true image of the opinions by which the nation itself was divided. On the side of the opposition, it was strongly argued by Lord Grenville, Lord Grey, Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. Whitbread, "That experience had now proved, what might from the first have been anticipated, that the Peninsula was not a theatre on which the British forces could ever be employed with advantage; with the Pyrenees unblocked, and the road between Paris and Madrid as open as between Paris and Antwerp, nothing could justify our sending thirty or forty thousand men into the interior of Spain to combat two hundred thousand. Such a measure can only be compared to the far-famed march to Paris, to which it is fully equal in wildness and absurdity.† It is clear it must rest with the Spaniards themselves to work out their own independence, and that without that spirit no army that we can send can be of any avail. The cautious defensive system of warfare which the Spanish juntas originally recommended has been abandoned, from the delusive hopes inspired by the regular armies we chose to send them, and defeat and ruin has been the consequence. As if to make a mockery of our assistance, we have sent our succours to the farthest possible point from the scene of action, and made our depôt at Lisbon, where the French must have been cut off and surrendered, if we had not kindly furnished them with the means of transport to France, from whence they might be moved by the enemy to the quarter most serviceable for his projects.

"When the Spanish insurrection broke out, and the world looked in anxious suspense on that great event, ministers took none of the steps necessary to enable Parliament to judge of the measures which should be pursued. In the generous enthusiasm, the confidence and prodigality

* Ann. Reg., 1809, 26, 29. South., Pen. War, ii., 328, 331.

† Lord Grenville here alluded to an expression of Lord Liverpool, then Mr. Jenkinson, in 1793, that the allied army, after the fall of Valenciennes, should march direct to Paris. This saying was, for twenty years afterward, the subject of constant ridicule by the opposition party, and it was set down, by general consent, as one of the most absurd ebullitions that ever came from the mouth of man. Yet it is now admitted by Napoleon, and all the French military historians, that the observation was perfectly just, and that, if the allies had held together and pressed on after that event, they would have taken the French capital and terminated the war in the same campaign. A parallel case, in domestic transactions, is to be found in Lord Castlereagh's celebrated saying regarding "the ignorant impatience of taxation," which, nevertheless, it is now plain, was entirely well founded, as but for it the national debt would now have been entirely paid off, or reduced to a mere trifle. So fallacious a guide is public opinion, when not formed at a distance from the event, and with the benefit of the light which subsequent experience, calm discussion, and superior intellects have thrown on the question.—See *Ante*, i., 247; and ii., 391–397.

* See the treaty in Martens, Sup., v., 160. Ann. Reg., 1809, 134. State Papers.

of the nation outstripped even their most sanguine hopes: men, money, transports, stores, all were put, with boundless profusion, at their disposal. How have they justified that confidence? Is it not clear that it has been misplaced? It was evident to every one that our whole disposable military force could not hope to cope single-handed against the immense armies of Napoleon; and, therefore, it was their bounden duty, before they hazarded any portion of our troops in the cause, to be well assured that the materials of an efficient and lasting hostility existed in the country. It was not sufficient to know that monks could excite some of the poorer classes to insurrection, and that, when so excited, they evinced, for a time, great enthusiasm. The real question was, Were they animated with that general resolution from which alone national efforts could flow, and was it guided and directed by those influential classes, from whose exertion alone anything like steadiness and perseverance could be anticipated? No proper inquiry was made into these subjects. From the agents whom ministers sent out they got nothing but false or exaggerated information, more likely to mislead than to enlighten; and the consequence has been, that immense stores were thrown away or fell into the enemy's hands, vast subsidies were squandered or embezzled, and the entire fabric of delusion and misrepresentation fell before the first shock of the imperial forces.

"In the direction of our own troops, mismanagement was, if possible, still more flagrant. Mr. Frere was obviously not a proper person to be sent to Madrid to report as to the prudence or chances of success of Sir John Moore's advance into Spain; a military man should have been there, qualified to judge of the real state of the Spanish armies, and not expose the flower of the British troops to destruction, from crediting the rodomontade of proclamations, and the representations of interested supporters. When Sir John did arrive in Spain, in the middle of December, he came in time only to be the last devoured; all the Spanish armies had been dissipated before the British fired a shot. After Napoleon had arrived at Madrid, the retreat previously and wisely ordered by the English general was suspended, and a forward movement, fraught with the most calamitous results, commenced. By what influence or representations was that most disastrous change of measures brought about? That was the point into which it behoved Parliament to inquire, for there was the root of all the subsequent misfortunes. Mr. Frere's despatches at that time urged him to advance, representing the great strength of the insurrection in the south of Spain, and that, if he would attack the enemy in the north, the Spanish cause, then almost desperate, would have time to revive. Incalculable were the calamities consequent on that most absurd advice; for such were the dangers into which it led the British army, that within a few days afterward Sir John Moore was obliged to resume its retreat; and if he had not done so, in twenty-four hours more it would have been surrounded and destroyed. What has been the result of all this imbecility? A shameful and disastrous retreat, which will influence the character of England long after all of us shall have ceased to live. We never can expect to be able to meet the four or five hundred thousand men whom Bonaparte can pour into Spain: when the opportunity was lost of seizing the passes of the Pyrenees, and the

Peninsula was inundated with his troops, success had become hopeless, and the struggle should never have been attempted.*

On the other hand, it was contended by Lord Liverpool, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Canning, "The question now is, whether we are to record a public avowal of a determination not to desert the cause and the government which we have espoused, and profess ourselves undismayed by the reverses we have sustained, which those very reverses had rendered it a more sacred duty to support. Those who inferred that the cause was desperate on account of these reverses, were little acquainted with history, and least of all with Spanish history. There it would be found that nations, overrun just as completely as the Spaniards had been, had continued the contest for ten or twenty years, and, though constantly worsted in regular battles, had still, by perseverance and resolution, in the end proved triumphant. The cause in which they were engaged was the most interesting to humanity: it was a struggle for their liberty, their independence, and their religion; for the homes of their fathers and the cradles of their descendants. Is nothing to be risked in support of so generous an ally? Is England, so renowned in history for her valour and perseverance, to be disheartened by the first reverse, and yield the palm to her ancient rivals, whom she has so often conquered even in their own territory, merely because she was unable to withstand forces quadruple of her own arms?

"It is a mistake, however, to assert that we have sustained nothing but disasters in the campaign. Was the conquest of Portugal; the capture of all its fortresses, arsenals, and resources; the defeat and capitulation of one of the best armies and ablest marshals of France, nothing for our first essay in Continental warfare? When we advanced into Spain, it was to act only as an auxiliary force: such was the express and earnest request of the Spaniards themselves, and it was the part which befitted the allies of so considerable and renowned a nation to take. Spain had made an energetic effort: she had combated with a spirit and constancy which had not distinguished greater empires and more extensive resources; she had gained triumphs which might put Northern Europe to the blush; and, if she had been unable to stand the first brunt of a power before which all the military monarchies of the Continent had sunk, it was ungenerous to reproach her with her reverses in the hour of her misfortune, unmanly to be discouraged because important victories have been followed by what may yet prove only passing clouds. It is in vain to attempt to disparage the efforts of the Spanish army and nation: those are not despicable victories which, for the first time since the French Revolution broke out, had arrested the course of its champion's triumphs, and made the conquerors of Northern Europe pass under the Caudine Forks; those were not contemptible national exertions which drove a French army of a hundred thousand men behind the Ebro, and brought Napoleon with two hundred thousand more from the other side of the Rhine.

"Nothing can be more erroneous than the opinion which has become general since the late reverses, that the Spaniards cannot, under any circumstances, require our assistance; that,

* *Parl. Deb.*, xii., 12, 21, and 1053, 1073.

if they are in earnest in the great object of their deliverance, they must work it out for themselves, and have the means of doing so without the aid of British soldiers; and that, if they are indifferent to their salvation, no succour of ours can achieve it for them. Such a proposition sounds well, and might perhaps be founded in truth, if the Spaniards had a regular army to support and form a nucleus for the efforts of their enthusiastic peasantry; but all history demonstrates that the resistance of no people, how resolute soever, is to be relied on for success in a protracted warfare, if entirely deprived of the support and example of regular armies. It is the combination of the two which makes a nation invincible. Spain has the one, but not the other; it is for England, so far as her resources will go, to supply the deficiency, and ingraft on the energetic efforts of newly-raised forces the coolness and intrepidity of her incomparable soldiers. Unless such a nucleus of resistance remains in the Peninsula, to occupy the French armies in one quarter, while organization is going on in another, no efficient resistance can be expected, because the patriot armies will be reached and dispersed in every province before they have acquired any degree of efficiency. How has every English patriot mourned the neglect of the fairest opportunity that ever occurred of combating the forces of the Revolution, by leaving the heroic Vendéans to perish under the merciless sword of the Republic! Taught by past error, let us not repeat it, now that resistance of the same description has arisen on a much greater scale, and under circumstances promising a much fairer prospect of success.

"The advance of Sir John Moore to Sahagun was neither undertaken solely on his own responsibility, nor solely on the advice of Mr. Frere: he had previously, from intercepted despatches from Berthier to Soult, ascertained that he would be on the Carrion on a certain day, and knew from thence that an opportunity was afforded of striking an important blow against that general when unsupported by the other French corps. About the same time advices arrived from Mr. Frere, painting in the warmest colours the resolution of the people of Madrid to emulate the example of Saragossa, and bury themselves under the ruins of the capital rather than surrender it to the French arms. Such were the concurring reasons which prompted the forward movement of the British general; and would not that general be unworthy of commanding British soldiers who would hesitate, under such circumstances, to advance to the support of his allies? On this occasion, the inestimable importance of our regular troops in the war was distinctly shown; this well-conceived invasion, though effected only by twenty-five thousand men, by menacing the enemy's line of communication, paralyzed the whole hostile armies of Spain; stopped at once the progress of the French corps both towards Andalusia and Portugal; gave the troops and inhabitants of these countries time to prepare for their defence, and drew Napoleon himself, with seventy thousand of his best men, into a remote corner of Spain. But for this seasonable advance, but for our assistance, the war would have been terminated in the first consternation consequent on the fall of Madrid. The sending out transports and bringing the troops home was not the work of government: it was the consequence of a distinct requisition from Sir David Baird that he

required them; thirteen thousand men were re-landed, after being shipped, in consequence of that demand, and the transports, to the infinite grief of government, sent out empty. But the cause of Spain was not yet desperate, and it was neither just to that country nor our own army, which it was to be hoped, would yet prove the stay of Europe, to assert that its honour was gone forever. All the energy of liberty, all the sacredness of loyalty, still survived; and the Spanish Revolution might yet be destined by Providence to stand between prosperity and French despotism, and to show to the world that, amid the paroxysms of freedom, a monarch might still be loved. If we had been obliged to leave Spain, we had left it with fresh laurels blooming upon our brows, more honourable in the sight of God and man, because more purely won, than if gained in the richest field of self aggrandizement, or amid the securest triumphs of selfish ambition."*

These generous sentiments, addressed to an assembly, in a large proportion of whom the chivalrous feelings yet Result of the debate. glowed, and who had recently caught the flame of patriotic ardour from the early glories of the Spanish war, proved triumphant with a great majority of the house, and Mr. Ponsonby's motion for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the campaign in Spain was negatived by a majority of 93, the numbers being 127 to 220.

These debates, though they by no means assuaged the public mind after the calamitous issue of the campaign, had Light which these debates threw on the real errors of the campaign. at least one good effect, that of demonstrating where it was that the real fault lay, and what should now be done to repair it. Nothing could be clearer, when the question was sifted to the bottom, than that the advance of Sir John Moore had been an able and well-judged step; that his subsequent retreat was alike necessary and expedient; that the withdrawing Napoleon's guards from Madrid, and leading Ney and Soult to Corunna, had saved the southern provinces and the cause of Spanish independence; and that, if there was any fault in its direction, it was in the unnecessary haste with which it had been conducted—a venial error, the result of inexperienced troops and a long-established despondency, on military affairs, of the public mind. The real error lay in abandoning the Peninsula, if Corunna was no longer tenable, and steering with the transports for England, instead of making for Lisbon or Cadiz. Disorganized as the army was by the sufferings of the retreat, it would soon have recovered its efficiency in the quiet of the Portuguese capital; the immense stores sent out by England would have speedily replaced its equipment and restored its *matériel*; a sense of security, the arrival of re-enforcements from home, would, ere long, have reanimated its spirit; and the French marshals would have had little to boast of, if, after the whole Peninsular war had been paralyzed for its destruction, and two of their corps been drawn to the extremity of Galicia in its pursuit, the English army had reappeared, a few days after, at the rock of Lisbon; and, from a still more formidable central position, threatened in flank their wearied and harassed troops, scattered from the Austrian mountains to the Sierra Morena.

* Parl. Deb., xii., 22, 23, and 1075, 1104

Impressed with these ideas, the English government, after a temporary hesitation till the decision of Parliament on the subject was known, took the magnanimous and fortunate resolution still to persevere in a land contest in the Peninsula, and to send out considerable re-enforcements to Portugal. The troops which had been prepared to re-enforce Sir John Moore, accordingly, were retained in the seaports to which they had been directed, and in the beginning of April sailed for Lisbon. The command of the expedition was given to Sir Arthur Wellesley, whom his great achievements in India, as well as recent unclouded triumph in Portugal, clearly pointed out for that arduous duty. So shaken were the minds of all, however, by the recent Peninsular disasters, and so uncertain was even government of the state of Portugal, that his instructions directed him, if, on his arrival at Lisbon, he found that capital evacuated by the British troops, to make for Cadiz. This calamitous event, fortunately, did not take place; the standard of independence still waved on the Tagus; courageous efforts had been made during the winter in Portugal, and on the 22d of April Sir Arthur landed, amid the acclamations of the inhabitants, at Lisbon, and commenced that career which has rendered his own name and that of his country immortal. He never re-embarked there again to steer for Britain: the days were past when the English looked for safety to their ships;* when next he set sail for England, it was from Calais, with his cavalry, which had marched thither in triumph from Bayonne.

To provide for the war on the gigantic scale on which, during this year, it was to be conducted, at once in Flanders, land-forces. Austria, and Portugal, large supplies of men and money were requisite, and the attention of government was early and anxiously directed to these vital objects. It had long been perceived that the true nursery for the British army was the militia, which, being raised by ballot for home service only, did not excite the jealousy of a people too much attached to their liberties to submit, save in the last necessity, to conscription for the regular army. A bill, accordingly, was brought in by Lord

Castlereagh, which soon received the assent of the Legislature, which provided for raising twenty-four thousand men for the militia, by bounties of ten guineas each, paid by the public; and, if it proved insufficient, by ballot, in order to replace an equal number who had volunteered from that service into the line. This measure proved entirely unsuccessful: the bounty for enlisting into the regular army was at the same time raised to twelve guineas; and from that time till the close of the war no difficulty was experienced in raising the requisite number of men, without any forced levy, for both services—even to supply the vast consumption of the Peninsular war—so strongly was the spirit of the nation now roused against the usurpations of France, and so widely had the military spirit spread with the general arming of the people which followed the threats of Napoleon's invasion.†

The raising of supplies for a year, when operations were contemplated on a scale of such

magnitude, presented difficulties of no ordinary kind, but they were surmounted without any extraordinary addition to the burdens of the people. The war expenditure amounted to £53,000,000; the ways and means, including a loan of £11,000,000, being somewhat more. The total expenditure of this year, including the interest of the debt and sinking fund, was £89,522,000, while the total income was £90,525,000. The regular army amounted to 210,000 men, besides 80,000 militia, of whom 100,000 were disposable in the British islands; and the navy, manned by 130,000 seamen, numbered no less than 1061 ships of war, of which 698 were in commission, 242 were of the line, besides 42 building, and 113 of that class actually at sea.* These numbers deserve to be noted, as marking the highest point to which the British navy had yet reached in that or any other war; and indicate an amount of naval force far superior to that of all other nations put together, and to which the world never had, and perhaps never will, see a parallel.†

The first great success which occurred to elevate the hopes of the British after the disasters of the Peninsular campaign, occurred at sea. A squadron of eight sail of the line and two frigates, under Admiral Villameuz, had for some time been watching for an opportunity to elude the vigilance of the British cruisers, and escape from Brest, in order to gain a general rendezvous assigned them by the French government in BASQUE ROADS. The object of this movement was to chase the British blockading squadron from before L'Orient, liberate the ships there, which consisted of three ships of the line and five frigates, and, with the united force of eleven line-of-battle ships and seven frigates, make for Martinique, now threatened by a British expedition, and for the relief of which it had several thousand land-troops on board. On the 21st of February they effected Feb. 21. their object of sailing from Brest, and immediately steered for the south, and after some difficulty, owing to the narrow channel and shoal waters round the Isle d'Aix, the desired junction was effected, and Villameuz found himself at the head of eleven ships of the line and seven frigates in Basque Roads. Thither he was immediately followed by the British squadron, under Lord Gambier, which, being joined to the blockading squadron off L'Orient, amounted to eleven sail of the line. Alarmed by the approach of so formidable a force, the French-March 26. squadron weighed anchor, and stood for the inner and more protected roads of Isle d'Aix. In performing this operation, one of their line-of-battle ships, the Jean Bart, went ashore and was lost. The British admiral immediately followed, and anchored in Basque Roads, directly opposite to the enemy, with his frigates and smaller vessels in advance; and as the close proximity of the hostile fleets, and their confined anchorage, rendered them in a peculiar manner exposed to the danger of fire-ships, extraordinary precautions were adopted on both sides against that much-dreaded mode of attack.‡

The French fleet was now anchored in a very

* Ann. Reg., 1809, 81. James's Naval Hist., iv., 404, Table 17. Parl. Deb., xiv., 531. Porter's Parl. Tables, ii., p. 1.

† See note B.

‡ James's Naval Hist., iv., 94, 110. Brenton, ii., 277, 279. Thib., vii., 260.

* Gurw., iv., 246. Soult, ii., 388.

† Parl. Deb., xii., 538, 539, and 314, 323.

French expedition sails from Brest for Basque Roads.

Position of the French in Basque Roads. An attack with fireships is resolved on.

strong position. On one side they were covered by the Isle d'Aix, garrisoned by two thousand men, and batteries mounting thirty long thirty-six pounders and several mortars; while, on the other side, the isle of Oleron, at the distance of three miles and a half, was fortified by several works, the guns of which nearly reached the range of those of the citadel of Aix. Shoals also abounded in all directions, and the French fleet, drawn up in two close lines, between the protecting forts near the shore, in a situation not unlike that of Brueys at the Nile, with this difference, that the vessels in the second line were placed opposite the openings in the first, as at Trafalgar. As any regular action with the fleet seemed hazardous in such a situation, Lord Gambier suggested an attack by means of fireships, in which the admiralty readily concurred. Twelve fireships were immediately prepared, with extraordinary expedition, in the English harbours; and, as most of the officers consulted gave it as their opinion that the undertaking would be attended with great hazard, the execution of it was intrusted to Lord COCHRANE, who considered it as attended with little difficulty, and whose cool intrepidity and inexhaustible resources, long demonstrated in a partisan warfare on the coast of France and Spain, pointed him out as peculiarly qualified for the important enterprise. He at first declined, from delicacy to the officers already in the fleet; but, being pressed by government, accepted the command, and in the beginning of April joined the fleet in Basque Roads, where he was immediately afterward joined by the Mediator frigate, and twelve other vessels armed as fireships.*

The preparations being at length completed, the different frigates and smaller vessels moved to the stations assigned to them; and, on the evening of the 11th of April, advanced to their perilous service. The enemy, being aware, from the arrival of the fireships, what was intended, had made every preparation for repelling the attack: a strong boom had been drawn across the line of their fleet, at the distance of 110 yards, composed of cables and chains twisted together, and secured by anchors at either end, of the enormous weight of five tons each; while the whole boats of the fleet, seventy-three in number, were assembled near the boom, in five divisions, for the purpose of boarding and towing away the fireships; and the line-of-battle ships lay behind, with their topmasts on deck, and every imaginable precaution taken to avert the dreadful fate which menaced them. Nothing, however, could resist the daring of the British sailors, and the admirable skill of the officers in direction of the fireships. The wind, which was strong and blew right in upon shore, was as favourable as possible; and under its blasts the fireships got under weigh, and bore down swiftly on the enemy's line, while the sailors in both fleets strained their anxious eyes to discern the dark masses as they silently glided through the gloom. Lord Cochrane directed the leading vessel, which had fifteen hundred barrels of powder and four hundred shells on board; while the Mediator, under the able direction of Captain Woolridge, filled with as many combustibles, immediately followed. The admirable directions given the latter vessel, by its he-

roic commander, brought it down direct against the boom, and the whole fireships, which rapidly followed, made direct towards the enemy's fleet, amid a heavy fire from the batteries on both sides and the line in front. Dauntless, indeed, was the intrepidity of the crews, who, during the darkness of a tempestuous night, steered vessels charged to the brim with gunpowder, and the most combustible materials, right into the middle of a concentric fire of bombs and projectiles, any one of which might, in an instant, have blown them into the air!*

During the darkness of a tempestuous night, however, it was impossible even for the greatest skill and coolness to steer the fireships precisely to the points assigned to them: the wind was lulled by the effect of the first explosions, and the consequence was, that many of them blew up at such a distance from the enemy's line as to do little or no damage. So resolute, however, were the captain and crew of the Mediator to discharge the duty assigned to them, that, after breaking the boom and setting fire to their vessel, they still held by her till she was almost in the enemy's fleet, and were blown out of the ship when she exploded, severely, though, happily, not mortally scorched. Lord Cochrane's vessel, which led the way, though directed by that gallant officer with the most consummate skill and courage, was unable to break the boom till the Mediator came up, when it gave way; and a minute thus lost caused her to explode a hundred yards too soon, and without any damage to the enemy. No sooner, however, was the boom burst than the other fireships came in, wrapped in flames, in quick succession; and this awful spectacle, joined to the tremendous explosions of the Mediator and Lord Cochrane's vessel, produced such consternation in the French fleet, that they all slipped their cables and ran ashore in wild confusion. The glare of so many prodigious fires illuminating half the heavens, the flashes of the guns from the forts and retreating ships, the frequent flight of shells and rockets from the fire-vessels, and the bright reflection of the rays of light from the sides of the French ships in the background, formed a scene at once animating and sublime. One fireship fell on board the Ocean, which carried the French admiral's flag, as she lay grounded on the shore; in an instant the flames spread over her. At this moment the Tonnerre and Patriote also got entangled in the fearful group: inevitable destruction seemed to await them all, when a sudden roll of the sea threw the Tonnerre aside, and the fireship drifted past. When the day dawned at five o'clock, half the enemy's fleet were discerned ashore; at half past seven only two were afloat; and Lord Cochrane, who had regained his own ship, the Imperieuse, repeatedly made signal to Lord Gambier, who lay twelve miles off, to advance. The last bore, "Half the fleet can destroy the enemy: eleven on shore."†

Success as splendid as that gained at the Nile or Copenhagen now awaited the British admiral, and it had been won by daring and skill not inferior to that of Nelson himself. But Nelson was not at the head of the fleet. In-

Dreadful nocturnal attack and destruction of the French fleet.

Preparations for the attack on the enemy in Basque Roads. April 14.

Attack on the ships ashore, and destruction of part of them.

* James, iv., 106, 107. Lord Gambier's Despatch, 14th April, 1809. Ann. Reg., 1809, 443. App. to Chron. Brenton, ii., 280.

† James, iv., 109, 111. Brenton, ii., 280, 281. French Official Account. James, iv., 109.

* James, iv., 102, 103. Brenton, ii., 278, 279.

ferior to none of the captains who followed that immortal flag in personal gallantry, Lord Gambier wanted the moral courage, the confidence in himself, which, in hazardous circumstances, is requisite for decisive success in a commander. At ten minutes before six Lord Cochrane had first made signal that half the fleet was ashore; and, if the admiral had instantly weighed anchor and stood in to the roads, he would, at eight o'clock, have been within reach of fire, when only two of them were afloat. Instead of this, he did nothing till half past nine, and then, instead of making the signal to move, merely called a council of war of flag-captains to come on board his ship; and it was, in consequence, not till a quarter before eleven that the fleet weighed, and, having advanced half way, anchored again six miles from the enemy, in the belief that their ships could not be got off, and that it was hazardous, till the tide had risen higher, to venture farther in amid the intricate shoals of Basque Roads. The *Atina* bomb and some frigates and lighter vessels were, however, moved on under the orders of Captain Bligh. Meanwhile, the French fleet evinced extraordinary activity in getting their vessels off the shore, and as the tide rose several were floated and warped up the Charente. Stung to the quick by seeing his noble prizes thus eluding his grasp, Lord Cochrane, with heroic gallantry, advanced himself to the attack in his frigate the *Imperieuse*. He was quickly followed by Captain Bligh with the bomb and light vessels, and a heavy cannonade was commenced on the most exposed of the enemy's ships. The *Calcutta*, of fifty guns, quickly struck her colours to the *Imperieuse*, the *Ville de Varsovie* and *Aquilon* soon after yielded to the concentric fire of the other frigates, and were burned as soon as the prisoners were removed, and the *Tonnerre* was set on fire by her own crew and blew up. So general was the consternation on the part of the enemy, that another French seventy-four, the *Tourville*, was abandoned by its crew, and might have been taken possession of by an English boat's crew, which, unaware of its condition, accidentally came very near. The *Indienne* frigate was also burned by the enemy. The other ships, however, though seriously injured, and two of them rendered unserviceable by being thrown ashore in the tempestuous gale, were, by great efforts, got afloat during the high tides which followed the strong westerly wind that prevailed during the action, and warped into safe anchorage in the upper part of the Charente.*

Lord Cochrane was deservedly made a knight of the Bath for the admirable skill which follow-
Proceedings of the Bath for the admirable skill which follow-
ed in England. this trying occasion; and there cannot be a doubt, when the French accounts are compared with the English, that, if he had had the command of the fleet, the whole enemy's ships would have been destroyed. Such as it was, the success was almost equal to that of Lord Howe in those seas fifteen years before, and it would have thrown the nation into transports of joy at the commencement of the war. But Lord Nelson had spoiled the English for anything less than complete success; and murmurs soon began to spread against Lord Gambier for not having, in a more energetic manner, supported Lord Cochrane on that occasion.

These were soon materially increased by the strong charges openly advanced against the commander-in-chief by Admiral Harvey, the second in command, one of the bravest captains of Trafalgar, who burned with desire to signalize himself against the enemy, and had expressed his opinion on the occasion, perhaps, with more frankness than discretion; and by Lord Cochrane intimating that, if the thanks of the House of Commons were moved to Lord Gambier, he would oppose it in Parliament. The result was, that Admiral Harvey was brought to a court-martial for the words he had uttered, cashiered, and dismissed the service, though he was shortly after restored for his gallantry at that memorable battle, with the general approbation of the navy; and Lord Gambier, after a protracted trial, was acquitted by his court-martial, and afterward received the thanks of both houses of Parliament, as well as Lord Cochrane and the other officers and men employed on the occasion.*

Napoleon's opinion on this matter was very decided. "Cochrane," said he, "not only could have destroyed the whole French ships, but he might, and would have taken them out, had the English admiral supported him as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by the French admiral for every one to shift for himself, they became panic-struck, and cut their cables. The terror of the fireships was so great, that they actually threw their powder overboard, so that they could have offered very little resistance. Fear deprived the French captains of their senses. Had Cochrane been supported, he would have taken every one of the ships."† Impressed with these ideas, the French emperor brought the officers of his lost vessels to trial, and Lafond, the captain of the *Calcutta*, was condemned and executed, and two others were sentenced to imprisonment.

Lord Cochrane was, after the death of Nelson, the greatest naval commander of that age of glory. Equal to his
Character of Lord Cochrane.
great predecessor in personal gallantry, enthusiastic ardour, and devotion to his country, he was, perhaps, his superior in original genius, inventive power, and inexhaustible resources. The skill and indefatigable perseverance with which, during the Spanish war, when in command only of his own frigate, he alarmed and distracted the whole coast from Toulon to Barcelona, has never been surpassed; with the crew of a frigate, which did not exceed three hundred and fifty men, he kept ten thousand of the enemy constantly occupied. It was his misfortune to arrive at manhood and high command only towards the close of the war, when the enemy's fleets had disappeared from the ocean, and the glorious opportunities of its earlier years had passed away: more truly than Alexander the Great he might have wept that there no longer remained a world to conquer. His coolness in danger was almost unparalleled even in the English navy, and in the days of Nelson and Collingwood:‡ his men, nevertheless, had such confidence in his judgment and resources, that they would have followed wherever he led, even to the cannon's mouth. Unhappily for himself and

* Brenton, ii., 285, 286. James, iv., 118, 121.

† O'Meara, ii., 292.

‡ Thib., vii., 261.

§ In Basque Roads, a seaman, sitting by his side in the boat, was killed by a cannon-shot from one of the French vessels, when in the act of looking through a telescope at the enemy's fleet: without saying a word, or averting his eye, he took the instrument out of the dead man's hand and completed the observation.

* James, iv., 110, 122. Brenton, ii., 281, 282. Thib., vii., 261. Lord Gambier's Account. Ann. Reg., 435. App. to Chron.

his country, he engaged, with little discretion when ashore, in party politics: he stood forth as a prominent opponent of government on various occasions, on which he unnecessarily put himself forward in contests with which he had no concern; while his strong inventive turn led him, when unemployed, to connect himself with some transactions with which his heroic qualities had no affinity. In consequence of these unhappy indiscretions and connexions, he was, towards the close of the war, brought to trial before the court of King's Bench for a hoax practised for jobbing purposes on the Stock Exchange, and, under the direction of Lord Ellenborough, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and an ignominious punishment, the worst part of which the better feeling of government led them to remit. The result was, that the hero of Basque Roads was dismissed the navy, bereft of his honours, and driven into the service of the South American Republics, where his exploits, of the most extraordinary and romantic character, powerfully contributed to destroy the last relics of the Spanish empire in that quarter, and establish the doubtful ascendancy of Democratic fervour. But, in a free country, no deed of injustice, whether popular or ministerial, can permanently blast a noble character. With the changes of time, the power which had oppressed England's greatest existing naval hero passed away: another generation succeeded, to which his exploits were an object of admiration, his weaknesses of forgiveness, his wrongs of commiseration; one of the most deservedly popular acts of the new ministry, which succeeded to the helm after the overthrow of the Tory administration, was to restore him to the rank and the honours of which he had been deprived; and there remains now to the historian only the grateful duty of lending his humble efforts to aid in rescuing from unmerited obloquy the victim of aristocratic, as he has frequently done those of popular injustice.*

The defeat and blockade of the French squadron in Basque Roads was shortly
 Capture of Martinique and St. Domingo, in the West Indies. felt in the capture of the French West India islands, to relieve which was the object of its ill-fated sortie from Brest Harbour. A British expedition sailed from Jamaica, and appeared off Martinique in the end of January. The landing was effected without any resistance, and the enemy having been defeated in a general action some days after, they were shut up in Fort Bourbon, the principal stronghold in the island, which shortly after surrendered, Feb. 2. with three thousand men, at discretion. Feb. 18. This was followed, some months afterward, by

* Lord Cochrane was tried for alleged accession to the Stock Exchange hoax, before a most able and powerful judge, Lord Ellenborough, and, being convicted, sentenced to imprisonment and the pillory. There can be no doubt that the evidence tending to connect him with the facts charged was of a very strong kind, and the judge was constrained to exhibit the case in an unfavourable light against the accused to the jury. Yet the author, after hearing Lord Cochrane deliver his defence in the House of Commons, on July 7, 1814, has never entertained a doubt of his innocence, and, even if the facts charged had been distinctly brought home to him, it was surely a most unwarrantable stretch to sentence to the degrading punishment of the pillory so heroic a character, especially for a proceeding involving no moral turpitude, and rarely, if ever, before or since made the object of punishment. This part of the sentence was immediately and most properly remitted by government; but the result of the trial hung heavily on the hero of Basque Roads, in this country, for twenty years afterward.

a successful descent on the colony and July 2. fortress of St. Domingo, which, with two battalions of infantry, were taken by General Carmichael. Cayenne was also reduced: so that, as Cuba and the other Spanish settlements in those latitudes were now allied colonies, the French flag was entirely excluded from the West Indies.*

The Isle of France, in the Indian Ocean, was, at the same time, strictly blockaded, and it was foreseen, must ere long of Bourbon in capitulate; the isle of Bourbon surrendered on the 21st of September; the French settlement on the Senegal River, on the western coast of Africa, had fallen into the hands of the English; and preparations were making on a great scale for an attack on Batavia, and the important island of Java in the Indian Archipelago. Thus in every direction the last distant settlements of Napoleon were falling into the hands of the British; and, at the time when the triumphant conclusion of the Austrian war seemed to give him the undisputed command of Continental Europe, the maritime superiority of England was producing its natural results, in the successive acquisition of the whole colonies of the globe.†

Important success also attended the British arms, both by sea and land, in the Mediterranean. A powerful naval expedition was despatched in autumn by Lord Collingwood, with sixteen hundred land-troops on board, who, after a slight resistance, made themselves masters of the seven islands of Zante, Cephalonia, Corfu, &c., which were permanently placed under the protection and sway of Great Britain. The importance of this acquisition was not at that period perceived; but, by giving Great Britain a permanent footing in the neighbourhood of Greece, and the command of Corfu, the finest harbour and strongest fortress in the Adriatic, it powerfully contributed, in the end, to counterbalance the influence of the cabinet of St. Petersburg in that quarter, and may be regarded as the first step in a series of events, linked together by a chain of necessary though unperceived connexion—the Greek Revolution—the battle of Navarino—the prostration of Turkey—the establishment of a Christian government in Greece—the subjugation of Persia—and rapid extension of Russian influence in Khorassan—which are destined, to all human appearance, in their ultimate consequences, to roll back to the East the tide of civilized contest, array the powers of the West in fearful collision in Central Asia, and prepare, in the hostile efforts of European ambition, that general restoration of the regions of the sun which, for mysterious purposes, Providence has hitherto prevented from taking place by the desolating sway of Mohammedan power.‡

In conformity with the earnest desire expressed by the Austrian government that a diversion of considerable magnitude should be attempted on the coast of Italy, an expedition was prepared in the Sicilian harbours, in the course of this summer, to menace the coast of Naples. As usual, however, the British government were so tardy in their operations,

* Ann. Reg., 228 and 461. App. to Chron.
 † Ann. Reg., 1809, 228, and 429, 461. App. to Chron. Jom., ii., 296.
 ‡ Ann. Reg., 1809. Lord Collingwood's Despatch, Oct. 30, 1809. App. to Chron., 530, 531.

And of the isle of Bourbon in the East.
 September 21.

Reduction of the seven Ionian islands.
 October 3.

Fruitless expedition of Sir J. Stuart against the coast of Naples.

that not only was ample time given to the enemy to prepare for his defence at the menaced points, but it was utterly impossible that the armament could have any beneficial effect on the vital line of operations in the valley of the Danube. The fleet, having no less than fifteen thousand troops, half British and half Sicilian, on board, did not set sail from Palermo till the beginning of June; that is to say, more than a month after the Archduke John had retired from Italy, and the theatre of contest between him and Eugene Beauharnois had been transferred to the Hungarian plains. It at first met with considerable success.

The island of Ischia, which forms so conspicuous an object in the Bay of Naples, was assaulted and carried by the British troops; Pro-

June 6.

cida was next taken, close to the shore, with a flotilla of forty gunboats, fifteen hundred prisoners, and a hundred pieces of cannon; while a detachment of the English forces, landing on the Straits of Messina, took possession of the Castle of Scylla and the chain of fortified posts opposite to Sicily. These advantages had, at first, the effect of spreading a great alarm along the Neapolitan coast, and occasioning the recall of a considerable body of men whom Murat had detached to the support of the viceroy, but they led to no other or more durable result. This powerful British force, nearly as large as that which gained the battle of Vimiero, and which, if landed and skilfully brought into action, would probably have overthrown the whole army of Naples, was shortly after withdrawn by the instructions of government, who intended this only as a diversion, without attempting anything farther; and the fortified posts at Scylla, after being several times taken and retaken, were at length abandoned to the enemy. This expedition, from its tardy appearance and inconsiderable exploits, could hardly be said to have contributed much to aid the common cause; but, from the alarm which it diffused through the Italian Peninsula, it had a powerful effect in accelerating the ecclesiastical revolution, which has already been noticed, and may be regarded as the immediate cause of the arrest of the pope, which, in its ultimate effects, produced such important results.*

A maritime operation, attended with more decisive consequences, took place in autumn, in the Bay of Genoa. A detachment of the Toulon fleet having put to sea, with a view to carry succours to the French troops in the Bay of Rosas, which were cut off by

the Spaniards from the direct communication with their own country, they were immediately chased by Lord Collingwood, who blockaded that port, and, after a hard pursuit, the ships of war were forced to separate from the convoy, and three ships of the line and one frigate driven ashore, where they were burned by the enemy, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the British. Meanwhile, the transports, under convoy of a frigate and some smaller-armed ships, in all eleven vessels, having taken refuge in the Bay of Rosas, under protection of the powerful castle and batteries there, deemed themselves beyond the reach of attack. In that situation, however, they were assailed by a detachment of the British fleet, under the orders of Captain Hallowell, who at once formed the daring resolution of cutting out the whole with the boats

of the ships under his command. The arrangements for this purpose, made with the judgment and foresight which might have been expected from that distinguished hero of the Nile, were carried into effect by Lieutenant Tailour with a spirit and resolution above all praise. In sight of the fleet, the boats stretched out, the crews being at the highest point of animation, filling the air with their cheers; and, rapidly advancing under a very heavy fire from the armed ships and batteries, carried the whole vessels in the most gallant style, and either burned or brought away them all.*

Brilliant as these naval operations were, they had no decisive effect on the issue of the war. The maritime contest was decided: at Trafalgar the dominion of the seas had finally passed to the British flag. It was at land that the real struggle now lay; it was for the deliverance of other nations that England now fought; it was on the soldiers of Wellington that the eyes of the world were turned.

After the retreat of the English to Corunna, and the fall of Madrid, affairs in the Peninsula appeared wellnigh desperate. In Portugal there was merely a corps of eight thousand British soldiers, chiefly in and around Lisbon,

State of affairs in Portugal, and forces of the patriots at this period.

upon whom any reliance could be placed; for, though about six thousand men, under Silveira, lay in the northern provinces, and the Lusitanian legion, of half that amount, on the northeastern frontier, yet the composition of the forces of which these detachments consisted was not such as to inspire any confidence as to their ability to contend with regular soldiers, or defend the country in the event of a fresh invasion. Their small numerical amount compelled Cradock, in the first instance, to concentrate his forces, which he did at Passa d'Arcos, close to the mouth of the Tagus, where he might be in a situation to embark with safety if a serious invasion should be attempted. These dispositions, however, naturally spread the belief that the English were going to abandon the country, as they had done Galicia, and tumults broke out in various quarters, arising from the dread of this anticipated desertion. Towards the end of February, however, the arrival of six thousand men from England, under Sherbrooke and Mackenzie, having augmented Cradock's force to fourteen thousand, he was enabled to take a position in advance, covering the capital, at Saccavino, which soon, by reviving confidence, had the effect of removing the public discontents.†

Affairs in Spain were still more unpromising. The army of Blake, which had suffered so severely at Espinosa and Reynosa, had dwindled into eight or nine thousand ragged and half-starved troops, without either stores or artillery, who with difficulty maintained themselves in the Galician Mountains: the remains of the soldiers of Arragon, about twenty thousand strong, had thrown themselves into Saragossa, where they were preparing to undergo a fresh siege; Castanos' men, who had come up from Andalusia, joined to some which had escaped from Somo-Sierre and Madrid, in all twenty-five thousand strong, were in La Mancha, and had their headquarters at Toledo; while ten or twelve thousand disorganized levies at Badajoz formed a sort of guard for the

* Sir J. Stuart's Despatch, June 5, 1809. App. to Chron., 457. Ann. Reg. Pol., iv., 41, 44.

† Lord Collingwood's Despatch, Nov. 1, 1809. Captain Hallowell, Nov. 1, Ann. Reg., 1809, 511, 515. App. to Chron., † Nap., ii., 142, 159. Lond., i., 294, 295

Central Junta, who had established themselves in that city after the fall of Madrid. As to the new levies in Andalusia, Granada, and Valencia, they were, as yet, too ill disciplined and remote from the scene of action to be capable of affording any efficient support to regular troops in the earlier periods of the campaign; and though, in Catalonia, there were at least fifty thousand brave men in possession of Gerona, Rosas, Tarragona, Tortosa, Lerida, and a strong central range of mountains, yet they were fully occupied with the invaders in their own bounds, and without either seeking from, or being able to afford succour to, the neighbouring provinces, resolutely maintained on their own hills an independent hostility. In all, scarcely a hundred and twenty thousand men, scattered round the whole circumference of the Peninsula, without either any means of uniting with each other, any central authority to which they all yielded obedience, or common object to which they could simultaneously be applied. At Madrid, Joseph reigned with the apparent consent of the nation: registers having been open for the inscription of the names of those who were favourable to his government, no less than twenty-eight thousand heads of families in a few days enrolled themselves; and deputations from the municipal council, the council of the Indies, and all the incorporations, waited upon him at Valladolid to entreat that he would return to the capital and reassume the royal functions, with which he at length complied.*

On the other hand, the forces of Napoleon were much more formidable, both from the position which they occupied, and the number and quality of the troops of which they were composed. Instead of being spread out, like the English and Spanish hosts, round an immense circumference, without any means of communicating with or supporting each other, they were massed together in the central parts of the kingdom, and possessed the inestimable advantage of an interior and comparatively short line of communication. The total French force in the Peninsula amounted, even after the Imperial Guards had departed for Germany, to two hundred and eighty thousand infantry and forty thousand cavalry, of whom two hundred and forty thousand were present in the field with the eagles. Fifty thousand of this immense force protected the great line of communication with France, which was strengthened by three fortresses and sixty-four fortified posts of correspondence; and the corps were so distributed that they could all support each other in case of need, or combine in any common operation. The northern provinces were parcelled out into military governments, the chiefs of which corresponded with each other by means of movable columns, repressed any attempt at insurrection, and levied military contributions on the inhabitants, to the amount not only of all the wants of their respective corps, but in some cases of immense fortunes to themselves. Nearly the whole charges of this enormous force were at the expense of the conquered provinces. Soult, with twenty-three thousand effective men, lay at Corunna, while Ney, with fourteen thousand, occupied Asturias and the northern coast; Lannes and Moncey, with two corps, about forty-eight thousand strong, were charged with the

siege of Saragossa; Victor was in Estremadura with twenty-five thousand; Mortier, with as many, in the valley of the Tagus; and Sebastiani, who had succeeded to the command of LeFebvre's corps, observed the enemy's forces in La Mancha; St. Cyr, with forty thousand, lay in Catalonia; and Joseph, with twelve thousand guards, was at Madrid.*

The spirits of the Spaniards, which had been sunk to an extraordinary degree by the disasters of the preceding campaign, the capture of their capital, and retreat of the English troops from Galicia, were first revived by the intelligence of the treaty so opportunely and generously concluded by great Britain at the moment of their greatest depression, by which she engaged never to conclude a separate peace with Napoleon; and by the resolution expressed in Parliament by the ministers, notwithstanding the gloomy forebodings of the opposition, never to abandon the cause of Spanish independence. These cheering announcements were speedily followed by deeds which clearly evinced an unabated resolution to maintain the contest. Measures were set on foot in Portugal, evidently calculated for a protracted struggle. General Beresford had been appointed by the regency field-marshal in the Portuguese service, and intrusted with the arduous duty of training and directing the new levies in that kingdom: twenty thousand of these troops were taken into British pay, placed under the direction of British officers, and admitted to all the benefits of British upright administration; the regency revived and enforced the ancient law of the monarchy, by which, in periods of peril, the whole male population capable of bearing arms were called out in defence of their country; numerous transports, filled with stores and muniments of war, daily arrived at Lisbon, which became a vast dépôt for the military operations of the kingdom; and, finally, the landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley, with powerful re-enforcements from England, was regarded at once as a pledge of sincerity in the cause, and the harbinger of yet higher glories than he had yet acquired. Reanimated by these vigorous steps on the part of their ally, not less than the breaking out of the Austrian war, and withdrawing of the Imperial Guard from the Peninsula, the Central Junta, which was now established at Seville, issued an animated proclamation to their countrymen, in which, after recounting the propitious circumstances which were now appearing in their favour, they strongly recommended the general adoption of the guerilla system of warfare, and renewed their protestation never to make peace while a single Frenchman polluted the Spanish territory.†

Saragossa was the first place of note which was threatened by the French arms. Preparations for the siege of Saragossa. The vicinity of that place to the frontier of the Empire, its commanding situation on the banks of the Ebro, the valour of its inhabitants, and the renown which they had acquired by the successful issue of the last siege, all conspired to render its early reduction a matter of the highest interest to the emperor. After the disastrous issue of the battle of Tudela,

* Belmas, i., 37, 38. Imp. Must. Rolls, Nap., ii., App., Nos. 1, 2.

† See proclamation in Belmas, i., App., No. 25. App., Lond., i., 294, 295. Nap., ii., 142, 159.

* Lond., i., 294, 295. Nap., ii., 4, 5. Vict. et Conq., xviii., 255, 257. Tor., ii., 204, 205.

Palafox, with about fifteen thousand regular troops, had thrown himself into that city; but their number was soon augmented to thirty thousand by the stragglers who had taken refuge there after that rout, to whom were soon joined fifteen thousand armed but undisciplined peasants, monks, and mechanics. The enthusiasm of this motley crowd was inconceivable: it recalled, in the nineteenth century, the days of Numantia and Saguntum. The citizens of the town were animated by the spirit of Democratic freedom; the peasants of the country by that of devout enthusiasm; the monks by religious devotion; the soldiers by former glory—all by patriotic fervour. By a single combination of circumstances, but which frequently occurred during the Spanish war, the three great principles which agitate mankind—the spirit of religion, the fervour of equality, the glow of patriotism—were all called into action at the same time, and brought to conspire to stimulate one common resistance; and thence the obstinate defence of Saragossa and its deathless fame.*

The defences of the place had been considerably strengthened since the former siege. The weak or ruined parts of the wall had been repaired, additional parapets erected in the most exposed situations, the suburbs included in new fortifications, barriers and trenches drawn across the principal streets, and the houses loopholed: so that, even if the rampart were surmounted, a formidable resistance might be anticipated in the interior of the town. General Doyle, of the English service, had, ever since the termination of the first siege, been indefatigable in his efforts to strengthen the place: a large quantity of English muskets were distributed among the inhabitants; ammunition, stores, and provisions, were provided in abundance; the solid construction of the storehouses diminished to a considerable degree the chances of a successful bombardment; and one hundred and eighty guns distributed on the ramparts gave token of a much more serious resistance than on the last memorable occasion. Such was the confidence of the Arragonese in the strength of the ramparts of Saragossa, the unconquerable spirit of its garrison, and the all-powerful protection of our Lady of the Pillar, that, on the approach of the French troops to invest the town, the peasants from all quarters flocked into it, burning with ardour and undaunted in resolution, so as to swell its defenders to fifty thousand men, but bringing with them, as into Athens when besieged by the Lacedæmonians, the seeds of a contagious malady, which among its now crowded dwellings spread with alarming rapidity, and in the end proved more fatal even than the sword of the enemy.†

Palafox exercised an absolute authority over the city, and such was the patriotic ardour of the inhabitants, that all his orders for the public defence were obeyed without a moment's hesitation, even though involving the sacrifice of the most valuable property or dearest attachments of the people. If a house in the neighbourhood was required to be demolished to make way for the fire of the ramparts, hardly was the order given than the proprietor himself levelled it with the ground. The shady groves, the delicious gardens in which

the citizens so much delighted, fell before the axe: in a few days the accumulated wealth of centuries disappeared in the environs of the town before the breath of patriotism. Palafox's provident care extended to every department: his spirit animated every rank; but such was the ardour of the people, that their voluntary supplies anticipated every requisition, and amply provided for the multitude now accumulated within the walls; terror was summoned to the aid of loyalty, and the fearful engines of popular power, the scaffold and the gallows, were erected on the public square, where some unhappy wretches, suspected of a leaning to the enemy, were indignantly executed.*

To attack a town defended by fifty thousand armed men, animated with such a spirit, was truly a formidable undertaking, but the forces which Napoleon put at the disposal of his generals were adequate to the enterprise. Two strong corps, numbering together nearly fifty thousand combatants, present with the eagles, were placed under the command of the Marshals Moncey and Mortier, and the operations of the siege began in good earnest in the middle of December.† The fortified out-
post of Torrero was carried after a slight resistance, the garrison having withdrawn into the town; but an assault, two days afterward, upon the suburb in the same quarter, though at first successful, was finally repulsed with great slaughter by Palafox, who hastened to the menaced point, and, by his example, powerfully contributed to restore the day. An honourable capitulation was then proposed by Mortier, accompanied with the intimation that Madrid had fallen, and the English were retiring before Napoleon to their ships; but even this disheartening intelligence had no effect upon the resolution of the brave governor, who replied that, if Madrid had fallen, it was because it had been sold, but that the ramparts of Saragossa were still untouched, and he would bury himself and his soldiers under its ruins rather than capitulate. Despairing now of effecting an accommodation, the French marshals completed the investment of the town on both sides of the river, and the parallels being now considerably advanced, a powerful fire was opened on the walls, especially on the convents of the Augustines, the Capuchins, and Santa Eufracia, the only structures resembling bastions in their whole circumference.‡

Marshal Junot arrived and took the command of the besieging force on the 2d of January, and every day and night thereafter was signaled by

* Belm., ii., 143, 144. Tor., ii., 238. Cav., 77, 81. Jones, i., 170.

† Colonel Napier (*Peninsular War*, ii., 25) says that the besieging force was only 35,000; but this is a mistake, as the numbers proved by the imperial muster-rolls, published by order of the French government, were as follows:

Third corps—Junot's—Infantry and Cavalry.....	22,473
Artillery.....	788
Fifth corps—Mortier's—Infantry and Cavalry.....	22,607
Artillery.....	1,660
Artillery, heavy, officers and men.....	542
Engineers' establishment.....	1,017
Total.....	49,087

Sixteen thousand five hundred of the infantry and cavalry of the third corps alone were employed in the siege, the remainder being devoted to keeping up the communications, making the force actually employed in the siege 43,000.—See BELMAS, *Journal des Sièges dans la Péninsule*, vol. ii., 333, 339: an official work of great accuracy and splendour.

‡ Jones, i., 171, 173. Tor., ii., 241, 242. Cav., 91, 93. Belm., ii., 153, 163.

* *Jom.*, iii., 125. *Cav.*, 68, 69. *Tor.*, ii., 236, 237.

† *Cav.*, 74, 87. *Tor.*, ii., 239, 240. *Jom.*, iii., 126, 127. *Belm.*, ii., 139, 140; and *Pièces Just.*, i.

Assault and bloody combats. Sorties were daily attempted by the Spanish troops, and sometimes with success; but, in spite of all their efforts, the progress of the besiegers was sensible, and, by the middle of January, almost all the fortified posts outside the rampart had fallen into their hands. The feeble parapet of the wall was soon levelled by the French cannon, and the heroic Spanish gunners had no defence but bags of earth, which the citizens replaced as fast as they were shattered by the enemy's shot and their own unconquerable courage. The tête-du-pont of the Jan. 15. Huerba was carried with very little loss, and though the bridge itself was blown up by the besieged, the enemy made their way across the stream, and, from fifty-five pieces of heavy cannon, thundered on the feeble rampart which, in that place, was so dilapidated as to give way after a few hours' battering. But, meanwhile, the Spaniards were not idle. Not only was every inch of ground resolutely contested, and the most extraordinary means taken to keep up the spirits of the besieged: the report was spread by the generals, and gained implicit credence, that the emperor had been defeated, several of the marshals killed, and that Don Francisco Palafox, brother to the commander-in-chief, was approaching with a powerful army to raise the siege. In truth, Don Philippe Perena, a guerilla leader, had succeeded in drawing together six thousand peasants, with whom he kept the field in Arragon, and disquieted the rear of the French army; and, although neither the numbers nor composition of this force was such as to give them any serious alarm, the knowledge of its existence had a surprising effect in supporting the efforts of the besieged, who now stood much in need of such encouragement, from the crowded condition of the population shut up within the narrow circle of the old walls, and the fearful ravages which contagious maladies were making among an indigent and suffering multitude, driven into crowded cellars to avoid the terrible and incessant fire of the enemy's bombs and cannon-shot.*

Matters were in this state when Marshal Lannes arrived, intrusted by Napoleon, who was dissatisfied with the progress made, with the general direction of the siege, and the command of both the corps employed in its prosecution. The influence of his master-mind speedily appeared in the increased energy of the attacks, and more thorough co-operation of the troops engaged in the undertaking. Several nocturnal sorties attempted by the Spaniards to retard their progress towards the Convent of Santa Eufracia, which itself formed a prominent part of the wall towards the river, having failed to stop the besiegers, an assault on that quarter was ordered by Marshal Lannes on the 27th at noon. Jan. 27. Two practicable breaches had been made in that quarter, and a third nearer the centre of the town, in the Convent of Santa Eufracia. The tolling of the great bell of the new tower warned the Saragossans of the approach of the enemy, and all instantly hastened to the post of danger. Hardly had they arrived when the assaulting columns appeared at the breaches, vast crowds of daring men issued from the trenches, and with loud shouts rushed on to the

attack. Such was the vigour of the assault, that after a hard struggle, the French, though twice repulsed, at length succeeded in making themselves masters of the Convent of St. Joseph; while in the centre, the attacking column on Santa Eufracia, after reaching the summit of the breach, was hurled headlong to its foot by a gallant effort of the Spanish soldiers. Returning again, however, with redoubled vigour to the charge, they not only penetrated in, but made themselves masters of the adjoining convent, where, in spite of the efforts of the besieged to dispossess them, they maintained themselves till evening. All night the tocsin rang incessantly to call the citizens to the scene of danger,* and devoted crowds rushed with indomitable courage to the very mouth of the enemy's guns; but, though they fought from every house and window with the most desperate resolution, they could not drive the assailants from the posts they had won.

The walls of Saragossa had now gone to the ground, and an ordinary garrison, Obstinate defence of the town after the walls were taken. having lost its military defences, would never have thought of prolonging the contest. But the valour of the inhabitants remained, and from the ruins of all regulated or acknowledged modes of defence, emerged the redoubtable warfare of the people. On the very next day, the commander of their engineers, San Genis, a man of equal professional skill and resolution, fell on the battery of Palafox. Though his manners were gentle, yet he had the true spirit of a soldier, and often said, "It is needless ever to cite me to a council of war in which there is to be a question of capitulating; my opinion is, we can, under all circumstances, defend ourselves." The French chief of engineers, La Coste, a young man of similar acquirements and valour, perished at the same time; but the loss of their skilled talents was now of little moment; the dreadful war from house to house had commenced, in which individual courage more than directing talent was required. No sooner was it discovered that the enemy had effected a lodgement within the walls, than the people assembled in crowds in every house and building near the structures which they occupied, and kept up so incessant a fire on the assailants, that for some days Lannes deemed it not advisable to provoke an open combat, but to confine his efforts to strengthening the posts he had won, and preparing the way for farther progress by the more certain methods of sap and mine.† Meantime, the passions of the people were roused to the very highest pitch by the dread of treason or any accommodation with the enemy; and popular vehemence, overwhelming all restraints of law or order, sacrificed, almost every night, persons to the blind suspicions of the multitude, who were found hanging in the morning on gallows erected in the Cosso and market-place. Jan. 28. Feb. 2.

The enemy's efforts were directed chiefly against the Convents of San Augustin and Santa Monaca, and a breach having been effected in their walls, they were carried by assault; but the assailants, having endeavoured, after this success, to penetrate into the principal street of the Cosso, were

* Belm., ii., 163, 204. Nap., ii., 31. Tor., ii., 243, 244. Cav., 93, 101. Rogn., 22, 24.

* Belm., ii., 218, 227. Cav., 103, 105. Tor., ii., 246, 247. Nap., ii., 34, 37.
† Cav., 107, 111. Tor., ii., 247, 248. Nap., ii., 37, 38. Belm., ii., 226, 277. Rogn., 26, 30.

repulsed with great slaughter. Every house, every room, in the quarters where the attack was going on with most vehemence, became the theatre of mortal combat: as the original assailants and defenders were killed or wounded, others were hurried forward to the spot; the dead and the dying lay heaped upon each other, to the height of several feet above the ground; but, mounting on this ghastly pile, the undaunted foemen still maintained the fight for hours together, with such obstinacy, that no progress could be made on either side; and not unfrequently, while still fast locked in the deadly struggle, the whole, dead, dying, and combatants, were together blown into the air by the explosion of the mines beneath. Yet even these awful catastrophes were turned by the besieged to their advantage: the ruined walls afforded no protection to the French soldiers, and, from the adjoining windows, the Arragonese marksmen brought down, with unerring aim, every hostile figure that appeared among the ruins. Taught by these dangers, the French engineers diminished the charge of powder in their mines, so as to blow up the inside of the houses only, without throwing down the external walls; and in these half-ruined edifices they maintained themselves, and pushed on fresh mines and attacks. Still, however, the convents and churches remained in the hands of the Spaniards; and, as long as these massy structures were garrisoned by their undaunted troops, the progress of the French was not only extremely slow, but liable to continual disaster from the sallies, often successful, of the besieged, and the countermines with which they thwarted the progress of their subterranean attacks. Disheartened by this murderous and apparently interminable warfare, which continued without intermission night and day, for three weeks, the French soldiers began to murmur at their lot: they almost despaired of conquering a city where every house was defended like a citadel, where every street could be won only by torrents of blood, and victory was attained only by destruction; the wounded, the sick, had fearfully thinned their ranks, and that depression was rapidly spreading among them which is so often the forerunner of the greatest calamities. "Scarce a fourth of the town," said they, "is won, and we are already exhausted. We must wait for re-enforcements, or we shall all perish among these ruins, which will become our own tombs before we can force the last of these fanatics from the last of their dens."*

But, while depression was thus paralyzing the arm of the besiegers, the miseries of the besieged were incomparably greater. The incessant shower of bombs and cannon-balls which fell upon the town had for a month past obliged the whole inhabitants, not actually combating, to take refuge in the cellars; and the close confinement of so vast a multitude in these narrow and gloomy abodes, joined to the failure of provisions, and mental depression springing from the unbounded calamities with which they were surrounded, induced a terrible fever, which was now making the most dreadful ravages. What between the devastations of the epidemic and the sword of the enemy, several thousands, in the middle of February, were dying every day; room could not be found in the chancel-houses for such a multitude of bodies; and the

living and the dead were shut up together in these subterranean abodes, while the roar of artillery, the explosion of mines, the crash of falling houses, the flames of conflagration, and the alternate shouts and cries of the combatants, shook the city night and day, without intermission, above their head. Happy those who expired amid this scene of unutterable woe! yet even they bequeathed with their last breath to the survivors the most solemn injunctions to continue to the last this unparalleled struggle; and from these dens of the living and the dead issued daily crowds of warriors, extenuated, indeed, and livid, but who maintained with unconquerable resolution a desperate resistance. But human nature, even in its most exalted mood, cannot go beyond a certain point: Saragossa was about to fall, but she was to leave a name immortal, like Numantia or Saguntum, in the annals of mankind.†

Marshal Lannes, unshaken by the murmurs of his troops, was indefatigable in his endeavours to prosecute the siege to a successful issue. He pointed out to them, with justice, that the losses of the besieged greatly exceeded their own, and that, even if the fierceness of their defence should continue unabated, their destruction must speedily ensue from the united ravages of famine and pestilence. Meanwhile, intelligence arrived of the evacuation of Galicia by the English, and various successes in other parts of Spain; and these advices having somewhat elevated their spirits, a general assault took place on the 18th, on both banks of the Ebro. The division of Gazan burst with irresistible violence into the suburb on the left bank, which the Spaniards had hitherto held; and, pushing on to the Convent of St. Lazaro, which stood on the water's edge, after a bloody repulse, made good their entrance through an enormous breach which their artillery had made in its walls. This important acquisition rendered the suburb no longer tenable, and its brave defenders were forced to retreat across the bridge into the town. Part effected their object, amid a terrific fire of grape, bombs, and musket-shot, which raked them on both sides in rushing through the perilous defile; the remainder, to the number of fifteen hundred, after vainly endeavouring to cut their way through the dense masses of the enemy, were surrounded, and, having exhausted their ammunition, were made prisoners. This was a fatal blow to the Spaniards. Fifty pieces of heavy artillery, placed in the abandoned suburb, played across the Ebro on the defenceless houses on the quay, and soon laid

Able efforts and successes of Marshal Lannes on the left of the Ebro. Feb. 18.

Miseries to which the besieged were exposed from pestilence.

* Belm., ii., 267, 277. Cav., 129, 131. Rogniat, 38, 42. Tor., 249, 250.

† Such was the heroic spirit which animated the inhabitants, that it inspired even the softer sex to deeds of valour. Among these, Augustina Zaragoza was peculiarly distinguished. She had served, with unshaken courage, a cannon near the gate of Portillo at the former siege, and she took her station there again when the enemy returned. "See, general," said she to Palafox when he visited that quarter, "I am again with my old friend." Her husband being struck by a cannon-ball, as he served the battery, she calmly stepped into his place, and pointed the gun as he lay bleeding at her side. Frequently she was to be seen at the head of an assaulting party, wrapped in her cloak, sword in hand, cheering on the soldiers to the discharge of their duty. She was at length taken prisoner; but, being carried to the French hospital and taken dangerously ill, she contrived to escape. A female corps was formed to carry provisions and water to the combatants and remove the wounded, at the head of which was Donna Benita, a lady of rank. Several hundred women and children perished during the siege, not by bombs or cannon-shot, but in actual combat.—See SOUTHEY, ii., 200; and RIG, 220, 221.

* Belm., ii., 227, 266. Nap., ii., 39, 40. Rogniat, 34, 39. Cav., 113, 123.

them in ruins. Before the besieged could recover from their consternation, Lannes commenced a furious assault on the monastery of the Trinity, near the University; and, after a vain attempt to carry it by open force, the assailants succeeded in making good their entrance during the confusion occasioned by the explosion of a petard. At the same time, a mine, charged with sixteen hundred pounds of powder, exploded with a terrific shock near the Comic Theatre, and six mines had been run under the street of the Cosso, each of which were charged with three thousand pounds of powder, more than sufficient to lay all that part of the city in ruins, and expose naked and defenceless all those quarters which were still held by the patriots.*

Happily, it was not necessary to have recourse to that extremity. Palafox, who, of Saragossa. from the commencement of the siege, February 20. had discharged with heroic resolution the duties of a commander-in-chief, and, though laid prostrate for nearly a month by the prevailing epidemic, still held the keys of the city in his grasp, now perceived that farther resistance was fruitless. His brother, Don Francisco Palafox, had not only been unable to throw succours into the place, but had been driven off to a distance, and the troops despatched against him had returned to re-enforce the besieging host; the malignant fever daily made great ravages, both among the troops and the inhabitants; hardly nine thousand of the former remained capable of bearing arms, and the latter were diminished in a still greater proportion; there were neither hospitals for the thousands of sick who crowded the city, nor medicines for their relief. In these circumstances, this noble chief, who was so reduced by fever as to be unable any longer to bear the

burden of the command; and yet knew Feb. 19. that as soon as the ascendant of his character was no longer felt, the resistance could not be prolonged, took the resolution to send his aide-camp to Lannes to negotiate for a capitulation. The terms he contended for were, that the garrison should march out with the honours of war, and be allowed to retire to the nearest Spanish army; but these proposals were, of course, rejected, and Lannes at first would only consent to protect the women and children. Don Pedro Ric, who, in the name of the Junta of Saragossa, was intrusted with the negotiation, replied, with great spirit, "That would be delivering us to the mercy of the enemy; if that be the case, Saragossa will continue to defend herself, for she has still weapons, ammunition, and, above all, arms." Fearful of driving to desperation a body of men of whose prowess he had recently had such ample proof, the French marshal, upon this, agreed to a capitulation, by which it was stipulated that the garrison should march out the following morning with the honours of war, and be marched as prisoners of war into France; the officers retaining their swords, horses, and baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks; that private property and public worship should be respected, and the armed peasants dismissed. Situated as the besieged were, these terms could not be regarded but as eminently favourable, and an enduring monument of their heroic constancy; but such was the spirit which still animated the people, that they murmured loudly at any capitulation, and it was with difficulty that the ruling

junta prevented an insurrection during the night for the purpose of continuing the contest till the last extremity.*

On the following day, at noon, twelve thousand men, for the most part pale, emaciated, and livid in hue, marched out, and having surrendered their arms, which they had hardly strength left to hold, to their courageous enemies, were sent into the besiegers' camp, where they received the rations of which they stood so much in need. The French troops then marched into the town, and never had such a spectacle before been exhibited in modern times. Six thousand dead bodies still lay unburied in the streets, among the fragments of buildings, or around the churches; half the houses were in ruins; infants were striving in vain to get nutriment from their dying mothers; from the vaults and subterraneous rooms a few squalid persons of both sexes, like ghosts, were issuing, drawing the corpses, hardly distinguishable save by their stillness from the persons who bore them; the pestilence spread, almost visibly, from those living charnel-houses, alike on friend and foe around. Fifty-four thousand human beings had perished during the siege, of whom only six thousand were killed by the sword or fire of the enemy: the awful plague had carried off the rest. Sixteen thousand sick, for the most part in a dying state, encumbered the town when hostilities ceased, and filled every quarter with woe. The French had three thousand killed and twelve thousand wounded during the struggle.† Fifty days of open trenches had been borne by a town defended by nothing but a single wall; half that time the contest had continued with more than forty thousand besiegers after that feeble defence had fallen, and the town, in a military sense, was taken. Thirty-three thousand cannon-shot, and sixteen thousand bombs, had been thrown into the place; yet, at the close of the siege, the assailants were only masters of a fourth of the town; thirteen convents and churches had been taken, but forty remained to be forced. It was domestic pestilence, not foreign arms, which subdued Saragossa. Modern Europe has not so memorable a siege to recount; and to the end of the world, even after Spain and France have sunk before the waves of time, and all the glories of modern Europe have passed away, it will stand forth, in undecaying lustre, a monument of heroic devotion, which will thrill the hearts of the brave and the generous throughout every succeeding age.‡

The lustre which the French arms justly acquired by the energy and perseverance which they had displayed during this memorable siege, was much tarnished by the cruel or rapacious conduct of the chiefs by whom it had

HIDEOUS appearance of the town when surrendered. Losses on both sides.

Cruel use which the French generals make of their victory.

* Cav., 143, 147. Rogniat, 47, 52. Tor., ii., 252, 253. Don Pedro Ric, 230, 231.

† Rogniat says the French loss was three thousand only, but without specifying whether it was killed, or killed and wounded; and it seems clear that it was the former only—an obscurity which has misled many later writers. It is incredible that forty-eight thousand French, headed by Lannes should have been arrested for fifty days of open trenches, by a resistance which cost them only three thousand men.—See ROGNAT, 49, 51; and SCHEPFLER, *Hist. de la Guerra d'Espagne*, ii., 195, 196. In fact, we have the authority of Suchet for the assertion, that Junot's corps in May, which, at the commencement of the siege, was twenty-three thousand strong, could only muster ten thousand men.—SUCHET, ii., 14, 15.

‡ Belin, ii., 318, 327. Cav., 148, 149. Don Pedro Ric, 232. Schepeler, ii., 196. South., ii., 198, 199.

* Vict. et Conq., xviii., 291, 293. Cav., 137, 139. Tor., ii., 251, 252. Nap., ii., 44, 45. Belin, ii., 308, 317. Rogniat, 42, 45.

been concluded. Don Basilio Boggiero, the former tutor and present friend of Palafox, who was watching beside that heroic chief's bedside to administer to him the last consolations of religion, was, by the express commands of Lannes, three days after the capitulation, dragged at midnight out of the sick chamber, and, along with Don Santiago Sas, another courageous chaplain, who had been distinguished alike by his bravery in the last and the present siege, bayoneted on the banks of the Ebro, and their dead bodies thrown into the river. The French had the cruelty to exact from the wo-struck city of Saragossa, immediately after their entry, a contribution of fifty thousand pairs of shoes, and eight thousand pairs of boots, with medicines and every other requisite for a hospital; a service of china and fitting up for a tennis court were demanded for the particular use of Marshal Junot. The church of our Lady of the Pillar, one of the richest in Spain, was rifled by Marshal Lannes of jewels to the enormous amount of 4,687,000 francs, or £184,000, the whole of which he carried with him into France,* to the infinite mortification of Madame Junot, who conceived her husband had an equal right to the precious spoil, and has, in her vexation, revealed the whole details of the disgraceful spoliation.† By way of striking terror into the monks, some of them were enclosed in sacks and thrown at night into the Ebro, whose waters threw them ashore in the morning, to the utter horror of the inhabitants; while Palafox himself, who was at the point of death when the city surrendered, was conducted a close prisoner into France the moment he was able to travel, in defiance of a promise by Lannes to Ric that he should be permitted to retire wherever he chose.§

The whole moral as well as physical strength of Arragon having been concentrated Submission of Arragon having been concentrated of the whole in Saragossa, its fall immediately of Arragon. drew after it the submission of the rest of the province. The important fortress of Jaca, commanding the chief pass from that province through the Pyrenees into France, surrendered, with its garrison of two thousand men, a few days after the capital had

* Tor., ii., 371. D'Abr., xii., 221.

† D'Abr., xii., 213, 221.

‡ The clergy at first offered a third of the treasure, but this was refused by Lannes, who insisted upon the whole. Marshal Mortier, with a true soldier's honour, refused any part of the plunder.—D'ABRANTES, xii., 221.

§ Ric, 245, 249. D'Abr., xii., 213, 214. Tor., ii., 253, 254. South., ii., 201, 204.

¶ Colonel Napier, after mentioning what is correct, that for a month before the siege terminated, Palafox had been constantly in a bomb-proof cellar, adds (ii., 82) that "there is too much reason to believe that he and others of both sexes lived in a state of sensuality, forming a disgusting contrast to the wretchedness which surrounded them." No authority is quoted for this assertion, and the author can discover none in any other historian. On the contrary, Cavallero, the Spanish chief of engineers of the siege, says, "Le général-en-chef qui depuis un mois n'avait pas sorti de son caveau, avait été atteint de la terrible maladie; il pouvait à peine veiller aux soins de son gouvernement. Il sentit son affaiblissement, et sachant bien que la place ne résisterait pas long temps lorsque l'ascendant de son caractère ne soutiendrait plus l'énergie des Saragossans, il envoya son aide-de-camp proposer au Duc de Montebello une capitulation."—CAVALLERO, 140. And Toreno adds, "Le Général (Palafox) fut emporté mourant de Saragosse; on l'on ne tarda pas à le rapporter au cause de l'extrême faiblesse dans lequel il se trouvait."—TORENO, *Hist. de la Guerre en Espagne*, ii., 254. Colonel Jones, of the British engineers, observes, "Granting the palm of skill and science to the besiegers, as seems their due, it cannot be doubted that, while heroic self-devotion, unshaken loyalty, and exalted patriotism are held in estimation among mankind, the name of Palafox, blended with that of Saragossa, will be immortal."—JONES'S *Sieges of the Peninsula*, i., 163.

fallen. Benasque, and some other places of lesser note, followed the example; and before Marshal Lannes was summoned by Napoleon, in the middle of March, to join the Grand Army in Bavaria, the conquest of the whole province, in a military sense, had been so far completed, that nothing remained for Junot, who continued in command in that quarter, and preparations were commenced for an expedition against Valencia.*

While these important operations were destroying all the elements of resistance in Arragon, Catalonia was becoming the theatre of a sanguinary warfare. At the close of the glorious successes of the preceding campaign, when Duhesme, as already noticed, had withdrawn to Barcelona after the failure before Gerona, there remained to the French in that province only that important fortress, garrisoned by eight thousand, and the citadel of Figueras, by four thousand men.† Napoleon, however, had no intention of allowing the eastern gate of Spain to slip from his grasp, and, even while the first siege of Gerona was still going forward, he was collecting a fresh corps at Perpignan to relieve those who were shut up in Barcelona, and confided the direction of it to Marshal St. Cyr. That accomplished officer took the command in the end of October: Napoleon's parting words to him were brief, but characteristic. "Preserve Barcelona for me; if it is lost, I cannot retake it with eighty thousand men." St. Cyr crossed the frontier on the 5th of November, and advanced Nov. 5, 1808. towards Rosas, the siege of which he immediately commenced. His forces consisted, at first, of thirty thousand, though they were some months afterward augmented to forty-eight thousand men; but they were a motley group of Italians, Germans, and Swiss, upon some of whom little reliance could be placed, and the marshal felt great discouragement at entering with such a force a mountainous province, where eighty thousand men were said to be in arms. But his forebodings were in a great degree groundless: the patriot force in the province was by no means in the brilliant condition which the Spanish journals represented. To the first burst of patriotic exertion had succeeded the usual depressing reaction when the effort is over, and the necessity for sustained sacrifices and organized armies is felt; great part of the peasants had returned to their homes; the local juntas were disunited, and had, in a considerable degree, fallen into incapable hands; a large part of the prodigal supplies of England had been embezzled or misapplied by the cupidity of the Spanish agents, to whom they had been consigned; while the English co-operation from Sicily, which was anxiously looked for, had been intercepted by demonstrations of Murat against Sicily, which had the effect of retaining Sir John Stuart and ten thousand British troops in that island.

Rosas, however, was too strong a place to fall without a vigorous resistance, and it was supported by means of defence Siege of Rosas. which rarely fell to the lot of the Spanish besieged cities. The Excellent, of 74 guns, with two bomb-vessels, lay in the bay, without cannon-shot of the town. Lord Cochrane came up in his frigate the Imperieuse, in the middle of the siege; and the fortifications, though old,

Rosas, however, was too strong a place to fall without a vigorous resistance, and it was supported by means of defence Siege of Rosas.

which rarely fell to the lot of the Spanish besieged cities. The Excellent, of 74 guns, with two bomb-vessels, lay in the bay, without cannon-shot of the town. Lord Cochrane came up in his frigate the Imperieuse, in the middle of the siege; and the fortifications, though old,

* South., ii., 201. Vict. et Conq., xviii., 296. Schepeler, ii., 226, 227.

† Nap., ii., 54, 61. St. Cyr, *Guerre en Catalogne*, 19, 30. Tor., ii., 223, 224. Colling., Mem., ii., 315.

Ante, iii., 75.

were regular and respectable. The citadel and the fort of Trinidad, a mile and a quarter distant, were the strongest points, though they were both commanded by the mountains rising above the town, and the garrison consisted of nearly three thousand men. The town, which

Nov. 27. was hardly fortified, was soon taken, but the citadel and Fort Trinidad made a stout resistance. Heavy guns were at length brought up close to the walls of the latter, and a large breach made in the ramparts, upon which the Spanish governor declared the post no longer

Nov. 30. tenable; but Lord Cochrane, who had just arrived, and to whose ardent spirit such scenes of danger were an actual enjoyment, immediately threw himself into it, and, by his courage and resources, prolonged a defence which otherwise would have been altogether desperate. Two assaults were repulsed by this intrepid officer and his undaunted seamen with very great slaughter; but, meanwhile, a practicable breach was effected in the citadel, and a Dec. 3. sally, attempted on the night of the 3d, having failed to arrest the progress of the besiegers,* the place surrendered with its garrison, still 2400 strong, on the following day; but Lord Cochrane succeeded in getting the whole garrison of Fort Trinidad in safety on board his vessel.

Having his retreat and communication in some degree secured by this success, St. Cyr moved on to the relief of Barcelona, where General Du-

hesme, with eight thousand men, was shut up by the Spanish armies, and reduced to great straits for want of provisions and military stores. It has been already mentioned,† that two roads lead from Perpignan to Barcelona: one going through Hostalrich and Gerona, and the other by Rosas and the seacoast. To avoid the destructive fire of the English cruisers, St. Cyr chose the mountain road, trusting to his resources and skill to discover some path through the hills which might avoid the fire of the first

Dec. 15. of these fortresses. On arriving at the point of danger, a shepherd discovered an unguarded path by which Hostalrich might be turned, which was accordingly done, though not without a very harassing opposition from the Spanish light troops. Next day,

Dec. 16. however, after their circuitous route was over, and they had regained the great road, they encountered the main body of the Spanish army under Vivas and Reding, who had collected fourteen thousand men, half regulars and half armed peasants, in a strong position at Cardadeu, to bar his progress; while seven thousand men, under Lazan, who had issued from Gerona, hung upon their rear, and Milans, with four thousand men, supported by clouds of Somanes, or armed peasants, infested the wooded hills on either flank. The French force on the spot was fifteen thousand infantry and thirteen hundred horse, while the whole Spanish force, if collected together, even after providing for the blockade of Barcelona, would have exceeded forty thousand, stationed in a rocky and wooded country, traversed only by narrow defiles: a situation of all others the most favourable for irregular or half-disciplined troops. Napoleon, in such circumstances, would have raised the blockade of Barcelona as he did that of Mantua

in 1796, and fallen with his whole force on the invader, who could scarcely have escaped destruction: a result which would have changed the whole face of the campaign, and possibly of Europe. But Vivas was not Napoleon, and the Spanish generals deemed no such concentration of all their means necessary. Elated with their advantages, they anticipated an easy victory, and were already, in imagination, renewing the triumphs of Baylen. St. Cyr, however, soon showed he was very different from Dupont. Uniting his troops into one solid mass, with orders to march headlong on, without firing a shot, he bore down with such vigour on the enemy's centre, that in half an hour they were totally defeated, with the loss of five hundred killed and two thousand wounded, besides all their artillery and ammunition. Lazan and Milans came up just when the action was over, and instantly retired to the shelter of Gerona and the mountains: arrived two hours sooner, they might have inspired hesitation in the enemy's column, given time for their whole forces to come up, and Cardadeu had been Baylen. Such is the value of time in war.*

Nothing now remained to prevent the relief of Barcelona by St. Cyr, which was effected the day after, and the junction of Duhesme with his troops completed. The Spaniards had been so

thoroughly dispersed by their defeat, that the general-in-chief, Vivas, had escaped by a cross mountain-path on board one of the English cruisers; and Reding, the second in command, who was left in the direction of the fugitives, could with difficulty, two days afterward, rally ten thousand foot and nine hundred horse to the south of Barcelona. In a few days, however, these troops swelled to twenty thousand men, and took post at Molinos del Rey, where, at daybreak on the 21st, they were attacked by St. Cyr with such vigour that in half an hour they were totally routed, and dispersed in every direction. Such was the swiftness of their flight, that few were killed or wounded, but twelve hundred were made prisoners, and all their magazines, stores, ammunition, and artillery fell into the hands of the victors. Among these were fifty pieces of cannon, three millions of cartridges, sixty thousand pounds of powder, and a magazine containing thirty thousand stand of English arms. The whole open country was, after this great defeat, abandoned by the Spaniards; twelve thousand took refuge, in the utmost disorder, in Tarragona, while five thousand fled to the mountains in the interior, where they conferred the command on Reding, who, undismayed by so many disasters, immediately commenced, with unshaken constancy, the reorganization of his tumultuary forces. But the discouragement of the province was extreme; and Lord Collingwood, who, from the British fleet in the neighbourhood, took a cool survey of the state of affairs, at once saw through the exaggerated accounts of the Spanish authorities, and declared that the elements of resistance in the province were all but dissolved.†

These disasters in Catalonia powerfully contributed to the fall of Saragossa, by extinguishing the only force from which any relief to its distressed garrison could have been obtained.

* St. Cyr, 41, 51. Nap., ii., 61, 65. Tor., ii., 227, 228.

† *Ante*, iii., 75.

* Nap., ii., 71, 73. Tor., ii., 232, 233. St. Cyr, 62, 72. Cabanes, p. 3, c. 11.

† Lord Collingwood to R. Adair, Feb. 2, 1809, Mem., ii., 315. Nap., ii., 75, 77. Tor., ii., 235, 236. St. Cyr, 79, 89. Cab., p. 3, c. 12.

Reding's plan of a general attack on the enemy to clear the way for Saragossa.

Thus far, therefore, the successes of St. Cyr had been most signal, and the immediate reduction of the province might reasonably have been expected. But that able commander experienced, in his turn, the exhausting effects of this interminable warfare. While he lay at Villa Franca refitting his troops, and forming a park of artillery out of the spoils captured from the enemy, the Spaniards recovered from their consternation, and in several guerilla combats regained in some degree their confidence in engaging the enemy. The junta at Tarragona, elected from the Democratic party during the first tumult of alarm and revolt consequent on the defeat of Molinos del Rey, displayed the utmost vigour: preparations for defence were made on such a scale as precluded all hope of a successful siege; and the confluence of disbanded soldiers who had escaped from the rout soon raised the force within the walls to twenty thousand men, while an equal force at Gerona and in the intervening mountains debarred the French all access into the hilly region to the westward. But a perception of their strength, notwithstanding all the disasters they had experienced, again proved fatal to the Spaniards: the cry for succour from Saragossa met with a responsive echo in the citizens of Tarragona and the breast of the brave Reding, who resolved at all hazards to make an attempt for its relief. The plan which he adopted was ably conceived, and failed only from the indifferent quality of the troops to whose execution it was intrusted. Fifteen thousand men under Castro, who lay outside of Tarragona, were to move forward so as to interpose between St. Cyr and Barcelona; Reding, with ten thousand more, issuing from the town, was to assail their front; while the Somatenes,* from all quarters, were summoned to descend from their hills to co-operate in the grand attack, from which the total destruction of the enemy was confidently and universally anticipated.

To withstand this formidable concentration of forces, St. Cyr had nominally forty-eight thousand men at his disposal, but of these only twenty-three thousand were concentrated under his immediate command at Villa Franca in the Llobregat, the remainder being either detached to keep up the communications, or sick and wounded in the rear. But such a body, under such a chief, had little to apprehend from the ill-combined efforts of forty thousand Spaniards, in part irregular, over a line of fifteen leagues in circumference. The moment that St. Cyr saw the enemy's forces accumulating around him, he took the judicious resolution to act vigorously on the offensive, and break the enemy's centre before their wings could come up to its relief. With this view, he broke up from Villa Franca with the division of Pino, and, joining his generals of division, Chabran and Chabot, formed a force in all eleven thousand strong. Early on the morning of Feb. 17, he commenced a vigorous attack on Castro's troops at Igualada, who, being completely surprised, were speedily put to the rout; and having thus broken through the enemy's line, he left the two former divisions at that place, and advanced against Reding, who was issuing from

Tarragona with ten thousand men. Though assailed by superior forces, the brave soul of Reding retreated with reluctance, but he felt the necessity of doing so, and with great difficulty he contrived to collect the greater part of his army, about twelve thousand men, with which he slowly moved, hardly shunning a combat, towards Tarragona. On the following morning, however, he encountered St. Cyr with fifteen thousand men at Valls, and, after a short combat, was totally routed. Two thousand men were killed or wounded, the whole artillery taken, and Reding, who fought heroically to the very last, so severely wounded, that he had great difficulty in regaining Tarragona, where he soon after died. The loss of the French did not exceed a thousand men. Such was the popular ferment against Reding when he arrived at that fortress, that he with difficulty escaped destruction from the populace, though he had discharged his duty better than any man in his army.*

After this decisive victory, the regular war in Catalonia was at an end; and such was the general consternation which it produced, joined to the fall of Saragossa, of which intelligence was received at the same time, that, if St. Cyr had pushed on immediately to Tortosa, it too would have fallen into his hands, almost without resistance. As it was, he made himself master of Reuss, an important commercial city, second only in size and importance to Barcelona, and containing ample resources of every kind. There were taken, also, several thousand sick and wounded, whom St. Cyr, with generous, though, perhaps, not altogether disinterested humanity, as he hoped to transplant the seeds of pestilence into the place, sent into Tarragona to Reding: a step which led to a convention, by which it was agreed that the wounded on either side should not be regarded as prisoners, but allowed to remain where they were, and rejoin their respective armies upon their recovery: an admirable arrangement, which it is devoutly to be wished could be extended to all civilized warfare. Want of provisions, however, compelled the French general to leave the plains of Tarragona, of which he was not yet in a condition to undertake the siege, and, approaching the French frontier, he drew near to Vich, with a view to make preparations for the siege of Gerona, which he meditated.†

Upon this retreat, the Somatenes, who had never ceased to maintain themselves in the mountains, even after the disaster of Valls, issued in all directions from their retreats, and increasing in audacity with a few partisan successes, not only regained possession of the whole open country to the south of Barcelona, but pushed parties up to the walls of that fortress. The object of this movement was to lend a hand to a strong party within the town, who were conspiring to gain possession of some of the gates, and deliver them to the patriots; and the English squadron, under Lord Collingwood, at the same time approached to co-operate in the enterprise, and cannonaded the works towards the sea. It failed, however, from the accidental defeat of a body of the Somatenes, who were advancing towards the walls; but such was the alarm inspi-

* Tor., ii., 301, 302. Nap., ii., 84, 85. St. Cyr, 94, 102. Cabanes, p. 3, c. 14.

† Tor., ii., 302, 307. Cabanes, c. 14, 15. St. Cyr, 112, 126. Nap., ii., 83, 91.

† Tor., ii., 207, 209. St. Cyr, 127, 140. Cabanes, c. 16.

red by this attempt, that Duhesme took the resolution of compelling all the principal Spanish functionaries to take the oath of allegiance to King Joseph, and, upon their courageous refusal, twenty-nine of the principal citizens were forthwith sent prisoners to Montjuic, from which they were soon after despatched by St. Cyr into France. But this severity, so foreign to the usual character of that officer, failed in producing any effect: on the contrary, the fortitude of these intrepid magistrates, in enduring captivity rather than abandon their sovereign and oath, spread the flame afresh over the country; Tarragona, Lerida, and Tortosa recovered from their consternation, and took separate measures for their defence, and the guerillas multiplied to such a degree in the mountains, that the French army was soon master of no ground but what itself occupied within the walls of Barcelona or at Vich, deserted of its inhabitants on their approach, where St. Cyr was making preparations for the siege of Gerona.*

To such a degree were the spirits of the rural population, especially in the mountainous districts, elevated by the retreat of St. Cyr from the neighbourhood of Tarragona to the foot of the Pyrenees, that Blake, who, on the death of Reding, was appointed captain-general of the three provinces of Arragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, deemed the opportunity favourable for making a forward movement, to recover his lost ground in the first of these provinces. With this view, he advanced from the mountain region around Lerida towards the plain of Arragon; and, having arrived on the banks of the Cinca, a mountain torrent which descends from the mountains on the Catalonian frontier to the Ebro, he found eight companies of chosen infantry, separated from the remainder of the brigade to which they belonged, and succeeded in making the whole prisoners. This success elevated the hopes of the peasantry in the highest degree, and encouraged Blake to attempt the deliverance of Saragossa and the entire expulsion of the French from the province. He was confirmed in the hope that this was practicable by the great reduction of their troops on the Ebro: Bessières's corps having been moved to Valladolid and Old Castile in the beginning of April, to keep up the communication on the great road from Bayonne, and Junot's alone left to make head against the Arragonese around Saragossa. Such had been the ravages which the sword of the enemy and the pestilence consequent on the siege had made in the ranks of this corps, that at this time, instead of twenty-four thousand, who crowded round its standards at the commencement of the siege, it could not muster more than ten thousand combatants; and they were in such a state of depression from the privations and dangers to which they had been exposed,† that little reliance could be placed on them in presence of an enterprising enemy.

Junot, who was taken ill at this juncture, and had never recovered, in the emperor's estimation, his defeat by the English in Portugal, was superseded by Suchet, a young general of division, hitherto unknown in high command, but whose great exploits and almost unbroken

success threw a radiance around the declining years of the Empire. Though not of the school of those illustrious chiefs who, roused to greatness during the struggles of the Republic, afterward sustained with such lustre the fortunes of the Empire, he was distinguished by a capacity which rendered him better qualified than any one of them to attain the summit of military glory. Unlike Murat, Ney, and many other leaders, whose brilliant actions were performed chiefly, if not entirely, when executing the orders of the emperor, and when surrounded by the halo of his fame, he early showed remarkable ability in separate command, and evinced those resources in difficulty, and that resolution in adversity, which, more than the splendour of success, are the tests of real military greatness. He has been characterized by Napoleon as "the first of his generals; as having grown in capacity, in later times, in a manner which was altogether surprising;"* and, after making every allowance for the feelings which must have been roused in the emperor's mind by the manner in which he was deserted by many of his other marshals in the period of his adversity, enough remains durably engraved on the tablets of history to prove that Suchet was not undeserving of this magnificent eulogium. Nor were his civil qualities less remarkable than his military: the order and regularity which he introduced into the provinces which his arms had subdued were justly regarded as in the highest degree admirable; and while they completely relieved the imperial treasury of all the expense of his armaments, they secured for him the gratitude and affection of the inhabitants subject to his rule, even at the very time that he was inflicting the deepest wounds on the fortunes of their country.

The first essay in arms, however, of this celebrated chief was unfortunate; and so Defeat of unpromising was the aspect of affairs, the French shortly after he entered on the com- at Alcaniz, mand in Arragon, that nothing but the greatest courage and capacity could have saved the French cause in the province from total ruin. Collecting all the disposable forces which he could muster, to avenge the affront received on the banks of the Cinca, and stop the progress of the enemy in that quarter, Suchet issued from Saragossa, and soon came up May 23. with the enemy, who had made himself master of Alcaniz, which he occupied with twelve thousand men. The French general had eight thousand infantry and seven hundred horse, but the superior discipline of his troops gave him hopes of an easy victory. The action began by an attack by the French on the Mount of Las Horcas, in the centre of the Spanish line, which was assailed by three thousand of their best men; but the assault was repulsed without much difficulty by Blake's infantry and artillery, and Suchet, apprehensive of still greater disasters with troops so seriously discouraged, drew off, after a short combat. Such, however, was the disorder which prevailed, that, though they were not pursued, a panic, originating in a false report spread by a drummer in the night, threw the whole army into confusion, and they fled pellmell into Sampedra, as if utterly routed.† In this disgraceful affair, the French lost nearly a thousand men, the Spaniards not three hundred; and such was the dejected state of the troops, that Suchet was

* Tor., ii., 307, 312. St. Cyr, 127, 159. Nap., ii., 93, 98. Cabanes, p. 3; c. 16.

† Suchet's Mem., i., 10, 12. Tor., iii., 15, 16. Nap., ii., 97, 98.

* O'Meara, i., 492. Las Casas, ii., 11.

† Suchet, i., 16, 21. Tor., iii., 17, 18. Nap., ii., 99, 100.

compelled to fall back to Saragossa, where it required all his moral courage to withstand the general clamour for a total evacuation of Arragon.

Had the Spanish general been at the head of well-disciplined troops, who could be relied on for operations in the level country, he might, by Suchet's admission, have accomplished the entire expulsion of the French from Saragossa; but the event proved that Blake judged wisely in not compromising his army, which had still very little of the consistency of regular soldiers, and was almost destitute of cavalry, in the level plains of the Ebro. For a fortnight after the battle he did nothing but march his troops from one position to another, sedulously endeavouring, during that period, to instruct them in the rudiments of the military art; and at length he deemed them sufficiently improved to hazard a conflict in the flat country. Suchet, meanwhile, expecting a siege, had been strengthening the Monte Torrero and suburbs of Saragossa, on the southern bank of the Ebro, and strenuously endeavouring to restore the spirit of his soldiers; but the event did not put the strength of his fortifications to the test. In the middle of June, Blake, at the head of seventeen thousand men, approached Saragossa, and the French general marched out with ten thousand men and twelve guns to meet him. The battle was fought under the walls of the capital: Arragon was the prize of the victor; but the enthusiasm of the Spaniards in such a situation was no match for the discipline, and now restored spirit of the French.* Blake had imprudently detached five thousand of his best troops, under Arezaga, to Botorrita, with the design, at that time so common with the Spaniards, of surrounding the enemy; so that for the shock of battle he had only twelve thousand men to rely on, and they were decidedly inferior, not merely in the steadiness of the foot-soldiers, but in the number and quality of their cavalry.

He began the action by extending his left, with the design of outflanking his opponent; but this movement was quickly checked by a rude charge of Polish lancers on the flank of the advancing wing, which threw it back in disorder on the second line. Suchet took advantage of this success to move forward his whole centre and right against the enemy, at the same time refusing his left. A precipitous ravine separated the two armies along this part of the line; the French infantry plunged into the hollow, and rapidly scaling the opposite heights, boldly advanced against the enemy: they were received, however, with so violent a fire of grape and musketry, as drove them back into the shelter of the ravine: Suchet immediately re-enforced the attacking troops by two battalions of Polish infantry, who again led on the charge. A violent storm at this instant arose, and concealed the two armies from each other, though separated only by a very short distance; but during this obscurity Suchet was preparing his decisive movement, and no sooner had it cleared away, than he made a rapid charge with two regiments of horse on the Spanish right, overthrew their cavalry, which were there stationed, and got possession of a bridge in the rear, by which the re-

treat of the army could alone be effected. The victorious horse now turned fiercely, supported by the infantry of the left, which quickly came up, on the Spanish centre, which, nevertheless, resisted bravely, and, by the aid of its numerous artillery, for long made good its ground against the combined attacks of the French centre and right. At length, however, some regiments stationed there, pressed at once in front and flank, having given way, the general ordered the whole to retire, and the retreat by the bridge, the only one practicable for the guns, being cut off, they were all taken, to the number of twenty. Favoured by the broken ground, however, almost all the troops withdrew in safety, and were rallied at night by Blake at Botorrita, and reunited to Arezaga, from whom, in an evil hour, they had been separated. The French lost about eight hundred, the Spaniards a thousand men in this battle; but it decided the fate of Arragon for the remainder of the campaign, and by its results restored the French superiority on both banks of the Ebro.*

It quickly appeared how completely the spirit of the French army had been raised, and that of the Spanish depressed by this reverse. Next day, Blake, re-enforced by Arezaga's troops, was much stronger than when he had first fought, while the French were nearly a thousand weaker; and the artillery of the fresh division almost compensated that which had been lost on the preceding day. Blake withdrew with these troops, still fourteen thousand strong, to Belchité; and Suchet, having by great exertions collected twelve thousand, followed and attacked them. The Spanish army was skilfully posted in a strong position among the sloping banks and olive groves which surround that town; Blake harangued his men before the enemy came up, and they promised a vigorous resistance. Nevertheless, hardly had the fire commenced, when a French shell having fallen on a Spanish ammunition-wagon and blown it up, the nearest battalion disbanded and fled; the next immediately followed the example; the contagion ran like wildfire along the whole line, and soon Blake was left alone with his staff and a few officers. Such was the rapidity of their flight that few prisoners were taken, and fewer still were killed or wounded; but the whole remaining guns, ten in number, with all the caissons, fell into the enemy's hands, and the Spanish army was entirely dispersed. A few broken bands reached Lerida and Mequinenza in Catalonia, but the greater part returned to their homes, and the elements of all regular resistance were extinguished in Arragon for the remainder of the war.†

St. Cyr, meanwhile, was actively preparing for the siege of Gerona. The design of St. Cyr's preparations for the siege of Gerona. the emperor was, that Verdier should be intrusted with the direction of the siege, and St. Cyr with that of the covering army; but the former of these generals, who had failed at Saragossa, and was most anxious to retrieve his character by a signal victory in the present instance, was unwilling to begin till assured of success, and urgent that his attacking force, which did not at first exceed ten thousand men, should be re-enforced by a division of the general-in-chief's army: a proposal which St. Cyr at first refused, from a just sense

Disgraceful rout of the Spaniards at Belchité.

* Suchet, i., 28, 30. Tor., iii., 20, 21. South., ii., 505, 506.

* Suchet, ii., 28, 32. Tor., iii., 22, 23. South., ii., 306, 307. † Tor., iii., 24, 25. Suchet, i., 34, 36. South., ii., 508, 510.

of the risk to which such a small body as would remain to him would be exposed, in the midst of so vast a host of enemies as was in arms in Catalonia. This produced an angry correspondence between the two generals, which terminated in Verdier appealing directly to Napoleon, who ordered St. Cyr to place three thousand infantry, five hundred horse, and a corps of artillery and sappers at his disposal: a dislocation of force which reduced the covering army to fifteen thousand men, and raised the besieging to the same amount.* These re-enforcements having left Verdier without excuse in any longer delay, he resolved forthwith to commence the siege, and the investment was completed by the Spanish outposts being all driven in on the 1st of June. But this disagreement between the two generals produced a coldness, which essentially injured their mutual co-operation, and protracted, beyond what might otherwise have been required, the duration of the siege.†

An untoward event occurred at this time, even on the element on which Great Britain had hitherto been victorious, which had a most calamitous effect on the war in Catalonia. Notwithstanding the extreme vigilance and admirable arrangements of Lord Collingwood, Admiral Cosmao, with a valuable convoy, succeeded in eluding the English blockading squadron and escaping from Toulon, from whence he made May 7. straight for Barcelona, into which he threw his supplies, and got back without sustaining any serious injury. The garrison of that important fortress, from being in a state of extreme want, especially of stores and ammunition, were, by this seasonable re-enforcement, put in a state of such affluence that they were not merely in a condition to sustain a long siege, but could spare ample supplies of stores of all kinds to the besiegers, which arrived safe before Gerona, under the protection of six of St. Cyr's battalions, detached for that purpose from the covering force; and by relieving the general-in-chief of all anxiety in regard to Barcelona, enabled him to give his undivided attention to the important duty with which he was more immediately connected.‡

“Whoever speaks of a capitulation or surrender shall be instantly put to death.” Such were the words of an order of the day, on the 5th of May, with which Alvarez, governor of Gerona, announced his resolution to hold out to the last extremity. Nor did the spirit of the garrison and inhabitants fall short of these heroic sentiments. Animated by the recollection of their former glorious resistance, the citizens had taken the most energetic steps to second the efforts of the regular soldiers, and had formed a corps, composed of the whole male population, without distinction of rank or age, whose duty was to support,

by every possible means, the defence of the garri- son. There, too, as at Saragossa, the women, even of rank and station, were formed into companies to bear away and tend the wounded; and at every breath of air their ribands were seen to float amid the bayonets of the soldiers. The patron saint of the town, Saint Narcissus, was declared generalissimo of the armies, and the utmost efforts were made to exalt the courage of the besieged, by the belief that his celestial aid would extend the same protection to the town which he had already shown in the former siege, and as had been displayed five hundred years before, when Philip the Bold, who besieged the place, had, according to the old chronicles, his army destroyed by a miraculous cloud of locusts. Nor were more worldly means of defence neglected: the garrison of three thousand men was animated with the best spirit; the ramparts were plentifully lined with artillery, and provisions for a siege of many months' duration already provided. The town stands on a steep declivity, rising up from the right bank of the Ter, which terminates in a bluff precipice, on which are situated several forts, which constitute the real strength of the place. The upper town is only defended by a single wall, fifteen feet high; the lower, which is more exposed, has the protection of a rampart, wet ditch, and outworks. The crest of the hill is occupied by three forts, called of the Capucines; and on the north the town is commanded by a fort called Monjuich, standing on a rocky eminence, and separated from it by the valley of Galligau. This fort, which had the advantage of bomb-proof casemates, and cisterns, and magazines, was tolerably fortified, and was garrisoned by nine hundred brave men, resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity; while the rocky nature of the ground, round both it and the forts of the Capucines, rendered the formation of approaches a matter of great labour and difficulty.*

The first serious attack of the enemy was directed against Monjuich, and the town- Progress of ers which formed its outworks were the siege. carried by assault on the 19th of June. June 19th. About the same time a convoy of a thousand cattle, destined for the garrison, fell into the hands of the French, and the near approach of St. Cyr with his covering force raised the troops which might be employed in the siege to thirty thousand men. After this the breaching batteries continued to thunder incessantly on the walls of the fort for a fortnight; and a large breach having been at length effected, an assault was attempted early in July, which was repulsed July 4. with severe loss. Three days afterward, July 8. and when the breach had been enlarged, July 9. and the adjoining defences ruined by the incessant fire of sixty pieces of cannon, the attack was again renewed with a very large force; but although the French, in close column, twice returned to the assault with great courage, they were on both occasions repulsed. The Spaniards had so barricaded the summit of the breach that it was impossible to surmount the obstacles, and the flanking fire of a half-moon and ravelin on either side tore the assailants in pieces, and finally drove them back with the loss of a thousand killed and wounded. Taught, by this bloody repulse, the quality of the enemy with whom he had to deal, St. Cyr now confined him-

* The exact force employed by the besiegers in this memorable siege, and the covering army, was as follows:

Forces employed in the siege, viz.:	
Infantry and cavalry.....	14,456
Artillery.....	1,362
Do. 7th corps.....	961
Engineers.....	314
Total in the siege.....	17,093
Army of observation, cavalry and infantry.....	15,732
Total.....	32,825

—BELMAS, *Journaux des Sieges dans la Peninsule*, ii., 650-655.

† St. Cyr, 157, 162. Belm., ii., 494, 498. Nap., iii., 19.

‡ St. Cyr, 159, 160. Tor., iii., 78.

* Belm., ii., 497, 501. Nap., ii., 23, 24. Tor., iii., 77, 78. St. Cyr, 181, 182.

self to the surer operations of sap and mine, and a month was consumed in that subterranean warfare, without any material progress being made in the reduction of the place.*†

Meanwhile, St. Cyr carried by storm Palamos, a small town built on a rocky promontory running into the sea, a day's march from Gerona, from which the besieged had occasionally derived supplies. This detachment, and the accumulation of force round Gerona, having reduced the covering army on the side of Hostalrich and Barcelona to eight thousand men, the Spanish generals, notwithstanding their numerous defeats, were tempted to try the relief of the place. While the preparations for this purpose were going on under the direction of Blake, the mining operations and fire of the besiegers against Monjuich continued with such violence that its buildings and defences were entirely ruined, and the fort being no longer tenable, it was evacuated in the middle of August, and the garrison withdrawn into the town. The defence of this external post was of sinister augury for the ultimate issue of their undertaking to the besiegers; for, though garrisoned only by nine hundred men, it had withstood thirty-seven days of open trenches, two assaults, had sustained the fire of twenty-three thousand cannon-shot and two thousand bombs, and had cost the assailants three thousand men. Hardly one of the garrison was unhurt: five hundred had been killed or seriously wounded. Elated with this success, however, Verdier boasted, in his public despatches, that Gerona could not now hold out fifteen days; but, in making this assertion, he underrated both the resolution of the besiegers and the resources of the Spaniards for the relief of the place.‡

Although the lower town was commanded in many parts by the fire from Monjuich and the forts of the Capucines, and its defences on that side consisted only of an old, weak wall, yet the governor and inhabitants continued to make the most resolute defence, and every inch of ground which the besiegers gained was won only by hard fighting and profuse bloodshed. Meanwhile, Blake having made his arrangements for the relief of the town, the attempt was made, and with perfect success, on the first of September. Claros and Rovira, two Somatene chiefs, had previously excited great alarm on the French frontier, by their attack on a convoy coming up to the relief of Figueras, which was constantly blockaded by the Miquillets; and Blake, having concerted measures with them, approached with nine thousand men from the side of Hostalrich, while four thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry, under General Conde, with a convoy of two thousand beasts of burden, each laden with flour, unknown to the enemy, approached from the same direction, and Claros and Rovira threatened the besiegers' posts on the north, from the side of Figueras. With

such skill were these operations conducted, that the enemy found himself assailed in every quarter except that by which the convoy was to enter; and St. Cyr, conceiving that the raising of the siege, not the revictualling of the town, was intended, drew off his troops to the points menaced to such a degree, that the convoy entered safe, amid the transports of the inhabitants, with hardly any fighting; and Conde, having left three thousand of his men to re-enforce the garrison, withdrew in safety with the remainder to Hostalrich, whither Blake soon after retired with the bulk of his forces.*

To have relieved the besieged in presence of fifteen thousand disposable French Heroic cont-troops, headed by such a general as stancy of the St. Cyr, with soldiers discouraged by besieged. repeated defeats, was no small subject of congratulation to the Spaniards, and reflected great honour on the perseverance and skill of Blake; but it speedily appeared that the supplies thus received, without having given them the means of permanent deliverance, had only prolonged for an additional period the duration of their sufferings. The supply of provisions introduced, taking into view the number of extra mouths brought along with them, did not exceed a fortnight's consumption; and the spirits of the besieged, which had been elevated to an extraordinary degree by the first appearance of succour, and anticipated from it a total deliverance, were proportionally depressed when they beheld the friendly standards on all sides recede from the view, and the French, without being disturbed, resume their menacing positions around the city. The fire of the breaching batteries was recommenced on the 11th of September with redoubled fury: a sortie to destroy the Sept 11. most advanced works of the besiegers, though attended at first with some success, was finally repulsed with loss; and three enormous breaches having been made in the walls, a general assault was made a few days after, and led to a struggle supported on both sides with unparalleled resolution.†

Alvarez had skilfully prepared all the means, not only of defence, but of succouring Repulse of the the wounded, bringing up supplies to grand assault. the points of danger, and relieving September 19. with fresh troops the defenders of the breaches; but, able as were his previous dispositions, and heroically as he discharged, on that eventful crisis, all the duties of a commander and common soldier, the town must have sunk under the fury of the assault if his efforts had not been seconded by the whole population. At the sound of the drums, which beat in all the streets, and the mournful clang of the tocsin, which rung in the churches, the whole inhabitants poured forth; men and women, monks and children, hastened with perfect regularity, without either trepidation or confusion, to the posts assigned them; and, amid the fire of two hundred pieces of artillery, calmly awaited death in the service of their country. Never was a more sublime spectacle beheld in modern times: silently they took up their stations; neither shouts nor cries were heard, but the bright expression of every eye revealed the sacred ardour by which the whole were animated. At half past four in the afternoon, three massy columns advanced to the breaches, while a terrific fire of artillery swept

* Tor., iii., 82, 84. Belmas, ii., 501, 536. Jones, i., 257. Nap., ii., 25, 26. St. Cyr, 190, 194.

† "A drummer had been placed near the breach to beat the alarm when a shell was approaching. As he was doing so, a cannon-shot carried off part of his thigh, and lacerated his knee in a dreadful manner. When the attendants, however, approached to convey him to the hospital, he said, 'No! though wounded in the leg, I have still arms left to beat the drum, and warn my friends of the approach of bombs.'"—Toreno, ii., 84.

‡ Nap., ii., 33, 35. Tor., iii., 85, 88. Belma., ii., 541, 566.

* Tor., iii., 91, 92. Nap., ii., 36, 38. Belm., ii., 568, 588. St. Cyr, 210, 226.

† Belm., ii., 596, 600. Tor., ii., 93, 94. St. Cyr, 226, 252

the ramparts by which they were flanked, now almost entirely denuded of their parapets. Three times did the assailants, animated with heroic courage, mount to the summit of the breaches, and three times were they repulsed by the invincible firmness of the garrison. Such was the fury with which their defenders were animated, that, often finding the discharge of firearms too slow a method of defence, they threw down their muskets, and, lifting up great stones with both hands, hurled them down upon the enemy. At length, after a hard struggle of three hours' duration, the assailants drew off, leaving the breaches covered with their slain, and weakened by the fall of six-
 hundred men.*

The dreadful loss sustained in these bloody assaults, and the undaunted countenance of the garrison, induced St. Cyr, after this, to convert the siege into a blockade, and trust for the final reduction of the place to the certain effect of famine and the continued fire of artillery, which would ruin every habitation which it contained. With this view, the lines around the town were drawn still closer than before, and every effort was made to exclude the casual introduction of small bodies of troops, which had occasionally taken place, notwithstanding all the vigilance of the besiegers, since the commencement of the siege. Blake, on the other hand, being sensible that the garrison was reduced to great straits from want of provisions, assembled fourteen thousand men, and made a second attempt for its relief. Meanwhile, the besiegers were suffering almost as much from want of supplies as the besieged: the Somatenes on all the neighbouring hills rendering the supply of the army extremely hazardous, and the vigilance of Lord Collingwood having intercepted and destroyed the large squadron which sailed from Toulon for their relief. But the failure of Blake's attempt to throw any effectual supplies into the place relieved the one party as much as it depressed the other: St. Cyr, more on his guard on this occasion, interposed with the bulk of his covering force between the besiegers' lines and the quarter from which the convoy was approaching; and the whole, consisting of two thousand beasts of burden, with the exception of a hundred and seventy which penetrated, with O'Donnell, at the head of a thousand men, into the town, fell into the enemy's hands, while Blake was driven off with the loss of three thousand of his best troops. This was a fatal blow to Gerona: plenty, thereafter, reigned in the one camp as much as want in the beleaguered fortress. Secure within his impregnable lines, St. Cyr, as he has himself told us, waited quietly till time, fever, and famine should subdue the resistance of the enemy.†

He was not permitted, however, himself to reap the fruit of this prudent but inglorious policy. The slow progress of the siege, and the frequent repulses of the assaults, were little suited to the impatient mind of Napoleon, who recalled St. Cyr, and sent Marshal Augereau to assume the command. On the same day on which he arrived, O'Donnell, with his brave band, fearful of augmenting the distress of the besieged by additional mouths, again made his way out of the place,

and reached Blake's quarters in safety. But the failure of provisions and supplies of all sorts was now daily making it more apparent that the fall of this heroic town could not much longer be averted. The hospitals were crowded with sick and wounded, and both beds, attendants, and medicines were wanting: a malignant fever, as at Saragossa, had broken out, and was daily carrying off great numbers, both of the soldiers and citizens; the magazines of corn and flour were almost exhausted, and the inhabitants were seeking the miserable resource of inferior animals; the capture of a third great convoy collected at Hostalrich for the relief of the place, and the defeat of O'Donnell's force, which formed its escort, both deprived the besieged of present relief, and supplied the besiegers in plenty with all sorts of provisions; while the transference of a large portion of Junot's corps from Arragon to the beleaguering force, and the arrival of powerful reinforcements from France, cut off all hopes of ultimate deliverance. Still the heroic governor and his worthy companions in arms continued their resistance for two months longer, with hopeless but unsubdued resolution: all offers of capitulation were sternly rejected, and it was not till provisions of all sorts were entirely exhausted, and the inhabitants, almost dying of famine, and having consumed every vestige of food in the city, had been reduced to the deplorable and unparalleled necessity of feeding on their own hair, that the word capitulation was for the first time pronounced in the city. Even in that woful extremity, and when seven large breaches were guarded by detachments of soldiers hardly able to bear the weight of their own arms, and more resembling ghosts than living men, Augereau did not venture to attempt an assault; but Alvarez, whom no necessity, how cruel soever, could induce to think of a surrender, was seized, like Palafox, with the prevailing fever, and soon reduced to the last extremity; and his successor, Bolivar, felt the necessity of entering into negotiations for the surrender of the place. Augereau, too happy to gain possession of it on any conditions, willingly granted honourable terms to the besieged, and on the 12th of December Gerona opened its gates to the conqueror. When the French marched in, they gazed with amazement on the proofs which were everywhere presented of the devoted courage of the garrison and inhabitants. The town was little better than a heap of ruins: the streets, unpaved and intersected in all quarters by barricades, were lined by half-destroyed edifices; unburied bodies lying about in all directions, putrid pools yet stained with blood, spread a pestilential air around; the survivors of the inhabitants, pale and emaciated, resembled spectres haunting a city of the dead. Almost all the heads of families had fallen; the women with child had, without exception, perished; numbers of infants at the breast had starved from want of nourishment. Nine thousand persons had died during the siege within its walls, in the service of their country, of whom four thousand were citizens, being nearly a third part of their whole number.*

Carnot has observed that the siege even of the greatest fortresses in modern times has seldom been prolonged beyond nature of their six weeks; and yet Gerona, with its feeble ramparts, held out seven months, of which

* St. Cyr, 252, 254. Nap., ii., 45. Tor., iii., 94, 96. Belm., ii., 600, 610.

† Tor., iii., 97, 98. St. Cyr, 254, 263. Belm., ii., 611.

* Tor., iii., 99, 104. St. Cyr, 270, 274. Belm., ii., 612, 642. Nap., ii., 46, 49.

six and a half were of open trenches. The besiegers directed against the place the fire of forty batteries, armed by above a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, from which were thrown into the town, during its continuance, eighty thousand cannon-balls and twenty thousand bombs. The greater part of the guns of the besiegers were rendered useless by constant discharges, or dismounted by the fire of the town: fifteen thousand men had perished by the sword or disease around its walls. Four thousand three hundred men were made prisoners in the town, including its heroic governor, Alvarez, then in the last stage of fever. With brutal harshness, Augereau, without regard to his noble defence or lamentable condition, had him shut up alone in a dungeon of Figueras, where he soon after died, under circumstances which made the Spaniards suspect assassination, although his state of debility probably rendered that last act of atrocity unnecessary. But, as Colonel Napier, with the true spirit of a soldier, observes, "As long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration;" and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard's merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both.*

The fall of Gerona terminated the campaign in Arragon and Catalonia. The Cortes, assembled at Seville, in just commemoration of the unparalleled constancy displayed by the besieged both in that town and Saragossa, passed decrees awarding extraordinary honours to the inhabitants and garrisons of both, and to the illustrious chiefs, Palafox and Alvarez, by whom their defence had been conducted; and after the peace, Castanos, then governor-general of Catalonia, repaired to Figueras, and constructed an appropriate monument to the last of these heroes in the dungeon where he had expired. But these successes gave the enemy a firm footing both in Arragon and Catalonia; and the elements of resistance in those provinces were now reduced to a desultory guerrilla warfare in the mountains, and the siege of the remaining strongholds in the latter province, still in the hands of the Spaniards. The whole fortresses of Arragon had fallen into the hands of the enemy; and although Tarragona, Lerida, Tortosa, and the other fortified cities of Catalonia were still in the possession of the patriots, yet it soon became painfully apparent that their means of regular resistance in the field were exhausted. Shortly after the fall of Gerona, Augereau, having sent all the monks of the town off as prisoners of war into France, marched against the irregular mass, in front of Hostalrich, which had so long disquieted the operations of the besiegers. Two brigades sufficed to defeat six thousand of them, on the ridge of La Jonqueris: Souham dispersed the bands of Rovera and Claros at Olot and Campredon, and got possession of Ripoll, their principal manufactory of arms; at the same time, Pino, with his Italian division, routed a corps of four thousand mountaineers; while Augereau himself, having, by these successes, re-established his communications with France, marched against the principal Spanish army, under Blake, whom he worsted at the Col-di-Sespina, and drove towards Tarragona, which enabled him to draw his forces around Hostalrich

and commence the blockade of that fortress. Suchet, at the same time, was making preparations for the sieges of Tarragona and Lerida; so that everything announced vigorous and decisive operations in that quarter of the Peninsula early in the ensuing year.*

While Arragon and Catalonia were the theatre of these memorable events, Soult and Ney, in Galicia, were slowly reaping the fruit of their successful operations, which had terminated in the expulsion of the English from the north of Spain. Both parties for a time appeared exhausted: the Spaniards, bent to the earth by the flight of their allies, and the loss of Corunna and Ferrol, the two strongest and most important places on the northern coast of the Peninsula, were sunk in the deepest affliction, and for a considerable time gave hardly any signs of life; while the French, almost equally exhausted, rested, without any attempt at farther exertion, in the important fortresses which they had conquered. Romana alone, with the remnant of Blake's army, which had been routed at Reynosa, still maintained, in the recesses of the mountains, the standard of independence; but his forces were reduced to six or eight thousand men, without either cannon, stores, or resources of any kind: the soldiers were without shoes, almost without clothes, and nothing but the devoted patriotism of their chief, and the extraordinary tenacity of the men, preserved the country from total subjugation. Fearful of permitting even such a wasted band to keep the field, Soult moved a division against him; but the brave Spaniard retreated, by Orense, to the rugged mountains of the Portuguese frontier; and, having thus got beyond the reach of his pursuers, resolved to maintain himself, like Pelayo in the days of the Moors, in the inaccessible ridges of his country, and await the issue of events, to reappear again in the field in its support.†

Meanwhile, Sir Robert Wilson, with the Portuguese levies which he had trained and disciplined, advanced beyond the Spanish frontier, and took post near Ciudad Rodrigo, in Leon. When the news of Sir John Moore's embarkation arrived, he sent his guns, as a measure of precaution, to Abrantes in the rear, but remained himself in the neighbourhood of that fortress, where he was soon joined by Don Carlos d'España, a Spanish chief, with a few followers; and though their united force was too weak to undertake any operation of importance, yet, by merely remaining where they were, and showing a bold front in a moment of such disaster, they did good service, and kept the spirits of the province from sinking under their misfortunes. And truly the aid of such chivalrous spirits as this gallant officer, to whom scenes of danger were a source of pleasure, was necessary to prevent the cause of Spanish independence from appearing altogether hopeless, amid the defection of many who should have taken the lead in its support. Addresses, as already mentioned, had been forwarded to Joseph Bonaparte at Valladolid, from all the incorporations and influential bodies at Madrid, inviting him to return to the capital and resume the reins of government; registers had been opened in different parts of the

State of Galicia and Asturias after the embarkation of the English at Corunna.

Feb. 3, 1809.

Advance of Sir R. Wilson to Rodrigo, and return of Joseph to Madrid.

* Nap., ii., 50. Tor., iii., 103, 104. Belm., ii., 645, 648.

* Belm., ii., 643, 649. South., iv.

† Tor., ii., 205. South., ii., 224.

city, for those citizens to inscribe their names who were favourable to his government; and in a few days thirty thousand signatures, chiefly of the more opulent classes, had been inscribed on the lists; and, in obedience to these flattering invitations, the intrusive king had entered the capital, with great pomp, amid the discharge of

Jan. 22, 1809. a hundred pieces of cannon, and numerous, if not heartfelt demonstrations of public satisfaction: a memorable example of the effect of the acquisition of wealth, and the enjoyment of luxury, in enervating the minds of their possessors; and of the difference between the patriotic energy of those classes who, having little to lose, yield to ardent sentiments without reflection, and those in whom the suggestions of interest, or the habits of indulgence, have stifled the generous emotions of our nature.*

Meanwhile, Napoleon, whose ardent mind could as little endure repose in any of his lieutenants as in himself, sent orders to Soult, while he still lay with the bulk of his corps at Ferrol, to prepare immediately for the invasion of Portugal. The plan for this purpose was formed by the emperor on a grand scale, and apparently promised certain success. Soult himself was to move, with four divisions of infantry and ten regiments of cavalry, numbering in all twenty-five thousand combatants present with the eagles, direct upon Oporto; on the road he was to be joined by Loison, with five thousand more; Lapisse, with nine thousand, was to menace the country from the side of Leon; while Victor, with thirty thousand, who was stationed at Merida, on the eastern frontier of the kingdom, was to co-operate from the side of Estremadura, and take a part in the combined movement on Lisbon. Thus sixty thousand men, from different quarters, were to invade Portugal, in which, at that time, there were not more than fourteen thousand British and an equal number of native troops, all in a state of extreme discouragement at the reverses in Spain, and the embarkation of the army from the shores of Galicia. So little did Napoleon anticipate any serious resistance in this undertaking, and so deeply was the future career of the British in the Peninsula shrouded from his view, that he calculated that on the 5th of February he would be at Oporto, and on the 16th before Lisbon; after reducing which, and driving the English into the sea, he was to co-operate in an expedition against Andalusia, and follow in the footsteps of Dupont to the shores of the Guadalquivir. After reading a despatch from Soult, giving an account of his operations in Galicia and the battle of Corunna, he said, "Everything proceeds well: Romana cannot exist a fortnight longer; the English will never make a second effort; in three months the war will be at an end. Spain may be a La Vendée; but I have tranquillized La Vendée. The Romans conquered its inhabitants, the Moors conquered them, and they are not nearly so fine a people now as they were then. I will settle the government firmly, conciliate the nobles, and cut down the people with grapeshot. They say the country is against me; but there is no longer a population there; Spain is, in most places, a solitude, without five men to a square league. I will let them see what a first-rate power can effect."†

Soult commenced his march from Vigo, on the coast of Galicia, in the beginning of February, and reached Tuy, on the shores of the Minho, on the 10th of the same month. The river being

Soult's march through Galicia towards Oporto.

deep and rapid, and at that season of the year a raging flood, it was no easy matter to pass it in presence of several thousand Portuguese ordenanzas, who occupied the opposite bank, which in that quarter formed the frontier of their country. At length, a small flotilla secretly appeared in the tributary stream of the Tamuga,

Feb. 15.

was sent down during the night, and ferried three hundred soldiers over to the Portuguese shore; but they were instantly attacked at daybreak by three thousand of the armed bands, the men already landed made prisoners, and the remainder driven back to the opposite bank. This check obliged Soult to ascend the banks of the river, through horrible roads, to Orense, in order to take advantage of the bridge there over the Minho; and his advanced guard reached that

Feb. 17.

town in time to secure that important passage before it could be destroyed. Still this gallant resistance of the Portuguese on their frontier was attended with important effects; for such was the fatigue of his troops, that the French general was unable to resume his march for Oporto till the 4th of March, which rendered it impossible for him to reach

Feb. 20.

Lisbon before the English re-enforcements, under Mackenzie and Hill, had arrived there in the beginning of April. Hardly had he left Orense, taking the road for Chaves and Oporto, when his advanced guard overtook the rear-guard of Romana, which was withdrawn before him at Monterey, and defeated it, with the loss of nearly a thousand slain and as many prisoners. Romana, upon this, separated himself from the Portuguese general Silveira, with whom he had been endeavouring to concert operations, and defied by mountain paths towards Braganza, from whence he made for the valley of the Sil and the direction of Asturias; while the Portuguese militia, now left to their own resources, were driven back, fighting all the way, to Chaves, a fortified town, which was immediately invested, and capitulated on the 13th, with fifty pieces of cannon, and ramparts in tolerable repair: an acquisition of great importance, as it gave the invaders a solid footing within the Portuguese frontier.*

March 4.

Having established the dépôt of his army, and left his heavy artillery, sick, and wounded, as well as stragglers, who were very numerous, in this stronghold, Soult set out on the 17th for

March 6.

Oporto, taking the route of Tras-os-Montes, in preference to that of Entre-Douro-Minho, in consequence of the number of deep and difficult streams which required to be crossed in the latter province. The road through the romantic and beautiful mountains of the upper province, however, passed through a series of defiles equal to any in Europe in strength and intricacy; and the French troops were not long of experiencing the resources which the ancient military institutions of the kingdom offered for resistance to an invading army. At every step they met with an incessant and harassing opposition, which both retarded their march and fatigued the soldiers;

And through Tras-os-Montes. March 17.

* South., ii., 24, 33. Nillerto, ii., 287, 301. Pièces Just.

† Tor., ii., 264, 265. Jones, i., 166. Nap., ii., 164, 165. Belin., ii., No. 24. Pièces Just.

* Operations de M. Soult, 50, 115. Nap., ii., 180, 187. Belin., i., 61, 62. South., ii., 214, 231.

March 20. and it was not till the 20th that they arrived in sight of Braga, which was occupied by General Freire, with two *jacuand* regular troops and twenty thousand *ordenanzas*, of whom, however, only five thousand were armed with muskets, the remainder being a confused rabble, with pikes, clubs, or pruning-hooks. Justly distrustful of such a tumultuary body in presence of an equal number of French soldiers, Freire evacuated Braga, and was taking the road for Oporto, when the multitude, suspecting treachery, mutinied, put him to death, and forced the command on General Eben, a Hanoverian officer in the Portuguese service, who had gained their confidence by his activity in organizing the new levies. Eben, thus forced to fight, made the best dispositions which the circumstances would admit; but it speedily appeared how totally unfit such an undisciplined body was to make head against the imperial veterans. A well-concerted attack from three French divisions soon proved successful: the Portuguese, utterly routed, fled on all sides, having lost all their artillery, and above three thousand men slain on the spot. So exasperated were the victors at some cruelties exercised by the peasants on their stragglers, that they took few prisoners; and such was the reciprocal feeling of hatred excited in the breasts of the natives, that, when the French entered Braga after their victory, they found it totally deserted by its inhabitants.*

No force now existed in the northern provinces to arrest the progress of the invader; for, though Silveira, at the head of ten thousand men, still kept his footing in the mountains on the eastern frontier, yet he was rather in their rear, and it was not to be expected that his irregular force could interpose any serious obstacles in the way of their farther advance towards the Douro. Thither, accordingly, Marshal Soult bent his steps, after resting his troops some days at Braga, and on the 28th he appeared on the north bank of that river, before Oporto. The means of defence were there very considerable, and the inhabitants were animated with the most unbounded hatred of the French, both from the experience of former wrongs and recent injuries; but regular soldiers and arrangements were wanting to turn to proper account the ardent passions and fervent zeal of the people. The Bishop of Oporto was at the head of affairs: a warlike and courageous prelate, whose patriotic zeal, not less than political ambition, had shown forth conspicuous since the first French invasion of the Peninsula. A series of fieldworks, dignified with the name of an intrenched camp, had been thrown up on the north of the city, which were armed by a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon; and fifteen hundred regular troops had been collected as a reserve to support any part of the line which might require assistance. The people were animated with the most enthusiastic spirit: all night the tocsin sounded from the churches, and at daybreak on the 29th, being Good Friday, a tumultuous body of twenty-five thousand men hurried forth and occupied the redoubts. But such a crowd of urban citizens, even though animated by an ardent spirit, is seldom capable of withstanding, except behind regular ramparts, the assault of disciplined soldiers. Having completed his

arrangements, and distracted the enemy's attention by demonstrations against his flanks, Soult bore down with the weight of his force against their centre: two redoubts, which flanked the main road in that quarter, were carried after a stout resistance, and the fire from thence having raked great part of the remainder of the Portuguese line, a general panic took place, and the whole rushed in wild confusion into the town. The French cavalry instantly charged the flying mass, now incapable of opposing any resistance, through the city; the horsemen galloped, cutting them down in vast numbers, to the edge of the Douro: such was the multitude which thronged the bridge, that part of it sunk under the weight, and hundreds were precipitated into the river; but, even after this catastrophe, the crowd from behind pressed on to avoid the bloody sabres of the imperial dragoons, and forced those in front headlong into the waves. Boats, hastily collected to receive the wretched throng, were as quickly sunk by the fire of the French artillery, which had now come down to the water's edge, and discharged grape incessantly on the living stream; the river was covered with dead bodies, among which numbers of those of women and children were to be seen; and before the French made themselves masters of the town, four thousand corpses encumbered the banks of the Douro. Even in this extremity, however, some traces of the ancient Portuguese valour were to be discerned; and a body of two hundred devoted patriots, who had taken refuge in one of the neighbouring churches of the city, resolutely refused all proposals of surrender, and were slain to the last man. When the French soldiers were fairly masters of the town, their passions were strongly excited, in addition to the usual fury of an assault, by the cruelties which had been exercised by the inhabitants on some of the prisoners who had fallen into their hands; and although Marshal Soult exerted himself to the utmost to arrest the disorders, tranquillity was not restored until about eight thousand Portuguese had fallen, and the city had undergone all the horrors which are usually the fate of towns taken by storm.*

While Soult was thus, amid blood and carnage, forcing a hateful domination upon the northern provinces of Portugal, Marshal Ney, who had been left in charge of Galicia and Asturias, was maintaining a harassing and desultory warfare with the undaunted mountaineers of those rugged provinces. The Marquis Romana, after his check at Monterey already noticed, had defiled in the direction of Pont Ferrada, on the great road from Benevente to Corunna; and, having accidentally discovered a French twelve-pounder, and some ammunition and balls, in a hermitage near Villa Franca, he took advantage of it to commence an attack upon the castle of that town, garrisoned by a French battalion, and, after a siege of seven days, forced it to capitulate. March 17. Eight hundred prisoners were taken on this occasion—a success which, loudly magnified by common rumour, so elevated the spirits of the Spaniards in these mountainous regions, that, in less than a fortnight, twenty thousand men hastened to Romana's standards. Upon

Operations by
Ney in Galicia
and Asturias
after Soult's
departure.

* Operations de M. Soult, 115, 142. Belm., i., 63, 64. Tor., ii., 339, 340. Nap., ii., 196, 198.

* Tor., ii., 340, 341. Nap., 201, 207. Belm., i., 63, 64. South., iii., 245, 250. Jones, i., 194, 195.

this, Ney, who deemed it high time to put a stop to this alarming progress, marched out of Corunna at the head of ten thousand men, with the design of giving battle to the Spanish general wherever he could find him. He advanced to Lugo, the point where the chief roads of the country intersect each other; but Romana, who had no intention of hazarding his raw troops, who were totally destitute of artillery or cavalry, in a general action with the French veterans, suddenly shifted his quarters, and, leaving Galicia with part of his troops, entered Asturias with the bulk of his forces, with the design of rousing the population and animating the resistance of that province. Ney fol-

April 20.

May 13.

lowed upon his footsteps, and marched across the mountains to Oviedo, the capital of the latter province. King Joseph, who deemed it of the highest importance to stifle in the outset the formidable insurrection which, on the appearance of Romana, broke out in that quarter, on account of its vicinity to the great line of communication with France, directed, at the same time, against it considerable forces from other quarters. Kellerman, who came up

May 19.

from Leon with nine thousand men, crossed the lofty ridge of Pajares a few days after, and, having put to flight a corps of two thousand Spaniards who attempted to dispute the passage, descended to Pola, in the neighbourhood of Oviedo; while, in three days

May 22.

afterward, Bonnet, with a third column, eight thousand strong, made his appearance at the passage of the Deba, on the coast road, and threatened the Asturian capital by the highway from France. Ballasteros, who, with ten thousand of Romana's troops, endeavoured to defend the passage of that river, was defeated with the loss of two thousand men. These strong divisions had been largely re-enforced by the troops of Mortier's corps, which had been transferred to Old Castile after the fall of Saragossa, and had its headquarters at Valladolid. The concentration of such formidable forces rendered it impossible for the Spaniards to defend Oviedo.

May 18.

Ney arrived on the 18th of May on the Nora, and forced the bridges of Pennafior and Gallivos, and on the day following entered Oviedo. Meanwhile, Romana, having left General Ballasteros in command of his troops, who retired from the valleys into the higher and inaccessible parts of the mountains, embarked at Gijon on the day following, and made sail for Ribadio, on the northern coast of Galicia, from whence he made his way across the hills to his brave followers, who still maintained themselves on the mountains in the interior of that province, and, joining his old soldiers near Mondonedo, reappeared in undiminished strength in the valley of the Sil. Astonished at his active adversary having thus escaped him, Ney lost no time

May 29.

in retracing his footsteps, and marched direct for Lugo, and on the 29th met Marshal Soult at that place, whither he had arrived on his retreat from Portugal, after his defeat by Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the manner to be immediately noticed.*

To complete the picture of the state of affairs in the adjoining provinces of Spain, when Sir Arthur's memorable career began, it remains to notice the situation of Estremadura and New Castile after the departure of Napoleon from the Peninsula.

After the fall of Madrid, the Duke del Infantado, who commanded the army of the centre, which had fallen back towards La Mancha, with great difficulty collected twenty thousand men

Total defeat of the army of the centre at Ciudad Real.

at Cuenca in that province. So little, however, were the Spanish generals at this period aware of their inferiority to the French troops, notwithstanding all the disasters which they had undergone, that no sooner had he received accounts of the march of Napoleon with his guards, and Ney's corps, to attack Sir John Moore on the Carrion, in the end of December, than, deeming the capital now denuded of its principal defenders, he advanced to co-operate in the movement upon it.

Jan. 4.

Victor, having received early intelligence of his approach, set out to meet him with fourteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, and having defeated the advanced guard under

Jan. 10.

Venegas, at Tarancon, the whole fell back to a strong position in front of Ucles, where they awaited the attack of the enemy. The battle took place on the 13th of January,

Jan. 13.

and proved one of the most disastrous of the whole war to the Spanish troops. Victor, perceiving that the left of the enemy was the weakest point of their line, threw the bulk of his forces against that wing; it was speedily routed, and the re-enforcements which Venegas sent up to its support were successively driven back.

The whole army now retreated; but this retrograde movement was speedily converted into a disorderly flight by the impetuous charges of the terrible French dragoons. Fifteen hundred men were slain on the spot; nine thousand prisoners taken, with the whole artillery, standards, and baggage of the army. This battle destroyed almost all the remains of the Spanish regular army; and the host which was thereafter collected by Cartaojal, who was appointed to succeed the Duke del Infantado in the command in the defiles of the Sierra Morena, were almost entirely raw and inexperienced levies, upon whom no reliance whatever could be placed. The French disgraced their victory by the most inhuman cruelties;* and, after subjecting the clergy and principal inhabitants of Ucles to every indignity, bound sixty-nine, two and two together, and massacred them, as in the Reign of Terror, some even in the public slaughter-houses; while three hundred women, the wives or daughters of the victims, who made the air resound with their shrieks at this atrocious iniquity, were delivered over, immediately after, to the passions and brutality of the soldiers; and great numbers of the prisoners taken in battle, on the plea of reprisals, were murdered in cold blood.

After this disaster, the Spanish armies who had escaped from the rout of Ucles, Rount of the and fled from the Somo-Sierra pass, Spaniards at fell back in two divisions: one Ciudad Real. towards the Sierra Morena, on the road to Seville; the other in the direction of Merida and Almaraz, with a view to the support of Badajoz. The first was under the command of Cartaojal, the latter of Cuesta. Cartaojal, when his whole detachments were called in, had still, in the end of February, sixteen thousand infantry and three thousand horse, with which he observed the French under Sebastiani, who lay with fifteen thousand men at Toledo; while Cuesta, with fourteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, was opposed to Victor on the Tagus, in

* Belm., i., 77, 79. Tor., ii., 327, 331. Jones, i., 209, 210. VOL. III.—R R

* Belm., i., 56. Tor., ii., 211, 219. Rocca, Guerra d'Es pagne, 110, 113.

Estremadura. The Duke d'Albuquerque commanded the advanced division of Cartaojal's army, consisting of nine thousand foot-soldiers and two thousand horse, with which he advanced in the middle of February towards Toledo, from Carolina in the Sierra Morena, where the remainder of the corps lay. This ill-concerted attack with part only of the Spanish force, depressed by defeat, on a superior body of the enemy, flushed with victory, led to the result which might easily have been anticipated. Sebastiani

March 27. hastily assembled twelve thousand men, with whom, as the enemy approached Toledo, he gave battle at Ciudad Real, and routed them in half an hour, with the loss of a thousand slain, all their guns, and three thousand prisoners. The remainder fled into the Sierra Morena, where they were quickly re-enforced by new levies from Andalusia and Grenada,* and Sebastiani, satisfied with his success, quickly resumed his position in the capital of La Mancha.

A still greater disaster awaited the army collected in Estremadura, under the orders of Cuesta. This general, though a brave old veteran, was, unhappily, of a headstrong and obstinate disposition, and being imbued with his full share of Castilian pride and ignorance, was equally incapable of taking counsel from the lessons of experience or yielding to the advice of abler persons than himself. These peculiarities, which appeared painfully conspicuous in the course of the campaign, on the first occasion when he acted in concert with Sir Arthur Wellesley, soon brought about a very serious disaster on the plains of Estremadura. Early in March, Victor received orders from Joseph at Madrid forthwith to pass the Tagus, in order to co-operate in Napoleon's design of the general attack upon Portugal, while, at the same time, Lapisse, who, with a division of eight thousand men, was stationed near Salamanca, was ordered to move and advance to Abrantes. Cuesta, at this time, lay on the banks of the Tagus, and occupied the famous bridge of Almaraz: a noble structure, five hundred and eighty feet long, and one hundred and thirty-four high, built by the town of Plasencia during the reign of Charles V., and which vied with the greatest works of the Romans in solidity and grandeur; but, as the enemy had possession of the bridges of Talavera and Arsobizbo, farther up the river, it was impossible to prevent them from crossing, and the destruction of one of the arches by Cuesta's order was to be lamented, as it destroyed a precious monument of former greatness, without contributing in any material degree to present security. Cuesta, finding himself assailed along the line of the Tagus by twenty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, with forty-two guns, fell back at all points, and, crossing the ridge of mountains which separates the valley of the Tagus from that of the Guadiana, took post at Medellin, on the latter river, where he contrived, by rallying all his detachments, to collect twenty thousand infantry, four thousand horse, and twenty pieces of cannon. The bridge of Medellin was not seriously contested by the Spaniards, who were drawn up in the form of a half moon, in a line about a league in breadth, a little to the south of the river. Notwithstanding his inferiority in numbers, having only fif-

teen thousand foot and three thousand horse on the spot, Victor immediately advanced to the attack. The right wing of the Spaniards, where their best troops were placed, made a brave resistance, and for two hours not only held the enemy in check, but sensibly gained ground, and already the shouts of victory were heard in that quarter. Encouraged by these favourable appearances, Cuesta moved forward his centre, which also drove back the enemy; and, deeming the victory now secure, the Spanish general sent forward his cavalry to charge. No sooner had they come into fire, however, than the whole horse, instead of charging the enemy, turned about and fled, trampling the victorious infantry under foot, and spreading disorder and alarm through the whole rear. The consequence of such a flight in an army composed, in great part, of new levies, was immediately fatal. Great part of the Spanish army took to flight. Still, however, the victorious centre stood firm, and gallantly, by a pointblank discharge, repelled the first efforts of the victorious French dragoons; but Victor, upon this, instantly brought up cannon, and made such gaps in their ranks by his volleys of grape, that the French dragoons succeeded in breaking in, and then the whole army took to flight. The French horse pursued the fugitives for several miles, with great slaughter. The whole Spanish artillery fell into the hands of the victors, and their total loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, did not fall short of ten thousand men, while that of the French did not exceed a tenth part of the number. So complete was their rout, that Cuesta, who fled with a few horsemen into the recesses of the Sierra Morena, could not, for some days after the battle, rally a single battalion of infantry; and nothing but the strength and intricacy of those mountains, and the vague apprehension excited by the disaster experienced in the last campaign by Dupont beyond them, prevented Victor, in the first moments of dismay occasioned by this victory and that of Ciudad Real, from penetrating into that beautiful province, and planting the French eagles in triumph on the minarets of Seville.*

While these disastrous events were prostrating the Spanish strength on the plains Situation and views of La Mancha, and on the banks of the Guadiana, Marshal Soult lay inactive at Oporto, and was far from making that use of his important conquest which might have been expected from his vigour and ability. He had made himself master, indeed, of an opulent commercial city, abounding in resources of all kinds, and containing one hundred and ninety pieces of heavy cannon, besides immense warlike stores and magazines; and his advanced posts, pushing forward to the south of the Douro, subdued the whole country as far as the Vouga. But not only had the obstinate hostility of the population considerably weakened his army during its march from Galicia, but strongly impressed him with the risk of advancing farther into a country animated by such feelings, until he received more accurate accounts of the force and intentions of the English army, and advices of the co-operation of Lapisse and Victor on the eastern frontier of the kingdom. Nor was this all. While he himself overcame all hostility in front, the elements of a most serious resistance had again sprung up in the country he had passed,

* Nap., i., 208, 213. Tor., ii., 279, 289. Belm., i., 68, 69.

* Nap., ii., 213, 226. Tor., ii., 284, 289. Belm., 67, 68

and blows of no inconsiderable magnitude had been struck, both by the Spaniards and Portuguese, on the fortified posts and detachments left in his rear. The Galician insurgents, taking advantage of the absence of Soult in Portugal, and Ney with the greater part of his corps in Asturias, had collected in great strength round the depôts and armed stations in the southern parts of their province: Tuy, containing the principal reserve of Soult's corps, and Vigo, garrisoned by thirteen hundred men, left in guard of the military chest, were soon surrounded each by several thousand armed peasants; and al-

though the former, after a blockade of several weeks, was relieved by succours despatched from Oporto, the latter, with its whole

garrison and treasure, fell into the hands of the Spaniards. A still more serious blow was struck by Silveira with his Portuguese levies, who had taken refuge, on the French invasion, in the wildest recesses of Tras-os-Montes. That enterprising officer, issuing from his retreat as soon as the French had passed

on, suddenly appeared before Chaves, now filled with the sick and magazines of their army, entered the town without opposition, and in four days afterward made himself master of the castle, with thirteen prisoners. Encouraged by this success, he advanced on the traces of the French army; reached Braga, which he evacuated upon hearing of the fall of Oporto, and crossed over to the valley of the Tamega,* where he made himself master of the important town and bridge of Amarante, a pass of great

strength, the possession of which barred the principal line of communication from the Douro to Tras-os-Montes and the northern provinces of the Peninsula.

But, in addition to these untoward circumstances, the situation of Soult, both from the intrigues with which he was surrounded, and those in which he himself was engaged, was one of a very peculiar and almost unprecedented kind. While the example of thrones having been won by soldiers' hands in the case of Napoleon, Murat, and, more recently, Jerome and Joseph, had inspired the marshal with extravagant ideas of the destiny which might await him in his Lusitanian provinces, the dreadful privations which they had recently undergone, and the apparently interminable extent of the wars in which the emperor was engaged, had laid the foundations of a widespread disaffection among his followers. Thus a double set of intrigues was going forward in the army at Oporto at the same time. While the French party in the northern provinces of Portugal were preparing an address, which, in a few days, was signed by thirty thousand persons, to Soult, praying him to assume the sovereignty of their country, and that officer, yielding to the flattering illusion, was preparing proclamations in the name of Nicholas I., king of Portugal,† and endeavouring, though without success, to

gain the consent of his generals of division to the usurpation, a numerous body of superior officers in his army were organizing the ramifications of a vast conspiracy among the troops, the object of which was to revolt against the authority of Napoleon, restore a Republican government in France, seize Soult and such officers as should adhere to his fortunes, and put a stop to the devastating wars which he was waging, to the detriment alike of his own country and the world. Secret advances, in relation to both these projects, were made to Sir Arthur Wellesley soon after he landed; but that cautious general, without implicating himself or his government in such dark designs, continued steadfast in his plan of terminating all these chimerical projects by expelling Soult from Portugal by force of arms;* while Napoleon wisely and magnanimously overlooked the whole affair, and wrote to Soult that "he recollected nothing but Austerlitz," where he had particularly distinguished himself.†

It was in this situation of affairs in Spain and Portugal that Sir Arthur Wellesley, who shall hereafter be called Wellington, landed at Lisbon; and from this time forward the historian, in narrating the annals of the Peninsular campaigns, instead of a confused and involved narrative of separate actions and operations, which no art can render interesting to the reader, and which it requires no small effort in the writer himself to apprehend, finds himself embarked on a connected and consecutive stream of events, at first inconsiderable, and scarcely attended to in the shock of vast armies on the Danube, but which steadily increased in depth and magnitude until it attracted the attention of all Europe, and finally overwhelmed the empire of Napoleon in its waves.

Two different plans of operation presented themselves to the choice of the English general when he took the command in Portugal. The first was, to move to the eastward, and combine an attack on Victor, with Cuesta, in the valley of the Tagus. This plan, which was strongly recommended by the Spanish general, had the advantage of striking at once at the heart of the enemy's power, and, by compelling the concentration of his principal forces to cover Madrid, would prove a seasonable relief to the patriot bands in all quarters, and prepare the means of renewed resistance in the remote provinces, especially of Andalusia. Wellington was not insensible to the importance of these considerations; and he declared, two days after his arrival in Portugal, that he was convinced "the French would be in serious danger in Spain, only when a great force shall be collected which shall oblige them to collect their troops; and a combined operation of the force in this country, with that under Cuesta, may be the groundwork of such extended operations." But, on a more mature consideration, it was justly deemed more expedient to commence operations by clearing the northern provinces of Portugal of the enemy. Much dissatisfaction would, with reason, be excited in that country, if, while one third of its territory was still in the hands of the enemy, a portion of the native and all the allied forces should be employed in a foreign operation; the

* Belm., i., 64, 65. Tor., ii., 332, 334, 336. Lond., i., 317, 318. Vict. et Cong., xix., 19, 20.

† Thib., vii., 546. Sav., iv., 128. Well. Desp., 7th May, 1809. Gurw., iv., 288.

‡ "It is certain that a proclamation was printed at Soult's headquarters addressed to the generals of division, to be published as an order of the day, in which he announced himself King of Portugal and Algarva, subject only to the approval of the emperor, of which he entertained no doubts. Delaborde, one of his generals, who positively refused, as well as Loison, to go into the project, long after showed a copy of this proclamation at Paris."—THIBAUDEAU, vii., 546, 547.

* Tor., ii., 344, 345. Wellington to Lord Castlereagh, 7th May, 1809. Gur., iv., 288.

† Sav., iv., 128.

First measures of Wellington in Portugal. April 22.

Reasons for marching against Soult at Oporto.

English army might be exposed to considerable hazard if, while far advanced into the interior of Spain, its line of communication were to be menaced by the advance of Soult from Oporto; and it was of no small consequence, in a war in which so much depended on opinion and early success, to engage at first in an operation within the compass of the British army alone,* rather than one in which much would depend on the co-operation of the Spanish forces, too clearly proved, by woful experience, to be incapable of bearing in the field the shock of the imperial legions.

Operations against Soult being resolved on in the first instance, Wellington moved Marches his force in two columns into the against Soult, north of Portugal: the right, consisting

of six thousand foot and one thousand horse, under Beresford, was to advance by Viseu and Lamego towards the Upper Douro, in order to co-operate with Silveira, who, it was hoped, still held the line of the Tamego and the important bridge of Amarante, and thus turn Soult's left flank, and cut him off from any retreat by Braga, or across the *Tras-os-Montes*, to Astorga and Leon; the left, under Wellington in person, after assembling at Coimbra, consisted of fifteen thousand infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, was to move direct by the Vouga upon Oporto. Hopes were entertained that a considerable part of Soult's army might be cut off in its retreat from the Vouga to the Douro, and measures had been very skilfully taken to surprise the enemy and secure that object; but Soult got information of the approach of the English, and the conspiracy in his own army, just in time to prevent the catastrophe; the principal leaders were

May 2. suddenly arrested, and the troops rapidly withdrawn behind the Douro, the bridge over which, at Oporto, was prepared for firing, and all the boats that could be discovered brought over to the northern bank of the river. At the same time, Loison was despatched to the rear, with a strong division, to clear the banks of the Tamego, and secure the bridge of Amarante; and, after some days' sharp fighting, he succeeded in that object, and dislodged Silveira from that important post.† Mackenzie, meanwhile, with three thousand British and four thousand Portuguese troops, was moved forward to Alcantara and the eastern frontier of the kingdom, to observe Lapisse and Victor, and afford some protection to that exposed part of the Portuguese dominions.

The British advanced posts fell in with the enemy on the 11th of May; but, by a Passage of the Douro, rapid retreat, they succeeded in extri- May 12. cating themselves from a situation of some peril, crossed the Douro, and burned the bridge of boats at Oporto. The English standards soon appeared in great strength on the southern bank, and the French battalions lined the northern shore; but the broad Douro rolled between the hostile forces, and it appeared next to impossible, without either bridge or boats, to cross the river in face of a nearly equal force. Early on the morning of the 12th, however, General Murray succeeded in collecting some boats, four miles up, at Avintas; and three boats having, by great daring, been obtained by Colonel Waters, by crossing in a small skiff opposite the

seminary at Oporto, twenty-five of the Buffs were quickly ferried over in the first boat, and the two others rapidly following, about a hundred men got a footing under cover of that building, unperceived by the enemy. The anxiety of the people, however, soon drew the enemy's attention to the spot; and no sooner were the red-coats perceived than a tumultuous noise of drums and shouts was heard in the city, and confused masses of the enemy were seen hurrying forth in all directions, and throwing out clouds of sharpshooters, who came furiously down upon the seminary. The building was soon surrounded; the fire of the enemy visibly augmented faster than that of the British; General Paget, who commanded the Buffs, was struck down, severely wounded; the eager gesticulations of the citizens from the houses on the opposite bank implored relief for their heroic allies, now apparently doomed to destruction. So violent was the struggle, so critical the moment, that Wellington himself was on the point of crossing to share the dangers of his advanced guard; and it was only the entreaties of his friends, and his own just confidence in GENERAL HILL, the second in command, which prevented him from doing so. By degrees, however, the fire of the British artillery, consisting of twenty guns, placed on the heights of Villa Nova, on a projecting promontory of the southern bank, opposite the seminary, became so powerful that it drove the enemy from all sides of the building excepting the iron gate on the north, where the Buffs were a match for them: some daring citizens crossed over with large boats to Sherbrooke's division, farther down the river, which was soon ferried over in large bodies; and hesitation became visible in the French columns, which was increased to confusion when Murray's columns, on the extreme right of the British, began to appear, and threaten their communication with Amarante and the great line of retreat. Horse, foot, and cannon now rushed tumultuously towards the rear; the city was hastily evacuated, amid the enthusiastic cheers of the people; Hill's central column, now strongly re-enforced by the passage of the 48th and 66th regiments, debouched fiercely from the seminary, and, by repeated volleys on the flank of the flying columns, threw them into utter confusion; and nothing but the inactivity of Murray on the right, who did not make the use he might of his advantageous position on the flank of the retreating host, preserved them from total ruin.* As it was, they lost five hundred killed and wounded, five guns, and a large quantity of ammunition, in the action: seven hundred sick were taken in the hospital, and fifty French guns in the arsenal; and so complete and unexpected was the surprise, that Wellington, at four o'clock, quietly sat down to the dinner and table-service which had been prepared for Marshal Soult.

To have crossed such a river as the Douro in presence of such a general as Soult, Soult's hazard with a force little, if at all, superior to arduous situation, his own, was a most brilliant opening of the campaign, and was justly regarded as reflecting as much credit on the daring and skill of the young English general, as it cast a shade on the vigilance and circumspection of the veteran French marshal. But Napoleon's troops were, beyond all others, capable of remedying

* Well. to Frere, 24th April, 1809. Gurw., iv., 247 and 249, to Lord Castlereagh.

† Well. to Mackenzie, 1st May, 1809. Gur., iv., 265 and 273. Nap., ii., 283-5. Tor., ii., 345, 346.

* Well. Desp., 12th May, 1809. Gur., iv., 297, 301. Nap., ii., 287, 291. Belm., i., 72, 73. Tor., ii., 345, 347.

such a disaster; and, notwithstanding the confusion into which they had been thrown by their precipitate retreat, before nightfall order was restored, and the army securely rested under the protection of a vigilant and powerful rear-guard. Next morning, Soult was quietly resuming his march for Guimaraens, in the direction of Amarante, when he received the stunning intelligence that that important post, commanding the only bridge and defile over the Tamega, and the only line of retreat practicable for artillery, was already in the hands of the enemy. In effect, Beresford, having crossed the Douro farther up, had attacked Loison's outposts at Amarante on the morning of the 12th, with such vigour that he fell back from that post in the direction of Oporto, and met the retreating columns evacuating that city late at night. Soult's situation now seemed all but desperate: the well-known strength of the bridge of Amarante precluded the hope that it could be forced with discouraged and retreating troops, now that it was held by regular British and Portuguese soldiers; the great road to Braga was already in the possession of the enemy, as they held Oporto, from which it issued; and it could be regained only by cross hill roads, totally impracticable for artillery, and almost unpassable for mules or horses. Yet not a moment was to be lost: already the British outposts began to appear, and the thunder of their horse artillery was heard at no great distance. The energy of the French general, however, now fully aroused, was equal to the crisis. He instantly resolved to abandon his artillery, ammunition, and baggage, and make his way, with all imaginable expedition, across the mountains to the Braga road. This resolution was immediately adopted: all the powder which the men could not carry was blown up near Penafiel on the morning of the 13th; and the French army, abandoning its whole carriages, rapidly ascended the valley of the Sousa by roads almost impracticable, even for the cavalry, rejoined Loison at Guimaraens, and continuing its passage over the mountains, and leaving Braga on its left, at length regained the great road at San-Joad del Rey, a short way beyond that town.*

Notwithstanding the sacrifice of his whole *ma-*
teriel, however, Soult's retreat was
 extremely disastrous, even to the
 soldiers of his army. When he re-
 joined Loison at Guimaraens, it be-
 came necessary to sacrifice all the artillery and
 ammunition belonging to that division; heavy
 rains, ever since the 13th, impeded the progress
 of the troops through the mountains; the strag-
 glers multiplied at every step; frightful defiles,
 beside raging torrents, formed their paths; the
 shoes of the soldiers were worn out; they could
 hardly bear their arms; and, with the whole re-
 maining mules and horses, all the sick and
 wounded fell into the hands of the British. The
 streams, everywhere swollen by the excessive
 floods, were unpassable except by their bridges,
 and the arch of Ponte Nova, over the roaring
 torrent of the Cavado, was the only line of re-
 treat which lay open, after the occupation of the
 road to Braga by Wellington, and Amarante by
 Beresford. This bridge was occupied,
 and had been partially destroyed, by the
 peasants: unless it could be regained, the hour

of surrender had arrived, for the army was strug-
 gling through a narrow defile between awful pre-
 cipices, almost in single file. Wellington, in
 close pursuit, thundered in the rear, and would
 infallibly attack on the following morning. In
 this extremity, the heroic courage of Colonel Du-
 long, who in the dark, with twelve grenadiers,
 crept along a narrow ledge of masonry which
 was left of the arch, surprised the Portuguese
 guards and made himself master of the bridge,
 extricated the army from this apparently hope-
 less situation, and opened up the road to Mont-
 alagre, where the whole arrived perfectly ex-
 hausted, and in woful plight, late on the even-
 ing of the 17th. Soult continued his ^{May 17,}
 retreat across the Galician frontier, ^{May 20,}
 reached Orense on the 26th, and on ^{May 21,}
 the day following met Ney at Lugo, who had
 returned from his Austrian expedition, and dis-
 lodged an irregular body of twelve thousand
 peasants who were blockading three French
 battalions in that place. "His condition," says
 Jomini, "was much more disastrous than that
 in which General Moore had traversed the same
 town six months before."* The French dis-
 graced this gallant retreat by savage cruelty:
 the peasants were massacred, and their houses
 burned by them along their whole line of march,
 without remorse;† but their own losses were
 very severe, amounting to about a fourth part
 of the whole troops which were attacked on the
 Douro, besides all their artillery, ammunition,
 and baggage, and even a considerable part of
 their muskets.

After this important success, Wellington re-
 turned to Oporto, from whence he ^{Wellington's}
 moved his troops forward as rapidly ^{preparations}
 as possible to Abrantes, and enga- ^{for operations}
 ged in active preparations for co-op- ^{in Estrama-}
 erating with Cuesta and advancing ^{dura.}
 through Estremadura towards Madrid. Victor
 had not improved his important victory at Me-
 dellin so much as might have been expected,
 especially considering the great amount and ex-
 cellent quality of his cavalry, which were of in-
 estimable importance in the level plains which
 run up to the foot of the Sierra Morena. But
 the operations of the English general were im-
 peded for above a month by the want of money,
 of which, at this period, he bitterly complained,
 and which led him to suspect, at the time, that
 government had engaged in an enterprise beyond
 their strength. In truth, however, the finances
 of Great Britain, as the event proved, were fully
 equal to the strain, and the difficulty arose en-
 tirely from the extraordinary scarcity of *specie*,
 at that crisis, in the British islands, arising par-
 tly from the profuse issue of paper to carry on the
 prodigious mercantile operations and national
 expenditure of the period, and partly from the
 vast consumption and requisitions of the French
 and Austrian armies during the campaign on
 the Danube. At the same time, the want of
 warlike experience was severely felt in the army,
 both on the part of the officers and soldiers. The
 commissariat, in all its branches, was very de-
 fective. Released, by a month's intermission,
 from active operations, from the excitement and
 dangers of actual warfare, the troops gave them-
 selves up to disorders of every kind: plunder was
 universal along their line of march; the coun-

* Belm., i., 72, 74. Well. Desp., 18th May, 1809. Gur., iv., 315.

† Well. Desp., 18th and 22d of May, 1809. Gur., iv., 315, 326. Nap., ii., 294, 300. Tor., ii., 347, 349. Belm., i., 74, 75. Vict. et Conq., xix., 39, 44.

try, for miles on either side, was filled with stragglers; and, the instant the common men got out of the sight of their officers, outrages were committed without end on the defenceless inhabitants, who had hailed their arrival as deliverers. To such a height did these evils arise, that Wellington, in several regiments, directed the roll to be called every hour; he largely augmented the powers and force at the disposal of the provost-marshal, and, in the bitterness of his heart, more than once wrote to government that the British army, "excellent on parade, excellent to fight, was worse than an enemy in a country, and liable to dissolution alike by success or defeat."* Doubtless the large arrears of pay due at this time to the army, amounting to £300,000, and in several regiments to two months' pay, contributed in a great degree to this disgraceful state of things; and it is interesting to trace the early difficulties of that commander in training his troops to the duties of real warfare, who afterwards declared, in the just pride of experienced achievement, "that with the army he led from Spain into France, he could have gone anywhere and done anything." But these facts are highly valuable, as demonstrating how essentially the military is an art dependant upon practice for success; how little even a rigid discipline, gallant officers, and admirable equipment, can compensate for the want of actual experience; what difficulties the commander had to contend with, who was compelled thus to educate his officers and his soldiers in presence of the enemy; how much allowance must be made for the disasters of the Spanish troops,† who, without any of those advantages, were at once exposed to the shock of the veteran legions of Napoleon; and what must have been the sterling courage of those men, who, even when thus inexperienced, were never once brought in the Peninsula into fair combat with the enemy, that they did not successfully assert the inherent superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Remittances to an adequate amount, in gold bars and specie, having, in consequence of the pressing representations of the English general, been at length obtained, on the 25th of June, for the army, and a more efficient system of control established by his unceasing vigilance among the troops, Wellington, in the end of that month, commenced his march from Abrantes in the direction of Alcantara and the Spanish frontier. His plan at first was, that Cuesta should maintain himself in some strong position towards the foot of the Sierra Morena, and, if possible, amuse Victor so as to retain him in that quarter, to the south not only of the Tagus, but the Guadiana, while he himself moved on Placentia and Talavera, so as to cut off his retreat to Madrid, and prevent his junction with the forces of Sebastiani in La Mancha, or Joseph in the capital. This plan, however, which had everything to recommend it, was found to be impracticable from the obstinacy of Cuesta, who refused to retire any farther back than the banks of the Guadiana, and the impossibility of finding any position there where there was the least chance of his making a successful stand if attacked by Victor. The English general, therefore, was compelled to alter his views, and adopt the more

hazardous plan of a junction and combined operation of the two armies. With this view, the British army marched by Castellbranco, Coria, and Placentia, while the Spanish advanced to the same point by the bridges of Almaraz and Arsobizbo. Victor fell back as Wellington advanced, and the two armies effected their junction at Oropesa on the 20th of July; while Sir Robert Wilson, with his brave Lusitanian legion and three thousand Spaniards, advanced on their left, from the Alberche to the mountains of the Escorial, with whom he approached, and actually put himself in communication with Madrid. The forces which thus menaced the capital were very considerable: the English were twenty-two thousand strong, of whom three thousand were cavalry, with thirty guns; Cuesta had thirty-two thousand infantry and six thousand horse, with forty-six cannon; and Venegas, who was to advance on Toledo, and join the other two armies in the neighbourhood of the capital, was at the head of twenty-three thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, in all above eighty-five thousand men, but of different nations, independent of each other, and of whom the British alone could be relied on for movements in the field in presence of the enemy. Beresford, meanwhile, with fifteen thousand Portuguese, established his headquarters at Fuente Guinaldo, near Ciudad Rodrigo; but his duty was merely to protect the frontier from insult and observe the enemy at Salamanca, not take any active part in the important operations which were in contemplation.*

The approach of forces so considerable, all converging towards the capital, produced an alarming fermentation, the sure proof, as Jomini observes, of the judgment with which the enterprise had been conceived. Joseph no sooner received intelligence of the formidable forces with which he was menaced, than he despatched the most pressing orders to Soult and Ney, who were at Astorga, on the frontiers of Leon, and Mortier, who lay at Valladolid, to unite their forces and descend as rapidly as possible through the pass of the Puerto de Banos, which forms the only line of communication through the great central chain of Spanish mountains from the valley of the Douro to that of the Tagus, to Placentia, so as to menace the communications of the English army with Lisbon; he himself, leaving only three weak battalions in the Retiro, marched, with six thousand of his guards and five thousand other troops, towards Toledo, which was assigned as the general rendezvous of all his forces; Sebastiani was hastily ordered to the same place, whither also Victor fell back from Talavera. Before doing so, however, Victor narrowly escaped destruction on the 23d, when the British troops were all in readiness for the attack, and Victor alone was exposed to their blows. The events which followed leave no room for doubt that, if Wellington had attacked, even unsupported by the Spaniards, on that day, he would have gained a glorious victory; but it could have led to no beneficial result, menaced as the British army was by the descent of an overwhelming force in its rear. Cuesta refused to fight on that day, as his troops were not prepared; and next morning, when the columns of attack were formed at daylight, the enemy had

* Gurw., iv., 407. Well. to Castlereagh, 17th June, 1809.

† Well. Desp. to Lord Castlereagh, &c., 30th May, 7th June, 16th June, 17th June, 1809. Gurw., iv., 343, 352, 407, 346, 385, 363, 400.

* Wilson's Desp., 17th June, 1st July, 24th July, 1809. Gurw., iv., 403, 499. Belm., i., 89, 90. Nap., ii., 339. Vict. et Cong., xix., 278, 279.

disappeared, having retired in the night in the direction of Toledo.*

Finding himself, on the 25th July, by the concentration of these forces, at the head of fifty-five thousand brave veterans, animated by repeated victories, and under the direction of experienced officers, Joseph deemed himself sufficiently strong to resume the offensive; and, contrary to the strenuous advice of Jourdan, and, indeed, the dictates of common sense on the subject, gave orders to advance before the co-operation of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, who could not arrive on the Tagus before the 1st of August, could be relied on. He quickly repulsed the advanced guards of Cuesta, which, elated by the continued retreat of the French before them, were advancing in a disorderly manner, dreaming of Madrid and the Pyrenees; and on the 26th, the French troops, driving Cuesta's advanced posts before them, reappeared in great strength in front of TALAVERA. The English general had only sent two brigades in pursuit of the enemy beyond the Alberche, having already begun to experience that pressing want of provisions, and the means of transport, which soon had such important effects on the issue of the campaign; and, in consequence, resolved not to advance with the main body of his force beyond that stream till some arrangement was made for the supply of these necessary articles. The whole allied army took post at Talavera, in a battle-field well calculated, by the diversity of its character, for the various qualities of the troops which were there to combat for the independence of the Peninsula. On the right, the dense but disorderly array of the Spaniards, with their flank resting on the Tagus, occupied the town and environs of Talavera, with the olive woods, intersected with enclosures, which lay along its front, filled with light troops, and their numerous artillery planted in an advantageous position along the front of their line, and commanding all the avenues by which it could be approached. Far beyond the enclosures, the British stood in the open field on the left, on the uneven ground which extended from the olive woods to the foot of the hills, forming the first range of the Sierra de Montalban. A deep ravine, in the bottom of which flowed the Portina rivulet, lay at the foot of these hills, and formed the extreme British left, the streamlet turning sharp round, and, winding through its way to the Tagus at Talavera, ran across the front of the whole allied line. On the heights, on one side of it, the French were placed in a strong position, with their batteries on the right, placed on some lofty heights overlooking a great part of the field of battle: right opposite to them stood the British line, on a similar ridge of eminences, and their guns also sweeping the open slope by which they were to be ascended. In the centre, between the two armies, there was a commanding hillock or mount, on which the English had begun to construct a redoubt, and on which some Spanish guns were placed: it was evident that on its possession the fate of the approaching battle would in a great degree depend.†

* Wellington's Desp., 24th July, 1809. Gurw., iv., 499. Nap., ii., 372, 373. Tor., iii., 36, 37. Belm., i., 91, 92. Jom., iii., 340, 344.

† Well. Desp., 29th July, 1809. Gurw., iv., 504. Belm., i., 91, 92. Kausler, 536. Nap., ii., 386, 387.

‡ The exact French and allied force at Talavera, as obtained by Kausler from the war office at Paris, was as follows:

About three o'clock on the afternoon of the 27th, Victor's advanced guards approached the British outposts, station-
ed beyond the Portina stream-
let, and immediately commenced an attack. Some of the English regiments, which had then seen fire for the first time, were thrown into confusion by the suddenness of the onset, and Wellington, who was with the advanced posts, narrowly escaped being made prisoner; while ten thousand Spaniards on the right were so alarmed by the French light cavalry riding up to them and discharging their pistols, that they broke after a single discharge of their muskets, and, flying tumultuously several miles to the rear, gave out that all was lost. Wellington, however, brought up some veteran troops to the scene of danger, and checked the disorder, while, at the same time, the British advanced posts, covered by the brave 45th regiment and 5th battalion of the 60th, retired to the position of the main body on the other side of the stream. Encouraged by this success, Victor, as night approached, was induced to hazard an attack on the English left, stationed on their line of heights; and for this purpose Ruffin was ordered to charge with his division, supported by Villatte, while Lapisse fell on the German Legion on their right, so as to prevent assistance being rendered from the other parts of the line. The forces which thus were brought into action by the French were above twenty thousand men, and the assault was so quick and vigorous, that, though Colonel Donkin gallantly repulsed the corps which attacked his front, his left flank was at the same moment turned by several French battalions, who, having advanced unperceived through the valley, suddenly appeared with loud shouts on the heights in his rear. General Hill, however, with the 29th regiment, charged them without an instant's delay and drove them down the hill, and immediately bringing up other battalions, formed a convex front, facing outward, which effectually covered the British left. It was full time; for Lapisse, soon after, opened a heavy fire on the German Legion on the right, and fresh battalions of Ruffin's division, emerging from the hollow, resolutely advanced to storm the heights on the left. It was now dark: the opposing lines approached to within thirty yards of each other, and the frequent flashes of the musketry enabled the dauntless antagonists to discern each other's visages through the gloom. For a few minutes the event seemed doubtful; but soon the loud cheer of the British soldiers was heard above the receding roar of the mus-

FRENCH.			
Royal Guards.....	5,000	Guns.	
Victor's Corps.			
Infantry and artillery.....	18,890	30	
Cavalry.....	3,781		
Sebastiani's Corps.			
Infantry and artillery.....	17,100	30	
Cavalry.....	3,670		
Reserve Divisions.			
Infantry and artillery.....	7,681	20	
75 battalions, 3 squadrons	56,123	80	
ALLIES.			
British infantry (28½ battalions) . .	16,663	30	
Artillery, engineers, &c.....	1,287		
Cavalry.....	3,047		
	20,997		
Spanish infantry and artillery.....	33,000	70	
Cavalry.....	6,000		
	59,997	100	

—See KAUSLER, 535, and NAP., ii., 361.

ketry, and the French fell back in disorder into the hollow, while Lapisse drew off on the right; and the soldiers on either side, worn out with fatigue, sunk into sleep around the fires of their bivouacs.*

Not discouraged by this bloody repulse, which Desperate cost him above eight hundred of his battle on best troops, Victor, contrary to the opinion of Jourdan, who contended strenuously that all offensive operations should be suspended till Soult was sufficiently near to threaten the enemy's communications, prevailed on Joseph to permit him to renew the battle on the following morning. The centre of the British being deemed too strong, by reason of the ravine which covered their front, it was determined to renew the attack on the heights on the left. At eight o'clock Ruffin's division again advanced to the attack, supported by Villatte's, and the French troops with an intrepid step ascended to the summit of the hill, while the artillery on both sides kept up a vehement fire, and soon made frightful chasms in the opposing ranks. Having gallantly made their way to the summit, the French instantly closed with Hill's division, and for half an hour a desperate struggle took place, in the course of which Hill himself was wounded, and his men were falling fast; but the French loss was still greater: insensibly their line gave ground, and at length, being forced back to the edge of the slope, the whole broke, and were hurled in wild disorder to the foot of the hill. Fearful, from these repeated attacks, that the enemy would at length succeed in turning his left, Wellington placed his cavalry at the entrance of the valley, obtained from Cuesta the succour of Bassecourt's division, which was stationed on the hills beyond its outer side, and two guns to re-enforce Hill's batteries, which were bravely served by the Spanish gunners, and rendered good service during the remainder of the day.†

The extreme heat of the day now for a few hours suspended the combat, during suspension of the battle during the heat of the day, which the lines were re-formed on both sides, the ammunition-wagons replenished, and the wounded withdrawn to the rear. In this interval Joseph held a council of war, in which Jourdan again renewed his counsel that they should retire to the Alberche, and Victor urged that they should recommence the attack. The latter advice prevailed, chiefly in consequence of the arrival of a courier from Soult, announcing that he could not arrive at Plasencia till the 4th of August, and the threatening advance of Venegas, who was already near Aranjuez. Meanwhile, the troops on either part, overcome by thirst, straggled down in great numbers to the streamlet which ran in the bottom of the ravine which separated the two armies: not a shot was fired, not a drum was beat; peaceably the foemen drank from the opposite banks of the same rill; and not unfrequently the hands which had so recently before been dyed in mutual slaughter were extended and shaken across the water, in token of their mutual admiration of the valour and constancy displayed on both sides. Wellington, meanwhile, was seated on the grass on the top of the hill which had been so obstinately contested, eagerly surveying the enemy's move-

ments, which indicated a renewal of the conflict with redoubled forces along the whole line. At this moment Colonel Donkin rode up to him, charged with a message from the Duke d'Albuquerque, that Cuesta was betraying him. Calmly continuing his survey, Wellington desired Donkin to return to his brigade! In a few minutes a rolling of drums was heard along the whole French line: the broad, black masses of the enemy appeared full in view, and, preceded by the fire of eighty pieces of artillery, fifty thousand men advanced to the attack.*

The French columns came down their side of the ravine at a rapid pace, and, though a little disordered by crossing the stream, mounted the opposite hill with the utmost intrepidity. On the extreme British right, Sebastiani's corps fell with the utmost fury on General Campbell's division, and by their loud cries indicated the confidence of immediate victory; but their attack was in column and the English were in line, and then the inherent vice of that arrangement became at once apparent. The British regiments which stood against the front of the mass, drawn up three deep, kept up an incessant rolling fire on the enemy; while those on either side, inclining forward and directing their fire against both flanks of the column, soon occasioned so frightful a carnage that even the intrepidity of the imperial veterans sunk under the trial, and the whole broke and fell back in confusion. On rushed Campbell's division, supported by two regiments of Spanish infantry and one of cavalry, who were inspired with unwonted steadiness by the example of their allies, and, pushing the disorganized mass before them, completed their discomfiture, and took ten pieces of cannon. At the same time, Ruffin and Villatte's divisions were descried marching across the valley on the enemy's extreme right, in order to turn by the foot of the Sierra de Montalban, that bloodstained hill which they had in vain sought to carry by assault. Wellington immediately ordered the 1st German hussars and 23d dragoons to charge the column in the bottom of the valley. On they went at a canter, but soon came to a hollow cleft which lay right across their path, and which seemed impossible to cross. The veteran German, Arenscheld, with characteristic coolness, reined up his men on the edge of the hollow; but Seymour, at the head of the 23d, with true English hardihood, plunged headlong down, and, though half of his men fell over each other in wild confusion in the bottom, where Seymour was wounded, the survivors, under Ponsonby, coming up by twos and threes, and disregarding the fire of Villatte's columns, through which they passed, fell with inexpressible fury on Strolz's brigade of chasseurs in the rear, which, unable to resist the shock, opened its ranks to let them through. The heroic British dragoons, however, after this marvellous charge, were assailed, when blown and disordered by success, by a regiment of Polish lancers and a body of Westphalian light horse, and broken with great slaughter; the survivors, not half of those who went into action, found shelter on the broken ground behind Bassecourt's division of Spanish infantry on the mountains beyond.†

* Nap. ii., 392, 395. Well. Desp., iv., 505, 506. Jom., iii., 344, 345. Kausler, 537. Vict. et Conq., xix., 282, 284.

† Well. Despatch, 29th July. Gurw., iv., 506. Vict. et Conq., xix., 285, 286. Jom., iii., 345, 346. Nap., ii., 396, 400.

* Lord Castlereagh's Speech, 1st Feb., 1809. Parl. Deb., xv., 293. Vict. et Conq., xix., 285, 286. Nap., 398, 401. Well. Desp. Gurw., iv., 506, 507.

† Vict. et Conq., xix., 287, 289. Napoleon, ii., 401, 403. Kausler, 538. Well. Desp., 29th July. Gurw., iv., 506.

While these terrible conflicts were going on in the two wings of the army, the centre, where Sherbrooke commanded, and the German Legion and guards were placed, was exposed to a still severer trial. The great batteries, mounting fifty guns, which there stood right opposite to the British line, at the distance of only half cannon-shot, made fearful chasms in their ranks; and the English guns, greatly inferior both in number and weight of metal, could make no adequate reply. Under cover of this fearful storm, Lapisse's division crossed the ravine in their front, and, ascending the opposite hill concealed by the smoke, got close to the British line, and already set up the shouts of victory. They were received, however, by a close and well-directed volley, followed by a general rush with the bayonet, which instantly threw the assailants back in great confusion; and the guards, following fast on their heels, not only drove them down the hill, but crossed the rivulet at the bottom, and were soon seen in disorderly array streaming up the opposite bank. Here, however, they met the enemy's reserve, who advanced in close order through the throng: powerful batteries, discharging grape, tore down whole ranks at every discharge on one flank, and some regiments of cavalry threatened the other. The guards, thus sorely pressed, gave way and fled in confusion; the disorder quickly spread to the Germans on their flank, and the whole British centre appeared broken. The danger was imminent; but Wellington, who had foreseen the consequences of the gallant but inconsiderate advance of the guards, had provided the means of restoring the combat. Instantly pushing forward the 48th regiment, which was in reserve, he directed it against the right flank of the French, who, in their turn, were somewhat disordered by success. When this gallant regiment got into the throng, beyond the stream, it was so beset by the crowd of fugitives, that it became necessary to open the ranks to let them through; but immediately closing again, it advanced in beautiful array against the flank of the pursuing French, and, by a destructive volley, compelled them to halt. The guards and Germans immediately rallied, faced about, and renewed their fire, and Cotton's brigade of light cavalry having come up on the other flank at the same time, the advance of the French was effectually checked in the centre. This was their last effort: their columns now drew off in good order, and retired across the Alberche, three miles in the rear, which was passed in the night. Shortly after the firing ceased, a frightful incident occurred: the grass, dried by the excessive heat, accidentally took fire, and, spreading rapidly over part of the field, scorched cruelly numbers of the wounded of both armies.*

Such was the glorious battle of Talavera, the first for a century past in which the English had been brought to contend on a great scale with the French, and which in its lustre equalled, in its ultimate effects exceeded, the far-famed days of Cressy and Azincour. Two-and-twenty thousand British had engaged for two successive days, and finally defeated above forty-five thousand French; for the aid which the Spaniards afforded in the battle was very trifling, and not more than ten thousand of the enemy, including the king's guard, remained to watch their lines in the olive

woods of Talavera, who never fired a shot. Seventeen pieces of cannon, several tumbrils, and some hundred prisoners, taken in fair fight, were the proud trophies of this hard-fought action. The loss on both sides was enormous, but greater on that of the French than the British, owing to their much superior numbers and their system of attack in close column. The latter lost 6,268 in the two days: that of the French is now ascertained, from the returns in the war office, to have been 8,794.* "This battle," says Jomini, "at once restored the reputation of the British army, which, during a century, had declined. It was now ascertained that the English infantry could dispute the palm with the best in Europe." In vain the mercantile spirit, which looks for gain in every transaction, and the virulence of faction, which has ever accompanied the noblest events in history, fastened on this far-famed field, complained of the subsequent retreat, and asked for durable results from the laurels of Talavera. These cold or selfish calculations were answered by the exulting throb of every British heart: the results asked for were found in the subsequent glorious career and long-continued security of England. Far from every generous bosom be that frigid spirit which would measure the importance of events only by their immediate gains, and estimate at nothing the lasting effect of elevation of national feeling. Character is the true strength of nations: historic glory is their best inheritance. When the time shall come that the British heart no longer thrills at the name of Talavera, its fruits will indeed be lost, for the last hour of the British Empire will have struck.

On the day following the battle, General Crauford, with three thousand fresh troops, joined the English army and replaced nearly half of those who had been disabled in the battle.

This gallant band had, at the distance of nearly sixty miles from the field of battle, met several Spanish runaways from the action of the 27th, who told them the English army was defeated and Lord Wellington killed. Pressing on only the more eagerly from this intelligence, Crauford, after giving his men a few hours' rest, and withdrawing fifty of the weakest from the ranks, hurried on with the utmost expedition with the remainder, and reached Talavera at eleven in the morning of the 29th, having passed over, in regular order, *sixty-two English miles* in the preceding twenty-six hours: a march which deserves to be noted as the greatest made by any foot-soldiers of any nation during the whole war, as that made by Lord Lake with the English cavalry, before the battle of Furruckabad, was the extreme stretch of horsemen.† But, notwithstanding this seasonable re-enforcement, Wellington had soon sufficient cause for anxiety; for, on the 2d of August, as he was preparing to march to Madrid, intelligence arrived that Soult, with a very large force, had penetrated, without opposition, through the Puerto de Banos, the Spaniards stationed in that important pass having abandoned it without firing a shot, and entered Plasencia, directly in the British rear and on the line of their communications with Lisbon, with thirty-four thousand men.‡

* Kausler, 539. Nap., ii., 405, 406. Well. Returns, Ann. Reg., 1809. App. to Chron. Jom., iii., 348.

† Ante, iii., 166.

‡ Wellington to Lord Beresford, August 4. Gurw., iv., 531, 533. Nap., ii., 412, 413.

* Well. Desp. Gurw., iv., 508. Nap., ii., 403, 406. Vict. et Conq., xix., 286, 288. Jom., iii., 347, 348.

This formidable and unlooked-for apparition had been occasioned by the concentration of the whole forces of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, in consequence of the pressing orders of Joseph, who, after uniting near Salamanca, had descended by forced

marches through Leon and the mountains forming the northern barrier of Estremadura, and appeared just in time to interfere with decisive effect on the theatre of the vital operations on the banks of the Tagus. Their concentration at this crisis was owing to a very singular and fortuitous chain of events. Soult, after he had brought the ghastly crowd which formed the only remains of his once splendid corps to Lugo, and delivering the garrison imprisoned there by the Galicians, deeming himself not strong enough to effect anything among the rugged mountains of that province, and having no magazines or stores to recruit his troops, resolved to make the best of his way into Old Castile; and, having set

out in the end of June for Benevente and Zamora, he put his troops into cantonments on the Esla in the beginning of July. Meanwhile, Ney, thus left in Galicia, had experienced a variety of disasters. After the conference at Lugo with Soult, he had moved towards Vigo, with a view to regain possession of that important fortress and seaport, and stifle the insurrection which, from the aid of several ships of war in the harbour, was there daily becoming more formidable. To reach it, however, he required to pass the bridge of St. Payo, in the valley of Soto-Mayor, where the road crosses the River Octaven. The Spaniards, ten thousand strong, with several pieces of heavy cannon, were there intrenched in a strong position on the opposite side of the river: the bridge was cut, and several gunboats, manned by English sailors, at its mouth, a short way farther down, prevented the passage from being turned in that direction. Driven thus to carry the passage by main force, Ney led on his troops gallantly to the attack, but the well-sustained fire of the Spaniards defeated all his efforts. He renewed the assault next day with no better success, and, despairing of forcing the position, he retired with the loss of three hundred men. Discouraged by this reverse, and finding himself abandoned by Soult, in a country swarming with enemies, and extremely difficult for military operations, Ney resolved to abandon Galicia. He was the more confirmed in this resolution, from the opinion which he entertained that he had been scandalously deserted and left to perish by Soult; and, under the influence of these mingled feelings of disappointment and indignation, he abandoned Ferrol and Corunna, and, collecting all his detachments, evacuated the whole province, and reached Astorga in the end of July. Asturias had previously been evacuated by Kellerman and Bonnet, who had arrived at Valladolid on the 20th

of June, in order to co-operate in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which at that period was in contemplation, after Santander had been carried by assault by the Spaniards some days before, and retaken, with great slaughter, by the latter of these generals. Thus, by a singular combination of circumstances, at the time when Wellington made his grand advance towards Madrid, Soult, Kellerman, and Bonnet, with above thirty thousand men, were assembled in the north of Leon,

ready to descend on his line of communication with Lisbon, and Ney was rapidly following in their footsteps from the extremity of Galicia.*

Wellington, thus menaced by a superior force in rear, at the same time that an army defeated, but still superior in number, lay in his front, had still the advantage of a central position between the two; and, if the quality of the whole allied forces had been alike, and he had commanded the whole, he had the means of striking the same redoubtable blows on the right and left, with a force inferior upon the whole, but superior to either taken singly, which Napoleon dealt out in 1796 to the converging Austrian columns which descended from the Alps for the relief of Mantua. This was the more feasible, as Joseph's army, which fought at Talavera, had been divided after the action: the king, with Sebastiani's corps, the reserve, and royal guards, having marched towards Madrid, now threatened on the one side by Venegas, who had occupied Aranjuez and passed Toledo, and on the other by Sir Robert Wilson, who was within seven leagues of the capital, and in communication with it. Doubtless, if Wellington had been at the head of fifty thousand British troops, he would have attempted, and probably with success, that resolute game. But, though the allied force at Talavera was of that numerical strength, dear-bought experience had demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on any part of it in the field, except the twenty thousand English soldiers. The British general and his whole troops had now seen the Spanish army, and the illusion which had formerly prevailed on the subject had been dispelled. Their artillery, it was ascertained, was for the most part well trained, and had rendered good service on some important occasions; but their cavalry was wretched, and their infantry, though courageous when resisting an attack, totally unfit to perform movements under fire, or in presence of the enemy, without falling into confusion. In these circumstances, it was apparent that a prudent defensive policy was the only one which promised a chance of success with an army in great part composed of such troops; but this was precisely the system which the ignorance and presumption of the Spanish generals rendered them incapable of adopting. Wellington, therefore, to avoid being attacked both in front and rear at the same time, deemed it necessary to divide the allied army; and he offered to General Cuesta either to stay with the wounded at Talavera, or march to the attack of Soult, as he chose. The Spanish general preferred remaining where he was, and Wellington, in consequence, set out from Talavera on the 3d of August,† taking with him the whole British army, and leaving about two thousand of their wounded in the hospital at Talavera, under charge of the Spanish army.

Hardly, however, had the last of the troops left the bloodstained banks of the Cuesta abandoned Alherche, when intelligence arrived that Cuesta was making preparations to abandon Talavera and the English wounded. At five o'clock Wellington received official intimation that the Spanish general had actually put his intentions in execution, and was moving after the British army, leaving nearly half the wounded to their fate.

* Belm., i., 60, 63. Tor., ii., 349, 353. Nap., ii., 324, 328.

† Well. Desp., Gurw., iv., 524, 534. Jom., iii., 349, 350. Nap., ii., 415, 417. Tor., iii., 48, 49.

Events in Galicia and Asturias which had led to this force assailing Wellington.

Apprehension of being attacked, at the same time, both by Victor and Soult, was assigned as the motive of this proceeding; but the real fact was, that the Spanish general entertained well-grounded apprehension of the stability of his own force, when left to defend an important position against such an enemy as he had seen

fight at Talavera, and he felt no chance of safety but in close proximity to the British force. Advice was received, at the same time, of the arrival of Soult at Naval Moral, on the high road leading to the bridge of Almarez, and that his force, which was hourly increasing, was already thirty thousand strong. In these circumstances, Wellington wisely resolved to alter his line of march, and, quitting the road by Almarez and Alcantara, to move across to the bridge of Arsobizbo, and take up a defensive position on the line of the Tagus.

This resolution was instantly acted upon: the troops defiled to the left, and passed the bridge in safety; the Spaniards rapidly

followed after them; and the bulk of the allied army reassembled at Deleitosa,

on the south of the Tagus, on the following day. The bridges of Arsobizbo and Almarez were destroyed, and a rear-guard of Spaniards, with thirty guns, left to defend the former passage. But the French corps, in great strength, were now appearing on the banks of the Tagus: Soult, with three corps, mustering already thirty-four thousand men, was in the neighbourhood

of Almarez; and Victor, with twenty-five thousand, attacked and defeated the Spaniards at Arsobizbo, by crossing the Tagus at a ford a little above the broken bridge with eight hundred horse, and captured all their guns. Nothing now appeared capable of preventing the junction of the whole French armies, and the attack of sixty thousand excellent troops on the allied army, already suffering from extreme want of provisions, exhausted by fatigue, and little capable of withstanding so formidable a force. But the object of delivering Madrid being accomplished, and the allies driven to the south of the Tagus, the French generals had no inclination for farther active operations: their soldiers, worn out with continued marching, stood much in need of repose; the recollection of Talavera checked the hope of any successful enterprise to the south of the Tagus, while its shores were guarded by the victors in that hard-fought field; and the great accumulation of troops around its banks exposed them, equally with the allies, to extreme suffering from want of provisions. These considerations pressing equally on both sides, produced a general separation of force, and suspension of

operations, after the combat of Arsobizbo. Cuesta, disgusted with his reverses, resigned the command, and his army was broken into two parts: ten thousand were despatched towards Toledo, to re-enforce Venegas, who was now bombarding that city, and twenty thousand, under the command of the Duke d'Albuquerque, remained in the neighbourhood of the English army, in the mountains which separate the valley of the Tagus from that of the Guadiana. The French armies also separated: Joseph returned with his guards, Dessolles's division, and Sebastiani's corps, to drive Venegas from Toledo; while Soult and Mortier remained at Talavera, Oropesa, and Plasencia, and Ney retraced his steps to Leon and the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. But so favourable an opportunity

never occurred again of breaking down the English power in the Peninsula; and Napoleon—who never ceased to lament, to the last hour of his life, that the advice of Soult was not followed, who wished to take advantage of this concentration of five corps, in all ninety thousand combatants, in the valley of the Tagus, and march at once on Coria and Lisbon—soon after dismissed Jourdan from his situation of major-general to Joseph, and conferred that important situation on Soult.*

The justice of this opinion appeared in a still more striking manner, from the proof which was soon afforded of the inefficient character of those corps threatening Madrid, which had caused such alarm in the mind

Defeats of the Spaniards at Puerto de Banos and Almonacid.

of Joseph as to lead him to break up the noble force which he had latterly accumulated in the valley of the Tagus. Ney, in his way back from Plasencia, met unexpectedly, in the Puerto de Banos, the division of Sir Robert

Wilson, consisting of three thousand Portuguese and as many Spaniards, who were winding their way, amid rocks and precipices, from the neighbourhood of Madrid to the Portuguese frontier, with which, being ignorant of the strength of the enemy, he endeavoured to stop the French corps. The result of a combat so unequal might easily have been anticipated: Wilson was, after a stout resistance of three hours, dislodged and thrown back on the Portuguese frontier, with the loss of a thousand men.

More important operations took place, at the same time, in the plains of La Mancha. Venegas, during the concentration of the French forces at Talavera, had not only, with one of his divisions, occupied Aranjuez, with its royal palace, but with two others was besieging and bombarding Toledo. No sooner was Joseph relieved, by the retreat of the English from Talavera, from the necessity of remaining in force on the Alberche, than he moved off, with Sebastiani's corps and Dessolles's division,

to attack him. Deceived as to the strength of his adversary, whose force he imagined did not exceed fourteen thousand men, the Spanish general resolved to give battle, and awaited the enemy in a good position at Almonacid. The French had twenty-four thousand foot and four thousand horse in the battle; the Spaniards about an equal force, but the difference in the quality of the troops in the opposite armies soon decided the contest. Encouraged by the ardour of his men, who demanded, with loud cries, to be led on to the combat, Sebastiani commenced the attack without waiting for the arrival of Dessolles's division: a division of Poles, under Sulcoski, attacked a hill, the key of the position on which the Spanish left rested, while the Germans under Laval assailed it in flank. The crest of the mount was speedily won, and the Spanish left fell back on their reserve, consisting of the soldiers of Bayleu; but they rallied the fugitives and stood firm, while Venegas, charging the victorious French in flank, threw them into confusion, and drove them back in great disorder. Victory seemed to declare in favour of the Spaniards, when the arrival of Dessolles and Joseph, with the reserve, restored the combat. Assailed both in front and flank by fresh forces, when still disordered by success, the Spanish troops, after

* Nap., ii., 417, 426. Belm., i., 94, 95. Jom., iii., 349, 357. Tor., iii., 50, 53.

a sharp conflict, fell back; the old Moorish castle of Almonacid, where the reserve was stationed, was carried, after a bloody combat;* and Venegas, utterly routed, was glad to seek refuge in the Sierra Morena, with the loss of thirty-five guns, nearly all his ammunition, and six thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners; but the loss of two thousand men on the side of the victors proved with what unwonted steadiness the Spaniards had fought on this occasion.

For nearly a month after their retreat to the southern bank of the Tagus, the English army remained undisturbed in their position on that river, with their headquarters at Deleitosa; and Wellington, informed of the return of Ney to Salamanca, was even

Sufferings of the English army, and their return to the Portuguese frontier.

preparing to resume offensive operations on its northern bank: with which view, he was busied in repairing the broken arch over the Tagus at Almaraz, when the total failure on the part of the Spaniards to provide subsistence for the English troops, rendered a retreat to Badajoz, and the vicinity of their own magazines, a matter of absolute necessity. From the moment the English troops entered Spain, they had experienced the wide difference between the promises and the performance of the Spanish authorities; and we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that, if the Junta of Truxillo had kept their contract for furnishing 240,000 rations to the English army, the allies would, on the night of the 27th of July, have slept in Madrid.† But, for the month which followed the battle of Talavera, their distresses in this respect had been indeed excessive, and had reached a height which was altogether insupportable. Notwithstanding the most energetic remonstrances from

Wellington, he had got hardly any supplies from the Spanish generals or authorities from the time of his entering Spain; Cuesta had refused to lend him ninety mules to draw his artillery, though, at the time, he had several hundreds in his army doing nothing; the troops of all arms were literally starving; during a month which followed the junction of the two armies on the 22d of July, they had not received ten days' bread; on many days they got only a little meat, without salt, on others nothing at all; the cavalry and artillery horses had not received, in the same time, three deliveries of forage, and, in consequence, a thousand had died, and seven hundred were on the sick list. These privations were the more exasperating that, during the greater part of the time, the Spanish troops received their rations regularly both for men and horses. The composition of the Spanish troops, and their conduct at Talavera and on other occasions, was not such as to inspire the least confidence in their capability of resisting the attack of the French armies: their men, hardly disciplined, and without uniform, threw away their arms and dispersed the moment they experienced any reverse, and permitted the whole weight of the contest to fall on the English soldiers, who had no similar means of escape. These causes had gradually produced an estrangement, and at length a positive animosity between the privates and officers of the two armies; an angry correspondence took place between their respective generals, which widened the breach; and at last Wellington, finding all his representations disregarded, inti-

mated his resolution to withdraw the British troops to the frontiers of Portugal, where they might be maintained from their own magazines. The Spanish authorities, upon this, made the most earnest protestations of their wish to supply the wants of the British soldiers, and offered to divide the magazines at Truxillo with them, or even put them entirely at their disposal. But Wellington had ascertained that this boasted resource would not supply the army for one day: his troops were daily becoming more sickly; and, justly deeming its very existence at stake if these evils any longer continued, the English general, on the 22d of August, gave orders for the army to retire across the mountains into the valley of the Guadiana, where it took up its cantonments in the end of August, the headquarters being at Badajoz.

August 22.

August 29.

But the malaria of that pestilential district in the autumnal months soon produced the most deleterious effect on the health of the soldiers: the noxious vapours which exhaled from the beds of the rivers, joined to the cessation of active habits, and consequent circulation of the bilious secretion through the system, rendered fevers alarmingly frequent; seven thousand men were soon in hospital, of whom nearly two thirds died, and the sands of the Guadiana proved more fatal to the army than the sword of the enemy.*

Being perfectly aware of the inability of the Spanish armies to contend with the French veterans, Wellington now earnestly counselled their leaders to

Success of the Spaniards at

Tamames.

adopt a different system of warfare: to avoid all general actions, encamp always on strong positions, and fortify them when in the neighbourhood of the enemy, and make the best use of those numerous mountain chains which intersected the country in every direction, and afforded the means of avoiding the numerous and terrible imperial horse.† An example soon occurred of the beneficial effects which would have resulted from the general adoption of this system: Ney's corps, which had been delivered over to General Marchand, when that marshal himself returned to France, lay in the plains of Leon, near Ciudad Rodrigo; and the army formerly commanded by the Marquis Romana having at length emerged from the Galician Mountains, and arrived in the same neighbourhood, the French general adopted the resolution of bringing him to action. After a variety of marches, the Duke del Parque, who had just been appointed to the command of the army, took post in the strong position of Tamames, in the mountains on the northern side of the Puerto de Banos, where he was attacked,

Oct. 24.

in the end of October, by Marchand, with twelve thousand men. The French troops commenced the attack with all their wonted spirit, anticipating an easy victory, and at first gained considerable success; but the main body of the Spanish army, trained in the campaign of Galicia to a mountain warfare, falling back to their strong ground, made a vigorous resistance, and, from behind inaccessible rocks, showered down a murderous fire on the assailants. After a sharp conflict, the unusual spectacle was exhibited of the French eagles receding before the Spanish standards, and Marchand drew off with the loss of fifteen hundred men and one gun; while the Duke del Parque gave decisive proof of the reality of his success, by advancing im-

* Gurw., v., 66. Tor., iii., 56, 59. Jom., iii., 352, 354. Nap., ii., 431, 433. Belm., i., 95. † Gurw., v., 355.

* Well. Desp., Gurw., v., 10, 11, 12, 22, 24, 33, 52, 57, 63, 69, 71. Nap., ii., 434, 446. † Gurw., v., 345.

mediately after the action, and taking unresisted possession of Salamanca, with five-and-twenty thousand men.*

This transient gleam of success, instead of inspiring the Spaniards to persevere in the battle in the cautious policy to which it led, had been owing, and which Wellington had so strenuously recommended, inspired them with a presumptuous self-confidence, which proved their total ruin. The success gained by the Duke del Parque at Tamames, and the junction of his followers to those of Balasteros, who had come down from Asturias with eight thousand fresh troops, gave such inquietude to the French, from their close proximity to their principal line of communication with Bayonne, that they deemed it necessary to withdraw part of Mortier's corps from Estremadura; and this inspired the Central Junta with the hope that they might now undertake, with some prospect of success, their long-cherished project of recovering Madrid. Areizaga, accordingly, who had been appointed to the command of the army of Venegas, which, by great exertions, and the junction of the greater part of Cuesta's force, had been raised to fifty thousand men, of whom seven thousand were cavalry, with sixty pieces of cannon, moved forward, in the beginning

Nov. 3. of November, from the foot of the Sierra Morena, and soon arrived in the plain of Ocaña, where Milhaud lay with the advanced guard of Sebastiani's corps. Encouraged by their great superiority of numbers, the Spanish horse fell with great vigour on the French division; but Milhaud was at the head of those redoubtable cuirassiers who had appeared with glory in all the great battles of Europe since the accession of Napoleon, and, after a short encounter, he routed the enemy with severe loss, and contrived to keep his ground in front of Aranjuez and the Tagus till the great body of the army came up to his assistance. In effect, Joseph soon arrived with part of the corps of Soult and Mortier, and the royal guards, which raised his force to thirty thousand men, of whom five thousand were horsemen and lancers, with fifty guns. The Spanish general, whose ignorance of war was equal to his presumption, now perceived his danger, and took post on the best ground within his reach to give battle; but it was essentially defective, and proved one great cause of the unheard-of disaster which followed. The left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was placed behind a deep ravine, which it could not cross without falling into confusion; the centre was in advance of the town of Ocaña, and the right in front of the same ravine, which ran along the whole line; so that the one wing was without a retreat in case of disaster, the other without the means of attacking the enemy in the event of success.†

Totally unequal to such a crisis, Areizaga took post at break of day in one of the steeples of Ocaña, behind his cannon, where he remained during the whole battle, neither giving orders nor sending succour to any part of his line. Thus left to themselves, however, his troops at first made a gallant defence. Laval's division was the first which advanced to the attack, preceded by Senarmon's terrible battery of thirty guns, the effect

of which had been so severely experienced by the Russians at Friedland. The Spanish troops in the centre, however, stood firm, and, with loud shouts, awaited the onset of the enemy, while their guns in position there kept up a heavy and destructive cannonade upon the advancing columns; and such was the weight of their fire, that the leading ranks of the assailants hesitated and fell back. Soult and Mortier, perceiving the disorder, instantly hastened to the spot, and brought up Gerard's division; and, opening their ranks to let the fugitives through, presented a front of fresh troops, in admirable order, to the combat. The prompt succour thus afforded restored the battle, and soon gave the French a glorious victory. The right wing of the Spaniards, severely pressed by Sebastiani's corps, was compelled to retreat behind the ravine, in front of which it stood at the commencement of the battle; while the dense lines of the Spanish left, posted behind the impassable gully in their front, were compelled to remain inactive spectators of the rout, arising from the whole enemy's force being thrown on their centre and right. The troops which had repulsed Laval were compelled to retire through the town of Ocaña, where Areizaga was chased from his steeple, and instantly took to flight. On the right, Sebastiani, by penetrating between the town and the extreme Spanish right, cut off six thousand men, and obliged them to surrender. The line, now broken in every part, rushed in wild disorder towards the rear, followed by the terrible French dragoons, who soon drove ten thousand men into a space behind Ocaña, having only one outlet behind, where the throng was soon so great that escape was impossible, and almost the whole were made prisoners. The army, upon this, dispersed in all directions, while the French cavalry, spreading out from Ocaña like a fan, thundered in pursuit over the wide and desolate plains which extend to the south towards the Sierra Morena. Twenty thousand prisoners, fifty-five pieces of cannon, and the whole ammunition of the army, were the fruits of this glorious battle, which lasted only four hours, and in which the victors fired only 1700 cannon-shot. Wearied with collecting prisoners, the French at length merely took their arms from the fugitives, desiring them to go home, telling them that war was a trade which they were not fit for; and such was the wreck of the army, which lately numbered fifty thousand combatants, that, ten days after the battle, Areizaga could not collect a single battalion to defend the passes of the Sierra Morena.*

This astonishing victory would doubtless have been immediately followed by the passing of the Sierra Morena, and probably the total extinction of all regular resistance on the part of the Spaniards, had it not been that the position of the English army at Badajoz rendered it imprudent to engage in those defiles, through which it might be difficult to retrace their steps, in the event of a powerful force from Estremadura advancing to cut off the communication with Madrid. Joseph, therefore, highly elated with this victory, which he hoped would at length put an end to the contest, returned with the greater part of his army in triumph to the capital, where his government was now established on a solid ba-

* Jom., iii., 358. Gurw., v., 362. Nap., ii., 65, 66. Tor., iii., 134, 137.

† Nap., iii., 79, 80. Jom., iii., 359, 360. Tor., iii., 144. Viet. et Conq., xix., 302.

* Jom., 359, 361. Well. Desp., Gur., v., 363. Nap., iii., 80, 84. Viet. et Conq., xix., 302, 304. Tor., iii., 144, 146.

sis; and all the elements of resistance in New Castile being now destroyed, the whole revenue of the province was collected, and the administration conducted by the intrusive government. A similar catastrophe soon after gave them a like command over the population and the resources of Leon and New Castile. In that province, the Duke del Parque, finding the force in his front considerably diminished by the collection of the French troops to oppose the incursion of Areizaga to Ocana, advanced towards Medina del Rio Seco, in order to assist in the general movement on the capital. He attacked a body

Nov. 23. of ten thousand French on the 23d of November, and gained considerable success. But, in two days after, the enemy was strongly re-enforced by some of the troops who had combated at Ocana, and who immediately spread the news of that dreadful event, as much to the elevation of the one as to the depression of the other army. The Spanish general, upon this disastrous intelligence, immediately retreated; but his troops were so extremely disheartened by this great defeat in the south, that on the following day, when Kellerman, with a body of horse, came up with the army near Alba de

Nov. 25. Tormes, the Spanish cavalry fled the moment the enemy appeared, without striking a blow. The infantry, however, stood firm and made a stout resistance, which enabled the duke to effect his retreat without any considerable loss, notwithstanding the repeated charges of the French horse upon his flank. Such, however, was the depressed state of the troops, that at daybreak on the following morning, when a French patrol entered the town in which they were lying, the whole Spanish army took to flight and separated in all directions, leaving their whole artillery, ammunition, and carriages of every sort, in the hands of the enemy. So complete was their dispersion, that for some days the Duke del Parque was left literally without an army. But the Spanish troops, whose constancy in adversity was as worthy of admiration as their unsteadiness in the field was remarkable, again rallied round the standard of their chief, and in a fortnight the duke, who had retired to the mountains to the south of Ciudad Rodrigo, again found himself at the head of twelve or fifteen thousand men, but for the most part unarmed, without cannon or ammunition, and literally famishing from want.*

As these terrible blows had dispersed the only forces in the field which the Spaniards had worthy of the name of armies; and, as the event had now clearly proved what he had long foreseen, not only that they were incapable of maintaining war themselves in the field with the French, but that, by their inability to perform movements in the presence of the enemy, they could not be relied upon to form a part in any combined system of operations, Wellington perceived clearly that henceforth the protection of Portugal must form his main object, and that, if the deliverance of the Peninsula was ever to be effected, it must be by the forces which rested on the fulcrum of that kingdom. He wisely resolved, therefore, to move his army from the banks of the Guadiana, where it had already suffered so severely from the autumnal fevers, to the frontier of the province of Beira, where it might at once

recover its health on higher and hilly ground, guard the principal road to the Portuguese capital from the centre of Spain, and watch the formidable force, now nearly thirty-six thousand strong, which the French had collected in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. In the beginning of December, therefore, Wellington, after having repaired to Seville and concerted measures with the junta there, moved his army to the neighbourhood of Almeida and the banks of the Agueda, leaving only a comparatively small force at Elvas and in the Alentejo, to co-operate with the Spaniards in Estramadura; and at the same time commenced those formidable lines at Torres Vedras and in the front of Lisbon which he had long contemplated, and which at length permanently arrested the hitherto irresistible torrent of French conquest!*

These movements closed the bloody and eventful campaign of 1809 in the Peninsula; and, certainly, never since the beginning of the world had a war occurred presenting more objects worthy of the admiration of the patriot, the study of the statesman, and the observation of the soldier. The sieges of Saragossa and Gerona, where forty thousand ill-disciplined troops, supported by the heroic inhabitants of these towns, had inflicted a greater loss upon the French than the whole military force of Austria, in the field of Wagram, had afforded memorable examples of what could be effected by the feelings of religious and patriotic duty, when brought into the conflict under circumstances where the usual advantages of discipline and prowess could not immediately decide the contest. On the other hand, the long train of disasters which the Spaniards had since incurred in every other quarter, terminating in the frightful catastrophe of Ocana, had demonstrated, in equally striking colours, the total inability of undisciplined troops, even when animated by the most ardent zeal in behalf of their independence, and the greatest possible advantages of a mountainous country, to withstand the attacks of a powerful, disciplined, and well-directed enemy. That the Spanish people were brave, was evident from the courage with which they withstood, and on many occasions repulsed, the first attacks of the French veterans; that they were hardy, was demonstrated by the privations which they underwent with unshaken constancy; that they were zealous in the cause of their country, was clear from the multitudes who in every quarter thronged to its standards; that they were enduring in adversity, was manifest from the unparalleled tenacity with which they maintained the contest, after reverses and under circumstances which would have overwhelmed the resistance of any other people. Yet, with all these admirable qualities, they had everywhere proved unfortunate, and could not point to one single province rescued by their efforts from the grasp of the enemy; for it was evident that the deliverance of Galicia and Asturias was to be ascribed, not to the arms of Romana and the mountaineers of those provinces, brave and indomitable as they were, but to the disciplined battalions of Wellington, which first, by depriving Soult's corps of all its equipments, compelled him to evacuate that province, and afterward, by threatening Madrid, forced the French generals to concentrate all their forces

Disastrous state of the Spanish affairs at this period.

Transfer of the British army to the frontier of Beira.

* Nap., iii., 86, 89. Vict. et Conq., xix., 305, 308. Tor., 147, 151. Well. Desp., Gur., v., 364.

* Well. Desp., Gur., v., 364, and Desp. 20th October 1809, v., 234, 240. Jom., iii., 363.

for the defence of the capital: a memorable example to succeeding ages, both of the astonishing effects of patriotic ardour in supporting the cause, when properly directed, of national independence, and of the total inadequacy of mere popular efforts to effect the national deliverance from serious dangers, if not directed by a strong government, and resting on the foundation of national forces, previously disciplined and prepared for the contest.

It was a clear perception of these truths, joined to the comparatively small force which he had at his disposal, and the extraordinary difficulty either of providing men or money in Great Britain for additional troops, which was the ruling principle in the campaigns of Wellington, that are to form so brilliant a part in the subsequent chapters of this history. With a force seldom exceeding thirty thousand British soldiers, and which could rarely bring, after the usual deductions, above twenty-five thousand into the field, he had to maintain a contest with six French corps, the whole of which, if necessary, would concentrate against his army, and which could bring into the field, after amply providing for their rear and communications, at least one hundred and fifty thousand combatants. The Spanish armies, at different periods during the campaign that was past, had, indeed, been numerous, their officers daring, and many had been the reproaches cast upon the English general for at last declining to join in the rash operations which terminated in the disasters of Ocana and Alba de Tormes. But it was now manifest to all the world that any such operation could have terminated in nothing but disaster, and that, if the English corps of twenty-four thousand men had advanced in the close of the year towards the Spanish capital, the consequence would have been, that the French generals would immediately have concentrated their whole forces upon it, as they did upon Sir John Moore; and that, if it escaped destruction at all, it could only have been by a retreat as disastrous and destructive as that to Corunna. The undisciplined state of the Spanish armies rendered this a matter of ease; for they were incapable, in the field, of moving to attack the enemy without falling into confusion; and any progress which their desultory bands might make in other provinces during such concentration of their troops, would only expose them to greater disasters upon the separation of the French forces after the destruction of the English army.

Immense as were the obstacles with which Wellington had to contend, in striving for the deliverance of the Peninsula with such allies, against such an overwhelming superiority of force, the difficulty became still greater from the different modes in which the respective armies carried on the war. The British, according to the established mode of civilized warfare, at least in modern times, maintained themselves chiefly from magazines in their rear; and when they were obliged to depend upon the supplies of the provinces where the war was carried on, they paid for them just as they would have done in their own country. In consequence of this circumstance, and the distance to which their supplies were to be conveyed, the expense of carrying on war, with even a comparatively inconsiderable force, on the Continent, was severely

felt by the British government. Already the cost of even the small army which Wellington headed in Portugal was about £230,000 a month. The French, on the other hand, by reverting to the old Roman system of making war maintain war, not only felt no additional burden, but experienced the most sensible relief by their armies carrying on war with foreign states. From the moment that his forces entered a hostile territory, it was a fundamental principle of Napoleon's, that they should draw nothing from the French exchequer; and, while the people of Paris were amused with the flattering statements of the moderate expense at which their vast army was maintained, the fact was carefully concealed that the whole troops engaged in foreign service—that is, two thirds of the whole military establishment of the Empire—were paid, fed, and lodged at the expense of the countries where hostilities were going forward. To such a length was this system carried, that we have the authority of the Duke of Wellington for the assertion, that the cost of the pay and hospitals for the French army, in Spain alone, was greater than the sum stated in the French Budget for the year 1809, as the expense of their whole military establishment.*

These causes produced a total difference in the modes in which the generals of the two armies were obliged or enabled to carry on war. The English, paying for everything which they consumed, found their difficulties and expenses increase the farther they advanced from the coast; and when they got into the interior of the Peninsula, any considerable failure in their supplies, or any blow struck by the enemy at their communications, threatened them with total ruin. The French, on the other hand, fearlessly plunged into the most desolate provinces, totally regardless of their flanks or rear; and, without magazines or communications of any kind, contrived to wrench from the inhabitants, by the terrors of military execution, ample supplies for a long period, in a country where a British regiment could not find subsistence for a single week. "The mode," says the Duke of Wellington, "in which they provide for their armies, is this: they plunder everything they find in the country; they force from the inhabitants, under pain of death, all that they have in their houses for the consumption of the year, without payment, and are indifferent respecting the consequences to the unfortunate people. Every article, whether of food or raiment, and every animal and vehicle of every description, is considered to belong of right, and without payment, to the French army; and they require a communication with their rear only for the purpose of conveying intelligence and receiving orders from the emperor."†

It may readily be conceived what advantages an enemy acting on these principles must always possess over another conforming to the good old fashion of taking nothing but what they can pay for. So, also, will fraud or violence, if directed by talent or supported by power, almost always gain the ascendancy in the first instance in private life, over the unobtrusive efforts of honest industry. But the same moral law is applicable to both: mark the end of these things, alike to the private villain and the imperial robber. What the French military historians call the circumstances

* Gurw., vi., 552. † Well. Desp., Gurw., vii., 283, 299.

tion and caution of the British general, was the necessary result of those principles of justice and perseverance which, commencing with the reverses of the Spanish campaign, were destined, ere long, to rouse mankind in their favour, and lead to the triumph of Vittoria and the Moscow retreat. The energy and fearlessness which they justly admire in their own generals, were the consequence of the system which, destroying the half of every army in the course of every campaign, was destined, in the end, to exhaust the military strength of the Empire, and bring the powers of Europe in irresistible force to the banks of the Seine.

Notwithstanding all these untoward circumstances, and the difficulties necessarily arising from the co-operation of the armies of three independent kingdoms in one campaign, Wellington, even after the retreat from Talavera, had no fears of the result, and repeatedly wrote, both to the British and the Spanish governments, that he had no doubt he should be able to deliver the Peninsula, if the Spanish generals would only adhere to the cautious system of policy which he so strongly inculcated.* Their course was perfectly clear. It was, to use the mat-

Rashness and folly of the Spanish rulers. It was, to use the motto of the Spaniards, *to take the sword and the bayonet*; to take advantage of the numerous mountain ranges which the country afforded to shelter their armies, and of the admirable courage of their citizens behind walls to defend their strongholds. In a word, they had nothing to do but to follow the course by which the Scotch, on eleven different occasions, baffled the English armies, numbering from fifty to eighty thousand combatants in each invasion, who had crossed the Tweed; and by which Washington, at every possible disadvantage, at length worked out the independence of the American States. But to this judicious system the ignorance and infatuation of the Central Junta, joined to the presumption and inexperience of their generals, opposed invincible obstacles. No disasters could convince them that they were not superior to the French troops in the open field; and so elated were they by the least success, that, no sooner did they see the imperial armies receding before them; than, hurrying from their mountain fastnesses with a rabble almost undisciplined, and without even uniform, they rushed into conflict with the veterans against whom the armies of Austria and Russia had contended in vain. Nothing could be expected from such a system but the result which actually took place, viz., the total destruction of the Spanish armies, and the throwing the whole weight of the contest in future upon the British and Portuguese forces.

And, though the success which attended her efforts had not been proportioned to the magnitude of the exertions which she made, yet England had no reason to feel ashamed of the part which she had taken in the contest. For the first time since the commencement of the war, she now appeared with troops in the field adequate to her

mighty strength; and it affords a marvellous proof of the magnitude of the British resources, that this display should have been made in the seventeenth year of the war. The forces by land and sea which she put forth in this year were unparalleled. With a fleet of two hundred and forty ships of the line, and nearly eleven hundred vessels of all sizes, she maintained the undisputed command of the waves; blockaded every hostile harbour in Europe; at once chased the Toulon squadron ashore at the mouth of the Rhone, burned the Brest fleet amid the shallows of Basque Roads, drove the Russian navy under the cannon of Cronstadt, and still found thirty-seven ships of the line wherewith to strike a redoubtable blow at the fleets in the Scheldt. With a hundred thousand regular troops, she maintained her immense colonial empire in every part of the world, and, as it suited her convenience, rooted out the French flag from their last transmarine possessions: with one hundred and ninety thousand more, she swayed the sceptre of Hindostan, and kept in subjection her seventy millions of Asiatic subjects: with four hundred thousand regular and local militia, she amply provided for the safety of the British islands: while, with another hundred thousand gallant disposable soldiers, she carried on the war with unexampled vigour on the Continent of Europe; menaced at once Antwerp, Madrid, and Naples, and was prevented only by the dilatory conduct of her general from carrying off in triumph thirty ships of the line from the Scheldt, and by the failure of the Spanish authorities to provide supplies, from chasing the imperial usurper from his palace at Madrid. The Roman Empire never had such forces on foot; they exceeded those wielded by Napoleon in the zenith of his power. To say that the latter enterprises, in the end, miscarried and terminated in disappointment, is no real reproach to the national character. To command success is not always in the power of nations, any more than of individuals. Skill in war, as in pacific enterprises, is not to be attained but by experience. The best security for ultimate triumph is to be found in the spirit which can conceive, and the courage which can deserve it; and the nation which, after such a contest, could make such exertions, if not in possession of the honours, was at least on the path of the fruits of victory.

Thirty years have now elapsed since this astonishing display of strength in the British Empire took place, and it is interesting to observe what, during that period, has been the change upon the national force, and the means of asserting the independence of the country, if again called in question by foreign aggression. The intervening period has been one, it is well known, either of unprecedented triumphs or of unbroken tranquillity. Five years of successful combats brought the war to a glorious issue; five-and-twenty years of subsequent uninterrupted peace have increased in an extraordinary degree the wealth, population, and resources of the Empire. The numbers of the people during that time have increased nearly a half; the exports and imports have more than doubled; the tonnage of the commercial navy has increased a half; and agriculture, following the wants of the increased population of the Empire, has advanced in a similar proportion. The warlike establishments of other states have undergone little or no diminution. France has

Comparison with what it was at the outset of the war, and has since become.

* "I declare that, if they had preserved their two armies, or even one of them, the cause was safe. The French could have sent no re-enforcements which could have been of any use; time would have been gained; the state of affairs would have improved daily; all the chances were in our favour; and, in the first moment of weakness, occasioned by any diversion on the Continent, or by the growing discontent of the French themselves with the war, the French armies must have been driven out of Spain."—WELL. *Desp.*, GURW., v., 335.

nearly four hundred thousand men in arms; Russia six hundred thousand, besides forty ships of the line constantly in commission and ready for service. What, then, with such resources, and exposed to such dangers, is the establishment which Great Britain now maintains when on the verge of a war in both hemispheres?

Her army of three hundred thousand regular soldiers and militia has sunk down to ninety-six thousand men; her fleet of two hundred and forty ships of the line has dwindled away to twenty in commission, fifty-eight in ordinary, and twelve building—in all, ninety; her Indian army, which in 1826 numbered two hundred and ninety thousand, has declined to one hundred and eighty thousand combatants, while the population and extent of her Asiatic possessions are hourly on the increase; her regular and local militia have entirely disappeared. All this has taken place, too, at a time when the wants and necessities of the Empire in every quarter of the globe have rapidly augmented, and the resources of the state to maintain an adequate establishment are at least double what they were thirty years ago. Nay, to such a length has the public mind become deluded, that it was lately seriously stated by an intelligent and upright lord of the Admiralty, in his place in Parliament, that "it could not be said that Great Britain was defenceless, for that she had *three ships of the line, and three guard-ships, ready to protect the shores of England*," being just one third of the force which Denmark possessed to protect the island of Zealand,* when her fleet and arsenals were taken by Great Britain in 1807. There is not, perhaps, to be found so remarkable an instance of the decay of national strength, consequent upon prosperity, in the whole history of the world.†

"In the youth of a state," says Bacon, "arms do flourish: in the middle age of a state, learning; and then both of them together for a time: in the declining age of a state, *mechanical arts and merchandise*;" "If a monarchy," says Napoleon, "were made of granite, it would soon be reduced to powder by the politi-

cal economists."* Are, then, the prognostics of these great men now about to be fulfilled? and is the British Empire, the foundations of which were laid by her Edwards and Henries, and the maturity crowned by the genius of Shakspeare and Newton, the conquests of Nelson, and the triumphs of Wellington, to terminate at last in the selfishness of pleasure, or the timid spirit of mercantile opulence? Are the glories of the British name, the wonders of the British Empire, to be overwhelmed in the growth of manufacturing wealth, and the shortsighted passion for commercial aggrandizement? Without pretending to decide on these important questions, the solution of which, as yet, lies buried in the womb of fate, it may safely be affirmed that the topic now alluded to affords deep subject for consideration both for the British patriot at this time, and the philosophic observer in every future age of mankind. The moralist, who observes how rapidly in private life excessive prosperity saps the foundation of individual virtue, will perhaps be inclined to fear that a similar cause of corruption has, at the period of its greatest exaltation, blasted the strength of the British Empire. The historian, who surveys the indelible traces which human affairs everywhere exhibit of the seeds of mortality, will probably be led to fear that the days of British greatness are numbered, and that, with the growth of the selfish passions springing out of long-continued and unbroken good-fortune, the virtue to deserve, the spirit to defend it, is gradually wearing out of the realm.

But, when the days of party strife have passed away, and the events of this time have been transferred into the records of history, all will probably concur in thinking that the immediate cause of this extraordinary decline is to be found in the long-continued and undue preponderance, since the peace, of the popular part of the Constitution, and the extraordinary duration and violence of that passion for economical reduction which always springs from the ascendancy, for any considerable time, in the national councils, of the great body of mankind. It is not surprising that such limited views should be entertained

* See Sir C. Adam's Speech, March 8, 1839.

† Tables exhibiting the resources and military and naval establishments of the British Empire, in 1792, 1809, and 1838.

I. RESOURCES.

	Population of Great Britain and Ireland.	Exports. Official value.	Imports. Official value.	Tonnage. Great Britain and Ireland.	Revenue.
1792	12,680,000	£24,904,850	£19,659,358	1,540,145	£19,258,814
1809	17,500,000	46,292,632	31,750,537	2,368,468	63,719,400
1838	27,250,000	97,621,548	57,023,867	2,792,646	48,547,435

—PORTER's *Parl. Tables*; MARSHALL's *Tables*; PORTER's *Progress of Nations*.

II. MILITARY FORCES, AND COLONIAL POPULATION TO DEFEND.

	Regulars.	Militia or Fencibles.	Volunteers or Local Militia.	Colonial population to defend.	Army.	Total.
1792	17,013	16,120	None	47,000,000	88,429	121,562
1809	210,000	84,000	320,000	73,000,000	185,504	614,000
1838	96,000	None	None	110,124,000	185,339	281,339

—MARTIN's *Hist. Coll.*, i., 314, and 318, &c.; PORTER, ii., 321; *Ann. Reg.*, 1792, 147.

III. NAVAL FORCES.

Line.										Frigates.			Smaller vessels in all.	Total.		Grand total.
In commission.			Ordinary.			In commission.			Ordinary.			Sloops, Brigs, &c.	Line.	Frigs.		
	Guard-ships.	Line.	Guard-ships.	Building.		Guard-ships.	Building.		Guard-ships.	Building.						
1792	26	3	87	25	12	52	57	6	149	153	109	411				
1809	113	28	14	40	47	140	25	25	634	242	185	1061				
1838	21	None	58	None	12	9	74	10	190	90	93	373				

—JAMES's *Naval History*, i., 404, Table 1; iv., 404, Table 1; BARROW's *Life of Anson*, App., p. 424.

† Bacon's Works, ii., 393.

* LAS CASAS, ii., 256.

by the popular party in Great Britain, when all the eloquence of Demosthenes failed in inducing the most spiritual Democracy of antiquity to take any steps to ward off the imminent dangers arising from the ambition of Philip; and all the wisdom of Washington was unable to communicate to the greatest Republic of modern times sufficient strength to prevent its capital being taken, and its arsenals pillaged, by a British division not four thousand five hundred strong. And, without joining in the outcry now directed against either of the administrations which have recently ruled the state, on account of a prostration of the national defences, of which it is easier to see the dangers than to provide the remedy, and in which all parties, save the few far-seeing patriots who had courage to resist the general delusion, and steadily opposed, amid general obloquy, the ex-

cessive and disastrous reductions which were so loudly applauded, will probably be found to be nearly equally implicated, it is the duty of the historian to point out this memorable decline for the constant observation of future ages. Posterity will, perhaps, deduce from it the inference that present popularity is seldom the reward of real wisdom; that measures calculated for the benefit of future ages are hardly ever agreeable to the present; and that the institutions which compel the rulers of the state to bend to the temporary inclinations of the people, in opposition to their ultimate interests, bear in themselves the seeds of mortality, and were the unobserved, but certain cause of the destruction of the greatest power which had existed in the world since the fall of the Roman Empire.

CHAPTER LIX.

COMPAIGN OF TORRES VEDRAS, AND YEAR 1810.

ARGUMENT.

Greatness of Napoleon's Situation after the Battle of Wagram.—The Want which he felt of Heirs and historic Descent.—Different Alliances which were the Object of his Choice.—Disclosure of his Resolution for a Divorce to Josephine at Fontainebleau.—Speech of the Emperor on the Occasion.—Josephine's dignified Answer.—Proposals made to the Emperor Alexander for his Sister.—Napoleon proposes to Marie Louise, and is accepted.—Journey of Marie Louise to Paris.—Pique of the Emperor Alexander on the Occasion.—Character of Josephine, and of Marie Louise.—Journey of the Emperor and Empress to Belgium.—Conflagration of Prince Schwartzberg's Ballroom.—Strange Intrigue and Disgrace of Fouché.—Rupture with Louis Bonaparte, and his abdication of the Throne of Holland.—Incorporation of Holland with the French Empire.—General Consternation in England at the Result of the last Campaign.—Debates in Parliament against the Continuance of the War in the Peninsula.—Arguments of the Opposition against the Continuance of the Peninsular War.—Arguments of the Ministry in Support of it.—Resolution of Parliament, and Supplies for the Year.—Important Effect which these gloomy Views in England had upon the Policy of the French Government.—Conquest of Andalusia by Soult.—Rapid and able March of Albuquerque, which saves Cadiz.—Operations in Catalonia.—Fall of Lerida and Mequinenza.—Preparations for the grand Attack on Portugal by Massena.—Wellington's Views for the Defence of Portugal, and ultimate Deliverance of the Peninsula.—His magnanimous Resolution to discharge his Duty, notwithstanding all the Clamour with which he was assailed.—Comparative Forces of the two Armies at the Commencement of the Campaign.—Extraordinary Difficulties with which Wellington had to contend.—Siege and Fall of Ciudad Rodrigo.—Siege and Fall of Almeida.—Retreat of Wellington into the Interior of Portugal.—He crosses the Mondego and occupies the Ridge of Busaco.—Battle there.—Bloody Defeat of the French.—Massena turns the Position, and Wellington retires to Torres Vedras.—Description of the Lines and Position there.—Junction of Romana, and admirable Position of the British Troops.—Continued Distresses, and ultimate Retreat of the French to Santarem.—Arrival of Re-enforcements from England, and ultimate Retreat of Massena.—Operations in Estremadura, and Investment of Badajoz.—Defeat of Mendizabel.—Fall of Badajoz.—Operations to raise the Siege of Cadiz.—Battle of Barossa.—Inaction of La Pena, and Return of the Troops to the Isle of Leon.—Various Actions during the Retreat.—Blockade of Almeida, and Efforts of Massena for its Relief.—Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro.—Obstinate Nature of the Fight, and Danger of the English.—Ultimate Failure of Massena, and his Retreat.—Reflections on this Campaign.—Cruelty of the French during their Stay in Portugal.—Its incalculable Importance.—Exhibits the first Example of the Stopping of the Revolutionary Torrent.—Magnanimity of Wellington in adhering to the System he had laid down.

THE result of the campaign of Wagram had elevated Napoleon to the highest point of greatness, in so far as it could be conferred by pres-

ent strength and grandeur. Resistance seemed impossible against a power which had vanquished successively the armies of Prussia, Russia, and Austria; contest hopeless with a state which had emerged victorious from eighteen years of warfare. The conflict in the Peninsula, it was true, still lingered; but disaster had everywhere attended the Spanish arms, and it only seemed to await the choice of the emperor when the moment was to arrive that was to see their efforts finally subdued, and the French eagles planted in triumph on the towers of Lisbon. If the maritime war yet continued, it was only because England, with now seemingly unavailing obstinacy, maintained a hopeless contest; and, if she was still the mistress of the waves, that steril supremacy had been attained by the sacrifice of all the objects for which the dominion of the earth had ever been coveted. More truly than in the time of the Roman emperors, the inhabitants of Albion were now severed from the civilized nations of the world, and the celebrated line of the poet,

"Penitus divisos orbe Britannos,"

seemed, after the revolution of seventeen hundred years, again to present a faithful description of the situation of the British Isles.

What, then, was wanting to a sovereign surrounded with such magnificence, to a chief wielding such awful power? Historic descent and ancestral glory; and for this one defect, even all the achievements of Napoleon afforded no adequate compensation. In vain the orators of the Empire dwelt with deserved emphasis on his marvellous exploits; in vain they pointed to Europe subdued by his arms, the world entranced by his glory; the present could not always fascinate mankind, the splendour of existing greatness could not entirely obliterate the recollection of departed virtue. Faintly at first, but still perceptibly, the grandeur of ancient days glimmered through the blaze of modern renown: as the whirl of the Revolution subsided, the exploits of the monarchy returned again to the recollection; the rapid fall of almost all dynasties recorded in history, founded on individual great-

Greatness of Napoleon's situation after the battle of Wagram.

The want which he felt of heirs and historic descent.

ness, recurred in painful clearness, even to superficial observation, and in the next generation, the claims to the throne, even of the heir of Napoleon's glory, might be overbalanced by those of an infant who had succeeded to the majestic inheritance of fourteen hundred years. The emperor was too clear-sighted not to perceive those truths: the policy of his imperial government was calculated to revive the sway of those natural feelings in the breasts of the people; but it was difficult to make them stop at the desired point, and the danger was obvious, that the feeling of awe and veneration with which he endeavoured to make them regard the throne, might insensibly, in the next age, revive the ancient feelings and attachments of the monarchy. The necessity of having descendants to perpetuate his dynasty was apparent, and for this object he was prepared to sacrifice the dearest attachment of his existence; but he required heirs who might unite the lustre of former descent with the brightness of recent achievements, and exhibit on the throne an enduring example of that fusion of ancient grandeur with modern interests which it was the object of all the institutions of the Empire to effect. He succeeded in his wish: he exhibited to the astonished world the spectacle of a soldier of fortune from Corsica winning at the sword's point a daughter of the Cæsars; the birth of a son seemed to realize all his hopes, and blend the imperial blood with the exploits of a greater than Charlemagne; and yet, such is the connexion, often indissoluble, even in this world, between injustice and retribution, and such the mysterious manner in which Providence renders the actions of men the unconscious instruments of its will, that from this apparently auspicious event may be dated the commencement of his downfall: the birth of the King of Rome was coeval with the retreat of Massena from before the lines of Torres Vedras, the first occasion on which the imperial arms had permanently recoiled in Continental warfare; and in the jealousy excited in the Russian cabinet by the preference given to the Austrian alliance is to be found the ultimate source of his ruin. "That marriage," said Napoleon, "was the cause of my destruction: in contracting it, I placed my foot on an abyss covered over with flowers."*

The emperor had long meditated the divorce of the empress, and his marriage with a princess who might afford him the hopes of a family. Not that he felt the unconcern so common with sovereigns in making this momentous separation; his union with Josephine had not been founded on reasons of state, or contracted with a view to political aggrandizement; it had been formed in early youth, based on romantic attachment; it was interwoven with all his fortunes, and associated with his most interesting recollections; and, though impetuous in his desires, and by no means insensible, on many occasions, to the attractions of other women, his homage to them had been the momentary impulse of desire, without ever eradicating from his heart its genuine affection for the first object of his attachment. But all these feelings were subordinate with Napoleon to considerations of public necessity or reasons of state policy; and though he suffered severely from the prospect of the separation, the anguish which he experienced was never permitted for an instant to swerve

him from the resolution he had adopted. The grandeur of his fortune, and the apparent solidity of his throne, gave him the choice of all the princesses of Continental Europe; and the affair was debated in the Council of State as a mere matter of public expedience, without the slightest regard to private inclination, and still less to oppressed virtue. For a moment an alliance with a native of France was the subject of consideration, but it was soon laid aside for very obvious reasons; a princess of Saxony was also proposed, but it was rather recommended by the absence of any objections against than the weight of any reason for its adoption. At length it was resolved to make advances to the courts both of St. Petersburg and Vienna; and, without committing the emperor positively to either, to be determined by the march of events, and the manner in which the proposals were received, from which of the two imperial houses a partner for the throne of Napoleon was to be selected.*

It was at Fontainebleau, in November, 1809, after the return of the emperor from the battle of Wagram, that the heart-rending communication of this resolution was first made to the empress. She had hastened to meet Napoleon after his return from that eventful campaign; but, though received at first with kindness, she was not long of perceiving, from the restraint and embarrassment of his manner, and the separation studiously maintained between them, that the stroke which she had so long dreaded was about to fall upon her. After fifteen days of painful suspense and anxiety, the fatal resolution was communicated Nov. 30. to her, on the 30th of November, by the emperor himself. They dined together as usual, but neither spoke a word during the repast; their eyes were averted as soon as they met, but the countenance of both revealed the mortal anguish of their minds. When it was over, he dismissed the attendants, and, approaching the empress with a trembling step, took her hand and laid it upon his heart: "Josephine," said he, "my good Josephine, you know how I have loved you; it is to you, to you alone, that I owe the few moments of happiness I have known in the world: Josephine, my destiny is more powerful than my will; my dearest affections must yield to the interests of France." "Say no more," cried the empress: "I expected this; I understand, and feel for you; but the stroke is not the less mortal." With these words, she uttered piercing shrieks, and fell down in a swoon. Dr. Corvisart was at hand to render assistance, and she was restored to a sense of her wretchedness in her own apartment. The emperor came to see her in the evening, but she could hardly bear the emotion occasioned by his appearance. How memorable a proof of the equality with which happiness is bestowed on all classes of men, that Napoleon, at the summit of earthly grandeur, and when sated with every human felicity, confessed that the only moments of happiness he had known in life had been derived from those affections which were common to him with all mankind, and was driven to a sacrifice of them, which would not have been required from the meanest of his subjects!

A painful duty now was imposed on all those concerned in this exalted drama, that of assigning

Disclosure of the resolution for a divorce to Josephine at Fontainebleau.

Different alliances which were the object of his choice.

* Las Casas, ii., 108; and iii., 131.

* Thib., vii., 99, 101. Montg., vii., 4. Bign., ix., 63, 66. † Bour., viii., 342, 344. Mém. de Josephine, i., 202, 209.

Speech of the emperor on the occasion of the divorce.

their motives, and playing their parts in its last stages before the great audience of the world; and, certainly, if on such occasions the speeches are generally composed for the actors, there never was one on which nobler sentiments were delivered, or more descriptive, perhaps, of the real feelings of the parties. On the 15th Dec. 15. of December, all the kings, princes, and princesses, members of the imperial family, with the great officers of the Empire, being assembled in the Tuileries, the emperor thus addressed them: "The political interests of my monarchy, the wishes of my people, which have constantly guided my actions, require that I should leave behind me, to heirs of my love for my people, the throne on which Providence has placed me. For many years I have lost all hopes of having children by my beloved spouse the Empress Josephine; that it is which induces me to sacrifice the sweetest affections of my heart, to consider only the good of my subjects, and desire the dissolution of our marriage. Arrived at the age of forty years, I may indulge a reasonable hope of living long enough to rear, in the spirit of my own thoughts and disposition, the children with which it may please Providence to bless me. God knows what such a determination has cost my heart! but there is no sacrifice which is above my courage, when it is proved to be for the interests of France. Far from having any cause of complaint, I have nothing to say but in praise of the attachment and tenderness of my beloved wife. She has embellished fifteen years of my life; the remembrance of them will be forever engraven on my heart. She was crowned by my hand; she shall retain always the rank and title of empress; but, above all, let her never doubt my feelings, or regard me but as her best and dearest friend."*

Josephine replied with a faltering voice and tears in her eyes, but in words worthy dignified answer. respond to all the sentiments of the emperor in consenting to the dissolution of a marriage which henceforth is an obstacle to the happiness of France, by depriving it of the blessing of being one day governed by the descendants of that great man, evidently raised up by Providence to efface the evils of a terrible revolution, and restore the altar, the throne, and social order. But his marriage will in no respect change the sentiments of my heart: the emperor will ever find in me his best friend. I know what this act, commanded by policy and exalted interests, has cost his heart; but we both glory in the sacrifices which we make to the good of our country: I feel elevated by giving the greatest proof of attachment and devotion that was ever given upon earth." "When my mother," said Eugene Beauharnois, "was crowned before the nation by the hands of her august husband, she contracted the obligation to sacrifice her affections to the interests of France. She has discharged, with courage and dignity, that first of duties. Her heart has been often torn by beholding the soul of a man accustomed to master fortune, and to advance with a firm step in the prosecution of his great designs, exhausted by painful conflicts. The tears which this resolution has cost the emperor suffice for my mother's glory. In the situation where she will be placed she will not be a stranger to his wishes

or his sentiments; and it will be with a satisfaction mingled with pride, that she will witness the felicity which her sacrifices have purchased for her country."* But, though they used this language in public, the members of the imperial family were far from feeling the same equanimity in private: they were all in the deepest affliction; Josephine was almost constantly in tears; in vain she appealed to the emperor, to the pope for protection; and so violent and long continued was her grief, that for six months afterward her eyesight was seriously impaired.

The subsequent arrangements were rapidly completed, and on the same day the marriage of the emperor and empress was dissolved by an act of the Senate: the jointure of the latter being fixed at two millions of francs, or £80,000 a year, and Malmaison as her place of residence.*

Though the divorce was thus completed, yet it was by no means as yet determined whether the honour of furnishing a successor to the imperial throne should belong to the imperial family of Russia or Austria. Napoleon, without deciding, as yet, in favour of either the one or the other, sounded in secret the disposition of both courts. His views had, in the first instance, been directed towards the Russian alliance; and on the 24th of November, a week before he had even communicated his designs to Josephine, a letter in cipher had been despatched to Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, enjoining him to open the project of a marriage with his sister to the Emperor Alexander in person; requiring him, at the same time, to make inquiries when the young grand-duchess might become a mother, as in the existing state of affairs six months might make a material difference. Alexander replied to the French ambassador that the proposal was extremely agreeable to himself personally, and coincided entirely with his political views; but that an imperial ukase, as well as the last will of his father, had left his sisters entirely at the disposal of his mother: "Her ideas," added he, "are not always in unison with my wishes, nor with policy, nor even reason. When I spoke to the emperor at Erfurt, of the anxious desire which all his friends had to see his dynasty established by heirs, he answered only vaguely; I thought that he did not enter into my ideas, and did nothing in consequence. Having not prepared the way, I cannot, in consequence, now answer you. If the affair depended on me, you should have my word before leaving this cabinet." At a subsequent interview, a few days after, the emperor expressed his regret that Napoleon had not sooner expressed his intentions, and declared in favour of his elder sister (since Duchess of Oldenburg), who, both from talent, character, and age, would have been much more suitable than her younger sister, Anne Paulowna, who was now in question. In regard to her, he declared his intention of sounding his mother, without actually compromising the French emperor. But these delays were little suitable to the ardent temper of Napoleon. He demanded, as soon as he was informed of these conversations, a categorical answer in the space of ten days; but this period

Proposals made to the Emperor Alexander for his sister.

Nov. 24.

Dec. 23.

Jan. 1, 1810.

Jan. 10.

* Moniteur, Feb. 6, 1810. Bign., ix., 58, 59.

* Goldsmith's Recueil, iv., 746, 747. Bign., ix., 58, 61. Mém. de Josephine, ii., 205, 208. † Bign., ix., 61.

was consumed in fruitless discussions with the dowager empress, who alleged the extreme youth of the grand-duchess, who was only sixteen, the difference of their religion, and other reasons still more insignificant, such as whether Napoleon was qualified to become a father. "A princess of Russia," said she, "is not to be wooed and won in a few days: two years hence it will be time enough to come to the conclusion of such an affair." She concluded by demanding a Russian chapel and priests in the Tuileries, and a delay of a few months to improve the age and overcome the scruples or timidity of the young princess.*

"To adjourn is to refuse," said Napoleon: "besides, I do not choose to have foreign priests in my palace, between my wife and myself." He instantly accepted. took his determination: he saw that a refusal was likely to ensue, and he resolved to prevent such a mortification by himself taking the initiative in breaking off the Russian negotiation.

Before the expiry of the ten days even, fixed by Caulaincourt for the ultimatum of Russia, secret advances were made by Maret, minister of foreign affairs, to Prince Schwartzberg, the Austrian ambassador at Paris: the proposals were eagerly accepted; as soon as this was known, the question of a Russian or Austrian alliance was publicly mooted

Jan. 26. and debated in the Council of State by the great officers of the Empire, and, after a warm discussion, decided in favour of the latter, on a division; Napoleon professed himself determined entirely by the majority; and, five days before the answer of Russia arrived, requesting

Feb. 1. delay, the decision of the cabinet of the Tuileries had been irrevocably taken in favour of the Austrian alliance. So rapidly were the preliminaries adjusted, that the marriage contract was signed at Paris, on the model of that

Feb. 7. of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, Feb. 16. on the 7th, and at Vienna on the 16th

March 11. of February; and on the 11th of March the marriage was celebrated at Vienna with great pomp: Berthier demanding the hand of the Archduchess Marie Louise, and the Archduke Charles standing proxy for Napoleon.†

On the day after the ceremony the new empress set out from Vienna, and was received at Braunau, the frontier town of Austria, by the Queen of Naples; and there she separated from her Austrian attendants, and continued her journey by slow stages, and surrounded with all the pomp of imperial splendour, and all the fatigue of etiquette, to the neighbourhood of Paris. Notwithstanding all the political advantages of the alliance, her departure was the occasion of great regret at Vienna: a large portion of the people openly murmured against the sacrifice of a daughter of Austria to the state necessities of the time; they regarded it as worse than the cession of the Illyrian provinces, more disgraceful than the abandonment of Hofer to the vengeance of the conqueror; and even the continuance of the war appeared preferable to the humiliating conditions by which it was thought peace had been obtained. In France, on the other hand, all the public authorities vied with each other in demonstrations of loyalty and enthusiasm: the choicest flowers awaited her at

every stage; crowds of respectful spectators lined the streets of all the towns through which she passed; this great event was regarded as at once the final triumph, and closing the gulf of the Revolution, by winning for its victorious leader the daughter of the first family in Europe, and mingling the lustre of descent with the grandeur of Napoleon's throne. "She is not beautiful," said the emperor, on a subsequent visit to Josephine, when he saw her miniature, "but she is the daughter of the Cæsars." These sonorous words more than compensated every deficiency: the sinister presage, arising from the fate of Marie Antoinette, was forgotten, and the most intoxicating anticipations were formed of the consequences of this auspicious union.*

According to the programme of the etiquette to be observed on the occasion, the emperor was to meet the empress at Compeigne, and immediately return to Paris, while she proceeded to St. Cloud, where she was to remain till the marriage was celebrated; but the ardour of Napoleon broke through these formalities, and saved both parties the tedium of several days' expectation. After the example of Henry IV., when he went to Lyons to meet his bride, Marie de Medicis, on her journey from Italy, he had no sooner received intelligence of her approaching Compeigne, where he then was, than

he went to meet her at the next post; March 28.

and when she came up, springing out of his carriage, he leaped into that of the empress, embraced her with more than youthful vehemence, and ordered the postillions to drive at the gallop to the palace of Compeigne. He had previously inquired of the legal authorities, whether, if a child were to be born without the formal marriage being celebrated, it would, after its conclusion by proxy, be legitimate; and being answered in the affirmative, he took this method of cutting short all the fatiguing ceremonies of the occasion. The empress was by no means displeased at the unexpected ardour, as well as young appearance of her husband; and next day, it is affirmed, her attendants hardly knew their former mistress, so much had she improved in ease and affability from the establishment of her rank and the society of the emperor. The marriage was celebrated with extraordinary April 1. pomp, at St. Cloud, on the 1st of April:

on the day following, the emperor and April 2. empress made their solemn entrance into Paris, amid the roar of artillery, the clang of bells, and the acclamations of three hundred thousand spectators. They received the nuptial benediction at the Tuileries: four queens held the train of Marie Louise; all the splendour of riches, and all the brilliancy of arms, were exhausted to give magnificence to the occasion. But, though the *Moniteur* was filled for several months with congratulations on the event, and all the flowers of rhetoric, and all the arts of adulation were exhausted in flattery, the people evinced no real enthusiasm after the spectacles were over; and in the multitude of gorgeous heralds, plumed pages, and arm-embazoned carriages, which were everywhere to be seen, the few remaining Republicans beheld the extinction of their last dreams of liberty and equality.†

The hand of Napoleon, however, was too important an element in the balance of European power to be given away without leaving deep

* Bign., ix., 66, 72. Thib., viii., 101, 104.

† Bign., ix., 66, 76. Thib., viii., 101, 105.

* Thib., viii., 108. Bign., ix., 79, 82. Las Casas, i., 330.

† *Moniteur*, March 28, April 3, 1810. Thib., viii., 109, 120. Bign., ix., 79, 86. Las Casas, i., 330, 331.

Pique of the Emperor Alexander on the occasion. traces in the minds of those who deemed themselves slighted on the occasion; and it soon appeared to what incalculable consequences this marriage might ultimately lead. Alexander, though not particularly solicitous about the connexion, was yet piqued in no ordinary degree at the haste with which the Austrian alliance had been concluded, and in an especial manner mortified at the hand of his sister having been, in effect, discarded, while yet the proposal for it was under consideration at St. Petersburg. This feeling was so strong that it was apparent, even through all the congratulations of the imperial court and all the practised dissimulation of the emperor. "We are pleased with this event," said Romanzoff, the Chancellor of the Empire, to Caulaincourt: "we feel no envy at Austria; we have no cause of complaint against her; everything that secures her tranquillity and that of Europe cannot but be agreeable to us." "Congratulate the emperor," said Alexander, "on his choice; he wishes to have children; all France desire it: this alliance is for Austria and France a pledge of peace, and on that account I am enchanted at it. Nevertheless, it is fortunate that the objection of age so soon disposed of the affair. If I had not taken the precaution to speak to the empress only in my own name, as of an event which by possibility might arise, what effect would now have been produced? Where should we now have been, if I had not scrupulously attended to her rights? What reproaches might I not have justly addressed to you? The delays of which you so much complained were therefore the result of prudence. Have you been equally considerate? Were you not conducting two negotiations at once? How was it possible that the marriage could have been concluded at Paris on the 9th of February, almost before the arrival of the messenger from St. Petersburg, despatched on the 21st of January, after the lapse of the ten days allowed for our ultimatum, and who was the bearer only of a proposal for farther delay, to overcome the scruples of the empress and archduchess? If the difference of religion had been an insurmountable objection, you should have said so at first. It is beyond measure fortunate that the age of the archduchess could not be got over. In this instance, as when the same subject was talked of at Erfurth, it was your emperor who spoke first; I only interfered in it as a friend; personally, I may have some reason to complain, but I do not do so: I rejoice at whatever is for the good of France." When such was the language of the emperor, it may be conceived what were the feelings of St. Petersburg, and how materially the discontent of the court weakened the French influence, already so hateful to the nobles and the people. These details are not foreign to the dignity of history: they are intimately blended with the greatest events which modern Europe has witnessed; for, though governed in his conduct in general only by state policy, and a perfect master of dissimulation, Alexander was scrupulously attentive to his private honour; the coldness between the two courts soon became apparent; but such is the weakness of human nature, alike in its most exalted as its humblest stations, that possibly political considerations might have failed to extricate the cabinet of St. Petersburg from the fetters of Tilsit and Erfurth, if they had not been aided by private pique; and Napoleon been

still on the throne, if to the slavery of Europe, and the wrongs of the emperor, had not been superadded, in the breast of the Czar, the wounded feelings of the man.*

Few persons in that elevated rank have undergone such varieties of fortune as Josephine, and fewer still have borne so well the ordeal both of prosperity and adversity. Born at first in the middle class of society, she was the wife of a respectable but obscure officer; the Revolution afterward threw her into a dungeon, where she was saved from the scaffold only by the fall of Robespierre; the hand of Napoleon elevated her successively to every rank, from the general's staff to the emperor's throne; and the same connexion consigned her, at the very highest point of her elevation, to degradation and seclusion: the loss of her consequence, the separation from her husband, the sacrifice of her affections. Stripped of her influence, cast down from her rank, wounded in her feelings, the divorced empress found the calamity, felt in any rank, of being childless, the envenomed dart which was to pierce her to the heart. It was no common character which could pass through such marvellous changes of fortune unmarked by any decided stain, unsullied by any tears of suffering. If, during the confusion of all moral ideas consequent on the first triumph of the Revolution, her reputation did not escape the breath of scandal; and if the favourite of Barras occasioned, even when the wife of Napoleon, some frightful fits of jealousy in her husband, she maintained an exemplary decorum when seated on the consular and imperial throne, and communicated a degree of elegance to the court of the Tuileries which could hardly have been expected, after the confusion of ranks and ruin of the old nobility which had preceded her elevation. Passionately fond of dress, and often blameably extravagant in that particular, she occasioned no small embarrassment to the treasury by her expenses; but this weakness was forgiven in the recollection of its necessity to compensate the inequality of their years, in the amiable use which she made of her possessions, the grace of her manner, and the alacrity with which she was ever ready to exert her influence with her husband to plead the cause of suffering, or avert the punishment of innocence. Though little inclined to yield in general to female persuasion, Napoleon both loved and felt the sway of this amiable character; and often, in his sternest fits, he was weaned from violent measures by her influence. The divorce and marriage of Marie Louise produced no estrangement between them: in her retirement at Malmaison she was frequently visited and consulted by the emperor; they corresponded to the last moment of her life; and the fidelity with which she adhered to him in his misfortunes won the esteem of his conquerors, as it must command the respect of all succeeding ages of the world.†

Born in the highest rank, descended from the noblest ancestry, called to the most exalted destinies, the daughter of the Cæsars, the wife of Napoleon, the mother of his son, Marie Louise appeared to unite in her person all the grandeur and felicity of which human nature is susceptible. But her mind had received no lofty impress; her

Character of Josephine.

And of Marie Louise.

* Bign., ix., 86, 90. Hard., xi., 77, 79.

† Las Casas, i., 330. Bour., passim.

character was unworthy of the greatness of her fortune. She had the blood of Maria Theresa in her veins, but not her spirit in her soul. Her fair hair, blue eyes, and pleasing expression bespoke the Gothic blood, and the affability of her demeanour, and sweetness of her manner, at first produced a general prepossession in her favour. But she was adapted for the sunshine of prosperity only: the wind of adversity blew, and she sunk before its breath. Young, amiable, prepossessing, she won the emperor's affections by the naïveté and simplicity of her character; and he always said that she was innocence with all its sweetness, Josephine grace with all its charms. All the attractions of art, says he, were employed by the first empress with such skill, that they were never perceived; all the charms of innocence displayed by the second with such simplicity, that their existence was never suspected.* Both were benevolent, kind-hearted, affectionate; both, to the last hour of his life, retained the warm regard of the emperor; and both possessed qualities worthy of his affection. If her husband had lived and died on the imperial throne, few empresses would have left a more blameless reputation; but she was unequal to the trials of the latter years of the Empire. If her dubious situation, the daughter of one emperor, the wife of another, both leaders in the strife, might serve her excuse for not taking any decided part in favour of the national independence on the invasion of France, the misfortunes of her husband and son had claims upon her fidelity which should never have been overlooked. The wife of the emperor should never have permitted him to go into exile alone; the mother of the King of Rome should never have forgotten to what destinies her son had been born. What an object would she, after such sacrifices, returning from St. Helena after his death, have formed in history! Force may have prevented her from discharging that sacred duty, but force did not compel her to appear at the Congress of Verona, leaning on the arm of Wellington, nor oblige the widow of Napoleon to sink at last into the degraded wife of her own chamberlain.

Shortly after his marriage, the emperor set out with his young bride for the Low Countries. They proceeded by St. Quentin, Cambray, and Valenciennes, to Brussels, everywhere received with adulatory addresses, passing under triumphal arches, and entering cities amid the roar of artillery. But other cares than the civil government of his dominions, other designs than the amusement of the young empress, occupied the mind of the emperor. The war with England still continued; maritime preparations were necessary for its subjugation; Antwerp was the centre of his preparations. It was from the Scheldt that the mortal stroke was to be dealt out. The first care of the emperor, therefore, was to visit the citadel, fortifications, and vast naval preparations at this important point. An eighty-gun ship was launched in his presence, and one of the new forts erecting on the left bank of the river, beyond the Tête-de-Flandre, was called by the name of Marie Louise, which it still bears. He had every reason to be satisfied with the works in progress; thirty ships of the line, nearly as great a fleet as that which was destroyed at Trafalgar, were ready for sea in the docks. From Antwerp, the emperor descended the

Scheldt to Flushing and Middleburg, where he gave directions for extensive works and fortifications, that were to do more than repair the devastations that were committed by the English in the island of Walcheren. They afterward returned by Ghent, Lisle, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre de Grace, to Paris, which they reached on the 1st of June. Napoleon there assisted in the interment of the body of Marshal Lannes at the Chapel of the Invalids at Paris. The direction of this journey, undertaken so shortly after his marriage, revealed the secret designs of the emperor. Naval preparations, the conquest of England, were uppermost in his thoughts; and if any additional arguments were necessary to vindicate the Walcheren expedition, they would be found in the direction he gave to this journey.*

A deplorable event occurred shortly after, which recalled the recollection of the lamentable accident that had occurred on the occasion of the marriage of Marie Antoinette, and was regarded of sinister augury for the marriage of the young empress. Prince Schwartzberg, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, gave a magnificent ball on the 6th of July, at which the emperor and empress, and the whole court were assembled. From the great number of guests expected on the occasion, it was deemed necessary to enlarge the accommodations of his hotel. The great dancing-room was fitted up in the most sumptuous manner, in a temporary building behind, and the festoons and drapery, in particular, excited universal admiration. By accident, one of the gauze curtains took fire from a lamp in its vicinity, and in an instant the flames spread over the whole roof and interior of the structure. The coolness of Napoleon was as conspicuous here as in the field of battle: he immediately sought out the empress, took her quietly by the arm, and led her out of the danger. Many persons, however, were scorched by the flames or wounded by the falling of the beams, and some of them died afterward of these injuries. But all lesser considerations were forgotten in the dreadful fate of the Princess Pauline of Schwartzberg, the sister-in-law of the ambassador. This amiable person had been one of the last of the company who escaped from the burning room with her daughter in her hand. Both had got out in safety, but in the confusion the child was separated from her mother, and the latter, conceiving that she had been left behind in the scene of danger, rushed, with generous devotion, back again into the burning saloon, and was crushed by the falling of the beams. So fierce were the flames, that the place where the unfortunate princess had perished could only be discovered by a gold ornament she had worn on her arm, which resisted the conflagration. This frightful incident excited a deep sensation in Paris, chiefly from its being regarded as a prognostic connected with the marriage of the empress; but history must assign it a nobler destiny, and record the fate of the Princess Schwartzberg as perhaps the noblest instance of maternal heroism recorded in the annals of the world.†

This period was rendered remarkable by the fall of one of the ministers of Napoleon, who had hitherto exercised the most unbounded influence in the internal concerns of the Empire. Fouché, whose

* Las Casas, i., 330; ii., 112.

* *Thib.*, viii., 124, 129.

† *Bign.*, xix., 159. *Thib.*, viii., 128, 129.

talents for intrigue, and thorough acquaintance with the details both of Jacobin conspiracy and police administration, had hitherto rendered him a necessary part of the imperial administration, fell into disgrace. The immediate cause of this overthrow was the improper use and undue extension which he gave to a secret proposition at this time made to the British government by Napoleon, for a general peace. The Dutch ambassador was the agent employed in this mysterious communication, and the proposals of Napoleon went to surrender to the English almost the entire government of the seas, provided that that power would surrender to Napoleon the uncontrolled government of the Continent of Europe.

In his secret conferences with the May, 1810. French agent on this subject, Marquis Wellesley insisted strongly on the prosperous condition of the British Empire, and its ability to withstand a long period of future warfare, from the resources which the monopoly of the trade of the world had thrown into its hands. These views singularly interested Napoleon, who had more than one agent employed in the transaction. This secret negotiation was discovered by Fouché, and either from an excusable desire to get to the bottom of the views of the British cabinet on the subject, or from an insatiable passion for intrigue, which could not allow any such transaction to go on without assuming its direction, he took upon himself, without the knowledge or authority of the emperor, to open a secret negotiation directly with Marquis Wellesley. The agent employed in these mysterious communications was M. Ouvrard, a man of considerable skill in intrigue, and whose vast monetary transactions had already produced such important effects in the early part of Napoleon's reign.* Ouvrard repaired to Amsterdam, where he entered into communication with an Irishman of the name of Fagan, in London. Labouchere, an agent of the King of Holland who had formerly been on a similar mission to the British government, was also employed in the transaction, and he communicated it to his sovereign, Louis, by whom it was revealed to Napoleon, at Antwerp. Ouvrard was, in consequence, arrested immediately after Napoleon's return to Paris, and closely interrogated by the emperor. It was proved from this examination, and from the documents found in his possession, that the basis of Fouché's propositions were, that the government of the Continent of Europe should be surrendered to Napoleon, and that of all the transmarine states and the seas to England, with the exception of South America, which was to be made over to the French emperor. In order to accomplish this double spoliation, a French army of forty thousand men was to be embarked on board an English fleet, and charged with the reduction of North America to the government of Great Britain, and of South America to that of France. Extravagant as these propositions may appear, it is proved by a holograph note of Napoleon himself, that they had been made by the minister of police to the English government.† "What was M. Ouvrard commissioned to do in England?" said Napoleon to Fouché, when examined before the council. "To ascertain," replied he, "the disposition of the new minister for foreign affairs in Great Britain, according to the views which I have had the honour of submitting to your majesty." "Thus,

then," replied Napoleon, "you take upon yourself to make peace or war without my knowledge. Duke of Otranto, your head should fall upon the scaffold." Upon consideration, however, Napoleon was inclined to adopt less rigorous measures. He was fearful of exhibiting to the world any instance of treachery in the imperial government, and perhaps not altogether at ease concerning the revelations which Fouché, if driven to extremities, might make regarding his own administration. He limited the punishment of the fallen minister, therefore, to deprivation of his office of minister of police, which was immediately bestowed on Savary, duke of Rovigo.* To break his fall, Fouché was, in the first instance, declared Governor of Rome, and he set out from Paris shortly after for that destination; but the recall of his appointment overtook him before he arrived at the eternal city; he stopped short at Leghorn, and, in his despair, took his place in a vessel with a view to seek for refuge in America. The sufferings he had undergone, however, from sea-sickness, in the outset of his passage, ultimately deterred him from carrying that intention into effect. He remained in Tuscany, determined to take his chance of Napoleon's vengeance, rather than incur the certain misery of a voyage across the Atlantic. He obtained, soon after, permission to return to Aix, in Provence, where he lived for some time in retirement; and at length the necessities of his situation obliged Napoleon again to have recourse to his assistance, and he took a prominent part in the subsequent course of events, which ultimately brought about the overthrow of the Empire.†

A still more important consequence resulted from the journey of Napoleon to the Rupture with Low Countries, in the resignation Louis Bonaparte. of Louis and annexation of Holland and the Hanse Towns to the French Empire. Napoleon had long been dissatisfied with his brother's government of the Dutch provinces; for that sovereign, sensible that his subjects' existence depended on their commerce, had done all in his power to soften the hardships of their situation, and had not enforced the imperial decree against English trade with the rigour which the impatient disposition of the emperor deemed necessary. The displeasure arising from this cause was much increased by the immense importations of English merchandise and colonial produce which took place into the north of Germany and the states of Holland, in consequence of the absence of the French guards from the coast during the campaigns of Wagram and the Walcheren expedition: an importation so enormous, that, chiefly owing to its influence, the British exports, which in 1808 had been only £30,387,990, were raised in the succeeding year to £46,292,632.‡ Determined to put an end to such a state of matters, which he deemed entirely subversive of his Continental policy, so far, at

* The emperor said to Savary, on appointing him minister of police, "I have put you in Fouché's place, because I have found I could no longer rely upon him. He was taking precautions against me when I had no designs against him, and attempting to establish consideration for himself at my expense. He was constantly endeavouring to divine my intentions, in order to appear to lead me; and, as I have become reserved towards him, he became the dupe of intrigues, and was often getting into scrapes. You will soon see that it was in that spirit that he undertook, without my knowledge, to make peace between France and England."—SAVARY, iv., 315.

† *Mém. de Fouché*, i., 417, 418; ii., 13, 38. *Thib.*, xiii., 130, 138. *Bign.*, ix., 136, 142.

‡ *Marshall's Stat. Tab.*, 48; and *Porter*, ii., 98.

* *Ante*, ii., 411.

* *Note of Nap.*, July 8, 1810.

least, as Holland was concerned, as well as with a view to prepare the minds of the Dutch for the general incorporation which he meditated, Napoleon compelled Louis, by a treaty March 16. concluded in the middle of March, to cede to France its whole territory on the left bank of the Rhine, including the isles of Walcheren, South Beveland, Cadsand, and the adjacent territory on the Continent to the left of that river, which was formed into a department under the name of that of the Mouth of the Scheldt.* At the same time, it was intimated to the King of Holland that he must relinquish all intercourse, direct or indirect, with England, and consent to his coasts being entirely guarded by French soldiers.

This cession, however, was but the prelude to more important advances. During the incorporation of Holland with the emperor's visit to Antwerp, he became more than ever convinced of the expedience of incorporating the whole of Holland with the French Empire; and many letters, in the most haughty style, were written by him to the unfortunate King of Holland in the course of his journey back to Paris, evidently intended to make him, in despair, resign the crown. The last, from Lille, on the 16th of May, concluded with these words: "It is high time that I should know definitively whether you are determined to occasion the ruin of Holland:

May 16. write no more to me in your accustomed phrases; for three years you have been constantly repeating them, and every successive day has proved their falsehood. This is the last letter in my life I will ever write to you." Matters soon after came to a crisis: Oudinot, with a French army twenty thousand strong, crossed the frontier, and rapidly advanced towards Amsterdam. Louis, who had a thorough reliance on the affections of his Dutch subjects, who knew what mortifications he had undergone on their account, at first thought seriously of resistance; but, upon the assurance of his generals that it was hopeless, he abandoned the attempt. It was next proposed to imitate the conduct of the Prince

July 1. Royal of Portugal and fly to Batavia; but this project was relinquished as impracticable, and at length the unhappy monarch came to the determination of resigning in favour of his son, the prince royal, Napoleon Louis.† Having executed this deed, he set out in the night from Haarlem for Toplitz in Bohemia, having first taken the precaution to order that the resignation should not be published till he had quitted the kingdom. The publication of this unexpected resolution excited universal consternation in Holland; but every one foresaw what soon after turned out to be the dénouement of the tragedy. On the 9th of July, a decree appeared, incorporating the whole kingdom of Holland with the French Empire.

"Obliged," as the report preceding the decree set forth, "to make common cause with France, Holland bore the charges of such an association without experiencing any of its advantages. Its debt, fixed on so inconsiderable a territory, was above a fourth of that of the whole Empire. Its taxes were triple what they were in France. In such a state of matters, the interest of Holland loudly called for its annexation to the Em-

pire. Nor was the interest of France less obvious in the transaction. To leave in foreign hands the mouths of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, would be to render the French commerce and manufactures tributary to the possessor of those estuaries. The present incorporation, on the other hand, completes the empire of Napoleon, and his system of war, policy, and commerce. It is a step necessary to the restoration of his marine; in fine, it is the most decisive stroke which he could deliver to England." Louis protested against the measure, as destructive alike of the interests of Holland and Aug. 1. the rights of his son; and with much dignity refused the provision of two millions of francs a year (£80,000) fixed on him by a Dec. 13, 1810. supplemental decree of the Senate in December following. Prince Louis, his son, repaired to Paris, where he was kindly received by the emperor, who had been much annoyed by the scandal which this family rupture would occasion in the world. His words, at his first interview with his disrowned nephew, were as characteristic of his private feelings as his public declaration on the subject was descriptive of the ruling principles of his policy. "Come, my son, I will be your father: you will lose nothing by the exchange. The conduct of your father has wounded my heart. When you are grown up, you will discharge his debt and your own. Never forget, in whatever position you may be placed by my policy and the interest of my Empire, that your first duties are towards me, your second towards France; all your other duties, even to the people whom I may confide to your care, must be postponed to these."*

The resignation of Louis was the source of great distress to Napoleon, on which Flight of Lu- he forcibly enlarged, even in the cien Bonaparte solitude of St. Helena. But it was to America.

soon followed by an event which still more nearly affected him. For some years past his brother Lucien and he had been on distant terms, and he could ill brook the sturdy, but honest feeling, which induced that disinterested Republican to refuse honours and royalty, when bestowed by the imperial hand. Their rupture became irreconcilable by the refusal of Lucien to divorce his wife, an American by birth, to whom he was tenderly attached, in order to receive a princess suggested by the political views of the emperor. He withdrew first to Rome, where he March, 1810. lived several years in privacy, devoted to poetry and the arts; and when the Roman States were incorporated with the French Empire, he resolved to take refuge in the United States, in order to be altogether beyond the reach of his brother's imperious temper. He set sail, accordingly, for America, but was Aug. 5, 1810. taken prisoner by two English frig-

ates and conducted to Malta, from whence he obtained liberty to reside on his parole in the British dominions. He fixed his residence, in the first instance, at Ludlow in Shropshire, where he continued to devote his whole time to literary pursuits, and the completion of an epic poem on Charlemagne, which had long occupied his attention. Shortly after this voluntary expatriation, he purchased the villa of Thorn- Dec. 19, 1810. grove, near Worcester, where he lived in affluence and elegant retirement till the conclusion of the war. About the same time

* Treaty with Louis, Mart., v., 327, Sup. Bign., ix., 132, 133. Thib., viii., 139.

† Hard., xi., 86, 90. Mart., Sup., v., 338. Thib., viii., 137, 141. Bign., iv., 189, 196.

* Bign., ix., 697, 199. Thib., viii., 139, 146. Mart., v., 338, 340, Sup. Hard., xi., 89, 90.

letters were intercepted by the Spanish guerrillas from Joseph, in which he bitterly complained of the rigorous mandates which he received from the emperor, and the perpetual mortifications to which he was exposed, and declared that, if he could do so, he would willingly resign the crown, and retire to a private station.* Thus, while the Emperors of Russia and Austria, dazzled by the blaze of his military glory, were vying with each other for the honour of Napoleon's hand, his own brothers, whom he had raised from the dust to thrones, from a practical acquaintance with his tyrannical government, were seeking in preference the security of private life, and voluntarily took up their abode with his enemies rather than incur any longer the vexations of his imperious disposition.†

The retreat of Wellington from Talavera, and the unsuccessful issue of the preceding campaign, excited the most desponding feelings in a large proportion of the inhabitants of Great Britain. The people of that country, although now strongly imbued with the military spirit, enthusiastic in the support of the war, and passionately desirous of military renown, were still mere novices in the military art, and totally incapable of appreciating the merits of a system of defence which was to last for years, and in which ultimate success was to be purchased by a cautious system of defensive policy, and frequent retirement before the enemy in the outset, till the Peninsular troops were trained to fight, and something approaching to equality in the field could be attained. Following the usual bent of popular bodies, to form their opinions from present impressions, the people never considered that a vast and admirably disciplined corps, like the French army, which had grown up with the victories of fifteen years, and was now drawn from the military strength of almost all Europe, could not be successfully resisted but by a steady perseverance at first in the most cautious policy; they forgot that it was by delay that Fabius restored the Roman affairs. Their idea of war was a victory followed by an immediate advance to the enemy's capital; and the moment that a retreat commenced they abandoned themselves to the most unmanly depression, and gave over all for lost, because the military power which had conquered all Europe was not at once crushed by twenty thousand English soldiers.

These feelings, characteristic in all ages of the great body of the people, who are usually governed by present occurrences, and incapable, when left to their own direction, of the steady foresight and sustained efforts indispensable in every department for durable success, were called forth with extraordinary violence in Great Britain, in the beginning of 1810, by the unsuccessful result of the Walcheren expedition, and the successive retreats of Sir John Moore and Lord Wellington, at the close of the preceding campaigns. In proportion to the unbounded hopes and expectations excited by the brilliant success of the first

contest in the Peninsula, was the despondence which universally prevailed at the ultimate discomfiture of the English arms, and the apparently unprofitable waste of British gallantry, and, above all, the innumerable defeats and disasters of the Spanish armies, which had now, seemingly, completely destroyed all hopes of successful resistance in the Peninsula. The opposition, as usual, took advantage of these feelings to excite the people to such a manifestation of public opinion as might compel the termination of the war in the Peninsula, and ultimately hurl the ministers from office. The temper of the public mind at this period, and the feelings of the opposition on the subject, may be judged of by the fact that the Common Council of the city of London, not merely petitioned Par-

Feb. 26, 1810.

liament against the bill brought in by ministers for granting Lord Wellington an annuity of £2000 a year, in consideration of the valour and skill he had displayed in the battle of Talavera, but prayed the king for an inquiry into the circumstances connected with the failure of the late expedition into the interior of Spain. The expressions made use of on this occasion deserve to be recorded, as containing a memorable example of the well-known truth, that real greatness in public life has rarely been attained but by those who, at one period, have resolutely acted in opposition to the opinions and clamours of the great body of the people, and that not unfrequently the acts of their life which have given them the most durable reputation with posterity, are those which have occasioned the most violent outcry and obloquy at the moment. The Common Council stated, "Admitting the valour of Lord Wellington, the petitioners can see no reason why any recompense should be bestowed on him for his military conduct. Profiting by no lessons of experience, regardless of the influence to be drawn from the disgraceful convention of Cintra and calamitous re-

Dec. 14, 1809.

treat of Sir John Moore, a third army, well equipped, under the orders of Sir Arthur Wellesley, was precipitated into the interior of Spain, with the same ignorance of the force and movements of the enemy. After a useless display of British valour and a frightful carnage, that army, like the preceding one, was compelled to seek its safety in a precipitate flight, before an enemy whom, we were told, had been conquered—abandoning many thousands of our wounded countrymen into the hands of the French. That calamity, like the others, had passed without any inquiry, and, as if their long-experienced impunity had put the servants of the crown above the reach of justice, ministers have actually gone the length of advising your majesty to confer honourable distinctions on a general who has thus exhibited, with equal rashness and ostentation, nothing but a useless valour." This address having been offered to the king, is not to be found in the Parliamentary history, or Annual Register, though a petition of Feb. 26, 1810, a similar character was presented to Parliament against the grant of Wellington's pension; but it was eagerly transcribed from the English daily papers into the columns of the *Moniteur*,* where it now remains among many other documents which their authors would now willingly consign to oblivion, but which history, looking to the encouragement of strenuous vir-

* "I enclose an intercepted letter from Joseph to Napoleon, which seems to me to be as interesting a document as has yet appeared. It shows that he treats his brothers as tyrannically as he does other people, and gives ground to hope that his tyrannical temper will, at no distant period, deprive him of the advantages of the Austrian alliance."—WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, 18th June, 1811. GURWOOD, viii., 35.

† *Ibid.*, viii., 147, 148.

* *Moniteur*, 20th Jan., 1810. See, also, City of London's Petition to Commons, Feb. 26, 1810. *Parl. Deb.*, xv., 600.

tue under unmerited obloquy, in future times, deems it its first duty to bring prominently into light.

When such was the temper of the opposition party throughout the kingdom, it may well be conceived that their leaders in Parliament were not slow in taking advantage of a state of public opinion which promised such great results to themselves, and threatened such discomfiture to their antagonists. The preceding campaign in Spain, accordingly, was the subject of long and interesting debates in both houses of Parliament; and the study of them is highly important, not merely as indicating the extent to which general delusion may prevail on the subject of the greatest events recorded in history, but as illustrative of the difficulties with which both Wellington and government had to struggle in the farther prosecution of the Peninsular campaigns.

On the part of the opposition it was strongly urged, on repeated occasions, by Lord Grenville, Lord Grey, Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. Whitbread, that, "admitting it was proper to bestow rewards where great public services had been performed, it is difficult to see upon what ground the battle of Talavera can be considered as of that character. If a decisive overthrow has been achieved, such as that of Maida, it may be proper to confer such a distinction, even although no durable results follow from the laurels of victory; but where that is not the case, and the contest has terminated in something like a drawn battle, it is reasonable to ask, when no subsequent advance has taken place, what evidence have we that a victory at all has been gained? Now, what was the case at Talavera? The enemy's army was neither dispersed nor overthrown, and, therefore, that test of success was wanting. Then what was the grand object of the campaign? Unquestionably to advance, with the aid of the Spanish armies, to Madrid; and so far is that object from having been gained, that we ourselves were in the end obliged to abandon our sick and wounded, and retire with disgrace, first behind the Gaudiana, and ultimately within the frontiers of Portugal. Nor was this all. By his disastrous retreat Lord Wellington left the flanks of his army unsupported, and the consequence was, that Sir Robert Wilson, though a most able and gallant officer, was defeated on the one flank at Escalano, and Venegas, with the best army that the Spaniards had, underwent a total overthrow at Ocana.

"Granting to Lord Wellington the praise of being an able, active, and enterprising officer, his conduct at the battle of Talavera was not such as to entitle him to the character of a good general. It was clear that the strong ground on the left had not been adequately taken possession of or secured, and the charge of cavalry in the valley was injudicious, leading, as it did, to a very heavy loss without any adequate advantage. If the Spaniards on the right were really the incapable body of troops, which might be inferred from his lordship's despatches, what must have been the temerity of the general who, supported by such troops, could advance into the heart of the enemy's territory? If they were incapable of moving in the presence of the enemy, why did he leave to them the important duty of defending the post of Talavera and the British wounded? And, if this was done because a still greater

force, under Soult, threatened our rear and communications, on what principle can we defend the conduct of a general who could thus move so far into the enemy's country, without having done anything to secure his flank or rear; or how affirm that the dispositions of the inhabitants of the country are with us when they gave no intelligence of the concentration and march of three French corps, and their approach to the theatre of war was for the first time made known by their threatening and all but cutting off our retreat to Portugal?

"Such has been the effect of want of supplies and disease upon the British army after their retreat into Portugal, that hardly nine thousand men remained capable of bearing arms to defend the frontiers of that kingdom. This was a deplorable result to succeed immediately what we were told had been a glorious victory. There is something inconceivable in the difficulties alleged by the English general in regard to the providing supplies for his army. How was it that the French generals experienced no such difficulty? After the battles of Austerlitz, Essling, and Wagram, their operations never were cramped by the want of provisions. How did this happen? Because they boldly pushed forward and seized the enemy's magazines. It argues a total want of organization, foresight, and arrangement, to be thus checked in all our operations by the alleged difficulty of obtaining that which it is the first duty of every prudent general to provide for his soldiers. In fact, the French sent out small parties after their victories, and thus obtained supplies, while we were utterly unable to do anything of the kind after our alleged triumphs.

"Unhappily for the country, the same ministers who had already so disgracefully thrown away all the advantages of the Spanish war are still in power. And they have derived no wisdom whatever from the failure of all their preceding efforts. It is now plain that they could no longer look either for co-operation, or efficient government, or even for the supplies necessary for their own troops in that country. Repeated disasters, unprecedented in history for their magnitude and importance, have at length taught us the value of the Spanish alliance, and the capability of that nation to maintain a war with France. They could not plead ignorance on this subject, for it was expressly stated in a letter of Mr. Secretary Canning to Mr. Frere, that 'we had shed our best blood in their cause, unassisted by the Spanish government, or even the good-will of the country through which we passed.' When government determined, in opposition to all the dictates of prudence, to continue the war in the Peninsula, they took the most injudicious possible mode of carrying it on, by directing Lord Wellington to advance into Spain, if it could be done consistently with the interests of Portugal. By doing so, we made the Spaniards abandon the system of guerilla warfare, in which they had uniformly been successful, and take up that of great battles, in which they had as uniformly been defeated. And when we did enter into war on that great scale, what have we done to support it? Why, we sent twenty-five thousand men under Wellington to Portugal, forty thousand to perish in the marshes of the Scheldt, and fifteen thousand to make a useless promenade along the coasts of Italy. These forces, if united together, would have formed a noble army of eighty thousand men, which would have effect-

nally driven the French from the Peninsula. Instead of this, by straining at everything we have gained nothing, and disgraced ourselves in the eyes of the world, by putting forward immense forces, which have in every quarter experienced defeat. If the war is to be conducted in this manner, better, far better, to retire from it at once, when it can be done without ruin to our own forces, than persist in a system of policy which has no tendency but to lure the Spaniards, by the prospect of assistance, from their true system of defensive warfare, and then leave them exposed, by our desertion, to the sad realities of defeat.*

On the other hand, it was answered by Lord Wellesley, Lord Castlereagh, Lord Liverpool, and Mr. Perceval, "The object of the British general was, first, to expel the invaders from Portugal; and next, to attempt the deliverance of the Spanish capital. The first object was attained by the passage of the Douro: an achievement as rapid and able as any recorded in military history, and which exposed the invading force to disasters fully equal to those which had been so loudly dwelt on in Sir John Moore's retreat. When Wellington advanced into Spain he had a fair prospect of success, and he neither could nor was entitled to anticipate the refusal of Cuesta to co-operate in the proposed attack on Victor before Sebastiani and the king came up, which, if executed, as he suggested, would unquestionably have led to a glorious, and probably, decisive overthrow. As to the merits of the battle itself, it is alike unfair and ungenerous to ascribe the whole credit to the troops, and allow nothing to the skill, resolution, and perseverance of the commander, who with half the enemy's force achieved so memorable a triumph. Did no glory redound from such a victory to the whole British name? Has it not been acknowledged, even by the enemy, to have been the severest check which he had yet sustained? Is it to be reckoned as nothing, in national acquisitions, the striking a blow which gives a spirit to your soldiers that renders them well-nigh invincible? What territorial acquisitions followed the victories of Cressy, Poitiers, or Agincourt? and yet, can there be the least doubt that these glorious days have contributed more to the subsequent tranquillity of England, by the renown with which they have surrounded our name, than the permanent acquisition of vast provinces?"

"But, in truth, it is a total mistake to assert that no benefit to the common cause has accrued from the battle of Talavera. What else was it that arrested the course of French conquest in the Peninsula; gave a breathing-time to the south to prepare fresh armies; liberated Galicia and Asturias from their numerous oppressors? What else prevented the invasion of Portugal, and gave time for the equipment, disciplining, and organizing of the Portuguese forces? It is in vain to suppose that an immense military force, like that of France in Spain, can be permanently arrested but by pitched battles and serious disasters; and, accordingly, the consequence of the march of the English army to Talavera has been, that the French have been stopped in their incursions into every part of the Peninsula, and, instead of a vigorous offensive, have been driven to a cautious defensive in every quarter. It

may be quite true, that the advantages thus gained, and which were of such a magnitude as was, in the opinion of Lord Wellington, sufficient to have rendered the Spanish cause absolutely safe, if conducted with prudence and wisdom, may have been in a great measure thrown away, perhaps altogether lost, by the blameable imprudence and rashness with which they have subsequently rushed into conflict with the enemy in the open plain, and the dreadful overthrows which their inexperienced troops have consequently received. But neither Lord Wellington nor ministers are responsible for these consequences; for not only were these subsequent efforts of the Spaniards undertaken without the concurrence of the British government or their general in Spain, but in direct opposition to the most strenuous and earnest advice of both; and, if the counsel given them had been adopted, the Spaniards would have possessed a powerful army of fifty thousand men to cover Andalusia, which would have rendered any attempt at the subjugation of that province hopeless, while the disciplined English and Portuguese armies retained a menacing position on the frontiers of Castile.

"It is true, that experience has now demonstrated that very little reliance is to be placed in the Spanish army in the field, in pitched battles; and, above all, that they are almost universally unfit to make movements in presence of the enemy. This defect was anticipated, to a certain degree, from the outset, although it could not be denied that Lord Wellington, from the appearance and experience of Cuesta's army, had good reason to be dissatisfied with the inefficiency of his troops during the short campaign in Estremadura. But it does by no means follow from that deficiency, that it is now expedient to abandon the war in the Peninsula. If, indeed, it had appeared that the spirit of patriotism had begun to languish in the breasts of the Spaniards; if miscarriages, disasters, and defeats had broke their courage or damped their ardour, then it might indeed be said that farther assistance to them was unavailing. But there is still life in Spain; her patriotic heart still beats high. The perseverance with which her people have returned to the charge, after repeated overthrows, reminds us of the deeds of their fathers in the days of Sertorius and the Moorish wars. The sieges of Saragossa and Gerona have emulated the noblest examples of ancient patriotism. The generous and exalted sentiments, therefore, which first prompted us to aid Spain, should still inspire us to continue that aid to the last. The contest in which she is engaged is not merely a Spanish struggle. The fate of England is inseparably blended with that of the Peninsula. Shall we not, therefore, stand by her to the last? As long as we maintain the war there, we avert it from our own shores. How often in nations, above all, how often in Spain, have the apparent symptoms of dissolution been the presages of new life, the harbingers of renovated vigour? Universal conquest, ever since the Revolution, has been the main object of France. Experience has proved that there are no means, however unprincipled, no efforts, however great, at which the government of that country will scruple, provided they tend to the destruction and overthrow of this country. How, then, is this tremendous power to be met, but by cherishing, wherever it is to be found, the spirit of resistance to its usurpation, and occupying the French armies as long

* Parl. Deb., xvi., 472, 504; xv., 140, 146, 458, 462.

as possible in the Peninsula, in order to gain time until the other powers of Europe may be induced to come forward in support of the freedom of the world!?"*

No division took place in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Peninsular war; but in the House of Lords, ministers were supported by a majority of 32, the numbers being 65 against 33.†

In reviewing, with all the advantages of subsequent experience, the charges here advanced against government and Lord Wellington, it seems sufficiently clear that the only part of the charges that were really well founded, consisted in the considerable British force which was uselessly wasted on the coast of Italy. That the Walcheren expedition was wisely directed to the mouth of the Scheldt, can be doubted by none who recollect that there was the vital point of the enemy's preparations for our subjugation; that thirty ships of the line, and immense naval stores, were there already accumulated; and that Napoleon has himself told us that he regarded Antwerp as of such importance to his Empire that he lost his crown rather than give it up. That success was easily attainable with the force employed, has already been sufficiently demonstrated by the opinions of all the French military writers, and even of Napoleon himself; That the prosecution of the war in Spain was not merely expedient, but necessary, must be evident to every rational person, from the consideration that without our assistance the Peninsula would have been immediately subdued, the whole forces of Europe, from the North Cape to Gibraltar, arrayed against the British dominions, and that at least two hundred thousand French troops would have been ordered across the Pyrenees to menace the independence of this country, from the banks of the Scheldt and the heights of Boulogne. But it is impossible to make any defence for the unprofitable display of British force on the shores of Italy. The expedition under Sir John Stewart was perfectly useless as a diversion in support of Austria, as it did not sail till the middle of June, at which time the whole forces of Napoleon were collected for the decisive struggle on the shores of the Danube. The ten thousand British troops thus wasted in this tardy and unavailing demonstration would probably have cast the balance in the nearly equal-poised contest in the Spanish Peninsula. Landed on the coast of Catalonia, they could have raised the siege of Gerona, and hurled M. St. Cyr back to Roussillon. United to the force of Wellington, they would have brought his standards in triumph to Madrid. But ignorance of the incalculable value of time in war, and of the necessity of concentrating their forces upon the vital point of attack, were the two grand defects which want of warlike experience had, at that time, impressed upon the British cabinet; and thus they sent Sir John Stewart to the coast of Italy when it was too late to aid the Austrians, and kept him away from Spain when he would have been in time to have materially benefited Wellington.

Severely as the government and Wellington were cramped by the violent clamour thus raised against the conduct of the war, both in Parliament and throughout the country, one good and important effect resulted, which was not at the

time foreseen, and probably was little intended by the authors of the outcry. This was the impression which was produced upon the French government and people, by the publication of these debates, as to the total inability of England to continue the struggle on the Continent with any prospect of success. The constant repetition in Parliament, and in all public meetings, of the dreadful burdens which oppressed England from the continuance of the war, and the unbounded extent of the calamities which had befallen her armies in the last campaign, naturally inspired the belief, either that the contest would speedily be terminated by the complete destruction of the English forces, or that the British nation would interfere, and forcibly compel the government to abandon it. This opinion was adopted by Napoleon, who trusted to these passionate declamations as an index to the real feeling of Great Britain, and who, having never yet been brought into collision with the English troops, was ignorant alike of the profound sense of the necessity of resistance which animated the great body and best part of the people, and of the prowess which an admirable discipline, and their own inherent valour, had communicated to their soldiers. All the speeches on this subject in Britain were ostentatiously quoted in the *Moniteur*, and they compose at least a third of the columns of that curious record for the year 1810. The emperor was thus led to regard the war in the Peninsula as a contest which could, at any time he pleased, be brought to a conclusion, and which, while it continued, would act as a canker that would wear out the whole strength of England; and to this impression, more, perhaps, than to anything else, is to be ascribed the simultaneous undertaking of the Russian and Spanish wars, which proved too great a strain upon the strength of his Empire, and was the immediate cause of his ruin.

Having thus come to the resolution of continuing the war with vigour in the Peninsula, government applied for, and Parliament, obtained, the most ample supplies and supplies from Parliament for its prosecution. of the year.

The termination of the contest in every other quarter by the submission of Sweden to Russia, which will be immediately noticed, enabled them to concentrate the whole forces of the nation upon the struggle in Portugal, and thus to communicate a degree of vigour to it never before witnessed in British history. The supplies to the navy were £20,000,000, those to the army were above £21,000,000, besides £5,000,000 for the ordnance. No new taxes were imposed, although a loan to the amount of £8,000,000, besides a vote of credit to the extent of £3,000,000 more, was incurred. The land-forces were kept up to the number of two hundred and ten thousand. And the ships in commission in the year were 107 of the line, besides 620 frigates and smaller vessels. The British navy at that time consisted of 240 ships of the line, besides 36 building, and the total numbers were 1019 vessels. The produce of the permanent taxes for the year 1810 was £39,744,000, and the war taxes and loans £40,000,000. The total expenditure of the year rose to the enormous sum of £94,000,000.*†

The decisive overthrow of Oceana having en-

* *Parl. Deb.*, xvii., 472, 505; xvi., 131, 154.

† *Parl. Deb.*, xvii., 503.

‡ *Ante*, ii., 265.

* *James's Naval History*, v., 320, Table xix. *Parl. Deb.*, xvi., 1044. *Ann. Reg.*, 1811. *Chron.*, 310

† See *App.*, note A.

Important effect which these gloomy views in England had on the conduct of the French government.

Preparations of Napoleon for the campaign in Spain. tirely destroyed the force of the Spanish army of the centre, and the Austrian alliance having relieved him of all disquietude in Germany, Napoleon deemed it high time to accomplish the entire subjugation of the Peninsula. With this view, he moved a large portion of the troops engaged in the campaign of Wagram, amounting to one hundred and twenty thousand men, across the Pyrenees, and arranged his forces in nine corps, besides the reserve on the Ebro, under the most renowned marshals of the Empire. Twenty thousand of the Imperial Guard even marched from Chartres and Orleans towards the Bidassoa; a large body of Polish and Italian troops assembled at Perpignan and entered Catalonia; and an immense battering-train of fifty heavy guns and nine hundred chariots took the road from Bayonne to Burgos. The emperor even went so far as, in his discourse to the Senate, on December 3d, to announce his intention of immediately setting out for the south of the Pyrenees.* Such was the magnitude of these re-enforcements, that they raised the total effective French force in Spain, which, in the end of 1809, had sunk to two hundred and twenty-six thousand men, to no less than three hundred and sixty-six thousand, of whom two hundred and eighty thousand were present with the eagles, and fit for service. Out of this immense force he formed two great armies, each composed of three corps, destined for the great operations of the campaign: the first, comprising the corps of Victor, Sebastiani, and Mortier, with Dessolles's reserve, mustering about sixty-five thousand men, under the command of Soult, was destined for the immediate conquest of Andalusia; the second, consisting of the corps of Victor, Ney, and Junot, consisting of eighty thousand men, which assembled in the valley of the Tagus, was charged, in the first instance, with the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and ultimately with the conquest of Portugal. Notwithstanding the enormous amount of these forces, the emperor adhered rigidly to his system of making war support war: he reduced to 2,000,000 francs (£80,000) a month, the sum to be drawn from the imperial treasury for all his troops in the Peninsula, leaving the whole remaining funds for their support to be drawn from the provinces to the south of the Pyrenees, which were, of course, exposed to the most unheard-of spoliation. To such a length was this system of regular extortion carried, that separate military governments were formed in each of the provinces of Biscay, Navarre, Arragon, Catalonia, Old Castile, and Leon, the object of which was to render the whole resources of the country available for the clothing, feeding, and pay of the soldiers; and so completely did they intercept the revenue which should have been enjoyed by Joseph at Madrid, that he had literally nothing to depend upon but the customs collected at the gates of the capital. Yet, with all this machinery to extort money from the people, and with this enormous army to collect it, the resources of the country were so thoroughly exhausted,

and the ruin of industry was so universal, that the troops were generally in the greatest want: their pay was almost everywhere thirteen months in arrear; the ministers at Madrid were starving from the non-payment of their salaries; the king himself was without a shilling; and it was as much from the necessity of finding fresh fields of plunder, as from military or political views, that the simultaneous conquest of Andalusia and Portugal was attempted.*

The Spanish government was in no condition to withstand so formidable an irruption. After the destruction of the army of the centre at Ocana, they had been unequal to the task of organizing a fresh force capable of defending the defiles of the Sierra Morena against so vast a host. Areizaga, indeed, had contrived, even in the short time which had elapsed since that dreadful overthrow, to collect twenty-five thousand fugitives in those celebrated passes, who repaired to their standards after their former dispersion, with that extraordinary tenacity after defeat which has always formed so remarkable a feature in the Spanish character; but they were so completely dispirited and disorganized as to be incapable of opposing any effective resistance. The Central Junta was in the utmost state of debility, without either unity of purpose, vigour of counsel, or resolution of conduct: destitute alike of money, consideration, or authority, it was utterly unable to stem the dreadful torrent which was about to burst upon Andalusia. The disaster of Ocana had called again into fearful activity all the passions of the people; but misfortune had not taught wisdom, nor did danger inspire resolution. A decree was hastily passed Jan. 5, 1810. to raise a hundred thousand men, which was followed a few days after by another, to distribute a hundred thousand poniards; Blake was recalled from Catalonia to Jan. 9. command the army of Murcia; intrenchments were thrown up in the defiles of the mountains at a pass of vast strength, called the Despinas Perros, where Areizaga, with twenty-five thousand men, was stationed. Echievaria had eight thousand at Helen, a little in the rear, and the Duke de Albuquerque had fifteen thousand good troops behind the Guadiana in Estremadura. But the forces in the important defiles of the Sierra Morena under Areizaga were in such a disorderly state that no reliance could be placed upon them, even in defending the strongest mountain position; and, if once driven from their ground, it was easy to foresee that their immediate dissolution was at hand.†

The French troops, during the first three weeks of January, collected in great force in the plains at the foot of the northern front of the Sierra Morena, under the nominal command of Joseph, but really directed by Marshal Soult; and on the 20th they put themselves in motion along the whole line, directing their masses chiefly against the defile of Despinas Perros and the pass of Puerto del Rey, which were the only passes by which the passage could be effected. Hardly any resistance was made at either point. Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey at the first charge, the troops who were defending it having retired precipitately, and dispersed at Navas de

* "When I shall show myself beyond the Pyrenees, the Leopard, in terror, will plunge into the ocean, to avoid shame, defeat, and death. The triumph of my arms will be the victory of the genius of good over that of evil; of moderation, order, morality, over civil war, anarchy, and the destructive passions. My friendship and my protection will give, I trust, tranquillity and happiness to the people of Spain." — Discourse of the EMPEROR to the Legislative Body, December 3d, 1809. *Moniteur*, 3d Dec., 1809.

* Belm., i., 103, 105. *Jom.*, iii., 407, 409. *Nap.*, iii., 101, 102. *Well. Despu.*, vi., 552. *Vict. et Conq.*, xx., 4, 5.
† *Tor.*, ii., 165, 167. *Nap.*, iii., 102, 109. *Thib.*, viii., 256, 257. *Jom.*, iii., 409.

Tolosas, the scene of the desperate battle between the Moors and Christians six centuries before. At the same time, Gazan's division mounted upon the right and left of the hills commanding the frightful gorge of the Despinas Perros, and soon drove the Spanish troops from the sides of the defile. No sooner was the road opened than Mortier poured forward with his horse, foot, and cannon, in great strength, and united with Dessolles's division, who had carried the Puerto del Rey that very night at Carolina, on the southern side of the mountains. Next day they passed over the field at Baylen, and arrived at Andujar. Meanwhile, Sebastiani, with his division, passed, after some fighting, through the pass of Villa Nueva de Los Infantes, and descended to the upper part of the valley of the Guadalquivir.*

Having thus accomplished the passage of the mountains, which was the only obstacle that they apprehended, the French generals divided their forces. Sebastiani, with the left wing, advanced against Jaen and Granada; while Soult, with the corps of Mortier and Victor, moved upon Cordova and Seville. Both irruptions proved entirely successful. Sebastiani, with the left wing, soon made himself master of Jaen, with forty-six pieces of cannon; while Areizaga's army, posted in the neighbourhood, fled and dispersed upon the first appearance of the enemy, without any resistance; and, pursuing

his advantages, the French general entered Granada amid the apparent acclamations of the people, and completely dissolved the elements of resistance in that province. At the same time Joseph, with the centre, advanced to Cordova, which was occupied without bloodshed; and, pushing on with little intermission, appeared before Seville on the 30th. All was confusion and dismay in that city. The working classes, with that ardent patriotism which often in a great crisis distinguishes the humbler ranks in society, and forms a striking contrast to the selfish timidity of their superiors, were enthusiastic in the national cause, and loudly called for arms and leaders to resist the enemy. But the higher ranks were irresolute and divided. The grantees, anxious only to secure their property or enjoy their possessions, had almost all sought refuge in Cadiz; and the junta, distracted by internal divisions, and stunned by the calamities which had befallen their country, had almost all taken to flight, and left the city without a government. Thus, although there were seven thousand troops in the town, and the people had every disposition to make the most vigorous resistance, there were no leaders to direct their efforts; and this noble city, with its foundry of cannon and immense arsenals, became an easy prey to Jan. 31. the enemy. On the 31st, Seville surrendered. Feb. 1. dered, and on the day following Joseph Feb. 5. entered that city in triumph. A few days afterward, Milhaud, with the advanced guard of Sebastiani's corps, pushed on to Malaga. The armed inhabitants in that city made a brave but an equally ineffectual resistance: nothing could withstand the impetuous charges of the French cuirassiers; and, after sustaining a loss of five hundred killed, Malaga was taken, with a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and a large quantity of stores of all sorts.†

These rapid successes appeared to have put an end to the war in Andalusia; but, at this critical juncture, a bold and fortunate movement of the Duke de Albuquerque saved Cadiz, and prolonged the contest in the southern parts of the Peninsula. In the end of January, several members of the Central Junta had straggled into that town in their flight from Seville, but so completely denuded of their authority and consideration, that they could be regarded as little better than private individuals. Feeling the necessity of resigning a power which they had exercised to so little purpose, they passed a decree vesting the government, in the mean while, in a regency of Jan. 29, 1810.

six persons, and containing various important enactments for the convocation of the Cortes, which will be the subject of consideration when the proceedings of that body are noticed in a subsequent chapter. Meanwhile, however, the danger was imminent that this great city, the heart of the Spanish war, the seat of government, and of the whole remaining naval and military establishments of the south of Spain, would fall into the enemy's hands, in the *interregnum* between the cessation of the one and the establishment of another ruling power. The new regency was proclaimed on the 31st; but already a rival authority, self-constituted, Jan. 31. under the name of the Junta of Cadiz, elected under the pressure of necessity on the flight of the Central Junta from Seville, and composed almost entirely of the mercantile class, exercised a power greater than the regency of the kingdom, and threatened to paralyze the public defence, by the partition between two rival and conflicting authorities. From these dangers they were rescued by the vigour and resolution of Albuquerque. This able chief, perceiving at once, after the forcing of the Sierra Morena, that Seville was lost, and that the only chance for the kingdom was to save Cadiz, took upon himself, with true moral courage, the responsibility of disobeying his orders, which were to move to Almadá and support the Spanish left in the mountains there, and, after disposing of half his forces, by throwing them into Badajoz, he himself, with the other half, consisting of eight thousand infantry and six hundred horse, set off, by forced marches by Llerena and Gaudalcaná, for Cadiz.*

The fate of Europe hung upon his steps; for, if the French had succeeded in making themselves masters of that city before his arrival there, and thereby extinguished the war in the south of Spain, there was hardly any chance that Wellington would have been able to maintain his ground against the united force of the armies of Soult and Massena in the mountains of Portugal. Everything depended on rapidity of movement, for the imperial generals were equally alive themselves to the vast importance of getting possession of the island of Leon: it was literally a race between the two armies which should first reach its walls; and the Spanish troops, when they arrived on the banks of the Guadalquivir, fell in with the French advanced posts pushing on for the same destination. But the French, who had much the least ground to go over, were needlessly tardy in their movements: in ten days they only advanced a hundred miles; and, by marching night and day with

* Tor., iii., 174, 178. Nap., iii., 114, 116. Vict. et Conq., xx., 47, 48.

† Tor., iii., 174, 182. Nap., iii., 114, 118. Thib., viii., 257, 260. Jom., iii., 410, 412. Vict. et Conq., xx., 47, 49.

* Tor., iii., 172. Belm., i., 108. Nap., iii., 116, 117.

Rapid and able march of Albuquerque, which saves Cadiz.

extraordinary rapidity, Albuquerque got first, Feb. 3. and late on the evening of the 3d of February entered Cadiz from Xeres, and instantly broke down the bridge of Zuazo, over the canal at Santa Petri, which separates the isle of Leon from the adjoining continent of Andalusia. It was full time, for hardly was this done when the advanced posts of Victor were seen on the side of Chiclana; and next morning the French battalions appeared in great strength on the opposite shores of the straits. The arrival of Albuquerque, however, diffused universal joy, and between the troops which he brought with him, the garrison of Cadiz, and the disbanded soldiers who flocked in from all quarters, his force was raised to fourteen thousand Spanish troops. The most urgent representations were made by the regency for assistance from Portugal; five thousand British and Portuguese soldiers were speedily despatched by Wellington, and arrived Feb. 23. in safety at Cadiz. Confidence was soon restored, from the magnitude of the garrison, the firm countenance of the English soldiers, and the assistance of the British fleet in the bay; and the government at Cadiz, undismayed by the conquest of the whole of Spain, still presented, with heroic constancy, an undaunted front to the hostility of Napoleon, leading on the forces of half of Europe.*

While these important events were extinguishing the war to the south of the Sierra Morena, circumstances of considerable importance, and extremely detrimental to the Spanish cause, were occurring in Arragon and Catalonia.

Operations in Catalonia. Suchet's failure before Valencia. In the first of these provinces, Suchet, having received considerable reinforcements from France, undertook an expedition against Valencia at the same time that Joseph was engaged in his grand enterprise against Andalusia. His army advanced in two columns, and, as the Spaniards had no forces capable of withstanding him in the field, he arrived without resistance under the walls of Valencia. He had come unprovided with heavy artillery, and in the hope that the inhabitants, intimidated by the fall of Seville and conquest of Andalusia, would hasten to make their submission to the conqueror; and had already entered into correspondence with several persons of consideration in the city, who had promised to surrender it on the first summons. But the plot was discovered, the leaders arrested, and one of them executed; and the government of the city being in the hands of determined patriots, all proposals for a surrender were resolutely rejected. Meanwhile, the guerrillas, who had wisely avoided an encounter with the French troops in the field, collected in great numbers around their flanks and rear, cut off their supplies, and straitened their communications to such a degree that the French general, after remaining five days before the town in expectation of a capitulation, was obliged to retrace his steps, not without danger, to Saragossa, which he reached on the March 17. 17th of March. This check proved very prejudicial to the French interests in the east of Spain, and almost counterbalanced, in its effect upon the population of Arragon and Catalonia, the fall of Seville and conquest of Andalusia; for the Spaniards were, beyond any other people in Europe, regardless of the events of the

war, and were elevated or depressed, not in proportion to its general aspect upon the whole, but the events in the provinces with which they were immediately connected.*

This check before Valencia was not the only one which the armies of Napoleon experienced, at this period, in this quarter of the Peninsula. Ever since the reduction of Gerona, the arms of Augereau had been unsuccessful in Catalonia; and Napoleon loudly complained, with some appearance of justice, that the great force which he had accumulated in that quarter, and which was now not less than fifty thousand men, had produced no result at all commensurate to the efforts which had been made to equip and augment it. The Spanish general, Campoverde, in the absence of Augereau, who had gone to Barcelona, attacked and destroyed a detachment of six hundred men which had been placed at Santa Perpetua, to keep up the communication between that fortress and Hostalrich; but this success, which gave extraordinary encouragement to the Catalonians, was balanced by a defeat which O'Donnell received in the neighbourhood of Vich in the middle of February, when the Spanish loss amounted to three thousand men. In consequence of this disaster, the Spaniards were obliged to take shelter under the cannon of Tarragona; and Hostalrich, which had been blockaded for two months, was closely beset, and at length reduced to the last extremity from the want of provisions. The brave governor, Estrada, however, who had borne every privation with heroic constancy, disdained to submit, even in that extremity, and at midnight on the 12th of May sallied forth to cut his way, sword in hand, through the blockading force; and although he himself fell with three hundred men into the hands of the enemy, the remainder, to the number of eight hundred, got clear off, and, embarking in vessels sent to receive them, joined with the bands of their countrymen in Tarragona. The possession of Hostalrich, however, was of great importance to the French, as, having got possession now both of it and Gerona, they were masters of the great road from Roussillon to Barcelona.†

The return of Suchet from Valencia, however, and the arrival of Marshal MacDonald with considerable reinforcements from France, soon restored the French ascendancy in Catalonia. That active general resolved to take advantage of these favourable circumstances to undertake the siege of Lerida, a fortress situated between the mountains of Arragon and Catalonia, and which, in ancient times, had been the scene of the memorable combats between Cæsar, and Afranius and Petreius, the lieutenants of Pompey. The garrison of this important place consisted of nine thousand men, and the governor, when summoned to surrender, at first made a gallant reply, stating that "Lerida had never looked to anything but its own ramparts for defence;" but the vigour of his resistance was by no means in proportion to these professions. The investment was effected in the beginning of April, and the operations were conducted with such vigour, that this celebrated place, which had twice in previous wars repelled its assailants, made a much less re-

* Tor., iii., 172, 173. Lond., i., 445, 447. Belm., i., 108, 109. Jom., iii., 412, 414. Nap., iii., 116, 119.

* Tor., iii., 214, 217. Nap., iii., 127, 129. Thib., viii., 272, 273. Suchet, i., 94, 105.

† Tor., iii., 220, 224. Nap., iii., 133, 143. Belm., i., 118, 119. Vict. et Conq., xi., 37, 55.

spectable defence than might have been expected. Its importance, however, induced the Catalonians to make the utmost efforts for its relief. O'Donnell, who commanded the Spanish forces in the province, collected eight thousand chosen infantry and six hundred horse, with which he

approached its walls, and on the 23d of April 23. April drew near to the French outposts round the town. They were at first driven in; but the Spaniards being quickly assailed by General Boussard, with two regiments of cuirassiers, the whole were thrown into confusion and totally defeated, with the loss of three guns, a thousand killed, and five thousand prisoners.*

This disaster enabled Suchet to commence his operations in form before the fortress, and the breaching batteries opened with great force upon the rampart on the 12th of May. The fire soon made three practicable breaches, and at night the besiegers took the outwork of Fort Garden. Next day, the assault took place at all the breaches, and although the Spanish fire at the first was so violent that the heads of the French assaulting columns staggered, yet, at length, the vigour of the assailants prevailed over the resolution of the besieged, and the French troops made their way through in all quarters. And now commenced a scene of horror almost unparalleled even in the bloody annals of the Peninsular war. Suchet directed his troops, by a concentrate movement, to drive the citizens of every age and sex towards the high ground on which the citadel stood; and the helpless multitude of men, women, and children were gradually driven into the narrow space occupied by that stronghold. In the general confusion, the governor was unable to prevent their entrance; nor was it possible, perhaps, for any resolution to drive back a helpless multitude of women and children upon the bayonets of the enemy. No sooner, however, were they shut in, than the French general directed a powerful fire of howitzers and bombs upon the crowded citadel, which was kept up with extraordinary vigour during the whole night and succeeding day. These projectiles, thrown in among a wretched multitude of men, women, and children, for whom it was impossible to provide either shelter or covering, produced such a tragic effect, and spread such unutterable woe in the narrow space, that the firmness of the Spanish officers yielded under the trial.

At noon, next day, Garcia Conde, the governor, hoisted the white flag, and the garrison surrendered to the number of above seven thousand men, with a hundred and thirty pieces of cannon, and vast stores of ammunition and provisions. The sudden fall of this celebrated fortress gave rise, at the time, to strong suspicions of treachery on the part of the governor, but they seem to have been unfounded, and the capture of the citadel is sufficiently explained by the diabolical device adopted by Suchet: a refinement of cruelty which, as Colonel Napier justly observes, is not authorized by the laws of civilized war, and which, though attended, as the excesses of wickedness often are, by success in the outset, did not fail to produce disastrous results to the French arms in the end, and contributed, along with the abominable cruelty of Augereau, who hung peasants taken in arms on great gibbets erected on the roadside, all the way from Gerona to Figueras, to exasperate the feelings of the

people, and prolong the war in that province long after the period when, under a more humane system, it might have been terminated.*

Taking advantage of the consternation produced by this frightful catastrophe, Suchet immediately proceeded against the castle of Mequinenza, a fortress ^{Fall of Mequinenza.} situated upon the top of a steep rock, seven hundred feet high, lying at the confluence of the Rivers Segra and Ebro. The difficulty of carrying on operations against a stronghold situated upon such a height, and the extreme hardness of the rock in which the trenches were to be made, were insufficient to arrest the indefatigable activity of the French general. The engineer officers had reported that the siege was altogether impracticable, but he, nevertheless, resolved to attempt it, and by the vigour of his resolutions speedily overcame every difficulty. The investment of the fort was effected on the 19th of May. During the next fortnight a road practicable for artillery was, with incredible labour, cut through the rocks of the neighbouring mountains, for the distance of above two miles, and at length the breaching batteries established within three hundred yards of the place, on the night of June 1. the 1st of June. The approaches were blown out of the solid rock by the indefatigable perseverance of the French sappers and miners, and on the night of the 4th of June the town was carried by escalade. This advantage precluded the garrison from all chance of escaping by the Ebro, to which they before had access. The breaching batteries were now advanced close to the castle walls, and the fire was kept up with extraordinary vigour on both sides until the morning of the 8th, when a great part of the rampart having fallen down and left a wide aperture, the garrison surrendered with forty-five guns and two thousand men.† At the same time, Napoleon, who had been extremely displeased with Augereau for retiring during the siege ^{Disasters and recall of Augereau in Catalonia.} of Lerida from the position which had been assigned to him to cover the besieging forces, and who had, by retreating to Barcelona, exposed Suchet's corps to the attack which it sustained from the enterprising O'Donnell, recalled him from Spain, and he was succeeded by Marshal Macdonald, who conducted the war in Catalonia both with more judgment and less ferocity. Such had been the incapacity of Augereau in the latter months of his command, that he not only failed in his great object of covering the siege of Lerida, but exposed his troops, by dispersing them in small bodies in different stations, to be cut up in detail by the indefatigable activity and skilful rapidity of General O'Donnell. This able chief, with the remains of the army which, only a few weeks before, had been routed at Vich, surprised and put to the sword a battalion in Villa Franca, cut off nearly a whole brigade, under Schwartz, at Marenza, and so straitened the enemy for provisions, as compelled Augereau himself, though at the head of nearly twenty thousand men, to take refuge in Gerona,‡ with the loss of above three thousand men. It is impossible, in contemplating the vigorous efforts thus made by the

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 54. Nap., iii., 143. Suchet, i., 106, 149. Vict. et Conq., xx., 25, 32. Nap., iii., 144, 157. Tor., iii., 226, 228.

† Suchet, i., 151, 170. Tor., iii., 228, 230.

‡ Tor., iii., 228, 231. Vict. et Conq., xx., 46, 55. Nap., iii., 161, 166. Suchet, i., 151, 170.

* Nap., iii., 144, 148. Tor., iii., 226. Vict. et Conq., xx., 26, 29.

Spaniards in Catalonia, and the heroic courage with which they maintained the war against every disadvantage, and deeply dyed almost every French triumph with disaster, not to feel the most poignant regret at the want of military discernment in the British government, which detained at this critical period ten thousand English troops, amply sufficient to have cast the balance, even against the skill and energy of Su- chet, in useless inactivity on the shores of Sicily.

While Andalusia was thus at once prostrated before the enemy, and the balance on the eastern coast of Spain, notwithstanding a more resolute resistance, was inclining slowly, but sensibly, in favour of the French arms, Wellington was steadily laying the foundations of that invincible defence of Portugal which has justly rendered his name immortal. The result of the short campaign in Talavera had completely demonstrated to him that no reliance could be placed on the co-operation in the field of the Spanish armies, and that, although the aid of their desultory forces was by no means to be despised, yet it would be much more efficacious when they were left to pursue the war in their own way, and the existence of the English army was not endangered by the concentration of the whole disposable resources of the enemy, to repel any regular invasion of Spain by their forces. He saw clearly that the Spanish government, partly from the occupation of so large a portion of their territory by the enemy, and the consequent destruction of almost all their revenue, partly from the incapacity, presumption, and ignorance of the members of administration and generals of the army, was totally incapable of either directing, feeding, or paying their troops; and, consequently, that their armed bands could be regarded as little better than patriotic robbers, who exacted alike from friends and foes the requisite supplies for their support. Wisely resolving, therefore, to put no reliance on their assistance, he determined to organize in Portugal the means of the most strenuous resistance to the enemy, and to equip in that kingdom a body of men who, being raised by the efforts of English officers to the rank of real soldiers, might, with the assistance of the British army, and by the aid of the powerful means of defence which the mountain ranges with which the country abounded afforded, maintain on the flank of the French armies in the Peninsula a permanent resistance. With this view, he spent the winter in sedulously filling up the ranks, and improving the discipline of the Portuguese soldiers; and the opportune arrival of thirty-one thousand stand of arms and suits of uniform from England, in the spring of 1810, contributed greatly to their improvement and efficiency. The British army was daily increasing in strength and orderly habits, from the continued rest of the winter; while the rapid progress of the vast fortifications which Wellington had directed to be constructed, in the October preceeding, at Torres Vedras, and in interior lines between that and Lisbon, afforded a well-grounded hope that, if manned by adequate defenders, they would prove impregnable, and at length impose an impassable barrier to the hitherto irresistible progress of the French armies.*

Wellington's views for the defence of Portugal, and ultimate deliverance of the Peninsula.

The difficulties, however, with which the English general had to contend, in the prosecution of these great designs, were of no ordinary kind, and would unquestionably have been deemed insurmountable by almost any other commander. The British government itself had been seriously weakened, and its moral resolution much impaired, by the external disasters of the year 1809, and the internal dissensions in the cabinet to which they had given rise. The unfortunate success of all their enterprises, and especially the Walcheren expedition, had not only materially diminished their popularity, but brought them to the very verge of overthrow; and the clamour raised by the opposition in the country against any farther prosecution of the war on the Continent was so loud and vehement, and supported by so large a proportion of the middle classes, that it required no ordinary degree of firmness to persist in a system exposed to such obloquy, and hitherto attended with such disaster. In addition to this, the unfortunate dissension between Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning had banished from the cabinet the two men whose genius and firmness were most adequate to encounter the difficulties with which they were surrounded. The place of the former, as secretary at war, had been inadequately supplied by Lord Liverpool, a statesman possessed, indeed, of sound judgment, admirable temper in public debate, and great tact in directing the government during ordinary periods, but without the firmness of character and clearness of perception which belong to the highest class of intellect, and therefore unfitted to take a great and commanding lead in opposition to the current of public opinion in the most trying crisis of the war. In civil transactions, Mr. Perceval, the head of the administration, was indeed bold and intrepid; but being bred a lawyer, and accustomed only to pacific concerns, he was in a great degree ignorant of military affairs, and did not possess sufficient confidence in his own judgment on these matters to take a due share in the responsibility of the mighty contest in which the nation was engaged. Thus, though the government had fortitude enough to continue the struggle in the Peninsula, notwithstanding the retreat from Talavera, the loud clamour of the opposition, and subsequent destruction of the Spanish armies; yet they did so rather in compliance with the clear opinion expressed by Wellington that the British army could keep its ground in Portugal, than from any conviction of their own on the subject; and they repeatedly stated that they threw upon him the whole responsibility connected with the maintenance of the English forces on the Continent of Europe.*†

In addition to these difficulties, which necessarily arose from the popular form of the government in Great Britain, and which are the price that every free country pays for the vast ad-

Extraordinary difficulties to which Wellington was exposed.
Inefficiency and weakness of the Portuguese government.

* Well. Desp., 7th April, 1810, Gurw., vi., 21, 28, 49; v., 274, 275, 280, 335.

† "The state of opinion in England is very unfavourable to the Peninsula. The ministers are as much alarmed as the public, or as the opposition pretend to be; and they appear to be of opinion that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle which is to answer no purpose. Their instructions are clear enough, and I am willing to act under them, although they throw upon me the whole responsibility of bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till it shall be necessary to evacuate it."—Desp., 21st April, 1810, Gurw., vi., 48, 49.

* Well. Desp., 20th April, 1810, Gurw., vi., 47; viii., 69. 20th October, 1809, v., 234, 274, 275, 317.

vantages of a general discussion on public affairs, the English general had to contend, also, with extraordinary obstacles arising from the weakness and perversity of the Portuguese authorities. Notwithstanding the most vigorous representations which Wellington made to the members of the regency there of the necessity of completing the regiments to their full nominal amount, faithfully collecting and applying the revenue, and impartially punishing all magistrates, of whatever rank, who shrunk from or neglected their duty, the utmost degree of weakness, inefficiency, and corruption prevailed in every part of the civil department in the state. The people, indeed, were generally brave, determined, and even enthusiastic in the cause; but the persons in office partook, in a most remarkable degree, at once of the corruption of aristocratic, and the weakness of Democratic, authority. The country was, in one sense, in a state of convulsion; but the spirit of the movement was, as Wellington observes, anti-Gallican, not Democratic; the authorities who had been elected during the first fervour of the Revolution were, for the most part, drawn from the dignified clergy or old nobility, and they were not only in a great measure ignorant of business, or influenced by local interests and prejudices, but entertained a nervous terror of losing their popularity: a feeling which is, of all others, the most effectual extinguisher to the utility of any public officer. Even during Massena's invasion, they measured the stability of the country, and the probable issue of the contest, not by the number of troops which they could bring into the field, or the magazines and equipments which they had provided for the army, but by the lists of persons who attended their levées, and the loudness of cheers which they received when passing through the streets of Lisbon. A government consisting of the aristocratic party, elected or supported by mere popular favour, is the weakest and least burdensome of all governments; one composed of Jacobin adventurers, who have risen to public eminence in the midst of Democratic convulsions, the most fearfully energetic and oppressive. Hence, although the numbers taken into British pay were nominally thirty thousand, and twenty thousand more were to be raised from the resources of Portugal, yet between the two never more than thirty thousand could be collected around the English standards; and although the monthly expenses of the campaign had risen to £376,000, yet the allied army was never able to bring more than fifty-two thousand men into the field.*

It is in the firm resolution to strive at least to overcome all these obstacles, and the magnanimous determination to risk at once his popularity, military renown, and chances of glory, rather than either abandon his duty or deviate from the plan by which he saw it could alone be discharged, that the brightest page in the career of Wellington is to be found. He was fully informed of the violent outcry raised against him by the opposition in England. No person was so well aware of the irresolution and terror of responsibility which existed in the British government, and none knew better the corruption, not only of the Portuguese regency, but of almost all the civil functionaries in their dominions. In these difficult circumstances, however, he did not despair. Disre-

garding alike the clamour of the populace, both in Portugal and Great Britain, the efforts of faction, and the strength of the enemy, he looked to nothing but the discharge of duty. His principles and resolution at this time cannot be better expressed than in his own words: "I conceive that the honour and interests of the country require that we should hold our ground here as long as possible; and, please God, I will maintain it as long as I can; and I will neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on those of the ministers the responsibility for the failure, by calling for means which I know they cannot give, and which, perhaps, would not add materially to the facility of attaining our object; nor will I give to the ministers, who are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position which, in my opinion, the honour and interest of the country require they should maintain as long as possible. I think that, if the Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough to maintain it; if they do not, nothing that Great Britain can afford can save the country; and if, from that cause, I fail in saving it, and am obliged to go, I shall be able to carry away the British army."†

The British general had need of all his firmness and heroic sense of duty, for the forces which Napoleon was preparing for the subjugation of Portugal were immense. The three corps of Ney, Regnier, and Junot, which were under the immediate command of Marshal Massena, consisted of eighty-six thousand men present with the eagles, all veteran soldiers.‡ A reserve of twenty-two thousand, under Drouet, was at Valladolid, and might be relied on to supply any waste in the main body; while General Serras, with fifteen thousand, covered the right of the army on the Esja, towards Benevente and Leon, watching the army of Galicia, and resting on the fortress of Astorga, which, after a protracted siege, had at length yielded to the arms of Napoleon. The rear and communications of the French army were covered by Bessières with twenty-six thousand men, including sixteen thousand of the young guards, who occupied Biscay, Navarre, and Old Castile.†

The force which Wellington had at his disposal was little more than the half of this immense host, and the troops of which it was composed, with the exception of the English soldiers, could not be relied upon as equal in combat to the enemy. The British troops, organized in five divisions, with the cavalry under General Cotton, consisted of twenty-two thousand infantry and three thousand horse; and the Portuguese regular troops, whom General Beresford had trained and rendered most efficient, amounted to about thirty thousand more. These forces were supported by a large body of militia, of whom nearly thirty thousand might be relied upon for desultory operations, but it was impossible to bring them into the field in regular battle with any chance of success. After making allowance for the necessary detachments in the rear and the sick, the largest force which Wellington was ever able to collect in this campaign on the frontiers of Portugal, opposite Ciudad

Preparations for the grand attack on Portugal by Massena. May, 1810.

Force of Wellington for the defence of Portugal.

* Well. Desp., 14th January, 1810, Gurw., v., 426.

† See note B. Appendix.

‡ Belm., i., 121, 122. Nap., iii., 201, 207. App., 568.

* Well. Desp., vi., 155, 168; vii., 424, 426, 610.

Rodrigo, was thirty-two thousand men, while General Hill, who was stationed at Thomar and Abrantes to guard the valley of the Tagus, had about thirteen thousand more, of whom nearly two thousand were horse. Thus, for the defence of Portugal, Wellington could only collect, at the very uttermost, forty-five thousand regular troops, which might be increased to fifty thousand when the army drew near its reserves at Lisbon; while Massena had fully eighty thousand men under his immediate command, supported by reserves and flanking forces, from which he could draw forty thousand more.*

Marshal Massena arrived on the 1st of June, Siege and fall took the command of the army, and of Ciudad immediately invested the fortress of Rodrigo. Ciudad Rodrigo. General Crawford, who commanded the English advanced guard, fell back, according to Wellington's orders, after making a gallant resistance, across the Agueda, leaving the Spanish fortress to its own resources. The investment was immediately formed, and on the 25th the breaching batteries commenced their fire with great effect upon the place. Wellington instantly hastened to the spot, and took post on the Agueda, with thirty-two thousand men. That was a trying moment for the English general, perhaps the most trying that he ever underwent. He was at the head of a gallant army, which burned with desire to raise the siege. He had promised the Spaniards, if possible, to effect it. The governor and the garrison were making a brave defence: the sound of their cannon, the incessant roar of the breaching batteries, was heard in every part of the English lines; his own reputation, that of his army, his country, appeared to be at stake; but Wellington refused, resolutely refused, to move forward a man to succour the place. He was charged, not with the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo merely, but with that of Portugal, and, eventually, with the safety and independence of the British Empire. If he had descended into the plain with thirty-two thousand men, half of whom were Portuguese who had never seen a shot fired, to attack sixty-six thousand French, of whom ten thousand were admirable horse, who formed the covering force, he would have exposed his army, and, probably, the cause of European independence, to certain destruction. Like Fabius, therefore, he persevered in his cautious course, disregarding alike the taunts of the enemy, the cries of the Spaniards, and the reproaches of his own troops. Though grievously affected by the necessity of abandoning the fortress to its fate, he never swerved from his resolution. The French, thus undisturbed in their operations, soon brought the siege to a successful issue.† The fire kept up from their batteries July 10. was so violent, that, on the 10th of July, several practicable breaches were made in the walls; and on the next day, as resistance and relief were alike hopeless, the governor surrendered the place, with his garrison of four thousand men, 125 guns, and great stores of ammunition, after having made a most gallant defence.‡

* Nap., iii., 261, 262. Well. Mem., Gurw., vii., 292.

† Tor., 258, 268. Nap., iii., 263, 283. Belm., i., 125. Well. Mem., Gurw., 292, 293. Vict. et Conq., xx., 60, 67. Well. Desp., vi., 404.

‡ How severely Wellington felt the necessity under which he lay, at this period, of abandoning the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the vast importance of the cautious system in which he then persisted, is well stated in a despatch from the English general, and a passage in the Spanish historian

Having thus secured this important fortress, in which he deposited the heavy Combat on the train and reserve parks of his army, Coa, and siege-Massena lost no time in moving forward across the frontier, while Almeida. Wellington, in pursuance of the system he had adopted, retired before him, leaving Almeida also to its fate. Before its investment took place, however, a very gallant action occurred between the French advanced guard and General Crawford, who commanded the British rear-guard, four thousand five hundred strong, on the banks of the Coa. Crawford, during the whole siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, had with this small force maintained his position on the French side of that stream, and he maintained it even when they approached Almeida. He was there assailed, on the 24th of July, by a French force of twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, with thirty guns. The river in the rear could be passed only by a single bridge, but by the great steadiness of the men, and the resolution with which the light troops fought, they succeeded in crossing the ravine without any considerable loss. No sooner were they passed, however, than the French, with extraordinary gallantry, dashed across the bridge, but the head of the column was swept away by the terrible fire of the British infantry and artillery; and, after a bloody combat of two hours, a heavy rain separated the combatants, and Crawford retired with his division to the main body of the army. In this bloody affair both parties sustained a loss of between four and five hundred men. All obstacles to the investment of Almeida being now removed, it took place on the following day. The trenches were opened on the 15th of Aug. 15. August. The fire of the place was at first extremely well sustained; and as the garrison consisted of four thousand Portuguese regulars and militia, and the governor, General Cox, was a man of known resolution, a protracted resistance was expected. But these anticipations proved nugatory, in consequence of a frightful catastrophe, which, at the very outset of the bombardment, deprived the besieged of all their means of defence. At daybreak on the Aug. 26. 26th, a heavy fire commenced upon the

Torreno, which are equally honourable to the feelings of both. "Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations which have been carried on for the last year; and it is very obvious that a continuance of the same cautious system will lose the little reputation which I had acquired, and the good opinion of the people of this country. Nothing, therefore, could be more desirable to me personally than that either the contest should be given up at once, or that it should be continued with a force so sufficient as to render all opposition hopeless. In either case, the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant of our own country as well as of this, and by those of this whom I am obliged to force to exertion, and who, after all, will be but imperfectly protected in their persons and property, would fall upon the government. But seeing, as I do, more than a chance of final success if we can maintain our position in this country, although probably none of a departure from our cautious defensive system, I should not do my duty by the government if I did not inform them of the real situation of affairs, and urge them, with importunity even, to greater exertion."—Desp., 19th August, 1810, Gurw., vii., 346, 347. "We feel ourselves bound to say," says Torreno, "that Wellington on that occasion acted as a prudent captain, if to raise the siege it was necessary to risk a battle. His forces were not superior to those of the enemy; and his troops and the Portuguese were not sufficiently disciplined to be able to manoeuvre with effect in presence of such a foe, or feel sufficient confidence in themselves to go into battle with the enemy. The battle, if gained, would only have saved Ciudad Rodrigo, but not decided the fate of the war. If lost, the English army would have been totally destroyed, the road to Lisbon laid open, and the Spanish cause rudely shaken, if not struck to the ground."—Tor., iii., 367.

place from sixty-five guns, to which the garrison replied during the whole forenoon with great vigour and effect; but, at five o'clock in the evening, a bomb was thrown, which accidentally fell into the great magazine of the fortress, containing one hundred and fifty thousand pounds of powder. The terrible explosion which followed blew up the Cathedral, the principal edifices in the town, a large part of the houses, and occasioned many breaches in the ramparts. The consternation produced by this frightful catastrophe was such, that on the same evening the garrison mutinied, and compelled the governor, who had retired into the town, to surrender; and on the following day the garrison, still consisting of three thousand men, were made prisoners, and a hundred and fifteen pieces of heavy cannon taken.*

Wellington now retreated down the valley of the Mondego, and the dispositions of Massena soon showed that he was to follow in the same direction: the extraordinary difficulties experienced by Junot, in 1808, in his advance into Portugal by the road of Abrantes having deterred the French general from penetrating into the country by that route. For the same reason, Regnier's corps, which had been posted in the valley of the Tagus, opposite to Hill's division, marched rapidly across the mountains, from the valley of the Tagus to that of the Mondego; upon which, Hill, moving parallel to him, crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, and moved swiftly to join Wellington by the pass of Espinoha. The French marshal's instructions had been to invade Portugal at the same time by both banks of the Tagus; but, as the English general was possessed of an interior line of communication, by the bridge of Villa Velha, over the Tagus, he justly deemed it too hazardous an experiment to attempt such a division of his force in presence of an enterprising enemy, who might suddenly fall with superior force upon one division of his forces, when detached by a broad river from the other. The whole French force, accordingly, was ordered to assemble in the valley of the Mondego on the 16th of September; and Wellington, having ascertained that the enemy were concentrating all their forces, immediately ordered Hill to join him with the right wing of the army. This important movement through the mountains was effected with great expedition, and on the 21st, the two corps of the allied army completed their junction on the Alva, in the valley of the Mondego. Meanwhile, ten thousand militia, under General Trant, were collected in the mountains between that river and Oporto, and already occupied the defiles leading to Lamego. The most peremptory orders had been given by the retreating general to lay waste the country, destroy the mills, and deprive the enemy of all their means of subsistence.†

Meanwhile, however, the continued retreat of the English troops, and the multitude of fugitive peasants and proprietors who flocked into Lisbon, produced the utmost consternation in that capital. Wellington soon felt the necessity of making an effort to support the drooping spirits of the people, and inspire additional en-

ergy into the governments of both countries. He therefore resolved to take post on the first favourable ground which might present itself, and, as Massena was descending the valley of the Mondego by the northern bank of the river, he crossed his whole army over, and took post on the summit of the ridge of BUSACO. This mountain range runs from the northern shores of the Mondego, in a northerly direction, about eight miles, where it unites with the great ridge which separates the valley of the Mondego from that of the Douro. Thus this Sierra forms a natural barrier, running across the northern bank of the Mondego, and the same ridge continues along the same mountains under the name of Sierra da Murcella, which runs in a southerly direction till it joins the great chain which separates the valley of the Mondego from that of the Tagus. On the summit of the northern portion of this range Wellington collected his whole army on the evening of the 26th, in all about fifty thousand men, while Massena, with seventy-two thousand, lay at its foot, determined to force the passage.*

The French marshal was not ignorant of the strength of the position which the English general had now assumed, or of the perilous nature of the situation in which he was placed; for, while lying at the foot of the ridge of Busaco, he received intelligence that Colonel Trant had, with ten regiments of militia, attacked the reserved artillery and military chest near Tojal, and captured the whole, with eight hundred prisoners; and already the communication by the Spanish frontier was entirely cut off by the Portuguese light parties. But the orders of the emperor were pressing, and he was well aware that fight he must, at whatever disadvantage.† Next day collecting, therefore, all his force, Massena commenced a desperate attack upon the English position, at daybreak of the morning of the 27th. The British army, during the night, lay in dense masses on the summit of the mountain. The sky was clear, and the dark rocky eminences rising on both sides of the pass were crowned by the fires of innumerable bivouacs. The veterans in the English army, accustomed to similar scenes of excitement, slept profoundly on their stony beds; but many of the younger soldiers, who were now to witness a battle for the first time, were kept awake by the grandeur and solemnity of the scene around them. As the first streaks of dawn were beginning to appear over the eastern hills, a rustling noise was heard in the wooded dells which ran up to the crest of the mountains. It arose from the French outposts, who, stealing unobserved during the night, had thus got close to the outposts of the English position without being perceived. The alarm was instantly given, and the troops started to their arms at all points. It was full time, for in a few minutes more the French, in two massive col-

* Well, Mem., vii., 296; vi., 445, 446. Jom., iii., 429, 430. Nap., iii., 321, 322, 324.

† In an intercepted letter from Napoleon at this period to Massena, he says, "Lord Wellington has only eighteen thousand men. Hill has only six thousand; and it would be ridiculous to suppose that twenty five thousand English can balance sixty thousand French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly on, after having well observed where the blow may be given. You have twelve thousand cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave six thousand cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations."—NAP., iii., 307, 308.

* Lond., i., 494, 497. Vict. et Cong., xx., 71, 75. Nap., iii., 304, 306. Well. Desp., Gurw., vi., 364.

† Nap., iii., 312, 320. Jom., iii., 428, 429. Well. Mem., Gurw., vii., 296, 297. Belm., i., 120, 139.

urns, were upon them. Ney, with three divisions, numbering full twenty-five thousand combatants, advanced against the British left, by the great road leading to the Convent of Busaco; while Regnier, with two, moved by St. Antonio de Cantara against their right, about three miles distant. The first, headed by Loison's division, preceded by a cloud of light troops, came rapidly up the wooded hollow which leads to Busaco, and the British sharp-shooters, driven before them, soon emerged from the woods, breathless and in disorder. Crawford, whose division stood at that point, had stationed his artillery most advantageously to play upon the enemy during their ascent from the hollow; but, though the guns were worked with extraordinary rapidity, nothing could stop the undaunted advance of the French troops. Emerging bravely from the hollow, they stand upon the edge of the mountain. The British artillery is quickly drawn to the rear. The shout of victory is already heard from the French line, when suddenly Crawford, with the 43d and 52d regiments, springing out of a hollow behind the highest part of the ridge, where they lay concealed, appeared on the summit, and eighteen hundred British bayonets sparkled on the crest of the hill. The head of the French column instantly fired, but in vain. It is broken and driven back. Both its flanks are overlapped by the English line, and three terrible discharges, within a few yards' distance, drove them headlong down, in wild confusion, with dreadful loss, to the bottom of the hollow.*

The attack on the British right by the two divisions of Regnier's corps met with no better success. The ground in that quarter was, indeed, of comparatively easy ascent, and although the British and Portuguese skirmishers opposed a vigorous resistance, and twenty pieces of cannon played incessantly on the advancing column, yet nothing could arrest the ardour and gallantry of the French, who mounted with an intrepid step up the hill, and, after routing a Portuguese regiment stationed before them, established themselves on the summit, and were beginning to deploy to the right and left. At this instant, however, when the British position in this point appeared to be almost carried, and the third division, part of which had been forced to give way, could with difficulty maintain itself against the dense and intrepid column which had forced itself into the centre of its line, General Leith and General Picton brought up their divisions, and charged them with such vigour, that the enemy, after a desperate struggle, were hurled down the hill, the British firing upon them as long as their muskets would carry, but not pursuing, lest their ranks should be broken, and the crest of the hill be again won. The other French division of Regnier's corps, which advanced up a hollow way a little to the left of his main column, was repulsed by the left of Picton's division before they reached the summit of the mountain. After these bloody defeats, the French made no attempt again to carry the top of the hill, though Loison and Marchand maintained a long and obstinate conflict in the hollows at its foot; but their efforts were effectually held in check by the brigades of Pack and Spencer, and at length, towards evening, Massena, wearied of the fruitless butchery, drew off his troops, after having sus-

tained a loss of eighteen hundred killed and three thousand wounded, among whom were Generals Foy and Merle, while the total loss of the allies was not above thirteen hundred men.*

The battle of Busaco produced an astonishing effect at the time at which it was fought, and in its ultimate consequences was, beyond all question, one of the most important that took place in the whole Peninsular war. It for the first time brought the Portuguese troops into battle with the French, and under such advantageous circumstances as at once gave them a victory. Incalculable was the effect produced by this glorious triumph. To have stood side by side with the British soldiers in a pitched battle, and shared with them in the achievement of defeating the French, was a distinction which they could hardly have hoped to attain so early in the campaign. Wellington judiciously bestowed the highest praises upon their conduct in this battle, and declared in his public despatch, that "they were worthy of contending in the same ranks with the British soldiers in this interesting cause, which they afford the best hopes of saving." It may safely be affirmed, that on the day after the battle, the strength of the Portuguese troops was doubled. The sight of this auspicious change dispelled every desponding feeling from the British army. No presentiments of ultimate discomfiture were any longer entertained. The plan of defence which the far-seeing sagacity of their chief had formed revealed itself to the meanest sentinel in the ranks, and the troops of every nation prepared to follow the standard of their leader wherever he should lead them, with that ready alacrity and undoubting confidence which is at once the forerunner and the cause of ultimate triumph.†

Wellington has since declared that he expected that the battle of Busaco would have stopped the advance of Massena in Portugal; and that, if the French general had been governed by the principles of the military art, he would have halted and retired after that check; and the English general wrote to Romana, immediately after the battle, that he had no doubt whatever of the success of the campaign.‡ But, fortunately for England and the cause of European freedom, Massena was forced on by that necessity of advancing in the hazardous pursuit of doubtful success which afterward drove Napoleon to Moscow, and is at last the consequence and the punishment, both in civil and military affairs, of Revolutionary aggression. Impelled by this necessity, the French marshal, finding that he could not carry the English position by attack in front, resolved to turn it by a flank movement; and, accordingly, on the following day he moved on his own right, through a pass in the mountains which led to Sardo, and brought him on the great road from Oporto to Coimbra and Lisbon. Sept. 28.

To attempt such a flank movement with an army that had sustained so severe and bloody a check in presence of a brave and enterprising enemy, was a hazardous undertaking; but the French general had no alternative but to run the risk or remeasure his steps to the Spanish frontier. Wellington, from the summit of the Busaco ridge, clearly perceived the French troops de-

* Nap., iii., 329, 334. Gurw., vi., 446, 450. Vict. et Conq., xx., 82, 87. Belm., i., 131.

† Well. Desp., 30th Sept., 1810, Gurw., vi., 446, 449.

‡ Wellington to Romana, 30th Sept., 1810, Gurw., vi., 450; and 3d Nov., 1810, Gurw., vi., 552.

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 83, 87. Nap., iii., 331, 333. Well. Desp., 30th Sept., 1810, Gurw., vi., 446, 447.

Sept. 28. filing in that direction on the evening of the 28th, but he wisely resolved not to disturb the operation. By attacking the French army when in march, he might bring the Portuguese levies into action under less favourable circumstances than those in which they had recently fought, and which might weaken or destroy their moral influence. His policy now was to leave nothing to chance. Behind him were the lines of Torres Vedras, now completely finished, and mounted with six hundred guns, before which he was well convinced all the waves of French conquest would beat in vain. He immediately gave orders, accordingly, for the army to retire to their stronghold. The troops broke up from their position at Busaco on the 30th, and, driving the whole population of the country within their reach before them, retired rapidly by Coimbra and Leyria to Torres Vedras, which the advanced guards reached on the 8th of October, and the whole army was collected within the lines on the 15th. The French followed more slowly, and in very disorderly array, while Trant, with the Portuguese militia,

Oct. 7. came up so rapidly on their rear, that on the 7th of October he made himself master of Coimbra, with above five thousand men, principally sick and wounded, who had been left there. This disaster, however, made no change in the dispositions of the French marshal. Pressing resolutely forward, without any regard either to magazines, of which he had none, or to his communications in the rear, which were entirely cut off by the Portuguese militia, he marched headlong on, and arrived in the middle of October in sight of the lines of Torres Vedras, of which he had never before heard, but which now rose in appalling strength to bar his farther progress towards the Portuguese capital.*

The lines of Torres Vedras, on which the English engineers had previously been engaged for above a twelvemonth, and which have acquired immortal celebrity from being the position in which the desolating torrent of French conquest was first permanently arrested, consisted of three distinct ranges of defence one within another, which formed so many intrenched positions, each of which must be successively forced before the invading force could reach Lisbon. The first, which was twenty-nine miles long, extended from Alhandra on the Tagus to Zezambre on the sea-coast. The second, in general about eight miles in the rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. Lorenza in the sea. The third, intended to cover a post embarkation, extended from Passo d'Arcos on the Tagus to the Tower of Jonquera on the coast. Within this interior line was an intrenched camp, designed to cover the embarkation of the troops, if that extremity should become necessary, and it rested on Fort St. Julian, whose high ramparts and deep ditches rendered any attempt at escalade impracticable: so that, in the event of disaster, the most ample means were provided for bringing away the troops in safety. Of these lines, the second was incomparably the strongest, and it was there that Wellington had originally intended to make his stand, the first being meant rather to retard the advance of the enemy and take off the first edge of his attack, than to be the permanent resting-place of the allied forces; but

the long delay of Massena at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida had given so much time to the English engineers, that the first line was completed and deemed susceptible of defence when the French arrived before it. It consisted of thirty redoubts placed on a ridge of heights, on which were mounted, in all, 140 guns; the great redoubt of Sobral, in the centre, on which was mounted forty-five pieces of heavy cannon, was perched upon an eminence that overlooked the whole exterior lines, and from which signal-posts communicated over their whole extent; an admirable road, running along the front of the position, enabled one part of the army to communicate rapidly with the other; the highways piercing through this terrible barrier were all palisadoed; the redoubts, armed with chevaux-de-frise, and a glacis cut away to make room for their fire, and the intervening spaces which were not fortified formed into encampments for the troops, under shelter of the guns of one or other of the redoubts, where they might give battle to the enemy with every prospect of success. On the whole lines, no less than 600 pieces of artillery were mounted on 150 redoubts.* Neither the Romans in ancient, nor Napoleon in modern times, have left such a monument of their power and perseverance; and they will remain in indestructible majesty to the end of the world, an enduring monument of the grandeur of conception in the chief who could design, and the nation which could execute, such a stupendous undertaking.

The situation of the English army on this astonishing position was as favourable as the ground which they occupied was carefully fortified. By drawing so close to the centre of his power, Wellington had greatly augmented the physical strength of his forces. Strong re-enforcements arrived from England just after the troops entered the lines, and the Marquis Romana, who was summoned up by Wellington to concur in the defence of the last stronghold in the independence of the Peninsula, joined, on the 20th of October, with five thousand men. There were now about thirty thousand English troops in the front line, besides twenty-five thousand Portuguese and five thousand Spaniards, in all sixty thousand men, perfectly disposable and unfettered by the care of the redoubts, while a superb body of marines that had been sent out from England, the militia of Estremadura and Lisbon, and the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, formed a mass of nearly sixty thousand additional combatants, of great value in defending positions and manning the numerous redoubts which were scattered through the positions. Altogether, before the end of October, one hundred and thirty thousand men received rations within the British lines; twenty ships of the line, and a hundred large transports, provided the sure means of drawing off the army in case of disaster; and yet, such were the inexhaustible resources which the vigour and activity of government had provided for this enormous warlike multitude, that not only was no want experienced during the whole time that the army lay in the lines of Torres Vedras, but the combatants of all descriptions, and the whole pacific multitude who had taken refuge with them, amounting, with the population of Lisbon, to at least four hundred thousand more, were amply provided with sub-

* Well. Desp., 30th Sept., 1810. Gurw., vi., 448, 450; and Mem., vii., 297. Nap., iii., 336, 351. Jom., iii., 432, 433. Belin., i., 132, 133.

* Belin., i., 133, 135. Nap., iii., 351, 359. Jom., iii., 433, 434. Vict. et Conq., ix., 93, 95.

sistence, and the troops of every description never were so healthy or in such high spirits. Military annals, in no age of the world, have so stupendous an assemblage of military and naval strength to commemorate in such a position; and it was worthy of England, which had ever taken the lead in the cause of European deliverance, thus to stand forth, with unprecedented vigour, in the eighteenth year of the war.*

Massena, with all his resolution, paused at the sight of this formidable barrier, and employed several days in reconnoitring the lines in every direction, while his troops were gradually collecting at the foot of the intrenchments; and much time was consumed in endeavouring to discover a weak point in which they could be assailed with some prospect of success. But, although the outer line exhibited a front in several places many miles in length without any intrenchments, and the orders of Napoleon were positive that he should immediately attack if he had the least chance of success,† yet the great advantage derived by the allies from the redoubts with which their position was strengthened, and which enabled the English general to throw his whole disposable force upon any point that might be assailed, rendered it evidently hopeless to make the attempt. In the centre of the British army, twenty-five thousand men were encamped close around the great redoubt of Sobral, upon the Monte Agraca, which could have reached any menaced point of the line in two hours. The French general, therefore, contented himself with sending off Foy, under an escort, to Paris, to demand instructions from the emperor. Meanwhile, the contest was reduced between the two armies to the question, Who should starve first? Massena, fondly hoping that Wellington would quit his lines to attack him in his own position, or that the British government, or the regency at Lisbon, would be intimidated by the near approach of his army, would abandon the contest held out for above a month, until he had consumed every article of subsistence which the country occupied by his troops afforded; and his troops, severely weakened by disease, were reduced to the last stage of starvation and misery. The Portuguese militia, fifteen thousand strong, drew round his rear, and became so adventurous that they cut off all his communications, and confined his troops to the resources of the ground which they actually occupied. Yet such was the power of squeezing the resources out of a country which long practice had given to the French generals, that we have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that Massena contrived to maintain sixty thousand men, and twenty thousand horses, for two months, in a country in which he could not have maintained an English division, with all the advantages of British wealth, and of the favourable inclination of the inhabitants:‡ At length, however, every article in the country being consumed, and the inhabitants, whom the French had oppressed, as well as themselves, reduced to utter starvation, Massena broke up from his position on the 14th of November, and, for the first time since the accession of Napoleon, the French eagles commenced a lasting retreat.§

No sooner was the joyful report brought in by the outposts that the French army was retiring, than the British issued from their intrenchments, and Wellington commenced a pursuit at the head of sixty thousand men. Desirous, however, of committing nothing to chance in a contest in which skill and foresight were thus visibly in a manner compelling fortune to declare in his favour, he did not press the French rear-guard with any great force, but despatched Hill across the Tagus to move upon Abrantes, while the bulk of the army followed on the great road by Cartaxo, towards Santarem.

Positions of the French at Santarem, and ultimate retreat of Massena.

But Massena, whose great military qualities were now fully awakened, had no intention of retreating to any considerable distance; and, after having retired about forty miles, he halted his rear-guard at the latter town, and there, with much skill, took up a position eminently calculated to combine the great objects of maintaining his ground in an unassailable situation, and at the same time providing supplies for his army. A strong rear-guard was rested on Santarem, a town with old walls, situated on the top of a high hill, which could be approached only by a narrow causeway running through the marshes formed by the Rio Major and the Tagus. While this formidable position, the strongest in Portugal to an army advancing from the westward, effectually protected his rear, the main body of his troops were cantoned behind in the valley of the Zezere, the rich fields of which, giving food to a hundred and ten thousand inhabitants, afforded ample supplies of grain, while the extensive mountains on either side yielded a very great quantity of cattle. The question of attacking the enemy in this strong ground was again well considered by Wellington, but finally abandoned, from a conviction that such an attempt could not, from the flooded state of the marshes on either side, succeed without immense loss, and that to hazard it would be to expose the allied army to the chances of war, while certainty of ultimate success was in their power. Wellington, therefore, contented himself with taking up a position in front of Santarem, and narrowly watching the Tagus, on which the French marshal was preparing boats, and all the materials for passing the river. If he could have succeeded in that enterprise, and transported the seat of war into the Alentejo, he would have reached a country hitherto untouched, and offering resources of every kind for his army. But Wellington anticipated his design, and, detaching Hill with two divisions to the opposite bank of the Tagus, where he was re-enforced by a large part of the militia of that province, guarded the banks of the river so effectually, and established batteries upon all the prominent parts with such skill, that the French generals found it impossible to effect the passage. Thus, Massena was reduced to maintain his army entirely from the resources he could extract from the northern bank of the Tagus; and although he was joined by Drouet's corps, with ten thousand men, Dec. 29. in the end of December, yet he did not deem himself in sufficient strength to attack the English army. Meanwhile, the British government, fully roused, at last, to the vast importance of the war in Portugal, and the fair hopes of conducting it to a successful issue, made great efforts to re-enforce their army. The troops embarked were delayed by contrary winds for above six weeks after they had been put on board; but at length

* Nap., iii., 358, 359. Belm., i., 134, 135. Well. Mem., Gurw., vii., 297, 298. Jom., iii., 433, 434. Vict. et Conq., xx., 101, 102.

† Well. Desp., Gurw., vii., 54, 55.

‡ Massena's Report to Napoleon, 29th Oct., 1810. Belm., i., App., 58. Well. Desp., Gurw., vii., 298, 299.

they set sail on the 20th of February, and landed at Lisbon on the 2d of March.* No sooner did the French marshal hear of their arrival than he broke up with his whole forces, taking the road through the mountains to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; and Wellington, still keeping Hill, with two divisions, in the Alentejo, to render assistance to the Spaniards, who were at this time hard pressed in Estremadura, commenced the pursuit with forty thousand British and Portuguese troops.

It was hard to say whether the position of the French or English general was most critical when Massena thus, in good earnest, began his retreat from Portugal; for such, during the winter, had been the progress of the French in Estremadura, that it was extremely doubtful whether the English would not speedily be threatened by invasion by a formidable army on the side of Elvas and the Alentejo. Napoleon was no sooner informed of the serious aspect of the war in Portugal, than he ordered Soult to confide to Victor the tedious duty of blockading Cadiz, while he himself should march with all his disposable forces upon Estremadura and Badajoz. In pursuance of these directions, that able chief set out from Seville, on the 2d of January, with twenty thousand men, taking the road by Llerena, for Badajoz. The troops which Romana had left under Mendizabel in that province, after he himself joined Wellington at Torres Vedras, consisted only of two Spanish divisions of infantry and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry, not amounting in all to twelve thousand combatants. Too weak to oppose any resistance to Soult's considerable force, these troops, which were under the command of Mendizabel and Ballasteros, retired under the cannon of Badajoz and Olivenza. Four thousand men, imprudently thrown, without any provisions, into the latter fortress, surrendered

after twelve days, on the 22d of January; and Soult, then collecting all his troops, took up his position before Badajoz. No sooner was he informed of the danger of that important fortress than Wellington resolved to despatch Romana, with the two divisions which had so seasonably joined him at Torres Vedras, to co-operate in its relief. Just as he was preparing, however, to set out on this important expedition, this noble Spaniard, at once the bravest, the most skilful, and most disinterested of all the Peninsular generals, was seized with a disease

in the heart, of which he suddenly died at Cartaxo.† His loss was severely felt by the Spanish army; for Mendizabel, who succeeded to the command, was totally disqualified for the duty with which he was intrusted. On the 30th of January the Spanish divisions from Wellington's army joined the remainder of Mendizabel's troops, with which, in the first week of February, he took up a position under the cannon of Badajoz, with his right resting on the fort of St. Christoval, forming one of the outer walls of that city. The arrival of this

formidable re-enforcement rendered Soult's situation extremely critical; for the necessity of keeping up his communications had reduced the forces under his command to sixteen thousand men, and the Spaniards, with a force nearly equal, occupied a strong position, resting on the cannon of the fortress.*

From this critical position he was soon relieved by the astonishing negligence and fatuity of the Spanish general, of Mendizabel which brought destruction on his own army, and ultimately occasioned the fall of that important fortress, with the protection of which he was intrusted, to be regained only hereafter by torrents of English blood. Wellington had repeatedly advised Mendizabel to strengthen his position under the walls of the place with intrenchments, in order that he might possess an impregnable station from which he might co-operate in its defence; and, if he had done so, he would unquestionably have preserved it for the Spanish arms. Such, however, was his ignorant presumption, that he deemed it wholly unnecessary to follow this advice; and as his position was separated from that of the French by the Guadiana and the Gebora, both of which were flooded with rains, he contented himself with breaking down a bridge over the latter stream, and left his army in negligent security on its bank. On the 18th of February, however, Soult, observing that the waters of the rivers had declined, conceived the audacious design of crossing both, and surprising the Spaniards amid their dream of security. Late on that evening he forded the Guadiana at the French ferry, four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. That stream, however, was still to cross; but next morning, before daybreak, the passage was accomplished under cover of a thick mist; and, as the first dawn broke, the Spanish outposts near the ruined bridge were alarmed by the tirailleurs, who already were on the opposite bank. The cavalry forded five miles farther up, and speedily threatened the Spanish flank, while Mortier, with six thousand foot, assailed their front. The contest was only of a few minutes' duration: horse, foot, and cannon were speedily driven together in frightful confusion into the centre; the cavalry cut its way through the throng and escaped, but the infantry were almost all cut down or taken. Mendizabel fled with a thousand men to Elvas, two thousand got into Badajoz; but eight thousand, with the whole artillery, were taken, and not a vestige of the army of Estremadura remained in the field.

Soult immediately resumed the siege of Badajoz; but with little prospect of success, for the ramparts were of great strength: the garrison was nine thousand strong, amply supplied with provisions; and the extreme necessities of Massena's army on the Tagus rendered it more than doubtful whether he would not speedily be driven to a retreat, and Beresford be seen approaching with two English divisions to raise the siege. From this difficulty he was again relieved by his good fortune, and the treachery of the Spanish governor of the fortress. Manecho, who first had the command, was a veteran of approved courage, and, so far from being discouraged by the rout of the Gebora, he vigorously prepared for

* Well. Desp., 5th of Jan., 1811; and Mem., viii., 471, 479, 410. Nap., iii., 392, 401, 452, 455. Belm., i., 163, 165. Jom., iii., 491, 494.

† "In Romana," said Wellington, "the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from him, as well by his operation as by his counsel, since he has been joined with this army."—Well. Desp., 26th January, 1811, Gurw., vii., 190.

* Well. Mem., Gurw., viii., 476, 476. Jom., iii., 481, 483. Belm., i., 162, 163. Tor., iv., 12, 20.

† Tor., iv., 20, 22. Jom., iii., 483, 484. Nap., iii., 434, 436. Well. Desp., Gurw., vii., 278; and viii., 478.

his defence, and gave out that he would rival the glories of Gerona and Saragossa. But this gallant Spaniard was, unfortunately, killed a few days after the fire began; and Imaz, who succeeded to the command, was a man of a very different stamp. Without vigour or resolution to keep up the spirits of his troops, he was, what was rare among the Spaniards, accessible to bribes from the enemy. Under his irresolute management the enemy's works rapidly advanced; the rampart was breached, and the fire of the place considerably weakened, though the enemy's battering-guns were only six, of which one was dismounted. Still the breach was impracticable; provisions were plentiful; the garrison was yet eight thousand strong; a great disaster had befallen the French in Andalusia, and advices had been received by three different channels from Wellington, that Massena was in full retreat; that Beresford, with twelve thousand men, was rapidly approaching, and that in a few days he would be relieved. Don Juan Garcia, the second in command, was clear, in a council of war, to hold out. Camerio, the chief of the artillery, was of the same opinion; but, though Imaz voted with them in the council, he, on the same day, shamefully surrendered the place, with eight thousand men and a hundred and seventy guns.*

Soult had no sooner crowned with this marvellous success his short but brilliant campaign, in which, with a force not exceeding twenty thousand men, he had carried two fortresses, and taken or destroyed an equal number of the enemy, than he returned with all imaginable expedition to Andalusia, where his presence was loudly called for by a disaster, all but decisive, which had occurred to the blockading force before Cadiz during his absence. Sir Thomas Graham, who commanded the British and Portuguese troops in that city, was encouraged by the great diminution of force under Victor, in consequence of Soult's absence on the opposite shores of the bay, to try an expedition, with a view to raise the siege. The allies sailed on the 21st, and landed at Algeiras on the day following; an attack was fixed for the 28th

Feb. 28. February, but, owing to the prevalence of contrary winds, it did not take place for a week later. Graham had collected four thousand British infantry and two hundred horse at Tarifa; and on the 29th La Pena landed with ten thousand Spanish troops, and, taking the command of the whole allied force, moved against the enemy. In a few days his force was increased, by the guerillas who came in from every direction, to twelve thousand foot and eight hundred horse; but, meanwhile, the French had collected their troops from all quarters, and fifteen thousand men were assembled round the standards of Victor before Cadiz, besides five thousand at Medina Sidonia, and other places in his rear. The allies, however, noways daunted, advanced to raise the siege; and on the 5th reached the heights of BARROSA, about four miles from the mouth of the Santi Petri, when Victor came out of his lines to give them battle.†

General Graham was extremely anxious to

receive the attack on the heights of Battle of Bar-
Barrosa, where his little band would rosa, have had an excellent position to March 6.
repel the enemy. La Pena, however, ordered him to move through the wood of Bermeya towards the seacoast; but no sooner did he commence this movement than the Spanish general followed after him, leaving the important ridge of Barrosa, the key of the whole ground, unoccupied. The moment Victor was apprized of this, he directed his whole disposable force, about nine thousand strong, of the divisions Ruffin, Laval, and Villatte, all veterans inured to victory, with fourteen guns, to attack the heights. Some Spanish troops, whom they met on their ascent, were quickly overthrown; and Graham, while still entangled in the wood, was apprized, by the torrent of fugitives that came after him, that the heights were won, and the enemy posted on the strong ground on March 6.
his rear. An ordinary general would have thought only, in such a crisis, of retiring to the isle of Leon, and extricating himself as rapidly as possible from his perilous situation; but Graham, who had the eye, as well as the soul of a great commander, at once perceived that, to attempt this in presence of such an enemy, with the Spaniards in full retreat,* and already out of sight, would rapidly bring on disaster. He instantly took his line: ten guns, under Major Duncan, wheeled about, and commenced a destructive fire on the enemy's masses, who were now descending the hill; and the infantry, hastily formed into two columns, under Colonel Wheatley and General Dikes, faced about, and advanced to meet the foe.

The onset at both points was exceedingly fierce: the French, as usual, came on in column, preceded by a cloud of English.
gallant light troops, who concealed the direction of their attack by a rapid fire; but when Laval's division, which advanced unchecked even by the admirably-directed fire of Duncan's guns, at length reached the British line, they were met by a determined charge of the 87th and 28th regiments, broken and driven back, with the loss of two guns and an eagle. The routed division fell back on their reserve, but they, too, were thrown into disorder, and the battle won on that side. Meanwhile, Dikes's division was not less successful against Ruffin's division, which was still on the brow of the hill. The guards, supported by two British regiments, there boldly mounted the steep: Ruffin's men, confident of victory, descended half way to meet them, and with loud shouts the rival nations met in mortal conflict. The struggle was very violent, and for some time doubtful; but at length the French were forced back to the top, and ultimately driven down the other side with extraordinary slaughter, Ruffin and Chaudon Rousseau, both generals of division, being severely wounded and taken. The two discomfited wings retired by converging lines to the rear, and soon met. They tried to retrieve the day, but in vain: Duncan's guns, with a close and rapid fire, played on their ranks; Ponsonby, with his two hundred German horse, charged their retiring cavalry, overthrew them, and took two more guns; and if La Pena had sent merely his eight hundred Spanish cavalry, and powerful horse artillery, to the fight, Victor must have sus-

* Tor., iv., 23, 25. Nap., iii., 450, 451. Well. Desp., viii., 480, 482; and Desp. 20th March, 1811. Gurw., vii., 371.

† Graham's Desp., 6th March, 1811. Gur., vii., 382. Nap., iii., 440. Tor., iv., 26, 33.

* Sir T. Graham's Desp., 6th March, 1811. Gur., vii., 391. Nap. iii., 42. Belm., i., 172, 173.

tained a total defeat, and raised the siege of Cadiz. But not a man did that base general send to the aid of his heroic allies, though two of his battalions, without orders, returned to aid them when they heard the firing, and appeared on the field at the close of the day. The French thus withdrew without farther disaster; and Graham, thoroughly disgusted with the conduct of the Spanish general, some days after re-entered the isle of Leon, bringing with him in triumph six French guns, one eagle, and three hundred prisoners, after having killed and wounded two thousand of the enemy, with a loss to himself of only twelve hundred men. La Pena speedily followed his example: the bridge of Santa Petri was again broken down. Victor cautiously resumed his position round the bay, where he was soon after joined by Soult, returning from his victorious expedition into Estremadura; and the battle of Barrosa remained without result, save that imperishable one which arises from the confidence which it communicated to the British arms, and the glory which it gave to the British name.*

Immediate, however, as well as ultimate results, attended the retreat of Massena Various actions during his position at Santarem. Having the retreat. ing exhausted the last means of subsistence which the country he occupied would afford, and finding his marauders at length returning on all sides empty-handed from their excursions, this veteran commander commenced his retreat. He chose for its line the valley of the Mondego and the road of Almeida; but, as this required a passage, in presence of the enemy, of the range of mountains which separates that valley from that of the Zezere, where the French army lay, of an army encumbered with an immense train of artillery and ten thousand sick, the operation was one which must necessarily be conducted with great caution. The great military talents of the hero of Aspern here shone forth with the brightest lustre. Forming his army into a solid mass, under the uniform protection of a powerful rear-guard, commanded by Ney, he retired slowly and deliberately, without either confusion or forced marches, and constantly availing himself of the numerous strong positions which the country afforded to take his stand in such a manner that he required to be dislodged by a flank movement of the pursuing force, which necessarily required time, and gave opportunity for the main body and carriages to defile quietly in the rear. Two days were necessarily occupied at first by Wellington in watching the enemy, as his line of retreat was not yet March 8. declared, and he had assembled Ney's corps near Leyria, as if menacing the lines of Torres Vedras. But no sooner did it clearly appear that he had taken the line of the Mondego, and was retiring in good earnest, than the whole allied force to the north of the Tagus was put in motion after him. The bulk of his forces was directed by Wellington on Leyria, whither also the re-enforcements, six thousand strong, were moved, which had recently arrived from England, in order to stop the enemy from moving on Oporto and the northern provinces of the kingdom. To gain time, the French general offered battle at Pombal, which obli- March 9. ged Wellington to concentrate his troops, and bring up the two divisions which had been

sent across the Tagus to relieve Badajoz; but, no sooner were seven divisions united than he retired, and a slight skirmish alone March 10. took place between the two armies. On the 12th, Ney, with the rear-guard, stood firm at Redinha, at the mouth of a long March 12. defile, through which the main body of the army was retiring; and the splendid spectacle was exhibited of thirty thousand men marching in an open plain against this position. At their approach, however, they retired without any considerable loss.*

Coimbra at this period appears to be the point towards which the French were tend- Continuation ing; but the fortunate occupation of of the retreat that town, at this juncture, by Trant's to the frontier. militia, and the report which, though erroneous, was believed, that the re-enforcements for the British army had been forwarded by sea to the mouth of the Mondego, and had arrived there, induced Massena to change the line of his retreat, and he fell back towards Almeida by the miserable road of Miranda del Corvo. Frightful ravages everywhere marked his steps: not only were the villages invariably burned, and the peasants murdered who remained in them, but the town of Leyria and Convent of Alcobaca were given to the flames by express orders from the French headquarters. But these barbarities soon produced their usual effect of augmenting the distresses of the retreating army: the narrow road was soon blocked up by carriages and baggage-wagons; confusion began to prevail; distress and suffering were universal; and nothing but the absence of two di- March 14. visions of his army, which Wellington was obliged again to detach across the Tagus to stop the progress of Soult, and secure Elvas, after the fall of Badajoz, saved the enemy from vigorous attack and total ruin. But as the retreating mass was, after that large deduction, considerably stronger than the pursuing, Wellington did not press the enemy as he might have done had he possessed an equal force, and Massena arrived at Colorico grievously distressed and almost destitute, but without any March 21. serious fighting, and the loss only of a thousand stragglers. The French general was there joined by Claparede's division, nine thousand strong, of the reserve corps collected by Napoleon in Biscay; and he resolved to remain there, and still maintain the war in Portugal. Ney, however, positively refused to obey this order, alleging the necessity of retiring to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo to give repose to the army; and to such a length did the discord between these two chiefs arise, that Massena deprived him of his command, and bestowed it on Loison. The indecision of the French marshal what course to adopt, however, was soon terminated by March 29. the approach of Wellington, who came up and drove him from the new line of operations he was endeavouring to adopt on Coria and Alcantara: the noble defensive position of Guarda was abandoned in confusion; and the French army again forced back on the line of the Coa, with the loss of two thousand prisoners. Regnier's position at Sabugal, when the allied troops approached him, suggested April 3. to the English general the project of cutting him off from the remainder of the army, and compelling him to surrender. This well-designed en-

* Sir T. Graham's Desp., 6th March, 1811. Gur., vii., 282. Nap., iii., 442, 445. Vict. & Cong., xx., 226, 231. Belm., i., 173, 174.

* Nap., iii., 455, 465. Belm., i., 165, 166. Well. Desp., Gur., viii., 481.

terprise failed in obtaining complete success, from the attack being prematurely made by the British advanced guard before the flanking columns had come up, and the movement of the troops being somewhat perplexed by a violent storm of rain which came on, accompanied with thick fog. As it was, however, the French, after a protracted conflict, and alternate success and defeat, were compelled to retire with the loss of one howitzer and a thousand men, including three hundred prisoners, and all Soult's and Loison's baggage. On the same day Trant destroyed three hundred of the enemy on the banks of the Agueda. These checks convinced Massena of the justice of Ney's opinion, that the army must seek for rest behind the cannon of Ciudad Rodrigo; and he therefore threw a

April 5. garrison into Almeida, and retreated with the bulk of his forces across the frontier to that fortress, and thence to Salamanca. He entered Portugal with seventy thousand men; ten thousand joined him under Drouet at Santarem, and nine thousand on the retreat to the Agueda; and he brought only forty-five thousand of all arms out of the country. He lost, therefore, the enormous number of forty-five thousand men, during the invasion and retreat, by want, sickness, and the sword of the enemy, while the British were not weakened to the extent of a fourth part of the number.*†

Almeida was immediately invested by Wellington; and as the French had retired to such a distance, and gone into cantonments on the Tormes, he deemed it safe to send a considerable part of his army, about twenty-two thousand strong, to the south of the Tagus, to co-operate with the troops which Beresford had collected for the siege of Campo Mayor and Badajoz, and repaired there himself to conduct the operations. Napoleon, however, was resolved not to permit the English general to gain possession of the frontier fortresses without a struggle, and he transmitted peremptory orders to Massena instantly to break up from the Tormes with his own three corps, and a considerable part of Bessières's reserve, which was ordered to join him from Biscay, and attempt the relief of

April 29. Almeida, which had only provisions for fourteen days. He accordingly again put his army in motion, and advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo in the end of April, and on the 2d of May crossed the Agueda at the bridge of that place, with fifty thousand men, including five thousand noble horse. Wellington hastened from Elvas, where headquarters had been established, and drew up his covering army, about thirty thousand strong, including sixteen hundred cavalry, on the summit of a vast plateau, between the Turones and the Dos Casas: the left at Fort Concepcion, the centre opposite Alameda, the right at FUENTES D'ONORO. The whole line was five miles in length, and the front was difficult of access, by reason of the Dos Casas flowing in a deep ravine across nearly its whole extent.‡

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 197, 202. Well. Desp., 4th and 9th April, 1811. Gurw., vii., 415, 435. Nap., ii., 473, 488. Jom., iii., 493, 494.

† "The army of Portugal, grievously weakened by the losses of its long and disastrous retreat, could hardly, on re-entering Spain, muster thirty-five thousand combatants. The cavalry had only two thousand men in a condition to march; the artillery could only muster up twelve pieces." — BELMAS, *Jour des Sièges dans le Péninsule*, i., 176.

‡ Well. Desp., 8th May, 1811. Gurw., vii., 514; and viii., 486. Nap., iii., 505, 509. Belm., i., 176. Jom., iii., 495.

No sooner had the enemy formed on the ground on the afternoon of the 3d, than they commenced a vigorous attack on the village of Fuentes d'Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions. So vehement was their onset, so heavy their cannonade, that the British were forced to abandon the streets, and with difficulty maintained themselves on a craggy eminence at one end, around an old chapel. Wellington, upon this, re-enforced the post with the 24th, 71st, and 79th regiments, which charged so vigorously down the streets that the enemy were driven out with great loss, and these battalions occupied the village throughout the night, the French retaining only a small part of its lower extremity. On the following day, Massena collected his whole army close to the British position, and made his final dispositions for the attack. The Coa, which ran along the rear of nearly their whole line, was in general bordered by craggy precipices, so that, if the allied army could be thrown into confusion, their retreat appeared almost impracticable. The convoy of provisions, destined for the relief of Almeida, was at Gallegos, seven miles in the rear, ready to move on as soon as the road was opened. For this purpose the grand attack was to be made from the British right, where an entrance to the plateau, on level ground, could be found; for the whole front of their position was covered by the rugged ravine of the Dos Casas, which separated the two armies in front, and was in most places wholly unpassable for cavalry, and in some even for infantry. With this view, three divisions of infantry, twenty-four thousand strong, and nearly all the cavalry, were, late on the evening of the 4th, drawn to the extreme French left, and posted, so as to attack at day-break the British right flank, on the neck of land, about three miles broad, where the plateau on which their army rested joined the level heights between the sources of the Turones and the Dos Casas.*

Early next morning the attack was commenced with great vehemence on the British right, under General Houston, near Poco Velho, and the enemy speedily drove them out of that village. Don Julian Sanchez, who commanded a body of three thousand guerillas on the extreme British right, immediately retired across the Turones; and Montbrun, finding the plain now open, fell with above four thousand admirable cuirassiers on the British and Portuguese horse, not twelve hundred strong. They were gallantly met and partially checked by the allied cavalry under General Charles Stewart, who took the colonel of one of the regiments, La Motte, prisoner, in the mêlée, with his own hand; but the combat was too unequal, and, after a gallant effort, our horse were driven behind the cover of the light division and Houston's troops. Montbrun instantly swept with his terrible cuirassiers around the now exposed infantry; Houston's men rapidly formed square and repelled the attack; but so swift was the French onset, that, ere a similar formation could be effected by the seventh division, the shock of steel was upon them; and though the Chasseurs Britanniques and some of the Brunswick infantry, with admirable steadiness, taking advantage of a ruined wall, repelled the charge in line, yet some were cut down, and Captain

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 205, 207. Belm., i., 177, 178. Well. Desp., 8th May, 1811. Gurw., vii., 515, 517. Nap., iii., 512, 513.

Battle of Fuentes d'Onoro.

Ramsay's troop of horse-artillery was entirely surrounded. All gave them over for lost; but, after they had for a while been concealed from the view by the glancing throng of cuirassiers, an English shout was heard, and that noble officer was seen bursting through the throng, his horses bounding with their guns over the plain, and the mounted gunners in close order protecting the rear.* But still the progress of the enemy in this quarter was very evident: the British right was turned and broken through, and it was apparent that, unless the ground lost could be regained, or a new defensive position defying attack taken up, the battle would be lost.†

Wellington's position was now in the highest degree critical: in his rear were the nature of ravines of the Turones and the Coa, extremely rugged and difficult of passage, while his right, the key of his position, commanding the entrance of the plateau, from the small body of cavalry at his disposal, was unable to make head against the enemy. In these circumstances he took a hazardous resolution, but which the admirable steadiness of his troops enabled him to execute with perfect success. He drew back the whole centre and right wing of his army, the left remaining firm at Fuentes d'Onoro, as the pivot on which the backward wheel was formed, in order to take up a new position facing to the original right of the line, and nearly at right angles to it, on a ridge of heights which ran across the plateau, and stretched from the ravine of Dos Casas to that of the Turones. Such a retreat, however, in the course of which the outer extremity of the line had to retire four miles over a level plateau, enveloped by a formidable and victorious cavalry, was most hazardous: the plain over which the troops were retiring was soon covered with carriages and fugitives from the camp-followers; and if any of the divisions had given way, the enemy would have burst in upon them with such force as would have sent the disorderly multitude headlong against some of its own squares, and thrown the whole into irreparable confusion. Meanwhile, a fierce contest was going on in Fuentes d'Onoro, where the three victorious regiments who had held it two days before, after a gallant resistance, were pierced through, Colonel Cameron, of the 71st, mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town taken.‡

But in that dread hour, perhaps the most perilous of the whole war for England, she was saved by the skill of her chief and the incomparable valour of her soldiers. Slowly, and in perfect order, the squares of the 1st, 7th, and light divisions retired for many miles, flanked on either side by the terrible cuirassiers of Montbrun, flushed with the newly-won glories of Wagram, pressed in rear by the columns and batteries of Ney's corps, which had broken the Russian army at Friedland.¶ In vain their thundering squadrons swept around these serried bands, and the light of the British bayonets was, for a time, lost in the blaze of the French cuirasses; from every throng the unbroken squares still emerged, pursuing their steady way amid a terrific fire; the seventh division

successfully accomplished its long semicircular sweep, crossed the Turones, and took up its ground between that stream and the Coa; the centre of the army soon gained the ridge of heights for which it was destined; while the left, with invincible firmness, still made good the crags and Chapel of Fuentes d'Onoro. When the whole had taken up their ground, Massena recoiled from the prospect of attacking such an enemy as he had now combated, posted in dense masses on a ridge not two miles in length, and covered on either flank by a steep ravine; and, confining himself to a cannonade along its front, redoubled his efforts on the left, where he sent the whole division of Drouet against the village of Fuentes d'Onoro. But though the fighting was most desperate all day in that quarter, though the enemy at one period had got possession of nearly the whole, and his skirmishers penetrated through on the other side towards the main position, the British always retained part of the houses; and at length, when the concentration of his forces enabled Wellington to re-enforce his left by fresh troops, they were driven through the streets with great slaughter by a charge of the 71st, 79th, and 88th regiments; on which occasion, perhaps alone in the war, the bayonets crossed, and the Imperial Guards, some of whom were lifted from the ground in the shock and borne backward a few paces in the air, were forced to give ground before the Highland regiments. Night put an end to the slaughter in this quarter; the British retained their position around the chapel and on the crags, and the French retired across the Dos Casas. Fifteen hundred men had fallen, or were made prisoners, on both sides; and yet neither could claim decided advantage.*

Though the British lost ground on all points but the extreme left during this battle, and were certainly nearer experiencing a defeat than in any other action in Spain, yet the result proved that they had gained their object. Massena lingered three days in front of the allied position, which Wellington strengthened with field-works, and rendered altogether unassailable. At length, despairing of either forcing or turning the British lines, he retreated across the Agueda, leaving Almeida to its fate: having first sent orders to the governor, General Brennier, by an intrepid soldier, named Tillet, to blow up the works, and endeavour to effect his retreat through the blockading force. These directions were obeyed with surprising skill and success. At midnight on the 10th, this brave man blew up the bastions, and sal- May 10. lying forth, marched swiftly and bravely forward to the Barba del Puerco, which he had ascertained was the most unguarded point of the allied line. The fourth regiment, which was ordered to occupy that point, did not receive its orders in time, and when it did, unfortunately missed its road in the dark, and the consequence was, that Brennier, with eleven hundred of his gallant followers, got clear off, and joined Massena near Ciudad Rodrigo;† but four hundred were killed or made prisoners in crossing the deep chasm of the Barba del Puerco. Wellington, on May 12. the day following, took possession of Al-

Massena's evacuation of Almeida, and his retreat. May 9.

Massena's ultimate failure.

* Nap., iii., 513.

† Well. Desp., 8th May, 1811. Gurw., vii., 516, 517. Vict. et Conq., xx., 208, 209. Nap., iii., 512, 513. Lond., ii., 104, 106. Belm., i., 178, 179. Jom., iii., 497.

‡ Well. Desp., Gurw., vii., 517, 518. Nap., iii., 515. Vict. et Conq., xx., 208, 210. Belm., i., 178.

§ Ante, iii., 251.

¶ Ante, ii., 536.

* Well. Desp., 8th May, 1811. Gurw., vii., 517, 518. Nap., iii., 515, 516. Jom., iii., 496, 497. Vict. et Conq., xx., 208, 211.

† Well. Desp., Gurw., vii., 548. Nap., iii., 519, 522. Vict. et Conq., xx., 212, 213. Jom., iii., 499.

meida, in which the artillery was entire, but several large chasms existed in the walls. Massena withdrew to Salamanca and the banks of the Tormes, and the last act in the eventful drama of the invasion of Portugal was terminated.

The retreat of the French from Portugal, a model of military skill and ability on the part both of the soldiers and commanders, was disgraced by a systematic and deliberate cruelty which can never be sufficiently condemned. We have the authority of Wellington for the assertion, that "their conduct was, throughout the retreat, marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, never surpassed. Even the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which the headquarters had been for several months, and in which the inhabitants had been invited, by promises of safety, to remain, were plundered, and in part destroyed; on the night the retreat began; and they have since burned every town and village through which they passed.* A single incident will illustrate the horrors of such a system of warfare better than any general description, and it comes from a gallant eyewitness, whose graphic powers are never called forth by mawkish sensibility, or indignant feelings excited by undue hostility towards his adversaries: "A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk, and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of whom only one was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food which we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first; all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The men seemed most eager for life; the women appeared patient and resigned, and even in this distress had arranged the bodies of those who first died with decency and care."† Such is ambition in its most terrible form; such the result of the atrocious system which, under the specious pretence of making war support war, consigns the innocent inhabitants of invaded countries, old men, women, and children, to ineffable misery, starvation, and death. Doubtless such horrors have in every age attended serious and long-continued hostility, and they are sometimes unavoidable, where great bodies of men, inflamed by violent passions, are brought into collision; but it is the peculiar and characteristic disgrace of the French Revolutionary armies, that they were not merely permitted, but enjoined by the commanders; and that those atrocities, which in other armies spring from the license or brutality of the soldiers, and the officers labour assiduously to prevent, were with them systematically acted upon by all ranks, and flowed from the system which, impressed upon the generals by the rapacity of government, was by them reduced to a regular form, and enjoined in general orders emanating from headquarters.‡

But these unheard-of atrocities, thus communicated to vast armies by a regular system of plunder, and exercised on a great scale in every part of Europe, were at length producing their natural effects. Unspeakeable was the indignation excited in the Portuguese peasantry by such revolting cruelties; and, although the inefficiency and desire for popularity in the regency at Lisbon for long paralyzed the efforts of the country, and rendered in some degree unavailing the ardent spirit of the people, yet the most perfect unanimity prevailed among the rural inhabitants, and the British were supported in their enterprise by the peasantry with a cordiality and fidelity which were alike honourable to both nations. Wellington has told us that in no single instance were the humbler ranks in Portugal discovered in any correspondence with the enemy; that the prisoners, though in some instances obliged to join the French ranks, all deserted, on the first opportunity, to the standard of their country; that the Portuguese peasants, though of such different habits, agreed admirably with the English soldiers; and that, though great numbers of crimes were committed, especially at first, by the disorderly Irish, who formed so large a part of many newly-sent-out regiments, yet it was next to impossible to get the natives who had suffered to come forward and give evidence against them.* These are truly noble traits in national character, and, combined with the heroic stand which, under British guidance, they made against their tremendous enemy, despite all the weakness and imbecility of their rulers, prove that materials for greatness exist in the Peninsula, if the time shall ever arrive when the spirit and energy of the higher ranks, then altogether wanting, shall equal the courage and virtue of the people.

Nor were these noble qualities in the Portuguese peasantry even then without their reward. Their bravery and their suffering excited the warmest sympathy in Great Britain: the enthusiasm of all classes, ever readily awakened in the cause of wo, was roused to the highest pitch; a grant of a hundred thousand pounds by Parliament to the sufferers by the French invasion was passed, without a single dissentient voice, in the House of Commons; private subscription in every town and village of the Empire soon trebled its amount, and the noblest qualities in our nature, patriotism and charity, excited by the heart-stirring course of events to the very highest pitch, poured forth from two perennial fountains a stream of mingled energy and benevolence, which was, because it deserved to be, invincible.†

Immense was the effect produced by the glorious termination of the war in Portugal on the British nation and the whole of Europe. The French armies had at length been brought to a stand; and that apparently irresistible torrent of conquest, which had hitherto flowed over the whole of Europe, was now, to all appearance, permanently arrested. Experience had proved that, by combining military discipline and regular forces with vast exertions and patriotic enthusiasm, a barrier could be opposed to revolutionary aggression: the failure of Austria, in her late heroic attempt,

Grant of Parliament, and subscription for the Portuguese in England.

Feb. 24.

Vast effect produced by this campaign in Great Britain and over Europe.

* Well. Desp., 14th March, 1811. Gur., vii., 348.

† Nap., iii., 457.

‡ Well. Desp., vii., 188, 196.

§ "The Convent of Alcobaca was burned by orders from the French headquarters. The bishop's palace, and the whole town of Leyria, where General Drouet had his headquarters, shared the same fate; and there is not an inhabitant of the country, of any class or description, who has had any communication or dealing with the French army, who has not had reason to repent of it."—WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, 14th March, 1811; GURWOOD, vii., 348.

* Well. Desp., Gur., vi., 105, 520, and viii., 165.

† Ann. Reg., 1811, 37. Parl. Deb., xix., 447, 462.

was forgotten in the still more recent triumph of England: Russia, contemplating a similar attack upon her own independence, watched with intense anxiety the interesting struggle, and beheld, in the defensive system and triumph of Wellington, both the model on which her defensive preparations should be formed, and the best grounds to hope for a successful issue from her own exertions. But the effect produced in England was still greater, and, if possible, more important. In proportion to the breathless suspense in which the nation had been kept by the advance of Massena, and the confident predictions of immediate success with which it had been preceded, from many in the British islands, and all on the Continent, was the universal joy which prevailed when the prospect of unlooked-for success began at last to dawn upon the nation. The battle of Busaco first flashed through the gloom of general despondence occasioned by the retreat of Wellington into the interior of Portugal; but its cheering light soon faded, and the public mind was more violently agitated than ever when, after such a triumph, the retreat was still continued to the close vicinity of Lisbon. But when Wellington at last took his stand, and, through the thick clouds with which the horizon was beset, the lines of Torres Vedras were seen dimly rising in stupendous and impregnable strength, the general enthusiasm knew no bounds. The advantages of the British position, hitherto altogether unknown, save to its chief, were now at once revealed: it was seen that England possessed an unconquerable stronghold, in which she might securely place her resources, where her armies, how numerous soever, would be amply provided for by her fleets; while the forces of Napoleon, how great soever, would either fall at the foot of the intrenchments, or perish of famine in the desert which they had created around them. The profound observation of Henry IV., "If you make war in Spain with a small army, you are beaten, with a large one, you are starved," arose in vivid importance to their recollection; and the nation ceased to despair in a contest in which the very magnitude of the enemy's force had, at length, been turned with decisive effect against him.*

There can be no doubt that the simultaneous invasion of Andalusia and Portugal, in a military point of view, was a capital error on the part of Napoleon. It was a direct deviation from his own principle, of bringing all the disposable forces to bear upon the decisive point. The line of the Tagus was the quarter where the decisive blow was to be struck. If Soult, with sixty thousand men, had invaded the Alentejo at the same time that Massena, with eighty thousand, poured down the valley of the Mondego, it is extremely doubtful whether even the strength of Torres Vedras would have enabled Wellington to maintain his ground at Lisbon. No one knew better than the French emperor that the passage of the Sierra Morena was an eccentric movement, which strengthened the enemy's chances of success at the vital point, but he was driven to adopt it by the political necessities of his situation. France could not, with safety, be more heavily taxed: the central provinces of Spain were utterly exhausted; fresh resources were indispensable, and the simultaneous invasion of Andalusia and Portugal was re-

sorted to in the prospect of obtaining their hitherto untouched fields of plunder. Crime and oppression may for long prove victorious, but they bear in themselves the seeds of their ultimate punishment, and they are constrained to bring those seeds to maturity by the efforts which they make for their own advancement.*

Government at home were far from being equally impressed with Wellington. Views of governing the progress of the campaign on the campaign, with the chances of ultimate success: they were not aware of the vast strength of the Torres Vedras position; and although they sent out all the succours which he demanded, yet they did so rather in deference to his wishes, and from respect to his opinion of the hope of success, than from any belief of their own that his anticipations were well founded. When he drew near to Lisbon their anxiety was very great; and it was well known that, for a considerable time, they expected that every arrival from that capital would bring the account of his embarkation. Yet, even in that contemplated extremity, they did not despair of the contest: they provided a vast fleet of ships of the line and transports capable of bringing off the British and Portuguese army, with a great number of the inhabitants who were implicated in the war; and gave orders to their general that, if he was driven from Lisbon, he should take refuge in Cadiz, and renew the war in Andalusia, from the basis of that city and Gibraltar.† This resolution was worthy of the highest admiration; it rivals the noblest instances of Roman constancy, and should make us overlook many previous instances of insensibility to the right mode of carrying on the contest which had arisen from their long inexperience of military combination. And although we, judging with all the advantages of subsequent experience, may occasionally feel surprised at the gloomy feelings which at times pervaded both government and the nation, when the dawn of European deliverance was beginning to appear behind the hills of Torres Vedras, yet it cannot be denied that, judging from past events, both had too much grounds for their prognostications; and, recollecting in what disaster all previous expeditions to the Continent had terminated, when engaged only with a part of Napoleon's force, there was little room for hope now that they were assailed by the whole. But from the generality and apparently solid ground for this opinion is to be drawn the brightest eulogium on the unshaken determination of the chief, which never faltered in the contest, and the clearest proof of the loftiness of the intellect which could discern through the gloom the shadow of coming events, and find in its own strength the means of their accomplishment.

Those, whether in public or private life, who take expedience for the principle of Magnanimous their conduct, are often sadly perplexed what course to adopt, by which Wellington was guided. cause, in the complicated maze of human events, they cannot see clearly to what end its conclusions point. Those who take duty for their guide are never at a loss, because its dictates are clear, and wholly independent of the changes of fortune. Ordinary observers too often judge of the future by the past, and act on the principle that subsequent events are to be exactly similar to those which have

* Well. Desp., vii., 286.

† Well. Desp., 2d Aug., 1810, Gurw., vii., 300.

* Well. Desp., viii., 76, 77.

preceded them. It belongs to the highest class of intellect to combine with the experience of the past the observation of the present; to perceive that human events are indeed governed, in all ages, by the same principles, but that new elements of power are perpetually rising into action; and that, in every state of human affairs, an under-current is flowing in an opposite direction from that on the surface, bringing salvation to the miserable, and often destined to confound the anticipations of the prosperous. Wellington possessed both the moral principle and the intellectual power requisite for the leader of such a contest as that in which he was now engaged. Alike fearless of danger and unmoved by obloquy, he looked merely to the discharge of duty: undismayed by the fall of Austria and Russia, he still did not despair of the cause of European freedom; and, with comparatively inconsiderable resources, prepared in a corner of Portugal the means of hurling back an enemy who had two hundred and fifty thousand disposable soldiers in the Peninsula at his command. He saw that force originally had drawn forth the powers of the French Revolution; that force had sustained its growth; but that force was now un-

dermining its foundations; and that the power which was based on the misery of every people among whom it penetrated, could not fail of being at length overcome, if combated by an energy equal to its own, accompanied by a forbearance commensurate to its rapacity. Strenuously urging, therefore, all whom he could direct to the most vigorous exertions, he as scrupulously abstained from the abuses of power: his efforts to repel the enemy were not greater than those he made to control the license and restrain the disorders of his own army; he preferred a small force, regulated by order and maintained by justice, to a great one elevated on the fruits of rapine. He thus succeeded in at last combating the Revolution with its own weapons, and, at the same time, detaching from them the moral weakness under which it laboured. He met it with its own forces, but he rested their efforts on a nobler principle. France had conquered Europe by assailing virtue with the powers of intellect, guided by the fire of genius, and stimulated by passions of wickedness; but Wellington conquered France by raising against it the resources of wisdom, sustained by the constancy of duty, and directed by the principles of virtue.

CHAPTER LX.

DOMESTIC HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1809 TO 1812.

ARGUMENT.

Vast Importance and Interest of the Reign of George the Third.—Great Characters which were grouped around his Throne.—Its Character, in illustrious and literary Men.—Brilliant Character of the Period.—Its Moral Features.—Influence of the French Revolution on general Thought in France.—Literature of Germany during the same Period.—Her Poets.—Her prose Writers.—Public Duties to which George the Third was called.—Consequences which would have ensued if his Character had been different.—Character of this Monarch.—His great moral Courage and his Failings.—Mental Alienation of the King in the End of 1810.—Proceedings in Parliament on that Event.—Argument for proceeding by Address on the Part of the Opposition.—Answer by the Ministers.—Remarkable Sides taken on this Occasion by the Whigs and Tories.—Reflections on the Merits of this Question.—The Prince Regent continues the Ministers in Power.—Discontent which this gives to the Whig Party.—Negotiation with Lords Grey and Grenville in January, 1812.—Whig Ministry proves abortive.—Assassination of Mr. Perceval.—Trial and Execution of the Assassin.—Renewal of the Negotiation with the Whigs.—Difficulty respecting the Officers of the Household excludes them from Office.—Reflections on this Subject.—Vital Interests at stake to Europe in this Negotiation.—Results which would have followed if the Whigs had then attained the Helm.—Character of George the Fourth.—His private Disposition and Talents.—His Frailties and Faults.—Character of Lord Liverpool.—His Merits, and Weaknesses and Errors.—Restoration of the Duke of York to the Command of the Army.—Character of Sir Francis Burdett.—His Libel on the House of Commons.—His Commitment to the Tower, and consequent Riots.—Reflections on this Subject.—General Distress of the Manufacturing Districts in 1811, and Causes to which it was owing.—Commercial Relief afforded by Parliament.—Origin and Progress of the Burdett Disturbances.—They come to a Head, and are suppressed.—Character of Sir Samuel Romilly.—Condition of the English Criminal Law at this Period.—Results which had arisen from its Neglect.—Principles for which Sir Samuel Romilly and Sir James Mackintosh contended.—Review of the Measures of Mr. Pitt connected with the Currency.—Monetary Changes during 1809 and 1810.—Impression they produced on the Legislature.—Argument in favour of the Bullion Report by Mr. Horner and Mr. Huskisson.—Argument against it by the Ministerial Party.—Decision of the House of Commons on the Subject, and Reflections on that Determination.—Ultimate and highly dangerous Effects which would have followed the Resumption of Cash Payments at that Time.—Errors of Mr. Huskisson and his Party.—Long

Continuance of Public Delusion on the Subject.—Birth, and early History of Mr. Huskisson.—His Character and great Abilities.—His erroneous Political Principles, and their destructive Effects.—Debates on the Repeal of the Orders in Council.—State of the Question, so far as Neutral Powers were concerned.—Argument against the Orders in Council by Mr. Brougham.—Argument on the other Side by the Ministers.—Result of these Proceedings in Parliament.—Reflections on this Subject.—Early Life of Lord Brougham.—His Character as a Statesman.—His Failings and Errors.—His Character as an Orator.—Argument of the Opposition against the Spanish War.—Answer by Lord Wellesley and Lord Liverpool.—Reflections on this Debate, and on the Conduct of the Opposition on this Subject.—Their long-continued Insensibility to the Glory of England.—Budget, and Naval and Military Forces of 1811.—Budget, and Naval and Military Forces for 1812.—Second Decennial Census of the People.—Negotiation for an Exchange of Prisoners with France.—Immense Accumulation of French Prisoners in Great Britain.—Failure of the Negotiation.—Was owing to Napoleon.—Description and vast Importance of Java.—Expedition against the Island, and its Reduction.—Storming of the Outworks of Fort Cornelius.—Storming of the Lines of Fort Cornelius itself.—Surrender of all Java.—Reflections on the total Destruction of the French Colonial Empire.—Superiority of Colonial to European Conquest.—Importance of the preceding domestic Detail of British Transactions.

THE reign of George III. embraces, beyond all question, the most eventful and important period in the annals of mankind. Whether we regard the changes in society, and in the aspect of the world, which occurred during its continuance, or the illustrious men who arose in Great Britain and the adjoining states during its progress, it must ever form an era of unexampled interest. Its commencement was coeval with the glories of the Seven Years' War, and the formation, on a solid basis, of the vast colonial empire of Great Britain; its meridian witnessed the momentous conflict for American independence, and the growth, amid transatlantic wilds, of European civilization; its latter days were involved in the heart-stirring conflicts of the French Revolution, and overshadowed by the

military renown of Napoleon. The transition from the opening of this reign to its termination is not merely that from one century to the next, but from one age of the world to another. New elements of fearful activity were brought into operation in the moral world during its continuance, and new principles for the government of mankind established, never again to be shaken. The civilization of a New World, in this age, was contemporary with the establishment of new principles for the government of the Old: in its eventful days were combined the growth of Grecian Democracy with the passions of Roman ambition; the fervour of plebeian zeal with the pride of aristocratic power; the blood of Marius with the genius of Cæsar; the opening of a nobler hemisphere to the enterprise of Columbus, with the rise of a social agent as mighty as the press, in the powers of Steam.

But if new elements were called into action in the social world, of surpassing strength and energy, in the course of this memorable reign, still more remarkable were the characters which rose to eminence during its continuance. The military genius,

unconquerable courage, and enduring constancy of Frederic; the ardent mind, burning eloquence, and lofty patriotism of Chatham; the incorruptible integrity, sagacious intellect, and philosophic spirit of Franklin; the disinterested virtue, prophetic wisdom, and imperturbable fortitude of Washington; the masculine understanding, feminine passions, and bloodstained ambition of Catharine, would alone have been sufficient to cast a radiance over any other age of the world. But, bright as were the stars of its morning light, more brilliant still was the constellation which shone forth in its meridian splendour, or cast a glow over the twilight of its evening shades. Then were to be seen the rival genius of Pitt and Fox, which, emblematic of the antagonist powers which then convulsed mankind, shook the British Senate by their vehemence, and roused the spirit destined, ere long, for the dearest interests of humanity, to array the world in arms: then the great soul of Burke cast off the unworthy fetters of ambition or party, and, fraught with a giant's force and a prophet's wisdom, regained its destiny in the cause of mankind; then the arm of Nelson cast its thunderbolts on every shore, and preserved unscathed in the deep the ark of European freedom; and, ere his reign expired, the wisdom of Wellington had erected an impassable barrier to Gallic ambition, and said, even to the deluge of imperial power, "Hitherto shalt thou come and no farther, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed." Nor were splendid genius, heroic virtue, gigantic wickedness, wanting on the opposite side of this heart-stirring conflict. Mirabeau had thrown over the morning of the French Revolution the brilliant but deceitful light of Democratic genius; Danton had coloured its noontide glow with the passions and the energy of tribunitian power; Carnot had exhibited the combination, rare in a corrupted age, of Republican energy with private virtue; Robespierre had darkened its evening days by the blood and agony of selfish ambition; Napoleon had risen like a meteor over its midnight darkness, dazzled the world by the brightness of his genius and the lustre of his deeds, and lured its votaries, by the deceitful blaze of glory, to perdition.

In calmer pursuits, in the tranquil walks of

science and literature, the same age ^{Its character} was, beyond all others, fruitful in illustrious ^{in illustrious} men. Dr. Johnson, the literary men-
strongest intellect and the most profound observer of the eighteenth century; Gibbon, the architect of a bridge over the dark gulf which separates ancient from modern times, whose vivid genius has tinged with brilliant colours the greatest historical work in existence; Hume, whose simple but profound history will be coeval with the long and eventful thread of English story; Robertson, who first threw over the maze of human events the light of philosophic genius; and the spirit of enlightened reflection; Gray, whose burning thoughts had been condensed in words of more than classic beauty; Burns, whose lofty soul spread its own pathos and dignity over the "short and simple annals of the poor;" Smith, who called into existence a new science, fraught with the dearest interests of humanity, and nearly brought it to perfection in a single lifetime; Reid, who carried into the recesses of the human mind the torch of cool and sagacious inquiry; Stewart, who cast a luminous glance over the philosophy of mind, and warmed the inmost recesses of metaphysical inquiry by the delicacy of taste and the glow of eloquence; Watt, who added an unknown power to the resources of art, and in the regulated force of steam discovered the means of approximating the most distant parts of the earth, and spreading in the wilderness of nature the wonders of European enterprise and the blessings of Christian civilization—these formed some of the ornaments of the period, during its earlier and more pacific times, forever memorable in the annals of scientific acquisition and literary greatness.

But when the stormy day of revolution commenced, and the passions were excited by political convulsion, the human mind took a different direction; and these names, great as they are, were rivalled by others of a wider range and a bolder character. Scott then entranced the world by the creations of fancy, and, diving deep into the human heart, clothed alike the manners of chivalry and the simplicity of the cottage with the colours of poetry, the glow of patriotism, and the dignity of virtue; Byron burst the barriers of wealth and fashion, and, reviving in an artificial age the fire of passion, the thrill of excitement, and the charm of pathos, awakened in many a breast, long alive only to corrupted pleasures, the warmth of pity and the glow of admiration; * Campbell threw over the visions of hope and the fervour of philanthropy, the sublimity of poetic thought and the energy of lyrical expression, and, striking deep into the human heart, alone of all the poets of the age has, like Shakspeare and Milton, transplanted his own thought and expression into the ordinary language of the people; Southey, embracing the world in his grasp, arrayed the heroism of duty and the constancy of virtue with the magnificence of Eastern imagination and the strains of inspired poetry; while the sparkling genius of Moore, casting off the unworthy associations of its earlier years, fled back to its native regions of the sun, and blended the sentiment and elevation of the West with the charms

* It is only, however, to his descriptions of nature, and a few of his reflections, that this high praise is due. Generally speaking, his sentiments and characters exhibit a chaos of ill-regulated passion, which never will be intelligible or interesting but to the spoiled children of fashion or self-indulgence—that is, a limited portion of mankind.

of Oriental imagery and the brilliancy of Asiatic thought.

But the genius of these men, great and immortal as it was, did not arrive at the bottom of things; they shared in the animation of passing events, and were roused by the storm which shook the world; but they did not reach the secret caves whence the whirlwind issued, nor perceive what spirit had let loose the tempest upon the world. In the bosom of retirement, in the recesses of solitary thought, the awful source was discovered, and Æolus stood forth revealed in the original Antagonist Power of wickedness. The thought of Coleridge, even during the whirl of passing events, discovered their hidden springs, and poured forth in an obscure style, and to an unheeding age, the great moral truths which were then proclaiming in characters of fire to mankind; Wordsworth, profound and contemplative, clothed the lessons of wisdom in the simplicity of immortal verse; Mackintosh, rising, like Burke in maturer years, above the generous delusions of his yet inexperienced life, wanted only greater industry, and a happy exemption from London society, to have rivalled Thucydides in the depth of his views, and a biographer like Boswell, to have equalled Johnson in the fame of his conversation; while Chalmers, bringing to the cause of truth and the interests of humanity a prophet's fire and an orator's genius, discerned in the indifferent or irreligious spirit of the former age the real cause of the dangers of the present; and in the spread of Christian instruction, and the prevalence of religious principle, the only power that ever has, or ever will, successfully combat, either in political or social evils, the seductions of passion, the delusions of error, and the powers of wickedness.

The French and German writers, justly proud of the literary fame of their own countries during this memorable reign, will hardly allow that their illustrious authors should be grouped around the throne of George III.; and will point rather to the Revolution, the empire of Napoleon, or the War of Independence, as marking the period on Continental Europe. But, by whatever name it is called, the era is the same; and if we detach ourselves for a moment from the rivalry of nations, and anticipate the time in future days when Europe is regarded by the rest of the world as a luminous spot, exceeding even Greece in lustre, and from whence the blessings of civilization and the light of religion have spread over the globe, we shall feel reason to be astonished at the brightness of the constellation which then shone forth in the firmament. It is pleasing to dwell on the contemplation. Like the age of Pericles in Grecian, or of Augustus in Roman story, it will never again be equalled in European history; but the most distant ages will dwell upon it with rapture, and by its genius the remotest generations of mankind will be blessed.

In no age of the world has the degrading effect of long-continued prosperity, and the regenerating influence of difficulty and suffering on human thought, been more clearly evinced. The latter part of the eighteenth century, the reign of Louis XV., the Regent Orleans, and Louis XVI., were characterized by a flood of selfishness and corruption, the sure forerunners, in the annals of nations, of external disaster or internal ruin. Fancy was applied only to give variety to the passions—genius to inflame, by the intermixture of

sentiment, the seductions of the senses—talent to obscure the Creator from whom it sprung. The great powers of Voltaire, capable, as his tragedies demonstrate, of the most exalted as well as varied efforts, were perverted by the spirit of the age in which he lived. He wrote for individual celebrity, not eternal truth; and he obtained, in consequence, the natural reward of such conduct—unbounded present fame, and, in some respects, undeserved, permanent neglect.* The ardent and more elevated, but unsteady mind of Rousseau, disdained such degrading bondage. The bow bent too far one way, recoiled too far another; and the votaries of fashion, in an artificial age and a corrupted capital, were amused by the eloquent declamations of the recluse of Meillière on the pristine equality of mankind, the social contract, and the original dignity of the savage character. Raynal, deducing the principles of humanity from the wrong source, traced with persuasive fervour, but with no prophetic foresight, the establishments of the European in the two hemispheres; and, blind to the mighty change which they were destined to effect in the condition of the species, diffused those pernicious dogmas which have now blasted the happiness of the negro race both in the French and English colonies; and sought to deduce, from the commencement of the vast change destined to spread the Christian faith over the wilderness of nature, arguments against its celestial origin. Every department of thought, save one, was tainted by the general wickedness and blindness to all but present objects which prevailed. Man's connexion with his Maker was broken by the French apostles of freedom; for they declared there was no God, in whom to trust in the great struggle for liberty. "Human immortality," says Channing, "that truth which is the seed of all greatness, they derided. To their philosophy man was a creature of chance, a compound of matter, a worm, soon to rot and perish forever. France failed in her attempts for freedom through the want of that moral preparation for liberty without which the blessing cannot be secured. Liberty was tainted by their touch, polluted by their breath; and yet we trusted it was to rise in health and glory from their embrace."† In the exact sciences alone, dependant upon intellect only, the native dignity of the human mind was asserted; and the names of D'Alembert, La Grange, and La Place, will remain to the end of the world among those who, in the loftiest subjects of inquiry, have extended and enlarged the boundaries of knowledge.

But more animating times were approaching fast: corruption had produced its inevitable fruits, and adversity, with its renovating influence, was about to pass over the moral world. The Revolution came with its disasters and its passions; its overthrow of thrones and destruction of altars; its woes, its blood, and

Influence of the French Revolution on general thought in France.

* Every bookseller in France and England will now bear testimony to the fact, that there is no voluminous writer whose works remain so dead a stock as those of Voltaire; and this is decisively proved by the extremely low price which the numerous editions of his works bear. His tragedies are noble works, and will live forever; but his romances have already descended to the vault of all the Capulets. His historical writings, compared with those in France which followed the Revolution, appear lifeless and uninteresting. His skeptical dogmas, so far from being regarded as the speculation of a powerful mind in advance, are now seen to have been the blindness of a deluded one, in rear of the momentous age to which his later years were prolonged.

† Character of Napoleon.

its suffering. In the general deluge thus suddenly falling on a sinful world, the mass of mankind in all ranks still clung to their former vices. They were, as of old, marrying and giving in marriage when the waters burst upon them. But the ark of salvation had been prepared by more than mortal hands. The handwriting on the wall was perceived by the gifted few to whom Providence had unlocked the fountains of original thought, and in the highest class of intellect was soon to be discerned the elevating influence of trial and suffering upon the human mind. While the innumerable votaries of Revolution, borne along on the fetid stream which had burst from the corruptions of previous manners, were bending before the altar of Reason, Chateaubriand ventured to raise again, amid the sneers of an infidel age, the standard of ancient faith, and devoted the energies of an intrepid, and the genius of an ardent mind, to demonstrate its relation to all that is beautiful, or great and elevating, both in the moral and material world. Madame de Staël, albeit nursed in the atmosphere of philanthropic delusion, and bred up with filial piety at the feet of Gamaliel, arose, amid the tears of humanity, to nobler principles; combined the refinements of sentiment with the warmth of eloquence and the delicacy of taste, and first announced, in a philosophic survey of human affairs, the all-important truth that there are but two eras in the history of the species—that which preceded and that which followed the establishment of Christianity. Seeds, whether for good or evil, sown in the human mind, generally take half a century to bring their fruit to maturity; and in the general profligacy and irreligion of the urban population in France since the Revolution, is to be discerned the havoc prepared by the labours of Voltaire and the Encyclopædists, and the long-continued corruption of previous literature. But the nobler fruits of the suffering of the Revolution are already apparent in the highest class of intellect, whence change, whether for good or evil, ever originates. Guizot has brought to the history of civilization the light of true philosophy and the glow of enlightened religion: Cousin, in the midst of philanthropic labour and vast information on the vital question of education, has arrived at the eternal truth, that general instruction, if not based on Christian principle, is rather hurtful than beneficial, because it opens new avenues to moral corruption, without providing the only antidote which experience has proved to be effectual in correcting it: Lamartine, gifted at once with an orator's fervour and a poet's fire, has traced in strains of almost redundant beauty the steps of an enlightened European pilgrim to the birthplace of our religion and the cradle of our race. May the seeds scattered by these illustrious men not fall on a barren soil and perish by the wayside, nor yet be choked amid briars, but bring forth good fruit, in some fifty fold, some eighty, and some a hundred!*

* Sir James Mackintosh, thirty years ago, observed this remarkable change in French literature, and deplored that it had not then made its appearance among English writers. "Twenty years ago," says he, "the state of opinion seemed to indicate an almost total destruction of religion in Europe. Ten years ago the state of political events appeared to show a more advanced stage in the progress towards such a destruction. The reaction has begun everywhere. A mystical spirit prevails in Germany; a poetical religion is patronised by men of genius in France. It is adopted in some measure by Madame de Staël, who finds it, even by the help of her reason, in the nature of man, if she cannot so deeply perceive it in the nature of things. In England no traces

Germany is a younger branch of the same illustrious family, but from the time that her language has been cultivated by native writers, she has advanced in the great race of mind with extraordinary rapidity. Last of the European surface to be turned up by the labours of the husbandman, her soil has been found to teem with the richness of a virgin mould, and to exhibit the sparkling of hitherto untouched treasures. In reading the recent poets and great prose writers of that country, we feel as if we had arrived at a new mine of intellectual wealth: the northern nations, with fresh ideas and powerful expression, have again burst into the almost exhausted world of thought, and the long sway of Grecian or Roman dominion has been modified by a second infusion of Gothic energy. However it may be explained, the fact is sufficiently proved by the most cursory survey of the history of mankind, that the human mind is never quiescent; that it frequently lies fallow, as it were, for a long succession of ages; but that, during such periods, former error is forgotten and ancient chains worn off; and that original thought is never so powerful, and important truth never so clearly revealed, as when the light of day is again let in to hitherto-unexplored regions of the mind. The ages of Bacon and Shakspeare in England, of Machiavel and Leonardo da Vinci in Italy, of Pascal and Descartes in France, are sufficient to demonstrate the general justice of this principle.

Long illustrious in the walks of philosophy, holding for centuries a distinguished place in the republic of science; the birthplace of printing and gunpowder, the two most powerful agents in the cause of freedom ever communicated to mankind;* the country of Kepler and Copernicus, of Euler and Leibnitz, Germany had not till the last half century explored the riches of her own tongue, or developed in native literature the novel and fervent ideas which had long been working in her bosom. But this was at length done; and her literature started at once into life with the vigour of youthful energy and the strength of an armed man. Klopstock, Her poets. obscure but sublime, poured forth the spirit of mystical Christianity in touching and immortal strains: Goëthe, simple, yet profound, united the depth of philosophical thought to the simplicity of childish affection; and, striking with almost inspired felicity the chord of native reflection, produced that mingled flood of poetic meditation and individual observation which has rendered his fame unbounded in the Fatherland. Wieland, without the religious fervour of the first of these writers, or the deep reflection of the second, has charmed every imagination by the brightness of his fancy, the richness of his lan-

of this tendency are discoverable among men of letters, perhaps because they never went so near the opposite extreme; perhaps, also, because they have not suffered from the same misfortunes."—MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i., 408. What a curious and instructive passage to be written thirty years ago, midway between the experience of the French and the commencement of the English Revolution! The days of anxiety, contest, and suffering have come to England from the effects of that very organic change in which Sir James Mackintosh himself, in his later days, from the spirit of party, against his better judgment, was led to concur; and with them, the resurrection of the religious spirit in the works of philosophy, literature, and philanthropy, of the want of which he then was led to complain.

* Of printing this will be generally admitted; of gunpowder, at present, as generally denied. This is not the place to demonstrate the proposition: the experience of a few generations will place it beyond a doubt.

guage, and the sparkling freshness which he has thrown over all the subjects which his magic pencil has touched : Schiller, uniting the ardour of a soldier to the soul of a statesman and the graphic hand of an historian, has portrayed the shades of former times with dramatic power, and in a noble spirit ; while the ardent soul of Körner, awakened by the trumpet of Germany's deliverance, has poured a hero's soul and a patriot's heart into lyric verse, which will endure as long as the memory of the struggle by which it was inspired.

Nor have the efforts of thought in the Fatherland been confined to poetic effusion : in the calmer walks of philosophy and literature the vigour of the human mind has been equally conspicuous ; and a new light has been already thrown, alike on present speculation and past events, by the mingled originality and perseverance of the German character. Niebuhr, uniting to the prodigious industry of the German scholar an instinctive sagacity in discerning truth and apprehending the real springs and state of far-distant events, which is, perhaps, unrivalled, has thrown a new and important light on the earlier periods of Roman annals ; and though his history, generally obscure, sometimes perplexed, and too often overloaded with insignificant details, can never rival in general popularity the heart-stirring legends to which the page of Livy has given immortality, yet his profound observation and marvellous penetration have rendered his work the most valuable contribution to the stock of ancient knowledge which modern times have produced. Heeren, not, perhaps, with equal learning or knowledge, has thrown a clearer, if not a more original light over the general history of ancient nations, and demonstrated how much remains still to be done on subjects apparently exhausted by previous industry, when the vigour of real talent and the force of an original mind are applied to its elucidation. The peculiar turn of the German intellect, abstract, contemplative, and often visionary, appears in the writings of Kant ; and the reader, in toiling through his obscure pages, cannot but feel both how many new ideas have been poured into the world of thought by the Gothic race, and how much their importance has been diminished by being turned into the realms of ideal contemplation, instead of being devoted to objects of real usefulness.

Perhaps future ages, in comparing the philosophy and literature of England with that of Germany and France at the commencement of the nineteenth century, will regret that the first has, especially in later times so exclusively devoted its energies to objects of physical utility, practical importance, or ephemeral amusement, to the neglect of those higher and more lasting purposes which spring from the elevation of national feeling and the purity of national thought ; that the direction of the second, cramped by the despotic nature of almost all the governments in the Empire, has been so strongly directed to abstract speculation, imaginary feeling, or visionary perfection, to the neglect of those more heart-stirring and momentous topics which bear directly on the well-being of society or the amelioration of the human race ; and that the genius of the last, still perverted, save in a few gifted spirits, by the sins and depravity of the Revolution, has been so much lost in the wildness of extravagant fancy, or blinded by the passions of

disappointed ambition. And, if we could conceive an era in which the freshness of German thought and the power of German expression, united to the acuteness of French observation and the clearness of French arrangement, were directed by the solidity of English judgment and the sway of English religion, it would probably be the brightest which has ever yet dawned upon the human race.

Inferior to many, perhaps all the illustrious men whose names have been mentioned, in intellectual power or literary acquisition, GEORGE III. will yield to none in the importance of the duties to which he was called, or the enduring benefits which he conferred upon the human race. His it was to moderate the fervour which burst forth in the world ; to restrain within due bounds the sacred fire which was to regenerate mankind, and prevent the expansive power destined to spread through the wilderness of nature the power of European art and the blessings of Christian civilization, from being wasted in pernicious attempts, or converted into the frightful sources of explosion and ruin. Vain are all the forces bequeathed to man, if the means of governing them are not at the same time bestowed. The power of steam was known for six thousand years, but it was applied to no useful purpose till the genius of Watt discovered the secret of regulating it ; the force of the wind produces only shipwreck and devastation, if the steady hand of the pilot is wanting to direct the impulse which it communicates to the vessel. It was the fate of George III. to be called to the throne of the only free empire in existence during the age of revolutions ; to be destined to govern the vast and unwieldy fabric of the British dominions, when torn at one period by internal convulsion, and menaced at another by external subjugation ; to be doomed to combat, from the commencement to the end of a reign extending over more than half a century, the Revolutionary spirit, veiled at one period under the guise of liberality and philanthropy, flaming at another with the passions and the terrors of a burning world.

Of the incalculable importance of directing the government of such a country, at such a period, with the steady hand of patriotic wisdom, we may form some estimate from observing what had been the consequences of the bursting forth of similar passions at the same time in other states, where a corresponding regulating power was wanting, and where Democracy, through the infatuation of the higher orders and the delusion of the throne, obtained an early and a lasting triumph. France exhibited the prodigy of a monarch yielding to the wishes, and a nobility impregnated from the very first with the passions, of the people ; and in the horrors of the Revolution, the devastation and subjugation of Europe, and the general ultimate extinction of all moral principle and every element of freedom within its bounds, is to be found an awful example of the consequences of admitting such a power unrestrained to act on human affairs. Republican feelings, sobered by English habits and directed by English principle, gained a glorious triumph in America, and the fabric of transatlantic independence was laid with a moderation and wisdom unparalleled in the previous annals of the world ; but subsequent events have given no countenance to the belief

Her prose writers.

Public duties to which George III. was called.

Consequences which would have ensued if his character had been different.

that such institutions can, in a lasting manner, confer the blessings of freedom on mankind; and rather suggested the painful doubt, whether the sway of a numerical majority, at once tyrannical at home and weak abroad, may not become productive of intrigues more general, and insecurity as fatal, as the worst oppression of despotic states. Placed midway between these two great examples of Democratic triumph, England still exhibits, though with diminished lustre, the rare combination of popular energy with aristocratic foresight. She is neither trampled under the hoofs of a tyrant majority, nor crushed by the weight of military power; her youth have not been mowed down by the scythe of revolutionary ambition, nor her renown tarnished, save of late years, by the vacillation of multitudinous rule. Gratefully acknowledging the influence in the continuance of those blessings which is to be ascribed to the prevalence of religious feeling, the moderation of general opinion, and the habits of a free Constitution, it would be unjust not to give its due weight to the personal character of the monarch who swayed the English sceptre when the conflagration burst forth, and the advisers whom it led him to place about the throne. And if any doubt could exist on the subject, we have only to look to 1831, and reflect what would have been the fate of the cause of freedom throughout the world, if, when France was convulsed by the passions of Jacobin ambition, England had been blinded by the delusion of the Reform mania, and surrendered to the guidance of a conceding monarch, a reckless ministry, and an insane people.

Although neither the intellectual powers nor mental cultivation of George III. were of a very high order, yet no monarch was ever better adapted for the arduous and momentous duty to which he was called, or possessed qualities more peculiarly fitted for the difficulties with which, during his long reign, he had to contend. Born and bred in England, he gloried, as he himself said, in the name of Briton. Educated in the principles of the Protestant religion, he looked to their maintenance not only as his first duty, but as the only safeguard of his throne. Simple in his habits, moderate in his desires, unostentatious in his tastes, he preferred, amid the seductions of a palace, the purity and virtues of domestic life. His education had been neglected—his information was not extensive—his views on some subjects limited; but he possessed, in a very high degree, that native sagacity and just discrimination, for the want of which no intellectual cultivation can afford any compensation, and which are so often found more than adequate to supply the place of the most brilliant and even solid acquisitions. He inherited from his father the hereditary courage and firmness of his race. On repeated occasions, when his life was attempted, he evinced a rare personal intrepidity; and when he proposed, during the dreadful riots of 1780, to ride at the head of his guards into the midst of the fires of his capital, he did no more than what his simple heart told him was his duty, but what, nevertheless, bespoke the monarch fitted to quench the conflagration of the world. Though quick in conversation, as kings generally are, he could not be said to have an acute mind; and yet the native strength of his intellect enabled him to detect at once any sophistry which interfered with the just sense he always entertained of his public or religious du-

ties. When Mr. Dundas, in the course of conversation on the Catholic claims, previous to Mr. Pitt's retirement on that ground in 1800, urged the often-repeated argument that the coronation oath was taken by him only in relation to his executive duties, he at once replied, "Come, come, Mr. Dundas, let us have none of your Scotch metaphysics."

But his firmness and principle were of a more exalted cast than what arises from ^{His great more- mere physical resolution.} No man ^{at courage and} possessed moral determination in a ^{his failings.} higher degree, or was more willing, when he felt he was right, to take his full share of the responsibility consequent upon either supporting or resisting any measure of importance. The firmness which he exhibited on occasion of the run upon the Bank and the mutiny of the *Nore*, in 1797, brought the nation safely through the most dangerous crisis of recent times. His inflexible determination, in 1807, to admit no compromise with the Catholics regarding the coronation oath, averted for twenty years that loosening of the constitution in Church and State under which the nation has since so grievously laboured. When resisting, almost alone, Mr. Fox's India Bill in 1783, he expressed his determination rather to resign his crown, and retire to Hanover, than to permit it to become a law; and the result has proved both that he had correctly scanned on that occasion the feelings of the English people, and rightly appreciated the probable effect of the proposed measure on our Eastern Empire, and the balance of the Constitution in this country. He was obstinate, and sometimes vindictive in his temper, tenacious of power, and contrived, throughout his whole reign, to retain in his own hands a larger share of real authority than usually falls to the lot of sovereigns in constitutional monarchies. But he had nothing permanently cruel or oppressive in his disposition: he freely forgave those who had attempted his life, and stood forth, on every occasion, the warm supporter of all measures having a humane or beneficent tendency. This inflexible disposition, however, sometimes betrayed him into undue obstinacy; and his well-known determination to admit no accommodation with the American insurgents, prolonged that unhappy contest for years after even his own ministers had become aware that it was hopeless: yet even such a resolution had something magnanimous in its character. It is now well known, that, but for the incapacity of the generals in command of his armies, his firmness would have been rewarded with success; and all must admit, that his first words to the American minister who came to his court after the peace, "I was the last man in my dominions to acknowledge your independence, but I will be the first to support it, now that it has been granted," were worthy of the sovereign of a great empire, whose moral resolution misfortune could not subdue, and whose sense of honour prosperity could not weaken.

Selecting, out of the innumerable arts which flourished in his dominions, that on which all others were dependant, he concentrated the rays of royal favour on the simple labours of the husbandman. Equalling Henry IV. in the benevolence of his wish,* and outstripping both him and his own age in the justice of his discrimina-

* That he might live to see the day when all his subjects had their fowl in the pot.

tion, he said that he hoped to live to see the day, not when all his subjects could merely read, but "when every man in his dominions should have his Bible in his pocket." Like all men in high situations during a period of popular excitement, of a really upright and conscientious character, he was, for a considerable period of his reign, the object of general obloquy, and to such a length was this carried, that open attempts to assassinate him were repeatedly made when he appeared in public; but he long survived, as real virtue generally does, this transient injustice. When a jubilee was appointed in the year 1809, for the fiftieth year of his reign, the nation unanimously joined in it with thankfulness and devotion; and the more advanced of the present generation still look back to the manly and disinterested loyalty with which, in their youth, the 4th of June* was celebrated by all classes with a feeling of interest, increased by the mournful reflection that, amid the selfish ambition and Democratic infatuation of subsequent times, such feelings, in this country at least, must be numbered among the things that have been.

The reign of the venerable monarch, however, who had awakened these feelings of loyalty among his subjects, was now drawing to a close. The health of the Princess Amelia, his favourite daughter, had long been declining, and she breathed her last, after a protracted illness, which she bore with exemplary resignation, on the 2d of November, 1810. The anguish which the king underwent on this occasion was such, that it produced a return of the alarming mental malady which, in 1788, had thrown the nation into such universal grief. Parliament met on the 1st of November, in consequence of the monarch's inability to sign any farther prerogative; but, as the alarming indisposition of his majesty had for some time been a matter of notoriety, it was deemed advisable to adjourn from time to time, in the hope, which was for some time held out, of a speedy recovery. These hopes, however, having at length vanished, and the mental aberration of the monarch having assumed a fixed character, it became necessary to apply to Parliament on the subject; and, on the 20th of December, Mr. Perceval brought forward the subject in the House of Commons.†

The basis of the proposition was the resolutions which were the groundwork of Mr. Pitt's Regency Bill, concerning which there was so vehement a debate in 1788, and they were as follows: 1. That the king, being prevented by indisposition from attending to the public business, the personal exercise of the royal authority has been suspended; 2. That it is the right and duty of Parliament, as representing all the estates of the people of the realm, to provide the means of supplying the defect in such a manner as the exigency of the case may seem to them to require; 3. That for this purpose the Lords and Commons should determine in what manner the royal assent should be given to bills which had passed both houses of Parliament, and how the exercise of the powers and authorities of the crown should be put in force during the continuance of the king's indisposition. The great feature of all these resolutions was, that they were a proceeding by *bill*, and not

by address; and although such a course involved the anomalous absurdity of the royal assent being held to be validly interposed by commission, under the authority of Parliament, to a bill for regulating the royal functions, and settling the party by whom they should be exercised at a time when the royal person was incapable of adhibiting such consent, yet such an assumption of power by Parliament was thought no unwarrantable stretch in such circumstances, when the Legislature was *de facto* resolved into two of its elements, and yet the actual existence of the monarch precluded the heir-apparent from ascending the throne by hereditary succession. It was intimated, at the same time, that it was the intention of government to bring forward a bill vesting all the powers of the crown in the Prince of Wales, to administer the affairs of the country in the name and on the behalf of his majesty, under no other restriction except such securities for the safety and comfort of the royal person, and the easy resumption of his authority in the event of recovery, as might appear necessary, and a certain restriction for a limited time of the prerogative of creating peers. These propositions were the subject of anxious debate in the two houses of Parliament, and the arguments advanced on both sides are worthy of notice even in a European history, as involving the fundamental principles on which constitutional monarchy are rested. The first proposition passed unanimously; the second, declaring the right of Parliament to supply the defect, did the like, with the single dissentient voice of Sir Francis Burdett; but upon the third, which declared that Parliament should proceed by bill to fix the person who was to exercise the royal authority, the opposition took their stand. An amendment, that an address should be presented to the Prince of Wales, praying him to take upon himself the royal functions, was proposed by Mr. Ponsonby, and on it the main debate took place.*

On the part of the opposition, it was urged by Mr. Ponsonby, Sir Samuel Romilly, and Earl Grey: "The case which is at present calls for the interposition of Parliament is the absence of the king's power; and that not owing to his abdication or the failure of heirs, but the incapacity of the existing monarch to execute the duties of the royal office. In dealing with so delicate a matter, one bordering so closely on the very foundations of government, it is of the last importance to adhere to the rules established by former precedent, and, in the absence of positive enactment, proceed in the paths of ancient usage. What, then, in similar circumstances, have our ancestors done? At the Restoration, in 1661, the basis of the whole change was the letter and declaration of Charles II., from Breda; and this declaration, with the letter from the king which accompanied it, was delivered on the 25th of April; and between that and the 29th of May, when the Restoration took place, an application was made from the Commons to the Lords to put the great seal in activity, as, without it, the proceedings of the courts of law were stopped; but this the House of Peers declined, and the Commons, sensible that their application was absurd and unconstitutional, gave up the proposition. Again, at the Revolution, when James II. had left the country, and the throne was thereby vacant, what did Parliament do? Did they

* The birthday of George III.

† Ann. Reg., 1811, p. 11.

* Parl. Deb., xviii., 242, 247, 267. Ann. Reg., 1811, p. 1.

proceed by bill to settle the person who was to succeed to the crown, and go through the farce of affixing the great seal to an act when there was no sovereign on the throne? No. Even in that extreme case, when the liberties and religion of the whole nation were at stake, and constitutional principles were so well understood, from the recent discussion they had undergone during the great Rebellion and at the Restoration, they never dreamed of such an anomaly, but contented themselves with simply addressing the Prince of Orange to call a Parliament; and, when it assembled, they read the great compact between king and people, the Bill of Rights, and immediately proclaimed William and Mary King and Queen of Great Britain. If proceeding by address was the proper course in the greater cause and on the greater emergency, it must be considered sufficient in the lesser.

"With regard to the proceeding by bill, its absurdity is so manifest, that the only surprising thing is how it ever could have been thought of. It is matter of universal notoriety, that every bill must have the royal assent before it becomes law; and, if that is the case in ordinary instances, how much more must it hold in that most momentous of all legislative enactments, the succession of the crown? Now, by 33d of Henry VIII., the royal assent must be given by the king personally, in Parliament, or by commissioners appointed by letters-patent under the royal sign-manual. Is his majesty at present capable of giving his consent in either of these ways? Confessedly not; and if so, then the proposed bill, though it may have passed both houses of Parliament, must ever want the authority of law. On what pretence, then, can we assume to do by fiction, and by an artificial and operose proceeding, what, in point of fact, is universally known to be impossible? Other precedents in older times, still more precisely in point, might be quoted; but these considerations seem so decisive of the matter at issue as to render their examination unnecessary.

"It may be conceded that the two houses of Parliament, and they alone, have the right to supply a deficiency, whether temporary or permanent, in the executive; but the question is, What is the proper and constitutional form for them to proceed on on the occasion? It is just as possible to tell the heir-apparent what restrictions are to be imposed to his authority, in the address which calls upon him to exercise the functions of royalty, as in the bill which confers its powers upon him. If it is deemed advisable to place the custody of the monarch in the hands of the queen, and to give her majesty the appointment of the great officers of his household, as well as the power of taking the initiative in restoring him to the throne upon his convalescence, is it to be presumed that the prince regent, even when he had assumed the powers of royalty, in consequence of the address of the two houses, would refuse his concurrence to such an arrangement? It is true, in this way the limitations which Parliament may deem necessary upon his authority may not form fundamental parts of the regent's authority, but you have just the same security that he will assent to them as to any other bill which has passed both houses, as to which there is no instance of a rejection since the Revolution. It is no answer to these objections to say the same thing was done in 1788, and that precedent should now be followed. The times, the circumstances of the Empire,

were essentially different in the two cases: then the chief danger apprehended was from the royal prerogative; now a crippled executive is the greatest calamity which the country, beset with dangers, could encounter.*

On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Canning, Mr. Perceval, and Lord Castlereagh: "Not the right and power of Parliament to supply the present defect, but the mode of exercising it, is in question. That great and serious difficulties lie in the way of either of these methods may at once be admitted; but the question is, not whether either mode of proceeding is unexceptionable, but to which the least objections can be stated. It is no fault of ours that we are placed in a situation at once painful and perplexing: our duty is to deal with these difficulties in the most legal and constitutional manner of which existing circumstances will admit. To object to either of the methods of proceeding by bill or address, its own inherent difficulties and embarrassments, is only to say, in other words, that we are placed in a situation in the highest degree perplexing. That, however, is not our own act, but that of Providence, and we must deal with it as our ancestors have done. Every catastrophe which suspends or dissolves the hereditary succession to the throne is necessarily involved in such difficulties; the only point for consideration is, what is the best mode of getting out of them?

"Now, what precedent does former usage afford to guide us in such perplexities? The example of the Restoration cannot with any propriety be referred to on this question, because then an exiled monarch was to be restored to a right of which he had been forcibly and unjustly deprived, and an acknowledged title to be simply proclaimed and re-established. Can this be affirmed to be the predicament in which we stand at this moment? Unquestionably not; for we have now no pre-existing right to declare, but a contingency unforeseen by the existing law to provide for. Then, as to the precedent of the Revolution, splendid and cheering as the recollection of that great event must always be to Englishmen, it will be wise in Parliament, before they permit their feelings to be carried away by it, to consider well whether it has any application to the circumstances in which we are now placed. Was the object of Parliament, at that period, to provide for the care and custody of the person of the monarch? Was it to provide for his return to the government of the country upon his restoration to health? Was it to erect a temporary sovereignty during the incapacity of the monarch, who, it was hoped, would soon be restored to health? Was it not, on the contrary, to provide *against* the restoration of James; to erect a barrier against his return, and defend the crown, which they proposed to transfer, against the hostile approach of its ancient possessor?

"The argument founded on the incompetency of applying the great seal to an act of Parliament during the incapacity of the sovereign, is founded on no logical principle. Admitting that a fiction of law is adopted—an irregular and absurd proceeding, if you will, carried on when two branches of the Legislature authorize the symbol of the consent of the third to be affixed to their bill without its knowledge or consent—does not this arise necessarily from the melancholy event which for a time has resolved government into

Answer by
the ministers.

two of its elements, and compelled them to provide themselves for the public service with the presumed or feigned consent of the third only? It is surely a singular remedy for the unfortunate incapacity of one branch of the Constitution, to proceed unnecessarily to incapacitate the remaining branches. The proceedings at the time of the Revolution were wise, just, and necessary, because there was no other mode of proceeding practicable at that period, when government was dissolved, and no legislative measure, even in the most informal style, could be adopted; but, because such a proceeding was proper then, does it follow that the same precedent should be followed now, when no such necessity exists? And is not the proposal to do so, in the forcible language of Mr. Burke, 'to make the extreme medicine of the Constitution its daily bread?'

"We have now a Parliament full, free, and so constituted as to be fully competent to provide for the exigency that exists. What analogy is there between such a situation and that at the Revolution, when the very convocation of a Parliament was the first step to be taken, and that could only be done by address to the Prince of Orange? Admitting the absurdity of applying the great seal, in the king's name, to a bill which has passed both houses, when there is no sovereign on the throne, the same difficulty exists in as great a degree to the whole proceedings of the regency during the king's life, which, contrary to the fact, speak in the king's name, and profess to utter his will. The question of a regency, it is historically known, was discussed at the Revolution, and rejected, as unsuitable to the circumstances which then existed; and this renders that precedent directly hostile to the proceeding by address in the present instance. So standing the older precedents, and such being the equal balance of difficulties, or incompetencies, on either side, what remains for us but to act upon the latest and most important authority, that of Parliament on the king's illness in 1788, which was adopted, after the fullest discussion, in circumstances precisely parallel to the present, and with the assistance of all the light to be derived from the greatest constitutional lawyers and statesmen who ever adorned the British Senate?"*

Upon this debate, Parliament, by a large majority in both houses, supported the resolutions proposed by ministers, that is, the proceeding by bill: the numbers being in the Commons 269 to 157, in the Lords 100 to 74.†

The details of the regency bill were afterward brought forward, and discussed with great spirit and minuteness in committees of both houses of Parliament. Most of the clauses were adopted with no other than verbal alterations; but a protracted debate took place on the clause which proposed to lay the regent for twelve months under certain restrictions, especially in the royal prerogative of creating peers, or calling the eldest sons of peers to the Upper House by writ. These restrictions, however, for that period, were inserted in the bill, by a majority in the Lower House of 24, the numbers being 224 to 200: a majority which fell, on the matter of the limitation as to creating peers, to 16 in the Commons, and in the Lords to 6. This rapid diminution of the ministerial majority clearly indicated what an insecure tenure min-

isters now had of their places, and how strongly the now confirmed malady of the sovereign, and the known partiality of the Prince of Wales for the Whig party, had come to influence that numerous party in Parliament—the waverers—in the line of policy they thought expedient to adopt. The queen, by the bill, had the appointment of all the offices connected with the king's household; and certain forms were prescribed, in which she was to take the initiative for paving the way for his restoration to power in the event of his convalescence. But in the all-important matter of the appointment of a ministry, the regent was invested, without any restriction, with the whole royal prerogative; and it was universally thought that the first use he would make of his newly-acquired power would be to dismiss the present ministers, and call Lords Grey and Grenville to the head of his councils. Thus modified, the bill appointing the regent passed the House of Lords on the 29th of January, by a majority, however, only of eight; and on the 6th of February the royal assent was given by commission, and the great seal, the object of so much contention, affixed to the bill, upon which the Prince of Wales immediately entered on the whole functions of royalty, by the title of the prince regent.*

On calmly considering the subject of this vehement contention and narrow division in both houses of Parliament, it cannot but strike the most inconsiderate observer how remarkable it was that the two great parties who divided the state took upon this conditional question sides diametrically opposite to what might have been expected from their previous principles—the Whigs supporting now, as in 1788, the doctrine of the hereditary inherent right of the heir-apparent to the regency, during a contingency not provided for by the Act of Settlement or Constitution, and the Tories exerting all their efforts, equally as in the days of Mr. Pitt, to negative the heir-apparent's claim *de jure* to the regency, and to confer it on him by act of Parliament only, and under such restrictions as to the two houses of the Legislature might seem expedient: a memorable instance of how much, even in the brightest days of national history, the greatest men in public life are influenced by considerations of interest to themselves or their party, in preference to adherence to the political principles which they profess; and of the ease with which the most conscientious intellects are insensibly brought round by the still small voice of private advantage or public ambition.

But, if the merits of the arguments adduced on both sides on this occasion are considered, without reference to the objects of present advantage which either party had at heart, no doubt can be entertained that the Whigs, both in reason and on precedent, had the best of the dispute. Admitting that the Constitution, as it at present exists, was originally formed by an exertion of the national will, in opposition to or in constraint of the views of the reigning monarch, still no one can doubt that the occasions on which reference is to be made to Parliament to appoint the supreme executive magistrate, are extreme ones, and that recourse is not to be had to that *ultimum remedium* except in cases where no other mode of solving the difficulty and carrying on the govern-

Jan. 29.
Feb. 6.

Remarkable
sides taken on
this occasion
by the Whigs
and Tories.

Reflections on
the merits of
the question.

* Parl. Deb., xviii., 280, 291.

† Parl. Deb., xviii., 329, 460. Ann. Reg., 1811, p. 1.

* Parl. Deb., xviii., 1084, 1140.

ment can be discovered. In Mr. Burke's words, to act otherwise would be to make the extreme medicine of the Constitution its daily bread. An event so little contrary to the ordinary course of events, that it unhappily occurred twice during the life of the same monarch—viz., the insanity or utter incapacity of the reigning sovereign—can hardly be said to be an extreme case, unprovided for by the Constitution, which calls for a recurrence to first principles, and warrants two branches of the Legislature in disposing of the third and the executive magistracy. The right of hereditary succession—the fundamental principle of the monarchy—interfered with to the smallest possible extent at the Revolution, and then recognised *de futuro* on the firmest basis, clearly points out the mode of solving the difficulty. The heir-apparent, if of competent age to undertake the government—if not, the party entitled by law to the regency on his minority—is the person to whom the interim duty of conducting the executive devolves, leaving it to Parliament to make what provision they please for the custody of the person of the fatuous monarch.

The result which followed this interesting discussion in both houses of Parliament was such as was little anticipated, and which, if foreseen, might possibly have inverted the sides which the ministerial party and opposition respectively took upon its merits. From the connexion which, during his whole life, had subsisted between the Prince of Wales and the Whig party, and the close personal intimacy in which he had long lived with its principal leaders, it was universally expected that his first act, upon being elevated to the office of prince regent, would have been to have sent for Lords Grey and Grenville, and intrusted them with the formation of a new administration. In fact, the anticipation of this had, towards the close of the year 1810, sensibly weakened the ministerial majority in both houses of Parliament; and, by inspiring government with the belief that their tenure of office was drawing to a close, and that an opposite system would immediately be embraced by their successors, had impaired in a most serious manner, and at the most important crisis, their efforts for the prosecution of the war. The despatches of Wellington during the momentous campaign of 1810 and the commencement of 1811, are filled with observations which, however guarded, show that he felt he was not supported at home as he ought to have been; that government threw upon him the whole responsibility connected with the continuance of the Peninsular struggle, and were either desponding of success after the disastrous termination of the Austrian war, or deemed exertion and expenditure thrown away, from a secret impression that their ministerial career was nearly at an end, and that all Continental resistance would immediately be abandoned by their successors. It was, therefore, matter of no small surprise to all parties, and perhaps to none more than to the minister to whom it was addressed, when the prince regent, immediately upon being invested with the powers of royalty, wrote a letter to Mr. Perceval, announcing that he had no intentions of making any change in the administration;* and the speech to Parliament which he immediately afterward delivered, differed in no respect, either in regard

to sentiments or expression, from what might have been anticipated had George the Third still been discharging the functions of royalty.

Although this communication assigned as the reason, and the *sole* reason, for the regent continuing the Tories in office, "the irresistible impulse of filial duty and affection to his beloved and afflicted father, which led him to dread that any act on his part might, in the smallest degree, have the effect of interfering with the progress of his sovereign's recovery," yet the determination it contained to continue the present government in their places, even for a limited period, gave great umbrage to the leaders of the Whig party. They complained that, as he was unrestricted in the choice of his ministers, no sufficient reason existed for the continuance in office of those to whom he had always been politically opposed; and they entertained an apprehension, which the event proved to be not unreasonable, that the habits of official communication with some of the administration, and the social talents of others, might go far to obliterate that repugnance to the Tory party which the prince had hitherto evinced. It was generally expected, however, that he would still revert to his earlier friends when the year during which the restrictions imposed by Parliament came to an end; and the opinion was confidently promulgated by those supposed to be most in the regent's confidence, that February, 1812, would see the Whig party entirely and permanently in office.*

The event, however, again disappointed the hopes entertained by the opposition. Early in January, 1812, the administration sustained a loss by the resignation of Marquis Wellesley, the foreign secretary; and the reasons assigned for this step were, that the ministry, of which Mr. Perceval formed the head, could not be prevailed upon to carry on the war in the Peninsula on such a scale as was either suited to the dignity of the kingdom, or calculated to bring that contest to a successful issue. The prince regent, however, earnestly pressed his lordship to retain the seals of office, which he consented to do in the mean time; but when the restrictions expired in February, and still no disposition to make a change of ministry was evinced, the resignation was again tendered, accompanied by a statement that the new administration should be formed on an intermediate principle between instant concession to, and perpetual exclusion of, the Catholics, and with the understanding that the war was to be carried on with adequate vigour. This second resignation was accepted, and Lord Castlereagh was appointed foreign secretary in his stead; and in the mean time the prince regent, through the medium of the Duke of York, opened a communication with Lords Grey and Grenville, the object of which was to induce them, and some of their friends, to form part of the government, on the principle of mutual concession and an extended basis. It was soon discovered, however, that the differences between the leaders of the Whigs and Tories were insuperable, and the result was, that the negotiation came to nothing; and a motion by Lord Boringdon in the House of Peers, for an address to the prince

The prince regent continues the ministers in power. Feb. 12.

Negotiation with Lords Grey and Grenville, in January, 1812, to form a Whig ministry, proves abortive.

Jan. 16, 1812.

Feb. 19.

Feb. 28.

Feb. 13.

March 19.

* Ann. Reg., 1811, 8, 9.

* Ann. Reg., 1812.

regent, praying for the formation of a ministry upon an extended basis, was negated by a majority of seventy-two. From what transpired in his debate, it was evident that a more vital question than even that of the conduct of the foreign war, now was the obstacle to the formation of a coalition ministry, and that Catholic emancipation, to the ultimate concession of which it was known Lord Wellesley was favourable, was the real point upon which irreconcilable differences existed, both in the cabinet and between some of its ministers and the throne.*

A dreadful and unexpected event, however, soon after gave rise to a renewal of the negotiation, and opened the way, May 11. apparently, for the restoration of the

Whigs to office, by the destruction of their most formidable and uncompromising opponent. On the 11th of May, as Mr. Perceval was entering the lobby of the House of Commons, at a quarter past five o'clock, he was shot through the heart, and immediately afterward expired. A cry arose, "Where is the villain who fired?" and immediately a man of the name of Bellingham stepped forward; and making no attempt to escape, calmly said, "I am the unfortunate man: my name is Bellingham; it is a private injury; I know what I have done; it was a denial of justice on the part of government." He was immediately seized and carried to the bar of the House of Commons, in which assembly, as well as in the Lords, the greatest agitation prevailed when the calamitous event became known, and both houses immediately adjourned. A message

of condolence was shortly after voted to the prince regent; and on the 13th, Lord Castlereagh, on the part of the government, proposed, and Mr. Ponsonby, on that of the opposition, seconded, a vote of £50,000 to the family of the deceased minister, and £2000 a year annuity to his widow. It appeared, to the honour of this disinterested statesman, who had for years directed the exchequer of the most opulent empire in the world, that not only had he taken advantage of none of the means of enriching himself which were in his power, but had not even been enabled to make that moderate provision for his family of twelve children which ordinary men, who have been successful in the legal profession, generally do. These provisions, to the honour of the opposition and of human nature be it said, passed the house without a single dissentient voice, though a debate took place upon the subsequent grant of £3000 a year to the eldest son of Mr. Perceval, after the demise of his mother,

May 15. which was, however, carried by a large majority; and a monument to his memory, at the public expense, voted in Westminster Abbey.†

The trial of the assassin, as the courts were sitting, and no lengthened citation of the prisoner is required by the English law except in cases of high treason, took place on the 15th, four days after the murder. He was found guilty, and executed on the 18th, in front of Newgate. His demeanour, both on the scaffold and in prison before his death, was firm, calm, and self-possessed; he engaged in his religious exercises with fervour, but uniformly persisted in denying his guilt, alleging that the death of Mr. Perceval, which he always admitted, was a proper retribution for

his neglect of his application for redress of private injuries. An attempt to prove him insane at the trial failed; and, indeed, his whole demeanour, though it indicated a degree of excitement on the subject of his real or supposed wrongs which amounted to monomania, was by no means such as to indicate that amount of mental derangement which renders an insane person irresponsible for his actions. It afterward appeared, from the production of a letter on the subject from Lord Leveson Gower, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg at the time, in the House of Commons, that, though he had sustained great patrimonial losses in England and Russia, yet they had arisen chiefly from his own intemperate conduct and language, and that his supposed claims for indemnification against the British government, and their alleged injustice in disregarding them, were entirely visionary. But though, in all probability, the result to the unhappy man would have been the same, and public justice in the end would have required his execution, it must always be regarded with regret, as a stain upon British justice, that the motion made, and earnestly insisted in by his counsel, to have the trial postponed for some days, to obtain evidence from a distance to establish his insanity, was not acceded to; that a judicial proceeding, requiring beyond all others the most calm and deliberate consideration, should have been hurried over with a precipitance which, if not illegal, was at least unusual; and that so glorious an opportunity of exhibiting the triumph of justice over the strongest and most general feelings of resentment, should have been lost from a desire to accelerate, by a few days only, the trial of the criminal.*

This tragic event reopened to the Whigs the path to power; for not only was the most determined opponent of the most determined opponent of the Whigs, now removed, but a general wish was felt, and openly expressed in the nation, for the formation of an administration on an extended basis, which, sinking all minor points of dispute, and embracing the leading men of both parties, should combine the whole talent of the nation in one phalanx, for the prosecution of the great contest in which it was engaged. This idea, so natural and apparently feasible to men inexperienced in public affairs—so impracticable to all acquainted with their real character, and the vital questions on which irreconcilable differences exist between equally able and conscientious statesmen—had got at this period such hold of the minds of the people, that repeated motions were made in Parliament, after Mr. Perceval's death, for the formation of a cabinet embracing the leading men of ability in all parties. On the 20th of May, a motion for an address to the prince regent, praying him to construct a cabinet on this principle, brought forward by Mr. Stuart Wortley (now Lord Wharncliffe), and supported by the whole strength of the Whigs, was carried against ministers by a majority of four, the numbers being 174 to 170. The subject was afterward resumed with extraordinary anxiety, on more than one occasion, in both houses of Parliament; and in the course of these discussions it transpired, both that the prince regent had taken the most decisive steps to carry into effect the

* Parl. Deb., xxii., 38, 39. Ann. Reg., 1812, 129, 131.

† Ann. Reg., 1812, 75, 79. Parl. Deb., xxiii., 186, 199.

* State Trials, 1812, xvi., 341-7. Ann. Reg., 1812, Chron., 73, 75; 304, 307.

wishes of the nation, and that the grand difficulty which obstructed the formation of the united administration was the question of Catholic emancipation. Lord Wellesley first received a commission to form a government; and, when he failed, that arduous duty was intrusted to Lord Moira. Lord Wellesley professed his willingness to take office on the principle of concession to the Irish Romanists, of adequate vigour in the Peninsular war, and of a union of parties in the cabinet; but this principle the prince regent was not inclined to admit, and it was firmly rejected by Lord Liverpool and the Tories in office; and, after some discussion, his royal highness, through Earl Moira, conveyed a wish to Lords Grey and Grenville that they and their friends should form a leading part of the administration. Conferences took place accordingly: the differences about the Catholics of Ireland and the American war were got over; everything appeared on the eve of a satisfactory adjustment, and no obstacles remained to prevent the return of the Whigs to power, on all the principles for which they had so long contended, when the negotiation was suddenly broken off, and the Tories were once more firmly seated in office, by one of those unforeseen and trivial obstacles which so often, in the affairs of state, derange the calculations of the wisest statesmen, and yet decide the fate of nations.*

In the course of Earl Moira's discussions with Earl Grey and Lord Grenville, which from the first were conducted with the most perfect candour and good faith on both sides, a difficulty occurred as to the appointment of the great officers of the royal household which had not previously been anticipated, but proved fatal to the whole negotiation, and to which events in subsequent times have given an unlooked-for degree of interest. It had generally, though not always, been the practice for the chief officers of the household to be changed with an alteration of ministry, upon the principle that a government could not be supposed to possess the royal confidence, and must necessarily be hampered and restricted in its measures, when persons belonging to an opposite and hostile party were in daily, and almost hourly, communication, on the most intimate terms, with the sovereign. The Whig peers, in order to prevent such a difficulty arising in a more advanced stage of the administration, stated it as an indispensable condition of their accession to office, that they should enjoy the same privileges in this respect which had been exercised by their predecessors on similar occasions, and this preliminary led to secret conferences, more curious even than what passed at the public negotiations. "Are you prepared," said Lord Moira to the prince regent, "to concede the appointment of the household to the leaders of the new administration?" "I am," answered the prince. "Then," replied the chivalrous nobleman, "not one of your present servants shall be displaced: it is enough for the crown to yield the principle, without submitting also to the indignity of the removal." To complete the extraordinary chances which traversed this momentous negotiation, Mr. Sheridan, to whom Lord Yarmouth, on the part of the lords of the household, intrusted a message stating their readiness to solve the difficulty by resigning, delayed to deliver this mes-

sage till it was too late, in the hope of securing for his party a triumph over the throne; and Lord Moira, upon the part of the prince regent, declined to make any such concession a fundamental condition of the administration; and thus the negotiation was broken off.*

The prince, irritated at what he deemed an unwarrantable interference with the freedom of choice and personal comforts of the sovereign, and acting under the direction of Lord Moira, who thought he had yielded all that could be required of the crown, immediately appointed Lord Liverpool first lord of the treasury. All the existing ministers were continued in their places, including Lord Castlereagh in the important one of minister of foreign affairs; and the Tories, lately so near shipwreck, found themselves, from the strong intermixture of personal feeling in the failure of the negotiations which had excluded their rivals, more firmly seated in power than ever. Lord Yarmouth, the highest officer in the household, whose exclusion from office was probably the principal object which the Whig leaders had in view in insisting so much on this condition, afterward stated, in the House of Lords, that both he himself, and also all the other officers in the palace, were prepared to have resigned their offices the moment the arrangements for the formation of a new ministry were completed; and that all they wished for was, that they themselves and their sovereign should be saved the pain of a dismissal.†

In reflecting, with all the lights of subsequent experience, on the singular failure of this important negotiation, it is impossible to doubt that Lords Grey and Grenville were right in the conditions which they so firmly insisted on as a condition of their taking office. It is no doubt easy for the satirist to inveigh against the eagerness for patronage which induces public men, after all questions of policy and principles of government have been adjusted, to break off negotiations merely because they cannot agree upon who is to have the disposal of domestic appointments; and Mr. Sheridan had a fair subject for his ridicule when he said that his friends the Whigs had fairly outdone James II., for he had lost three crowns for a mass, whereas they had lost the government of three kingdoms for three white sticks. But all this notwithstanding, it is sufficiently clear that the Whigs, who could not have foreseen the intended resignation of the Tory officers of the household, were right in stipulating for a power, if necessary, to remove them. Household appointments, of no small moment even to private individuals, are of vital consequence to kings, and still more to queens. The strongest intellect is seldom able to withstand the incessant influence of adverse opinions, delicately and skilfully applied by persons in intimate confidence, and possessing numerous opportunities for successfully impressing them. If no man is a hero, still less is he a sage, to his *valet de chambre*. It is in vain to say that the private inclinations of the sovereign are to be consulted in preference to the wishes of his responsible ministers. Household appointments in a palace are, in truth, political situations, and must be in harmony with the principles of

* Personal information, and Lord Yarmouth's Speech, *Parl. Deb.*, xxiii., 423.

† Lord Yarmouth's Speech, *Parl. Deb.*, xxiii., 423; and *Papers*, *ibid.*, App., i., 43; and *Ann. Reg.*, 1812, 84, 90.

* *Parl. Deb.*, xxiii., 250, 381.

government which public opinion or external circumstances have rendered necessary for the country. To decide otherwise is to impose upon ministers the responsibility of office without its power, and hold up one government to the country as regulating its public concerns, while another is in secret directing all its movements.

But the failure of this momentous negotiation suggests another and a still more serious subject of consideration. All Vital interests at stake to Europe in this negotiation. in the great questions of policy, both in external and internal concerns, had been arranged between the sovereign and the new ministry. The difficulties of Catholic emancipation, the Peninsular contest, and American concession had been satisfactorily adjusted, and a vital change in the government and policy of the country on the point of taking place, when it was prevented, and Mr. Pitt's system continued as the ruling principle, by a mere contest about the appointment of three household officers! Yet what mighty interests, not only to Great Britain, but the human race, were then at stake; and what wondrous changes in the course of events must have ensued, if this seemingly Providential difference about the household officers had not arisen! The contest with France, after a duration of nearly twenty years, had at length reached its crisis. The rock of Sisyphus, rolled with such difficulty to the summit of the steep, was about to recoil. The negotiation with the Whigs was broken off on the 6th of June. On the 13th of the same month, Wellington crossed the Portuguese frontier and commenced the campaign of Salamanca;* while, on the 23d, Napoleon passed the Niemen, and threw his crown and his life on the precarious issue of a Russian invasion.† The expulsion of the French from the Peninsula, the catastrophe of Moscow, the resurrection of Europe, were on the eve of commencing, when the continued fidelity of England to the cause of freedom hung on the doubtful balance of household appointments!

If a change of ministry had taken place at that time, the destinies of the world would probably have been changed. The Whigs, fettered by their continued protestations against the war, could not, with any regard to consistency, have prosecuted it with vigour. Their unvarying prophecies of disaster from the Peninsular contest would have paralyzed all the national efforts in support of Wellington; their continued declamations on the necessity of peace would have led them to embrace the first opportunity of coming to an accommodation with Napoleon. Alexander, mindful of their refusal of succour after the battle of Eylau, would have been shaken in his resolution after the battle of Borodino. Sweden, unsupported by English subsidies, would not have ventured to swerve from the French alliance. The occupation of Moscow would have led to a submission destructive of the liberties of Europe; or the retreat, unthreatened from the north, would have been spared half its horrors; at latest, peace would have been concluded with the French emperor at Prague. Wellington would have been withdrawn with barren laurels from the Peninsula, Europe yet groaning under the yoke of military power, and the dynasty of

Napoleon still upon the throne. In contemplating the intimate connexion of such marvellous results with the apparently trivial question of household appointments in the royal palace of Great Britain, the reflecting observer, according to the temper of his mind, will indulge in the vein of pleasantry or the sentiment of thankfulness. The disciples of Voltaire, recollecting how a similar court intrigue arrested the course of Marlborough's victories in one age, and prolonged the popular rule in Great Britain in another, will inveigh against the subjection of human affairs to the direction of chance, the caprice of sovereigns, or the arts of courtiers; while the Christian philosopher, impressed with the direction of all earthly things by an Almighty hand, will discern, in these apparently trivial events, the unobserved springs of Supreme intelligence; and conclude that, as much as royal partialities may be the unconscious instruments of reward to an upright and strenuous, they may be the ministers of retribution to a selfish and corrupted, age.

George IV., who, probably from personal rather than public considerations, was led to take this important step in the outset of his government, had the good fortune to wield the sceptre of Great Britain during the most glorious reign in its long and memorable annals, and yet no sovereign ever owed so little to his own individual wisdom or exertions. The triumphs which have rendered his age immortal were prepared by other hands, and matured in a severer discipline. It was his good fortune to succeed to the throne at a time when the seeds sown by the wisdom of preceding statesmen, the valour of former warriors, and the steadiness of the last monarch, were beginning to come to maturity; and thus he reaped the harvest prepared, in great part, by the labours of others. Yet justice must assign him a considerable place in the august temple of glory constructed during his reign: if the foundation had been laid, and the structure was far advanced when he was called to its direction, he had the merit of putting the last hand to the immortal fabric. To the vast and unprecedented exertions made by Great Britain towards the close of the contest he gave his cordial concurrence; he resisted the seducing offers of peace when they could have led only to an armed neutrality; and, by his steady adherence to the principles of the grand alliance, contributed in no slight degree to keep together its discordant elements when they were ready to fall to pieces amid the occasional disasters and frequent jealousies of the last years of the war. The unprecedented triumphs with which it concluded, and the profound peace which has since followed, left little room for external exploits during the remainder of his reign; and the monarch was of too indolent a disposition, and too limited a range of intellectual vision, to influence those momentous internal changes which ensued, or take any part either in advancing or retarding the vast revolution of general thought which succeeded to the excitement and animation of the war. Yet history must at least award to him the negative merit of having done nothing to accelerate the changes which grew up with such extraordinary rapidity during that period, so fertile in intellectual innovation; of having been the last man in his dominions who assented to that momentous change in their religious institutions which first loosened the solid fabric of the British Empire, and of having left to his succe-

* Curw., ix., 258.

† Fain, i., 163.

sors the Constitution in state, at a period when it was seriously menaced by domestic distress and general delusion, unimpaired either by tyrannical encroachments or Democratic innovations.

If, from the comparatively blameless and glorious picture of George IV.'s public disposition and administration, we turn to the details of his private life, and the features of his individual character, we shall find less to approve and more to condemn. Yet even there some alleviating circumstances may be found; and the British nation, in the calamities which hereafter may ensue from the failure of the direct line of succession, can discern only the natural result of the restrictions, equally impolitic and unjust, which it has imposed, in their dearest concerns, on the feelings of its sovereigns. His talents were of no ordinary kind, and superior to those of any of his family. It is impossible to see the busts of the sons of George III. in Chantrey's gallery, without being at once convinced that the Prince of Wales had the most intellectual head of the group.* His tastes were cultivated; he had a high admiration for the great works of painting; his ear in music was exquisite; and although his passion in architecture was rather for the splendour of internal decoration than the majesty of external effect, yet the stately halls of Windsor will long remain an enduring monument of his patronage of art in its highest branches. The jealousy which generally exists between the ruling sovereign and heir-apparent early brought him into close connexion with the leaders of the Whig party; and, for nearly fifteen years, Carlton House was the grand rendezvous of all the statesmen, wits, and beauties whom jealousy of the reigning power had thrown into the arms of the opposition. This circumstance had a material influence on his future character. Accustomed from his earliest youth to the society, not merely of the most elegant, but the most intellectual men of his age; the companion not less than the friend of Burke and Fox, of Grey and Sheridan, he soon acquired that skill and delicacy in conversation which such intercourse alone can communicate, and shone with the reflected light which so often, in those habituated to such society, dazzles the inexperienced beholder, and supplies, at least during the hours of social intercourse, the want of original thought or solid acquirements. Yet his talents were not entirely imbibed from the brilliant circle by which he was surrounded. His perceptions were quick; his abilities, when fairly roused either by the animation of conversation or the lustre of external events, considerable; and many of his holograph letters are a model of occasional felicity both in thought and expression.† His features were handsome; his

figure, in youth, graceful and commanding; and both then, and when it was injured in maturer years by the hereditary corpulence of his family, his manners were so perfectly finished, that he was universally admitted to deserve the title which he acquired, of the first gentleman in Europe.

But with these, no inconsiderable qualities, it is true, in a sovereign, the meed of praise due to his memory is exhausted, and there remains nothing but to do justice to the faults, and draw no screen over the many frailties of his character. Thrown from the outset of life into the vortex of dissipation, without the necessity for exertion, which, in an humbler rank, or on a more arbitrary throne, so often counteracts its pernicious effects, he soon became an ardent votary of pleasure; and, without descending to the degrading habits to which that propensity often leads, he only rendered its sway, on this account, the more tyrannical and destructive to his character. Profuse, extravagant, and unreflecting, he not only was, throughout his whole life before he mounted the throne, drowned in debt, but the systematic pursuit of refined enjoyment involved him in many discreditable and unfeeling, some dishonourable acts. Dissipation and profligacy in youth, indeed, are so usual in princes, and arise so readily from the society with which they are surrounded, that they are to such persons peculiarly difficult of resistance; but the passions of George IV., fretting against the unjust restrictions of the Marriage Act, led him into delinquencies of a more serious kind. His conduct towards Queen Caroline, whatever the demerits of that princess may have been, was unpardonable; for it began to be unjust before those demerits could have been known, and continued to be unfeeling after misfortune had exalted them by suffering; and if it be true, as is generally believed, that he gained possession of the person of a most amiable and superior woman, Mrs. Fitzherbert, by a fictitious or elusory marriage ceremony, and afterward made, as he certainly did, his friends in Parliament deny its existence, and subsequently deserted her, he was guilty of an act which passion cannot extenuate, and royalty should not excuse. The last days of this fortunate monarch and systematic voluptuary were chiefly spent at Windsor, in the seclusion of elegant society, intermingled with the brilliancy of conversational talent; and if its noble halls were the scene of meretricious ascendant, at least they were not disgraced by open profligacy: decency and seclusion threw a veil over irregular connexions; and justice must admit that subjection to female charms was, in his case, more than usually pardonable, from the unjust laws which had deprived him of a free choice in virtuous attachments, and the calamitous union which had denied him the blessings of domestic and filial love.

It is a singular circumstance that the statesman who, with his sovereign, was thus elevated to the helm at a crisis of unexampled difficulty, and when pool the national prospects were, to all appearance, gloomy in the extreme, was almost from the moment of his elevation borne forward on an uninterrupted flood of success; and that, though

with such a general. You have sent me, among the trophies of your unrivalled fame, the staff of a French marshal, and I send you, in return, that of England."—*THE PRINCE REGENT TO WELLINGTON, 3d July, 1813, GURWOOD I. 532.*

* This is decisively established by the testimony of no ordinary observer, and certainly no partial judge. "It may give you pleasure," said Lord Byron to Sir Walter Scott, "to hear that the prince regent's eulogium on you to me was conveyed in language which would only suffer by my attempting to transcribe it; and with a tone and taste which gave me a very high idea of his abilities and accomplishments, which I had hitherto considered as confined to *manners*, certainly superior to those of any living gentleman."—*LORD BYRON TO SIR WALTER SCOTT, July 6, 1812, LOCKHART'S Life of Scott, ii., 402.*

† The following holograph note from the prince regent to the Duke of Wellington accompanied the appointment of the latter as field-marshal after the battle of Victoria: "Your glorious conduct is above all human praise, and far above my reward. I know no language the world affords worthy to express it. I feel I have nothing left to say, but devoutly to offer up my prayer of gratitude to Providence that it has, in its omnipotent bounty, blessed my country and myself

inferior in capacity to many of the great characters who had preceded him in the struggle, he exceeded them all in the felicity of his career, and the glorious events which, under his administration, were so deeply engraved on the monuments of history. Much of this extraordinary prosperity is doubtless to be ascribed to his singular good fortune. He had the almost unprecedented felicity of being called to the highest place in government at the very time when the tide, which is ever discernible in the affairs of men, was beginning to turn; when the stream-flow of Napoleon's triumphs was turning into ebb; and when the constancy of Britain, long conspicuous in adverse, was to be rewarded by the gales of prosperous fortune. Like his royal master George IV., he thus reaped, with little exertion of his own, the fruits of the seeds sown by the efforts of others; and was called, during his long ministry, rather to moderate the vices consequent on excessive prosperity, than to sustain the national spirit under the trials of long-continued and searching adversity.

Justice, however, must assign to Lord Liverpool, if not the highest, at least a considerable place among the great men who threw such imperishable glory over the annals of Britain during the latter period of the war. His capacity could not have been the least, who stood foremost in rank through those memorable years: granting to Alexander, Wellington, and Castlereagh the merit of having been the main instruments in the deliverance of Europe, the British premier may at least justly lay claim to the subordinate but important merit of having strenuously supported their efforts, and furnished them with the means of achieving such important triumphs. His judgment in counsel, temper in debate, and conciliation in diplomacy, seconded admirably their heroic efforts. The resources brought by England to bear upon the fortunes of Europe at the close of the struggle were unexampled since the beginning of the world; and if the spirit of the nation put them at his disposal, no small wisdom and skill were displayed in the use which he made of them. Notwithstanding all their successes, the allied sovereigns were sometimes, from the jealousies and separate interests inherent in so vast a coalition, exposed to serious divisions; and on these occasions the judgment and prudence of Lord Liverpool were of the highest service to the common cause. He could not be called a powerful debater, and his speeches made little impression at the time on either house of Parliament, but they abounded in matter and sound argument, and few afford, on a retrospect, a more luminous view of the principles which swayed the government at many of the most important periods of the war. His private life was irreproachable, his domestic habits pure and amiable; and, like all the great statesmen of that heroic period, he long held the highest offices, and disposed of uncounted wealth, without a spot upon his integrity, or having conferred a more than moderate share of patronage on his connexions.

He held a respectable place, however, in the second class of statesmen only, and did not belong to the master-spirits of mankind. He had not sufficient vigour of character or reliance on his own judgment to take a decided line in any arduous crisis. His maxim always was to temporize and avoid difficulties, rather than brave the danger in the outset. Under a calm and dignified de-

portment, and the most unruffled suavity in debate, he concealed an anxiety of temper and dread of responsibility, which appeared conspicuous at the council board, and rendered him unfit to hold the helm in any period of real danger. He had neither the ardour of genius, nor the strength of intellect, nor the heroism of valour in his character. Clear-sighted as to immediate, his vision was defective as to remoter dangers. Judicious and prudent in counsel in ordinary times, he was a dangerous adviser in cases of difficulty, and exercised a ruinous influence on the ultimate fortunes of his country. He was mainly instrumental in introducing, after the close of the war, that seductive policy which purchases present popularity by sacrificing future resources, and wins the applause of the existing multitude by risking the censure of the thinking in every future age. The popularity, accordingly, of his government, during the fifteen years that he remained prime-minister, was unprecedented; opposition seemed to have disappeared in Parliament, as it was thought to have expired in the country. But, amid all these seductive appearances, the elements of future discord were preparing: the sinking fund was fatally encroached upon, amid the general applause of the unthinking multitude; indirect taxes, the pillar of public credit, were repealed to an unnecessary and ruinous extent; a vast and uncalled-for monetary change spread unheard-of discontent through the industrious classes; the people were habituated to the pernicious flattery that their voice is wisdom, and must be obeyed; and out of the calm which was thought to be perpetual arose the tornado which changed the Constitution.

The year 1811 beheld the extinction of the absurd and exaggerated discontent against the Duke of York, which, for factious purposes, had been raised two years before. Colonel Warde, the principal agent in producing the clamour, had long since returned to obscurity; the want of the duke's long acquaintance with the business of the Horse Guards, and active zeal for the interests of the army, had long been severely felt; and on the 25th of May, 1811, after somewhat more than two years spent in a private station, he was again, with the general concurrence of the nation, and the universal approbation of the army, reinstated in his office of commander-in-chief, which he held during the whole remainder of the war. The subject was brought forward by Lord Milton in Parliament shortly after it occurred; but the result only tended to demonstrate, in the most decisive manner, the total revolution which public opinion had undergone regarding it. The debate was feebly conducted on the part of the opposition: when Lord Milton put the case hypothetically, that "the duke might have been the victim of a foul conspiracy," a universal cheer burst from all parts of the house, and the motion to have the appointment censured was negatived by a majority of 249, the numbers being 296 to 47.* If any doubt could exist on the justice as well as expedience of this step, it would be removed by the contemporary testimony of Wellington. "I rejoice most sincerely," said he, "at the reappointment of the Duke of York as commander-in-chief. The arrangement is not less a matter of justice to him than of benefit to

Restoration of
the Duke of
York to the
command of
the army, May
25, 1811.

* Ann. Reg., 1811, 72, 74. Parl. Deb., ix., 470, 510

the public interests; and it has been so admirably timed, that the motion of Lord Milton is likely to be advantageous to the duke's character."*

Two circumstances, during the years 1810 and 1811, convulsed the internal frame of society to an extraordinary degree, and are deserving of notice even in a general history. These were the Parliamentary proceedings against Sir Francis Burdett for contempt of the House of Commons, and the general distress which led to the Luddite disturbances.

SIR FRANCIS BURDETT is a statesman who, Character of for nearly half a century, has taken Sir Francis so prominent a part in English Parliamentary history, that he deserves a place in the portrait-gallery of the age. Endowed by nature with no ordinary talents, an accomplished scholar, an eloquent speaker, an indefatigable senator, the master of a splendid fortune, and connected, both by position in society and family alliances, with the higher branches of the nobility, he was yet, for the greater part of his political career, the ardent friend of the people—the adored, often rash and dangerous, champion of popular rights—a zealous advocate for Parliamentary reform in its widest sense—an extended suffrage, Catholic emancipation, and all the objects which the extreme section of the Whig party had at heart. But he was, at the same time, at bottom a sincere friend to the monarchy, and pursued these objects from a belief, sincere and honest, though now proved to be mistaken, that such changes, even if pushed to their utmost limits, were not inconsistent with the security of property, the stability of the altar, the existence of the throne. A sense of this error caused him, in the close of life, after the effect of the Reform Bill had become apparent, to join the Conservative ranks; but at the period with which we are now engaged, he was the most furious opponent of the oligarchy who, he conceived, directed the national councils; and "England's pride and Westminster's glory," as he was termed by his potwalloping constituents in that borough, was ever in the foremost ranks of those who declaimed with most asperity against ministerial influence or parliamentary corruption.

He had long inveighed, in no measured strains, His libel on against the Tory majority by which the House of the proceedings of the House of Commons. Commons were controlled; but as most of these declamations were pronounced within the walls of Parliament, they were beyond the reach of animadversion. At length, however, he laid himself open to attack in a more vulnerable quarter. A violent Democrat, named John Gale Jones, had published a resolution of a debating-club, of which he was president, which the House of Commons deemed a libel Feb. 21. on their proceedings, and that assembly had, in consequence, sent him to Newgate for breach of privilege. Sir Francis more than once brought this matter under the consideration of the house, and strongly contended, though in vain, that Parliament had no legal power to punish a person of their own authority for an offence cognizable in the ordinary courts of justice, even though it did contain a libel on their proceedings; and that the warrant of commitment was illegal, and a breach of the liberties of the subject. The house March 24. overruled these arguments by a majority of 153 to 14. Upon this, Sir Francis publish-

ed a letter to his constituents in Cobbett's *Weekly Register*, which, among other passages of strong invective, declared that the real question was, "Whether our liberties be still to be secured to us by the laws of our forefathers, or to lie at the absolute mercy of a part of our fellow-subjects, collected together by means which it is not necessary for me to describe. They have become, by burgrave tenure, the proprietors of the whole Legislature, and in that capacity, inflated with their highflown and fanciful ideas of majesty, they assume the sword of prerogative, and lord it equally over the king and people!"*

The House of Commons, upon this letter being brought before them, passed a resolution, by a majority of 190 to 152, that Sir Francis be committed to the Tower. His committal to the Tower, and consequent riots. March 26. Great doubts were entertained, in the first instance, by the speaker, whether his warrant, which was immediately issued, would authorize the breaking open of Sir Francis's house, which was barricaded, and where he remained without moving out. The attorney-general (Sir V. Gibbs), however, gave it as his opinion that entry might be made good by force, if it could not otherwise be obtained; and the sergeant-at-arms, accordingly, on the day following, forced his way in by the aid of a police force, supported on the outside by the military. Sir Francis was found in his library, surrounded by his family, and employed in making his son translate *Magna Charta*. Having made such a show of resistance as to demonstrate that he yielded to compulsion, he was conveyed, under a military escort, to the Tower, where he remained a prisoner till the close of the session of Parliament. Serious riots occurred, and some lives were lost on the evening of the day on which the imprisonment took place, chiefly in consequence of an erroneous report which was spread that the Tower guns had fired upon the people. Sir Francis afterward wrote an intemperate letter to the speaker on the alleged illegality of the proceeding, which, however, the house had the good sense, having exhausted their powers of chastisement, to pass over without farther notice. Meanwhile, the imprisoned baronet received a great variety of addresses from various popular assemblies in the kingdom, and the House of Commons was deluged with petitions for his liberation; but they continued firm, and Sir Francis remained in confinement till the prorogation of Parliament, when the power of the assembly which committed him having ceased, he was, of course, liberated. Great preparations for his triumphal procession through the city to his residence in Piccadilly were made May 21. by the populace, and serious apprehensions of disturbances were entertained; but he had the good sense or humanity not to bring his partisans into the risk which such a demonstration would have occasioned, by returning privately to his house by water. He afterward brought actions at law against the speaker of the House of Commons, for damages on account of illegal seizure, house-breaking, and imprisonment; and against Lord Moira, the governor of the Tower, for unwarrantable detention; and the case was argued with the greatest ability, by the attorney-general on the one side, and Sergeant (afterward Mr. Justice) Holroyd on the other. The Court of King's Bench, however, sustained the de-

* Wellington to Torrens, June 29, 1811, *Gurw.*, viii., 61.

* Ann. Reg., 1810, 92, 99.

fence for both, that they acted under the orders of a competent authority, and that the privileges of Parliament had not been exceeded, and could not be questioned in a court of law.*

Upon this case it has been observed by Mr. Coleridge, "The House of Commons must of course have the power of taking cognizance of offences against its own rights. Sir Francis Burdett might have been properly sent to the Tower for the speech which he made to the house; but when, afterward, he published them in Cobbett, and they took cognizance of it as a breach of privilege, they violated the plain distinction between privilege and law. As a speech in the house, the house could alone animadvert upon it, consistently with the effective preservation of its most necessary prerogative of freedom of debate; but when that speech became a book, then the law was to look upon it; and there being a law of libel commensurate with every possible object of attack in the state, privilege, which acts, or ought to act, only as a substitute for other laws, could have nothing to do with it."†

In these observations of the philosophic sage there is much subject for anxious reflection in the breast of every friend to real freedom. It is the essential characteristic of such a blessing, that it renders law omnipotent, and personal privilege quiescent: the monarch may punish an insult offered to his authority, but he must do so by prosecutions in his own courts of law, and by proving the accused party guilty before a jury of his subjects. There is not only the same, but a much stronger reason, why a numerous assembly of the Legislature should be constrained to enforce the respect due to their authority or deliberations when insulted out of their own presence, and not at the moment interfering with their own discussions, in the same way; for in their case numbers destroy responsibility without conferring wisdom; while ambition weakens the sense of justice without adding to the capacity for judgment. In this respect there is no difference whether the assembly is of a popular or aristocratic class; whether it is subject to the caprices of a tyrant majority, or swayed by the influence of a corrupt court: human nature is always the same, and the danger of tyranny is not the less formidable that its powers are wielded by a multitude of tyrants. Under pretence of maintaining the inviolability of their own privileges, a despotic assembly may entirely extinguish those of their subjects. While professing for themselves the most unbounded freedom of discussion, they may crush all fearless examination of their conduct by others. Diminution of respect, degradation of authority, need never be apprehended from the Legislature claiming no superiority in this respect over the sovereign or the judges of the land: the makers of laws never stand on so lofty a pedestal as when they acknowledge the paramount authority, in their application, of the courts by whom they are administered; they never descend so low as when they set the first example of violating that general equality which they have proclaimed for their subjects.‡

* Parl. Deb., xvi., 454, 630. Ann. Reg., 1810, 106, 110; and App. to Chron., 265, 267.

† Table-talk, i., 8, 9.

‡ "In the multitude of counsellors," says Solomon, "there is safety." "Yes," said Dr. Gregory; "but it is safety to the counsellors, not the counselled."

§ The author cannot dismiss this subject without offering his tribute of praise to the dignified firmness of Mr. Sheriff Evans and Mr. Sheriff Wheelton, who, in 1840, have so nobly

The popular discontents excited by this ill-timed and doubtfully-founded assertion of the powers of sovereignty by the House of Commons, were augmented to an alarming degree by the general distress which prevailed in the manufacturing districts of Great Britain during the latter part of the year 1810 and the whole of 1811. Various causes contributed to produce this distressing result; but among them the least influence is to be imputed to the Continental system of Napoleon, to which his panegyrists are willing to ascribe the whole. The real causes were very different, and either arose necessarily from the progress of society, or might have been easily avoided by a more prudent policy on the part of the British merchants and government. Machinery at that period had taken one of its great starts in the application of its powers to manufacturing industry. The mule and the spinning-jenny; the vast improvements of Arkwright and Cartwright had been added to the immortal discovery of Watt; and the operative classes, in great part deprived of their employment by the change, brooded in sullen exasperation at innovations which they regarded, not without some show of reason, as destructive of the subsistence of themselves and their families. The vast export trade, which had risen to the unprecedented amount of nearly £47,000,000 sterling in the year 1809, in consequence of the withdrawal of the French coast-guard from Northern Germany to restore the fortunes of the Empire on the Danube, had engendered a spirit of speculation which regarded the exports to Continental Europe as unbounded, and terminated in a cruel reverse, from the confiscation of a fleet of above three hundred merchantmen, having on board goods to an immense amount, in the Baltic, in November, 1810, by order of the Emperor of Russia. But, above all, the natural irritation of the American government at the unbounded vexations to which they were exposed by both the belligerent powers from the operation of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, and the orders in council, had produced, on the part of the government of the United States, the Non-intercourse Act in February, 1811, whereby all commercial connexion, both with France and England, was terminated, and the vast market of the United States, worth all other foreign markets put together, which took off British manufactures to the amount of above thirteen millions sterling, was entirely lost. To complete the causes of general distress which then pressed upon the nation, the harvests of 1810 and 1811 were so deficient that in the last of these years the importation amounted to 1,471,000 quarters, to purchase which the enormous sum of £4,271,000, chiefly in specie, was drained out of the country.* These causes, joined to the excessive drain of specie arising from the vast expenditure and boundless necessities of the war, both in Germany and the Peninsula, in the year 1809, produced a very great degree of commercial distress through the whole of 1811; and the reality of the defalcation, and the alarming decline in the market for our manufacturing industry, appeared in the most decisive manner from the returns of exports, which sunk in that year to twenty-eight millions, being fifteen millions less than they had been in the

General distress in the manufacturing districts in 1811, and its causes.

bly vindicated these privileges, and have obtained, in consequence, a distinguished place in the glorious pantheon of British patriots.

* Parl. Deb., xxi., 178

preceding year, and much lower than they had sunk since the renewal of the war.*†

So general and pressing was the public distress, and so overwhelming, in particular, the embarrassments in by Parliament. which the commercial classes were February 14. involved, that Parliament, in the spring of 1811, with great propriety, following the example of 1793, came forward for their relief. In March of that year, the chancellor of the exchequer brought forward a bill for the purpose of authorizing government to issue exchequer bills to the mercantile classes to the extent of six millions sterling, the advances to be repaid by instalments at nine and twelve months after receipt. This resolution was agreed to without a division; and, although not more than half of this large sum was actually required or taken up by the community, yet the fact of government coming forward in this way had a most important effect in upholding commercial credit, and preventing the occurrence of one of those panics, so common in subsequent times, which might have proved extremely dangerous, at that political crisis, to the Empire. Little of the money thus advanced was ultimately lost to the community; but it must always be considered as an act highly honourable to the British government, that, at a period when they were oppressed by a sinking exchequer and an increasing war expenditure, they came forward with this splendid advance to sustain the mercantile credit, and assuage the manufacturing distress of the community.‡

It may readily be conceived what wide-spread internal distress and discontent so prodigious a diminution in the colonial and manufacturing exports of the kingdom must have occasioned, especially when coming in the nineteenth year of the war, and to a nation already overburdened with excessive and universal taxation. The unhappy operatives who were thrown out of employment, suffering severe distress, and incapable of extending their vision to the wide and far-distant causes which had concurred to produce these calamitous results, conceived that their distresses were owing to the introduction of machinery into the manufactories, and would be relieved by their destruction. A wide-spread conspiracy was, in consequence, formed for the destruction of the obnoxious frames, which, originating in the weaving districts of Nottinghamshire, soon spread to the adjoining counties of Derby and Leicester, and involved a large part of the manufacturing zone of England in riot and alarm. Open assemblages of the disaffected, and undisguised violence, took place; but these excesses were speedily suppressed by the interposition of the military; and the conspirators, who acted in concert, and took the name of Luddites, from that of General Ludd, their imaginary leader, adopted the more dangerous system of assembling secretly at night, quickly completing the work of destruction, and imme-

diately dispersing before either their persons could be identified, or assistance from the nearest military station procured.*

At length, in the winter of 1811 and the spring of 1812, the evil rose to such a height, especially in the great and a height, and populous county of York, that it at- are suppressed. tracted the serious attention of both houses of Parliament. Secret committees were appointed, in consequence, who collected a large mass of evidence, and made reports of great value on the subject. From the information obtained, it appeared that, though this illegal confederacy had its ramifications through all the central counties of England where manufactures were established, and was organized in the most efficient manner to effect the objects of the conspirators, yet it was almost entirely confined to persons in the very lowest ranks of life, and was rather directed to the immediate objects of riot and plunder than any general or systematic change in the frame of government. A bill, limited, however, in its duration to the 1st of January, 1814, Feb. 26. was passed into a law, rendering the breaking of frames a capital offence; and with such energy was this law carried into operation, that no less than seventeen men were condemned to death, and executed in the courtyard of the castle of York, at one time, for crimes connected with these disturbances. This dreadful but necessary example had the effect of stopping these dangerous riots, which, like other undisguised inroads on life and property, however formidable in the vicinity where they occur, are never dangerous in a national point of view, if not aided by the pusillanimity or infatuation of the middle and higher ranks; and before the end of the year all disposition even to these excesses died away under the cheering influence of the extended market for manufacturing industry, which arose from the opening of the Baltic harbours, and the animating events of the Russian campaign.†

Among the senators in the opposition ranks who distinguished themselves by their Character of resistance to this increase, even for a Sir Samuel limited period, of the number of capi- Romilly. tal offences in the English law, and who devoted the energies of a powerful mind and the warmth of a benevolent heart, to the end of his life, to effect a reduction in its sanguinary enactments, was SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY. This great lawyer, and truly estimable statesman, was of French descent; but his parents had settled in London, where his father carried on business as a jeweller; and he had the merit of raising himself, by his unaided exertions, from the respectable but comparatively humble sphere in which they moved, to the most exalted station and society. He was called to the bar in 1783; and it was impossible that his perseverance and logical precision of argument could have failed of raising him to eminence in that profession, where talent, in the end, never fails to overbear all competition; and he was highly distinguished, and in great practice in Chancery, before he was heard of beyond the legal circles of the metropolis. His reputation, however, at length procured for him more elevated destinies: in 1806 he was made solicitor-general by Mr. Fox, and elevated to the rank of knighthood; and at the same time he took his seat in Parliament as one of the members for Queensborough, thus adding another to

* Porter's Rise, &c., of Britain, ii., 98. Parl. Deb., xxi., 1094, 1163.

† Exports (official value) from 1808 to 1812:

	Foreign and Colonies.	British and Irish.	Total.
1808,	£5,776,775	£24,611,215	£30,387,990
1809,	12,750,523	33,542,274	46,292,632
1810,	9,357,435	34,061,901	43,419,336
1811,	6,117,720	22,681,400	28,799,120
1812,	9,533,065	29,508,508	39,041,573

—PORTER'S Rise and Progress of the Nation, ii., 98.

‡ Parl. Deb., xix., 327, 350.

VOL. III.—B B B

* Ann. Reg., 1812, 35, 38. Parl. Deb., xxi., 807, 820.

† Ann. Reg., 1812, 35, 38, 132. Chron., 17, 80. Parl. Deb., xxi., 807, 840.

the long array of illustrious men, on both sides of politics, who have been ushered into public life through the portals of the nomination boroughs, which the Reform Bill has now forever closed. He took an active part in many of the most important debates which subsequently occurred in Parliament, particularly those on the slave-trade, the regency, and Catholic emancipation; and he had already attempted, and in part effected, a great improvement in the law of bankruptcy,* when his attention was attracted by the state of the criminal law, to the amelioration of which, during the remainder of his Parliamentary career, his efforts were chiefly directed.†

His political principles were those of the Whig party; but he was alike free, by character and professional success, from factious ambition; and the improvement of the human race was the object for which his philanthropic heart beat to the latest hour of his existence. Exemplary and affectionate in the relations of private life, he contrived, in the midst of all the labours and anxieties consequent on his legal and Parliamentary career, to find time for domestic society. The seventh day of rest was never broken in upon by his labours; and when making twelve thousand a year at the bar, and actively discharging his duties in the House of Commons, he contrived to keep up his acquaintance with all the literature of the day, as well as the studies of his earlier years: a fact which, however inexplicable to those who are unaccustomed to such exertions, is verified by every day's experience of those who are; and which arises from the circumstance that, to the mind trained to intellectual toil, recreation arises rather from change of employment, or a new direction to thought, than entire cessation from labour.

The condition of the English criminal law at this period was, indeed, such as to call for the serious attention of every friend to his country and mankind. Political power having for a long, almost immemorial period, been really vested in the wealthier classes, either of the landed or commercial orders, penal legislation had been mainly directed to the punishment of the crimes which had been found by experience to be dangerous to their possessions, and had, in consequence, been founded on no principle and regulated by no justice. Every interest in the state, during the course of several centuries, had by turns enjoyed influence sufficient to procure the passing of laws denouncing capital punishments against the perpetrators of crimes peculiarly hostile to its own property; and these successive additions to the penal code were silently acquiesced in by all other classes, upon the understanding that a similar protection would be extended to them when circumstances seemed to render it necessary. Thus the landholders, whose influence had so long been predominant in the Chapel of St. Stephen's, had obtained a huge addition to the catalogue of capital punishments for offences trenching on their freeholds. The trading classes had been equally diligent in having the punishment of death affixed to theft from the person, within shops, or from warehouses or manufactories. Shipmasters and merchants had done the same for the protection of their interests; and so strongly were the dangers of forgery felt in a mercantile community, that it

had come to pass into a sort of axiom, which obtained universal assent, that nothing but that terrible sanction could preserve from fearful invasion the rights of the great body of traders throughout the Empire.

The result of this separate and selfish system of legislation had come to be, that Results which in 1809, when Sir Samuel Romilly had arisen from its neglect. ly set about the reformation of this bloodstained code, the punishment of death was by statute affixed to above six hundred different crimes, while the increasing humanity of the age had induced so wide a departure from the strict letter of the law, that, out of eighteen hundred and seventy-two persons capitally convicted at the Old Bailey in seven years, from 1803 to 1810, only one had been executed. All those concerned in the prosecution of offences combined their efforts to mitigate in practice its sanguinary enactments. Individuals injured declined to give information or prosecute, unless in cases of serious injury, or when their passions were strongly aroused; witnesses hung back from giving explicit evidence at the trials, lest their consciences should be haunted by the recollection of what they deemed, often not without reason, as little better than judicial murder; jurymen made light of their oaths, and introduced a most distressing uncertainty into the result of criminal prosecutions; and even judges often caught at the evanescent distinctions which the acuteness of lawyers had made between offences, and willingly admitted the subtleties which were to save the offender's life. The consequence was, that not more than two thirds of the persons committed for trial were convicted; the remainder, after contracting the whole contagion of a prison, were let loose upon the world, matured in all the habits of iniquity; and the depraved criminals, seeing so many chances of escape, before and after apprehension, ceased to have any serious fears for the uncertain penalties of criminal justice.*

The principles, on the other hand, for which Sir Samuel Romilly, and, after his lamented death in 1818, Sir James Mackintosh contended, were, that the essential quality of criminal law, without which all its provisions would be of little avail, was certainty; that, to attain this, the cordial co-operation of all classes of society, as well as the activity of the constable and the diligence of the prosecutor, was requisite; that this co-operation could never be secured unless the punishments affixed by law to offences were such as to offer no violence to the feelings of justice which are found in every bosom; and that these feelings would never have been implanted so strongly as they are in the human heart, if the interests of society had required their perpetual violation. These principles, which require only to be stated to command the cordial assent of every intelligent mind, have since been fully carried into effect in every part of Great Britain: the penalty of death has come to be practically abolished for almost every offence except murder; and secondary punishments have been apportioned out, as accurately as the vast simultaneous growth of crime rendered practicable, to the real merits of the offences to which they were affixed. If the result has hitherto exhibited no diminution, but, on the contrary, been copresent

Principles for which Sir Samuel Romilly and Sir James Mackintosh contended.

* 46 Geo. III., c. 135.

† Romilly's Speeches and Memoir, i., 29.

‡ Personal knowledge.

* Romilly's Speech, Feb. 9, 1810, Speeches, i., 106, 107. Parl. Deb., xvi., 366, 372.

with a vast increase in the sum-total of delinquencies, it has, at least, produced a most gratifying decrease in the more atrocious and violent offences; a much greater degree of certainty has been introduced into criminal proceedings; and in Scotland in particular, where the system of penal jurisprudence has long been established on a far better footing than in England, the certainty of punishment to the guilty, and of acquittal to the innocent, has attained a height unparalleled in any other age or country of the globe.* With the diminution of its sanguinary enactments, however, the English criminal law has felt the difficulty of secondary penalties: the multitude of convicts who required transportation has caused the evils and sufferings of the penal settlements to increase in an alarming degree; and society at home, overburdened with a flood of juvenile delinquency, has long laboured under the evils of inadequate jail accommodation, for which all the efforts of philanthropy, and all the improvements of prison discipline, have hitherto proved an inadequate remedy.

Important in their ultimate effects as were these beginnings of interior reformation, of which society, from the important changes which it underwent during the progress of the war, stood so much in need, they yet yielded, in the magnitude of their present consequences, to the three great subjects of internal debate in Parliament and the nation during the years 1811 and 1812, viz.: the Question of the Currency, the Repeal of the Orders in Council, and the Prosecution of the War in the Peninsula.

It had been already noticed† how Mr. Pitt, driven by hard necessity, had adopted the momentous step of suspending cash payments in February, 1797; and that, after more than one temporary act had been passed, postponing the period for their resumption, it was at length enacted, by the 44 Geo. III., c. 1, that the restriction in favour of the Bank should continue till six months after the conclusion of a general peace. Allusion has also been more than once made to the prodigious effect which this unavoidable measure had in raising prices and vivifying industry during the war; and no one can doubt that it was in the great extension of the currency, which took place from 1797 to 1810; that the resources were mainly found, which provided both for the long-continued efforts with which it was attended, and the gigantic expenditure of its later years. Now that the true principles which regulate this important subject have, from long and dear-bought experience, come to be so well understood, it may readily be conceived how the increase of the Bank issues, from eleven millions in spring, 1797, to twenty-one millions in 1810, and twenty-seven millions in 1815, must have tended both to alter the prices of commodities of all sorts throughout the Empire, and to induce the extraordinary and unprecedented vigour which was conspicuous during all that period, both in our foreign commerce and internal industry, and which supported the vast and long-continued national efforts.‡

In the course of the years 1809 and 1810, however, the combinations of a variety of causes produced an extraordinary demand for an enlarged currency for domestic transactions, at the very time

that the whole gold, and great part of the silver specie of the country, were drained off for the purposes of foreign warfare. The prodigious increase in the exports and imports during these years, in consequence of the opening of the German harbours in the former, and of the smuggled trade to the Baltic in the latter, which has been already noticed,* necessarily required an extended circulation; and the influence of that demand speedily appeared in the enlarged issue of bank-notes, as well as the extraordinary increase in commercial paper discounted at the Bank of England for the whole of that period; the former of which, from fourteen millions in 1808, had risen to twenty-three millions in the beginning of 1811; while the latter, during the same time, had advanced from thirteen to twenty millions. Yet such was the scarcity of specie in Great Britain during these years, in consequence of the absorbing demand which the Austrian and Spanish wars occasioned for the precious metals, that the bullion coined at the Bank during both put together was little more than six hundred thousand pounds. The immense drain of specie to the Peninsula, to meet the expenses of the war, had gone on progressively increasing, until, in the end of 1810, it had risen to the enormous amount of £420,000 a month, or £5,040,000 a year. The money thus required could be transmitted only in coin or bullion, as English paper would not pass in the interior of Spain; and although government made the most strenuous exertions to collect specie for the service of the army, yet they could not, by all their efforts, obtain it in sufficient quantities; and such as they could get was transmitted at a loss, from the exchanges, of nearly thirty per cent. The demand for specie on the Continent, during and before the Austrian war, had been such, that gold had almost entirely disappeared from circulation, both in France and Germany, and even silver could hardly be procured in sufficient quantities to meet the ordinary necessities either of government or the people.†

This singular and anomalous state of matters naturally and strongly roused the attention at once of government, the commercial classes, and all thinking men in Great Britain at this period.

The simultaneous occurrence of a vast increase of foreign trade and domestic industry, with a proportional augmentation of the paper currency, and the total disappearance of specie of every kind from circulation, was a phenomenon so extraordinary, that it attracted, as well it might, the anxious attention of the Legislature. A committee was appointed to inquire Feb. 1, 1810. into and report on the subject in the session of 1810, and it embraced many of the ablest men, on both sides of politics, who then sat in Parliament. Mr. HORNER, whose premature and lamented death, some years afterward, alone prevented him from rising to the highest eminence on the opposition side, was the chairman, and took the leading share in the preparation of the memorable report which the committee prepared on the subject. But Mr. Canning and Mr. HUSKISSON were also among its members; and in the intimate connexion which took place between these eminent men on both sides of politics, during the long and arduous exami-

Impression it produced in the Legislature.

* See Note A, Appendix.

† *Ante*, i., 447.

‡ *Ante*, i., 447, 448; ii., 191, 405, 406.

§ See Note B, Appendix.

* *Ante*, iv., 377.

† *Well. Desp.*, April 15, 1810, *Garw.*, vi., 37, and vi., 159, 168; and May 16, 1810, vi., 116, and June 6, 1810. *Bign.*, ii., 46.

nations of evidence in the course of their investigations, is to be found the first appearance and unobserved spring of an element in the financial and commercial policy of Great Britain, attended with consequences of unbounded importance in the future history of the British Empire. The opinions of the majority of the committee were embodied in certain resolutions moved by Mr. Horner, its chairman, which were strenuously supported by the whole Whig party; while those of the minority, which were entertained also by government, were embraced in counter-resolutions brought forward by Mr. Vansittart, and backed by all the strength of the administration.*

On the part of the opposition, it was urged by Mr. Huskisson, Mr. Horner, and, with one exception,† by Mr. Canning: "The facts on which the present question hinges are sufficiently ascertained, and cannot be disputed on the other side. It appears, from the evidence which was laid before the committee, that, under the existing laws in force anterior to the period of the bank restriction, no contract or undertaking could be legally satisfied, unless the coin rendered in payment shall weigh in the proportion of $\frac{20}{21}$ parts of 5 pennyweights, 8 grains of standard gold, for each pound sterling; nor in silver coin for any sum exceeding £25, unless such coin shall weigh in the proportion of $\frac{20}{62}$ parts of a pound troy of standard silver for each pound sterling. When it was enacted by the authority of Parliament in 1797, that the payment of the promissory-notes of the Bank of England should be suspended, it was not the intention of the Legislature that any alteration should take place in the value of such promissory-notes; but it now appears that the actual value of the promissory-notes of the Bank of England, measuring such value by weight of standard gold and silver, has, for a considerable period, been much less than what is established by law as the legal tender in payment of any money contract; that the fall which has thus taken place in the value of Bank of England notes has been occasioned by a too redundant issue of paper currency both by the Bank of England and the country banks; and that the excess has originated in the want of that check on the issues of the Bank of England which existed before the suspension of cash payments.

"The exchanges with foreign countries have, for a considerable period, been unfavourable to this country in the highest degree. But although the adverse circumstances of our trade, and the large amount of our military expenditure abroad, may have contributed to turn our exchanges with the Continent of Europe against us, yet the extraordinary degree in which they have

been depressed for so long a period can have arisen only from the depreciation which has arisen in the relative value of the currency, as compared with the money of foreign countries. The only way of guarding against these manifold dangers is by a vigilant watch being kept up by the Bank of England on the foreign exchanges, as well as the price of bullion, with a view to regulate the amount of its issues. But the only certain mode of providing against an excess of paper currency is by establishing by law the legal convertibility, upon demand, of all such currency into the lawful coin of the realm. It may not be expedient to make such a change suddenly, but it must be done ere long; and two years appear to be a reasonable time within which the alteration may with safety be effected, instead of the period of six months after the ratification of a definite treaty of peace, which is established at present by law.

"The necessity of having recourse to such a measure is obvious. A pound of gold and £46 14s. 6d. being equal to each other, and, in fact, the same thing under different names, any circulating medium which purports to represent that amount of silver ought by law to be exchangeable at will for a pound of gold. But, under the operation of the Bank Restriction Act, a pound of gold has now come to be equivalent to £56 in paper currency. The difference, therefore, between £56 and £46 14s. 6d., or £9 5s. 6d., is the measure of the depreciation of the currency, or the amount which every creditor in an old obligation, dated prior to the year 1797, to the extent of £56, loses, if his debtor now pays up his debt in the paper currency—that is to say, every creditor of that standing loses just a fifth by the present state of matters. It would be monstrous to imagine that so gross an injustice ever was intended by Parliament when they established as a temporary measure, and under the pressure of unavoidable necessity, the currency of bank paper as a legal tender. What could have been the consistency of the Legislature, which, leaving unrepealed and unmodified the regulations which take away the character of a legal tender from every guinea weighing less than the legal standard of 5 dwts. 8 grains, should give it to a bank-note, purporting to be of the same denomination, but the real value of which at this moment is only 4 dwts. 14 grains, or, in other words, about three shillings less than the lightest guinea which is allowed to pass in payment? Yet this is precisely what the act of 1797 has now come in practice to produce; and the question is, whether this anomalous and unjust state of matters can be allowed to continue. To sell or to buy guineas at a higher rate than 21s. each, in bank paper, is an offence at present punishable by fine and imprisonment; but, though the penalties attach to the unhappy holder of a *heavy* guinea, the fortunate possessor of a *light* one is entitled by law to sell it for what it will bring, which is about 24s. 3d. Can there be a more absurd state of matters, or one more directly operating as a bounty on clipping, defacing, and melting down the coin; and need it be wondered at, if, with such temptations held out by the operation of law to the commission of these offences, the gold coin has entirely disappeared from circulation?

"By the common consent of mankind in all civilized countries, the precious metals have been received as the fittest standard for measuring the value of all other commodities, and are employed as the universal equivalent for effecting their

* Parl. Deb., xv., 270. Ann. Reg., 1811, 43.

† Mr. Canning, in general, coincided with the whole views of Mr. Huskisson and the majority of the Bullion Committee, and he supported their principles in a speech of uncommon power and singularly lucid argument. But he dissented from them upon one very material practical point, viz., the period which it was expedient Parliament should fix for the resumption of cash payments. The committee reported in favour of an unconditional resumption in two years from the time of the debate (May, 1811), and Mr. Huskisson and Mr. Horner strenuously contended for that period; but Mr. Canning deprecated so sudden a return to a cash standard during the continuance of hostilities, and in lieu proposed that it should take place at the term of six months after a general peace, to which it stood at that time by law limited.—See *Parl. Deb.*, xix., 1115-1126.

exchange. Gold in this country, as silver is in Hamburg, is really and exclusively the fixed measure of the rising and the falling of all other commodities in reference to each other. The article itself which forms this standard never can rise or fall in value with reference to this measure, that is, with reference to *itself*. A pound weight of gold never can be worth a pound and a quarter of gold. A bank-note, on the other hand, is not a commodity: it is only an engagement for the payment of a certain specified quantity of money. It cannot vary its value in exchange for any commodity, except in reference to the increase or diminution of such commodity in gold. Gold, therefore, is the test by which the value of bank-notes must be tried; and if a bank-note, as stated by the witnesses in the evidence, instead of being worth the standard value of 5 dwts. 3 grains of gold, is only worth 4 dwts. 8 grains, it is really worth only the latter amount of gold in exchange for any other commodity. A general increase of prices, therefore, is not an indication of the depreciation of its currency. Such an effect may be produced by many other causes, as, for example, an increase in the supply of the precious metals; but every considerable or durable increase in the price of the precious metals, which form the basis of a currency, cannot be ascribed to anything but the depreciation of such currency, even if the price of all other commodities were to be falling at the same time.

"Depreciation of a currency may be produced either by the standard coin containing less of the precious metal which forms that standard than it is certified by law to contain, or by an excess in the amount of that currency. The first effect took place to a great extent in the reign of William III., when the quantity of precious metals in the current coin was about thirty *per cent.* less than it was certified to contain. To that evil a remedy was applied by the recoinage in 1773, and since that time this evil has not been felt in this country. The existing depreciation, therefore, must be occasioned by excess. Such depreciation cannot exist for any length of time in any country, unless its currency consists partly of paper, partly of the precious metals. If the coin itself be undepreciated, but, nevertheless, the currency is so, which is the present case; that can arise only from an excess in the paper circulating at par with the coin. The necessary effect of such a state of things is, that gold will be sent abroad to the better markets which are there to be found. And the only possible way of applying a remedy to this evil is to compel the Bank to pay in gold, and give the market price for guineas. By so doing, indeed, you will at first subject that establishment to a loss equal to the difference between the market and the mint price of that metal; but the effect of this will be, in the end, to force it to contract its issues, and restore the value of the currency; and, till that is done, whatever it gains by avoiding this liability is just so much lost to the holders of its notes."*

On the other hand, it was maintained by Mr. Vansittart, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Perceval: "It is a matter of equal regret and surprise to behold a committee, composed of gentlemen so sagacious and well-informed, so conversant

in business, and respectable in every point of view, arrive at conclusions so very opposite to those which the evidence before the committee, as well as the good sense of the nation, has long since pointed out for general adoption. The last resolution is the substantial practical recommendation of the Bullion Committee; the other resolutions are only explanatory and introductory, and might, with perfect innocence and safety, be placed unanimously on the journals. It is the resumption of cash payments, within a definite and not distant period, which is the real point at issue; and all argument is misapplied which is not directed in the first, as well as last instance, to that leading point. We are all agreed that a mixed circulation of bank-notes, convertible at pleasure into cash and coin, is the most desirable circulating medium which can be conceived; because, if properly regulated, it possesses the solidity of a metallic with the cheapness of a paper currency. We differ only about the means, and the fit season, for returning to this state. The Bullion Committee are for attempting it positively and absolutely, without regard to consequences, or even practicability: we are for waiting till a violent and unnatural state of things shall have ceased, during the continuance of which our object cannot be gained, while the attempt would only aggravate the evil.

"The foundation of all our reasonings on this subject must be an appeal to experience; and the resolutions which we are to submit to the house are, therefore, not abstract propositions, but a statement of facts. The fundamental position on the other side, viz., that there is a certain fixed and definite standard of value arising from a given weight and purity of the precious metals being used in the formation of coin in this country, is erroneous. Any sum under £25 may, it is notorious, be legally discharged in silver coin; and such is the degree in which the silver coin of various denominations now current has been worn away by use, or diminished by fraud, that the actual amount of silver which a creditor holding an obligation under that sum will receive, may vary from 5 lbs. 5 oz. 15 dwt., to 8 lbs. 15 dwt., according as he receives his payment in the worn sixpence or the fresh crown-pieces of the realm. The act of 1774, limiting the legal tender of silver to sums below £25, expired in 1783, and from that time down to 1798 obligations to any amount might have been discharged in these clipped and worn-out sixpences, then current; and such coins are still, in practice, the great circulating medium by which the transactions of the country are carried on. Even in regard to the gold coin no fixed standard was introduced till 1774, so that all the boasted fixity of that part of the currency dates only from that comparatively recent period.

"The right of establishing and regulating the legal money of the kingdom, at all times vested in the sovereign or the crown, with concurrence of Parliament, cannot be abrogated but by the same authority. The promissory-notes of the Bank of England, however, have hitherto passed in common estimation, and in the usual transactions of men, as equivalent to gold, although at various periods, both before and after the Bank restriction, the exchanges between Great Britain and other countries have been unfavourable to Great Britain; and, as a matter of course, in such periods the market prices of gold and silver have risen considerably above the mint prices, and the coinage of money at the mint has been

Argument
against it by
the minister-
ial party.

* Parl. Deb., xix., 798, 1098. Huskisson's Speeches, i., 57, 123.

unavoidably either partially or wholly suspended. Such unfavourable exchanges and rises in the price of bullion have usually occurred in the course of foreign wars, when the metallic currency was all carried abroad to conduct the operations of our fleets and armies; as during the wars of William III. and Queen Anne, the greater part of the Seven Years' War, and the American war. These causes all conspired together to produce the extraordinary pressure upon the Bank in February, 1797, and rendered unavoidable the suspension of cash payments at that period; and they again occurred with still greater severity in the two years which preceded the peace of Amiens. In these instances, the unfavourable state of the exchanges, and the high price of bullion, do not appear to have been produced by the restriction of cash payments, or any excess in the issue of notes; inasmuch as all the instances, except the last, occurred previously to any restriction on such cash payments; and because the price of bullion has frequently been highest, and the exchanges most unfavourable, at periods when the issues of the bank-notes have been considerably diminished, and they have been afterward restored to their ordinary rates, though those issues have been increased.

"During seventy-eight years, ending with January, 1797, the price of gold has been at and under the mint price for twenty-eight years, and above the mint price fifty years; and during that period the price of standard silver has been at and under the mint price three years and two months only. The exchange with Hamburg fell, during the three latter years of the American war, full eight per cent., and the price of foreign gold rose from £3 17s. to £4 2s. an ounce, and the price of dollars nearly in the same proportion; while the bank-notes in circulation were, during the same period, diminished from nine to six millions. Again, in December, 1804, the rate of exchange with Hamburg rapidly rose to 34, and the price of gold fell to its former standard of £3 17s. before February, 1787. The amount of bank-notes in February, 1787, was £8,600,000, and in February, 1791, £11,700,000; and between these years the sum of £10,700,000 was coined in gold, and yet the exchange with Hamburg rose three per cent. The bank-notes, which in February, 1795, were £11,500,000, were reduced in February, 1797, to £8,600,000, during which time the exchange with Hamburg fell three per cent.; and on the 1st of February, 1798, they were increased to £13,200,000, during which period the exchange had risen nine per cent. Examples of this sort prove to a demonstration how extremely fallacious is the idea that the unfavourable state of the foreign exchanges is to be ascribed to any excess in the issues of paper at home: they show that the exchanges depend on a variety of other circumstances independent of the home currency, and not unfrequently they are highest when the paper circulation is most abundant.

"It is not difficult to perceive what are the circumstances, in our foreign relations, which have produced the present unfavourable state of the exchanges. The trade with the Continent has, from the effect of Napoleon's decrees against British commerce, become hazardous, precarious, and expensive; it is everywhere loaded with excessive charges: the trade with America has been precarious and interrupted; the naval and military expenditure has for some years been very great; and the price of grain, owing to a succession of bad crops, has, during the same

period, been very high. Any one of these causes is sufficient to account for the drain of specie from this country, much more the whole taken together.

"The amount of the currency of the country must bear a certain proportion to its trade, revenue, and expenditure. Now, the average amount of exports, imports, and revenue of England, for some years past, has been so great as absolutely to require an enlarged circulation; for all the three have nearly doubled since the period when the Bank restrictions were first imposed. If the average amount of bank-notes in circulation at the two periods is compared, it will be found not to have advanced in the same proportion.* And how, when our metallic currency was drawn abroad by the necessities of foreign commerce and warfare, was the ordinary circulation of the country to be supplied, and its immense transactions conducted, if the increase in bank-notes, now so loudly complained of, had not taken place?

"The extraordinary circumstances in which the kingdom has lately been placed, therefore, are amply sufficient to account for the unfavourable state of the exchanges, without any change in the internal value of the currency, or any reason being afforded for its contraction. It is highly important, indeed, that the restriction as to payments in cash should be removed as soon as the political and commercial relations of the country shall render it compatible with the public interest; but under the present situation of the state, in all these particulars, it would be highly dangerous to do so before the period fixed by law, namely, six months after the conclusion of a definitive treaty of peace.

"There is a depreciation of bank-notes compared with legal coin, and there is a depreciation compared with the price of commodities. But the depreciation on which the Bullion Report so largely dwells is a depreciation different from either of these. It is a depreciation compared with the money of other countries. What is the meaning of such a depreciation, when no one ever imagined that Bank of England paper could pass current anywhere but in Great Britain? What would be the effect of an order upon the Bank just now to resume cash payments in two years? Would it not be to compel them to purchase gold coin at any loss, in order to meet the certain drain about to come upon them? All the witnesses examined before the committee agree in this, that there is an irresistible tendency at present in the guineas of England to go abroad. Some ascribe it to the necessity of cash remittances to meet the balance of trade, others to the demand for gold on the Continent; but all concur in the fact, and the state of the foreign exchanges sufficiently demonstrates its reality. How, then, is the Bank of England to be able singly to stand the torrent produced by the commercial and political relations of the whole globe? Is it fair, equitable, or prudent, to expose that establishment to the certainty of the enormous loss consequent on such a contest? And is this a time to make an experiment so

* Average exports and imports of Great Britain 3 years before Feb., 1797. £48,732,000 1811, £77,981,000
Expenditure 42,855,000 82,205,000
Bank-notes 10,782,000 19,541,000
No less than £87,000,000 worth of gold coin had been coined during the reign of George III., of which a large portion was in circulation at the first of these periods, but a very small portion only at the second.—See MR. VANSITTART'S Resolution, May 13, 1811, *Parl. Deb.*, xx., 73, 74.

hazardous to the solvency of government and the credit of the nation, when the empire is engaged in the eighteenth year of a costly war, waged for its very existence, and every guinea that can be spared from its domestic necessities is absolutely requisite to maintain the expensive contest in the Peninsula, which alone averts the horrors of invasion from the British shores?"

Upon a division, Mr. Horner's resolutions were lost by a majority of 76, the numbers being 75 to 151; and the counter-resolutions of Mr. Vansittart were, a few days after, carried by a majority of 40, the numbers being 42 to 82.*

Few subjects in the modern history of England have been discussed, both in and out of Parliament, with more vehemence and ability than this Bullion Report; and none was ever fraught, both in its immediate and ultimate effects, with more momentous consequences. In fact, the very existence of the nation was at stake in the discussion; and it may now with safety be pronounced, that if the arguments urged by Mr. Horner, Mr. Huskisson, and the Bullion Committee, had proved successful, and Parliament had acted upon their recommendations, the national independence must have been destroyed, and England rendered a province of France long before the

Moscow catastrophe arrived.† The very fact on which their whole argument was rested, viz., that the difference between the market and the mint price of guineas had come to be 25 per cent., was decisive against the practicability of restoring cash payments, at least till the pressure of the war had come to an end; for what must have been the effect of a compulsor to pay in gold purchased by the Bank at such a loss, and issued to the public at such a profit? Evident ruin to that establishment, bankruptcy to the government, and an abandonment of all our enterprises, vital to the state, in which the empire was engaged. Wellington, deprived of all his pecuniary resources in Spain, would have been compelled to withdraw from the Peninsula in the mortal struggle between insolvency at home and disaster abroad. All our foreign efforts must have been abandoned. A force as great as that which drew back Hannibal from the scenes of his triumphs in Italy, would have forced the British hero from the theatre of his destined triumphs in Spain. The crash in England would have come precisely at the crisis of the war; cash payments would have been resumed in May, 1813, just after the battle of Lutzen, and on the eve of the armistice of Prague; Napoleon, relieved from the pressure of Wellington's veterans, would have made head against the forces of the north; Austria, in such unpromising circumstances, would never have joined the coalition; Russia, exhausted and discouraged, would have retired to her forests; Germany, unarrayed by British subsidies, would have remained dormant in the strife; and the sun of European freedom would have sunk, perhaps forever, beneath the wave of Gallic ambition.

Dangers of resumption of cash payments at this period.

Even if, by prudential measures and great efforts on the part of the government and the bank, an immediate catastrophe had been avoided, there can be no doubt that the resumption of cash payments at that crisis must, at no distant

period, have proved fatal to the finances and public credit of Great Britain. Experience has now cast a broad and steady light on this subject. It is known that the adoption of this step in 1819, enforced and carried out as it was by the suppression of small notes in 1826, changed prices at least 33 per cent.; that the holders of commodities and property of all descriptions found their capital diminished to that amount in the course of a few years; that debts, augmented in the same proportion, speedily proved fatal to all the labouring fortunes, whether in land or money, over the country; that bankruptcies to an unparalleled extent diffused ruin and misery through the industrious classes; and that the general distress and difficulties of the middle ranks of society produced that wide-spread feeling of discontent, which, ignorant of the real cause of its suffering, and fanned into a flame by the spirit of faction, gave rise to the conflagration which brought about the great organic change in 1832. If such have been the effects of this momentous step in a period of profound peace, universal commerce, and comparatively light national burdens, what must have been its result if it had occurred in the crisis of the war and in the presence of Napoleon, with the income-tax forcibly extracting all the surplus profits of the people, commerce to Continental Europe almost closed by the military power of France, and a gigantic naval and military establishment exhausting all the resources of the state, and yet alone preserving the nation from foreign subjugation?

The fundamental error of Mr. Huskisson and the Bullion Committee on this subject consisted in the principles, Errors of Mr. Huskisson and his party. which they laid down as axioms, that the measure of the depreciation of the currency was to be found in the difference between the market and the mint price of gold; and that the cause of the high price of the precious metals was to be sought for in the over issue of paper, rather than the absorption of specie in foreign states. Both positions, it has now been proved by experience, were erroneous, or, rather, embraced only a part of the truth; and, what is singular enough, the first erred chiefly from underrating the depreciation arising from excessive issue, on which the Bullion Committee themselves so strongly founded. Assuming the depreciation to be measured by the difference between the market and the mint price of gold, they estimated it at 25 per cent., whereas there can be no doubt that it was at that period nearer 75 per cent.; and a revulsion of prices in most articles to nearly half that amount took place upon the resumption of cash payments when the bill of 1819 came into operation. In fact, the relative money and mint price of the precious metals had nothing to do with the question of depreciation of the currency; for, as bank-notes never sunk in value compared with specie, whatever party-spirit may have affirmed to the contrary, the measure of the depreciation which undoubtedly took place was to be sought for, not in the relative value of the metallic and paper currency, but in the diminished value of the whole currency, gold, silver, and paper, when compared with that of all other commodities; and the proof of that was to be found in the fact, not that gold was at a premium of twenty-five per cent., but that wheat had, on an average of ten years preceding, advanced 100 per cent., and was then selling at 110 shillings the quarter. The

* Mr. Vansittart's Resolutions, May 13, 1811. Parl. Deb., xx., 73, 74; xix., 919, 967.

† Parl. Deb., xix., 1128, and xx., 128.

high premium on gold, on which so much stress was laid, was evidently owing to the political or natural causes which at that period caused the precious metals to be all drained out of the country; and we, who have seen the Bank of England reel, and the United States Bank of America fall,* under the effects of the drain of £6,000,000 sterling from the vaults of the former of these establishments to purchase grain from Continental Europe in 1839, for the consumption of the British islands, can feel no surprise that gold was at an extravagant premium in 1810 and 1811 in London, when £4,171,000 was, in the former of these years, sent out of the country for grain alone; and in both years, above £6,000,000 was annually remitted to the Peninsula, in specie and bullion, for the service of the English and Portuguese armies.

It is remarkable that a measure fraught, as every one now sees, with such obvious and utter ruin both to the nation and the individuals of whom it is composed, was at that period supported by the ablest men in Parliament, and many of the profoundest thinkers in the country; that the report which recommended such a perilous and destructive change was, for above twenty years, held up as the model of political wisdom; and that the ministry who, by resisting it, saved their country from destruction, more, perhaps, than by any act in their whole career, incurred the imputation, with the great bulk of the succeeding generation, of being behind the lights of the age. It is the more remarkable that the general delusion should so long have prevailed on the subject, when it is recollected, not only that the true principles of this apparently difficult but really simple branch of national economy, which are now generally admitted, were at the moment most ably expounded by many men both in and out of Parliament;† and that, in the examination of some of the leading merchants of London before the Parliamentary committees on the subject, the truth was told with a force and a precision which it appears now surprising how any one could resist.‡ This memorable example should always be present to the minds of all who are called upon, either theoretically or practically, to deal with so momentous a subject as the monetary concerns of a nation; and while it is calculated to inspire distrust in abstract or speculative conclusions, when unsupported by facts, it points in the clearest manner to the wisdom of adhering to those common-sense views which experience has suggested to practical men, and which, however apparently irreconcilable at the moment to speculative principle, will generally be found to emanate from it in the end, and to

have arisen from some unobserved element, acting with a force imperceptible to the philosopher, but most cogent to the merchant, on the great and complicated maze of human transactions.

WILLIAM HUSKISSON, who first rose to great and deserved celebrity in the course of these important discussions, was a statesman whose career belongs to the pacific but momentous period which intervened between the close of the war and the passing of the Reform Bill; but he was too eminent a man, and exercised too powerful an influence on the fortunes of his country, to be passed over without remark in the annals of Europe during the French Revolution. He was descended from a family of ancient standing, but moderate fortune, in Staffordshire, and received the elements of education in his native county. He was early sent over to receive the more advanced branches of instruction at Paris, under the direction of Dr. Gem, physician to the British embassy at that metropolis; and he arrived there in 1789, just in time to witness, and in some degree share, the enthusiasm excited by the capture of the Bastille in that year. The intimate acquaintance which at this period he formed with Franklin and Jefferson, as well as the popular leaders in the Club of 1789, of which he was a member, had a powerful influence on his character, which was never obliterated through life, and eventually no inconsiderable effect on the fortunes of his country, to the chief direction of the commercial concerns of which his great abilities ultimately raised him. He was first brought into Parliament in the close of the year 1796, for the borough of Morpeth, under the nomination of Lord Carlisle, and about the same time appointed under-secretary of state for war and the colonies, in which laborious and important situation his business talents were speedily discovered, and he enjoyed the intimate friendship, and was often called to the private counsels, both of Mr. Dundas and Mr. Pitt. He retired from office with Mr. Pitt in 1801, along with Mr. Canning, with whom, throughout life, he maintained the closest intimacy; but was reinstated in the situation of secretary to the treasury on Mr. Pitt's return to power in 1804, which important trust he continued to hold, with the exception of the brief period when the Whigs were in power, down to the retirement of Mr. Canning from Downing-street in September, 1809, when he withdrew from government with his brilliant friend, and became a leading member of the liberal section of the Tory party, now in avowed hostility to the administration. In 1814 he was appointed a commissioner of the woods and forests, and from that time till his appointment to the important office of president of the Board of Trade in January, 1823, he devoted his attention, almost exclusively, to subjects of trade, navigation, and political economy, in which his vast information gave him great weight, and of which, even before he became a cabinet minister, he had acquired almost the exclusive direction. The return to cash payments, by the celebrated bill of 1819, the reciprocity treaties, and abandonment of the navigation laws and the free-trade system, were mainly occasioned by his influence; and he continued, whether in or out of office, almost entirely to direct the commercial concerns of the nation till the time of his death, which was occasioned by the frightful accident of the railway train passing over his body on the

* In Mr. Biddle's able paper on the causes of the suspension of cash payments by the United States Bank in October, 1839, the principal reason assigned was the drain upon the Bank of England during the preceding year, from the vast importation of grain, in consequence of the bad harvest in Great Britain in 1838, and the consequent contraction of the British circulating medium, and pressure upon the money market of America.

† Particularly by Sir John Sinclair, whose sagacious mind early and clearly perceived the fatal effect of the proposed resumption of cash payments at that critical period, especially on that great national interest, agriculture, to the support and improvement of which his long and useful life was devoted.—See *Life of Sir John Sinclair*, ii., 268, by his son, the Rev. John Sinclair, chaplain to the Bishop of London; a work full of valuable information, both historical and political, by an author who unites to the talents and industry hereditary in his family, the accomplishments of a scholar, the learning of a divine, and the philanthropy of a Christian.

‡ See note C.

day on which the line from Liverpool to Manchester was first opened, on the 15th of September, 1830.*

He was the first of that class of statesmen who have arisen with the prodigious increase in the commercial transactions and industrial activity of Great Britain in later times, and whose attention is chiefly devoted to the material interests and statistical details of the nation. He was not endowed by nature with any remarkable oratorical abilities; he had great powers of thought and application, but neither the fire of genius nor the soul of poetry in his character; and though in the later years of his life he was listened to with profound attention on both sides of the house, yet this respect was owing rather to the vast stores of varied information which he never failed to bring to bear upon the subject of debate, and the luminous views which he advanced regarding it, than any faculty of captivating a mixed audience with which he was gifted. His reasoning faculties were of a very high order; and there is no statesman of that period to whose arguments the historian can now so well refer for an exposition of the principles which, during the interval between the peace and the Reform Bill, governed the commercial and maritime policy of England. He first brought to bear upon legislative measures the resources of statistical research; and to the industry and perseverance requisite for such an undertaking, he united the rarer faculty of philosophic reflection, and the deduction of general principles from an immense detail of particular instances. He was never taken unawares on any subject of that description; the details of the Parliamentary returns were ever present to his memory; and by the skilful use which he made of them in debate, he acquired, for the last ten years of his career, a weight in the House of Commons on all subjects connected with trade and navigation which was wellnigh irresistible.

Adam Smith has said that he had no great faith in political arithmetic; and although nothing is more certain than that the principles of the Baconian philosophy will be found, in the end, to be applicable to this as to every other subject of human inquiry, and that a careful examination of facts is the only sure test of the truth or falsehood of any particular opinion, yet here, as elsewhere, principle must be the guide to inquiry; it is only by persons thoroughly imbued with rational views that these valuable results can be obtained; while, to the world in general, statistical returns will present an unmeaning mass of figures, and to the speculative politician they may often become a fruitful source of error. Statistics are to the science of politics what the observations of Tycho Brahe were to astronomy; but it requires the mind of a Kepler to deduce from them the true philosophic conclusions. The reason is, not that the returns are incorrect or the figures err, but that such a variety of circumstances enter into the formation of the general result, that the chances are, that, in the outset of statistical inquiry, and before the true causes have been separated from the imaginary ones by experience, conclusions altogether fallacious will often be deduced from perfectly correct premises. Certain it is, that with all the accuracy and extent of Mr. Huskisson's information on mercantile

subjects, and all the force of his reasoning powers, his conclusions were in great part erroneous; and that to his influence, more, perhaps, than that of any other individual, is to be ascribed the false direction of British policy for the last twenty years, alike in regard to monetary, commercial, and colonial affairs. Experience, the great test of truth, has now demonstrated this in the most decisive manner.

He strenuously advocated the return to a metallic currency in 1819, before any serious progress had been made in the reduction of the debt contracted during the paper one; and the result has been, that the nation has been permanently disabled from paying it off; and the fall in the money price of all property to the extent of a third, produced such a storm of discontent as overthrew the old Constitution of the Empire. He strenuously advocated the conclusion of reciprocity navigation treaties with the powers of northern Europe; and the result has been, that our shipping with them has been reduced in fifteen years to a fourth of its amount, while theirs with us has been quadrupled in the same period, without any advantage whatever having been gained for our manufacturing interests to counterbalance so serious a disadvantage. He strenuously advocated the reduction of the duties on various articles of foreign manufacture; and the result has been, that a severe wound has been inflicted on domestic industry, without foreign jealousy having, in so much as a single instance, relaxed aught of the burdens on British productions. He strenuously advocated the proposition of foreign mercantile powers in the same stage of civilization as ourselves, even if the consequence should be the discouragement and irritation of our own colonies; and the result has been, without the slightest relaxation of their prohibitions, a general neglect of those vast colonial interests in which Great Britain can alone find a permanent market for its manufactures, and which, according as they are attached by durable cords to the parent state, or severed from it, must ultimately become either an unbounded source of its strength, or the immediate cause of its ruin.*

Another subject which occupied a large portion of the attention of Parliament during the years 1811 and 1812 was the repeal of the orders in council, which was now anxiously pressed upon government both by the opposition and the principal manufacturing cities in the Empire; and in which a statesman, reserved for the highest destinies in future days, HENRY BROUGHAM, first rose to distinguished eminence.

It has been already noticed that the British government—justly irritated at the Berlin and Milan decrees, which Napoleon, in the intoxication consequent on the overthrow of Prussia in 1806, had fulminated against English commerce—issued the celebrated orders in council, which in effect declared that no ship belonging to any neutral power should be permitted to enter the ports of any country under the government of France, unless it had previously touched at a British harbour.† Between these rigorous orders on the one hand, and the peremptory French decrees on the other, the trade of neutral states was wellnigh destroyed; for

His erroneous political principles, and their destructive effects.

Debates on the repeal of the orders in council.

State of the question so far as neutral powers were concerned.

* Huskisson's Memoirs, i., 235. Speeches and Life, vol. i. Vol. III.—Ccc

* See note D, Appendix.

† *Ante*, ii., 556.

they had no means of avoiding the penalty of confiscation, denounced against them by the one power, but by adopting a course which immediately exposed them to the same risk from the other. The only neutral power which at this period carried on any considerable carrying trade was America; but it did so to a great extent, and that commerce promised daily to become greater and more profitable to its citizens, from the mutual rage of the belligerents, which threw the only traffic which could be maintained between them into the hands of the only neutral state in existence. Deeply, therefore, did both the people and government of the United States feel themselves injured by these acts on the part of France and England; and, in despair of bringing either of these powers back to a more reasonable and civilized species of hostility, they had recourse to measures calculated to withdraw from any inter-

course with either. A general embargo was first laid on all American shipping within their harbours, which was soon after succeeded by a Non-intercourse

Act, which prohibited all intercourse between the United States and either France or England. The particulars of these acts, and the abortive diplomatic efforts which were made to re-establish a good understanding between the two nations, will be given in the sequel of this work.* Suffice it to say that the Non-intercourse Act continued in force through the whole of 1810 and 1811, and that the cessation of all exports to the United States, which then took off British produce and manufactures to the extent of no less than thirteen millions sterling, powerfully contributed both to the extraordinary falling off in the exports of the latter of these years, and to the general discontent and suffering in the manufacturing districts, which have been already noticed.† Committees were appointed to take evidence on the subject early in 1812 in both houses of Parliament; and their members, among whom Mr. Brougham, Mr. Baring, and Mr. Huskisson took the lead, exerted themselves with extraordinary vigour in prosecuting the inquiry. A great number of petitions against the orders in council, chiefly from the large manufacturing towns interested in the trade with America, were presented. Early in June the subject came on for discussion in the House of Commons, and the debates which followed were of the utmost importance, as illustrating the real effect on the national interests of the extraordinary species of warfare in which the Empire was now engaged.‡

On the part of the opposition, it was argued with uncommon ability by Mr. Brougham, Mr. Baring, and Mr. Ponsonby: "The question at issue, though one of unexampled importance, is of very little intricacy; the evidence is of immense extent and apparently interminable details; but a few minutes' debate must be sufficient to demonstrate where the only safe or honourable path is to be found. The table of the house has groaned under the mass of petitions presented—the hearts of the members have been harrowed by the details of general suffering which have been established in the evidence. Numerous disorders in different parts of the country have arisen out of this general distress; it has even driven large bodies of men to the ab-

surd expedient of endeavouring to revive an obsolete law of Elizabeth, for magistrates fixing the rate of wages; while the more enlightened sufferers under the restrictions of the times have sought some relief in what would prove a most inadequate remedy, the extension of a free trade to India and China. The potteries have demanded permission to send their porcelain to China; and the ancient and respectable city of Newcastle has earnestly entreated that it may be allowed to ship coal for the stoves and hothouses of Calcutta! These various projects, some to a certain extent feasible, others utterly absurd and visionary, only prove the magnitude of the evil which is so generally felt, and remind us of the awful accounts of the plague, when, in the vain effort to seek relief, miserable men were seen wildly rushing into the streets, and madly grasping the first passenger they met, to implore his help. The dreadful amount of the present distress is proved by all the witnesses; it comes upon us in a thousand shapes; it exhibits the same never-ending yet ever-varying scene of heart-rending suffering. The wants of the poor have been proved to be so pressing, that they have been forced to part with their whole little stock of furniture; pawn their blankets, their beds, their very clothes off their backs; and the prodigious mass of movable articles thus brought at once into the market, has produced a decided depression upon prices even in the London market. Great as was the general distress during the scarcity of 1800 and 1801, it is described by a host of witnesses as having been as nothing compared to that which now prevails: for then there was a want only of provisions, but wages were high and employment abundant; whereas now the want of money meets and aggravates the want of food.

"The returns of exports and imports during the last two years completely account for this extraordinary wo. Nay, they exhibit a decay in national industry, which might have been expected to produce a still more heart-rending and wide-spread suffering. Comparing the whole amount of trade, both exports and imports (which is the only fair way of reckoning), there is a falling off, compared with 1809, of thirty-six millions, with 1810 of thirty-eight. In British manufactures alone, the decline from 1809 to 1811 is sixteen millions: taking in colonial produce, it is no less than twenty-four millions as compared with 1809, and twenty-seven as compared with 1810. This reduction is unparalleled in British annals; it outstrips all the efforts of financiers or treasury clerks to conceal, and stands forth an imperishable monument of the infatuation in the policy of the government which has brought such calamities on the nation.

"It is vain to talk of substitutes for the North American trade, the loss of which has been the main cause of these grievous evils. The Brazil market, the South American market have been tried, and both have terminated in nothing but disappointment. We neither know their wants, nor do they require our manufactures. The smuggling trade to the United Provinces through Canada at first afforded some relief; but, since the continuance of our prohibitory system has exasperated the North American population, even this resource has failed us. As a necessary consequence of this total stoppage of our best foreign markets, the home trade has become depressed in a most remarkable degree. Goods of all sorts, destined for the consumption of foreign

* *Infra*, ch. lxxi.

† *Ante*, iii., 376.

‡ *Ann. Reg.*, 1810, 253, 260; and 1812, 91, 92. *Bign.*, ix., 309, 319.

states, have been thrown back upon the home market from inability to find any extraneous vent for our manufactures; and then the diminution in the amount of our exports, great as it is, affords an inadequate representation of the real depression of our industry; for it frequently has happened that goods which had paid duty as exports, and even crossed the Atlantic, have been thrown back upon our own market, and sold at a ruinous loss to all concerned, for domestic consumption. It is in vain, therefore, that in this unexampled depression of our foreign sales we turn to the home market for relief, for there the magnitude of our external losses has produced a ruinous glut, and every effort made to find a vent among our own inhabitants but adds to the general distress.

"Let it be shown, indeed, that the national honour or security is involved in upholding the orders in council, and all these arguments go for nothing; nay, it becomes the first duty of every patriot, at any hazard, even that of the total ruin of our manufactures, to concur in their maintenance. But has this been shown to be the case? Nay, is it not evident that their repeal is called for alike by what is due to the national character, and the preservation and stability of our naval power? It is unnecessary, in discussing this question, to go back to the legality or illegality, the justice or injustice, of the paper blockades of long lines of the enemy's coast, to which Napoleon constantly refers the origin of this calamitous species of warfare. Admitting that it may be both just and legal to do so, the question is, Is it *expedient* to assert and enforce such rights at a time when it involves us in such calamities? History proves that, on many occasions, these rights, though never abandoned, have been quietly passed over *sub silentio*, where the assertion of them would have interfered with national interests, or impeded national advantages. This was done at the peace of Utrecht, in the American war, and by express acts of the government in 1793 and 1794. The point now is, whether this is an occasion when, without surrendering our maritime rights, it is expedient for a time to waive their consideration. Now, what is the commerce which we sacrifice for the vain honour of preserving these rights? Why, it is no less than the vast North American market—a market now taking off thirteen millions' worth of our produce, and worth, in the estimation of the most competent witnesses, all foreign markets put together. The returns in that market are as sure, the bad debts as few, as in the former trade with Holland. The extent, steadiness, and rapid increase of the trade between England and North America are easily accounted for. The inhabitants of the United States are connected with us by origin, language, and habits; their tastes go along with their inclinations, and they come to us, as a matter of course, for such manufactured articles as they require. There is not a cabin or loghouse in their vast territory in which you do not meet with British produce; while the rapid increase of their population, which doubles every thirty years, and in which, nevertheless, there is not a single pauper to be found, offers a boundless field for future increase. It is not a figure of speech, but the simple truth, to assert, that, circumstanced as the two countries are, there is not an axe falls in the woods of America which does not put in motion some shuttle, or hammer, or wheel in England. It is the miserable, shuffling, doubtful traf-

fic to the north of Europe and the Mediterranean that we prefer to the sure, regular, and increasing North American trade—a trade placed beyond the reach of the enemy's power, and which supports at once all that remains of the liberty of the seas, and gives life and vigour to its main pillar within the realm, the manufactures and commerce of England.

"Look to the other side of the picture. If you continue the cessation of intercourse with America much longer, the inevitable consequence will be that the Americans will be driven to the necessity of supplying themselves with manufactures. They have the means of doing so within their own bounds: coal and water-carriage in abundance are to be found in their territory; and the vast fortunes already accumulated in their seaport towns prove that they are noways deficient in the true commercial spirit. We can have no jealousy of America, whose armies are yet at the plough, or making, since your policy has so willed it, awkward though improving attempts at the loom; whose assembled navies could not lay siege to an English man-of-war. The nation is already deeply embarked in the Spanish war; let us not, then, run the risk of adding another to the already formidable league of our enemies, and reduce ourselves to the necessity of feeding Canada with troops from Portugal, and Portugal with bread from England.*†

Such was the weight of these arguments, and such the strong foundations which they had in the necessities of the times, and the evidence laid before both houses of Parliament, that government made very little resistance to them. It was merely urged by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Rose: "No question more vital both to the national security and the commercial interests of the country ever came before Parliament; and there can be no doubt that a case of grave distress to the manufacturing interest has been made out by the evidence. Nay, there is reason to believe that, if the North American market is not speedily opened, that suffering will be augmented. Even admitting, however, that the repeal of the orders in council would occasion the abrogation of the Non-importation Act, still it does by no means follow that the original imposition of these orders was not called for by necessity and justified by expedience. Is it to be expected that Great Britain is tamely to submit to the iniquitous decrees of France without any retaliation? without attempting, at least, to inflict upon that state some part of the suffering which it has brought upon this country? As against France, that system has perfectly succeeded; and severely as our commerce has suffered in the struggle, theirs has undergone a still more remarkable diminution. From the official accounts published by the French government, it appears that, even with their population of nearly forty millions, the total amount of their manufactures for the home market and exportation was only, in 1810, £54,000,000 sterling; while that of Great Britain and Ireland, with only seventeen millions of souls, was £66,000,000. With the exception of the year 1811, which was one of great depression arising from temporary causes, the preceding years, when the orders in council were in oper-

* *Parl. Deb.*, xxiii., 486, 522.

† The argument of Lord Brougham, of which the preceding sketch is but the skeleton, is one of the ablest, and, withal, soundest pieces of oratorical reasoning in the English language.

ation, were periods of extraordinary and unprecedented prosperity. The average of our exports to Continental Europe, for three years previous to the issuing of the orders in council, was £17,500,000; that for the three years subsequent, £23,000,000. Can more decisive proof be imagined that the machinations of the French emperor for our destruction have not only failed in their object, but recoiled upon himself?

"The hostile feelings of the American government have now made the orders in council a pretext for breaking off all commercial intercourse with this country; and doubtless that interruption is one great cause of the distress in which the mercantile interests are now involved. But such an interruption could not have been calculated upon; and, in the ordinary course of human events, it would not have occurred. Reason and equitable feelings should have taught the Americans that the orders in council were adopted by the English government as a measure of retaliation only; that they were issued subsequent to the Berlin decree, under the pressure of necessity; and if these defensive measures proved, as doubtless they did, injurious in a very high degree to the interests of American commerce, their enmity should have been directed against France, the primary cause of this destructive system of hostility, instead of this country, which merely in its own defence was driven to its adoption.

"Never was a country which, when forced to embrace such a system, evinced a more sincere desire to prosecute it in the way least injurious to neutral powers; an instance of which is to be found in the order of 1809, limiting the blockade to France and the powers under her immediate control. The license system, when properly understood, was no departure from the principles of the orders in council; not a fifth of the licenses issued were intended to evade those orders; four fifths were occasioned by the relief which the enemy himself required from the stringent effects of our measures. We did, however, offer to forego all the advantages of the license trade, and revert to the strict measures of 1807, if the government of the United States would repeal the Non-importation Act; but they have hitherto shown no disposition to embrace such a proposition.

"The prince regent long ago issued a declaration, bearing that, as soon as the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed, the British government would forthwith withdraw the orders in council; and the French cabinet has recently communicated to the American government a resolution apparently consenting to abandon the decrees, if the British orders were at the same time repealed. That declaration, however, is not sufficiently explicit to enable the English cabinet to act upon the assurance it contains; in particular, it appears to be virtually abrogated by the sweeping declaration of the Duke of Bassano, that the Berlin and Milan decrees should remain in full force till the maritime assumptions of this country were abandoned. But the British government is fully disposed to receive the olive branch tendered, whether in good or doubtful faith, by the French ruler; she is willing for a time to suspend the orders in council, if the American government will repeal the Non-importation Act. The sincerity of France will thereby be put to the test, and a breathing-time gained in the midst of this mortal hostility, during which an opportunity would be offered for a

return to a more civilized species of warfare. If the experiment fails, and France persists in her frantic devices, we must return to our retaliatory system; but if driven to do so, we shall at least have shown every disposition to concede to all just demands of the neutral powers; and such a return would, it is to be hoped, not lead to any interruption of the amicable intercourse between this country and its transatlantic offspring, which it is the curse of both countries should ever have been broken.*

No division ensued upon this debate, Mr. Brougham contenting himself with congratulating the country upon the prospect of speedily getting rid of these obnoxious orders, and the ministry upon the manly course they had adopted regarding it. In truth, it was evident, after the declarations of both the English and French governments, that no real object of contention remained between them; or, at least, that both might, with perfect consistency with their national honour and recorded declarations on the subject, recede from the virulent system of hostility which they had adopted. A fortnight after there appeared in the Gazette an order absolutely and unequivocally revoking the orders in council; but with a declaration that, if the Americans do not, after due notice, revoke their interdictory acts against British commerce, the revocation should become null, and the original orders revive. This just and manly concession, however, came too late: the Democratic party in America had gained entire possession of the public mind: a contest with England, at all hazards, was resolved on; and, before the conciliatory act of the British government had crossed the Atlantic, war was actually declared.†

It is evident, on a dispassionate review of this great debate, and the mighty interests which were wound up with it, that the repeal of the orders in council, at the period it took place, was a wise, and, indeed, necessary measure, and that the greater part of Mr. Brougham's arguments were well founded. The observation of Mr. Canning, in the course of the discussion, was perfectly just, that the orders in council were a political, not a commercial measure; and the moment that the evil induced by their continuance exceeded the benefit to be expected from it, the hour for their repeal had arrived. That this period had arrived in 1812 was decisively proved by the great falling off in the commerce of the preceding year. Hopes, indeed, might reasonably have been entertained that the neutral states, seeing how evidently Great Britain stood upon the defensive in the maritime quarrel, would have stood aloof from engaging in it, especially when it was recollected how much more closely their interests were wound up with the maintenance of pacific relations with this country than with any of the Continental powers. America, in particular, which traded with Great Britain to the extent of £13,000,000 a year, and with France not to the extent of £1,000,000 annually, had the most vital interest to preserve pacific relations with the nation with whom so great a portion of its commercial intercourse was conducted. The whole arguments, so forcibly urged by Mr. Brougham, as to the vast importance of the American trade

Result of these proceedings in Parliament.

June 23.

Reflections on this subject.

* Parl. Deb., xxiii., 522, 536.

† Ann. Reg., 1812, 93, 94.

to the English manufacturers, applied still more strongly to the impolicy of the United States coming to a rupture with this country, as the proportion which the English trade bore to the sum-total of their commerce was much greater than the Americans bore to the aggregate of ours. But still, when the experiment had been made, and it had been proved by the result that the United States were willing to undergo the loss of such a traffic rather than submit to the English orders in council, it became to the last degree impolitic to continue them any longer: for America had infinitely greater resources whereon to subsist during such suspension of intercourse than the British Empire; and in the struggle which can starve longest, the manufacturing state, the workshop of the world, like a besieged town, is sure to suffer more than the nations which have drawn their lines of circumvallation around it.

History, in the general case, has to deal only with the dead; and it is seldom either just or delicate to mingle with the historical gallery of departed greatness the portraits of living genius. There are some instances, however, in which this obvious rule must be infringed upon; where the impress communicated to the events of an age by one individual has been so powerful, that his character has become historical property even before his active agency has ceased on the theatre of human affairs. Such a character, in a military and political view, is the Duke of Wellington; and such, in a moral and social one, is Lord Brougham. This very remarkable man is descended from an old and respectable family in Westmoreland, from whom he inherited the ancient castellated mansion from which he afterward took his title; and he received the rudiments of his education at the High School of Edinburgh, where his father had for some years resided. Thence, at an early age, he went to the far-famed university of that city, over which the names of Stewart and Playfair at that period threw an unusual splendour, and where a band of gifted spirits were then arising, many of whom have since shone forth with extraordinary lustre on the great stage of the world. Lord Jeffrey, the most celebrated critic of the age in which he lived; Sir Walter Scott, the greatest of human novelists; Lord Lansdowne, the not unworthy successor of Pitt in the direction of the British finances; Mr. Horner, whose early and lamented death alone prevented him from rising to the highest place in the councils of his country; Lord Brougham, who, for good or for evil, has made the schoolmaster's rod superior to the marshal's baton, formed some of the members of a society, in which other men, not less distinguished for energy and talents, were then prominent, whose powers are, it is to be feared, destined to be buried in that common charnel-house of genius, the Bar and Bench of the country.* He was called to the bar at Edinburgh in 1801, and soon attracted notice by the energy of his character, and the fearlessness and occasional sarcasm of his demeanour: but that capital was too

limited a theatre for his growing powers. An able and original work, which he published in 1802, on the colonial policy of Great Britain, early attracted the notice of Mr. Pitt; a series of powerful and original papers in the *Edinburgh Review* gave token of the vast influence which he was destined to exercise on public thought; and his removal to Westminster Hall a few years afterward placed him in a situation where legal celebrity was not inconsistent with senatorial advancement.

He first obtained entrance into Parliament, like all the great men of his day, for His character a close borough, then in the gift of Lord Carlisle; but his manner was unprepossessing, his voice harsh, and he was far at first from coming up to the exalted anticipations formed by his friends, and subsequently realized, of his future career. The unconquerable perseverance of his disposition overcame all obstacles, and ultimately obtained for him, if not the apogee, at least the real lead on the Whig side in the House of Commons. His practice at the bar, though considerable, and brilliant from the political character of the cases in which he was chiefly engaged, was not first-rate; and both in legal knowledge and forensic judgment he was never deemed equal to his redoubted antagonist on the northern circuit, Sir James Scarlett, now Lord Abinger. But in energy of character, invincible perseverance, versatility of talent, force of expression, and sarcastic power, he was far beyond any barrister or statesman of his day; and if his judgment had been equal to his ability, or his discretion to his information, and his vast capacity for exertion had always been directed to objects consistent with each other, and of permanent utility rather than passing interest, he would have left a name in history, as he unquestionably has exercised an influence on his own age, second to none in the modern annals of Great Britain.

But inconsistency and want of foresight have always been the bane of his public character. He has signally promoted some great causes, as that of legal reform; but it is hard to say, upon reviewing the opinions which he has advocated at different periods of his life, whether he has most injured or benefited others which he had still more at heart. He was the steady advocate of negro freedom, general education, universal toleration, and social amelioration; yet there is hardly a measure in the end destructive to these great interests of which he has not, at some period of his career, been the ardent supporter. He has been through life the most resolute enemy of the slave-trade, and deserves the lasting thanks of every friend to humanity for his noble efforts to root out that execrable traffic; but he not less strenuously advocated the abolition of slavery in the British West India Islands in 1834; and, by so doing, he has doubled the slave-trade in extent, and quadrupled it in atrocity throughout the globe.* He besought the House of Peers on his bended

* To those who have the felicity of enjoying the acquaintance, or, still more, the friendship of Lord Corehouse, Lord Moncrieff, Lord Mackenzie, or Lord Cockburn, it is needless to say that nothing but a wider theatre of action, closer proximity to the Legislature, or greater leisure for literary pursuits, were necessary to have raised them to the same general eminence which the philosophers, statesmen, and historians of their country, in the last and present age, have attained.

* "The number of slaves landed in Cuba and Brazil alone," said Mr. Buxton, the able and humane advocate of the negro race, "is 150,000, being more than double the whole draught on Africa when the slave-trade controversy began. Twice as many human beings are now its victims as when Wilberforce and Clarkson began their noble task; and each individual of this increased number, in addition to the horrors formerly endured, is cribbed up in a smaller space, and stowed in a vessel where accommodation is sacrificed to spoil."—*African Slave-trade*, by T. F. Buxton London, 1839, p. 172.

knees to pass the Reform Bill, though the opponents of that measure drew their strongest arguments from his own earlier writings on the subject; and his whole efforts for the last five years have been directed to demonstrate the unhappy effects of the kind of government which that great change necessarily brought upon the country. He was the warm and consistent supporter of Catholic emancipation; but his exertions have of late been equally vigorous and effective in demonstrating the bad consequences which its concession has hitherto at least had upon social amelioration in the one island, and the general system of government in the other. He has always been the sincere and powerful supporter of popular instruction; but, by directing it chiefly to intellectual acquisitions, he turned that mighty lever to visionary objects, and placed it beyond the reach or without the interest of the great body of the people; while, by severing it from religious instruction, he deprived it of the chief blessings which it is fitted to confer upon mankind. He is possessed of extraordinary intensity of vision for present objects and immediate interest, but far from being equally clear-sighted as to ultimate consequences, or the permanent welfare of humanity.

His style of speaking presents the most extraordinary contrast to the abstract ideas which he entertains, and has powerfully expressed, as to the perfection of eloquence. No man feels more strongly the simplicity of ancient oratory, or has better described the injurious effect sometimes even of a single epithet on the majesty of thought; while none more constantly weakens the force of his own intense and vivid conceptions by variety and redundancy of expression. He objected to the addition which the imagination of Tasso made to the sublime image of Dante;* and yet he seldom fails to overwhelm the reader by exaggerations of the same idea under different forms, till the original impression is wellnigh obliterated. No one more happily or forcibly strikes the iron upon the head in the outset; but none, by a repetition of slant blows, more frequently mars its force or alters its direction. His long practice of addressing juries, or assemblies of ordinary capacity, has proved injurious to his efforts to reach the highest style of eloquence. Every idea, if at all felicitous, is, in his hand, torn to rags. He forgets that those who read his speeches will not be equally obtuse with those who heard them, "que les gens habiles s'entendent a demi-mot." On this account, his fame with posterity, that is, the reading and

thinking few, will be by no means equal to that which he has enjoyed among his contemporaries, that is, the hearing and unthinking many. Irony and sarcasm constitute his strongest arm in oratorical contests, and there he is unrivalled even by Pitt or Canning. His speeches to juries were often models of vehement and powerful declamation; but his judgment as a counsel was far from being equal to his talent as a barrister, and in more than one instance he has supplied what was wanting on the side of the prosecution by his imprudence in calling witnesses for the defence.* His information is immense, and his powers of application unbounded; but his knowledge on subjects of philosophy rather extensive than accurate, of law varied than profound. He has always been distinguished by the warmest filial and domestic attachments; and a purer ray of glory than even that which is reflected from his senatorial achievements is to be found in the steadiness with which, though often erring in judgment, he has ever supported the interests of freedom and humanity; and the indefatigable ardour which has enabled him, amid a multiplicity of professional and official duties, which would have overwhelmed any other man, to devote his great powers to the illustration of the wisdom of God from the works of nature.

The prosecution of the war in the Peninsula, and the chances of continuing it with success, was the last of the momentous subjects which occupied the British Parliament during the sessions of 1810 and 1811, and none present more interesting matter for retrospect.

On the part of the opposition, it was strenuously argued by Mr. Ponsonby, Earl Grey, and Lord Grenville: "It is a painful task to refer to predictions formerly made and despised, now unfortunately realized. How disagreeable soever it may nevertheless be, from a reference to past disasters, to anticipate future calamities, it has now become a bounden duty to do so; and that the more, that it is not a mere barren censure of past errors to which such a retrospect leads, but a solemn injunction to rescue the country in future from similar calamities. Is Parliament to sit year after year passive spectators of wasteful expenditure and the useless effusion of the best blood of the country in hopeless, calamitous, and disgraceful efforts? What return is due to the gallant army which has made such noble sacrifices? Is it not a sacred duty imposed upon government to see that not one drop more of blood is wasted in a cause where no thinking man can say that by any

Argument of the opposition against the Spanish war.

* Al guisà di Leon quando si posa.

To which Tasso added the line,

Girando gli occhi, et non movendo il passo.

Critics may differ as to whether the beautiful image in the last line does or does not detract from the majestic simplicity of the first; but Lord Brougham unequivocally condemns it as destroying the grandeur of the Florentine bard. —See LORD BROUGHAM'S *Address to the Students at Glasgow. Lord Rectors' Addresses, Glasgow, 1830.* A most interesting collection, as well from the celebrity of the statesmen and philosophers called to that eminent station, as from the progressive change in the character of thought which their successive compositions evince, from the philosophic silence on the subject of religion, characteristic of the days of Hume, with which it commences, to the devotional glow descriptive of those of Chalmers, with which it concludes, and which only wants the admirable address of Sir James Graham, in 1838, to be one of the most instructive monuments which the literature of Europe during and after the French Revolution has produced, of the vast effect of that great event in bringing men back, by necessity and suffering, to the best and noblest sentiments of their nature.

* It is well known that the character of the chief witnesses for the prosecution, in the case of Queen Caroline, was so bad that no reliance could be placed on their testimony; and on this fact Lord Brougham has never failed to descant in the most unmeasured terms whenever he could by possibility introduce the subject. He has not so frequently told, however, what is equally well known, that it was the evidence of the witnesses whom he himself put into the box, Lieutenants Flyn and Howman, whose character was above suspicion, that in the end left no doubt of the queen's guilt in the mind of any person capable of weighing evidence. —See *Parliamentary Debates, 1820, iii., 450, 543, New Series.* Yet this unhappy princess was possessed of some amiable, and many charming qualities; and in better hands might, in Mr. Canning's words, have been "the life, and grace, and ornament of society." "She is," says a personal and disinterested acquaintance, Sir Walter Scott, "a charming princess, and lives in an enchanted palace; and I cannot help thinking her prince must labour under some malignant spell to deny himself her society." —See *LOCKHART'S Life of Scott, p. 99.*

possibility such dreadful sacrifices are made with any prospect of advantage to the country? Is it agreeable, or consistent with the character of men of common intelligence, to submit to be led, from day to day, with the tale of unprofitable successes—of imaginary advantages to be gained by our army for ourselves or our allies? Is there any one who in his conscience believes that even the sacrifice of the whole British army would secure the defence of Portugal? If such a man there be, it may with confidence be affirmed, not only that he is unfit to be intrusted with the government of the country, but even incapable of transacting public business in any deliberative assembly.

"In a financial point of view, the cause of the Peninsula is utterly hopeless. Can any man, who looks at our immense exertions for the last seventeen years, assert that the annual expenditure of from three to four millions in its defence has not been absolutely lost to Spain, fruitless to Portugal, and of no advantage whatever to this country? In fact, so utterly hopeless is the cause, that nothing short of a divine miracle can render it effectual to its proposed object. But there are higher considerations than those of mere finance, which call upon us instantly to abandon this sanguinary and unprofitable struggle. The utter impossibility of defending Portugal with the British army, aided by the Portuguese levies, is so apparent, that it is a mockery of common understanding to argue on the subject. In former instances, when Portugal was attacked, the forces of the enemy were divided; but now they are wholly unoccupied in the north, and may be directed with fatal and unerring effect against that country. Is there any man bold enough to assert that the British army in Portugal, aided by the native force, maintained by our subsidies, will be sufficient to resist such an attack? What reliance can be placed on this subsidiary force, unpractised in the operations of war, and wholly ignorant of military discipline, except what they may pick up from their British officers? That Portugal can be defended by such a force is a thing absolutely impossible: if our troops do not take refuge in their ships, before six months is over not a British soldier will remain in the Peninsula except as a prisoner of war.

"Has anything been done to rescue the Portuguese people from the miserable state of thralldom in which they have been kept by their government, nobles, and priests, and to develop that ardent popular spirit from which alone, history teaches us, a vigorous national resistance is to be expected? Here has been a glorious opportunity for raising the Portuguese nation from that wretchedness and degraded condition to which centuries of mental ignorance and civil oppression have reduced them. Here was a task worthy of the greatest statesmen, suited to a wise and liberal policy—to an enlarged and generous spirit—to the free institutions of a free government. Nothing has been done with this view: the Portuguese are in as degraded a state as when the French eagles first approached the towers of Lisbon. Was it possible to expect a national spirit to arise when nothing was done to elicit it? And without such a spirit among the people, was it not, if possible, more hopeless than from other views to expect that any successful resistance could be made?

"The Portuguese levies, upon whom so much reliance is placed, might in time, perhaps, here-

after become good soldiers, and be capable of acting with regular troops. But when the corruption, weakness, and imbecility of the government are taken into view, every one must be convinced of the total impossibility of obtaining any native force capable of active co-operation with the British army. What assistance have we ever obtained from the Spanish armies, notwithstanding the high-sounding promises with which they have deluded the English troops into their territories? To expect anything better from the Portuguese, is to put all experience at defiance. They may be useful as light troops, but cannot act with regular soldiers. Portugal, instead of being defensible from its mountains, is, perhaps, the most indefensible country in Europe. The experience, not merely of the last seventeen years, but of the last few months, has amply demonstrated the total inefficacy of mountain ranges as a barrier against the vast forces and bold tactics of modern war. What defence has the Sierra Morena proved against the invasion of Soult? It is not by any such defences that Portugal is to be saved from the fate which has overtaken all the military monarchies of Europe. Disguise it as you will, the real question at issue is, whether the army at this moment in Portugal is to be sacrificed, as those under Sir John Moore and Lord Chatham have been; and unless the house intervenes, from a just sense of its own duty not less than of the national honour, disasters yet greater than either of these, and probably irreparable, await the British Empire.

"Our victories are perpetually held up as monuments of our eternal glory; and Maida, Corunna, Vimeira, and Talavera are everlastingly referred to as the theme of undying congratulation. But what have any of these boasted triumphs done for the people of the country where they were won, or for the general issue of the war? Maida handed over the Neapolitans to the tender mercies of an irritated and cruel enemy; Corunna sacrificed Moore only to deliver over Galicia to the Gallic armies; Vimeira was immediately followed by the disgraceful convention of Cintra; and Talavera was, at best, but an exhibition of rash confidence and victorious temerity. Honours have been conferred upon Sir Arthur Wellesley, for whom and for his country it would have been much more honourable if he had never changed his name. His conduct in Spain seemed the result of infatuation. After defeating Soult, he recrossed the Douro to form a junction with Cuesta, and when that was effected, he remained unaccountably inactive, till Soult was so far recovered as to be able to paralyze all his efforts, by descending into his rear after the battle of Talavera; and, when forced to retreat, he retired to an unhealthy province at an unhealthy season, where he remained some months, till his army had lost a third of its amount from malaria fever. If these are the consequences of your triumphs, what may be anticipated from your defeats?"

To these arguments it was replied by Lord Wellesley, Lord Liverpool, and Mr. Perceval: "The arrangements now proposed proceed on the same principles with the whole efforts hitherto made, and sanctioned by large majorities in both houses of Parliament. What has hitherto occurred to induce us to swerve from this course, or depart from those principles which have inva-

riably influenced our alliance with the Peninsular kingdoms to the present hour? The royal message proposes to take thirty thousand Portuguese into British pay. Has not such a course been strenuously recommended by Mr. Fox and Mr. Windham, when Portugal was endangered, when they were in power in 1806? Why are we to be now called upon to depart from this policy, adopted by our greatest statesmen of all parties; to abandon Portugal to her fate at the very time when she is making the greatest efforts to avert subjugation? What advantage is to be gained from thus casting over our counsels the hue of despair? Are we to tell our allies that the hour of their fate has arrived; that all attempts to assist them are in vain, and that they must bow the neck and submit to the yoke of a merciless invader? That, indeed, would be to strew the conqueror's path with flowers; to prepare the way for his triumphal march to the throne of the two kingdoms. Is it for this that so much treasure has been expended, so much blood has been shed? The spirit of the Spanish people is still excellent, their resources are far from exhausted; those of Portugal are untouched; our gallant army has never yet sustained a defeat; and is this the time to retire with disgrace from the contest? Will he who never risks a defeat ever gain a victory? Let us not, therefore, come to any resolution which can countenance Portugal in relaxing her exertions, or justify Spain in considering her condition hopeless. And yet, what other result could be anticipated if we were now to withdraw from the Peninsula before Portugal is so much as invaded, or the shock of war has even come upon us?

"The circumstances under which the war has commenced in the Peninsula form a glorious contrast to those that pervade all the other nations of the Continent. Spain was the first country that exhibited the example of a general rising of its population against the invasion and usurpation of the French ruler. In other countries he has been opposed by the armies alone, and, when they were overwhelmed, the states were conquered. But in Spain the resistance has proceeded from the whole people; and the hopes founded on their efforts are not to be dashed to the ground by the disasters of two or three campaigns. The country presents, beyond any other, physical advantages for such a stubborn system of warfare, from the vast desert or rocky tracts and numerous mountain ridges with which it abounds; while the history and character of the people afford room for well-grounded hopes that they will not, in such a contest, belie the character which they acquired in the Moorish wars. No point can be imagined so favourable for the *place d'armes* of the British force as the Tagus, lying, as it does, on the flank of the enemy's communications, and in such a position as to afford a central point, equally adapted for secure defence or offensive operations.

"If the defence of Portugal is really of that desperate character which is represented, let a motion be brought forward at once to abandon that country to its fate. Will the gentlemen opposite support such a motion, and thereby sacrifice at once all the blood and treasure which have been expended in defence of the Peninsula? Will they bring invasion home at once to our own doors? Have we gained nothing by the contest in its bloody fields? Is it nothing to have maintained a doubtful struggle with the conqueror of Continental Europe for so long a period:

to have stayed the tide of conquest, heretofore so fearfully rapid, and to be able to say that still, in the third year of the war, our standards wave undiminished security over the towers of Lisbon? We have gained that which is at once more honourable and more precious than empty laurels, the affection and confidence of the people both in Portugal and Spain; affection so great, that there is not a want of the British soldiers in the former country that is not instantly and gratuitously supplied; confidence so unbounded, that the government of the latter have offered to put their fleet at the disposal of the British admiral. War has its chances and its reverses as well as its glories: we cannot gain the latter if we shun the former; but surely never did nation win a brighter garland than England has done during the Peninsular contest, and never was nation bound by stronger ties to support a people who with such heroic resolution have, during three years, borne the whole weight of Napoleon's military power.*

"It is ungenerous to represent the whole people of the Peninsula as having achieved nothing worthy of memory. Have the defenders of Saragossa and Gerona no title to the admiration of posterity? Where else have three hundred thousand Frenchmen been constantly engaged in active warfare for three years, without having yet effected its subjugation? True, Spaniards have been often defeated; true, their chief provinces have been overrun; but after every defeat fresh armies have sprung up, and all history cannot produce an example of a more heroic resistance than this 'degraded' people have opposed to the invader. Nor has our co-operation been in time past unavailing, nor will it prove in time to come fruitless. Sir John Moore's advance arrested the conquest of the south of Spain, and postponed for more than a year the irruption into the Andalusian provinces. Lord Wellington's attack on Soult expelled the French from Portugal, and restored Galicia and Asturias, with the fleet at the Ferrol, to the patriot arms; his advance towards Madrid has drawn all the disposable forces of the enemy into the plains of La Mancha, and at once protected Portugal and given a breathing-time to Spain. The British army, headed by Wellington, and supported by forty thousand Portuguese, directed by British officers, is not yet expelled from the Peninsula; and it will require no ordinary force of the enemy to dislodge such a body from their strongholds near Lisbon."†

Upon this debate Parliament supported ministers in their resolution to continue the war: in the Lords by a majority of 30, the numbers being 124 to 94; and in the Commons by a majority of 96, the numbers being 263 to 167.‡

When the Eastern sage was desired by a victorious sultan to give him an inscription for a ring, which should, in a few words, convey the advice best calculated to moderate the triumph of prosperous, and diminish the depression of adverse fortune, he wrote the line, "*And this, too, shall pass away.*" Perhaps it is impossible to find words more universally descriptive of human affairs; or of that unceasing change from evil to good, and from

* Parl. Deb., xvi., 508, 535, and 94, 105.

† In justice to the opposition, it must be observed, that the greater part of the debates here summed up took place immediately before the Torres Vedras campaign.

‡ Parl. Deb., xvi., 536, and 105.

Reflections on this debate, and the conduct of the opposition on the subject.

good to evil, which, alike in private life and the concerns of nations, appears to be the destiny of all sublimary things. It is from inattention to this perpetual revolution, not of fortune, but of moral causes controlling it, that the greatest political calamities, and most of the greatest political errors, in every age, have been owing. The opposition, in the earlier part of Wellington's career, were subject to their full share of this general weakness. They thought that things would continue permanently as they then were; that Napoleon's greatness was to be as durable as it had been irresistible; and that the experienced inability of any European power to combat his land-forces had, for the lifetime of the whole existing generation at least, established his Empire beyond the possibility of overthrow. Judging from the past experience of that conqueror, there can be no doubt that these views were founded in reason; and yet the world was on the eve of the campaign of Salamanca and the Moscow retreat. The error of the opposition consisted in their insensibility to the change which was supervening in human affairs, and to the new principles of vigour on the one side, and weakness on the other, which were rising into action from the effects of the very triumphs and reverses which appeared to have indelibly fixed the destiny of human affairs. The perception of such a change, when going forward, is the highest effort of political wisdom; it is the power of discerning it which, in every important crisis, distinguishes the great from the second-rate statesman; the heroic from the temporizing ruler of mankind. Alone of all his compeers, Wellington saw and acted on this conviction: the government at home, gifted with less penetration, or fewer opportunities of observation, were far from sharing in his confidence as to the result, though they had the magnanimity to persevere in their course, even when they had little hopes of its success. The glorious triumph to which it led, and the enduring reward which their constancy obtained, adds another to the many instances which history affords where heroism of conduct has supplied the want of intellectual acuteness, and where the ancient maxim has been found good, that "true wisdom cometh from the heart."

The prolonged, obstinate, and most formidable resistance which the Whig party made to the prosecution of the Spanish war in its earlier stages, was an error of judgment, which only showed that they were not gifted with the highest political quality—that of seeing futurity through the shadows of present events. But when the tide had obviously turned—when success had, in a durable way, crowned the British arms, and the waves of Gallic ambition had permanently receded from the rocks of Torres Vedras—their conduct was of a more reprehensible cast; it became the fit subject of moral censure. With slow and unwilling steps they receded from their favourite position, as to the impossibility of defending Portugal: they still heaped abuse upon ministers for their conduct in the contest, although it was chiefly blameable, in time past, from having been too much framed on their advice; it was a cold and reluctant assent which they yielded even to the merits of Wellington himself. This insensibility to national glory, when it interfered with party ambition—this jealousy of individual greatness, when it obscured party renown—proved fatal to their hopes of accession to power during the lifetime of the

generation which had grown up to manhood in the Revolutionary war. Doubtless, it is the highest effort of patriotic virtue to exult at successes which are to confirm an adverse party in power—doubtless, no small share of magnanimity is required to concede merit to an opponent who is withering the hopes of individual elevation; but nations, from men acting on the great theatre of the world, have a right to expect such disinterestedness; it is the wisest course, in the end, even for themselves; and experience has proved that, in every age, really generous hearts are capable of such conduct. When Wellington lay at Elvas, in May, 1811, he received a letter from Mr. Whitbread, retracting, in the handsomest manner, his former strictures, and ascribing them, probably with perfect justice, to the imperfect information on which his judgment had been founded. The English general expressed himself highly gratified, as well he might, with this generous conduct;* but it does not appear that so noble an example was followed by any other of the Whig leaders; and on this occasion, unhappily, as on many others, the exception proves the rule.

Having determined to prosecute the war in the Peninsula with undiminished vigour, Parliament voted to minister ample supplies, in the year 1811, for its prosecution. No less than £19,540,000 was voted for the navy, and £23,869,000 for the army, besides £4,555,000 for the ordnance, and £2,700,000 for the support of the Portuguese forces. The permanent taxes amounted to £33,232,000, and the war yielded above £25,000,000; and the loan was £16,636,000, including £4,500,000 for the service of Ireland. The total Ways and Means raised on account of Great Britain were £80,600,000, and £10,309,000 on account of Ireland—in all, £90,909,000. This income, immense as it was, fell short of the expenditure of the United Kingdom, which that year reached £92,194,000. The army numbered 220,000 soldiers in the regular forces, 81,000 militia, besides 340,000 local militia; and the navy exhibited 107 ships of the line in commission, besides 119 frigates. The total vessels of war belonging to the United Kingdom were 1019, of which no less than 240 were of the line.†

The supplies voted for the succeeding year, 1812, were still greater, and kept pace with the increasing magnitude of the contest when the campaign of Salamanca had commenced, and the deliverance of the Peninsula in good earnest was attempted. The net produce of the permanent taxes in that year was no less than £40,000,000; of the war, £26,000,000; in all,

* "I was most highly gratified by your letter of the 29th of April, received last night, and I beg to return you my thanks for the mode in which you have taken the trouble to inform me of the favourable change of your opinion respecting affairs in this country. I acknowledge that I was much concerned to find that persons for whom I entertained the highest respect, and whose opinions were likely to have great weight in England and throughout Europe, had delivered opinions, erroneous, as I thought, respecting things in this country; and I prized their judgments so highly, that, being certain of the error of the opinion which they delivered, I was induced to ascribe their conduct to the excess of the spirit of party. I am highly gratified by the approbation of yourself and others; and it gives me still more pleasure to be convinced that such men could not be unjust towards an officer in the service of the country abroad."—WELLINGTON TO SAMUEL WHITBREAD, Esq., 23d May, 1811, GURWOOD, vii., 585.

† Finance Accounts. Parl. Deb., xxii., 1, 34, App., and Ann. Reg., 1812, 398, 408. App. to Chron. James, v. Table iii., App., No. 19. ‡ See note E, in Appendix.

£66,000,000; and £29,268,000 was raised by loan, including £4,500,000 for the service of Ireland, and £2,500,000 for that of the East India Company, guaranteed by government. The public expenditure was on a proportionate scale: the sums expended for the navy were £20,500,000; for the army, £25,000,000, besides £4,252,000 for the ordnance; the loans to Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Sicily, and Russia, amounted to £5,315,000, while the interest of the national debt amounted to £23,124,000; and still no less than £13,482,000 was applied to the sinking fund. The navy, during this year, consisted of 978 ships of all sizes, of which 236 were of the line and 102 line-of-battle ships, and 131 frigates in commission. The army numbered 227,000 regular soldiers under its banners, besides 76,000 regular, and 335,000 local militia. It seemed as if, as the contest continued and the scale on which it was conducted was enlarged, the resources of the Empire, so far from declining, widely expanded.*

The second decennial census of the population took place in the close of 1811, and was reported to Parliament in January, 1812. It exhibited an increase of 1,500,000 since the former number in 1801, being at the rate of about 13 1-2 per cent. annually over the whole Empire. So great an augmentation, considering the protracted and bloody hostilities in which the nation had so long been engaged in every quarter of the globe, and the heavy drain on the male population both for foreign and colonial service, justly excited the surprise and called forth the congratulation of Parliament and the nation; and the important fact was then for the first time elicited, that war, though generally considered as the scourge of the species, when carried on according to the maxims of civilized life, often rather communicates an impulse than a check to the increase of mankind; and that the quickened circulation and augmented demand for labour which it occasions, more than compensate the destruction of human life by which it is accompanied.†

Two very important events which occurred at this period deserve to be mentioned before the domestic transactions of Great Britain in the year 1811 and 1812 are disposed of, and the reader is embarked in the mighty concluding events of the war. The first of these was the rupture of the negotiations which had been for some time pending for the exchange of prisoners of war between England and France; the second, the capture of the last colonial settlement of the French emperor, and the establishment of the British flag in undisputed sovereignty both in the Eastern and Western hemispheres.

Great embarrassment had, for a very long period, been experienced by the English government from the immense accumulation of French prisoners in the British islands, and the difficulty of finding any secure places for the custody of so large a number of able-bodied men. Fortresses, with the exception of Portsmouth and Plymouth, there were none in

England; and the only other regular fortification in the northern part of the island, Fort George, near Inverness in Scotland, had not accommodation for above fifteen hundred men. Nevertheless, there were, in 1810, not less than fifty thousand French prisoners in Great Britain, and after erecting, at an enormous expense, several vast structures for their habitation, particularly one at Dartmoor in the south of England, and two in Scotland, each capable of containing six or seven thousand men, the government were under the necessity of confining great numbers in the hulks and guard-ships. The detention of soldiers in such a situation was made the subject of loud and frequent complaint by the French emperor, who said in the *Moniteur*, "that, by a refinement in cruelty, the English government sent the French soldiers on board the hulks, and the sailors into prisons in the interior of Scotland."* With his usual unfeeling disposition, however, to those whose services could no longer be made available, he not only resisted every proposal for an exchange of prisoners on anything approaching to reasonable principles, but never remitted one farthing for their maintenance, leaving the whole helpless multitude to starve, or be a burden on the British government, which, on the contrary, regularly remitted the whole cost of the support of the English captives in France to the imperial authorities. Notwithstanding Napoleon's neglect, however, the prisoners were surprisingly healthy, there being only 321 sick out of 45,939 in confinement, while out of 2710 who enjoyed their liberty on their parole, no less than 165 were on the sick-list.†

At length, in April, 1810, the British ministry sent Mr. Mackenzie on a special errand to endeavour to effect an exchange of prisoners with the French government. He was well received by the imperial cabinet, and the negotiation opened under apparently favourable auspices; but it soon appeared that the demands of Napoleon were so exorbitant as to render all the efforts of the negotiators abortive. He insisted that the exchange should be general; that is, that all the prisoners, French, English, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Italians, should be exchanged, man for man, and rank for rank, on the same footing as the principal power under whose banners they were respectively ranged. The effect of this would have been, that Napoleon would have obtained restitution of fifty thousand French soldiers and sailors in exchange for ten thousand English prisoners, whom he only had in his custody; the balance of forty thousand being made up of a rabble of Spanish and Portuguese levies, who were of little value, and who had no title to be placed in the same rank with the regular soldiers of either of the principal nations. The British government insisted that any given num-

* The great dépôt of French prisoners in Scotland which Napoleon held out as so deplorable a place of detention, was a noble edifice, erected at a cost of nearly £100,000, in a beautiful and salubrious situation near Perth, on the Tay, which, after being for twenty-five years unoccupied, was, in 1839, converted by the government, on account of its numerous advantages, into a great central jail for criminals. It contained 7000 prisoners, and, so healthy was the situation and substantial the fare and lodging they received, that of this great number only from five to six died annually: a smaller mortality than any equal body of men, in any rank in Europe, going about their usual avocations. That in England was equally healthy. At Dartmoor dépôt, in 1812, out of 20,000 prisoners there were only 300 sick, or 1 in 66: a proportion much above the average health of persons at large.—*Personal knowledge.* See *Parl. Deb.*, xx., 694.

† *Parl. Deb.*, xx., 634. *Hard*, ix., 105.

* See note F, in Appendix.

† *Parl. Deb.*, xxi., 478.

	1810.	1811.
Population of England,	8,331,434	9,499,400
Wales,	541,546	607,380
Scotland,	1,599,068	1,604,864
Army and Navy,	470,598	640,500
Totals,	10,942,646	12,552,144

—*Parl. Deb.*, xxi., 286.

ber of British should first be exchanged for an equal number of French; and that then the transfer, man for man, and rank for rank, between the remaining French or their allies against the Spanish and Portuguese should commence.* Neither party would recede from the position which they had respectively taken, and the result was, that the negotiations broke off, and Mr. Mackenzie returned to this country in the beginning of November.†

No other testimony than that of Napoleon himself is requisite to demonstrate the unreasonable nature of the pretension on his part, which led to this melancholy result. "Supposing," said he, in speaking of the comparative merit of the troops composing the French and allied armies previous to the battle of Waterloo, "that one English soldier was to be placed against one French, you would require two Prussian or Dutch, or soldiers of the confederation, to counterbalance one Frenchman."‡ Now, if two Prussian or German regular soldiers were required to counterbalance one Englishman or Frenchman, unquestionably four Spanish or Portuguese undisciplined recruits would have been barely sufficient for a similar counterpoise. Nothing, therefore, could have been more unreasonable than the demand on the part of the French government, which ultimately proved fatal to the negotiation; yet so much was Napoleon blinded by egotistical feelings on this subject, that he made the conduct of the English cabinet in the transaction a bitter subject of complaint to the latest hour of his life; and actually had the address to persuade his troops that their long detention in English prisons was the fault of the British government, when it was entirely his own; and he had left them to starve there, which would have been their fate but for the humane interposition of the very government which in this transaction he was loading with obloquy.§

The other memorable event of the period, apart from the never-ending maze of European politics, was the successful expedition undertaken against Java in the close of 1811, and the capture of the last colonial possession of the French Empire. This noble island, in itself a kingdom, is no less than 640 miles long, from 80 to 140 broad, and contains above two millions of inhabitants. Its surface, agreeably diversified by hill and dale, and rising in the interior into lofty

mountains, presents situations adapted for almost every variety of vegetable production, whether in the temperate or torrid zones; while its admirable situation, in the centre of the Indian Archipelago, midway between India and China, pointed it out as the emporium destined by nature for almost the whole of the lucrative Eastern commerce. So rich is its soil, so varied its capabilities, that it now produces sixty thousand tons of sugar, and five million pounds of pepper for exportation annually, besides furnishing rice and other grains for the support of its numerous inhabitants, and yielding a lucrative commerce of cinnamon, nutmeg, and other spices, to its European masters. It was early acquired, and had been for centuries in the hands of the Dutch, who, carrying to the East the habits and partialities of their own swampy territory, built their capital, Batavia, in a low, unhealthy situation, and intersected it with canals, which rendered it doubly dangerous. Such, however, are the advantages of its situation, and of its noble harbour, esteemed the finest in the Indian Archipelago, that, notwithstanding its pestilential atmosphere, it contains nearly two hundred thousand inhabitants. But the cool breezes on the heights in its vicinity offered many salubrious situations which the eager European thirst for gold has hitherto unaccountably neglected; while the lofty hills and pastoral valleys in the interior present numerous spots for human abode, where the burning rays of the sun are tempered by the fresh-blown mountain air, and the glowing skies of the East shed their radiance over the rich foliage and green slopes of European scenery.*

This splendid island was the last possession beyond the seas which remained to the French Empire, of which it had become a part upon the incorporation of Holland in 1810. Its reduction had long been an object of ambition to the British government; and in 1802 the preparations for the expedition were so far advanced that the command was offered to Sir Arthur Wellesley, then Governor of Mysore, by whom it was refused, as interfering with the important duties of that responsible situation. The Marhatta war, which soon after broke out, with its immediate consequence, the contest with Holkar, involved the Indian government in such a maze of hostility, and so seriously embarrassed their finances, that it was not till 1811 that the project could be seriously revived. It was then, however, set about in good earnest; and, to give additional *clat* to the expedition, Lord Minto, the governor-general of India, resolved to accompany it in person.

In the close of 1810, the Isle of France surrendered to a combined naval and military expedition from Bombay, Dec. 6, 1810. and the enemy was completely rooted out of his possessions in the Indian Ocean. Those in the Eastern archipelago were the next object of attack. The islands of Amboyna and Banda having been reduced by the British arms, a powerful expedition against Java was fitted out at Madras in March, consisting of four British and five native regiments of infantry, with a regiment of horse and a considerable train of artillery. In all ten thousand five hundred men, under the command of the gallant Sir Samuel Auchmuty.

* See note G, Appendix.

† Bign., ix., 145. Parl. Deb., xx., 623, 631.

‡ 9th Book of Nap., Mem., 61.

§ Bign., ix., 145, 146. Parl. Deb., xx., 623, 631. Ann. Reg., 1811, 76. Las Casas, vii., 39, 40.

¶ Napoleon's account of these transactions was as follows: "The English had infinitely more French than I had English prisoners. I knew well that, the moment they had got back their own, they would have discovered some pretext for carrying the exchange no farther, and my poor French would have remained forever in the hulks. I admitted, therefore, that I had much fewer English than they had French prisoners; but then I had a great number of Spanish and Portuguese, and, by taking them into account, I had a mass of prisoners, in all, considerably greater than theirs. I offered, therefore, to exchange the whole against the whole. This proposition at first disconcerted them, but at length they agreed to it. But I had my eye on everything. I saw clearly, that if they began by exchanging an Englishman against a Frenchman, as soon as they got back their own they would have brought forward something to stop the exchange. I insisted, therefore, that three thousand Frenchmen should at once be exchanged against one thousand English and two thousand Portuguese and Spaniards. They refused this, and so the negotiation broke off."

—LAS CASAS, vii., 39, 40.

* Malte Brun, iii., 445, 453. Valentyn., Java, 64, Indes Orient., v., 65.

The expedition effected a landing at the village of Chillingching, about twelve miles to the east of Batavia, in the beginning of August. The principal force of the enemy, which consisted of about ten thousand men, was collected in the entrenched camp of **FORT CORNELIUS**, a position strongly fortified by art and nature, and defended by numerous redoubts, surrounded by strong palisades, and mounting two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon.*

The chief force of the French and Dutch was, **Aug. 4.** Storming of in this formidable position, under the outworks their commander General Jansens; of Cornelius. but a considerable detachment, about three thousand strong, occupied a more advanced post, also strengthened by fieldworks, two miles in front of the main body. Neither of these positions, however, commanded the road to the

Aug. 8. capital, which was accordingly occupied, without opposition, a few days after the landing; and from thence the troops advanced against the enemy's advanced work, and drove them from it with great spirit, under shelter of the cannon of Fort Cornelius, the grenadier company of the 78th, as in every Eastern field of fame, heading the attack. When the victorious troops, however, came in sight of that stronghold, they were checked by the fire from its outworks, and the boldest paused at the sight of the difficulties which they had to encounter. The enemy, strongly intrenched, occupied a position between the great River Jacatra and the Sloken, an artificial watercourse, neither of which was fordable. The front of this position, thus secured on either flank from attack, was covered by a deep ditch, strongly palisaded, within which were seven large redoubts, all planted with a formidable array of heavy artillery, garrisoned by a body of regular troops, much superior to the attacking force. Batteries were speedily raised opposite to these fortifications, which, though armed with guns inferior to those of the enemy both in number and calibre, shortly did great execution, from the superior rapidity and precision of their fire. The season, however, was too far advanced, and the heat too violent to admit of regular approaches; and, notwithstanding the strength of the intrenched camp, the English general resolved on an assault, which was fixed for daybreak on the 26th.†

At midnight on the 25th, the assaulting columns moved from the trenches, under the command of a most gallant **Storming of the lines of Fort Cornelius itself.** and experienced officer, Colonel Gillespie. The right, under his own immediate direction and that of Colonel Gibbs, was directed against the enemy's redoubts beyond the Sloken, and had orders, if they succeeded in carrying them, to endeavour to force their way across the bridge which united that outwork to the main intrenchments; the left, under Colonel M'Leod, was to follow a path on the bank of the Jacatra, and commence an attack on that side when the firing was heard on the other flank; while the centre, under General Wetherall, was to endeavour, in the general confusion, to force its way across the ditch in front. Notwithstanding the early hour and secrecy of the attack, the enemy were on the alert, and under arms at all points; but the devoted gallantry of

the British troops, aided by the unflinching steadiness of the sepoys, overcame every obstacle. All the attacks proved successful. Colonel Gillespie, after a long detour through an intricate country, came on the redoubt on the right, stormed it in an instant, notwithstanding a tremendous fire of grape and musketry; and, passing the bridge with the fugitives, also carried the redoubt next in order, though defended in the most obstinate manner by General Jansens in person. The British column then divided into two, one under Gillespie himself, the other under Colonel Gibbs, supported by Colonel Wood, at the head of the heroic 78th, which, though long opposed, now burst in with loud shouts in the front of the lines, and successively carried the works on either hand; while Colonel M'Leod, on the extreme left, also forced his way into the redoubt which rested on the Jacatra, and gloriously fell in the moment of victory. With equal judgment and valour, Gillespie lost not a moment in leading on the victorious troops to the attack of the enemy's park of artillery in the rear, which, with all the troops that defended it, fell into the hands of the conqueror. The victory was complete, though the severe loss sustained by the British, amounting to 872 killed and wounded, showed how obstinately it had been contested. The carnage of the enemy, within the works, was very great: above a thousand were buried on the field, besides multitudes cut down in the pursuit, and five thousand prisoners taken. No less than four hundred and thirty pieces of cannon were found in the intrenched camp, of which two hundred and eighty were mounted on the batteries and redoubts: the total pieces taken then, and in the citadel of Batavia, and the outworks previously stormed, amounted to the enormous number of 264 brass and 504 iron guns and mortars, besides ammunition and military stores to an incalculable amount.*

This splendid exploit was soon after followed by the capitulation of the remaining **Surrender of troops who had escaped with Gen- all Java. Sep- eral Jansens from the rout at Fort tember 26.** Cornelius, and who, notwithstanding all his efforts, found it impracticable to prolong his defence. The whole of this noble island thus fell under the dominion of the British (which, it must always be regretted, was relinquished by a misplaced generosity at a future time); and Lord Minto said with great, but not unfounded pride, in his despatches to the British government on the occasion, that "now the French flag was nowhere to be seen flying from Cape Comorin to Cape Horn."†

Such was the termination of the maritime war between England and Napoleon: **Reflections on the total destruction of the French colonial empire.** thus was extinguished THE LAST REMNANT of the colonial empire of France. There is something solemn and apparently providential in the simultaneous march of these great powers to universal dominion on their respective elements, and in the establishment of the colonial empire of Great Britain on a scale of grandeur which embraced the whole earth in its arms. No such result could have been anticipated at the commencement of the contest, still less could it have been hoped for amid the multiplied disasters with which its progress was attended. The maritime forces of England and France were very near-

* Sir S. Auchmuty's Desp., Aug. 31, 1811, Ann. Reg., 1812, 225. App. to Chron.; and James's Naval History, vi., 26, 27.

† Sir S. Auchmuty's Desp., Ann. Reg., 1812, 226. App. to Chron. James, vii., 32, 33.

* Sir S. Auchmuty's Desp., Ann. Reg., 1812. App. to Chron., 226, 236. James, vi., 24.

† Ann. Reg., 1812, 169.

ly matched at the opening of the war; united to those of Spain, the latter were superior. Gibraltar was only revictualled during the American war by the nautical skill of Lord Howe; and Plymouth beheld, for the first time in English history, its harbour blockaded by the triumphant squadrons of France and Spain. The colonial empire of France in 1792, though not equal, was a fair rival to that of England. In the West Indies, she possessed St. Domingo, an island then yielding colonial produce equal to that of all the British West India islands put together at this time;* in the East, her flag, or that of her allies, waved over the Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of Bourbon, the Isle of France, Java, and the Malaccas, midway stations, apparently set down for the transit of the commerce of the East to the European shores; while on the Continent of Hindostan, her influence almost equalled that of England herself, and on the banks of the Jumna a force was organized, under French officers, superior to any which British energy could bring to bear against it.† What was it, then, which subverted this vast and growing colonial empire, which gave to the arms of England, amid continual European disasters, a succession of maritime triumphs unparalleled in the days of Marlborough or Chatham, and led to the total destruction of the Asiatic and American possessions of France at the very time when Napoleon's forces had acquired universal dominion on the Continent of Europe? Evidently the French Revolution on the one hand, and the constancy of England on the other: those mighty agents which at once dried up the maritime resources of the one country, and quadrupled the naval power of the other; which poured forth a host of ardent Democrats on the plains of Europe, and sent forth the British fleets, conquering and to conquer, on the waves of the sea; which nursed in England the heroic spirit of Conservative freedom, and extricated in France the irresistible energy of Democratic ambition.

Even if the contest had terminated at this point, the fortunes of the British Empire, though overshadowed at the moment by the grandeur of Napoleon's Continental victories, must now appear to the reflecting eye to have been on the ascendant. England, by wresting from her rival all her colonial settlements, had made herself master of the fountains of the human race. In vain France recounted the fields of European fame, and pointed to the world filled with her renown, the Continent subjugated by her arms: it was the seats of ancient civilization, the abode of departed greatness, which were thus subdued. Great Britain had cast her anchor in the waters of the emerging globe; her flag waved on the infant seats of civilization; her seed was spreading over the future abodes of mankind. The con-

quest of the world which had been, however superior in present lustre, could never equal in durable effect the settlement of the world which was to be. There was to be found the ark which bore the fortunes of humanity; there the progenitors of the Greece, and the Rome, and the Europe yet to come; there the tongue which was to spread the glories of English genius, and the pride of English descent, as far as the waters of the ocean extend. But the contest was not to terminate here. The rival powers thus nursed to greatness on their respective elements, thus alike irresistible on the land and the sea, were now come into fierce and final collision. England was to launch her legions against France, and contend with her ancient rival on her own element for the palm of European ascendancy; the desperate struggle in Russia was to bring to a decisive issue the contest for the mastery of the ancient world. We are on the eve of greater changes than have yet been traced on the pages of this eventful history, fiercer passions are to be brought into collision than those which had yet stirred mankind in the strife; sacrifices greater recounted, glories brighter recorded, than had yet shed lustre on the human race.

Long, and to some uninteresting, as the preceding detail of the domestic transactions of Great Britain from 1810 to 1812, may appear, it will not, to the reflecting reader, be deemed misplaced even in the annals of European story. Amid the multiplied scenes of carnage, the ceaseless streams of blood, which characterize the era of Napoleon, it is consolatory to linger on one spot of pacific disquisition. To the eye wearied with the constant mastery of nations by physical strength, it is refreshing to turn to one scene where mind still asserted its inherent superiority, and in moral causes was yet to be found the source of the power which was ultimately to rule mankind. Independent of the vast intrinsic importance of the questions which then agitated the British mind, and their obvious bearing upon the social interests which now are at stake in all the commercial communities of the globe, their influence on the contest which was then pending was immediate and decisive. The crisis of the war truly occurred in the British islands at this period. If any of the great questions then in dependance had been decided in a different manner from what they actually were by the English Parliament, the issue of the war—the fate of the world, would have been changed. The accession of the opposition to power when the restrictions upon the prince regent expired in 1812; the adoption by the House of Commons of the recommendations of the Bullion Committee; the abandonment of the Peninsular contest, in pursuance of the strenuous arguments of their Parliamentary antagonists, would, any of them, have speedily terminated the contest in favour of the French emperor, crushed the rising spirit of Russia, extinguished the germe of European freedom, and effected, by the destruction of English maritime power, the whole destiny of the human race. Not less than on the fields of Leipsic or Waterloo did the fortunes of mankind hang suspended in the balance during the debates on these momentous subjects; interests more vital, consequences more momentous than any that were contemplated by their authors, hung upon the lips of the orators, and quivered on the decisions of the statesmen. It is this which gives the debates of the British

Importance of the preceding domestic detail of British transactions.

* It yielded £18,000,000 worth of colonial produce: the whole British islands, in 1833, was only £22,000,000; and in 1839, in consequence of the emancipation of the slaves, it did not produce £17,000,000. The total West India produce of the British West India islands,

	Sugar hhds.	Rum puncheons.
in 1829, was	271,700	61,700
in 1839,	179,800	43,400
Falling off,	91,900	18,300

—Colonial Magazine, No. III., Appendix. Parliamentary Returns, 4th June, 1833, and PORTER'S Parliamentary Tables, i., 64. Ante, ii., 240.

† They had 38,000 infantry and cavalry, and 270 guns, all commanded by French officers, and trained in the European method.—Vide Ante, iii., 154.

senate at this period their enduring interest; it is this which has rendered the Chapel of St. Stephen's the forum of the human race. The military glory of England may be outshone by the exploits of future states; her literary renown may be overshadowed by the greatness of subsequent genius; but the moral interest of her social contests, mirrored in the debates of Parliament,

will never be surpassed; and to the end of time the speeches of her illustrious statesmen will be referred to as the faithful image of those antagonist powers which alternately obtain the mastery in human affairs, and on the due equipoise of which the present happiness, as well as future advancement, of the species is mainly dependent.

CHAPTER LXI.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CORTES—WAR IN SPAIN.

JANUARY, 1810—FEBRUARY, 1812.

ARGUMENT.

Singular Mixture of Good and Evil in human Affairs.—Agency by which it is brought about.—Ultimate Effects of the Blockade of Cadiz.—Vast Consequences it has produced in the World.—Regulations laid down for the Convocation of the Cortes.—Enactments regarding its passing of Laws.—Character of the Population in Cadiz, and the Municipality within its Walls.—Persecution of the Members of the Central Junta.—Circumstances which preceded and attended the Assembling of the Cortes.—Its Election is based on Numbers, not Interests.—Election of its Supplementary Members.—Final Election of the Cortes itself.—Its Opening and early Proceedings.—Proclaims the Sovereignty of the People.—Fresh Assumptions of supreme Power by them.—Decree on the Liberty of the Press.—Appointment of a Committee to frame a Constitution.—Their heroic Conduct in holding out against France, and rigid Adherence to the Romish Church.—Principles of the Constitution of 1812.—Powers of the King.—Constitution of the Cortes.—Its vast Effect in stimulating political Passion in the Peninsula.—Manner in which the New Constitution was received in Spain.—Wellington's clear Perception and curious Predictions on the Effects of the Cortes and New Constitution.—His still clearer Opinion on the Subject, after visiting Cadiz in the Spring of 1813.—Abortive Attempt to effect the Liberation of Ferdinand VII.—Military Condition of the French in Spain in the Spring of 1810.—Napoleon's Intentions as to Dismembering Spain at this Period.—Negotiation between him and Joseph for its Partition.—Efforts of the Spanish Envoys to prevent it.—Joseph, in Disgust, at length Resigns the Crown.—Terms of Accommodation between him and Napoleon.—Prosperous Condition of the French at this Period in Spain.—Force assembled in Cadiz by the Allies.—Spanish and British Forces in the Peninsula.—Description of Cadiz.—Arrival of the British Troops, and first Measures of Defence.—Noble Defence of Matagorda by the British.—Increased Means of Defence accumulated in Cadiz itself.—Description of the French Lines round the City.—Position of the French and Spanish Armies in Andalusia and Grenada.—Operations in Catalonia, and Preparations for the Siege of Tortosa.—Forces and Dispositions of the Spaniards in that Province.—Macdonald's first Operations in Catalonia.—Brilliant Success of O'Donnell in the North of the Province.—Repulse of Macdonald at Cardona, and his Retreat to Gerona.—Suchet's Exertions preparatory to the Siege of Tortosa.—Commencement of the Siege.—Description of that Fortress.—Its Siege.—Fall of the Place.—Important Consequences with which it was attended.—Preparations for the Siege of Taragona.—Renewed Vigour of the Catalonians in the War.—Attempt to Surprise Barcelona, and Capture of Figueras by them.—Unsuccessful Attempt of Campoverde to relieve the Place.—Burning of Manresa, and Action at that Place.—Suchet's Reasons for persisting in the Siege of Taragona.—Description of that Fortress.—Commencement of the Siege.—Preparations for the Storming of Port Olivo.—It is carried by Storm.—Vigorous Preparations of the Spaniards for a protracted Defence.—Progress of the Siege, and Preparations of the Spaniards to raise it.—The Approaches are brought up to the Lower Town.—It is carried by Assault.—Fruitless Attempt to raise the Siege, and Failure of Succours from England.—Preparations for Storming the Upper Town.—Its Success.—Disgraceful Cruelty of the French to the Citizens.—Immense Results of this Siege.—Suchet's next Operations.—Description of Mont Serrat.—Storming of its Convent.—Blockade and Surrender of Figueras.—Invasion of Valencia by Suchet, and Preparations for its Defence by the Spaniards.—Description of Saguntum.—Siege and unsuccessful Assault of that Fort.—A second Assault is also defeated.—Perilous Situation of Suchet

after this Repulse.—Successes of the Guerillas in Arragon.—Advance of Blake to raise the Siege.—Battle of Saguntum.—Delay of Suchet there till he received Reinforcements.—He at length approaches and invests Valencia.—The Spaniards are defeated and thrown back into the Town.—Siege and Fall of Valencia.—Immense Results of this Conquest.—Complete Subjugation of the Province.—Honours and Rewards bestowed on Suchet and his Troops.—Reflections on these Campaigns of Suchet.—Painful Feelings on the Conduct of England in this Part of Spain.—Causes of the Weakness of the British Government at this Period.—Insecure Tenure Ministers had of their Offices.—Its principal Cause.—Surprising Result of these Circumstances on the ultimate Fate of Napoleon.

So intimately blended together are the links in the great chain of human affairs, Singular mixture of good and evil in human affairs. so mysterious the bond which unites in this sublunary state the co-existent principles of good and evil, that it is impossible to find any period where these antagonist powers have not been at work, and where unseen causes have not been preparing a vital change in the fate of nations or the fortunes of mankind. In the darkest moments of the French Revolution, the seeds of revived religion and renewed loyalty were widely scattered among mankind; in the most depressing period of the conquests of Napoleon, the principles of resistance were acquiring increased energy, and suffering was preparing in silence the renovation of the world. The period we are now considering was no exception to the general law. At the moment when the constancy of England and the heroism of Russia were preparing the emancipation of the Continent from French oppression, and the delusions of Democracy were disappearing in Northern Europe before the experience of its effects, and about to yield to the aroused indignation of mankind, a new principle of evil was springing up in the last asylum of European independence, destined to revive in another quarter the worn-out flames, and perpetuate a frightful civil war for a quarter of a century in the Spanish Peninsula; and while Great Britain was securely laying the foundations of a colonial empire, which was to embrace the earth in its grasp and civilize mankind by its wisdom, the vast Indian possessions of the Spanish monarchy were breaking off from the parent state, and the frantic passions of ill-regulated freedom were preparing desolation and ruin for the boundless realms of South American Independence.

That there is no rose without its thorn, and no private life which the concurring voice of all ages has proclaimed, and every man's experience, who has seen much of human affairs, must probably have confirmed. Agency by which this is brought about. The law of nature seems to be of universal ap-

plication and unceasing activity; for we can distinctly trace its agency in every transaction, whether individual or political, in the page of history or in common life around us, and perpetually witness its effects alike in the trials of individuals and the discipline of nations. In the very events which at one period are most the objects of our desire, whether as communities or private men, we can subsequently trace the unobserved causes of our distresses; in the evils which we at the time regarded as altogether overwhelming, we afterward discern with thankfulness the secret springs of our blessings or improvement. Inexperience or infidelity alone will discover in this mysterious system the blind operations of chance, or the antagonist agency of equal and opposing supreme powers. Reason, equally with revelation, tells us that such is necessarily the condition of a world composed of free agents in a state of moral probation; that, if the good principles alone were brought into action, it would be heaven—if the bad, hell; and that the mixed condition of mankind, and the perpetual agency of the causes of evil amid good and of good amid evil, necessarily arise from that inherent tendency to wickedness, as well as aids to virtue, which we have inherited from our first parents or derived from revelation. The pride of intellect, the visions of philanthropy, will to the end of time chafe against this simple truth, and contend, on the principle of unlimited perfectibility, for a relaxation of every restraint, except what itself imposes, on human action; but it is the only principle which will ever afford any solution of the otherwise inexplicable maze of human affairs. Experience, the great test of truth, is perpetually demonstrating its universal application. Suffering, wide-spread and inevitable, never fails to chastise any attempt to elude its obligations; and the more widely that one generation deviates from it in their actions, the more closely will the next adhere to it in their opinions.

Never was the truth of these principles more clearly evinced than in the contrast between the immediate and ultimate results which followed the arrival of the French before Cadiz in 1810. Europe with admiration beheld the able and energetic march of the Duke of Albuquerque, which, outstripping the celerity of the French legions, preserved the last bulwark of Spanish independence for the arms of freedom.* The subsequent assembly of the Cortes within its impregnable ramparts, promised to give that unity to the Spanish operations of which they had hitherto so grievously felt the want, at the same time that it presented a national authority with which other powers might treat in their negotiations for the furtherance of the common cause; while the English people, variously affected by philanthropic ardour or merchantile interest, beheld with undisguised satisfaction the progressive emancipation of the South American colonies, and fondly anticipated, some a renovation of the Southern Hemisphere, others a boundless extension of the field for British speculation, in the regenerated states of the New World. Yet from these very events, so fortunate at the moment in their immediate effects, so apparently auspicious in their remote consequences, have arisen results to the last degree pernicious, both to the Spanish Peninsula and the British Empire.

The establishment of the Cortes within the walls of Cadiz brought it under the direct influence of the Democratic mob of a great and corrupted city; the Revolutionary passions revived with the immediate subjection of supreme power to their control, and the Constitution of 1812 bequeathed to the Spanish Peninsula the fatal gift of a system of government, alike impracticable for the country at large, and seducing to the urban constituencies, for whose interest it was intended. The severance of the Spanish colonies from the parent state, to which the mercantile jealousy of the Cadiz government speedily gave rise, spread the Revolutionary passions through a people unfit, either from their habits, intelligence, or descent, for the blessings of freedom: the bright dawn of their independence was speedily overcast with clouds; and the now wasted and distracted South American States, the successive prey of a race of tyrants too numerous for history to record, remain an enduring monument of the utter impracticability of applying to a Roman Catholic population and Celtic race those institutions which are overspreading the world with the Protestant faith and the Anglo-Saxon descent. Nor has England suffered less in this audacious attempt to war against the character of men and the laws of nature; consequences, to the last degree disastrous, have flowed both to her people and her Constitution from the independence of the Spanish colonies, in promoting which she took so prominent a share: her wealth, guided by deluded, or the prey of unprincipled hands, has been absorbed to an unparalleled extent in South American speculations. The loss of fifty millions, lent to their faithless, insolvent republics, or reckless and improvident companies, brought on the great commercial crisis of 1825; the entire abandonment of the South American mines, from the bankruptcy of those who worked them, altered by fully a third the value of money over the globe; and, joined to the suppression of small notes in Great Britain by the bill of 1826, added a third to the whole debt, public and private, of the British Empire; and, from the general distress and suffering thence arising, has sprung that wide-spread discontent and chaos of unanimity in favour of some organic change, which, in its ultimate effects, altered the old English Constitution. Out of the walls of Cadiz, in 1810 and 1811, has issued the cloud which now overspreads the world; the fierce passions which have ever since drenched the Peninsula with blood; the guilty ambition which has halved in numbers, and almost reduced to barbarism, the South American population; the restless energy which overthrew the constitutional freedom of the restoration in France; the turbulent spirit which overturned the tempered aristocracy and government of property in England.

Little dreaming of the momentous consequences dependant on their actions, the Spanish authorities in the Isle of Leon, animated with unconquerable resolution, and a spirit of resistance which seemed to augment with the straits to which they were reduced, proceeded to the formation of a Cortes for the regulation of the Constitution. It has been already mentioned that the Central Junta, after their expulsion from Seville in January, 1810, had passed a decree, vesting the interim government in a regency of six persons, which

Regulations laid down for convocation of the Cortes. Jan., 1810.

Jan. 29.

* Ante, *ibid.*, 343.

was proclaimed in Cadiz on the 31st, and laying down the principles by which the convocation of the Cortes was to be regulated.* These were of the utmost importance, and materially influenced the character of the subsequent proceedings. By the first, the ancient constitution of that body was altered, and, instead of assembling, as of old, in three chambers, they were to meet in two; the one called the Popular, the other the Dignified Assembly. A still more important enactment was passed, relative to the mode of supplying the members of such provinces of the monarchy as, from their distance from the place of assembly, or from being in the possession of the enemy, could not assemble for the purpose of choosing representatives. It was provided, with a view to the choice of deputies to represent those provinces of America or Asia which could not, by reason of their distance, be summoned in time, that the regency should appoint an electoral junta, composed of six persons, natives of those regions, who should choose, by a double ballot, twenty-six deputies out of a list of persons, also natives of the same districts, who happened to be at that time in Spain, made up by a committee of the Cortes. In like manner, to fill up the representation of the provinces in the occupation of the enemy, another electoral junta was appointed by the regency, composed of six other individuals, natives of those districts, who were to choose, by a double ballot, four members for each of such provinces out of a list furnished by the Cortes. The provinces, in regard to which representatives were to be chosen in this manner, comprised the whole of Spain, with the exception of Galicia, Asturias, and part of Catalonia: so that the great majority of the Cortes was necessarily composed of persons elected in the city of Cadiz; and the powers of the assembly thus elected were sufficiently extensive, for they embraced a general remodelling of the whole laws and Constitutions of the monarchy.†

With regard to the legislative business of the assembly, it was provided that all propositions for changes in the laws should be submitted, in the first instance, to the two chambers; and, if passed by them, be sent up to the regency, in place of the crown, for approval; but the regency might, in the first instance, refuse their consent, and remit the bill to the chambers for reconsideration. If, however, it was then approved by two thirds of both houses, it was to return to the regency, who were bound to adhibit their signature to it within the space of three days, on the expiry of which it became law, with or without the royal sanction.‡

Strongly as these fundamental provisions savoured of popular restrictions on the royal authority, their effect became doubly powerful from the circumstances of the city, and the character of the population, in which the sittings of the Cortes took place. The junta, immediately before the resignation of their authority, passed two resolutions, by the first of which the liberty of the press was established in the most ample manner during the whole sitting of the Cortes, and in the place of its deliberations; while, by the second, none of their own members were declared eligible for

the approaching national convention. After their resignation, and before the assembly of the Cortes, the regency of six, to whom the supreme authority had been confided, insensibly sunk into insignificance; and the Municipal Junta of Cadiz, elected by the whole householders of the city, rapidly rose to the highest influence and consideration. It may easily be conceived what was the character of a municipality elected, in a great commercial city, by universal household suffrage, in a moment of mingled terror, enthusiasm, and patriotic fervour. Its population of a hundred and fifty thousand souls, increased at that period by nearly a hundred thousand strangers, who had taken refuge within its impregnable walls, from all parts of the Peninsula, naturally Democratic in its tendency, was then in the most violent state of effervescence; the Central Junta, under whose government so many disasters had been experienced, had fallen into universal obloquy; and the ardent, inexperienced multitude, who had lost or suffered so much in the course of the contest, not unnaturally concluded that they were all to be ascribed to the ignorance or incapacity of former rulers, and that the only chance of salvation for the country was to be found in the substitution of the vigour of popular for the imbecility of aristocratic direction.*

The great majority of the Municipal Junta, accordingly, was, from the very first, strongly tinged with Republican sentiments. Their incessant object was to augment their own power and depress that of every other authority in the state; and nothing but the presence of the large military force of the allied nations within the fortress, amounting to twenty-seven thousand men, prevented them from breaking out into all the excesses of the French Revolution. Though restrained in this way from such atrocities, however, the revolutionary action soon became so violent as to gain the entire civil direction of the government clubs, in which Democratic sentiments of the most violent kind, uttered amid thunders of applause, abounded in all quarters of the city. The public press shared in the general excitation. The most licentious and profigate works of the French metropolis were translated, sold at a low price, and greedily devoured by the excited populace. One of the most popular journals indicated the public feeling by taking the title of the "Spanish Robespierre;" and when the few members of the Junta, who really were elected by the provinces, arrived at Cadiz, in the beginning of March, the torrent had become irresistible, and they found themselves instantly swept away by a wave of Democratic fury.†

The principal members of the late Central Junta, which had governed Spain, if not with credit or success, at least with constancy and courage, during fourteen months of almost continued disasters, were speedily exposed to persecution and violence from this infuriated party. Count Tilly and Don Lorenzo Calvo were arrested and thrown into prison on a charge of treason to the Spanish cause, on grounds so clearly futile and unfounded, that public opinion, excited as it was, could not support the measure, and the latter was acquitted and liberated, after a

* Ante, iii., 265.

† Proclamation of Junta, Jan. 29, 1810. Tor., iii., 464. Pièces Just.

‡ Ibid. Tor., iii., 464. Pièces Just.

* Hard., xi., 145, 146. South., iv., 284, 286. Tor., iii., 184, 187.

† Hard., xi., 169, 172. Tor., iii., 186, 187. Southey, iv., 285, 286.

long confinement by the Cortes. All the other members of the Junta were proceeded against in the same vague manner, and searched or imprisoned without the vestige of ground but that which they shared with all Spain, of having been unfortunate. The clamour of the multitude, prevailing alike over the dictates of justice and the principles of reason, insisted on their immediate prosecution with the utmost rigour of the law. Even the venerable name and great services of Jovellanos could not protect his person from contumely, or avert an iniquitous decree, which banished him, without trial, to his own province, there to be placed under the surveillance of the police. Such was the grief which he felt at this undeserved severity, that it embittered his few remaining days, and brought him speedily to the grave. Tilly died in prison, without a trial. Calvo, one of the heroes of Saragossa, who had been thrust into a dungeon, without a bed in it, was brought to trial after the Cortes met, and acquitted. So violent, however, was the public effervescence, that the British ambassador felt relieved by the imprisonment of these unfortunate functionaries, lest the populace should anticipate the march of legal proceedings, and take the wreaking of their vengeance into their own hands.*

Having got possession of the government of the country, the regency and municipality of Cadiz were in no hurry to accelerate the assembly of the Cortes, by which a rival, and, possibly, paramount legislative power might be established in the very seat of their authority. By the decree of the 29th of January, that national assembly stood convoked for the 1st of March, "if the national defence would permit;" but these words were sufficiently vague to let in the continued blockade of Cadiz as a reason against convoking the Cortes, and furnished a decent pretext to the regency for delaying their assembly. The promised time, accordingly, passed over, without anything being done. Loud clamours, in consequence, arose, both among the inhabitants of Cadiz and various deputies from the juntas of different provinces, who had taken refuge within its walls; and the ferment at length became so violent, June 18. that the government deemed it necessary to yield to the torrent, and issued a decree for the convocation of the Cortes. Great difficulties, however, were experienced in determining the principle on which the members were to be summoned, and still more in filling up the returns of deputies from the districts occupied by the enemy. Another question, of still more importance, was, whether the Cortes should sit in a single, or in two chambers, as the decree of the late Junta had provided. At length, after a vehement discussion, it was determined that the ancient mode of election should be completely changed, and that the assembly should sit in a single chamber.†

The mode of election formerly had been various in different provinces; but in all, the principle of the representation of, and election by, the three orders, had been more or less clearly established: a principle, indeed, which was universal in the middle ages in all the European communities, and may be considered as the distinctive mark of European civilization.

It was followed, and given effect to, by the division of the Cortes into the three chambers, or *estamento* of the nobles, the clergy, and the commons, each of which had a negative on any legislative measure. The members for the boroughs were, in general, chosen by their magistrates, not their inhabitants; but there was no fixed rule, and ancient custom regulated the franchise and its mode of exercise. It was now determined, however, by the regency, in opposition to the strenuous advice of the illustrious Jovellanos, that the principle of the elections should not be, as of old, the representation of ranks or of orders, but of *individuals*; and, as a consequence of this, that the elective franchise should be thrown to every Spaniard domiciled in the country, of the age of twenty-five years. One deputy was to be returned for every fifty thousand souls in the rural districts; one by every borough which formerly returned a member; and one by every provincial junta, in consideration of their services during the war. The whole of the deputies, thus elected by universal suffrage, were to sit in one chamber: the nobles and the Church had no separate representatives. In this assembly, therefore, the Dukes of Medina Cœli, or Del Infantado, or the Archbishop of Toledo, had no more influence than a simple mechanic. How long would the institutions of England, with its calm judgment, old habits, and Anglo-Saxon descent, withstand the dissolving influence of a single constituent assembly, vested with unbounded legislative power, elected, and conducting business in such a manner? Not one week. What, then, was to be expected from the fervent spirit and inexperienced ambition of Andalusia, suddenly invested with supreme uncontrolled power, under the burning sun, and within the beleaguered walls of Cadiz?*

Perilous as were the elements of legislation thus thrown together in the national assembly of Spain, the danger was materially augmented by the steps taken to fill up the supplementary members for the provinces beyond seas, and those in the occupation of the enemy. By an edict published in the beginning of September, it was provided that the number chosen from the provinces beyond seas should be twenty-eight, and for the conquered provinces forty; and that both the electors and the elected should be taken from the persons belonging to those districts who had then taken refuge in Cadiz. Thus, one part of the Cortes was composed of deputies chosen by universal suffrage, in the cities and provinces of Spain yet unoccupied by the enemy; and the remainder made up of refugees, selected, by the same promiscuous mode of choice, from the excited crowd who encumbered the streets of that great commercial emporium. No restrictions of any sort were imposed on the choice of any of the members: it was only necessary that the deputy should be above twenty-five, born in the province for which he was chosen, and unconvicted of any crime. It is remarkable that a proceeding so perfectly novel and revolutionary as this formation of the Cortes, to which the entire remodelling of the Spanish Constitution was intrusted, not only met with no opposition at Cadiz, but was cordially supported by men of all parties, even the most exalted functionaries, and the staunchest support-

The election is based on numbers, not interests.

Election of the supplementary members of the Cortes. September 8.

* Tor., iii., 190, 192. South., iv., 296 and 298.

† Tor., iii., 342, 347. South., v., 75.

* Tor., iii., 342, 351. South., v., 75, 85.

ers of the ancient order of things: another proof, among the many which history affords, that revolutions are diseases of the national mind, which, however they may be strengthened by the discontents or suffering of the lower orders, really originate in the infatuation of the higher; and that the class who invariably put the fatal weapon into the hand of the masses are those who are ultimately to be swept away by their fury.*

The deluded patriots who had thus conceded irrevocable power to a faction totally unfit to wield it, were not long of perceiving the consequences to which their blind trust in Republican virtue, in a corrupted society, was likely to lead. As the day for the elections and filling up the supplementary seats drew nigh, the public effervescence hourly increased. Clubs, juntas, assemblies, resounded on all sides; the press multiplied in extent and increased in violence; and that general anxiety was felt, which, by a strange instinct in the moral, equally as the physical world, precedes the heaving of the earthquake. It was soon found that the torrent was irresistible: rank, experience, age, learning, consideration, were almost everywhere disregarded in the candidates; and Republican zeal, loud professions, vehement declamation, impassioned eloquence, constituted the only passports to public favour. Before the elections, three fourths of which were conducted within the walls of Cadiz, were half over, it had become evident that the Democratic party had acquired a decisive ascendancy. Then, and not till then, a large proportion of those who had supported or acquiesced in these frantic innovations became sensible of their error, tried to pause in their career, and soon began to declaim loudly against the Cortes of their own creation. But it was too late: popular passion was not only excited, but unchained; and the march of revolution had become inevitable, because aristocratic infatuation had installed Democratic ambition in supreme power.†

On the 24th of September, the Cortes thus constituted commenced its sittings; that was the first day of the SPANISH REVOLUTION. They began, like the French National Assembly in 1789, with religious ceremonies and the forms of the monarchy. High mass was celebrated in their presence by the Archbishop Bourbon, and an oath binding them to maintain the Roman Catholic faith, the integrity of the monarchy, the rights of Ferdinand VII., and the national institutions, so far as not requiring amendment, administered to and taken by all the members. From thence they adjourned to the hall prepared for their reception in the principal theatre of the city; and then it soon appeared that the influence to which they were exposed would speedily prove fatal alike to the religion, the monarchy, and the constitution of the country. The saloon was spacious and elegant; but the immense crowds of both sexes who occupied, as spectators, the upper tier of boxes, and the vehement applause with which all the most violent Republican sentiments were received, soon demonstrated that the Cortes were to be subjected to that external seduction and intimidation which a popular assembly is rarely, if ever, able to resist. From the outset, accordingly, the character of

their proceedings was pronounced; it at once appeared that a new era in the domestic history of the Peninsula had arisen. The preceding movement, although violent and sanguinary, had, with a few local exceptions, been of a different character: it was national and anti-Gallican; this was social and Democratic. Though still engaged in the French war, and resisting with unconquerable firmness alike the open hostility and insidious propositions of the French ruler, the principal object of the Cortes after this was not foreign, but domestic: it was not external independence, but internal reform on which their hearts were set; and, trusting to the impregnable walls of Cadiz for their immediate security, and to the English arms for their ultimate deliverance, they concentrated all their efforts upon the dissemination of Republican institutions and the establishment of Republican ascendancy in their country. In this effort they were from the very first completely triumphant, and incalculable results in both hemispheres have flowed from their success.*

The very first resolution with which the Cortes commenced was decisive of the character of the assembly, and of the sovereign character of the institutions of a mixed monarchy. It bore, "That the deputies who compose the Congress, and represent the Spanish nation, declare themselves legitimately constituted in the general and extraordinary Cortes, in which is placed the national sovereignty." The members of the regency were required to swear obedience "to the sovereignty of the nation, represented by the Cortes, and obey its decrees." These, and many similar resolutions, were carried unanimously, amid the loud applause of the members and galleries; the debates were prolonged till midnight, amid a delirium of unanimity; extempore speeches, unknown hitherto in Southern Europe, fraught with eloquence, bespoke at once the ability and fervour of the speakers; and the regency, with the exception of the Bishop of Orense, who had courage enough to resist the innovation, abandoned by all, and confounded by the violence of the torrent, took the oath at four in the following morning, and thereby virtually converted the monarchy into a "Democracy."†

Having gained this great triumph, the Cortes were not long of following up the advantage. On the very next day, it was declared that they should be addressed by the title of majesty, and that all the authorities, civil, ecclesiastical, and military, should take the oath in the same terms as the regents had done. Alarmed at the responsibility thus imposed upon them by so excited an assembly, the regency anxiously requested an explanation of the meaning of the Cortes in this particular; but all that they could obtain was a vague declaration, "that their duties embraced the security and defence of the country, and that the responsibility which was exacted from the members of the regency excluded only the absolute inviolability of the person of the king." The Bishop of Orense, with patriotic fervour, endeavoured to stem the torrent: he openly combated the oath exacted from the regency, and denounced, in no measured terms, the usurpation of supreme power of which the Cortes had been guilty. No one, however, had

* Martignac sur l'Espagne, 94, 95. Tor., iii., 349, 356. South., v., 76, 85. Hard., xi., 170, 172.

† Tor., iii., 355, 357. Martignac, 94, 95.

* Tor., iii., 356, 363. Mart., 97, 98.

† Tor., iii., 361, 375. South., vi., 84, 87.

courage sufficient to imitate the example of his firmness; and, after several months spent in fruitless resistance, he was forced to submit, and

Feb. 3, 1811 withdrew to his diocese in Galicia, to shun, if he could not prevent, the approaching calamities. The regents being wholly destitute of real authority, and subject to the responsibility of office without its powers, shortly resigned their situations; and they were immediately banished from the island of Leon, and ordered to reside each in distant places. New functionaries were appointed, more obsequious to the will of the popular assembly; but one of them had the courage to refuse the oath of sovereignty to that body, and it was universally felt that they were merely puppets in the hands of their imperious masters.*

Oct. 28, 1811. The most momentous topic which can occupy the attention of a popular government—the liberty of the press—early attracted the notice of the Cortes. In the debates which ensued on this interesting subject, the different parties assumed a regular form and consistency; and it soon appeared how little the ardent spirits who had obtained the command in its deliberations, were inclined to pause in their career from the most awful example which history afforded of the perils attending it. One member openly expressed a wish for a “Christian Robespierre;” another declared that “*un piquenno*” Robespierre was what was required, a person who might establish a system of terror somewhat more moderate than had been used in France. “Caustics,” it was said, “is what is called for: matters must be carried on with energy: heads must be struck off, and that speedily: more Spanish blood requires to be shed than French.” “The hatchet of the executioner is the only answer to oppose to such arguments,” said an infuriated priest; “I am willing to undertake the office of such a debater. We have been assembled six months, and not one head has fallen.” These extreme opinions, it is true, were not approved by the majority of the assembly; and several speakers, having the eloquent Arguelles at their head, referred to England as the great example of the unconquerable energy which the freedom of the press can communicate to a nation, at the very time that it spreads the antidote to the passions and the errors of an excited Democracy. But the very fact of such opinions being advocated by any party, however extreme, in the Legislature, was a clear indication of the perilous torrent which had been let loose; and it was already but too evident that in this, as in all other social contests during the *advance* of a Revolution, the most violent opinions were likely to be the most successful. After a protracted debate, which

Decree on the liberty of the press.

Oct. 18. lasted four days, the freedom of the press was established, under no other qualification than the exception of offences against religion, which were still to be taken cognizance of by the ordinary ecclesiastical courts, and a certain responsibility for individual or political delinquencies, which were to be adjudicated upon in a certain court erected for the purpose. The decree was promulgated in the middle of Nov. 10. November; and there immediately issued from the press such a deluge of journals and ephemeral pamphlets, and such unmeasured vehemence of language, as demonstrated both how anxiously the Spanish urban population

had thirsted for political discussion, and the imminent danger which they would run from the draught when first administered.*

At this period, also, there arose those important discussions between Spain and the South American colonies, which terminated, after a protracted contest and the shedding of oceans of blood, in the independence of those vast and highly interesting states. This topic, however, is too vast for casual discussion, and must be reserved for a subsequent chapter, when it will form the leading subject of consideration.†

It is remarkable that, from the very first opening of the Cortes, they manifested an impatient anxiety to abolish the separate immunities and privileges of the different provinces of Spain; and the “*Fueros*” of Biscay and Navarre were, in an especial manner, the object of their jealousy. The desire to extinguish them, and establish one uniform constitution for the whole monarchy, formed one of the leading objects of the party in the Spanish cities who urged on the assembly of the Cortes. In pursu-
Dec. 23, 1811. ance of this desire, a committee was appointed to draw up a constitution on a uniform and systematic plan; and on its preparation, as might naturally have been expected, the principal attention of all parties at Cadiz was afterward fixed. It cannot be denied that the project of establishing a perfect equality of civil rights between the members of the same community is equitable in theory, and apparently feasible in practice; but experience has proved that it is, of all other things, the most difficult to carry with safety into execution; and that, unless the inhabitants to whom it is applied are homogeneous in point of race, and equally advanced in point of civilization, it is likely to produce the most disastrous effects upon the whole fabric of society.‡

In two important particulars the Cortes faithfully represented the feelings of the Spanish people, and exhibited an example of constancy in adverse fortune which will be forever memorable in the annals of the world. They issued a resolute proclamation, in which they declared that they would “never lay down their arms till they recovered their sovereign, and regained the national independence; that the whole treaties, resignations of the crown, and proceedings at Bayonne, were null and void, as wanting the consent of the nation; that all engagements or obligations undertaken by the king while in captivity were illegal and of no effect; that they would never bend their knees to the usurper, nor treat for peace so long as a French soldier remained in the Peninsula, which they had invaded with such perfidy and treated with such injustice.”

When it is recollected that this decree was issued at a time when the French legions beleaguered the ramparts of Cadiz, and the bombs from their batteries already reached the nearest houses of the city; that the whole of Spain, with the exception of Galicia, Asturias, and a part of Catalonia and Valencia, were in the possession of the invaders, who had moulded the conquered provinces into a regular government; and that Wellington, with his gallant army, were then cooped up within the lines of Torres Vedras,

* Mart., 94, 95. Tor., iii., 415, 428. Diario de Cortes

441. South., v., 99, 101.

† Vide infra, c. lxviii.

‡ Tor., iii., 447

* Tor., iii., 377, 391. South., v., 87, 94.

with hardly any prospect of being able to take an active part in the deliverance of the Peninsula, and but little hope of maintaining themselves on its soil, it must be confessed that the Spanish historians have good reason to pride themselves on their government, and that the annals of the Roman Senate contain nothing more sublime.*

The other particular in which the Cortes faithfully represented the sentiments herence to the of the Spanish, was in the respect Romish faith. which, in despite of their Revolutionary tendency, they evinced to the Roman Catholic faith; not but that there were many of its ardent spirits secretly enemies, not merely to the Romish Church, which was there established in its most bigoted form, but to every other species of religious belief; and who longed for that general overthrow of all ecclesiastical establishments, and liberation from all restraints, human and divine, which in old, corrupted societies constitutes the real spring of Democratic agitation. But they were as yet too few in number to venture openly to promulgate their principles; and, unfortunately, when emancipated from the shackles of the Romish creed, they had not judgment and principle enough to revert to the pure tenets of the Catholic or universal church, but flew at once into the infidelity and selfishness of the Parisian philosophy. Hence they made no attempts to moderate the fervour of the rural deputies; but, regarding the whole clerical institutions as an incubus on the state, which would, ere long, be removed, acquiesced, in the mean time, in all the declarations of the majority in favour of the ancient faith; and the Cortes exhibited the prodigy, during a few years, of a body animated with the strongest Revolutionary principles, and yet professing the most implicit obedience to the rigid principles of the Church of Rome.†

The influence of these conflicting principles, and of the antagonist passions which, 1812. March in every age, have most profoundly agitated society, signally appeared in the Constitution, which, after more than a year's discussion in the committee appointed to draw it up, and in the assembly, was finally approved of and sworn to by the Cortes on the 19th of March, 1812. The leading principles of this celebrated legislative fabric, which has become of such immense importance from subsequent events, were such as might have been expected from the composition of the assembly in which it originated. Supreme sovereignty was declared to reside in the nation; the Roman Catholic faith to be the sole religion of the state; the supreme legislative power to reside in the Cortes. That assembly was alone empowered to vote taxes and levies of men—to lay down regulations for the armed force—to nominate the supreme judges—to create a regency in case of minority, incapacity, or other event suspensive of the succession—to enforce the responsibility of all public functionaries—and to introduce and enact laws. During the intervals of the session, the Cortes was to be represented by a permanent commission or deputation, to which a considerable part of its powers was committed, especially the care of watching over the execution of the laws and conduct of public functionaries, and the convocation of the assembly in case of need.‡

The person of the king was declared inviolable, and his consent was requisite to the passing of laws; but he could not withhold his consent more than twice to different legislatures; if presented to him a third time, he was forced to give his sanction. Powers of the king. He had the prerogative of pardon, but circumscribed within very narrow limits; he concluded treaties and truces with foreign powers, but they required for their ratification the consent of the Cortes; he had the command of the army, but all the regulations for its government were to emanate from the same body; he nominated the public functionaries, but from a list only furnished by the Cortes. The king was not to leave the kingdom nor marry without their consent; if he did so, he was to be held as having abdicated the throne. The nomination of the judges of the tribunals, to whose exclusive cognizance the conduct of public functionaries was subjected, was reserved to the same assembly. For the assistance of the king in discharging his royal functions, a privy council, consisting of forty members, was appointed by him out of a list of one hundred and twenty presented by the Cortes: they could not be removed but by that body; and, in that number, there were only to be four grandees and four ecclesiastics. All vacant situations in the Church, the bench, and the diplomatic departments, in like manner, were filled up by the king from a list of three presented to him by the Cortes; and he was bound to consult the privy council in all matters of importance, particularly the conclusion of treaties, the sanction of laws, the declaration of war, and the conclusion of peace.*

Important as these institutions were in their tendency, and strongly as they savoured of that Democratic spirit amid which they were cradled, they yet yielded in magnitude to the vitality of the changes in the election and composition of the Cortes, which were established by the same Constitution. It was carried by a large majority that the assembly should sit, as it was then constituted, in a single chamber, without, as of old, any separate place of assembly for the clergy or nobles, or any veto or power of rejection being vested in their members apart from those of the commons. Population was made the basis of representation: it was declared that there should be a member for every seventy thousand souls; and that every man above the age of twenty-five, a native of the province, or who had resided in it for seven years, was qualified alike to elect or be elected. No property was for the present insisted on as a qualification, but it was left to future Cortes to legislate on this important point. The election of members took place by three successive steps of parishes, districts, and provinces; but the boroughs, who sent members to the ancient assemblies, and the juntas, who were admitted to the representation in the present, were alike excluded. The American colonies were placed on a perfect equality, in the article of representation, with the European provinces of the monarchy; the ministers, councillors, and persons in the household of the king were excluded from a seat in the assembly; the Cortes were to assemble every year, and sit at least three months for the despatch of business; no member of it was to be capable of holding any office under the crown; it was to be re-elected every two years, and no individual who had been the mem-

* Decree, Jan. 1, 1811. Tor., iii., 450. South., v., 102.

† South., v., 107, 108. Tor., iii., 418, 423.

‡ Martignac, 97. Constitution, 1812, tit. ii., iii.

* Mart., 17, 98. Tor., iv., 341, 342.

ber of one assembly could be re-elected till a different legislature had intervened; so that the new Cortes, every two years; was to present an entire new set of members from that which had preceded it.*

Such was the famous Constitution of 1812, the Magna Charta of southern revolutionary Europe, the model on which the subsequent Democratic constitutions of Spain, Portugal, Piedmont, and Naples, in 1820, were framed; the brand which has filled the world with its flames, and from the conflagration raised by which both hemispheres are still burning. To an Englishman practically acquainted with the working of a free constitution, it is needless to expatiate on the necessary effect of vesting such powers in the people of an old state. If he reflects how long the institutions of England, habituated as she has been to the strain by centuries of freedom, would withstand the influence of universal suffrage, annual Parliaments, the abolition of the House of Peers, the withdrawing of the legislative veto from the sovereign, an entire change of legislators every two years, and the practical vesting of the disposal of all offices of importance in the House of Commons, he will easily understand what must have been the result of such a system among a people of mixed blood and hostile passions, of fiery temperament and towering ambition; long subjected to despotism, wholly unused to freedom; among whom political fervour was as yet untamed by suffering, and philanthropic ardour uncooled by experience; where property, accumulated in huge masses among the nobles and clergy, was but scantily diffused through the middle classes; and instruction was still more thinly scattered among any ranks of the people. But it was the fatal peculiarity of this Constitution, that it so obviously and immediately opened the avenue to supreme power to the urban constituencies, and so entirely shut out and disinherited the rural nobility, and ecclesiastic orders, and rural population, that it necessarily bequeathed the seeds of interminable discord between these classes to future ages; because it gave a definite object and intelligible war-cry to the minority, massed together and in possession of the principal seats of influence in towns, while it established a system altogether insupportable to the majority, tenfold greater, but scattered, and destitute of defence or rallying-points in the country.

The reception which the new Constitution met with in Spain was such as might have been expected from so great an innovation in a country in which the urban constituencies were so zealous for innovation, and the rural inhabitants were so firmly attached to the institutions of their fathers. At Cadiz, Barcelona, Valencia, and, in general, all the great towns, especially those of a commercial habit, the enthusiasm of the people at this great addition to their power was loudly and sincerely expressed: in the lesser boroughs in the interior, and in all the rural districts, where Revolutionary ideas had not spread, and the ancient faith and loyalty were still all-powerful, it was the object of unqualified hatred. In vain the partisans of the new régime sought to persuade the people that the Constitution was but a return to the old usages of the monarchy, cleared of the corruptions and

abuses of ages: the good sense of the country inhabitants revolted at the idea that the King of Spain of old had been merely a puppet in the hands of the populace; the clergy could never see a confirmation of their privileges in institutions which, on the other side of the Pyrenees, had led to their total overthrow; the nobles beheld, in the concentration of all power in the hands of an assembly elected by universal suffrage, the certain forerunner of their total ruin. The provinces in the occupation of the French, who had sent no representatives to the isle of Leon, embracing three fourths of the monarchy, loudly complained that their rights and privileges had been reft from them by an assembly almost wholly elected at Cadiz, to which they were entire strangers. Thus, the whole country population were unanimous in their detestation of the new order of things; and it was easy to foresee that, if the matter were to be determined by the nation itself, it would be rejected by an immense majority; but the partisans of the new Constitution, though few in number, were incomparably better organized and favourably situated for active operations than their antagonists; and, being already in possession of all the strongholds of the kingdom, it was hard to say to which party, in the event of a struggle, victory might ultimately incline.*

Wellington, from the very first, clearly perceived, and loudly denounced, the pernicious tendency of these measures on the part of the Spanish Cortes, not merely as diverting the attention of the government from the national defence, and wasting their time in fruitless discussions when the enemy was at their gates, but as tending to establish Democratic principles and Republican institutions in a country wholly unfitted for them, and which would leave to future ages the seeds of interminable discord in the Spanish monarchy. His prophecies, which are to be found profusely scattered throughout the latter volumes of his correspondence, little attended to at the time, from the absorbing interest of the contest with Napoleon, have now acquired an extraordinary interest, from the exact and melancholy accomplishment which subsequent events have given to his predictions. Before the Cortes had been assembled six weeks he expressed to his brother, Henry Wellesley, then ambassador at Cadiz, his apprehensions that they were about to follow the usual course of Democratic assemblies, and draw to themselves, in opposition to the wishes of the great bulk of the nation, the whole powers of government.† As they advanced in their career, and experience began to develop the practical result of their administration in the provinces, he repeatedly expressed his conviction of the general dissatisfaction which they had excited.‡

Wellington's clear perception and curious predictions of the effects of the Cortes and new Constitution.

* Martignac, i., 99, 100.

† "The natural course of all popular assemblies of the Spanish Cortes, among others, is to adopt Democratic principles, and to invest all the powers of the state in their own body; and this assembly must take care that they do not run in this tempting course, as the wishes of the nation are decidedly for a monarchy. By a monarchy alone it can be governed; and their inclination to any other form of government, and their assumption of the power and patronage of the state into their own hands, would immediately deprive them of the confidence of the people, and render them a worse government, and more impotent, because more numerous, than the Central Junta."—WELLINGTON to WELLESLEY, Nov. 4. 1810, GURWOOD, vi., 559.

‡ Gurw., vi., 559; ix., 524; x., 54.

§ "The Cortes are unpopular everywhere, and, in my

But after his visit to Cadiz, on occasion of being appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies in January, 1813, he denounced, in the strongest terms, the wretched government, at once tyrannical at home and weak abroad, which the furious Democracy of that city had produced; and predicted the ruinous effect, both upon the fate of the war and the future prospects of the monarchy, of the Constitution which they had established.* His words, after a close personal view of the working of the Democratic Constitution, are deserving of profound attention, as marking the impression produced on an intellect of the highest order by a state of things arising from the success of popular ambition, and therefore of lasting interest to mankind. "The greatest objection which I have to the new Constitution is, that, in a country in which almost all property consists in land, and there are the largest landed proprietors which exist in Europe, no measure should have been adopted, and no barrier provided, to guard landed property from the encroachments, injustice, and violence to which it is at all times liable, but particularly in the progress of revolutions. The Council of State affords no such guard; it has no influence in the Legislature; it can have no influence over the public mind. Such a guard can only be afforded by the establishment of an assembly of the great landed proprietors, such as our House of Lords, having concurrent powers with the Cortes; and you may depend upon it, there is no man in Spain, be his property never so small, who is not interested in the establishment of such an assembly. Unhappily, legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more, it frequently happens that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme power. It is impossible to calculate upon the plans of such an assembly: they have no check whatever, and they are governed by the most ignorant and licentious of all licentious presses, that of Cadiz. I believe they mean to attack the royal and feu-

opinion, deservedly so. Nothing can be more cruel, absurd, and impolitic, than their decrees respecting the persons who have served the enemy. It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain has not produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It appears as if they were all drunk: thinking and speaking of any other subject than Spain."—WELLINGTON to WELLESLEY, Nov. 1st, 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 524.

* "It is impossible to describe the state of confusion in which affairs are at Cadiz. The Cortes have formed a constitution very much on the principle that a painter paints a picture, viz., to be looked at; and I have not met one of its members, or any person of any description, either at Cadiz or elsewhere, who considers the Constitution as the embodying of a system according to which Spain is or can be governed. The Cortes have in fact divested themselves of the executive power, and appointed a regency for that purpose: but the regency are, in fact, the slaves of the Cortes; and neither have either communication in a constitutional way with each other, nor any authority beyond the walls of Cadiz. I wish that some of our reformers would go to Cadiz to see the benefit of a sovereign popular assembly, calling itself 'Majesty,' and of a written constitution. In truth, there is no authority in the state except the libellous newspapers, and they certainly ride over both Cortes and regency without mercy."—WELLINGTON to LORD BATHURST, Cadiz, 27th Jan., 1813, GURWOOD, x., 54.

dal tenths, and the tithes of the Church, under pretence of encouraging agriculture; and, finding the contributions from these sources not so extensive as they expected, they will seize the estates of the grandes.* "Our character is involved in a greater degree than we are aware of in the Democratic transactions of the Cortes, in the opinion of all moderate, well-thinking Spaniards, and, I am afraid, with the rest of Europe. It is quite impossible such a system can last: what I regret is, that I am the person who maintains it. If the king should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric if he has any spirit; but the gentlemen at Cadiz are so completely masters, that I am afraid there must be another convulsion."

The British government were well aware, while Democratic phrensy was thus reigning triumphant at Cadiz, from the despatches of their ambassador there, the Honourable the Cortes.

H. Wellesley, as well as from Wellington's information of the dangerous nature of the spirit which had thus been evolved, that they had a task of no ordinary difficulty to encounter, in any attempt to moderate its transports. The Spanish people, long and proverbially jealous of foreign interference, had recently evinced this peculiarity in so remarkable a degree, that, even when defeated in a hundred encounters, and bleeding at every pore from the want of any general competent to stem the progress of disaster, and give unity to the operations of their different armies, they still refused to give the command to the British hero who had arrested at Talavera the tide of success, and rolled back from Torres Vedras the wave of conquest, even though he has recorded his opinion that, if they had done so, he could have saved their country as he did Portugal.† In these circumstances, any decided or marked interference on the part of Great Britain with the proceedings either of the Cortes at Cadiz, or of the regency in its formation, would not only, in all probability, have totally failed in its object, but possibly cooled their ardour in the cause of independence, and thrown the party in Spain, in possession of the few remaining strongholds it possessed, headlong into the arms of the enemy. In these circumstances, the British cabinet, albeit noways insensible to the dangers of the Republican government which had thus grown up, as it were, under their very wing at Cadiz, and its strange inconsistency with their own principle, as well as those on which the war had been conducted, nevertheless deemed it expedient not to intermeddle with the internal affairs of their ally, and to comply literally with the advice of Wellington, "to keep themselves clear of the Democracy, and to interfere in nothing while the government was in their hands, excepting in carrying on the war and keeping out the foreign enemy."

It was chiefly with a view, however, to obtain a legitimate head for the government at Ca-

* Wellington to Don Diego de la Vega, Jan. 29, 1813, and to Earl Bathurst, April 21, 1813, Gurw., x., 64, 65, and 247; xi., 91.

† "I understand the Spanish government may, perhaps, offer me the command of their armies. If they had done so a year and a half ago, and they had set seriously to work to feed and pay their army, the cause would have been saved; nay, it would have been saved without such an arrangement if the battle of Ocena had not been fought in November, 1809."—WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, 2d Feb., 1811, GURWOOD, vii., 216.

‡ Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 5, 1813, Gurw., xi., 91.

Abortive attempt to effect the liberation of Ferdinand VII. diz, and, if possible, extricate Spain by legal means from the abyss into which she was falling, that the English cabinet at this time made a serious attempt to effect the deliverance of Ferdinand VII. from his imprisonment at Valençay. The captive king, and his brother Don Carlos, were there detained, living sumptuously, but so narrowly watched as to render their escape apparently impossible. Notwithstanding all the vigilance of the police, however, the British government contrived to commu-

March 24, 1810. nicate with him by means of the Baron Kolli, a man of skilful address and intrepid character, in whom the Marquis Wellesley had entire confidence. The project for their deliverance, when on the point of succeeding, was betrayed by an agent, to whom a subordinate part in its execution had been committed. Ferdinand himself revealed the plot to his jailers, and Kolli was arrested and committed to Vincennes. He refused, however, with unshaken constancy, to divulge anything which could involve either Ferdinand or the British ministry, but the French police took advantage of the discovery they had made to endeavour to entrap the royal captives into some hazardous attempt by means of a false Kolli who was despatched to Valençay; but the penetration of the Spanish king detected the disguise, and nothing followed on the insidious attempt.*

The military condition of the French in Spain, notwithstanding the disastrous issue of the expedition into Portugal, had been essentially improved, so far as the command of the resources of the country went, in the course of the campaign of 1810. The successful irruption of Soult into Andalusia, in its commencement, had given them the entire command of the resources of that opulent province; and although the dispersion of force which it occasioned, in consequence of the continued resistance of Cadiz, proved in the end, as the event showed, extremely detrimental to their interests in the Peninsula, yet, in the first instance, it greatly augmented their resources, and diffused the pleasing hope which seems to have gained possession of all the counsellors of Joseph, that the war was at length approaching its termination. So completely did hostilities appear to be concluded to the south of the Sierra Morena, that Joseph Bonaparte crossed that formidable barrier, published at Cordova an ominous decree, in which he declared that, if Spain "became again the friend of France, it was for the interest of Napoleon to preserve its integrity, if not, to dismember and destroy it;" entered Seville amid the acclamations of the higher class of citizens, who were fatigued with the war and hopeless of its success; received from the civic authorities there the standards taken at the battle of Baylen; accepted the services of a royal guard, organized for his service in the southern provinces; and, amid the apparent transport of the people, arrived at the lines before Cadiz, and made the tour of the bay almost within reach of the Spanish batteries. Seduced by these flattering appearances, the benevolent monarch appears for a time to have trusted the pleasing hope that his difficulties were at an end; that all classes of Spaniards would at length rally round his standard; and that, supported by his faithful population, he might at length obtain,

not merely the shadow, but the substance of a throne, emancipated from the burdensome tutelage of his imperial brother.*

But if Joseph for a brief period gave way to this pleasing illusion, he was not long of being awakened from it by the acts of Napoleon himself. Early in February a decree was issued by him, which organized into four governments the provinces of Catalonia, Arragon, Biscay, and Navarre; and charged the military governor of each of them with the entire direction of affairs, civil and military. The police, the administration of justice, the collection and disposal of the revenue, were intrusted to them equally with the warlike arrangements of the provinces; and the fundamental condition on which this more than regal power was held by the marshals was, that they should make no demands on the imperial treasury, and that the provinces under their command should feed, clothe, lodge, and pay the numerous French corps who occupied their territory. Deeper designs, however, than the temporary occupation of a portion of the Spanish monarchy, the whole of which was overrun by his troops, were involved in this decree of the emperor; and what these designs were are explained in a letter, at the same period, from the Duke of Cadore (Champany) to the French ambassador at Madrid: "The intention of the em-

Napoleon's intentions as to dismembering Spain at this time. Feb. 8.

Feb. 19, 1810.

peror is to *unite to France the whole left bank of the Ebro*, and perhaps the territory as far as the Douro. One of the objects of the decree is to prepare for that annexation; and you will take care, without letting a hint fall as to the designs of the emperor, to prepare matters for this change, and facilitate all the measures which his majesty may take to carry it into execution." Thus Napoleon, after having solemnly guaranteed the integrity of Spain, first by the treaty of Fontainebleau to Ferdinand VII., and again by that of Bayonne to Joseph, was now preparing, in violation of both engagements, to seize a large part, and which commanded the whole remainder of its territory, by the spoliation of his own brother, whom he had put upon the throne.†

Notwithstanding all the precautions of the emperor, however, to keep his designs secret, they transpired so far as to awaken in Joseph the most anxious solicitude as to the preservation of his crown and the integrity of his dominions. To avert the stroke as far as possible, under pretence of congratulating his brother on his marriage with the Austrian archduchess, he despatched M. Asanza to Paris, an intrepid and able Spaniard, zealous for the interests of his country, and peculiarly solicitous of preserving the province of his birth, Navarre, for the crown of Castile. Asanza, on his arrival at Paris, found that the expense of the Spanish war, which it was said had already cost the imperial treasury above two hundred millions of francs (£8,000,000), was the great subject of complaint with the cabinet of St. Cloud; and, without openly divulging the project of incorporating with France the territory north of the Ebro, Champagny made no secret of the wish of the emperor to obtain, and his right to demand, more valuable indemnities than the barren satisfaction of having placed an incapable and prod-

Negotiation between Napoleon and Joseph for the dismemberment of Spain.

* Bign., ix., 269, 271. Hard., xi., 151.

† Champagny to Delaforest, Feb. 19, 1810. Bign., ix., 270, 274.

* Hard., xi., 150. Bign., ix., 448.

igal brother on the throne of Madrid. When Asanza pleaded strongly for the integrity of Spain, and the obligation of the emperor to support his brother, he was openly told by the imperial minister, that, strong as the emperor's obligations to the members of his family were, his obligations to France were still stronger; and that "Joseph would do well to recollect that he held in his power the Prince of Asturias, Ferdinand, whom he was strongly tempted to send into Spain, and who would make no scruple, as the price of his liberty, to cede the required provinces, or anything else which might be required of him." Asanza, unable either to

Asanza's letter. July 20, 1810. fathom the secret intentions or get any satisfaction as to the public

deeds of the emperor, returned downcast to Madrid, where general gloom had succeeded to the first transports of joy among the adherents of Joseph at the conquest of Andalusia; and unequivocal acts on the part of Napoleon soon demonstrated his real designs, and at what price he estimated the phantom of a king which he had established in Spain. A new decree, in ad-

dition to that which had created the four military governments already established, formed two new ones, embracing the whole country to the north of the Douro: the first, comprising the province of Burgos; the second, those of Valladolid, Palencia, and Toro; and

this was soon followed by a second, which gave Soult the exclusive direction of the army and the provinces to the south of the Sierra Morena. Thus, while Suchet was actively conducting the work of conquest in Catalonia and Valencia, and Soult was living in more than regal magnificence at Seville, the unhappy Joseph, almost destitute of resources, lingered on, a shadow at Madrid, without either being intrusted with the duties, or enjoying the splendour of royalty.*†

Napoleon's favourite project of securing the northern provinces of Portugal for himself soon assumed a more tangible form, and became the subject of open negotiation with the cabinet of Madrid. In this negotiation the plenipotentiaries of Spain in vain appealed to the treaty of Bayonne, by which the integrity of the monarchy was guaranteed; Champagny replied, in the name of the emperor, and from his notes, that the convention of Bayonne had *de facto* disappeared, by the majority of its members having passed over to the insurgents; that Spain owed a large indemnity for the sacrifices in men and money which he had made in her behalf; and that, as she could never repay the debt, he must insist on the cession of the whole provinces to the north of the Ebro, including Catalonia, for ten years. Finding the emperor resolute, the Spanish plenipotentiaries strove only to gain time: the more pressing concerns of the north engrossed his attention; and, before his dominion in the Peninsula was so well established as to render it practicable to carry the transference formally into effect, the whole country was reft from both by the arms of England, and the star

of Napoleon set forever behind the snows of Russia.

Such, however, was the destitution to which the court of Madrid was reduced, during the whole of the winter of 1810 and spring of 1811, that in January, 1811, Joseph intimated to Napoleon "that the French marshals

intercepted his revenue, disregarded his orders, insulted his government, and oppressed and ruined his country. He himself had been appointed to the throne of Spain without his own consent; and, though he would never oppose the emperor's will, yet he would not live a degraded king; and, therefore, he was ready to resign, unless the emperor would come in person and remedy the evils." Struck with the decision of this announcement, and the obvious justice of the complaints on which it was founded, the emperor so far interposed in behalf of his unhappy brother, as to fix, by an imperial edict, the monthly sums at which the allowance of the whole military officers of the Peninsula, from the marshals, governors of

provinces, to the sub-lieutenants, should be fixed; and directed that 500,000 francs (£20,000) should be remitted monthly from Paris to defray the most urgent demands of his household. This relief, however, proved altogether insufficient. The whole civil functionaries of the crown were seven months in arrear of their salaries; the public treasury was empty; the king had not money at his disposal to give a respectable dinner to the ambassadors; and he was incessantly besieged with complaints of oppression, which he had no means of relieving.

To such a height, at length, did the mortifications of the court of Madrid arrive, and so completely were all the royal revenues intercepted by the legal or illegal exactions of the marshals, that, in the beginning of May, Joseph set out with his resignation in his pocket, and, to Napoleon's no small embarrassment, arrived in Paris to lay it at his feet. Thus was the prodigy exhibited, not merely of three brothers of a soldier of fortune in Corsica being elevated by that soldier to European thrones, but of two of them, Louis and Joseph, being reduced to such mortifications by his imperious temper and rigorous exactions, that they renounced their crowns to escape them; while a third, Lucien, had taken refuge from his persecution in the dominions of his most persevering and inveterate enemy.*

Napoleon, who was well aware what a subject of scandal these divisions in the imperial family would afford to Europe, and how strongly they would confirm the declamations of the English press against the insupportable nature of his rule, did his utmost to appease the incensed monarch. Partly by argument, partly by persuasion, partly by threats, he prevailed on the fugitive king to place again on his head his crown of thorns; and, after some weeks' residence at Paris, he returned to Madrid, having concluded a private treaty, which, in some degree, obviated the most intolerable of his grievances. By this compact it was stipulated that the Army of the Centre should be placed directly under the orders of the King of Spain: he was to receive a quarter of

Terms of accommodation between him and Napoleon.

* See Asanza to Joseph, July, 1811, Bign., ix., 278, 285. Hard., xi., 152, 155.

† The letters of Asanza to the court of Madrid were intercepted by the guerrillas, forwarded to Cadiz, and published by the regency. Wellington quotes, and Bignon refers to them, without either throwing the slightest doubt on their authenticity or accuracy.—See BIGNON, ix., 280.

‡ Bign., ix., 285, 287. Hard., xi., 154, 155.

* See Joseph's papers taken at Vittoria, Nap., iv., 517, 533, App.

the contributions levied by the marshals in their several provinces, for the maintenance of his court and government, and for the support of the Army of the Centre, and of the Spaniards who had enlisted in his service, who amounted to nearly thirty thousand men; and the half million of francs, hitherto given monthly to the king, was to be increased to a million. But the emperor would not relinquish the military direction of the war, or the command of the provinces by his marshals; and they were still to correspond with Berthier, and take all their directions from the Tuileries. Napoleon also strongly counselled the convocation of a Cortes at Madrid to consider the state of the nation, and form a set-off

June, 1811. against that assembled in the island of Leon, which he characterized as "a miserable canaille of obscure agitators."

July 14. With these promises and injunctions Joseph was, for the time, pacified; and he returned to Madrid in July. July 14. where his situation appeared, for a while, to be improved by the successes of Marshal Suchet in the east of Spain. But the promised remittances from Paris were never regularly made; the former disputes with the marshals about the contributions revived; the project of the Cortes was adjourned from Wellington's successes in the next campaign; and, in less than two years, nothing remained of Joseph's government but the recollection of the oppression of which he was the impotent spectator, and the privations of which he had been the real victim.*

While the governments of France and Spain were thus arranging between themselves the proportions in which they were to share between each other the spoils of the Peninsula, and Napoleon was securing the lion's share to himself, a lingering but unconquerable resistance was still presented in the few strongholds which remained in the hands of the patriots. It was in a very few quarters, however, that the contest was continued: the greater part of the country was subdued; its resources were almost all at the conqueror's disposal; and, in a military point of view, the conquest might be considered as complete. Both the Castiles, with the capital, were in the victor's power: Andalusia and Grenada, with their rich and hitherto untouched fields of plunder, were at his disposal; and the whole northern provinces, including the passes of the Pyrenees, the whole of Arragon, and the greater part of Catalonia, were strongly garrisoned by his troops. The recent successes in the latter province, particularly the fall of Gerona, Hostalrich, Lerida, and Mequinenza, had both opened to the French arms the road from Perpignan to Barcelona, and established them in a solid manner on the Ebro; and nothing was wanting but the conquest of Tortosa and Tarragona to enable Suchet to carry his victorious arms into Valencia, and subject the whole eastern provinces to the emperor's sway. On the other side, they were still excluded from the kingdom of Portugal, and a disastrous campaign had followed the invasion of that country; but the English armies appeared in no sufficient strength to disturb them beyond the Spanish frontier; and the possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz promised to secure the Castiles against any serious incursion from their ancient antagonists

in that quarter. Great as the extent of territory occupied by the French generals was, the forces at their disposal were fully equal to their command. Seventy-five thousand men in Andalusia, under the command of Soult, maintained the blockade of Cadiz, retained the whole provinces to the south of the Sierra Morena in subjection, and watched over the security of Badajoz, on the Portuguese frontier: fifty thousand were still ready in Leon to assemble round the standard of Marmont, who had succeeded Massena in the command of the army of Portugal, while sixty thousand more, under Bessières, at Valladolid, Biscay, and Leon, watched the Spanish force at the entrance of the Galician defiles, and secured the important line of communication by Vittoria to Bayonne; while in the eastern provinces, Macdonald, with forty-five thousand men, lay at Gerona and Hostalrich, guarding the important entrance by Perpignan into Catalonia: Suchet, after providing for all his fortresses, could still bring thirty thousand excellent troops into the field for active operation, besides leaving twenty thousand in the garrisons of his government; and twenty thousand more under Joseph and Jourdan at Madrid, and fifteen thousand under Regnier, in Estremadura and La Mancha, overawed the capital, and maintained the communication between the different parts of this immense military establishment.**

The vital point of resistance to all this stupendous array was to be found within the walls of Cadiz; but, though the force there was nearly twenty thousand strong, yet it was composed of such various nations, and in great part so disorganized and depressed, that little reliance could be placed on it, even for the defence of that last stronghold of Spanish independence. Five thousand English and Portuguese, who arrived immediately after the French troops appeared before its walls in February, 1810, from Lisbon and Gibraltar, under General Stewart, were excellent soldiers; but the remaining fourteen thousand, composed of the refugees from Seville, and the gallant men who had come up under Albuquerque, were in the most miserable state, without shoes, pay, or clothing, and hardly any remaining ammunition. The regency was without vigour or consideration; the public stores were shamefully dilapidated by private cupidity; and such was the general despondence and confusion which prevailed, that if Victor's troops had immediately, on their arrival at the bay, pushed on and attacked the defences on the isthmus which connected the city with the mainland, they, in all probability, would have carried it, and, but for the arrival of the English troops, certainly would have done so. As it was, the exterior forts on the mainland side of the bay were abandoned and dismantled in the general consternation; and from Fort Matagorda, the most advanced and important outwork on their side, the French bombs could reach the upper harbour and a considerable part of the city.‡

In the other quarters of Spain appearances were, if possible, still more unpromising. Twenty-five thousand men, indeed, in Valencia, and twelve thousand in Murcia, still hoisted the colours of independence; but their composition,

Spanish and British forces in the Peninsula.

* Imperial Muster Rolls, April, 1811. Napier, iii., 570, 571, and iv., 51. Belm., 185. † See note A, Appendix.

‡ Ante, iii., 343.

§ Thib., viii., 259, 260, and Napier, iii., 173, 174. Belm., i., 184. Tor., iii., 196, 197.

* Nap., iv., 126, 127. Papers taken at Vittoria, *ibid.*, iv., 533, 541, App.

equipment, and discipline were so wretched, that military discernment could already anticipate, what the event soon proved, that no reliance was to be placed on them in the field, and but little in the defence of fortified places. In Catalonia, though a desultory warfare was still kept up in the mountains, no force existed capable of keeping the field in the level country; and the campaign was, in reality, reduced to the sieges of Tortosa and Taragona, the last important strongholds which the Spaniards possessed in that province; while in Galicia, the new levies, nearly fifteen thousand strong, were unable, from their want of discipline, to emerge from their mountain defiles; and the guerilla parties in the central provinces, though exceedingly harassing to the enemy's communications, were detached from each other, and altogether inefficient as a force in regular warfare. Thus eighty or ninety thousand men, for the most part ill-disciplined, and worse equipped, shut up in fortified places along the seacoast, and altogether detached from each other, were all that remained of the Spanish forces to contend with above three hundred thousand French soldiers, admirably equipped, under the guidance of veteran generals, masters of all the entrances into the main roads through the country, in possession of its principal strongholds, and the whole interior lines of communication through its provinces. In these circumstances, it required not the gift of prescience to foresee that the weight of the contest would fall on the English and Portuguese army; and that unless Wellington, with his fifty thousand disciplined soldiers, could strike a decisive blow at the heart of the enemy's power, the cause of the Peninsula, and with it the hope of European independence, was lost.*

CADIZ, the keystone of the brave but disjoined arch of resistance which still encircled Spain, was a city, the natural strength of which had, from the most remote ages, rendered it an important object in the Peninsular wars. The Gaditane Isle, or Isle of Leon, indeed, is by nature so strong as to require but little assistance from art to become altogether impregnable. It consists of an island, three leagues long, and one and three quarters broad, in the form of an irregular triangle, situated in the sea, at the mouth of the Guadaleta River; and separated from the adjacent continent by the Santa Petri channel, an arm of the sea nine miles long, about three hundred yards wide, and of depth sufficient to float a seventy-four, which receives the waters of all the streams that descend from the heights on the mainland, and is bounded on the continent by salt marshes of still greater breadth.

The great road from Cadiz to Seville crosses this channel and marsh by the bridge of Zuazo, which on the approach of the French was broken down, and which was defended by powerful batteries on either side. The arsenal Caraccas stands on the extremity of the isle of Leon, nearest to the bridge and mainland, but, from the breadth of the marsh, it could not be reached save by water or bombardment; and, on the other side of the bridge, the castle of Santa Petri commanded all the opposite shore and approaches to the marsh. The whole isle of Leon is composed of a salt marsh, with the exception of the ridge on which the town of Isla, containing eighteen thou-

sand inhabitants, is placed, and the sandhills at the opposite extremity, running out into the sea, on which Cadiz is built, which in general numbers eighty, but was then encumbered by a hundred and fifty thousand souls. The great road by the bridge of Zuazo, which runs through the town of Isla, is elevated on, and runs for two leagues along a narrow isthmus, between the Atlantic on the one side, and the inner salt marsh of the island on the other; and it is cut in various places by ditches, and intersected by redoubts, which, presenting successive points of defence, rendered attack from without extremely difficult, even if the bridge of Zuazo and town of Isla had been carried. At the close of all, Cadiz itself, situated at the extremity of the isthmus, arose, strongly fortified on that side; the neck of land which approached it was exposed to the concentric fire of numerous and formidable batteries; and an advancing enemy would be exposed to a flanking fire from the vessels of war on the one side, and gunboats on the other. Nearly two thousand guns, in all, were mounted on the immense circuit of the works; but many of them were unskilfully constructed, and not less than thirty thousand men were requisite to provide them with proper garrisons. The promontory of the mainland which approaches nearest to the city was armed by two strong forts, called the Trocadero and Matagorda; but even if they were carried by the besiegers, the immense batteries of the Puntales stood directly opposite, on the other side of the channel, at the distance only of twelve hundred yards; while the nearest parts of Cadiz itself were still four thousand yards, or nearly two miles and a half, from the most advanced point to which the besiegers' batteries could be pushed.*

General Stewart arrived at Cadiz, with 2000 British troops from Gibraltar, on the 11th of February, and in a few days 2000 more English and Portuguese were received from Lisbon, who were welcomed with loud acclamations by the inhabitants, impending danger having completely extinguished the hitherto inveterate jealousy entertained by the Spaniards of foreign interference. They found the people zealously engaged in exertions to repair and strengthen the fortifications; and multitudes, in particular, labouring day and night in cutting a deep ditch across the chaussée, on the isthmus leading to Cadiz, in the narrowest part—so as to bring both seas to its foot—and constructing strong walls of masonry and batteries on either side. Their efforts, however, though stimulated by all the ardour of patriotic enthusiasm, were ill directed: confusion and dilapidation pervaded every part of the public administration; and such was the ignorance of the Spanish engineers of the plainest principles of the military art, that while they had abandoned the strongholds of the Trocadero and Matagorda, from whence the enemy's shells could reach the city, they had pushed their advanced posts on the road to Seville, a mile and a half beyond the Zuazo bridge; that is, into a situation where they were exposed to attack on either flank, and where defeat would endanger the bridge itself, and the whole extensive defences of the isle of Leon.†

The first care of General Stewart, after his ar-

* Belm., i., 185, 186. Vict. et Conq., xx., 8, 10. Nap., iii., 178, 1790. Thib., viii., 259, 260.

* Tor., iii., 195, 197. Nap., iii., 173, 175. Hard., xi., 144. Vict. et Conq., xx., 10, 11.

† Tor., iii., 196, 197. Nap., 177, 179. Thib., viii., 262, 263.

Feb. 22. No rival, was to regain Fort Matagorda, where batteries were already constructing to bombard Cadiz. The important service was successfully performed by Captain M'Lean, at the head of 150 seamen and marines. Its dismantled works were hastily restored, and guns planted on the ramparts, which not only silenced the field-pieces of the enemy directed against them, but severely galled their advancing works on the Trocadero Point. The whole efforts of the French were, therefore, directed to regain possession of this fort on the mainland; and with such vigour were their operations conducted, and such resources for a siege did they find in the arsenal of Seville, that, in a few weeks, they had fifty pieces of heavy cannon placed in battery against its walls; while a Spanish seventy-four and armed flotilla, which had hitherto co-operated in the defence, were obliged, by a tempest of red-hot shot, to slip their cables and move across to Cadiz. The feeble rampart soon gave way before this tremendous weight of metal; but though the walls were ruined, and the enemy's balls flew so thick that a flag-staff bearing the Spanish colours was broken six times in an hour, and at last they could only be kept flying by being nailed to the corner of the rampart, yet the heroic little garrison, with their dauntless commander, Captain M'Lean, still maintained their ground, and from the midst of the ruins kept up an unquenchable fire on the besiegers. For six-and-thirty hours this marvellous resistance was prolonged, till at length General Graham, who had succeeded to the command of the British troops in the isle, seeing that half of that band were killed or wounded, withdrew them in boats to the opposite side, and the bastions, after being blown up, were abandoned to the enemy.*

The brave resistance of this little band of heroes proved the salvation of Cadiz, and eventually exercised a material influence on that of the civilized world. For fifty-five days they had held the post on the enemy's side, and in the midst of his batteries; and by simply maintaining it they had prevented any attack being made in other quarters. During this important interval the panic had subsided in Cadiz; the British troops had been augmented to 8000 men by re-enforcements from Lisbon and Gibraltar; six millions of dollars, recently arrived from Mexico, had replenished the public treasury; heavy taxes on houses within, and imports into, Cadiz furnished a small permanent revenue; the Spanish garrison was considerably augmented by volunteer battalions raised in the city, and numerous detachments brought by sea from different points in the coast; the whole ships of war had been brought round from Ferrol; and thirty thousand men in arms within the walls, supported by a fleet of twenty-three ships of the line, of which four were British, and twelve frigates, were in a condition not only to defy any attack, but to menace the enemy in the lines which they were constructing round the bay. Victor, who was at

the head of the blockading force, had not above 20,000 men under his command, so widely had the vast French force which burst into Andalusia been dispersed to compel obedience and levy contributions over its wide extended territory. Despairing, therefore, of carrying the place by open force, he resolved to turn the siege into a blockade; and, for this purpose, vast intrenchments were constructed round the bay, at the distance of a league and a half beyond the exterior defences of the isle of Leon, on which the French army laboured for two years, and which, equally with those defences themselves, remain a monument for the admiration of future ages.*

These gigantic lines of circumvallation, setting out from Rota, a village on the coast, on the north of the Bay of Cadiz, passed through the towns of St. Maria and Puerto Real on the sea-shore, ascended the semicircular range of hills which forms the eastern boundary of the great salt marsh, and, after passing through Chiclana, regained the sea at the tower of Barmeja, three leagues to the south of Cadiz. Thus they formed an immense semicircle, ten leagues in length, resting at each extremity on the sea, and embracing within its ample circuit the isle of Leon, lying in the centre of the bay, and separated at every point from the besiegers there by an intervening arm of the ocean and vast salt marsh, in general a league across. On these works upward of three hundred pieces of cannon, drawn from the arsenal of Seville, were, before the end of the year 1810, planted by the French engineers; the forts of Matagorda and Trocadero, the advanced posts of their lines, were greatly strengthened, and armed with powerful batteries, while mortars of a prodigious size were cast at Toulon, and sent by sea, by Malaga, to Cadiz, in order to annoy the shipping in the bay or the city. Other advantages, however, accrued to the French from this position: fifteen hundred prisoners, on board two hulks at Cadiz, who had been detained there since the battle of Bayleu, cut their cables, drifted during a heavy gale to the French side of the bay, and rejoined their comrades, notwithstanding all the fire of the Spanish batteries, after a deplorable captivity of two years; and General Lacy, who was embarked with three thousand men to aid the peasants of the Sierra de Ronda, who had taken up arms to resist the French spoliating columns, was, after some successes, surrounded by their forces in every direction, cut off from Gibraltar, and compelled, after sustaining severe loss, to re-embark at Estipona for Cadiz.†

But it was soon found that the damage which could be effected in this way was very inconsiderable; and although Soult was indefatigable in his efforts, it was very apparent that he had slight hope of reducing the place by force of arms, and that, under the pretext of maintaining the blockade of the fortress, his real object was to construct a barrier which might prevent the garrison from issuing forth, and the English from rekindling, from that basis, the flames of war in the Andalusian provinces. Victor, accordingly, was left in the works with a force never exceeding twenty thousand men,

* Nap., iii., 180, 181. Thib., viii., 264.

† A memorable instance of female heroism occurred at this siege. A sergeant's wife, named Rotson, was in a casement with the wounded men, when a drummer-boy was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort. On going out, the boy faltered under the severity of the fire, upon which she took the vessel from him, and, although a shot cut the bucket cord when in her hand, she braved the terrible cannonade, and brought the water in safety to the wounded men.—NAPIER, iii., 181; and *Sketch of a Soldier's Life in Ireland*, 72.

* Jom., iii., 419. Tor., iii., 199, 201. Thib., viii., 265. Nap., iii., 182, 183.

† Nap., iii., 182, 184. Thib., viii., 264, 265. Jom., iii., 419, 421. Tor., iii., 301, 302.

wholly inadequate to undertake active operations against the isle of Leon, and barely sufficient to guard the immense circuit of the lines; Soult and Sebastiani established themselves with powerful garrisons at Seville and Grenada, where they strove, by a profuse expenditure and sumptuous entertainments, to render the French sway popular in the provinces of which they were the capitals; Mortier lay in the neighbourhood of the Sierra Morena, and observed the great road to Badajoz; while detached columns traversed the country in all directions, repressing the guerrilla chiefs, levying contributions to defray the heavy expenses of the generals, and plundering the paintings which now form the unrivalled collection of the works of the Spanish masters in Marshal Soult's hotel at Paris. Though the forces at the disposal of the French generals were altogether irresistible in the field, and gave them the entire command of the open country, yet the Spaniards in the mountains were still unsubdued: Romana and Ballasteros in the Sierra Morena, to the south of Estremadura; Blake and Elio on the confines of Murcia; and numerous bodies of armed peasants in the mountains of Ronda, still maintained a desultory resistance, cut off the French detachments when they ventured too near their fastnesses, and preserved afloat the standard of independence, which might again be unfurled if happier days should dawn upon their country. To such a degree were the French irritated and annoyed by this harassing warfare, that Soult, on the 9th of May, issued a proclamation, declaring "the army of King Joseph the only regular Spanish force, and the whole patriot bands as armed banditti, to whom no quarter should be given;" and this enactment was carried into effect by the burning of several villages, and execution of their inhabitants, who had taken part in the insurrection. The regency for some time made no reprisals; but the exterminating system being continued, they at length issued a decree, declaring that for every Spaniard thus murdered three Frenchmen should be put to death; and this resolution having in some instances been acted upon, a stop was at length put, at least in the south, to this inhuman species of hostility.*

While a noble constancy amid misfortunes was thus exhibited within the ramparts of Cadiz, and the standard of independence floated only in the south of the Peninsula in inaccessible deserts, or on the summit of the mountains, Suchet was commencing that energetic and skilful campaign which proved so fatal to the Spaniards on the east of Spain. It has been already noticed with what ability he had effected the reduction of Lerida and Mequinenza, and how much his successes were paralyzed by the disasters of Augereau in the northern parts of the province.† Napoleon was so highly gratified by these successes, and mortified by the simultaneous reverses, that he resolved to intrust his successful lieutenant with the important mission of completing the reduction of the province, and to deprive the unsuccessful one of his command. Augereau, accordingly, was recalled, and Macdonald, restored to favour by his glorious exploit at the battle of Wagram,‡ appointed to the direction of the northern parts of the province. Two great roads alone existed at that period in

Catalonia, the one from Barcelona to Saragossa, the other by the seacoast from Perpignan by Gerona, Barcelona, Taragona, Tortosa, and Peniscola, to Valencia. Of the first road the French, since the fall of Lerida, were entirely masters; but the second was in their power only as far as Barcelona. Napoleon directed his lieutenants to proceed immediately to the reduction of the remaining strongholds on this line, the success of which would at once give him the command of the great communication along the east coast of Spain, and deprive the enemy of the succours which they were constantly deriving from the English vessels. Macdonald was to command the covering force, while to Suchet was given the immediate direction of the attacking army.*

But although active operations were thus resolved on in the eastern provinces, ^{Forces and dispositions of the Spaniards in Catalonia.} and the two French marshals, after leaving a sufficient number in garrison, could bring nearly sixty thousand excellent troops into the field, yet it was no easy task which awaited them in executing the commands of the emperor. The Spaniards in Catalonia, under O'Donnell and Campoverde, were above twenty thousand strong, and this force was capable of being increased to double the amount for a particular enterprise, by the concurrence of the peasants, all of whom were armed, and to whom dire necessity had taught the art of quitting their houses, and taking refuge in the hills on the approach of the enemy. The upper valleys in Arragon and Catalonia were entirely in the hands of the Spaniards; and, descending from their mountain fastnesses, where, from the absence of roads, pursuit was hardly practicable, they alike straitened Suchet's quarters in the former province, and threatened Macdonald's communication with Barcelona in the latter. Though the road from Gerona to that capital was only forty miles long, it was highly dangerous, from the number of narrow defiles with which it abounded, and the many rivers it had to cross; and so formidable were the armed bands who hung upon its flank, that the reevictualling of the fortress, which was kept in a constant state of blockade by the patriots, required a covering force of 8000 or 10,000 men. To add to the difficulties of the French generals, the battering-train for the reduction of Taragona was preparing at Toulon, and required to come from France. Transport by sea was impossible, from the vigilance of the British cruisers; and not only was their conveyance by land along the seacoast both difficult and dangerous, from the vicinity of so many valleys issuing upon it swarming with armed men; but, even if these were successfully passed, the ridge of mountains which separated the neighbourhood of Barcelona from Tortosa and the valley of the Ebro was in the hands of the Somatenes, and its principal passes, the Col de Balaguer and the Col del Alba, were strongly guarded by detachments of regular troops; while the neighbouring fortress of Taragona, which the Spaniards had materially strengthened, and from whence ample supplies by sea could be obtained, operated as an advantageous base for their defensive operations.†

When Macdonald succeeded Augereau in the command of the army in Northern Catalonia, he found the troops in a state of frightful insubordination, carrying on war in a most inhuman

* *Jom.*, iii., 421, 422. *Tor.*, iii., 236, 246. *Nap.*, iii., 188, 196. *Thil.*, viii., 266, 267.
† *Ante*, ii., 344, 345, 346.

‡ *Ante*, ii., 252.

* *Jom.*, iii., 444, 445. *Nap.*, iv., 7, 9. *Tor.*, iii., 312, 315.
† *Tor.*, iii., 312, 313. *Nap.*, iv., 10, 12. *Suchet*, i., 173, 176. *Vict. et Conq.*, xx., 53, 54.

Macdonald's first operations in Catalonia. May 15.

manner, and inflicting on and receiving from the unhappy peasants every species of atrocity—the sad bequests of the cruelty and violence of his predecessor. His first care was, by the establishment of discipline, to endeavour to bring them back to more humane habits and greater regularity of conduct; but the injuries given and received on each side were too recent—the mutual exasperation too violent, to enable him to restore the contest to the usages of civilized war. It was still a matter of extermination, and conducted on both sides with the utmost exasperation. Having in some degree, however, by a wholesome severity, restored the discipline of his own

troops, he undertook, in the middle of June 10. June, the revictualling of Barcelona, which was hard pressed for provisions; and though, by the aid of a covering force of ten thousand men, he succeeded in his object, yet such were the delays occasioned to his movements by the incessant attacks of the Somatenes, that his provisions were nearly half exhausted when he reached that city, and he himself was obliged to return with his empty carts, the very next day, to the neighbourhood of Gerona.

In July he collected another convoy to relieve the again famished city, forced the Garriga pass on the 18th, and entered Barcelona that night. Early in August he again set out with a third convoy, which he also delivered in safety in that fortress; and, finding that the northern parts of the province were entirely exhausted by these repeated requisitions, he now moved to the southward, forced the pass of Ordal with sixteen thousand men, and established himself for a few days at Reuss, in the middle of a little plain near Taragona,

while Campoverde, with the main body of the Spanish forces, withdrew under the cannon of that fortress. Finding, however, that the resources of Reuss and its vicinity were soon exhausted, and that the Spanish irregulars were drawing round him in all directions, and straitening his foraging parties, he again broke up; and, after making a feint towards the Col de Balaguer, turned sharp to the left, and, overthrowing all opposition, penetrated through the defile of Mont Blanch, and, descending into the plain of Urgel, entered into communication with Suchet, who lay at Lerida, in that vicinity, busily engaged in preparations for the siege of Tortosa.*

Aug. 16. of the Spanish forces, withdrew under the cannon of that fortress. Finding, however, that the resources of Reuss and its vicinity were soon exhausted, and that the Spanish irregulars were drawing round him in all directions, and straitening his foraging parties, he again broke up; and, after making a feint towards the Col de Balaguer, turned sharp to the left, and, overthrowing all opposition, penetrated through the defile of Mont Blanch, and, descending into the plain of Urgel, entered into communication with Suchet, who lay at Lerida, in that vicinity, busily engaged in preparations for the siege of Tortosa.*

O'Donnell no sooner learned that Macdonald, with a considerable part of his forces, had crossed the mountains, and taken up his quarters in the neighbourhood of Lerida, than he formed the design of surprising some of the French troops which were left scattered in the Ampurdan and northern parts of Catalonia. This bold design he executed with a vigour, skill, and secrecy worthy of the very highest admiration. Shrouding his plans in profound darkness, he set out with a chosen body of six thousand men, and proceeded by forced marches towards Upper Catalonia. Leaving Barcelona and Hostalrich to the right, spreading contradictory reports wherever he went of his destination, proceeding by horse-tracks only through the hills, and swelling his column as he advanced by the numerous bands of armed peasants on his road,

he fell with an overwhelming force on Schwartz's brigade, cantoned at La Bisbal, three quarters of a league from Gerona, totally Sept. 14. defeated it, and made the whole, twelve hundred strong, prisoners. Bravely following up his success, he next surprised and captured the whole French detachments on the coast towards Palamos, and fifteen hundred prisoners were embarked at that harbour for Taragona, where they arrived in safety. The success, however, was dearly purchased by a severe wound which the brave O'Donnell received at Bisbal, which obliged him to return with part of his force by sea to Taragona, where he was received by the population in transports as a deliverer; but he left sufficient forces under Campoverde to nourish the war in the Ampurdan, which soon became so formidable that it induced Napoleon to send strong reinforcements from Perpignan to Gerona, in the end of October, while thirty thousand fresh troops entered Navarre from France at the same period.*

Severely mortified by this disaster, which reflected as much discredit on the vigilance of his own officers as it did lustre on the skill and audacity of the enemy, Macdonald felt the necessity of retracing his steps to Northern Catalonia; and while on his march there, sought to take his revenge by an attack on Cardona, where Campoverde had stationed himself with a considerable part of his forces, and where the local junta of Upper Catalonia had taken refuge when driven from Solsona, their usual place of assembly. In the attack on the latter town, the magnificent cathedral took fire, and burning all night, fell with a frightful crash, that froze with horror every heart that heard it, while the mountains around were illuminated to their summits by the awful conflagration. Cardona itself stands at the foot of a rugged hill, which is the last of an offshoot from the great mountain range that divides Eastern from Western Catalonia, and a strong castle frowned on a mountain above. On the slope between the town and this

stronghold the Spanish army was drawn Oct. 21. up in an admirable position, and presented so formidable an aspect that Macdonald at first hesitated to attack it; but while he was deliberating, his advanced guard engaged without orders, and he was obliged to bring up his main body to its support. Neither, however, were able to make any impression: the French columns were driven back down the hill in disorder, and, after losing some hundred men, Macdonald drew off and resumed his march to Gerona, which he reached in the beginning of November. There, however, he found the country so utterly exhausted as to be incapable of furnishing subsistence to so great a number of troops; and as Barcelona was again reduced to extremity by want of provisions,† he left fourteen thousand men,

* Nap., iv., 21, 24. Belm., i., 151. Tor., iii., 391, 392. Vacani, 96, 99.

† Such was the extremity to which Barcelona was reduced at this period by the vigilant blockade kept up by the Catalonians on land, and the English at sea, that Macdonald, on the 28th of October, wrote to Suchet, "The Governor of Barcelona has announced to me the immediate departure of a convoy from Perpignan on the 4th of November, and urges me in the strongest manner to protect its advance. If that convoy is taken or dispersed, Barcelona will be lost; and it is not doubtful that the enemy will try every method to intercept it. My presence alone can save it; and you will easily understand that, even if the chances of success are equally balanced, we can never permit, without effort to avert it, such a loss, which would be irremediable."—MACDONALD TO SUCHET, 28th October, 1810. SUCHET'S Mem., i., 206.

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 54, 55, and 136. Nap., iv., 19, 21. Belm., i., 150. Such., i., 195, 196. Vacani, 84, 92.

Repulse of Macdonald at Cardona, and his retreat to Gerona.

Nov. 27. under Baraguay d'Hilliers, in the Ampurdan to maintain the communication with France, himself set out with sixteen thousand more, and the convoy collected in Perpignan for its relief, and, after some fighting, succeeded in revictualing the fortress a fourth time; and again moving to the southward, took a position near Mont Blanch, rather in the condition of a straitened and defeated than a victorious and relieving force.*

While Macdonald was thus painfully maintaining his ground in Upper Catalonia, without the forty thousand men under his command making any progress in the subjugation or pacification of the country, Suchet was busily engaged in preparations for the siege of Tortosa. To effect this, however, was a very tedious and difficult undertaking, for the strength of the enemy's forces in the intervening country rendered the transport of the battering-train from Gerona and the French frontier impossible; and it required to be collected in Arragon, and conveyed in boats down the Ebro to the destined points, where the banks were in great part in the enemy's hands. Macdonald's approach to the plain of Urgel rather increased than diminished his difficulties; for the unlooked-for accumulation of force speedily exhausted the resources of the country, without affording any protection from the Somatenes to counterbalance that disadvantage. The financial difficulties of the

Sept., 1810. French general were much augmented at this period by a peremptory order received from Napoleon to burn the whole English goods found in the province: an order which, however ill-timed and disastrous, he was obliged, after making the most vigorous remonstrances, to carry into complete execution, by publicly burning all the British manufactures found in the province, in the great square of Saragossa. British colonial produce, by great exertions, escaped with a duty only of fifty per cent. This rigorous measure entirely ruined the merchants of the province; and the only resources which the French general had at his command to encounter his enormous expenses, were those which he derived from the plain of Arragon, for great part of its mountain districts were in the hands of the guerillas; and Napoleon, following out his usual system of making war maintain war, had thrown him entirely on his own province for the whole expenses of his corps and military operations.† Such was the influence, however, of the vigorous government and able administration of Suchet, that, under the protection of his power, industry by degrees resumed its exertions; and though the taxes were extremely severe, comparative contentment prevailed; while such was the dexterity in extracting the resources from a country which long practice had given to the French generals and authorities, that, from

the ruined capital and wasted province of Arragon they contrived to extort no less than eight millions of francs (£320,000) annually, for the pay of the troops alone, besides a much greater sum for their maintenance and operations,* although it had never paid four millions of francs in taxes in all to government, in the most flourishing and pacific days of the Spanish monarchy.†

Although a sort of nominal blockade had been kept up off Tortosa since the middle of August, yet it was not till the beginning of November that the operations before it were seriously prosecuted, the waters of the Ebro being too shallow in the autumnal months, from the drought of summer, to permit the heavy boats laden with the siege equipage to drop down from Saragossa to the lower parts of the river. Meanwhile, the Spanish guerilla parties were indefatigable in their efforts to impede the progress of the navigation: several French parties, despatched to clear the banks, were surprised and cut to pieces, and, on one occasion, a whole Neapolitan battalion was made prisoners. Early in November, however, the waters had risen sufficiently to enable the flotilla having the battering-train and other siege apparatus, which had been so long in preparation, to drop down the stream; and, though some of the boats were stranded, and severe fighting was necessary to clear the banks of the enemy, yet a sufficient number reached the neighbourhood of Tortosa to enable Suchet to commence the siege. Macdonald, at the same time, approached from the north to lend a hand to the operations; and, to facilitate their advance, Suchet attacked the Spanish troops at Falcet, who obstructed the communication between the two armies, and, after a short conflict, put them to the rout with considerable loss, while General Bassecour, who, with the Valencian troops, lay on the right bank of the Ebro, and who took advantage of the absence of the general-in-chief with the main body of the French forces on the left bank, to make an attack on the covering force near Ull-decona, was defeated in two engagements, Nov. 26. with the loss of three thousand men, and forced to take shelter within the walls of Peniscola. These important successes in a great measure secured the rear of the besieging force, and materially extended the district from which their resources were to be drawn; but such was the perseverance of the Spaniards, and the unconquerable spirit with which hostility sprung up in one place when extinguished in another, that the flotillas on the river were still exposed to attack, and a considerable convoy descending the stream was saved from destruction only by the sacrifice of the covering force, some hundred strong, ashore. Notwithstanding all their vigilance, however, the French generals were drawing their forces, as well as accumulating their means of prosecuting the siege, around the fortress. Suchet had twenty thousand men encamped under its walls; while Macdonald, having revictualled Barcelona, and raised its garrison to six thousand men, and left Baraguay d'Hilliers with fourteen thousand at Gerona, drew near with fifteen thousand excellent troops to cover the siege.‡

* Nap., iv, 25, 28. Tor., iii., 321, 322. Vict. et Conq., xx., 139, 141.

† "The Governor of Arragon, Marshal Suchet, is charged with the administration of the police, of public justice, and of the finances. He will nominate to all public employments, and make all the requisite regulations. All the revenues of Arragon, as well ordinary as extraordinary, shall be paid over to the French paymaster, for the payment of the troops, and the charges of their maintenance. As a consequence of this, from the 1st of March, 1810, the French treasury shall cease to remit any funds for the service of the troops stationed in the whole extent of that government."—Decree, 8th Feb., 1810; *Moniteur*, 9th Feb.; and SUCHET'S *Memoirs*, i., 365. This decree is a specimen and sample of the whole military government of Napoleon.

* In the six months preceding the siege of Tortosa, Suchet had levied in Arragon 120,000 sheep and 1200 oxen — SUCHET, i., 313.

† Suchet, i., 280, 286, 306. Nap., iv., 30, 32. South., v., 257, 258. Belm., i., 151.

‡ Nap., iv., 32, 35. Suchet, i., 217, 224. Tor., iii., 325, 327. Vict. et Conq., xx., 143, 144. Belm., iii., 415, 419.

TORTOSA, situated at the mouth of the Ebro, and in part resting on a ridge of rocky heights, which, in that quarter, approach close to the river, seems to form the bond of communication between the mountains of Catalonia and the waters of the river. The town itself is situated on the northern or left bank, and its chief defence consisted in the strong fortifications which crowned the crest of the rugged heights that rise from thence towards the mountains that lie to the northward. The communication with the opposite bank was by a bridge of boats, the southern extremity of which was covered by a regular *tête-du-pont*. The works on the left bank, running up broken ridges and across precipitous ravines, were extremely irregular, and formidable rather from the depth of the precipices and obstacles of the ground than the strength of the battlements with which they were surmounted. A hornwork, called the *Ténasas*, perched on a height beyond the northern suburb, and a lunette, bearing the name of Orleans, constructed to cover the point where the Duke of Orleans had carried the place during the war of the Succession, constituted its principal outworks on the left bank of the river. The garrison consisted of eight thousand men; the inhabitants, ten thousand more, were animated with the best spirit; and both from the strength of the works and the importance of its position, commanding the only bridge over the Ebro from Saragossa to the sea, this fortress was justly regarded as the key of all Southern Catalonia.*

Six thousand of Macdonald's men were placed under the command of Suchet, while he himself, with the remainder, 10,000 strong, stationed himself in the passes of the hills, in such a manner as to interrupt the approach of any Spaniards from Taragona, where the bulk of their forces were placed. But the defence made by Tortosa was noways commensurate either to its ancient reputation or the present efforts which had been made for its reduction. The investment having been completed, the whole enemy's posts were driven in on the 19th of December, and on the following night ground was broken before the fortress. With such vigour were the operations conducted, and so negligent the defence, that, in the short space of seven days, the besiegers were safely lodged in the covered way, and on the following day a sally was repulsed with much slaughter. On the night of the 26th the batteries were armed with forty-five pieces of heavy artillery, from which, at daybreak on the following morning, a heavy fire was opened upon the Spanish ramparts. In two days the works were sensibly injured, the bridge to the southern bank of the river broken, and the *tête-du-pont* on that bank abandoned by the besieged. In the night of the 31st, the besiegers' guns were brought up to the edge of the counterscarp, and the miners had effected a lodgment in the rampart; but the mine was not yet fired, no practicable breach had been effected, and the garrison and armed citizens, still above 9000 strong, might have prolonged for a considerable time a glorious defence.†

The governor, Alacha, however, was a weak man, wholly destitute of the resolution requisite for such a situation: his imagination was haunted

ed by the terrors of a mine exploded, Fall of the and the enemy rushing in through place. a defenceless breach; and at seven January 2. o'clock in the evening he hoisted the white flag on the bastion chiefly threatened. Meanwhile, he had recourse to the usual resource of irresolute men, a council of war; but it decided nothing, and left him in greater perplexity than before. The officers, however, of the garrison, indignant at the pusillanimous surrender which was in contemplation, loudly remonstrated against the proposed surrender, and, in fact, almost shook off the governor's authority. In the night, however, the artillery of the besiegers Jan. 2. thundered with powerful effect on the ramparts from the opposite side of the ditch; in the morning two practicable breaches were made on it, and an immediate assault was commanded. Upon this, three white flags were displayed in different parts of the city; and Suchet, perceiving that the governor's authority was not generally obeyed, rode up to the principal gate, informed the sentinels that hostilities had ceased, and desired to be instantly conducted to the governor in the citadel. He found him surrounded by his officers, who were vehemently protesting against a surrender, and contending for a renewal of hostilities; but such was the ascendant speedily obtained by the stern manner and undaunted bearing of the French general, that the governor was overawed; none of his officers could undertake the responsibility, at so awful a moment, of revolting openly against his authority, and the place was surrendered at discretion. The garrison, still 7000 strong, laid down their arms. There were found in the place 180 pieces of cannon, 30,000 bombs and cannon-balls, and 150,000 pounds of powder.*

Suchet took steps, without any delay, to improve the immense advantage thus gained to the uttermost. An expedition was immediately fitted out from the fallen city against the Col di Balaguer, a fort commanding the pass over the mountains of the same name between Tortosa and Taragona, and this important stronghold was carried by escalade. This easy conquest gave him the means of directing his forces at pleasure, either against the latter of these cities, the seat of government and great bulwark of the Spaniards in the province, or against the valleys still held by their arms in the north of Catalonia; while the possession of the only bridge over the Lower Ebro entirely severed the patriots in Catalonia from those in Valencia, and laid open the rich plains and hitherto untouched fields of the latter province to the French incursions. At the same time, the fort of La Rapita, on the seacoast near the mouth of the Ebro, and the mouth of that river itself, fell into the hands of the French, and the Valencians and Catalonians, finding themselves entirely severed from each other, and separately menaced with an attack, gave up all thoughts of combined operations, and severally prepared to the best of their power to withstand the storm about to fall on their heads. Macdonald, however, in the course of his march from the neighbourhood of Barcelona to Jan. 15. Lerida, whither he was directing his course in order to concert measures with Suchet for the investment of Taragona, had to sustain a rude conflict, in the defile of Valls, with the troops of

* Suchet, i., 225, 227. Nap., iv., 36, 38. Belm., iii., 419, 420.

† Tor., iv., 98, 101. Belm., iii., 434, 440. Suchet, i., 238, 246. Nap., iv., 42, 44.

* Belm., iii., 441, 443. Suchet, i., 245, 249. Nap., iv., 44, 45. Tor., iii., 99, 102.

Sarsfield, while the garrison of Taragona, under Campoverde, assailed his rear; the latter were defeated and driven back into the place; but the Italian division of Eugene was so severely handled by the former as to be at first defeated with severe loss, and only forced the passage by a sudden onset during the night, when the pass was at last cleared, and Macdonald succeeded in reaching Lerida. Notwithstanding this success, the cause of the Peninsula could not have received a severer blow than by the unlooked-for and discreditable fall of the important fortress of Tortosa; and to it may immediately be ascribed the long train of disasters which ensued in the east of Spain; and which, if not counterbalanced by the extraordinary successes simultaneously gained by the English in the west, would have permanently riveted the fetters of French despotism around the neck of the Spanish nation.*

After the fall of Tortosa, Suchet was engaged for several months in preparations for the most arduous undertaking which of Taragona. now remained in the Peninsula—the siege of TARAGONA, the strongest fortress still in the hands of the Spaniards—the seat of government, the arsenal of their power, and in an especial manner valuable from its capacious harbour, which afforded ample means of communicating by sea with the English fleet. The city, however, was so powerful, that great preparations and no small concentration of force were required for its reduction. In order to prepare for it, Suchet returned to Saragossa, where he devoted himself for some months to the internal concerns of his province, and the collecting provisions for his army; while General Guilleminot, chief of the staff to Macdonald, joined him in that city, to arrange joint measures for the important enterprise. So inadequate, however, did all the means which they possessed appear, that Guilleminot was despatched to Paris, in the name of both generals, to solicit succours, and the means of pushing the siege with vigour. Napoleon, however, who by this time was actively engaged in preparations for the Russian war, informed them that they must not look to him for assistance, and that they had ample means at their disposal to effect their object; but he directed that the army of Arragon should form the besieging, and that of Catalonia the covering force; that the siege equipment and artillery should be drawn from the ramparts of Lerida and Tortosa; and that Suchet's force, which was much weakened by its active operations, should be re-enforced by two divisions of the army of Macdonald, numbering seventeen thousand men. Notwithstanding this copious draught, the hero of Wagram had still nearly thirty thousand men under his banners, of whom, however, only one half could be spared from the garrison of the Ampurdan, and the arduous duty of keeping open the communication between Barcelona and France.†

March 18, 1811. The war in Catalonia, during the whole Peninsular contest, was of a very peculiar kind, and more nearly resembled the varied adventures and balanced successes of the wars of the League in France, or of the Succession in Spain, than the fierce and irresistible onsets which characterized, in other quarters, the wars of the French Revolution. Exhaustion and lassitude followed every considerable achievement, and the enemy never appeared so formidable as after reverses that presaged his ruin. This was the natural consequence of the strong country which the Spaniards occupied, of the tenacious spirit with which they were animated, and of the parsimonious policy of Napoleon, which denied to his generals in every province every pecuniary assistance excepting such as they could derive from the province itself. A striking example of this peculiarity in the contest occurred immediately after the fall of Tortosa. While all Europe imagined that so decisive a blow was to terminate the war in the east of the Peninsula, and that Catalonia and Valencia, now severed from each other, would separately fall an easy prey to the victor, the gallant Spaniards of the former province, nothing daunted, were preparing to wrest its most important fortresses from the enemy; and, though baffled in one of their enterprises, they succeeded in making themselves masters of the key to the Eastern Pyrenees.*

Barcelona was the first object of their attack. Early in March, Campoverde assembled 8000 men at Molinos del Rey, and 7000 at Igualada and the neighbouring villages; and having secret intelligence with the inhabitants of Monjuich, the citadel of that fortress, who promised to aid him in the attempt, he deemed himself secure of success. Late on the night of the 29th of March, he arrived close to the walls, and a column of grenadiers descended into the ditch. General Maurice Mathieu, the French governor, however, had accurate intelligence of all that was going forward: the ramparts were lined with armed men; and so terrible a fire was speedily opened on the head of the column, that great numbers fell on the spot, and the remainder, who had not crossed the crest of the glacis, finding the design discovered, retired hastily, and abandoned the attempt. Far from being discouraged by this failure, a similar enterprise was shortly after undertaken against Figueras, and crowned with complete success. A leader of the Miquelets, named Martinez, having ascertained that the governor of this important fortress kept a very negligent look-out, and that the garrison, not 2000 strong, trusted entirely to the strength of the ramparts for their defence, formed the design, with the aid of some citizens in the town, of surprising the gates. Late on the evening of the 9th of April, he descended from the mountains, and as soon as it was dark sent his advanced guard, under Rovira, seven hundred strong, close to the ramparts. The citizens inside, with whom the plan was concerted, immediately opened the postern; the Spaniards rushed in, and disarmed the guard; and so rapidly did Martinez, with the main body of his forces, follow on their footsteps, that, before the astonished Italians could make any preparations for their defence, the gates were all in possession of the enemy, the arsenals taken, and the whole garrison made prisoners. Thirty men only were killed or wounded in this brilliant exploit; the governor and 1700 men were taken; a few hundred made their escape to Gerona, where they arrived, in great dismay, early in the morning; while the Somatenes of

Attempt to surprise Barcelona, and capture of Figueras by the Spaniards.

March 29. April 9.

* *Jom.*, iii., 448. *Nap.*, iv., 45. *Suchet*, i., 253, 254. *Tor.*, iv., 108. *Vict. et Conq.*, xx., 297, 300.

† *Jom.*, iii., 516, 517. *Nap.*, iii., 46, 51. *Suchet*, ii., 308, 313.

* *Jom.*, iii., 517. *Nap.*, iii., 48, 49.

the neighbouring hills, among whom the news spread like wildfire, made the most incredible exertions, before the French could reinvest the place, to throw in supplies of men and provisions.*

This important advantage, which seemed to counterbalance the fall of Tortosa, and, if it had been adequately supported, unquestionably would have done so, excited the most enthusiastic transports throughout all Spain. Crowds of Miquelets, fully equipped, and burning with ardour, crowded round the standards of Campoverde and Sarsfield; and from all quarters bands of armed men converged towards Figueras to raise the blockade, revictual the fortress, and preserve the eastern key of the Peninsula for the arms of the monarchy. *Te Deum* was sung in all the churches of the Peninsula not under the immediate control of the enemy. The general transports knew no bounds. But, while the people were giving themselves to excusable congratulations on this auspicious event, the French generals were busily engaged in taking measures to render it of no avail to the enemy. Baraguay d'Hilliers immediately drew out all the forces he could collect from Girona and the neighbouring forts, and closely blockaded the fortress, in the hope of compelling it to surrender, from want of provisions, before any succours could be thrown in by the enemy. The Spaniards, on their part, were not idle; and Campoverde speedily approached from the side of Taragona, at the head of 8000 infantry and 1200 horse, bringing with them a great convoy of ammunition and provisions. But all his efforts to relieve the place proved unsuccessful.

Early in May he made his appearance before the besiegers' stations; and so completely had the design been concealed from the French generals, that, at the point where the heads of his columns appeared, there was only a single battalion ready for action, while the Baron d'Erolles threatened the besiegers on the other side by a sally from the citadel; and, if the Spanish commander had instantly commenced the attack, the French historians admit he would easily have accomplished his object. The French general, in this extremity, had recourse to an artifice, and announced the conclusion of an armistice, with a view to a capitulation to Sarsfield, who fell into the snare, and consented, at the critical moment, to a suspension of arms. Meanwhile, urgent messengers were despatched for succour, and, when hostilities were resumed, the period for complete success had passed. As it was, the head of Sarsfield's column, after overthrowing all opposition, penetrated into the town, and 1500 men, with some provisions, succeeded in re-enforcing the garrison; but Baraguay d'Hilliers, alarmed by the fire of musketry, and now aware of the real point of attack, hastened, with a choice body of 40000 men, to the spot, and, assailing the Spaniards, while scattered over several miles of road, and in part involved in the streets of the suburbs, in flank, won an easy victory; 1100 men were lost to the Spaniards in this affair, and the remainder driven to a distance from the beleaguered fortress; and though the French loss was nearly as great, yet they might with reason congratulate themselves on the success of their defence, as the provisions thrown into the place bore no proportion to the ad-

ditional mouths introduced; and after the defeat of Sarsfield, the blockading columns quietly resumed their stations on the hills around its walls.*

Macdonald was engaged, during these operations in Northern Catalonia, in an enterprise which has left an enduring stain on his memory. After the departure of Suchet for Saragossa, consequent on the fall of Tortosa, the marshal had set out from Lerida for Barcelona, not by the direct road of Igualada, which was occupied in force by Sarsfield, but by the circuitous route of Manresa. Sarsfield, apprized of his intentions, lay in the rocky heights in the neighbourhood of Mont Serrat, to assail him in the march. The Italians, who formed the head of the column, encountered a severe opposition at Barning and the bridge of Manresa, which was fight of Manresa strongly barricaded; but, having ^{sa.} March 29. forced their way through, they, with wanton barbarity, set fire to the town, though it had made no resistance, and was almost entirely deserted by its inhabitants, and even tore the wounded Spaniards from the hospital. The flames, spreading with frightful rapidity, soon reduced 700 houses to ashes, among which were two orphan hospitals, and several other noble establishments, both of industry and beneficence. Macdonald, who witnessed the conflagration from the heights of Culla, at a short distance, made no attempt to extinguish the flames, but, resuming his march on the following morning, left the smoking ruins to attest where a French marshal's army had passed the night. But the wanton act of barbarity was quickly and condignly avenged. The inhabitants of all the neighbouring hills, struck by the prodigious light, which, through the whole night, illuminated the heavens, hastened, at day-break, to the scene of devastation, and, wrought up to the highest pitch by the sight of the burning dwellings, fell with irresistible fury on the French rear-guard, as it was defiling out of the town, while Sarsfield himself assailed the long column of march in flank, when scattered over several leagues of woody and rocky defiles, and before Macdonald reached Barcelona he had sustained a loss of 10000 men. The hideous cruelty of this conflagration excited the utmost indignation, not only in Catalonia, but throughout the whole of Spain. The war assumed a character of vengeful atrocity hitherto unequalled, even in that sea of blood; and the Spanish generals, justly indignant at such a wanton violation alike of the usages of war and the convention hitherto observed in Catalonia, issued a proclamation, directing no quarter to be given to the French troops in the neighbourhood of any town which should be delivered over to the flames.††

Macdonald was so disconcerted by this disaster and the fall of Figueras, which in the highest degree excited the displeasure of the emperor, that he earnestly entreated Suchet to lay aside for the present all thoughts of the

Suchet's reasons for persisting in the siege of Taragona.

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 308, 311. Tor., iv., 121, 123. Nap. iv., 62, 63.

† "The conduct of Marshal Macdonald has been equally unworthy of his rank as a French duke and marshal, and his station as a general of civilized armies. Not content with reducing to ashes a defenceless city, which was making no resistance, he has not even respected the asylum of wounded soldiers, and has violated the sacred contract concluded between the hostile armies, and acted upon since the commencement of the war."—*CAMP-VERDE'S Proclamation*, 5th April, 1811; TORENO, iv., 116.

‡ Tor., iv., 115, 116. Vict. et Conq., xx., 304, 307. Nap., iv., 56, 57. South., v., 260, 261.

* Tor., iv., 118, 119. Nap., iv., 60, 62. Vict. et Conq., xx., 304, 308.

siege of Taragona, and unite all his disposable forces with those of the army of Northern Catalonia, for the great object of regaining the most important fortress in Eastern Spain for the French arms. But Suchet, who was intent on the reduction of the great stronghold of the patriots in that quarter, was not to be diverted from his object; and since Macdonald professed his inability to render him any assistance, he resolved to undertake the enterprise alone, with the aid only of Macdonald's divisions which were placed under his orders. He replied, therefore, to the requisition of his colleague for aid in the blockade of Figueras, "That a simple blockade might be established by the nearest troops, while to accumulate great forces on so sterile a spot would, without accelerating the surrender, transfer the difficulties of subsistence to the besieging force; that it was by no means reasonable to renounce the attack on Taragona, the only remaining bulwark of Catalonia, at the very moment of execution, because of the loss of a fort; that it was in Taragona that the greatest number of the Spanish forces in the province were shut up, and it was April 26. there only that they could be made prisoners. Eighteen thousand had already been captured in Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, and if ten or twelve thousand more were taken in Taragona, the strength of Catalonia would be entirely broken. It was more than ever expedient to press this great operation, as that fortress, stripped of a large portion of its defenders sent to the relief of Figueras, would fall more easily than under any other circumstances could be expected."*

TARAGONA, which Suchet, in obedience, not less of the express injunctions of the emperor, than the dictates of sound policy on the subject, was now seriously resolved to besiege, is a city of great antiquity, and celebrated from the earliest times in the wars of the Peninsula. The Tarraco of the ancients, it was the capital, in the time of the Romans, of Citerior Spain: though sunk from its pristine magnificence, it still retained many remains of former splendour; and great part of the rampart, which still encircles its edifices, had been erected by the hands of the legions. The town consisted of a rectangular parallelogram, the northern part of which is perched on a rocky eminence, of which the eastern base is washed by the waves of the Mediterranean. The lower town is situated at the southwest of the rectangle, on the banks of the Francoli, which glides in a gentle current into the sea; and the whole inhabitants did not, at the time of which we speak, exceed eleven thousand souls, though nearly an equal number of armed men had, ever since the commencement of the war, been there assembled around the ruling junta of Catalonia. The garrison, however, as Suchet had foreseen, had been so much reduced by the large expeditions fitted out under Campoverde for the relief of Figueras, that, when the French appeared before the place in the beginning of May, it did not consist of more than six thousand men, including twelve hundred armed inhabitants, and the seamen of the port. The principal defence of the place on the northeast, where the great road to Barcelona entered its walls, consisted in a line of redoubts connected by a curtain, with a ditch and covered way, running from the sea to the

rocks on which the upper town is built; and behind this exterior line there was a rocky space called the Milagro, lying between the castellated cliffs of the upper town and the sea. The approach to the city on the southeast, where the Francoli flowed in a sluggish current into the sea, is perfectly flat; and as that side appeared least protected by nature, a newly-constructed line of fortifications had been erected both towards the sea and the river, in the interior of which a fort, termed the Fort Royal, formed a sort of citadel to the lower part of the city. The upper town, which both by nature and art was much the strongest part of the fortress, was separated by a complete rampart from the lower, and communicated with Fort Olivo, a large outwork eight hundred yards distant, built on a rocky eminence, from which the place might have been commanded by an old aqueduct which brought water to the city. The place was, generally speaking, strong, chiefly from the rugged and inaccessible nature of the cliffs on which the greater part of its ramparts were built; but it had several weak points, especially on the southern side; the ample circuit of its walls required more than double the garrison within them to provide a proper defence; and though the English squadron, of three sail of the line, under Commodore Codrington, in the bay, had a most imposing appearance, and might aid considerably in the defence, yet it could not be concealed that it could give but little support to the breaches, and that, if the lower town were carried, the upper, now cut off from all communication with the harbour and the sea, would soon be forced to surrender.*

Being aware what a desperate resistance he would encounter in assailing this important fortress, the last link which enabled the Catalonians to communicate with Cadiz, Valencia, and the rest of Spain, as well as the British fleet, Suchet had taken extraordinary precautions for the success of the siege. Immense convoys had been collected in Arragon, which still retained its character of the granary of the army; the flourishing town of Reuss in the vicinity had been fortified, and contained his principal magazines; armed posts along the road in his rear, towards Saragossa, afforded points of protection for his supplies; and a considerable part of his army was scattered over their line of march to repel the incursions of the Somatenes from the neighbouring hills. All things having, by great and long-continued exertions, been at last got in readiness, the French army moved forward, and, approaching the fortress from the south, crossed the stream of Francoli, and completed the investment on that side from the foot of the cliffs of Olivo to the sea. In doing so, however, they were exposed to a severe fire from the fort on the one side, and the English squadron on the other, by which, in a short time, two hundred men were struck down; but, notwithstanding this loss, they succeeded in maintaining their ground, and next day repulsed a sortie by the garrison to drive them from it. The French had for the undertaking twenty thousand men, composing the very best troops in the Peninsula, and a hundred pieces of cannon; but the Spanish garrison was receiving continual re-enforcements by sea. Campoverde himself arrived with four thousand men on the 10th, and, after re-enforcing the garrison, again set sail to join his lieutenants in

* Suchet, Mem., ii., 16, 17. Nap., iv., 63, 64. Tor., iv., 122, 123

* Suchet, ii., 35, 36. Nap., iv., 70, 71. Tor., iv., 125, 126

the attempt to raise the siege. Colonel Green soon afterward made his appearance from Cadiz with considerable English stores, and fifty thousand dollars in money; while Sarsfield and D'Errolles resumed their former stations near Valls, Mont Blanch, and Igualada, to threaten the communications of the besieging force.*

The attack of the besiegers being directed, in the first instance, against the lower town on its southern front, near the Francoli stream, they found themselves severely galled by the fire of Fort Olivo; and, on that account, soon felt the necessity of directing their operations, in the first place, against that formidable outwork. Several sallies by the besieged, in some of which nearly six thousand men were engaged, and which, though repulsed, seriously impeded his operations, convinced Suchet, at the time, of the necessity of contracting his communications, and accumulating all the disposable forces he could command round the fortress, which was now defended by above twelve thousand soldiers. The fortified station on Mont Blanch, accordingly, was abandoned, and its garrison drawn in to re-enforce the besiegers, the line of communication by Falcet and Felipe de Balaguer being alone preserved open. Ground

May 21. was broke before Fort Olivo on the 21st; but the vigorous fire of the Spanish batteries, and the extraordinary difficulties of the ground, rendered the progress of the trenches extremely slow; and it was not till the 27th that thirteen guns were pushed so near as to be able to breach the place, and early on the 28th before the fire was opened. Notwithstanding the weight of metal with which it was attacked, the gunners of the fort replied with uncommon vigour, and little progress was made during the May 28. next day in breaching the ramparts; but towards night the engineers succeeded in blowing down the palisades which defended the junction of the aqueduct and wall, and left an entrance almost on a level with the ramparts. The breach was not yet practicable; but this ill-defended point afforded a hope of effecting an entrance, and the circumstances of the besiegers, and the increasing numbers and audacity of the Somatenes in their rear, as well as the general enthusiasm excited by the fall of Figueras, rendered it indispensable to hazard an immediate assault. It was therefore ordered for that very night: two chosen columns were selected for the attack; every man in the army, as well as the town, felt that on its success the fate of the siege, and probably of the war in Catalonia, would depend.†

Four guns were discharged at nightfall as the It is carried signal for the assault; a variety of by storm. false attacks were immediately directed, with loud cheers and beating of drums, against the ramparts of the fortress, and the columns destined for the real assault of the breach and the aqueduct entrance of the fort swiftly and silently advanced to their destined points. The Spaniards, distracted by the fire and rolling of drums in every direction, and unable from the darkness to see the assailants, opened a fire from every rampart and bastion in the place; the vast circumference of Taragona presented an undulating sheet of flame; every

cliff, every salient angle, stood forth in bright illumination amid the general gloom; while the English ships in the bay opened a distant cannonade, which increased the grandeur of the spectacle, and threw flaming projectiles that streaked the firmament in every direction with flitting gleams of light. Amid this awful scene the assaulting columns, shrouded in gloom, advanced bravely to the assault. That destined for the attack of the breach stumbled in the dark against a Spanish column, which was proceeding from the town to relieve the garrison of the fort; the two bodies, from the violence of the shock, soon got intermingled; and, in the confusion which ensued, some of the assailants got in at the gate opened to receive the succour; and when it was closed, their comrades outside, now close to the walls, began to mount them by escalade. Meanwhile, the other column was still more fortunate. The front ranks, who had descended into the fosse, indeed found their scaling-ladders too short, and were soon swept away by the murderous fire from the rampart; but the aqueduct presented a bridge, narrow, indeed, but capable of being passed by resolute men, now that the palisades were blown down, and over this narrow ledge the Italian grenadiers made their way into the fort. Though the defences, however, were now penetrated in two different quarters, the brave garrison disdained to surrender: facing their enemies on the ramparts, wherever they presented themselves, they still fought like lions; the cannoniers fell at their guns; the infantry perished in their ranks as they stood; and it was only by pouring in fresh columns of unwearied troops, who, as day dawned, mowed the heroic defenders down by concentric volleys on all sides, that the resistance was at length overcome. Two hundred of the assailants perished in this desperate assault; but the loss of the besieged was still greater, and nearly a thousand men were made prisoners, the remainder of the garrison having, in desperation, leaped from the ramparts and escaped into the city.*

The loss of Fort Olivo was a severe discouragement to the Spaniards, as it had been generally considered as impregnable, and contained ammunition and provisions for a long siege. Its fall was poorly compensated, on the following day, by the arrival of re-enforcements to the amount of two thousand men, who came by sea from Minorca and Valencia. With their aid a sortie was attempted, by three thousand men, to endeavour to regain the fort before the French had time to establish themselves in their conquest; but so rapid had been the dispositions of General Rogniat, who commanded the engineers, for its defence, that it was repulsed with loss. A council of war was, upon this, held in Taragona, and it was decided May 31. that Campoverde should leave the place, and endeavour to rouse the mountaineers of Catalonia, who already mustered ten thousand strong in the neighbourhood of Valls, to raise the siege; while the command of the garrison was committed to Don Juan de Contreras, a brave man, who ably and faithfully executed the arduous trust committed to his charge. He immediately adopted the most energetic measures for the public defence: levied a heavy tax on the principal merchants, which replenished the military chest;

Preparations of the Spaniards for a protracted defence.

* Belm., iii., 479, 483. — Tor., iv., 127, 128. Suchet, ii., 36, 45.

† Belm., iii., 494 and 497. Nap., iv., 76, 77. Tor., iv., 129, 130. Suchet, ii., 52, 55.

* Vacani, 124, 126. Belm., iii., 497, 502. Suchet, ii., 56, 60. Tor., iv., 131, 132. Nap., iv., 78, 81.

and divided the whole inhabitants, without exception of age or sex, into companies, to whom various duties, according to their capacity, were assigned; the aged and women to attend the wounded and prepare bandages, the children to carry water and ammunition to the troops, the men capable of supporting arms to re-enforce the soldiers on the ramparts; while Commodore Codrington materially aided the defence by continually landing fresh supplies of provisions and warlike stores, and removing the sick and wounded to the neighbouring and friendly harbour of Valencia.*

Finding the garrison resolute in maintaining the defence, notwithstanding the disaster they had experienced, Suchet commenced his approaches in form against the lower town, on the side of the Francoli River. Sarsfield, at the same time, entered the fortress with re-enforcements, and took the command in the menaced quarter. The French engineers, by great exertion, had there established fifty pieces of heavy cannon in the trenches, which were gradually pushed forward to breaching distance, notwithstanding repeated sallies of the besieged.

On the 7th of June the fire commenced against Fort Francoli, and on the same night a lodgment was effected in that outwork, which forms the southeastern angle of the fortress, close to the sea. By this means the French gained the important advantage of closing the entrance of the harbour to the British fleet; but Codrington still kept up his communication with the town by means of the point of Melagro, which was beyond the reach of the guns from Francoli; and he soon after landed four thousand men from Valencia at Villa Nova, who made their way across the hills to June 20. Campoverde, who was now seriously preparing in their rear to disquiet the besiegers; while D'Errolles, near Falcet, attacked and destroyed a valuable convoy on its route to their camp. Meanwhile, the garrison of Taragona were so confident in their means of defence, that they despatched a body of horse out by the road to Barcelona, who broke through the French lines of investment, and succeeded in joining their comrades destined to raise the siege. Several gallant sorties also were made by the Spaniards from the lower town, some of which proved entirely successful, and sensibly retarded the approaches of the French, which were now directed against the Orleans bastions, still on the southern front of that part of the fortress.†

These untoward events seriously alarmed Suchet for the event of the siege. The garrison of the fortress had now been augmented to nearly seventeen thousand men: the losses of the defence were constantly supplied by fresh troops; his own besieging force was hardly of greater amount, when the losses it had sustained, already amounting to two thousand five hundred men, were taken into view; and fourteen thousand irregular troops, under Campoverde and Sarsfield, were assembled to threaten his communications and cut off his convoys. An ordinary general, in such circumstances, would have abandoned the undertaking. But Suchet was one of those remarkable characters who find re-

sources in themselves to overcome even the most formidable obstacles: he saw that the issue of the campaign was entirely centred in Taragona; that the siege was a combat of life or death to the opposite parties; and he resolved, at all hazards, to persist in the attempt. Abandoning, therefore, all subordinate stations, and summoning to his aid four thousand additional troops from the rear, he concentrated all his efforts upon pushing forward the approaches, and keeping up the spirits of his men. Such, however, was the vigour of the Spanish fire, and the obstacles which they threw in the way by repeated sorties, that from sixty to a hundred men fell every day in the trenches; and it was evident that both the numbers and spirits of the soldiers would sink before so incessant a consumption if it was of long endurance. At length, however, on the 21st of June, three practicable breaches were declared in the rampart of the lower town, and the troops were directed to make ready for an assault.*

At seven o'clock at night, fifteen hundred chosen men were disposed in three columns, and, on a signal of four lower town. Assault on the bombs discharged at once, advanced June 21. in silence, but with a swift and steady step, towards the breaches. The first column, under General Bouvion, rushed on rapidly to the breach of the Orleans bastion, which they were fortunate enough to surmount almost before they were perceived, and before the enemy had time to fire two mines which had been run under the ruined part of the wall. The Spaniards, surprised, were driven back to the gorge of the redoubt, where they stood firm and arrested the assaulting column; but fresh troops pouring in, they were at length overcome, and the victors, hotly pursuing their advantage, made themselves masters of the whole works in the southwest angle of the lower town, and arrived at the foot of the rampart of Fort Royal. Meanwhile, the second column, whose attack was directed against the breach in the bastion of St. Charles, near the seacoast, met with a severe resistance, and its head was arrested on the breach; but Suchet no sooner perceived this than he ordered up a second body, which, pressing on immediately behind the first, fairly pushed it through the perilous pass, and the rampart was won. The whole bastions and walls now swarmed with the assailants; the Spaniards, without a leader, were thrown into confusion, and fled, some to the upper town, some into the houses in the lower, where they were speedily pursued and massacred: the shouts of the victors, the cries of the vanquished, were heard on all sides; the warehouses near the harbour took fire, and soon filled the heavens with a prodigious flame; in the general confusion, the vessels in the port cut their cables and stood out to sea; while the English squadron increased the horrors of the scene by pouring their broadsides indiscriminately into the quays and ramparts, now crowded with the enemy's soldiers. In the midst of this frightful confusion, however, the assailants steadily pursued their advantages: amid a terrific carnage, alike of soldiers and citizens, the besieged were driven entirely from their defences; Fort Royal itself was carried by escalade in the first tumult of victory, and when morning dawned, the French were masters of

* Suchet, ii., 61, 63. Belm., iii., 506, 507. Tor., iv., 133, 134. Nap., iv., 79, 80.

† Belm., iii., 512, 518. Tor., iv., 135, 137. Nap., iv., 87, 89. Suchet, ii., 63, 81.

* Suchet, ii., 80, 84. Belm., iii., 521, 525. Nap., iv., 88. Tor., iv., 137, 139.

the harbour and whole lower town: the principal warehouses were smoking in ruins; fifteen hundred Spaniards lay dead in the streets and on the breaches, besides five hundred French who had fallen in the assault; eighty heavy guns which stood on the ramparts were in the enemy's power, and the whole remaining hopes of Taragona centred in the infuriated multitude who crowded the walls of the upper town.*

But that multitude still presented an undaunted front to the enemy, and, amid the ruin of all their hopes, still hoisted, with mournful resolution, the standard of independence. A flag of truce, displayed by Suchet the day after the successful assault, was

sternly rejected. Loud were the clamours, however, which arose, both in the city and the adjoining province, against Campoverde, for his inactivity in not seriously attempting to raise the siege; and to such a height did the ferment arrive, after the fall of the lower town, that the

Junta of Catalonia sent him positive orders at all hazards to attempt it. But, though he had twelve thousand infantry and two thousand horse under his command, and the besieged had all their forces ready to co-operate on their side, nothing was done: the officer to whom the principal attack was intrusted was too timid to undertake it; and Campoverde himself, after a vain demonstration, drew off, leaving the garrison to its fate. Still, however, the besieged held out undismayed, and their spirits were elevated again to the highest pitch, when,

June 26. on the 26th, two thousand English from Cadiz, under Colonel Skerret, arrived in the bay. Loud and enthusiastic were the cheers of the excited multitude when the English commander, with his staff, landed and proceeded to the breach. The fall of Fort Olivo, the assault of the lower town, the terrors of Suchet, were forgotten when the scarlet uniforms were seen traversing the streets. But these generous and confiding hopes were miserably disappointed. The British officers, though brave and zealous, had not the true military genius; they did not see where the vital point of the war in the east of Spain was to be found. The engineers reported that the wall, already shaking under the French fire, would soon give way: the Spanish garrison appeared adequate to the defence of the now diminished front, which was alone assailed; and, therefore, they merely put their troops at the disposition of the Spanish authorities, without insisting that they should share the dangers of the assault. Contreras, who saw that they despaired of the defence of the place, generously refused to require their aid in the town, and acquiesced in their project to co-operate with Campoverde externally in attempting to raise the siege. This, however, failed, from the impossibility of getting that general and the governor to agree on any joint plan of operations; and the result was, that the precious hours were lost in useless deliberation. Two thousand British troops, capable of rendering Taragona as impregnable as Acre had been to the enemy, and changing the whole fortune of the war in the east of Spain, remained on board their transports, passive spectators of the last struggles for Catalonian independence.†

This resolution of the English commanders to keep themselves afloat proved fatal to Taragona. The withdrawal of the English, universally deemed in the Peninsula at that period invincible, inevitably produced the general impression that the defence could no longer be maintained, and spread distrust and irresolution at the very moment when vigour and enthusiasm were indispensably necessary to avert the crisis. Suchet, meanwhile, was stimulated by the strongest motives to press on and complete his conquest. The town was half taken; the wall which separated him from the moiety which still remained in the hands of the Spaniards, had no counter-scarp or wet ditch; the harbour was in his hands; and his breaching batteries, run up to within musket-shot of the walls, had already begun to shake their aged masonry. Contreras, however, though abandoned by the British, was not dismayed. A thick hedge of aloe-trees, no small obstacle to troops, grew at the foot of the rampart; defences behind the breach were prepared; the adjoining houses loopholed as at Saragossa; barricades were erected across the streets leading into the interior of the town; the breach itself was occupied by three strong battalions; reserves, immediately behind, were ready to support any point which might be menaced; and eight thousand veteran troops within the walls still promised a desperate resistance. Such was the vigour with which the fire of the place was kept up, that the parapets in the nearest French trenches, erected within the lower town, were shot away; and the gunners stood exposed beside their pieces to a tremendous storm of musketry from the rampart, which swept away numbers every minute. The place of those who fell, however, was instantly supplied by others; the fire of the assailants' batteries continued without intermission; the breach rapidly widened with every discharge, while the impatience on either side for the final struggle became such, that the soldiers on the walls and in the trenches stood up and hurled defiance, with frantic gestures, at each other, in the midst of the tempest of shot which was flying on all sides. At length Suchet, at five in the afternoon, deeming the breach sufficiently widened to admit of being carried, traversed the ranks, addressing himself to every company; and, seeing the men wrought up to the highest pitch, gave the signal for assault, and fifteen hundred chosen troops, sallying forth from the trenches, rushed forward towards the rampart, while eight thousand more were in reserve in the trenches to support their attack.*

The assailants had to cross a space a hundred and twenty yards broad before reaching the foot of the wall, and the row of Its success, June 29. aloes at its foot offered no insurmountable obstacle to their advance. When they leaped out of the trenches, the whole French batteries instantly ceased firing, while that of the Spaniards from the summit of the rampart redoubled, and a frightful storm of musketry, grape, hand-grenades, and howitzers, swept away the head of the column. On they rushed, however, till the aloes were reached, but their line was found to be impenetrable; the column required to make a circuit to get round, and the delay and confusion incident to this obstacle had wellnigh proved fatal to the assault. When the troops,

* Suchet, ii., 85, 87. Belm., iii., 529, 531. Tor., iv., 137, 138. Nap., iv., 91.

† Tor., iv., 140, 141. Nap., iv., 94, 95. South., v., 305, 306. Contreras's Report. Suchet, ii., 421.

* Suchet, ii., 88, 99. Nap., iv., 96, 97. Tor., iv., 142, 143. Belm., iii., 531, 543.

disordered and out of breath, at length reached the foot of the rampart, and began to ascend the breach, the crumbling ruins gave way under their feet; its summit was crowned by a phalanx of determined men, strongly armed with bayonets, swords, and hand-grenades. A converging fire of musketry fell on all sides, and the leading files were struck down by a shower of grape in flank from the bastion of St. John. The column hesitated, and recoiled in confusion: already the cries of victory were heard from the rampart, when Suchet, who was at hand to arrest the disorder, pushed forward a strong reserve to its support, and himself followed with his staff to the scene of danger. Still the assailants hesitated at the foot of the breach, and, spreading out on either side in wild confusion, began to return in vain the fire of the enemy, or take shelter under the projections of the bastion of St. Paul. Upon this, General Habert, Colonel Pepe, and the whole officers of the staff, themselves rushed forward to the breach, followed by the commanders of companies of the assaulting columns. Many fell in the ascent; but the remainder pushed on with heroic courage, and reached the top; the mass behind re-formed and rapidly followed on their footsteps, and the town was won. Eight thousand French, in the highest state of excitement, speedily streamed over the breach, and spread like a torrent along the ramparts on either side; and in the general confusion the three battalions, placed behind as a reserve for the defenders, were overthrown. A panic seized the Spanish troops in the interior; almost all their defences were abandoned; and it was only at the barricades and loop-holed houses, near the street of La Rembla, that any serious resistance was experienced. There, however, a handful of desperate men defended themselves like lions, and it was only by continually bringing up fresh columns of attack, and the failure of ammunition among the besieged, that they were at length overcome and the town finally taken.*†

The fame justly due to Suchet and his indefatigable army for this glorious exploit, which was one of the greatest blows struck during the whole Peninsular war, and gave a decisive preponderance to the French arms in the east of Spain, was deeply tarnished by the savage cruelty which disgraced their triumph after the city was taken. The heroic governor, Contreras, who had received a deep bayonet wound in the breast, near the breach, was borne on a board into the presence of the French commander, while the carnage was yet reeking in every quarter. Instead of admiring the valour and

commiserating the situation of his fallen enemy, the victorious general reproached him for the tenacity of his defence, and declared he deserved instant death for having continued the resistance after the breach was practicable. "I know of no law," replied Contreras, "which compelled me to capitulate before the assault; besides, I expected succour. My person should be respected like that of the other prisoners, and the French general will respect it; if not, to him the infamy, to me the glory." This dignified answer recalled Suchet to his better feelings: he treated the captive general with respect, and soon after loaded him with kindness, and made advances to induce him to accept rank in the service of Joseph; but the brave Spaniard was proof alike against his seductions as his menaces, and he was, in consequence, sent as a prisoner to the citadel of Bouillon, in the Low Countries, from whence he afterward made his escape. But in other quarters the work of slaughter went on without intermission. Gonzalez, the second in command, fell, pierced by more than twenty wounds: nine hundred wounded, who had sought refuge in the Cathedral, and lay on the pavement weltering in blood, were spared; but upon the defenceless inhabitants the storm of the victor's fury fell with unexampled severity. Armed and unarmed, men and women, gray hairs and infant innocence, attractive youth and wrinkled age, were alike butchered by the infuriated troops, whose passions were, not like the English soldiers', those of plunder or drunkenness, but the infernal, unrelenting spirit of vengeance. Above six thousand human beings, almost all defenceless, were massacred on that dreadful night, which will be remembered in Spain as long as the human race endures; the greater part of the garrison, which had precipitated itself over the rocks or rushed through the northern gates, enclosed within the French lines and the fire of the ramparts, were made prisoners; and when the magistrates of the surrounding country were, on the following morning, by Suchet's orders, brought into the town, and marched through the streets to see what fate awaited those who resisted the French arms, "the blood of the Spaniards," to use the expression of the French journalist of the siege, "inundated the streets and the houses." Humanity, however, amid such scenes of horror, has to recount with pleasure that many French officers exerted themselves, though too often in vain, and at the hazard of their own lives, to stay the carnage, and that numbers of individuals owed their lives to their generous intercession.*

The trophies of the victory were immense, its results decisive. The French loss immense had been very severe during the sally of this siege, amounting to full five thousand men, but this was much exceeded by that of the besieged. Nine thousand of the garrison were made prisoners; three hundred and twenty guns mounted on the ramparts, fifteen thousand muskets, and above a million of cartridges, fell into the hands of the victors. The total loss to the Spaniards, from the commencement of the operations, had been little short of twenty thousand of their best troops. The French artillery had discharged forty-two thousand projectiles, the Spaniards a hundred and twenty thousand, during this siege: in every point of view, one of the most memorable in modern times. But its

* Suchet, ii., 93, 106. Nap., iv., 97, 98. Tor., iv., 143. Belm., iii., 539, 545.

† To such a height had the spirit of Suchet's troops arisen, that an Italian soldier named Bianchini, who, at the assault of Fort Olivo, had pursued the Spanish garrison to the foot of the walls of the town, and made some prisoners there, being brought before the general-in-chief, and asked what recompense he desired, answered, "The honour," said he, "of mounting first to the assault of Taragona." On the 28th of June, this brave man, now promoted to the rank of a sergeant, presented himself in full dress before the general, and claimed the honour which had been promised him. He obtained it: was seen at the head of the forlorn hope; received a wound, but still pressed on, encouraging his comrades to follow him; was twice again wounded without stopping; and at length fell, pierced to the heart by a musket-ball, near the summit of the breach! The spirit of Rome is not extinct in Italy: it is only obscured by the corruptions which have overspread the higher ranks from long-continued civilization.—See SUCHET'S *Memoirs*, ii., 100, 101.

* South., v., 307, 309. Tor., iv., 144, 146. Suchet, ii., 105, 114. Belm., iii., 544, 547. Contreras's Report, No. 22. Suchet, ii., 423, 424.

greatest results were the depriving the patriots of their grand military arsenal and principal point of communication with the British fleets and the ocean in those parts of Spain. Justly impressed with the magnitude of those advantages, as well as the fortitude and ability displayed in their acquisition, Napoleon sent Suchet his marshal's baton, with an injunction to proceed as he had begun, and earn his dukedom under the walls of Valencia.*

Anxious to secure, by rapidity of operations, the whole fruits which might be expected from so great a stroke, Marshal Suchet no sooner found himself master of Taragona than he marched out with the greater part of his forces against Campoverde, whose troops, divided between consternation at its fall, and indignation at his temporizing policy in not relieving it, were alike disheartened and distracted, and incapable of opposing any serious resistance to his arms. The Spanish general, however, fell back so rapidly into the upper valleys and mountain ridges of Catalonia, that Suchet could not reach his footsteps; and various atrocious deeds of cruelty, by which the French marshal endeavoured to strike terror into the Catalans during his march, only revived the exasperation, and sowed again the seeds of an interminable war in the province. Campoverde, however, finding himself in no condition to make head against so formidable an assailant, retired to the mountain ridges on the frontier of Arragon, and openly announced his intention, which a council of war supported, of abandoning the province altogether as a lost country. Upon this all the soldiers in his army who were not Catalans deserted; numbers of the natives of the province returned, in despair, to their homes: grief and dejection universally prevailed. Meanwhile,

July 3. fifteen hundred prisoners, chiefly wounded, were captured at Villa Nova when endeavouring to embark, the road to Barcelona opened, and the Spanish rear-guard defeated at Villa Franca. The Valencians, however, so loudly remonstrated against being abandoned to their fate in the Catalonian Mountains, the more especially when their own country was evidently threatened, that Campoverde

July 9. agreed to return to Cervera; and the Valencians, three thousand in number, made their way to the seacoast, where they were embarked at Arun de Mar. The English commodore, however, who took them on board, refused to embark any but Valencians, and thus the bulk of the army was forcibly retained on its own shores. Ultimately, Campoverde was deprived of the command, which was conferred on General Lacy, and that indefatigable commander immediately gave a new organization to his army, suited to the altered circumstances. Dismissing a great proportion of the officers, and almost all the horses, he re-formed great part of the troops into guerilla bands under whatever chiefs they chose to select, and numbers of them repaired to the standard of MINA, in Navarre, who had now risen to celebrity; and, after undergoing hardships and privations which exceeded all figured in romance, ultimately joined the victorious host which, under Wellington, righted, at the eleventh hour, the wrongs of their country.*

July 11. While the elements of resistance to French

domination were thus, to all appearance, melting away in Catalonia, Description of Suchet, whose activity neither difficulty could check nor prosperity diminish, executed a *coup-de-main* against MONT SERRAT, a celebrated mountain fastness, and now the last stronghold of independence in that part of Spain. It was composed of the Convent of Our Lady of Mont Serrat, formerly possessing great riches, removed, at an early period of the war, to Minorca by the monks, and stood upon the summit of a fantastic mountain, overlooking from the westward the plain of the Llobregat, in the neighbourhood of Barcelona. The prodigious height of the precipices on which the buildings were situated; the wild forms of the peaks, which shot up, as it were, into the sky around them; the naked and savage character of the rocks, like the bones of a gigantic skeleton, of which the whole upper part of the mountain is composed; the numerous hermitages, which nestled like swallows' nests in the clefts, or crowned the projecting points in its long ascent; the blue waters of the Mediterranean bounding the distant horizon from the higher regions; the smiling aspect of the plain of Barcelona, teeming with riches and glittering with buildings at its foot, joined to the massy pile, Gothic towers, and aerial spires of the convent itself, at the summit—had long impressed the minds of the Spaniards with religious awe, and rendered this monastic retreat one of the most celebrated in the South of Europe. But war, in its most terrible form, was now to penetrate these abodes of solitude and meditation; and the clang of musketry and the thunders of artillery were to re-echo amid wilds hitherto responsive only to the notes of gratitude or the song of praise.*

The Convent of Nôtre Dame, evacuated by the monks, had, from the beginning of Storming of the war, been a favourite station of the convent. the patriot bands; and though its sit- July 25. uation, at the distance of seven leagues only from Barcelona, had long rendered it at once a point of importance to the Spaniards and annoyance to the French, yet, from the apparently impregnable strength of its situation, no attempt had been made to dislodge them from it. Of late considerable pains had been taken to strengthen the position: the steep and narrow paths which wound up the long ascent had, in many places, been fortified; batteries had been erected on some commanding points; deep ditches drawn across the road in others; and near the monastery itself a strong intrenchment had been thrown up, while its gates were barricaded, and massy walls loop-holed for the fire of musketry. The principal approach was on the north side, by Casa Mansana, and it was on it that the greatest care of the garrison had been bestowed; that which ascended the mountain on the south by Colbato, and on the east towards Monestrol, were mere paths, so steep and rugged that they were deemed altogether inaccessible to a body of troops. Suchet, however, having accurately inquired into the nature of the ground, resolved to menace all the three approaches at once; the principal attack, under General Maurice Mathieu, being directed on the northern side. This column experienced no serious opposition till it arrived at the chapel of Saint Cecilia; but there a strong intrenchment blockaded the road, while a severe fire of grape and musketry from the overhang-

* Suchet, iii., 121. Belm., 549, 550. Tor., iv., 147.

† Tor., iv., 148, 150. Nap., iv., 100, 103. Belm., iii., 550, 553.

* Tor., iv., 151, 152. Suchet, ii., 122, 123.

ing woods and cliffs seemed to render attack impossible. The grenadiers halted, and fell back till they were out of reach of the fire; but, meanwhile, Maurice Mathieu detached some light troops to scale the rocks which arose behind the intrenchments; and these gallant men, after undergoing incredible fatigues, succeeded in establishing themselves on the heights in the rear of the Spanish position, and opened a plunging fire on the gunners at their pieces. Encouraged by this joyful sound, the grenadiers in front returned to the charge, and, by a rapid rush, succeeded in passing the perilous defile and carrying the work: a second battery was won in like manner, though the Spaniards stood their ground bravely, and were bayoneted at their guns; and when the assailants reached the summit, and were preparing to assault the monastery, the sound of musketry behind, and a sudden rush of the garrison towards the barriers in front, told them that those intrusted with the attack on the side of Colbato had already succeeded in surmounting all the difficulties of the ascent, and that the last stronghold of the enemy was won. They had got into the enclosures by means of a postern which had been neglected, and made their way, by a sudden surprise, into the convent. Baron d'Erolles threw himself, with the greater part of the garrison, down some ravines, known only to the Spanish mountaineers, and reached the Llobregat without any material loss; but the convent, with ten pieces of cannon and all its stores, was taken, and the reputation of invincibility reft from the last asylum of Catalonian independence. Two of the monks were massacred in the first heat of victory, but the officers succeeded in rescuing the remainder; the hermits were left unmolested in their moss-grown cells. This brilliant success, coming so soon after the capture of Taragona, produced a powerful impression over the whole province: many guerilla bands laid down their arms; several towns sent in their submission; and Suchet, deeming Macdonald now in sufficient strength to complete its pacification, returned to Saragossa to accelerate his preparations for the expedition against Valencia.*

No force now remained in Catalonia capable of interfering with the blockade of Figueras, which Napoleon was daily becoming more desirous of regaining for the French Empire. Macdonald, on his part, was not less solicitous for its reduction, as well to wipe out the blot which its capture had affixed on his scutcheon, as to propitiate the emperor, who was much displeased at the repeated checks he had experienced, and was already preparing to give him a successor. Despairing of effecting the reduction of so strong a place, garrisoned by four thousand resolute men, by open force, he preferred the surer, but more tedious method of blockade; and for this purpose drew vast lines of circumvallation around the town, resembling rather the imperishable works of the Roman legions than those constructed during the fierce but brief career of modern warfare. These lines were eight miles long, forming a complete circuit of the town, beyond the reach of cannon-shot, and effectually barring all communication between the besieged and the circumjacent country. They were formed everywhere of a ditch, palisades, covered way, and curtain; were strengthened at

equal distances by bastions armed with heavy cannon, and defended by twenty thousand men. Secure behind these inaccessible ramparts, the French troops quietly waited till famine should compel the besieged to surrender: such was their strength, and the vigilance with which they were guarded, that the sallies of the garrison, and the efforts of the Somatenes, in the adjacent hills, to throw succours into the fortress, were alike baffled; and at length, after losing fifteen hundred of their number in these ineffectual sorties, and having exhausted all their means of subsistence, the Spaniards were compelled to surrender at discretion. Thus was accomplished the prophecy of Suchet, that the surprise of Figueras, by inducing the Spaniards to detach a portion of the defenders of Taragona to its succour, would prove rather prejudicial than auspicious to their arms; and the wisdom of his military counsel, not to endanger success by dividing his means, but, relinquishing all minor objects, to concentrate his whole force upon the principal stronghold of the enemy, and vital point of the campaign.*

Having completed his preparations, Marshal Suchet, in obedience to the positive orders of Napoleon, in the beginning of September commenced his march against Valencia, at the head of somewhat above twenty thousand men; the remainder of his force, which numbered nearly forty thousand combatants, being absorbed in the garrisons of the numerous fortresses which he had captured, and in keeping up his extensive communications. The Spaniards, meanwhile, had not been idle. Aware of the formidable onset which now awaited them, the Junta of Valencia had, for a considerable period, been busily engaged in the means of defence; the fortifications of Peniscola, Oropesa, and Saguntum, which lay on the great road from Barcelona, had been materially strengthened; the latter had a garrison of three thousand men, and was amply provided with the means of defence; Valencia itself was covered by an external line of redoubts and an intrenched camp, which, in addition to its massy, though antiquated walls, and ardent population, inflamed by the recollection of two successive defeats of the French, seemed to promise a difficult, perhaps a doubtful contest. Blake, the captain-general of the province, and a member of the council of government, was at the head of the army, which mustered five-and-twenty thousand men, comprising almost all the regular soldiers in the Peninsula. He had it in his power, if overmatched, to fall back on the impregnable walls of Carthage or Alicante, while the sea in his rear everywhere afforded the inestimable advantage, at once of succour from the English in case of resistance, and the means of evasion in the event of defeat.†

MURVIEDRO, the ancient SAGUNTUM, is a fortress built upon the summit of a steep and rocky hill, at the bottom of which the modern town of Murviedro stands. The waters of the Mediterranean, in the days of Hannibal, approached to within a mile of its eastern walls; but at present they are five miles distant, a proof how much

* Belm., i., 206, 207. Tor., iv., 154, 155. Vict. et Conq., xx., 533, 534.

† Vict. et Conq., xx., 334, 335. Jom., iii., 526, 527. Tor., iv., 208, 211. Suchet, ii., 143, 151, 155.

‡ Polyb., lib. iii., c. 2.

* Suchet, ii., 124, 131. Nap., iv., 102, 104. Tor., iv., 150, 151.

Description of Saguntum.

the sea has retired along that coast in the intervening ages. Many remains of its former grandeur are still to be found by the curious antiquary, although its greatness has so much declined that the modern city contains but six thousand inhabitants, and occupies only a corner of the ample circuit of the ancient walls. The modern fortress, which bears the name of San Fernando de Saguntum, stands on the summit of the mountain, round the base of which the ancient city was clustered, and consisted, at this time, of two redoubts, armed only with seventeen pieces of cannon. The garrison, however, was three thousand strong; the principal defence of the place consisted in its position, perched on the summit of a rock, perpendicular on three sides, and only accessible on the west by a steep and devious ascent; and its importance was great, as commanding the only road from Barcelona or Arragon to Valencia.*

The lower town, upon the approach of the French, was abandoned, and occupied by General Hubert's division without resistance. Immediately the investment of the fort was completed, and the French engineers having, by means of their telescopes, discovered two old breaches in the walls, which were, as yet, only imperfectly barricaded with wood, though the besieged were endeavouring to erect a curtain of masonry behind them, conceived the design of carrying the place by escalade. The success which had attended a similar *coup-de-main* at the Col di Balaguert seemed to encourage the attempt, and two columns were formed early on the 28th for the assault; but the vigilance of the Spanish governor, Adriani, had penetrated the design: the assailants were received with a close and well-directed fire of grape and musketry, and repulsed with the loss of four hundred men. Warned by this check of the need of circum-spection, Suchet now saw the necessity of making approaches in form; but for this purpose it was necessary to reduce the little fort of Orope-sa, which commanded, in a narrow defile, the road by which alone artillery could be brought up from the great arsenal at Tortosa. It was attacked, accordingly, by a Neapolitan division; but, though it was only garrisoned by two hundred men, and armed with four guns, this Lilliputian stronghold held out till the 11th of Oct. 11. October, when it was taken after a practicable breach had been made in the rampart; while the garrison of another castle on the seacoast, near the same pass, resolutely refused to capitulate, even when the wall was ruined and the enemy were mounting to assault, and succeeded, when the post was no longer tenable, in getting clear off by sea, and, with the aid of an English frigate, to Valencia.†

Suchet, meanwhile, marched against and defeated a considerable body of guerillas under Don Carlos O'Donnell, which had assembled in his rear; and the heavy stores and siege equipage having been now brought up from the Ebro, the approaches against Saguntum were carried on with extraordinary vigour. A practicable breach having been made in the walls, a second assault was ordered on the 18th of October. Though the guns in the fort were entirely silenced by the superior number and weight of the en-

emy's cannon, and the rampart had neither wet ditch nor exterior defences, yet the heroism of the garrison supplied all these defects. With indefatigable perseverance, they collected sandbags, with which they stopped up the chasm in the masonry occasioned by the French guns; their muskets returned a gallant, though feeble fire, to the thunder of the besiegers' artillery; and a band of dauntless men, on the summit of the breach, braved the French fire, and provoked the imperial grenadiers to come on to the assault. Soon their desire was gratified. A chosen column, 8000 strong, was let loose from the trenches, and swiftly ascended towards the breach: they succeeded, though with great difficulty, in reaching its middle; but there the fire of musketry, discharged within pistol-shot of their heads, was so severe, and the shower of stones, hand grenades, and cold shot from the summit so overwhelming, that, after a short and bloody struggle, they were hurled back to the foot of the hill with the loss of half their number, and Saguntum again, after the lapse of two thousand years, repulsed the soldiers of Napoleon, as it had done those of Hannibal.*†

Suchet's situation was now again full of peril. The guerilla parties infested the road between Tortosa and Orope-sa, so as to render the conveyance of stores and provisions impossible, except by the detachment of a considerable force. Blake, with an army superior to his own, and entirely master of his operations, was in his front; he could not pass Saguntum, already proved, by the failure of two assaults, to be all but impregnable, and to retreat would be to blow the whole of the east of Spain into a flame, and lose all the fruits of the fall of Taragona. Nor were the accounts from Catalonia and Arragon calculated to allay his fears as to the issue of the campaign. The long inactivity of the French troops around Figueras had been attended with its usual effects in those warm latitudes. Sickness had spread to a frightful extent during the autumnal months: 10,000 men were in hospital, and the communication between Gerona and Barcelona was again entirely interrupted. Encouraged by the debility of the enemy's forces in the Ampurdan, and the absence of Suchet from the southern parts of the province, the unconquerable Catalans had again risen in arms. Lacy August, 1811. had succeeded in reorganizing 8000 men under D'Erolles and Sarsfield, who were prosecuting a partisan warfare with indefatigable activity—arms and ammunition having been furnished by the English. Busa, a mountain of great strength about twenty miles above Cardona among the Spanish Pyrenees, fixed on as their arsenal and seat of government, was already fortified and guarded by the militia of the country. Lacy was soon in a con- Sept. 10. dition to resume offensive operations: he surprised Igualada, destroyed the French garrison,

* Nap., iv., 273, 274. Tor., iv., 214, 216. Suchet, ii., 168, 173. Viet et Cong., xx., 136, 138.

† "Pauco cepisse jam se urbem, si paullulum adnitatur, credentes; Saguntinis pro nudatâ menibus patriâ corpora obponentibus, nec ullo pedem referente, ne in relictum a se locum, hostem immitteret. Itaque quo acris et conferti magis utrimque pugnabant, eo plures vulnerabantur; nullo in ter arma corporaque vano interdicente telo. Quum diu anceps fuisset certamen, et Saguntinis, quia præter spem resisterent, crevisset animi; Penuis quia non vicisset pro victo esset; clamorem repente oppidani tollunt, hostemque in ruinâ muri expellunt; inde impeditum trepidantemque exturbant, postremo fuscum, fugatumque in castra redigunt." —Liv., l. xxi., c. 8, 9.

* Tor., iv., 209, 210. Suchet, ii., 154, 159. Viet et Cong., xx., 335, 336.

† Suchet, ii., 158, 168. Tor., iv., 212, 214. Belin., i., 209.

Sept. 12. two hundred strong, captured an important convoy, compelled the enemy to evacuate Mont Serrat and retire to Taragona, levied contributions up to the gates of Barcelona, and even crossed the frontier, carrying devastation through the valleys on the French side of the Pyrenees. Six hundred men were made prisoners at Cervera, two hundred at Bellpuig. Macdonald was recalled from a command in which he had earned no addition to his laurels, and it was only by collecting a force of 14,000 infantry and 2000 horse that his successor, Decaens, was enabled to escort a convoy from Gerona to Barcelona.*

The intelligence from Upper Arragon was not less disquieting. The EMEPECINADO, the guerrillas a noted guerilla chief, whose stronghold was the mountains near Guadalupe, had united with Duran and other guerilla leaders; and their united force, consisting of six thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse, threatened Calatayud: MINA, another guerilla chief, with five thousand men, was threatening Arragon from the side of Navarre; and lesser partisans were starting up in every direction. Musnier's and Severole's division, indeed, numbering twelve thousand soldiers, succeeded in raising the siege of Calatayud; but Mina gained great successes in the western part of the provinces, pursued the flying enemy up to the gates of Saragossa, and totally destroyed twelve hundred Italians, who were following him in his retreat towards the mountains. Such was the local knowledge and skill of this incomparable partisan, that, though actively pursued by several bodies of the enemy much superior to his own troops, he succeeded in getting clear off with his prisoners, which were taken from his hands on the coast by the Iris frigate, and conveyed safe to Corunna. The road between Tortosa and Oropesa also, Suchet's principal line of communication, was entirely closed by lesser bands; and it was easy to see that, if he either remained where he was without gaining decisive success, or fell back to the Ebro, he would be beset by a host of enemies who would speedily wrest from him all his conquests.†

From this hazardous situation the French general was relieved by the imprudent daring of the Spaniards themselves. Blake, who was no stranger to the formation of a practicable breach in the walls of Saguntum, and knew well that, notwithstanding their recent success, the brave garrison would, in the end, sink under a repetition of such attacks, was resolved that they should not perish under his eyes, as that of Taragona had done under those of Campoverde. He accordingly made preparations for battle, and for this purpose got together twenty-two thousand infantry, two thousand five hundred horse, and thirty-six guns. With this imposing force, after issuing a simple but touching proclamation to his troops, he set out from Valencia on the evening of the 24th of October, and made straight for the French position under the walls of Saguntum. Suchet was overjoyed at the intelligence, which reached him at eleven at night; and immediately gave orders for stopping the enemy on his march, before he had arrived at the ground where he designed to give

battle. With this view, the French general drew up the whole force that he could spare from the siege, about seventeen thousand men, with thirty guns, in a pass about three miles broad, which extended from the heights of Vall de Jesus and Sancti Spiritus to the sea, and through which the Spanish army befooled to pass in approaching Saguntum from Valencia. The gunners were all left in the trenches; and, in order to deceive the enemy, and deter them from attempting a sortie, they received orders to redouble their fire upon the breach. But, notwithstanding this, the besieged from their elevated battlements desisted the approaching succour, and, with intense anxiety, watched the progress of the advancing host.*

At eight o'clock on the following morning the Spanish army commenced the attack upon the French at all points, and soon drove in their light troops. Following up this advantage, they pressed on, and won a height on the French right which commanded that part of the field, and established some guns there which did great execution. The whole Spanish left, encouraged by this success, advanced rapidly and with the confidence of success; their dense battalions were speedily seen crowning the heights on the French right; and the garrison of Saguntum, who crowded the ramparts, deeming the hour of deliverance at hand, already shouted victory and threw their caps in the air, regardless of the besiegers' fire, which never for an instant ceased to thunder on their walls. In truth, the crisis was full of danger, and a moment's hesitation on the general's part would have lost the day. Suchet instantly ordered up Harispe's division, which, after a severe struggle, regained the heights; and, perceiving that Blake was extending his wings with a view to outflank his opponents, he brought up his second line, leaving the cuirassiers only in reserve, and made a vigorous attack on the Spanish centre. The first onset, however, proved utterly unsuccessful: the Spaniards, driven from the height, rallied behind their second line, and again advanced with the utmost intrepidity to retake it; Caro's dragoons overthrew the French cavalry in the plain at its foot; and not only was the hill again wrested from the infantry, but the guns planted on it fell into the enemy's hands. Everything seemed lost, and would have been so but for the valour and presence of mind of the French commander-in-chief; but he instantly flew to the reserve of cuirassiers, and, addressing to them a few words of encouragement, in doing which he received a wound in the shoulder, himself led them on to the charge. They came upon the Spanish infantry, already somewhat disordered by success, at the very time when they were staggered by a volley in flank from the 116th regiment, which, inclining back to let the torrent pass which they could not arrest, at this critical moment threw in a close and well-directed fire. The onset of the terrible French cuirassiers, fresh and in admirable order, on the Spanish centre, proved irresistible: the Valencian horsemen, already blown and in disorder, were instantly overthrown; the infantry were broken and driven back; not only were the captured guns retaken, but the whole Spanish artillery in that part of the field seized, and the two wings entirely separated from each other.

* Tor., iv., 224, 230. Nap., iv., 276, 277.

† Suchet, ii., 192, 203. Tor., iv., 230, 239. Nap., iv., 276, 280.

* Tor., iv., 217, 218. Nap., iv., 281, 282. Suchet, ii., 179, 181.

er. The French right, at the same time, succeeded in regaining the ground it had lost on the hills, and threw the Spanish left opposed to it in great confusion into the plain; their left also was advancing; and Blake, seeing the day lost, retired towards Valencia, with the loss of a thousand killed and wounded, and two thousand five hundred men and twelve guns taken. Suchet lost eleven hundred men in the action; but Blake's inability to contend with him in the field was now apparent; and so depressing was this conviction on the garrison of Saguntum, that they capitulated that night, though the breach was not yet practicable, and the garrison still two thousand five hundred strong, deeming it a useless effusion of blood to hold out longer, now that relief had become hopeless.*

Though this important victory and acquisition gave the French general a solid footing in the kingdom of Valencia, he did not consider himself as yet in sufficient strength to undertake the siege of its capital, and the situation of Blake was far from being desperate. His forces were still above twenty thousand men; he was master of an intrenched camp, with a fortified town enclosed within its circuit, and the sea and harbour gave him unlimited means of obtaining re-enforcements and supplies from the rear. Impressed with these ideas, as well as the serious character which the desultory warfare had assumed in Arragon and Catalonia in his rear, Suchet halted at Saguntum, and made the most pressing representations to Napoleon as to the necessity of re-enforcements before he could proceed farther in his enterprise. During six weeks that he remained quiescent at Saguntum, he was incessantly engaged in making preparations for the siege; while the Spaniards, who had all withdrawn behind the Guadalaviv, were daily recruiting their numbers, and completing the arrangements for defence. Although, however, a great degree of enthusiasm prevailed among the people, yet nothing indicating a desperate resistance was attempted; and it was very evident that the Valencians, if shut up within their walls, would neither imitate the citizens of Numantium nor Saragossa. Meanwhile, Suchet on two occasions had defeated powerful bodies of guerillas under Duran and Campillo, who were infesting the rear of the army; and at length, the divisions of Severole and Reille having, by command of the emperor, been placed under his orders and reached his headquarters, he prepared, in the beginning of December, with a force now augmented to 33,000 men, to complete the conquest of Valencia; and for this purpose, pushed his advanced posts to the Guadalaviv, so that the river alone separated the hostile armies.†

By drawing considerable re-enforcements from the troops in Murcia, Blake had augmented his army to 22,000 men. He had broken down two out of the five stone bridges which crossed the river; the houses which commanded them on the south bank were occupied and loopholed; the city was surrounded by a circular wall thirty feet high and ten feet thick, but with a ditch and covered way only at the

gates. Around this wall, about a mile farther out, was the rampart of the intrenched camp, five miles round, which enclosed the whole city and suburbs, and was defended by an earthen rampart, the front of which was so steep as to require to be ascended by scaling-ladders, while a wet ditch ran along its front. But all history demonstrates that such preparations, how material soever to a brave and disciplined, are of little avail to a dejected or unwearied, array, if vigorously assailed by an enterprising enemy. In the night of the 25th of Decem-
ber, 200 French hussars crossed the river several miles above the town, opposite the village of Ribaroya, by swimming their horses across, and put to flight the Spanish outposts. The engineers immediately began the construction of two bridges of pontoons for the infantry and artillery; and with such expedition were the operations conducted and the troops moved across, that, before the Spaniards were well aware of their danger, or the movement which was in contemplation, Suchet himself, with the main body of his forces, and the whole of Reille's division, had not only crossed over, but, by a semicircular march, had got entirely round the Spanish intrenched camp, in such a manner as to cut off the retreat from the city towards Alicante and Murcia. It was precisely a repetition of the circular sweep by which Davoust, in 1805, had interposed between Ulm and Vienna, and cut off all chance of escape from its ill-fated garrison.* The French hussars fell in with the Spanish cavalry, hurrying out of the city to stop their advance at Aldaya, several miles round, and to the southwest of the intrenched camp. They were overpowered in the first encounter, and General Broussard made prisoner; but soon rallying, as fresh troops came up, they regained their lost ground, delivered their general, and pursued their march. At the same time, the better to conceal his real design, Suchet caused Palombini, with his division, to cross the river a little farther down, and make for Mislata and the westward of Valencia. The two divisions of Musnier and Habert, which were left on the other bank of the river, commenced a furious assault on the north of the intrenched camp. The roar of artillery was heard on all sides; the rattle of musketry seemed to envelop the city; and it was hard even for the most experienced general to say to which quarter succour required in the first instance to be conveyed.†

In the midst of all the tumult, however, the French marshal incessantly pressed on to the main object of his endeavours, which was to sweep round the whole southern side of the town, and interpose near the Lake Ar-
bufera, on the seacoast, between Blake's army and the line of retreat to Alicante. So anxious was he to effect this object, that he put himself at the head of Harispe's division, which formed the vanguard of the force which had crossed the river at Ribaroya, and, pressing constantly forward, overthrew all opposition, and never halted till he had reached the western margin of the lake, and had become entire master of the southern road. Meanwhile, the action continued with various success in other quarters; the leading brigades of Palombini's division, charged with the attack on Mislata, encountered

The Spaniards are defeated, and thrown back into Valencia. December 26.

* Suchet, ii., 180, 191. Tor., iv., 218, 221. Nap., iv., 285, 286. Vict. et Conq., 343, 349.

† Suchet, ii., 201, 213. Tor., iv., 269, 274. Vict. et Conq., xx., 351, 352. Nap., iv., 291.

* Ante, ii., 348.

† Suchet, ii., 210, 216. Tor., iv., 273, 274. Nap., iv., 296, 297. Vict. et Conq., xx., 553, 554.

so tremendous a fire from the Spanish infantry and redoubts that they fell back in utter confusion almost to the banks of the Guadalavivier; but without being diverted by this check, fresh battalions crossed over, and, following fast on the traces of Harispe, completed the sweep round the intrenched camp, and established the general-in-chief in such strength on its southern front, that he was in no danger of being cut off, and in condition to shift for himself. Deeming himself secure, Suchet at this critical moment ascended the steeple of the village of Chirivilla, to endeavour to ascertain by the line of smoke how the battle was proceeding in other quarters; and when there, he narrowly escaped being made prisoner by a Spanish battalion, which, in the general confusion, entered the village, then occupied only by a few horsemen and his own suite; and it was only by an impetuous charge of his aids-de-camp and personal attendants that the enemy, who were ignorant of the all-important prize within their grasp, were repulsed. General Habert, at the same time, not only drove the enemy from the northern bank, but throwing a bridge over the river, under cover of fifty pieces of cannon, below Valencia, passed over, amid a terrible fire of cannon and musketry, and pushed his advanced posts on till they met, near the northern end of the Lake of Albufera, those of Harispe, which had crossed above the town and completed its circuit on the southern side. Thus the investment of the place was completed; and so little had the victors suffered in this decisive operation, that their loss did not exceed five hundred men. That of the Spaniards was not much greater, though they abandoned eighteen guns to the enemy; but they sustained irreparable damage by having their army entirely dislocated, and the greater part of it shut up, without the chance of escape, in Valencia, whither Blake, with seventeen thousand men, had taken refuge. The remainder broke off from the main body, and, fortunately for the independence of the Peninsula, succeeded in reaching Alicante, though in straggling bands, to the number of above four thousand men. It is a signal proof of the contempt which the French general must have entertained for his opponents, that he thus ventured to spread his troops in a circular sweep of more than fifteen miles in length, with their flank exposed the whole way to the attacks of a concentrated enemy little inferior in number, in possession of an intrenched camp; and of the strong foundation for that contempt, that he succeeded in his design.*

The decisive effects of the investment of the intrenched camp and city of Valencia were speedily apparent. A few days after, Blake, at the head of fifteen thousand men, endeavoured to force his way out of the town by the left bank of the Guadalavivier; but though the column at first had some success, and drove in the enemy's advanced posts, yet Blake had not determination enough to enforce the only counsel which could extricate the troops from their perilous predicament; Lardizabal did not evince his usual energy in the advance; the advice of the heroic Zayas to press on at all hazards, sword in hand, was overruled; some difficulties at crossing the canals threw hesitation into the movements of the whole; and, after losing the precious minutes in vacillation,

the Spanish general returned on his footsteps to Valencia, while his advanced guard, to whom the order to return could not be communicated, got safe off to the mountains. A similar attempt was made, a few days after, on the road to Alicante, with no better success. Meanwhile, Suchet was commencing regular approaches; and on the night of the 5th, the Spanish general, despairing of defending the vast circuit of the intrenched camp with a depressed army and irresolute population, withdrew altogether from it, and retired into the city. The French, perceiving the retrograde movement, broke into the works, and pressed on the retreating enemy so hotly, that eighty pieces of heavy artillery, mounted on the redoubts, fell into their hands, and they immediately established themselves within twenty yards of the town wall. Rightly conjecturing that the resistance of the Spaniards would be more speedily subdued by the terrors of a bombardment than by breaching the rampart, Suchet immediately erected mortar batteries, and began to discharge bombs into the city. Blake at first refused to capitulate, when terms were offered by the French general. No preparations, however, had been made to stand a siege: the pavement had nowhere been lifted; no barricades were erected; there were no cellars or caves, as at Saragossa, for the besieged to retire into to avoid the fire; already some of the finest buildings in the city, particularly the noble libraries of the archbishop and University, had been reduced to ashes; and the impossibility of finding subsistence for a population of a hundred and fifty thousand souls besides the troops, as well as the desponding temper of the inhabitants, whose spirit was completely broken by the long train of disasters which had occurred in the east of Spain, soon convinced the Spanish general of the impossibility of holding out. After the bombardment had continued some days, therefore, and the town had been set on fire in different places, he proposed to capitulate. His terms, however, were sternly rejected; and he at length, finding the majority of the inhabitants adverse to any farther resistance, surrendered at discretion.*

By the capture of Valencia, the French general, in addition to the richest, most populous, and most important city of the Peninsula next to Cadiz, that remained still unsubdued, became master of sixteen thousand regular troops, the best in Spain, who were made prisoners, besides three hundred and ninety pieces of cannon, thirty thousand muskets, two thousand cavalry and artillery horses, twenty-one standards, and immense military stores of all kinds. Seldom has a greater blow been struck in modern war: it was like that delivered by the English when they stormed the fortress of Seringapatam. The Spanish army marched out on the 10th of January, and, having laid down their arms, were immediately sent off to France. The elements of resistance still existed in the province: Alicante was still unsubdued; no hostile troops had approached the plains of Murcia, and the mountain range which separated it from New Castile swarmed with active and resolute guerillas. But all unity of purpose, or regular government, was destroyed among the patriot bands by the fall of the capital: the desultory warfare gradu-

* Suchet, ii., 214, 223. Tor., iv., 271, 279. Nap., iv., 297, 300. Vict. et Conq., xx., 353, 356.

* Tor., iv., 279, 289. Suchet, ii., 225, 230. Vict. et Conq., xx., 356, 364. Nap., iv., 300, 302. Jem., iii., 530, 531.

ally died away, or was confined to the neighbourhood of the mountains; and the rich and beautiful plain of Valencia, the garden of Spain, the scene which poetic rapture sought in vain to enhance, with all its immense resources, fell entirely under the French power, and was immediately turned to the best account by the vigorous administration and oppressive impositions of Marshal Suchet. Order was completely preserved, discipline rigorously maintained; but all the most energetic characters, especially among the clergy, on the side of independence, nearly fifteen hundred in number, were arrested and sent to France, and some hundreds of them shot when unable, from fatigue, to travel farther; the perpetrators of the disgraceful murders which had stained the commencement of the war justly executed, while an enormous contribution brought into the imperial coffers all that was rescued from private rapacity. On the war-wasted city and province of Valencia, at the close of four oppressive and burdensome campaigns, the French marshal imposed a contribution of fifty millions of francs, or two millions sterling, equivalent to five or six millions on a small portion of England; and such was the skill which long experience had given the officers of the imperial army in extracting its utmost resources from the most exhausted country, that this enormous impost was brought, with very little deduction, into the public treasury.*

The subjugation of Valencia was soon after completed by the reduction of the little fort of Peniscola, which, after a short siege, capitulated, with seventy-four pieces of cannon and a thousand men, in the beginning of February. This conquest was of importance, as completing the pacification of the whole province, and clearing of all molestation the road from Tortosa. Encouraged by the easy reduction of this stronghold, Monbrun, with his cuirassiers and horse artillery, who had been detached, by Napoleon's orders, from Marmont's army to act against Valencia, presented himself before Alicante, and began to throw bombs from a few pieces into the town. This ludicrous attempt at a bombardment, however, only had the effect of accelerating the preparations for defence, which were now made in good earnest, and with such effect that the French general retired from before its walls towards Madrid, where his presence was loudly called for by the menacing attitude of the English on the Portuguese frontier. Alicante, meanwhile, daily beheld its defenders strengthened by the arrival of the broken bands who had escaped the wreck of Valencia; a powerful English force, some months afterward, from Sicily landed within its walls, and this city shared, with Cadiz and Carthagena, the glory of being the only Spanish cities which had never been sullied by the presence of the enemy.†

Justly desirous of giving a public mark of his high sense of the great services rendered to his empire by Marshal Suchet and his brave companions in arms, Napoleon, by a decree dated the moment that he received intelligence of the fall of Valencia, bestowed on the former the title of Duke of Albu-

fera, the scene of his last and most decisive triumph, with the rich domains attached to it in the kingdom of Valencia; on the latter an extraordinary donation of two hundred millions of francs, or £8,000,000 sterling. These immense funds were directed to be realized "from our extraordinary domain in Spain, and such parts thereof as are situated in the kingdom of Valencia," and afford a striking example of the system of extortion and spoliation which the emperor invariably put in force in all the territories which he conquered. But the hour of retribution had arrived: the English armies on the Portuguese frontier were about to commence their immortal career; Russia was preparing for the decisive conflict; and there remained only to Suchet and his descendants the barren title which bespoke the scene of his triumph and his glory.*

There is no passage in the later history of

Napoleon which is more worthy of study than the campaigns of Suchet, which have now been considered. Independent of the attention due to

the military actions of a general, whom that consummate commander has pronounced the greatest of his captains,† there is enough in the annals of his exploits to attract the notice and admiration even of the ordinary historian, who pretends to nothing but a general acquaintance with military affairs. In the other campaigns of the French generals, especially in later times, the interest felt in the individual commander is often weakened by the perception of the magnitude of the force at his disposal, or its obvious superiority in discipline and equipment to the enemy with which it had to contend; and the emperor himself, in particular, hardly ever took the field, from the time when he mounted the imperial throne till he was reduced to a painful defensive struggle in the plains of Champagne, but at the head of such a force as at once ensured victory and rendered opposition hopeless. But in the case of Suchet, equally with that of Napoleon himself in the Italian campaign of 1796, or the French one of 1814, no such disproportion of force existed: the resources of the contending parties were very nearly balanced, and it was in the superior fortitude and ability of the victorious general that the real secret of his success is to be found. If the imperial commander was at the head of a body of men superior in discipline, equipment, military prowess, and numbers, so far as real soldiers are concerned, to the Spanish generals, these advantages, how great soever, were compensated, and perhaps more than compensated, by the rugged and inaccessible fastnesses of which the greater part of Catalonia is composed, the absence of any practicable road through them, the number and strength of their fortified towns, the indomitable spirit and patriotic ardour of the inhabitants, and the vast resources at their command, from the vicinity of the sea and the succour of the English navy. No one who studies these campaigns can doubt that these circumstances counterbalanced the superior discipline and prowess of the French army in the field; that the issue of the contest thus came to be mainly dependant on the comparative talents of the two generals; and that, if their relative positions in this respect had been reversed, and Suchet had been at the head of the Spanish, and Campoverde or Blake of the

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 364, 365. Tor., iv., 288, 291. Suchet, ii., 231, 232.

† Suchet, ii., 234, 236. Tor., iv., 293. Vict. et Conq., xx., 366.

* Suchet, ii., 236. Vict. et Conq., xx., 366, 367

† Las Casas, ii., 11. O'Meara, i., 492.

French forces, the result would, in all probability, have been the entire defeat of the imperial power in the east of the Peninsula. And in the inexhaustible mental resources of the French general, his fortitude in difficulty, presence of mind in danger, and the admirable decision with which, in critical moments, he abandoned all minor considerations to concentrate his whole force on the main object of the campaign, is to be found the real secret of his glorious successes, as of all the most illustrious deeds recorded in history.

For the same reason, there is no period of the Peninsular war which an English historian feels so much pain in recounting as that of this gallant but abortive struggle in the east of Spain. When we reflect on the noble stand which the province of Catalonia, aided only by transient succours from Valencia, made against the armies of two French marshals, who numbered 70,000 admirable troops, in possession of the principal fortresses of the country, under their banners; when we recollect how equally the scales of fortune hung on several occasions, and with what decisive effect even a small re-enforcement of regular troops, happily thrown in, would unquestionably have had on the issue of the contest, it is not without the bitterest feelings of regret that we call to mind that, at that very moment, 12,000 English soldiers lay inactive in Sicily, an island effectually defended by our fleets alone from foreign invasion, and within only a few days' sail of the scene of conflict. Had half this force been landed in Catalonia previous to the siege of Tortosa, the French general would never have approached its walls. Had it been added to the defenders of the breaches of Taragona, the French grenadiers would have been hurled headlong from its ramparts. Had it even come up to the rescue under the towers of Saguntum, the imperial eagles would have retreated with shame from the invasion of Valencia, and the theatre of the first triumphs of Hannibal might have been that of the commencement of Napoleon's overthrow. If we recollect that the capture of Valencia in the east of Spain was contemporaneous with the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo in the west, and that the extinction of regular warfare in one part of the Peninsula occurred at the very moment when a career of decisive victories was commencing in another, it is difficult to over-estimate the importance to the general issue of the contest which would have arisen from such a happy addition of British succour as would have kept alive the conflagration in a quarter where it was already burning so fiercely, and prevented that concentration of the enemy's force against Wellington, in the close of 1812, which wellnigh wrested from him the whole fruits of the Salamanca campaign.

But it is still more painful to recollect that English succour was at hand when the last stronghold of Catalanian independence was torn by overwhelming force from the arms of freedom; that the warriors of the power which had seen the conquerors of Egypt and the fortunes of Napoleon recoil from the bastions of Acre, beheld secure from their ships the grenadiers of Suchet mount the breach of Taragona; and that, when the garrison of Saguntum saw their last hopes expire by the defeat of the army at their feet, British ships received by signal the intelligence, and the conquerors of Maida, within a few days' sail, might have snatched their

laurels from the victors. We have a mournful satisfaction in recounting the horrors of the Corunna retreat; we dwell with exultation on the carnage of Albuera; for that suffering was endured and that blood was shed in a noble cause, and England then worthily shared with her allies the dangers of the contest; but to relate that Taragona fell unaided when the English banners were in sight, that deeds of heroism were done, and England, though near, was not there, this is, indeed, humiliation, this is truly national dishonour. And under the influence of this feeling, it is not only without regret, but with a sense of justice which amounts to satisfaction, that the subsequent disgrace of the British arms before the walls of Taragona will be recounted; * for it was fitting that, on the one and only spot in the Peninsula where deeds unworthy of her name had been done, the one and only stain on her fame should be incurred.†

In truth, even a cursory record of the campaign of 1811 must be sufficient to convince every impartial observer that a political paralysis had, to a certain extent, come to affect the British government, and that the cabinet was far from being directed during that year by the firm and unshrinking hands which had hitherto held the reins. Nor is it difficult to discover to what cause this change is to be ascribed. The year 1811 was, as already noticed, one of extraordinary distress in England: the exports and imports, taken together, had sunk, as compared with the preceding year, no less than thirty-six millions; the revenue had declined by above two millions; while the universal and poignant distress among the manufacturing classes, in consequence of the simultaneous operation of the Continental system and the American Non-intercourse Act, rendered the contraction of any considerable loan, or the imposition of fresh taxes of any amount, a matter of extreme difficulty. Add to this the enormous expenditure consequent, in the beginning of the year and the close of the preceding one, on the vast accumulation of soldiers in the lines of Torres Vedras, and the unparalleled drain of specie which had taken place from the necessity of supplying the warlike multitude, which had not only wellnigh exhausted the treasure of the country, but necessarily crippled all active operations on the part of the English generals in the Peninsula.

But, notwithstanding the weight justly due to these circumstances, a more minute examination of the state of parties at that period will demonstrate that it was not to them alone, nor even chiefly, that the languid operations of the English on the east of Spain, during this momentous year, are to be ascribed. Wellington had clearly pointed out the important advantages

Causes of the weakness of the English government in 1811.

Insecure tenure of their offices the great cause of the inefficient aid of England in this campaign.

* Vide infra, c. lxxiii.

† These observations are made in a national view, and for national objects only. No reflection is intended either on the naval or military officers engaged, who had scarcely a land-force at their disposal adequate to the rude encounter which awaited them with the French veterans who crowded round the breach of Taragona, and who did offer, though in a desponding way, to put their force, slender as it was, at the disposal of the Spanish governor. The chief blame rests with the administration, who had not discernment enough in military affairs to see that Taragona was the vital point of the war in the east of Spain, and that the whole force we possessed in the Mediterranean should have been directed to its support.

‡ Ante, iv., 376.

which must accrue to the French from the fall of Valencia; both from the concentration of all their force against himself, which it would enable the imperial generals to make; the resources which would await Suchet, and could immediately be rendered available in the province; and the disinclination which the grandes at Cadiz, having estates in the east of Spain, would in consequence probably feel towards any farther prosecution of the war.* That the British ministry were fully alive to these considerations, and prepared to act upon them as soon as they felt themselves secure in their offices, is proved by the considerable expeditions which, when equally hard pressed for money, they sent to Alicante from Sicily in June, 1812;† and which, though not conducted with any remarkable ability, effectually stopped the progress of the French in the east of the Peninsula. The supineness with which, in the course of 1811, they permitted a much fairer opportunity of effecting this great object to escape, is to be ascribed chiefly to the insecure tenure by which they then held the reins of power, and the determined and impassioned resistance which the opposition, their probable successors, had invariably made to its continuance.‡ The prince regent, as already noticed,§ had assumed the reins of power, upon the incapacity of his father, in February, 1811; and though he had continued the ministers in their several offices, yet he had done so on the distinct explanation that he was actuated solely by a desire, while the reigning monarch had any chance of recovery, not to thwart his principles or choice of public servants; and it was well understood that, as soon as the restrictions expired in February, 1812, he would send for the Whig leaders, which, in point of fact, he immediately did. The knowledge of this precarious tenure of their power not only disheartened government from any fresh or extraordinary efforts in a cause which they had every reason to believe was so soon to be abandoned by the succeeding administration, but weakened to a most extraordinary degree their majority in the House of Commons, which, in general, during that interregnum, did not exceed twenty or thirty votes.¶

* "The loss of Valencia would be of great importance: the greater part of the grandes of Spain have estates in that province, upon the revenues of which they have subsisted since they have lost everything else elsewhere. It may be expected, therefore, that the loss of this kingdom will induce many to wish to submit to the French yoke. The probability that the fall of Valencia would immediately follow the loss of Taragona, was the cause of the ferment at Cadiz in the beginning of last summer. Though Blake has found no resources in that province, the French will find in Valencia the resources of money and provisions, of which they stand so much in need. This conquest will enable the enemy to concentrate their forces. Even if Suchet should be unable to press on farther to the south of Valencia, and Soult should be unable to communicate with him through Murcia, Suchet will be enabled to communicate by a former route that he formerly possessed with the armies of the centre and of Portugal; and his army will be disposable to support the armies of the north and Portugal opposed to us."—WELLINGTON TO THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL, 4th December, 1811, GURWOOD, viii., 421, 422.

† *Infra*, ch. lxiii.

‡ "The government are terribly afraid that I shall get them and myself into a scrape. But what can be expected from men who are beaten three times a week in the House of Commons? A great deal might be done if there existed in England less party and more public sentiment, and if there was any government."—WELLINGTON TO ADMIRAL BERKELEY, April 7, 1810, GURWOOD, vi., 21.

§ *Ante*, iv., 368.

¶ On the Regency question, on January 21, 1811—a vital question to ministers—the majority was only twenty-two in a remarkably full house of 402 members; and Mr. Vansittart's resolutions on the Bullion Report, a still more impor-

The opposition were so inveterate against the Spanish war, that not only did they declaim against it in the most violent manner on all occasions, both in and out of Parliament, but, if we may believe the contemporary authority of Berthier, actually corresponded during the most critical period of the contest with Napoleon himself, and furnished him with ample details on the situation of the English army, and the circumstances which would, in all likelihood, defeat its exertions.* It is not surprising that a ministry thus powerfully thwarted, destitute of any members versed in military combination, with a very scanty majority in Parliament, and no support farther than the cold assent of duty from the throne, should, during this critical year, have shrunk from the responsibility of implicating the nation, on a more extended scale, in a contest of doubtful issue even under the most favourable circumstances, which was, to all appearance, to be abandoned as hopeless by their successors.

And yet, so little can even the greatest sagacity or the strongest intellect foresee the ultimate results of human actions, and so strangely does Providence work out its mysterious designs by the intervention of free agents, and the passions often of a diametrically opposite tendency of mankind that, if there are any circumstances more than others to which the immediate catastrophe which occasioned the fall of Napoleon is to be ascribed, it is the unbroken triumphs of Suchet in the east, and the strenuous efforts of the English opposition to magnify the dangers and underrate the powers of Wellington in the west of the Peninsula. Being accustomed to measure the chances of success in a military contest by the achievements of the regular troops employed, and an entire stranger to the passions and actions of parties in a free community, he not unreasonably concluded, when the last army of Spain capitulated in Valencia, and the whole country, from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, had, with the exception of a few mountain districts, submitted to his authority, that the contest in the Peninsula was at an end, so far as the Spaniards were concerned; and when he beheld the party in Great Britain, who had all along denounced the war there as utterly hopeless, and irrational on

Surprising result of these circumstances on the ultimate fate of Napoleon.

tant division, only forty.—See *Parl. Deb.*, xviii., 973, and xx., 128.

* "L'intention bien formelle de l'empereur, est au mois de Septembre (1811) apres la récolte, de combiner un mouvement, avec l'armée du midi, un corps de l'armée du centre, et votre armée, pour culbuter les Anglais, et jusqu'à cette époque, que vous devez agir de manière qu'aucun corps ennemi ne puisse tenir la campagne. Nous sommes parfaitement instruits par les Anglais, et beaucoup mieux que vous ne l'êtes. L'empereur lit les journaux de Londres, et chaque jour un grand nombre des lettres de l'opposition, dont quelques-unes accusent Lord Wellington, et parlent en détail de vos opérations. L'Angleterre tremble pour son armée d'Espagne, et Lord Wellington a toujours été en grande crainte de vos opérations."—BERTHIER, Major-general, au Maréchal MASSÉNA, Prince d'Essling, Paris, 29 Mars, 1811. BELMAS, *Journal des Sièges dans la Péninsule*, i., 495, 496.

The "extempore correspondence" which is here stated to have gone on between Napoleon and the English opposition, took place in March, 1811; that is, when Masséna lay at Santarem and Wellington at Cartaxo, the most critical period of the campaign and the war. Notwithstanding the high authority on which the existence of this correspondence is asserted, it is impossible to believe that it took place with any of the leaders of the opposition; but it shows with what a spirit the party, generally speaking, must have been actuated on this subject, when any, even the lowest of their number, could, at such a moment, resort to communication with the mortal enemy of their country.

the part of this country, and some of whom, in their zeal against its continuance, and to demonstrate its absurdity, had actually corresponded with himself, even at the crisis of the contest, on the eve of getting possession of the reins of power in London, he was naturally led to believe that no cause for disquiet existed, in consequence of the future efforts of England in Spain. He was thus tempted to prosecute, without hesitation, his preparations for the Russian war; and, before finishing the conflict in the Peninsula, plunge into the perils of the Moscow campaign, and the double strain it was, as he has himself told us, which proved fatal to the Empire.* Had he been less successful in the east of Spain—had the English opposition less strenuously asserted the impolicy and hopelessness of British resistance in the west—he would

probably have cleared his rear before engaging with a new enemy in front. Neither could have withstood his whole force if directed against itself alone; and the concentration of all his military power against Wellington, in the first instance, would have chilled all hopes of success in Russia, and extinguished, perhaps forever, the hopes of European freedom. So manifestly does Supreme power make the passions and desires of men the instruments by which it carries into effect its inscrutable purposes, that the very events which vice most strenuously contends for are made the ultimate causes of its ruin; and those which virtue had most earnestly deprecated when they occurred, are afterward found to have been the unseen steps which led to its salvation.

CHAPTER LXII.

CAMPAIGN OF 1811 ON THE PORTUGUESE FRONTIER.

ARGUMENT.

Wellington's Reasons for undertaking the Siege of Badajoz. —Comparative View of the contending Forces at this Period. —Forces on the Side of the Allies, and on that of the French. —General Causes which led to Wellington's Success. —His central Position in the Peninsula. —Advantages which the English enjoyed from the Command of the navigable Rivers, and of the general Interruptions of the French Communications by the Guerillas. —Hatred of the French. —Its great Effect on the War. —Jealousy and Discord of the rival French Powers in the Peninsula. —Discord of the Marshals among each other. —Desperate Hostility produced by the Cruelty of the French. —Difference between the English Plunder and the French Exactions. —Dreadful Severity of the French Military Decrees. —General Partisan Resistance which this Oppression produced, and extraordinary Difficulties in which it involved the French. —Wellington's Difficulties. —Corruption and Imbecility of the Portuguese Administration. —Imbecility with which the Regency at Lisbon discharged their Duty. —Wretched Conduct of the Spanish Troops, and Jealousy of their Generals. —Extreme Penury of the English Army in Money during these Campaigns, and Wellington's Suffering from it. —Foundation for Wellington's Complaints on this Subject. —Uniform Neglect by the British of warlike Preparation in Time of Peace. —Universal Inexperience of inferior Functionaries. —Causes which led to these Obstacles to Wellington's Success. —The British Difficulties were the greatest in the Beginning: the French in the End. —Commencement of the first Siege of Badajoz. —Force of the opposing Armies at Albuera. —Description of the Field of Battle, and the French and English Position. —Battle of Albuera. —The French accumulate their Forces on the British Right, and force the Spanish Position. —Dreadful Disaster of the British Division which first got up. —Gallant Attempt to retrieve the Day by Houghton's Brigade. —The British at the Summit begin to fail. —Gallant Charge of the Fusilier Brigade recovers the Day. —Heroic Gallantry of the English Infantry. —Conclusion of the Battle. —Its Results. —Wellington arrives and takes the Command of the Siege of Badajoz. —Moral Results of the Battle. —Renewal of the Siege of Badajoz. —Second Assault on Christoval, which is repulsed. —Measures of Napoleon to raise the Siege. —His defensive Preparations through the whole of the North of Spain. —Wellington raises the Siege and retires into Portugal. —Entry of Marmont and Soult into Badajoz. —Wellington takes Post on the Caja. —Soult and Marmont decline fighting, and separate. —Operations of Blake and Ballasteros in Andalusia. —Fatal Rout of the Spaniards at Baza in Murcia. —Rise and rapid Progress of the Insurrection in the Northern Provinces. —Operations of the Insurgents in them. —Napoleon's new Dispositions in Spain. —Wellington's Movement to the North of Portu-

gal. —Defeat of the Galicians on the Esla. —Wellington's Measures for the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. —Grounds of Hope for a successful Enterprise against that Fortress. —Project of Napoleon for invading the Alentejo by Soult and Marmont. —Wellington turns the Siege into a Blockade. —French approach to raise the Siege. —Approach of the two Armies to Ciudad Rodrigo, which is reinvited. —Combat of Elbodon. —Heroic Steadiness of Colville's Brigade. —Imminent Danger of the British Army at Fuente Guinaldo. —Both Armies go into Cantonments. —Courtesy shown on both Sides during these Operations. —Reoccupation of Asturias by Bonnet, and Concentration of the French Forces at Valladolid and Burgos. —Surprise of Gerard at Aroyos di Molinos. —Total Defeat of the French. —Improvement of the Health of the British Army in their Cantonments. —French Expedition against Tarifa, which fails. —Second Expedition against, and Siege of, Tarifa. —Defeat of the Assault, and Raising of the Siege. —General Results of the Campaign. —The British Government and Army learn their own Deficiencies during its Progress. —Napoleon's real Intentions at this Period in regard to the War in Portugal.

WHEN the retreat of Massena from Torres Vedras had delivered the realm protected by Wellington from the imperial yoke, and the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro had destroyed his hopes of retaining a permanent footing within the Portuguese frontier,* Wellington's eyes were immediately turned towards Badajoz, the loss of which he justly considered as not only perpetually endangering the west of the Peninsula, but as by far the greatest calamity which had happened to the allies since Napoleon had taken Madrid. For, though not belonging to the first rank, either from wealth or population, this renowned fortress was of the very highest importance, from its great strength and important situation on the Estremadura frontier—at once forming a base for the operations of an invading army, which should threaten Lisbon on its most defenceless side, that of the Alentejo, and the strongest link in the iron girdle which was to restrain Wellington from pushing his incursions into the Spanish territory. While Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz remained in the enemy's hands, it was equally impossible for Wellington to feel any confidence in the safety of Portugal, or undertake any serious enterprise for the deliverance of Spain. The vast importance of fortresses in war, overlooked or forgotten amid the unparalleled multitudes who overspread the plains of Europe

* "Cette malheureuse guerre d'Espagne," said Napoleon, "a été une véritable plaie; la cause première des malheurs de la France. L'Angleterre s'est fait une armée dans la Péninsule, et de là elle est devenue l'argent victorieux, le nœud redoutable de toutes les intrigues, qui ne se forment sur le Continent—C'est se qui m'a perdu."—LAS CASAS, iv., 205.

* Ante, iii., 356, 357.

during the latter years of the Revolutionary war, was fully appreciated and clearly expressed by the greatest masters in the art of war it produced—Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington.*

As the first siege of Badajoz by the English, and its immediate consequence, the battle of Albuera, are the true commencement of the deliverance of the Peninsula, and of that surprising series of victories by which the French were, in two campaigns, stripped of all their conquests in Spain, and driven across the Pyrenees by an army which could not bring a third of their disposable forces into the field, it is of the highest importance to obtain a clear conception of the relative position of the contending parties at this eventful period, and of the causes which contributed to the production of so extraordinary an event.

The British and Portuguese forces in Portugal, nominally above eighty thousand strong, could seldom (from the extremely reduced state of the Portuguese regiments after the French retreat from Torres Vedras, and the vast number of English sick who encumbered the hospitals—the result chiefly of the invariable unhealthiness of fresh regiments when first taking the field, and of the seeds of permanent disease which many of them brought with them from the Walcheren marshes) number above fifty thousand men fit for actual service. The strong bond of patriotism which had, during the invasion of their country, held the Portuguese troops to their standards, had been sensibly weakened since the last French columns had receded from their frontiers; and though the extraordinary fatigues of the pursuit did not at the time disable a large proportion of the troops, yet when they were over, and stationary habits began to coexist with hot weather, the number of sick became so excessive, that in the beginning of October, 1811, above twenty-five thousand British and Portuguese troops were in hospital, of whom upward of nineteen thousand were English soldiers. And such was the desertion or sickness among the Portuguese at the commencement of Wellington's offensive campaign, that, while thirty thousand stood on the rolls of the regiments for British pay, not more than fourteen thousand could be collected around the standards of the English general.†

On the other hand, the French force at that period in the Peninsula amounted to the enormous number of three hundred and seventy thousand men, of whom forty thousand were cavalry; and of this number two hundred and eighty thousand were present with the eagles. A considerable part of this im-

mense host, indeed, was actively engaged under Macdonald and Suchet in Catalonia, or was necessarily absorbed in keeping up the vast line of communication from the Pyrenees to Cadiz; but still the disposable amount of the troops which could be brought into the field from the three armies of the North, of Portugal, and of the South, were nearly triple those which the English general could command, and they seemed to render any offensive operation on his part utterly hopeless. Soult's forces, in Andalusia and the southern part of Estremadura, on the 1st of October, were eighty-eight thousand men, including ten thousand cavalry, of whom sixty-seven thousand were present with the eagles: Marmont, in Leon, had sixty-one thousand under his banners, of whom above forty-one thousand infantry and ten thousand horse were in the field; Joseph, in the centre, had twenty-two thousand French troops, of whom seventeen thousand could take the field, besides nearly an equal number of Spaniards around Madrid, the greater part of whom could, in case of need, be joined to the columns of Marmont; while the army of the North, under Marshal Bessières, and subsequently General Caffarelli, amounted to the enormous number of a hundred and two thousand men, of whom seventy-seven thousand foot and eleven thousand horse were present with the eagles. In addition to this, re-enforcements to the amount of eighteen thousand men were on their march, who actually entered Navarre in August and September of this year; so that the united force to which the British were opposed, in the autumn of 1811, was not less than two hundred and forty thousand men actually in the field.* Supposing a hundred thousand of this immense force to have been absorbed in guarding the fortresses and keeping up the communications, which probably was the case, there would have remained a hundred and forty thousand men, who, by a combined effort, might have been brought to bear against Wellington without relinquishing any other part of Spain, or nearly triple the force which he could by possibility oppose to them.† And these were not raw conscripts or inferior troops, but the very flower of the imperial legions, led by the best marshals of the Empire, comprising that intermixture of the steadiness of veterans with the fire of young troops, which, it is well known, is most favourable to military success, and who proved themselves capable, at Albuera, Badajoz, and Salamanca, of the most heroic exploits.‡

When the magnitude and composition of this force are taken into consideration, General causes which led to the entire extinction of any regular Spanish force in the provinces which it

* Viz., present with the eagles :

Soult	67,000
Marmont	51,000
Joseph	17,000
Bessières	88,000
Re-enforcements	17,000
	240,000

† This calculation coincides with that of Soult, made at the time in a letter to Joseph, even after twenty thousand men had been lost to France by the battle of Salamanca. "If your majesty should collect the army of Arragon, the army of Portugal, and that of the centre, and march upon Andalusia, 120,000 men will be close to Portugal." This was, without any part of the immense army of the north, full sixty thousand strong, of whom thirty thousand at least were disposable.—SOUULT to JOSEPH, August 19, 1812, taken at Vittoria. See NAP., v., 236.

‡ Imperial Muster Rolls. Nap., iv., 588, 589, taken at Vittoria. Wellington to Lord Liverpool, July 18, 1811, Gurw., viii., 109, 112. § See note B, Appendix.

* "The loss of Badajoz I consider as by far the greatest misfortune which has befallen us since the commencement of the Peninsular war."—WELLINGTON.

† "Had it not been for the fortresses in Flanders," says Napoleon, "the reverses of Louis XIV. would have occasioned the fall of Paris. The Prince Eugene of Savoy lost a campaign in besieging Lille: the siege of Landrecy gave occasion to Villars to bring about a change of fortune: a hundred years after, in 1793, at the time of the treason of Dumourier, the strong places of Flanders again saved Paris: the allies lost a campaign in taking Conde, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and Landrecy: that line of fortresses was equally useful in 1814; and in 1815, if they had been in a condition of defence, and not affected by the political events at Paris, they could have stopped till the German armies came up, the Anglo-Prussian army on the banks of the Somme."—NAPOLEON. *Memoirs* in MONTHOLON, i., 292.

‡ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, July 18, 1811. Gurw., viii., 111. § See note A, Appendix.—NAP., iv., 586.

occupied, no serious diversion was to be expected from their exertions, whatever partial annoyance the guerilla parties might occasion—when we call to mind that all the fortresses in the kingdom, with the exception of Cadiz and Alicante, were in the possession of the French generals; that the whole resources of the country were in their hands, and levied with merciless severity for the use of the troops, who were thus entirely taken off the imperial treasury; and that the whole conflict was under the immediate direction of a ruler unparalleled in the ability with which he always brought his vast resources to bear on the vital point of the campaign—it becomes an object of the highest interest to inquire how it was that the British were in a condition to maintain their ground at all in the Peninsula against such overwhelming multitudes; and still more, how it happened that, laying aside the defensive, they were enabled to dislodge this vast array from the whole strongholds of the country, and finally to drive them, like chaff before the wind, over the Pyrenees into the south of France. Such an inquiry cannot be satisfactorily answered by merely referring to the military talents of Wellington and the extraordinary gallantry of his followers; for, granting their full weight to these certainly most important elements in the contest, they could not effect an impossibility, which the discomfiture of such a host by so small a body of assailants would at first sight appear. Experience, as Wellington himself remarked, has “never, at least in later times, realized the stories which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons;” and even the most sincere believer in the direction of human affairs by a Supreme Power cannot doubt that, humanly speaking, there is much truth in the assertion of Moreau, that “Providence favours the strong battalions.” There must, it is evident, have been some causes, in addition to the bravery of the English troops, which brought about this marvellous deliverance; and it is in their discovery that the great usefulness and highest aim of history are to be found. Such an inquiry can form no deduction from the merits of the British hero: on the contrary, it will lead to their highest exaltation; for no great revolutions in human affairs can be brought about but by the concurring operation of many general causes; and it is in the perception of the incipient operations of these causes, when hidden from the ordinary eye, and contrary to those operating on the surface, and their steady direction to noble purposes, that the highest effort of military or political intellect is to be found.

I. The first circumstance which gave an advantage to Wellington, and compensated in some degree the vast superiority of the enemy's force, was his central situation, midway between the widely-scattered stations of the French generals, and the powerful citadel, stored with all the muniments of war, and resting on that true base of British military operation, the sea, which lay in his rear. Grouped at the distance of two hundred miles from the ocean, on either bank of the Tagus, with a secure retreat by converging lines to the strong position of Torres Vedras, ascertained, by dear-bought experience, to be all but impregnable, the English troops were in a situation to threaten either Ciudad Rodrigo and the forces of Marmont in the north, or Badajoz and the vanguard of Soult in the southern parts of the Pen-

insula. At the time when they were most widely severed from each other, the forces of Beresford or Hill in Estremadura, and Wellington himself in Beira or on the Agueda, were not distant by more than sixty or seventy miles, and could, if hard pressed, unite in a few days; whereas the French troops, after the occupation of Andalusia, were scattered over an immense line, more than five hundred miles in length, from the mountains of Asturias to the ramparts of Cadiz, and nearly two months must elapse before they could combine in any common operations. The force under Marmont, immediately in front of Wellington, was not superior to his own army in strength; and its means of obtaining subsistence, and keeping considerable bodies of men together, were, from the desert nature of the plains of Leon, much inferior: thus, by uniting with Beresford on the south of the Tagus, or calling him to his own standard on the north, he had a fair chance of striking a serious blow before the distant succour could be collected to avert it from the banks of the Douro or the Guadalquivir. It was by a similar advantage of a central position between his widely-separated enemies, that Frederic the Great so long resisted, on the sands of Prussia, the distant armies of Austria and Russia converging from the Vistula and the Elbe, that Napoleon, on the banks of the Adige and in the plains of Champagne, so successfully warded off the redoubtable blows prepared for him by the slow tenacity of the Austrian councils; and that the Consul Nero, in the second Punic war, effected the deliverance of Italy, and changed the fate of the world, by taking advantage of the interior line of communication which separated the forces of Hannibal in Apulia from those of his brother Hasdrubal on the banks of the Po.*

II. The circumstances of the British armies in respect of supplies afforded another advantage to the English general, of which he did not fail to avail himself, and in regard to which he was much more favourably situated than his antagonist. The country from Madrid to the Portuguese frontier, and especially towards the Alentejo, was reduced by the devastations and grinding contributions of the French armies to an almost continuous desert; the peasants had, for the most part, abandoned their possessions, and joined the guerilla parties, with which all the mountain ridges abounded,† deeming it better to plunder others than be plundered themselves; and to such a pitch had their penury arisen, that the imperial generals were, in all the provinces, under the necessity of sending to France, in the spring of 1811, for seed-corn, to prevent agriculture from becoming altogether extinct.‡ The consequence

Advantages of the English from the command of the navigable rivers.

* See note C, Appendix.

† “The whole country between Madrid and the Alentejo is now a desert, and a still smaller proportion of land than before has been cultivated this winter. The argument of the people of the country is, that it is better to rob than to sow and have the produce of their harvests taken from them; and the French begin to find that they cannot keep their large armies together for any operation which will take time, and that, when we can reach them, they can do nothing with small bodies.”—WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL, 4th December, 1811, GURWOOD, viii., 422.

‡ “Famine had made such ravages over the whole Peninsula in the winter of 1812, that grain was wanting to sow the ground; and the generals-in-chief in Andalusia, La Mancha, Catalonia, and Old Castile, wrote to Berthier to request him to forward seed-corn from France.”—BELMAS, *Journ. des Sièges dans la Péninsule*, i., 223.

was, that the French armies, approaching the Portuguese frontier either from the south or the north, were unable to keep together in large bodies for any considerable time; and, whether the object for which they were assembled had failed or been accomplished, they were equally compelled to separate into distant and widely-separated provinces, to seek the means of subsistence. They were thus continually experiencing the truth of Henry the Fourth's saying, "that in Spain, if you make war with a small force you are beaten, with a large one, starved."* On the other hand, although Wellington experienced nearly the same difficulties, so far as the resources of the country were concerned, yet he had means of overcoming them which the enemy did not enjoy: of specie, indeed, he often had little or none; but the credit of the country, his own strenuous exertions, and the efforts of government, went far to obviate this great disadvantage. Not only was the wealth of England applied with lavish, though sometimes misguided prodigality, to the support of his army, and supplies of all sorts brought, by every wind that blew, to the harbour of Lisbon—although the extraordinary difficulty of procuring specie from England, or the means of transport in the country, often exposed him to extreme difficulties on the Spanish frontier—but the great rivers of the Douro, the Mondego, and the Tagus, gave him the inestimable advantage of *water-carriage* to a considerable distance in the interior. The former of these rivers was navigable for boats of a considerable burden to within eighty, the Mondego to within a hundred miles of the frontier on the Agueda; and Wellington took measures, which came into operation in March, 1812, which rendered the Douro navigable as far as its junction with that lesser stream. This was an immense advantage, especially when the attack of fortified places was to be undertaken on the Portuguese frontier; for the French principal magazines were on the Douro and the Tormes, and their battering-train and stores required to be brought from Madrid or Bayonne, the former of which was above two, the latter more than three hundred and fifty miles from the scene of action; whereas the stores of the English, even when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz, had only to be conveyed a hundred miles by land-carriage, not half the distance. It was, in a great measure, from a consideration of this advantage, that Wellington, in December, 1811, wrote to Lord Liverpool:† "Our situation is improving, and, whatever may be the fate of Valencia, if

the Spanish nation hold out, I think they may yet be saved."

III. The French generals, following out the established imperial system of making war maintain war, and wrenching the whole expenses of the troops out of the provinces which they occupied, had inflamed immensely the general irritation felt at their authority; and the misery and despair which their exactions produced had augmented, to a fearful degree, the guerilla bands over the whole country. We have the authority of Mariano d'Orquija, home secretary to Joseph, for saying, that the great increase of the guerilla parties, especially in Leon, Navarre, and the two Castiles, in the years 1810, 1811, and 1812, arose from the establishment of provincial governments, and the innumerable acts of extortion practised on the inhabitants by the French military authorities.* This mode of providing for themselves was reduced to a perfect system by the imperial generals; a fixed sum was imposed on the inhabitants, and levied from them with merciless severity by military execution; and to such a degree of perfection had long practice brought the French troops in this oppressive art, that they contrived to subsist, and levy all the resources which they required, out of districts which any other army would have considered as absolutely exhausted. The soldiers were everywhere trained themselves to reap the standing corn, and grind it, by portable mills, into flour; if green, they mowed it down with equal dexterity for their horses; if reaped, they forced it from the peasants' place of concealment, by placing the bayonet to their throats. In this way they were, to a very late period of the war, when the general ruin of agriculture forced them to rely, in some degree, on magazines, entirely relieved from all care about communications or supplies, which to the English general, who paid for everything that was consumed by or required for his troops, often proved a matter of excessive difficulty.†

But, on the other hand, they paid dearly for this advantage, in the unbounded exasperation which they excited among the whole rural population, and the universal partisan warfare which they aroused in the flanks and rear of every considerable detachment. The consequence was,

Hatred of the French. Its great effects on the war.

* "His majesty could cite a crowd of instances of oppression which have exasperated the minds of the inhabitants, furnished arms to the insurrection, and given the English grounds for supposing projects which really did not exist, and rendering the war interminable. Let the number of brigands and insurgents in Spain be counted, and it will at once be seen how much they have increased since the institution of the military governments. It is the decree of 8th February, 1810, establishing military governments in Navarre, Biscay, Arragon, and Catalonia, that is the real cause of the war still continuing, and the flames of discord having again arisen up after they seemed extinguished."

† The Minister of State, D'ORQUIJA, to the DUKE DE SANTA FE, Madrid, 12th Sept., 1810, taken at Vittoria. See NAPIER, iv., 517, 523.

† Nap., v., 147, and Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 21, 1812, Gurw., ix., 298.

‡ "The army of Portugal," said Wellington, "has been surrounded for the last six weeks, and scarcely even a letter reaches its commanders; but the system of organized rapine and plunder, and the extraordinary discipline so long established in the French armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the country in which it has been placed; and I am not certain that Marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater quantity of provisions and supplies of every kind than we have from Lisbon."—WELLINGTON to LORD BATHURST, 21st July, 1812, Gurwood, ix., 298.

* "Such was the destitution of the country," says Marmont, "on the Portuguese frontier, that in April, 1811, the army of Portugal lost its whole artillery and great part of its cavalry horses in six days, between the Coa and the Agueda, of absolute famine. I arrived at the headquarters of the army of the North in January last. I did not find a single grain of corn in the magazine, not a sou in the military chest; nothing anywhere but debts, and a real or factitious scarcity, of which it is hardly possible to form an idea, the natural result of the absurd system of administration which had been adopted. Provisions, even for each day's consumption, could be obtained only by arms in our hands: there is a wide difference between that state and the possession of magazines which can enable an army to move. On the other hand, the English army is always united and disposable, because it is supplied with money and the means of transport. Seven or eight thousand mules are employed in the transport of its means of subsistence. The hay which the English cavalry consumes on the banks of the Coa and the Agueda comes from England."—MARMONT to BERTHIER, 26th Feb., 1812. BELMAS, *Journ. des Sièges dans la Péninsule*, i., 629, 632. *Précis Just.*

† Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 5, 1811, Gurw., viii., 421, 422. Nap., iv., 365.

not merely that guerilla chiefs sprung up in every quarter where the shelter of mountains rendered pursuit difficult, and under Mina and Duran in Navarre, the Empecinado in the Guadalupe Mountains, the curate Merino in Leon, and Il Pastore on the coast of Biscay, kept alive the war, and did incredible mischief to detached bodies of the enemy; but smaller bodies, called *Partidas*, hovered everywhere round their flanks and rear, and almost entirely obstructed their communication with each other. On the other hand, the regularity with which the English always paid for all the supplies required for their army, rendered them so popular with the rural population, that they brought information and intercepted letters with incredible diligence and rapidity to headquarters, and kept the British general always as well informed of his adversaries' movements as they were ignorant of his. Thus Wellington, from his central position on the Portuguese frontier, was enabled to select his own time and place for an attack. His preparations were, to a surprising degree, unknown to the enemy, who, as already more than once remarked, had seldom any means of communicating with each other; and not unfrequently a serious blow was struck before they were even aware that preparations for it were going forward.*

IV. The strange and impolitic division of the government of Spain which Napoleon had made, rendered it absolutely impossible that anything approaching to a regular or united plan of operations could be carried on against an enemy. Not only was the central dominion of the crown at Madrid set at naught by the authority of the emperor, who, from Paris, overruled and directed all the military operations, and yet left to the phantom king the shadow of power and the reality of responsibility; but all possibility of a cordial union between him and his lieutenants was destroyed by the unexampled, and, to a sovereign, highly grating distribution of the resources of the country which the emperor had established between them. The whole revenues of the provinces were assigned to the French generals, with all the contributions which, by the most rigorous military execution, they could extract from the wretched inhabitants; while the king in the capital was left with the burden of a court, the expenses of which he had no means of defraying except the pension of a million of francs (£40,000) a month which he received from France; and even that was, in the later stages of the contest, exclusively devoted to the payment of the troops, leaving the king himself utterly destitute. The consequence was, that the monarch and his court were reduced to such straits, that the royal councillors were seen begging their bread from door to door. Joseph himself was compelled to pawn his plate to raise the money required to purchase the necessaries of life; and Marshal Jourdan, major-general of the armies, after borrowing till his credit was exhausted, could with difficulty procure common subsistence.† Such

being the state of the court of Madrid, it is not surprising that the most bitter animosity should have prevailed between the king and the marshals in the provinces, who seemed placed there only to usurp his authority and intercept his revenue. His letters to Napoleon, during the whole of his reign, are, accordingly, filled not only with the bitterest complaints of his own sufferings, but with positive accusations of treason against his lieutenants, especially Soult, whom he openly charged with aspiring to the throne of Andalusia.* But it was all in vain. The power of the sword was irrevocably vested in these rigorous taskmasters; and when Joseph, on one occasion, in desperation, laid his hands on a large magazine of corn collected near Toledo, Marmont immediately sent troops, who recovered the magazine by force, telling the owners of the grain they might apply to the monarch for their payment.†

Nor was it only with the King of Spain that the French marshals, wielding the whole military power of the country, were then at variance. There was no cordial union or co-operation among themselves, and they wanted that indispensable preliminary to military operations, unity of design, and implicit obedience among the commanders employed. Each accustomed to regal state and authority in his own province, and looking to the Tuileries only for the instructions he was to obey, felt his vanity mortified, and his consequence lessened, when he was called upon to act in obedience to, or even to co-operate on equal terms with, any of his brother marshals. To such a height did this discord rise, that Ney was put under arrest by Massena, during the retreat from Portugal, for direct disobedience of orders; and no subsequent military operation of length was undertaken by any two of the marshals jointly till the victories of Wellington forced them into one, still disunited, mass after the battle of Salamanca. Soult remained in Andalusia, living in regal magnificence on the banks of the Guadalquivir, and deeply engaged in great designs for that province, from which he was only occasionally diverted by the advances of the British in Estremadura. Bessières, openly condemning both the retention of Badajoz and the siege of Cadiz, found himself so occupied with the protection of the great communication in the north, from the increasing vigour of the Biscay and Navarre guerillas, as to be able to lend only a casual aid to the army of Portugal; while Marmont, at the head of

cannot, in fine, be at once King of Spain and general of the French. Let me resign, and live peaceably in France. The Marquis Cavailles, a councillor of state and minister of justice, has been seen actually begging for a piece of bread."—JOSEPH TO NAPOLEON, April 11, 1813, taken at Vittoria. NAPIER, v., 444, 445.

* See confidential letter of the DUKE DE FELTRE to JOSEPH, Paris, 10th November, 1812; and COLONEL DESPERS to JOSEPH, 22d September, 1812, taken at Vittoria. NAPIER, v., Nos. 5 and 6, Appendix; and v., 197, text.

† Nap., iv., 347.

‡ "All the world is aware of the vicious system of our operations; every one sees that we are too much scattered. We occupy too wide an extent of country; we exhaust our resources without profit and without necessity; we cling to dreams. Cadiz and Badajoz will swallow up all our resources: Cadiz, because it will not be taken; Badajoz, because it can only be supported by an army. The only safe course would be to destroy the one, and abandon, for the moment, all thought of the other. We should concentrate our forces; retain certain points d'appui for the protection of our magazines and hospitals; and regard two thirds of Spain as a vast battle-field, which a single victory may either secure to or wrest from us, until we have changed our whole system, and seriously set about pacifying and conquering the country. We have not a man on the coast, from Roussillon

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 4, 1811, Gurw., viii., 422.

† Nap., v., 445.

‡ "I am in such distress," said Joseph, "as never king was before. My plate is sold—my ministers and household are actually starving—misery is in every face, and men otherwise willing are deterred from joining a king so little able to support them—my revenue is seized by the generals for the supply of their troops. I cannot, as a king of Spain, without dishonour, partake of the resources thus torn by rapine from my subjects, whom I have sworn to protect."

that force, found himself immediately exposed to the attacks of Wellington without any cordial support either from the army of the centre in his rear, or the distant columns of Soult or Bessières on either flank. When the English general assumed the offensive and the period of disaster began, the French commanders mutually laid the blame on each other: Joseph loudly accused them of selfish regard to their separate interests; while Napoleon, who could ill brook reverses of any kind, thundered out his censure in such cutting terms from the Tuileries or Russia against them all, as made the greater number of them tender their resignations, and gave rise to a constant and rapid change of commanders on the exposed frontier at the most critical period of the war. Each marshal was solicitous chiefly for the protection of his own province, with the safety of which he was intrusted, and in which the foundations of his fortune were laid; and when the king applied to either for succour, the answer he got from Soult or Suchet was, that he should come to Seville or Valencia, but that they could spare no aid to him. Wellington, on the other hand, though at the head of far inferior forces, singly commanded them all. Experience had taught him the impracticability of any co-operation with the wretched armies of Spain; and, relying on his own British and Portuguese alone, he trusted, by unity of operation and the advantages of a central position, to obtain advantages over forces in number triple his own, but disseminated over an immense surface, and disjointed by separate interests and variety of direction.*

V. But, beyond all doubt, the most powerful ally which Wellington had in the prosecution of his operations against the French generals in the Peninsula, was to be found in the oppressive manner in which they were constrained by Napoleon to carry on the war, and the incredible excesses of cruelty to which they had recourse to maintain their soldiers, and repress the hostility which the exactions, which were everywhere going forward, had excited in all the provinces. When it is recollected, indeed, that nearly four hundred thousand French soldiers were permanently quartered on the Spanish territory, and had been so now for three years; that, during the whole of that time, this immense body had been paid, fed, clothed, and lodged at the expense of the conquered districts, who had already been exhausted by the contributions of their own troops and guerillas, and devastated by all the horrors of war during four successive campaigns, it becomes rather a matter of astonishment how they contrived to extract anything at all, in the end, from a country so long exposed to such devastations, than that their rapine could be levied only by the last atrocities of military execution. As it was, however, the systematic rigour and cruelty with which they enforced their exactions were as unparalleled in modern warfare as their enormous amount was unexampled. It

to Barcelona: Valencia is the centre of all the insurgents of the north and centre, and still we are besieging Cadiz." —BESSIÈRES to BERTHIER, 6th June, 1811. BELMAS, Appendix, No. 73, vol. i.

These views were highly displeasing to Napoleon, who a few months after superseded Bessières in the command of the army of the North; but they were far sounder than the emperor's own, and he lost the Peninsula by not following them.

* See *Pièces Just.* in BELMAS, *Journaux des Sièges*, i., 530-657.

has been already noticed that, by his own admission, Suchet, whose civil administration was incomparably the least oppressive of any of the French generals in the Peninsula, contrived to extract eight millions of francs annually from the war-wasted province of Arragon, or more than double what it had yielded in the most flourishing days of the monarchy,* and that two millions sterling were at once levied from the small province of Valencia; and, judging of the comparative weight of his requisitions, and those made by others, from the flourishing aspect and general submission of his province compared with the wasted features and fierce resistance which were everywhere else exhibited, we may safely conclude that his exactions were not half of what were elsewhere experienced. It was this oppressive system of military contributions which was adopted by the French, and invariably acted upon from the very outset of the Revolutionary war; and not the passing devastations of the soldiers, that was the principal evil which provoked so universal a spirit of hostility to their government.

The English soldiers, at times, plundered just as much as their opponents, and Differences between the English plunder society from which they were drawn, they were on such occasions more brutal in their disorders than the French; but there was this difference between the two, and it was a vital one to the inhabitants of the conquered countries: the English plunder was merely the unauthorized work of the common men, and was invariably repressed when order was restored by the officers, the whole supplies for the troops being paid with perfect regularity from the public funds of government; whereas the French exactions were the result of a systematic method of providing for their armies, enjoined by express command upon all the imperial generals, and forming the groundwork of the whole military policy of Napoleon. In the case of the former, when discipline was restored all military oppression ceased, and the presence of the army was felt only in the quickened sale for every species of produce which the inhabitants enjoyed, and the immense circulation of money which took place: in that of the latter, the more thoroughly that military subordination was established, the greater was the misery which prevailed around the soldiers' cantonments, from the greater perfection which the system of methodical robbery had attained. And this difference appeared in the clearest manner when they respectively quitted the countries which they had long occupied. When Soult abandoned Andalusia, of which he had enjoyed the whole resources for three years, such was the universal destitution which prevailed, though the country was the richest in Spain, and had not seen any serious invasion during that time, that the French armies of the south, the centre, and Portugal, had received no pay for one, the civil servants none for two years;† whereas the wealth which had been poured into Portugal during the same period was so enormous, that it had far more than counterbalanced all the devastations of Massena's invasion, and all the sacrifices of the long-protracted contest.‡

* *Ante*, iii., 414. Suchet, i., 280-286.

† Nap., v., 280

‡ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Nov. 3, 1810, *Gurw.*, vi., 552, and vii., 188.

§ "The French discipline is founded upon the strength

But, oppressive as were the exactions of the French armies, the severity of the military executions by which they were levied, and the infamous cruelty of the imperial decrees by which it was attempted to suppress the insurrections to which they gave rise, were still more instrumental in producing the general and increasing hostility to their authority which characterized the later years of the war. Not only did Soult, Aug. 13, 1810.

Andalusia, issue and act upon a proclamation, directing "no quarter to be given to any of the Spanish armies or armed bands, and all the villages where any resistance was attempted, to be delivered to the flames,"* but Augereau, in Catalonia, announced "that every man taken with arms in his hands should be hung, without any form of process, by the highway; every house from which resistance was made should be burned, and every inhabitant in it put to the sword;"† and Bessières, in the north, issued and enforced decrees unparalleled, it is to be hoped, in modern warfare, for the cold-blooded atrocity in which they are conceived. By the first of these it is declared that "the clergy, alcaldes, curés, and justices of every village, shall be responsible for the exact payment of the contributions, and the furnishing the whole requisitions ordered by the military authorities. Every village which shall not immediately execute the orders which it has received, or furnish the supplies ordered, shall be delivered over to military execution; and every individual convicted of stimulating the people to withstand or delay obedience to the French orders for furnishings and requisitions, shall be forthwith delivered over to a military commission;"‡ while by the second it was announced that "*the fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, children, and nephews* of all individuals who have quitted their domiciles, and do not inhabit the villages occupied by the French, shall be held responsible, *in their persons and effects*, for all acts of violence committed by the insurgents; that if any inhabitant is carried off from his domicile, three of the nearest relations of *some brigand* shall be arrested as hostages, and shot if the individual is put to death; that every person who shall be absent eight days without permission shall be considered as a brigand, and his relations proceeded against in terms of this decree; that every person not provided with a *carte de sûreté* shall be immediately sent to prison; every one found corresponding with the insurgents put to death; and every one writing to the inhabitants of a country occupied by them, sentenced to ten years' imprisonment."§ It was reserved for the armies of a power which began the contest with the cry of war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and professed the most unbounded philanthropy, especially for the poor, to push, in the nineteenth century, the responsibility for alleged transgressions beyond the utmost limits assigned

to them by the jealous tyranny of imperial Rome; and to denounce the punishments proclaimed as a penalty, not against subjects revolting against their acknowledged sovereign, but foreign citizens striving for the independence of their country, and discharging what they had themselves a thousand times justly styled the most sacred of human duties.

When such were the principles of war, not casually acted on by ungovernable troops in a moment of fury, but deliberately announced and methodically enforced by the imperial marshals for years together, it is not surprising that an uncontrollable thirst for revenge should have seized a large portion of the Spanish nation. Such, accordingly, was the case from the moment that the decrees establishing the military government were issued in February, 1810. The excessive rigour with which the generals' contributions were everywhere levied, and the crushing weight with which they fell upon the peasantry, filled the guerilla ranks, as well from the bereavements which they occasioned as the destitution which they produced. They brought the bitterness of conquest home to every cottage in the kingdom; they drove the iron into the soul of the nation; revenge, that "wild species of justice," gained possession of every heart. If you inquired into the private history of the members of any of the guerilla bands, it uniformly recounted the same tale of suffering—one had had his father murdered by the French soldiers at the threshold of his home; another had seen his wife violated and massacred, or his children butchered before his eyes; a third had lost both his sons in the war; a fourth, burned out of house and home, had joined the bands in the mountains, as the only means either of gaining a livelihood or wreaking vengeance. All, in one way or other, had been driven by suffering to forget every other feeling but the remembrance of their woes, and the determination to revenge them. Incredible were the obstacles which this state of things threw in the way of the French army; vain the attempt by severity to extinguish a spirit which found in the excesses of that very severity the principal cause of its increase. Already, in June, 1811, Marshal Bessières had bitterly experienced the woful effect of the sanguinary policy which he had pursued.* So formidable did this insurrection become in the course of 1812, that it engaged, as will appear in the sequel, the anxious attention both of Napoleon and his generals, and by degrees absorbed nearly the whole army of the North in a murderous and inglorious partisan warfare. Mina retaliated in Navarre by a counter-proclamation, in which, in an equally sanguinary but more excusable spirit, because it was in self-defence only, he declared that no quarter should be given to the French troops.†

Dec. 14, 1811.

of the tyranny of the government operating upon an army, the majority of whom are sober, well-disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree educated. They live by the authorized and regulated plunder of the country, if any should remain: they suffer labour, hardships, and privations every day; they draw no money from France, and go on without pay, provisions, money, or anything; but they lose, in consequence, half their army in every campaign."—WELLINGTON to LORD WELLESLEY, January 26, 1811, GURWOOD, vii., 188.

* Ante, iii., 412.

† See Proclamation, Dec. 28, 1809. Belm., i., 429.

† See Decree, June 6, 1811. Belm., i., 567.

‡ Proclamation of Duke of Istria, June 5, 1811. Belm., i., 563.

* "It is time to take a decided part: the army of the North is composed, it is true, of 44,000 men; but, if you unite 20,000 together, all communication ceases, and the insurrection makes great progress. The coast will soon be lost as far as Bilbao. We are destitute of everything: it is with the greatest difficulty we can live from day to day. The spirit of the country is frightful. The journey of King Joseph to Paris—the retreat from Portugal—the evacuation of the country as far as Salamanca—have elevated their minds to a degree I cannot express. The bands enlarge and recruit daily at all points."—MARSHAL BESSIÈRES to BERTHIER, June 6, 1811; BELMAS, i., 560.

† "Navarre," said Mina in the preamble of this proclamation, "is covered with desolation: everywhere tears are

In the midst of this terrible warfare, it was with the utmost difficulty that the great line of communication from Madrid to Bayonne could be kept open: fifty thousand men were required to guard it, and, independent of the great fortresses of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian, and the fort of Burgos, nineteen fortified posts or blockhouses, each garrisoned by three or four hundred men, were erected on the line from the Bidassoa to the capital; eleven on the more circuitous route by Valladolid, Segovia, and the Guadarama; fifteen on the road from Valladolid to Saragossa; eight from Valladolid to Santander; and so on through the whole kingdom.* Thus Spain was overspread by a vast iron net, constructed at an enormous expense, and upheld by an incredible expenditure of men and treasure; but though it was sufficient, except in the mountain districts, to chain the inhabitants and prevent any serious insurrection, yet it absorbed a large proportion of the French troops, and was attended with a great and ceaseless consumption of life to the invaders; so that Wellington did not over-estimate its importance when, in December, 1811, he wrote to Lord Liverpool, "The people of the country are still disposed to resist whenever they see a prospect of advantage. Bonaparte is still far from having effected the conquest even of that part of the Peninsula of which he has military possession; and, in truth, the devastation which attends the progress of our enemies' arms, and is the consequence of their continuance in any part of the country, is *our best friend, and will, in the end, bring the contest to a conclusion.*"†

But if such were the difficulties—arising partly from the nature of the country which was the seat of war, partly from the absurd distribution of power in the Peninsula by Napoleon, and partly from the oppressive and exterminating mode of conducting war which the Revolution had established—with which the French generals had to contend, Wellington, on his part, did not recline on a bed of roses: the obstacles which thwarted his operations, though arising from different causes, were nearly as great as those with which his antagonists had to strive; and it is hard to say whether an impartial survey of their relative situations does not leave his superiority as great as if his vast inferiority of force and unbroken career of victories were alone considered.

The first and most important circumstance which constantly thwarted all the English general's efforts for the deliverance of the Peninsula, was the long-established and incurable corruption of every part of the Portuguese administration. This deplorable evil, the sad bequest of ages of despotism, had not at that period been counterbalanced in the dominions of the house of Braganza by the feverish, and

sometimes almost supernatural, energy which, in a Democratic convulsion, springs from the temporary ascendancy of poverty and the unrestrained career of passion. Portugal had lost its monarch and regular government; its rulers owed their election in a great degree to popular choice, and the country was in the most violent state of general excitement; but the convulsion, as Wellington often observed, was anti-Gallican, not Democratic: the old influences still pervaded every department of the administration; and that fearful vigour was wanting which invariably appears when uncontrolled power is for the first time vested in the masses, and the people enjoy the dangerous faculty of laying impositions on property, from the operations of which they are, from their poverty, almost entirely exempted. Hence the government and whole administration were corrupt and imbecile to a degree which appears almost inconceivable to those who have either experienced the permanent vigour of monarchical, or the transient energy of Democratic states. So inveterate were abuses in every department, that the people could not conceive any administration without them; and when the soldiers enrolled under British command received the full pay promised them, their astonishment knew no bounds, having never, under their native officers, known what it was to have less than one half or two thirds absorbed by the peculation of those through whose hands the money passed.*

Had Wellington possessed the same unlimited power in the civil as he did in the military affairs of Portugal, these abuses would speedily have been corrected; but, unfortunately, this was very far indeed from being the case. His direct authority extended only to the command of the armies; and although his influence was, doubtless, considerable with the regency at Lisbon, and he was most ably seconded by the British ambassador there, the Honourable Charles Stuart, yet his efforts to effect an amelioration in the public service, and communicate the requisite vigour to the administration, were perpetually thwarted by the inability of its members to comprehend his views; the extraordinary difficulty of reforming, amid the din of external war, long-established domestic abuses; and the constant dread which the regency had of interfering with existing emoluments, or adopting any measures of compulsion against inferior functionaries and magistrates, lest they should endanger their own popularity. Their nervousness on this last head was such as to render government perfectly powerless, either in enforcing the laws or drawing forth the resources of the country; and all the remonstrances of Wellington were unable to make them even adventure upon the very first duty of executive administration, that of making inferior officers do their duty. The consequence was, that, though the taxes were very heavy, they were most irregularly collected, and the rich and privileged classes discovered a thousand ways of evading them. Ample levies of men were voted, but no adequate measures were ever taken to bring forth the soldiers, or send them back if they had left their colours. The army in the field was seldom more than half the number for whom pay was drawn; clothing, ammunition,

Imbecility with which the regency discharged their duties at Lisbon.

*Corruption and imbecility of the Portuguese administration.

shed for the loss of the dearest friends; the father sees the body of his son hanging for having had the heroism to defend his country; the son witnesses with despair his father sinking under the horrors of a prison, for no other reason than that he is the parent of a hero who has fought for his native land. The mayors, the nobles, the priests, have been all ruined, or conducted in captivity into France. All our efforts, by showing generosity to our captives, to introduce a more humane style of warfare, have proved nugatory: there remains only the duty of retaliation."—*Proclamation by ESPOZ Y MINA, December 14, 1811*; BELMAS, i., 594.

* Belm., i., xii., *Introd.*

† Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Dec. 4, 1811, *Gurw.* viii., 422.

* Wellington to the Prince Regent of Portugal, April, 1813. *Nap.* v., 422.

provisions, and stores of all sorts, were constantly wanting for the troops; the means of transport were rarely provided for them, and never in time; and even the English subsidy for the support of 30,000 men, which was regularly advanced, was so much diverted to other objects, that the pay of the men was almost always in arrear, and, in April, 1813, the army in the field had received no pay for seven, the garrison for nine, the militia for fifteen months. The consequence was, that Wellington was obliged to feed the Portuguese troops from the British magazines; and this, in its turn, impoverished the resources and paralyzed the efforts of the British army.* Had these evils occurred in the French armies, their generals would speedily have applied a remedy by taking the supplies wanted by force, and sending the owners to the regency for payment; but such a proceeding would have been altogether repugnant to the English mode of carrying on war. It was abhorrent to the nature of Wellington, and the principles on which he was conducting the contest; and, if adopted, he was well aware it would have purchased present relief by the sacrifice of all the grounds on which he hoped for ultimate success. Thus the evils continued through the whole campaign. Remonstrance and representation were the sole remedies relied on; the whole of this gigantic civil conflict in his rear fell on Wellington, as always ensues in such cases; and not unfrequently he was engaged in presence of the enemy, and within sight of their videttes, in lengthened yet vain memoirs on the most complicated details of Portuguese civil administration.†

The next circumstance which paralyzed, on repeated occasions, the operations of the English general, and often at the most critical moments, was the wretched condition and total destitution of the Spanish armies, and the pride and obstinacy which rendered their

Wretched condition of the Spanish troops, and jealousy of their generals.

* "The unfortunate governments in the Peninsula had been reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that there was no authority in Spain or Portugal before the French invasion. The French invasion did not improve this state of things; and since that event no crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of being a French partisan. Those malversations in office—those neglects of duty—that disobedience of order—that inattention to regulation which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state that is involved in war more than all the plots of French partisans, are passed unnoticed, notwithstanding the numerous complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made. The cause of all this is, the mistaken principle on which the government have proceeded. They suppose the best foundation for their power is a low, vulgar popularity, of which the evidence is the shouting of the mob at Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees; and to obtain this bubble, they have neglected the essential duty of making inferior functionaries do their duty, which, if done, would, ere this, have saved both countries. On the same principle, they will not regulate their finances, because it interferes with some man's job. They will not lay on new taxes, because none who do so are ever favourites with the mob. They have a general income of 10, and sometimes 20 per cent., but no one has yet paid a hundredth part of what he ought to have done. Thence, from want of money, they can pay nobody. The hire of mules and carts is never paid; the horses die, and the people desert; the commissaries have no money to buy provisions, or provide the means of transport; and thence the troops are constantly suffering; and, as I will not allow pillage, every department of the service is paralyzed. In consequence, I have been obliged to incorporate the Portuguese troops with the English divisions, and both are paid from one military chest; but the evil exists in its full extent with the detached corps and garrison."—WELLINGTON to COLONEL GORDON, 12th June, 1811. GURWOOD, viii., 6, 7.

† Nap., v., 422, 423. Wellington to Prince Regent of Portugal. Wellington to Stuart, April 9, 1812. Gurw., ix., 62, and viii., 6, 7.

generals unreasonably jealous of foreign interference, and equally averse to and incapable of any joint measures by which a material or durable benefit to the common cause could be obtained. Such, indeed, were the inefficiency and destitution of the Spanish forces, that it was soon discovered that their presence was a burden rather than an advantage to the Anglo-Portuguese troops, by bringing into the field a host of useless mouths, whose arms were incapable of rendering any effectual service in the field against the enemy, and who yet devoured all the resources by which the war could be maintained; and after the experience of the Talavera campaign, Wellington formed the resolution, from which he never afterward deviated, of engaging in no joint undertaking whatever with the Castilian armies, but, trusting to them merely for distant diversions, to rely upon his own British and Portuguese forces alone for any operations in the front of the conflict. In fact, after the battles of Ocana and the Tormes, in the close of 1809,* no Spanish force worthy of the name of an army existed within the sphere of the English operations; and on the only subsequent occasion on which necessity compelled a junction of the British and Spanish in the field—at Albuera, in 1811—they only escaped a bloody defeat, induced by the obstinacy and intractability of the Spanish generals, and the unwieldy character of their troops, by the surpassing valour of the English soldiers, and the shedding of torrents of English blood.†

At a subsequent period of the war, the lustre of Wellington's victories, and the universal voice of all men of sense in the Peninsula, which loudly demanded that he should be put at the head of the whole military operations, compelled the Cadiz government, much against their will, to appoint him generalissimo of all the armies; and the increased vigour and efficiency which, in spite of every difficulty, he speedily communicated to them, clearly demonstrated of what benefit it would have been to the common cause if he had been earlier elevated to the supreme command. But at this period of the contest he was not only thwarted by the frequent jealousy of the Spanish generals, one of whom, Ballasteros, was so mortified at his appointment that he resigned his command in disgust, and wellnigh occasioned the loss of the whole fruits of the battle of Salamanca,‡ but he found his influence and usefulness interrupted by treason and disloyalty in the seat of government itself. So fiercely, indeed, had the passions of Democracy now begun to burn at Cadiz, that, in their animosity at the orderly spirit of aristocratic rule in England, the

Treachery of the Cortes.

* Ante, iii., 325, 326.

† Wellington to Castanos, July 24, 1811, Gurw., viii., 133, and ix., 98, 111.

‡ "Your excellency may depend upon the truth of what I have repeatedly had the honour of stating to you in conversation, that, until the Spanish armies shall possess regular resources, by which they can be supplied during any operation which they may undertake, and are equipped in such a manner that casual or trifling difficulties will not impede their operations; and until the troops are disciplined, as all other troops are which are to meet an enemy in the field, it is useless to think of plans of co-operation between this army and those of Spain, which must be founded on the active offensive operations of all parts of the armies of all the three nations. I should deceive myself and you, and the governments of both nations, if I were to encourage such a notion; and if I were to undertake the execution of such a plan, I should risk the loss of my army for no object whatever."—WELLINGTON to CASTANOS, 24th July, 1811, GURWOOD, iii., 133.

§ *Infra*, iii., ch. lxiii.

Republican leaders forgot the whole evils and wrongs of French invasion; and at a period when the deliverance of the Peninsula was no longer hopeless, but reasonable grounds for expecting it had arisen from the heroic efforts of the English troops, and the approaching hostility of the northern powers, a secret negotiation was going on between Joseph and a considerable portion of the Cortes for the delivery of Cadiz to the French troops, and the submission of the whole Peninsula to the imperial government. They were willing to concede everything, and acknowledge the Napoleon dynasty, provided the Democratic Constitution of 1812 was recognised. This conspiracy, suspected at the time, and since fully demonstrated by the documents which have been brought to light, soon made its effects apparent from the undisguised hostility which the Cortes manifested towards Wellington and the English army; the occasional excesses of the soldiers were magnified by the voice of malignity; their services forgotten, their great deeds traduced; the contagion had reached some of the generals of the armies, who were prepared to pass over with their troops to the enemy; and nothing but the unbroken series of Wellington's victories, and the loud voice of fame which heralded his exploits, prevented the government of the Cortes, on the eve of the deliverance of their country from the hands of the spoiler, from blasting all the glories of the contest which it had so heroically maintained, by uncalled-for submission and shameless treachery at its termination.*†

The last circumstance which, throughout his whole career, impeded the operations of Wellington, and had often wellnigh snatched the laurels of victory from his hand when almost within his grasp, was the extraordinary difficulty which the English government experienced, especially in 1811, in procuring supplies of provisions and money for his army, and the very limited amount of re-enforcements in troops which the circumstances of the British Empire, or the apprehensions of ministers, allowed them to send to his support. The circumstances have been already fully detailed; which had, at that juncture, to an unprecedented degree, reduced the resources of the Empire. It was, in truth, the crisis of the war: both England and France were suffering immensely from their mutual blockade, and the contest seemed reduced to the question who should starve first. At such a time, the closing of the American harbours and the vast markets of the United States to the productions of British industry, added to the calamity of an unusually bad harvest, which required nearly five millions sterling to be sent out of the country for the purchase of subsistence, not only rendered it almost an impossibility for the government to send to Portugal either specie or provisions, but made it a matter of extraordinary difficulty for the English general to obtain from

any quarter supplies for his army. His correspondence, accordingly, during the whole of his campaigns, but especially in the years 1810 and 1811, are filled with the difficulties which he experienced in getting provisions and the means of transport, and the backwardness of government in making the requisite remittances; and not unfrequently, in the bitterness of his heart at finding his best-laid schemes rendered abortive by the want of perhaps an inconsiderable sum in ready money, or a few stores in siege equipage, sharp complaints escaped him at the incapacity of the administration, which, engrossed with its Parliamentary contests, left undone the weightier matters of the war.* But in cooler moments, and on a just retrospect of the extraordinary difficulties with which government, as well as himself, had to struggle at that crisis, the candour of Wellington's nature modified the censure which the anxiety of the moment had called forth: he admitted that it was "the want of money, that is, of specie, which was felt during the war; but that commodity, from the effect of the bank restriction, was then exceedingly scarce in England, and frequently could not be procured at all; and that he had uniformly received the most cordial support and encouragement from the ministers, without excepting Mr. Perceval, than whom a more honest, zealous, and able minister never served the king."†

In truth, however, the complaints of Wellington were not altogether unfounded; and there can be no doubt that his confidential letters to Mr. Stuart, the English ambassador at Lisbon, written at the time, must be regarded by history as documents on which more reliance should be placed than subsequent general recollection, at the distance of five-and-twenty years, when the difficulty was over, and unequalled success had gilded the retrospect of the past with, perhaps, unfaithful colours. Even at the moment, however, when the contest was going on, Wellington expressed to Foundation for Mr. Stuart his strong sense of the Wellington's extraordinary efforts which the Brit- complaints.

Counter
remarks.

* The greater part of these complaints will be found quoted in Napier's *Peninsular War*, v., 52-64: Counter Remarks, *infra*; and they are scattered through all Gurwood's *Correspondence*.

As a specimen, the following extracts may be given: April 20, 1810.—"The ministry are as much alarmed as the public, or as the opposition pretend to be: the state of public opinion is very unfavourable to the war; and the general opinion is, that I am inclined to fight a desperate battle, which is to answer no purpose. Their private letters are in some degree at variance with their public instructions; and they throw upon me the whole responsibility of bringing away the army in safety, after staying in the Peninsula till it becomes necessary to evacuate it. But it will not answer, in these times, to receive private hints and opinions from ministers; which, if attended to, would lead to an act directly contrary to the spirit, and even the letter of the public instructions."* June 5, 1810.—"This letter will show you the difficulties under which we labour for want of provisions, and of money to buy them. The miserable and pitiful want of money prevents me from doing many things which might, and ought to be done, for the safety of the country: yet, if anything fails, I shall not be forgiven."† December 22, 1810.—"It is useless to expect more money from England, as the desire of economy has overcome even the fears of ministers, and they have gone so far as to send home the transports, in order to save money."‡ July 26, 1811.—"The soldiers in the hospitals die because the government have not money to pay for the hospital necessities; and it is really disgusting to reflect upon the distresses occasioned by the lamentable want of funds to support the machine we have put in motion."§ There are a great many other letters to the same effect.

† Wellington to Spencer Perceval, Esq., June 6, 1835. Nap., v., 50.

* Wellington to Stuart.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid.

§ Ibid.

* Nap., v., 82, and 406, 407.

† Many persons in the Cortes held secret intercourse with Joseph, with the view of acknowledging his dynasty, on condition that he would accede to the general policy of the Cortes in civil government. Early in 1813, the Conde de Montejo, then a general in Elio's army of Mercia, had secretly made propositions to pass over, with the forces under his command, to King Joseph; and soon afterward the whole army of the Duke del Parque, which had advanced to La Mancha, made offers of the same nature. They were actually in negotiation with Joseph when the emperor's orders obliged the French army to abandon Madrid and take up the line of the Ebro.—NAPIER, v., 406, 407.

‡ *Ante*, iv., 392-394.

ish government was making to supply the wants of the army, as well as the discreditable manner in which they were threatened by the selfishness of the Portuguese administration. "The Portuguese government," says he, "ought to be aware of the difficulties in which Great Britain is involved, in order to procure, not money's worth, but money—specie—to maintain the contest, of which the probable want alone renders the result doubtful. In order to avoid this want, they are making the most gigantic efforts, at an enormous expense, to send to this country every article that an army can require, in hopes to save the demand for, and expenditure of, specie, in the purchase of these articles in the country; and yet the Portuguese government, instead of seconding their laudable efforts, set themselves against them."* Although, therefore, he was often most grievously hampered by the want of specie, and driven to every imaginable resource to procure supplies, by his own exertions, for his army, yet his difficulties arose from other and more general causes than any want of zealous co-operation on the part of the English government; and, without entirely exculpating them from blame in allowing their attention to be more engrossed by their Parliamentary struggles than the Peninsular contest, it may safely be affirmed that these causes were the following:

Though the contest had now continued nearly eighteen years, the English government were still, thanks to our insular situation and invincible navy, mere novices in the art of military warfare; and the subordinate functionaries in every department required literally to be taught their several duties in presence of the enemy. There is nothing surprising in this: it is the natural result of the peculiar circumstances, unassailable power, nautical habits, popular government, and commercial character of the English people. Though naturally brave, and always fond of military renown, they are the reverse of warlike in their ordinary habits: naval supremacy has long since made them trust to their wooden walls for defence; commercial opulence opened more attractive pursuits than the barren heritage of the sword. In peace they invariably relax the sinews of war: no amount of experience can persuade them to take any antecedent measures either to avert disaster or to ensure success; they constantly expect that, without the least previous preparation, and with greatly inferior numbers, their armies, newly raised, uninstructed, and inexperienced, are to vanquish their enemies in every encounter; and the extraordinary valour of the Anglo-Saxon race has so often, in pitched battles, more than compensated every other disadvantage, that the result seems almost to justify the anticipation. But though in a regular stand-up fight native bravery may often make amends for the absence of military instruction or matured preparation, it is otherwise with the varied duties of a protracted campaign: skill and experience on the part of all engaged in the vast enterprise are there indispensable; and for their want no amount of talent in the general, or courage in the troops, can afford any compensation. An army, if brave and well-disciplined, may often vanquish a more experienced, but less sturdy antagonist, in the field; but it will prove no match for him in marching, retreating, finding provisions, or en-

during the long-continued fatigues of a campaign—the same array which has successfully emerged from the perils of the battle-field, may ingloriously melt away amid the accumulated horrors of ill-arranged hospitals; the courage which can mount the deadly breach, may be rendered wholly unavailing by the bluntness of intrenching tools or the shortness of scaling-ladders; and the fruits of a mighty victory, capable of changing the fate of the world, may be reft from the conquerors by the incapacity of commissaries in bringing up supplies, or the remissness of government in furnishing a few pieces of heavy artillery.

Wants of this sort were those which Wellington so often and bitterly experienced in the course of the Peninsular campaign. Every person in the army, with a very few exceptions, from the general to the drummer, was at first ignorant of a great part of his most necessary duties; and the commander-in-chief was obliged himself to attend to the minutest details in every department, under the penalty of seeing his best-laid projects miscarry from the ignorance or incapacity of those to whom some subordinate duties had been committed. No one can ever have been intrusted with the responsibility of directing new and inexperienced public servants in any department, who must not in the outset have found this difficulty: it may be conceived, then, with what weight it pressed on a general at the head of an army taking the field for the first time, on any extended scale, for a century, and filled with officers and civil functionaries to whom experience was unknown, and on whose theoretical instruction no pains whatever had been bestowed. In the battle-field, or evolutions in presence of the enemy, their native steadiness and admirable discipline rendered them from the very first adequate to any emergency; but how small a portion of the life of a soldier do such events occupy, and how much does military success, in the end, depend upon other and less dazzling qualities, and in which long experience had rendered the French perfect proficient! The commissariat was at first ignorant of its duties, and often failed in procuring supplies at the critical moment; the health of the soldiers, especially those newly sent out, frequently suffered dreadfully; and the military hospitals, charged sometimes with twenty thousand sick at a time, fostered contagion rather than cured disease;† the inebriety of the soldiers amid the wines of the south too often aggravated the tendency to malaria fever which arose from the death-betrotten gales of Estremadura; the engineers were able and instructed, but the troops unskilled in the labour of the trenches, the working tools often insufficient, the mining chisels blunt and useless, and the battering ordnance worn out or inadequate; and these obstacles, perpetually marring the general's operations at the most vital moment, could only be overcome by shedding torrents of heroic blood.‡ This universal ignorance is not to be wondered at: it results inevitably in a nation whose power has superseded the necessity of military experience, and whose temper has discouraged the military art.

* The total number of sick and wounded who passed through the military hospitals of Portugal, from 1808 to 1814, amounted to the enormous number of three hundred and sixty thousand men.—SIR JAMES MCGREGOR'S *Evidence before the House of Commons*.

† See Wellington in Gurwood, *passim*.

* Wellington to Stuart, Aug. 27, 1811, Gurw., viii., 232.

The ministry shared in the general deficiencies: trained, for the most part, to civil professions, they were generally unfit to judge of military arrangements; they yielded on the management of the war to professional men of capacity inferior to their own, and often immersed, from long inactivity, in a flood of insignificant details; and the pressing concerns of Parliament, with the general conduct of government, left them little leisure to acquire, when in harness, the information requisite for a vigorous and enlightened prosecution of the cabinet duties connected with the military department. Above all, they were, to an extent which now appears almost inconceivable, unaware of the vital importance of *time* in war: they almost always attended, in the end, to the general's requests, but they often did so at a period when the season for gaining the important effects anticipated from them had passed; they combined operations so as to favour his designs, but they not unfrequently marred these minor enterprises by the incapacity of the untried officers whom they placed in command. It is in vain to ascribe these unhappy arrangements to the fault of any particular body of men then intrusted with the reins of government; they obviously arose from general causes, for they characterize equally the first years of every contest in British history: many a Byng has been morally executed for faults really owing to the constitution of his country; many a Bourgoigne has capitulated because the means of salvation were not, through popular heedlessness, put into his hands. If foresight and wisdom in previous preparation, commensurate to their vigour and resolution when warmed in the contest, had been given to Democratic societies, the English people in modern, as the Roman in ancient times, must long since have obtained the empire of the world. Instead, therefore, of ascribing peculiar blame to any one class in the British islands for the manifold difficulties with which Wellington had to struggle in the first years of the contest, let us regard them as the inevitable consequence of previous neglect and long-continued security on the part of the whole Empire; and let this reflection only enhance our admiration for the hero whose resolution and sagacity prepared, and the army whose bravery and perseverance secured, the means of overcoming all these obstacles, and brought the British army in triumph to the walls of Paris.

But, on considering the comparative weight of the difficulties with which the British and French generals had to contend in this memorable contest, one observation applies to them all, eminently characteristic of the conflicting principles on which it was conducted, and the antagonist powers which were there brought into operation on the opposite sides. The French, by disregarding every consideration of justice or humanity, forcibly wrenching from the vanquished people their whole resources, and extracting from their own countrymen, by the terrors of the conscription, all the physical force of sixty millions of subjects or allies, had obviously the advantage in the outset; and the chances were very great that, before the English could gain any solid footing in the Peninsula, they would be driven from it by a concentration, from all quarters, of overwhelming forces. This, accordingly, was what had happened in all the previous campaigns of the British during the war; and it had

been prevented from again occurring only by the admirable foresight with which the position of Torres Vedras had been chosen and strengthened.

But, on the other hand, when the first brunt of the imperial onset had been withstood, the French and the contest was reduced to a series of protracted campaigns, the balance became more even, and at length, by the natural reaction of mankind against oppression, inclined decisively in favour of the British general. The English method of procuring supplies by paying for them, though extremely costly, and far less productive, at first, than the French mode of taking possession of them by force, proved, in the end, the only one which could permanently be relied on, for it alone did not destroy in consumption the means of reproduction. The English system of procuring men for the army by voluntary enlistment, though incapable of producing the vast arrays which were clustered by the conscription around the imperial standards, did not exhaust the population in the same degree, and permitted the British armies to be progressively increased to the close of the contest, while the French, in its latter stages, declined in a fearful progression. The English principle of protecting the inhabitants, so far as it was possible, amid the miseries of war, though in the beginning extremely burdensome, in comparison of the summary methods of spoliation and rapine invariably practised by the French, proved, in the long run, the most expedient; for it alone conciliated the affections and husbanded the resources of the people, by whose aid or hostility the contest was to be determined. It is precisely the same in private life: the rapacity of the robber or the prodigality of the spendthrift often outshone, in the outset, the unobtrusive efforts of laborious industry; but mark the end of these things, and it will be found that, in the long run, honesty is the best policy, and that the fruits of rapine or the gains of dishonesty ultimately avail as little to the grandeur of nations as the elevation of individuals.

Having taken his determination to act on the offensive against the French in Spain, and to endeavour, in the outset, to recover the important fortress of Badajoz, Wellington moved his headquarters in the middle of May to Estremadura, taking with him 12,000 men to re-enforce General Beresford, who had previously begun the campaign in that province, and had made himself master, after a few days' siege, of Olivenza, with its garrison of 380 men. Badajoz was immediately thereafter blockaded; but the great floods of the Guadiana prevented any serious operations being commenced against it till the first week of May, when the communications across the river having been effected, the town was invested on both banks. Scarcely had the enterprise than he began to collect troops at Seville for its relief; and on this occasion the deficiencies of the English army in all the knowledge and preparations requisite for a siege were painfully conspicuous. All the zeal and ability of the engineer officers, and they were very great, could not compensate the wants of an army which had, at that period, no corps of sappers and miners in its ranks, nor a single private who knew how to carry on approaches under fire. A double attack was projected—one on the castle, and another on the fort of St. Christoval; and on the

Causes which led to these obstacles to Wellington's success.

The French difficulties greatest in the end.

Commencement of the first siege of Badajoz.

April 17.

May 5.

May 8. night of the 8th, ground was broken at the distance of four hundred yards from the latter. A bright moon enabled the enemy, however, to keep up a destructive fire on the working parties. A vigorous sally, two days afterward, was repulsed with loss; but the allies,

May 10. pursuing too far, were torn in flank by a discharge of grapeshot from the ramparts, which in a few minutes struck down four hundred men; and, though the besiegers continued their operations with great perseverance, the fire of Christoval was so superior, that four out of five of the guns placed in the trenches

May 12. were speedily dismounted. On the 12th, ground was broken before the castle, and a battery commenced against the *tête-du-pont*; but, before any progress could be made in the operations, intelligence was received that Soult was approaching; and Beresford instantly and wisely gave orders to discontinue the siege, and assemble all the forces in front, to give battle.*

Having, by great exertions, collected all his disposable forces in and around Seville, this indefatigable marshal set out on the 10th from that capital, and, joining Latour Maubourg on the road, made his appearance at Villa Franca and Almedralejo on the 14th, having in four days cleared the defiles of the Sierra Morena, and transported his troops from the banks of the Guadalquivir to the streams which nourish the Guadiana. On the 15th he moved forward his advanced guard, occupying the heights in front of ALBUERA, where Beresford's army was concentrated. The force which was here at the disposal of the English general was considerable in numerical amount, but in composition, with the exception of the British, very inferior to the homogeneous veterans of the French marshal. General Blake arrived from Cadiz, with 9000 men, early on the morning of the 16th; Castanos, with 3000, chiefly horse, was also at hand; and Don Carlos d'Espana's men, who had still kept their ground in the northern slopes of the Sierra Morena since the rout of Modellin, swelled the Spanish force to 16,000 men, of whom above 2000 were cavalry. The Anglo-Portuguese force, consisting of two divisions, and Hamilton's Portuguese brigade, numbered 7000 British and 8000 Portuguese sabres and bayonets; so that the allies, upon the whole, had in the field 30,000 men, of whom 3000 were horse, with thirty-eight guns; but of these the English alone could be relied on for the decisive shock. Soult's force was inferior in numerical amount, being only 19,000 infantry and 4000 horse; but they were all veteran troops, whom Napoleon justly termed "the finest in Europe," and he had fifty guns admirably harnessed and served; so that, in real military strength, his force was decidedly superior to that of his antagonist.†

Beresford, to whom Castanos, with a delicacy and forbearance very unusual at that period in the Spanish generals, had relinquished the command of the allied army, had drawn up his motley array on the heights lying to the north of the Albuera streamlet, with the right thrown back in a semicircle, so as to guard against his flank being turned in that

quarter, where still higher eminences rose beyond the extremity of the line. The British divisions, commanded by Cole and Stewart, were in the centre, on either side of the great road from the village of Albuera to Badajoz and Valverde, where the principal attack was anticipated; to the right of these stood Hamilton's Portuguese; while Allen, with his brave brigade of Germans, occupied the village and bridge of Albuera, in advance of the centre of the whole line; the right was strongly occupied by the Spaniards under Blake, whose position, on a line of heights, promised to render their unwieldy bulk of some service in making good the position. The French army, according to their usual custom, was arrayed in dense masses, partly in the wood on the south of the Albuera stream, partly on the open ground to their north, and in advance both of the Albuera stream and Ferdia rivulet, which ran along the foot of the heights on the allied right. Soult, seeing that Beresford had neglected to occupy the high ground which commanded the whole field beyond his extreme right, in order to strengthen his centre commanding the great road, resolved to make his principal attack in that quarter; and with this view, during the night, unknown to the English general, and under the screen of the lofty height, concentrated his principal forces, consisting of Gerard's corps, Latour Maubourg's cuirassiers, and Rutty's guns, in all fifteen thousand men, with forty pieces of artillery, on the southern slope of the great hill, within half a mile of Beresford's right, but screened entirely from their view; while the remainder of his forces, consisting of Werle's division, Godinot's brigade, the light cavalry, and twelve guns, were arrayed in the wood to the south of the Albuera stream; the bridge over which, with the village of the same, were to be the object of an early attack, to distract the enemy's attention from the powerful onset preparing against them under cover of the lofty eminence on the right.*

The action began early on the morning of the 16th, by a strong body of cavalry, Battle of Albuera. May stream, opposite the allied right, 16. while Godinot's division, preceded by ten guns, issued from the wood and bore down upon the bridge. The British guns in the centre immediately opening upon the moving mass, ploughed through its columns with great effect; but the brave assailants pressed on, while their cannon answered the English fire, and, crowding towards the bridge in great numbers, were soon warmly engaged with Alten's Germans at that important point. As the Hanoverians were soon pressed by superior numbers, Beresford advanced a Portuguese brigade to their support. A Spanish battery, placed on a height near the church, played warmly on all the approaches to the bridge: the French artillery thundered back without intermission, but with less effect, and the enemy made no material progress in that quarter. Perceiving, however, that Werle's division did not follow in the footsteps of Godinot's, Beresford justly concluded that the real attack was not intended at the village, and despatched Colonel Hardinge to Blake to warn him that a serious onset might immediately be expected on the right, and entreating him to throw back his line and face outward, so as to be prepared to receive it. The Spanish general, however, with char-

* Nap., iii., 523, 527. Vict. et Conq., xx., 235. Jones, Pen. War, i., 381, 385.

† Beresford to Wellington, May 18, 1811, Gurw., vi., 573. Nap., iii., 528, 532. Vict. et Conq., xx., 235, 236. Torr., iv., 66, 67. Hamilton's Pen. Camp., iii., 83.

* Nap., iii., 532, 533. Beresford's Despatch., Gurw., vi., 574. Vict. et Conq., xx., 236, 237.

acteristic obstinacy, refused to credit the information, and declined to endanger his troops by moving them in presence of the enemy. Colonel Shepelor, however, an intelligent German officer, who was serving as a volunteer in the Spanish staff, and has since written a valuable history of the war, was of the opposite opinion; and, fixing his eyes steadily on the right, while Blake and Castanos were engrossed only with the attack on the bridge, at length showed them the glancing of deep columns of bayonets in the interstices of the wood in that direction. Yielding, reluctantly, to the evidence of his senses, Blake, upon this, ordered the requisite change of front: the second line of Spaniards was moved forward and drawn up at right angles to the first, thus forming a bar across the extremity of the line, perpendicular to its direction, exactly as took place with the Russians in the middle of the battle of Eylau.*†

Before, however, this critical movement could be completed, the enemy in appalling strength were upon them. Werle, as Beresford had foreseen, no sooner saw Godinot's leading battalions engaged at the bridge, than, leaving a few troops to connect the lines together, he rapidly countermarched to the westward, and, issuing from the wood, joined the rear-guard of Gerard's corps as it was mounting the hill, on the right of the allies; while, at the same time, the light cavalry, quitting Godinot's column, forded the Albuera, and, ascending the hill at the gallop, joined the already formidable mass of Latour Maubourg's cuirassiers, who stood opposite to the British heavy dragoons under Lumley. Thus, while the Spanish line was going through the difficult operation of changing its front, it was attacked by fourteen thousand infantry, four thousand noble horse, and forty pieces of cannon. The contest was too unequal to be of long duration. Though such of Blake's troops as had got to their ground before the enemy were upon them opposed a stout resistance, and for some time kept the assailants at bay, yet their line was irregular and confused when the firing began: huge gaps were visible, into which the French cavalry poured with irresistible force; Rutý's guns, now playing within pointblank range, threw the moving regiments into confusion, and, after a short and sanguinary struggle, the Spaniards were overthrown at all points, and the whole heights on which they stood fell into the enemy's hands, who immediately placed their batteries there in position, in such a manner as to command the whole field of battle.‡

The day seemed more than doubtful; and Soult, thinking that the whole army was yielding, was concentrating his reserves, and arranging his cavalry, so as to be able to convert the retreat into a rout, when Beresford, seeing the real point of attack now clearly pronounced, ordered up the British divisions from the centre to the scene of danger on the right. This order was instantly obeyed: the lines fell back into open column, and, with a swift and steady step, moved to the right up the heights, from which the tumultuous array of the Spaniards was now hurled in wild confusion. But before they had

reached the summit, a dreadful disaster, well-nigh attended with fatal consequences, befell them. The morning, which had been throughout cloudy and unsettled, at this time broke into heavy storms of wind and rain, accompanied with thick mists, under cover of one of which the French advance against the Spanish position had been effected. Another moment of darkness of the same description proved as fatal to the British as it had been favourable to their antagonists. When General Stewart, with the leading brigade of the second English division, still in column, arrived at the slope of the height which the French had gained, and had got through the Spaniards, he opened a heavy fire upon the enemy from the front rank; but finding they could not be shaken by musketry, immediately ordered a charge of bayonets, and the regiments were in the act of deploying for that purpose, when they were suddenly and unexpectedly attacked in rear, and in great part destroyed, by two regiments of hussars and one of Polish lancers, which had got round their flank unobserved during the mist. The 31st alone, which still remained in column, resisted the shock; but the remainder, which had got into line, or were in the act of deploying, consisting of the Buffs, the 66th, and the second battalion of the 48th, were instantly pierced in many different quarters by the lancers from behind, and almost all slain on the spot, or driven forward into the enemy's line and made prisoners. Seven hundred men and three standards fell into the hands of the cavalry: in the tumult of success, they charged the second line coming up; and such was the confusion there from this disaster, that Beresford himself only escaped being made prisoner by his great courage and personal strength, which enabled him to parry the thrust, and dash from his saddle a lancer, who in the affray assailed him when alone and unattended by his suite.*

All seemed lost; for not only were the heights, the key of the position, taken, and crowned with the enemy's infantry and artillery, but the British brigade, which had advanced to retake them had almost all perished in the attempt. With the troops of any other nation it would probably have been so; but the English were determined not to be defeated, and it is surprising how often such a resolution in armies, as well as in individuals, works out its own accomplishment. The Spaniards, incapable of perceiving the change which had taken place in the action, continued to fire with great violence directly forward, although the British were before them; and no efforts on the part of Beresford could induce them to advance a step, while the succeeding columns of the English fired, in like manner, on the Spaniards, and endangered Blake himself. But, amid all this confusion, the unconquerable courage of the British, by a kind of natural instinct, led them to the enemy, and retrieved the disasters of the day. The 31st, under Major l'Estrange, isolated on the heights it had won in the midst of enemies, still maintained its ground, and kept up, now in line, a murderous fire on Gerard's dense columns, by which it was assailed. Dickson's artillery speedily came up to the front, and, firing with prodigious rapidity, covered the advance of Houghton's brigade, who

Gallant attempt to retrieve the day by Houghton's brigade.

* Nap., iii., 534, 536. Tor., iv., 68. Vict. et Conq., xx., 238, 239. Hamilton, iii., 84, 85. † Ante, ii., 465.

‡ Nap., iii., 535, 536. Beresford's Despatch, Gurw., vii., 374. Tor., iv., 68, 69. Vict. et Conq., xv., 288, 289.

* Beresford's Despatch, Gurw., vii., 574. Nap., iii., 535, 537. Hamilton, iii., 86. Vict. et Conq., xx., 241, 242. Tor., iv., 69, 70.

erelong got footing on the summit, and formed in line on the right of the 31st; the remainder of the second division, under Abercromby, shortly after pressed gallantly forward and took post on its left, while two Spanish corps also came up to the front; and Lumley's horse artillery, on the extreme right, by a most skilful and well-directed fire, kept at a distance the menacing and far superior squadrons of Monbrun's cuirassiers.*

Still the combat, though more equal, was far from being re-established. The British troops, in mounting the hill, were exposed to a dreadful fire of grape and musketry from the French guns and masses at the summit; hardly a half of any regiment got to the top unhurt; Houghton himself fell, while nobly heading and cheering on the 29th in the van; Duckworth, of the 48th, was slain; while the 57th and 48th, which next came up and opened into line in the midst of this terrific fire, soon had two thirds of their numbers struck down by the fatal discharges of the enemy's artillery. But this combat of giants was too terrible to be of long duration; the French, though suffering enormously in their dense formation, stood their ground gallantly: neither party would recede an inch, though the fire was maintained within pistol-shot, and a deep, though narrow gully, which ran along the front, rendered it impossible in that direction to reach the enemy with the bayonet. At this awful crisis ammunition, from the rapidity of the discharges, failed: in some of the British regiments, despite all their valour, the fire slackened; Houghton's brigade slowly, and in firm array, retired; a fresh charge from the now reassembled Polish lancers captured six English guns; and Beresford, deeming the battle lost, was making preparations for a retreat, and had actually brought up Hamilton's Portuguese brigade from the neighbourhood of the bridge of Albuera into a situation to cover the retrograde movement.†

In this extremity the firmness of one man changed the fate of the day, and in its ultimate effects, perhaps, determined the issue of the Peninsular war. While Beresford, under circumstances which not only justified, but perhaps called for the measure, was taking steps for a retreat, an officer of his staff, endowed with the eye of a general and the soul of a hero, boldly took upon himself the responsibility of venturing one more throw for victory. Colonel, now Sir HENRY HARDINGE, ordered General Cole to advance with his division on the right, which was still fresh, and, riding up to Abercromby on the extreme left, ordered him also to bring his reserve brigade into action. Cole quickly put his line, with the fusilier brigade in the van, in motion, crossed the Aroya streamlet, and mounted the hill on the right, while Abercromby, with the reserve brigade of the second division at the same time clearing their way through the throng, ascended on the left. These brave men soon changed the face of the day; and the advance which the enemy had made in the centre against Houghton's brigade, proved in its results extremely disastrous, by bringing them into a situation where the *flanks*, as well as the front, of their deep columns were exposed to the incessant fire of the English infantry. It was exactly the

counterpart of what had happened to Lannes's column which broke into the middle of the Austrian line at Aspern,* and the terrible British column which all but gained the battle of Fontenoy. Houghton's brigade, in the centre, encouraged by the timely succour, and having received a supply of ammunition from the rear, again stood firm, and fired with deadly aim on the front of the mass; while the fusilier brigade on one flank, and Abercromby's on the other, by incessant discharges prevented any of the lines behind from deploying. The carnage, in consequence, was frightful, especially in the rear of the column; and the very superiority of the French numbers magnified the loss, and augmented the confusion, from causing every shot to tell with effect on the throng. Pressing incessantly on, the fusilier brigade recovered the captured guns and dispersed the lancers; but a dreadful fire met them when they came near Gerard's infantry: Colonel Myers was killed; Cole himself, and Colonels Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe fell, badly wounded; and the whole brigade, "staggered by the iron tempest, reeled like sinking ships."†

"Suddenly recovering, however," says Colonel Napier, in strains of sublime military eloquence, "they closed on their terrible enemy; and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soulé, by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen; in vain did the hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded column, sacrifice their lives to gain time and space for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and, fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately on friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering on the flanks threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order: their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot, and with a horrid carnage, it was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the struggling multitude, endeavour to sustain the fight: their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion; and the mighty mass, at length giving way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood; and fifteen hundred un wounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill."‡

Beresford, seeing the heights thus gloriously won, immediately took steps to secure the victory. Blake's first line, which had not yet been engaged, was removed to the village and bridge of Albuera; Alten's Germans and the whole Portuguese were thus rendered disposable, and formed a mass of ten thousand men, who advanced up the hill in the footsteps of Abercromby and the fusilier brigade; while Ballasteros and Zayas, with

Gallant charge of the fusilier brigade recovers the day.

changed the fate of the day, and in its ultimate effects, perhaps, determined the issue of the Peninsular war. While Beresford, under circumstances which not only justified, but perhaps called for the measure, was taking steps for a retreat, an officer of his staff, endowed with the eye of a general and the soul of a hero, boldly took upon himself the responsibility of venturing one more throw for victory. Colonel, now Sir HENRY HARDINGE, ordered General Cole to advance with his division on the right, which was still fresh, and, riding up to Abercromby on the extreme left, ordered him also to bring his reserve brigade into action. Cole quickly put his line, with the fusilier brigade in the van, in motion, crossed the Aroya streamlet, and mounted the hill on the right, while Abercromby, with the reserve brigade of the second division at the same time clearing their way through the throng, ascended on the left. These brave men soon changed the face of the day; and the advance which the enemy had made in the centre against Houghton's brigade, proved in its results extremely disastrous, by bringing them into a situation where the *flanks*, as well as the front, of their deep columns were exposed to the incessant fire of the English infantry. It was exactly the

* Kausler, 540. Nap., iii., 537. Vict. et Conq., xx., 241. Tor., iv., 70, 71.

† Kausler, 541, 542. Vict. et Conq., xx., 241, 242. Nap., iii., 537, 539. Beresford's Despatch, Gurw., vii., 574, 575.

* Ante, iii., 346.

† Nap., iii., 539, 540. Vict. et Conq., 240, 251. Belm., i., 183. Jom., iii., 505.

‡ Nap., iii., 541. Vict. et Conq., xx., 241, 243. Belm., i., 183. Jom., iii.

Conclusion of the battle.

their Spanish brigades, also pressed on in pursuit. Gerard's corps was soon entirely dissolved: almost all the men threw away their arms, dispersed, and sought for shelter in the wood behind the Albuera stream. Werie's reserves, five thousand strong, were brought up by Soult to cover the retreat; but it was overwhelmed in the flight, and the general himself killed. "All, on the admission of the French themselves, was lost, if, in that fatal moment, the artillery had shared in the general consternation;"* but Rutly skilfully drew his guns together, and, emerging through the throng of fugitives, stood forth gallantly in the rear, and by the vigour of his fire arrested the advance of the conquerors. Such was the rapidity with which the guns were worked, and the precision of their aim, that the Spaniards and Portuguese, advancing in the rear of the British, suffered severely; the British infantry were obliged to wait till their own artillery came up, and, meanwhile, the confused masses of the enemy got over the stream and regained the cover of the wood. Monbrun's cuirassiers restrained the allied cavalry, which repeatedly endeavoured to charge, though, from the advanced position which they assumed to do so, they suffered dreadful losses from the British artillery; and at length this sanguinary contest gradually died away on both sides, rather from the exhaustion of the victors than any means of farther resistance, save in their artillery, which remained to the vanquished.†

Such was the battle of Albuera, memorable as being the most desperate and bloody of any that occurred, not only in the Peninsula, but the whole Revolutionary war. Its results. Though the firing had only lasted four hours, eight thousand men had been struck down on the part of the French, and nearly seven on that of the allies: an amount of loss which, in proportion to the number of men actually engaged, is unparalleled in modern war, at least on the side of the victors. The Spaniards lost two thousand men; the Portuguese and Germans, six hundred; but the British alone, four thousand three hundred—a chasm out of seven thousand five hundred English soldiers engaged, which marks clearly upon whom the weight of the contest had fallen. When the Buffs were called together after the battle, only three privates and one drummer answered to the muster-roll, though great numbers who had been made prisoners, and escaped in the confusion, joined during the night and next day. The survivors were less numerous than the wounded. All the efforts of the Portuguese videttes, to whom the care of the maimed was intrusted, could not provide for the multitude who required their aid; the streamlets on the field, swollen with the rain, which fell without intermission all night, ran red with human blood; while Blake, soured by his own defeat and the English success, refused to send any assistance to the succour of his bleeding allies. But, disastrous as was the condition of the British, that of the French was still more calamitous: forced to a retreat, they were encumbered by six thousand five hundred wounded, for whose relief no means whatever existed. Eight hundred of these unhappy men fell into the hands of the British, who left five hundred prisoners and one howitzer in the hands of their

opponents. But though the trophies of victory were thus nearly balanced, the May 18. result showed decisively on which side success had really been won; for, after remaining the next day in the wood from which he had issued in the morning of the battle, Soult on the following night retired towards Seville by the road he had advanced, leaving the British to resume their position undisturbed around the bastions of Badajoz.*

As soon as it was ascertained that the enemy had retreated, the siege of that fortress was resumed on the left bank of the river, and the light cavalry followed the enemy towards the Sierra Morena, whither Soult was retreating. He left the great road to Seville, and fell back towards Llerena, his cavalry being stationed near Usagre. There, a few days afterwards, they were attacked by the 3d and 4th dragoon guards, supported by Lumley's horse artillery in front, while Madden's Portuguese cavalry assailed them in flank. The result was, that they were completely overthrown, with the loss of a hundred slain and eighty prisoners. This brilliant affair terminated Beresford's independent operations: Wellington had May 23. arrived in person, and taken the command of the siege of Badajoz; Hill, who had returned to Portugal, resumed the command of the second division and the covering army; and Beresford set out for Lisbon, where his influence and great talents of administration were indispensably called for, to restore the dilapidated condition of the Portuguese army.†

Though Beresford's firmness had not proved equal to the dreadful crisis of the battle itself, yet his resolution in maintaining his ground next day, with the diminished and bleeding remnant of his host, was deserving of the highest admiration, and had the most important effect on the fate of the campaign. Soult had still fifteen thousand veterans unhurt when he retired to Llerena; and so strongly had Beresford felt the vast superiority of that force to the handful of British who remained after the battle, that, on the evening on which it had occurred, he had written to Wellington, avowing that he dreaded a renewal of the action and a bloody defeat on the succeeding day; although the troops, justly proud of their victory, had crowned the hill which they had won by such efforts with several hundred flags taken from the Polish lancers, where they waved defiance to the enemy. That he had the firmness to make good his post, and brave such a danger, is a memorable instance of moral resolution; while the retreat of Soult, under circumstances when, by persevering, he might have perhaps achieved success, cannot but be considered as at once a blot in his escutcheon, and the most convincing proof of the ascendancy gained by that extraordinary display of unconquerable intrepidity which the English army had made in this well-debated field, and which encircled their arms with a halo of renown which carried them through all the subsequent dangers of the war. The French military historians are the first to admit this: "Great and disastrous," say they, "was the influence which this fatal day exercised upon the spirit of the French soldiers.

Wellington arrives and takes the command of the siege of Badajoz.

Moral results of the battle.

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 243.

† Jones, i., 387, 388. Vict. et Conq., xx., 243, 245. Nap., iii., 542, 543. Belm., i., 183. Beresford's Despatch, Gurw., vii., 575, 576.

* Jones, i., 388. Nap., iii., 543, 544. Beresford's Despatch, Gurw., vii., 577, 578. Hamilton, iii., 87, 90.

† Nap., iii., 545, 547. Vict. et Conq., xx., 249, 250. Belm., i., 184.

These old warriors, always heretofore conquerors in the North of Europe, and often in Spain, no longer approached the English but with a secret feeling of distrust; while they, on their part, discovered, by the result of the battle of Albuera, the vulnerable side of their antagonists, and learned that, by resisting vigorously the first shock, and taking advantage of superiority of number, they would rarely fail to gain the victory.* In truth, however, the British learned on this bloody field a simpler lesson, which they never afterward forgot, and which they applied with fatal efficacy in all the subsequent battles of the war: viz., that the English *in line* could successfully resist and defeat the French *in column*; and to the constant adherence to this maxim the unbroken career of success which followed is in a great measure to be ascribed.†

Delivered by the retreat of Soult from so formidable an antagonist, and deeply impressed with the necessity of straining every nerve to regain the important fortress of Badajoz, Wellington had no sooner arrived on the spot than he recommenced the siege with the utmost vigour. Both

parties had improved to the uttermost the short breathing-time afforded them by the battle of Albuera; and never was activity more indispensable to either; for it was well known that succour was approaching, and that, unless the place could be carried in a fortnight, the united armies of Marmont and Soult would arrive from the north and south, and compel the raising of the siege. During the absence of the allied forces, Philippon had levelled the trenches and destroyed the approaches of the besiegers, and not only repaired his own works where injured by their fire, but constructed strong interior intrenchments behind where breaches were expected, and considerably augmented his supplies of provisions. Colonel Dickson, who commanded the British engineers, had on his side, by extraordinary activity, got together a train of fifty pieces of heavy artillery; considerable supplies of stores had arrived, and six hundred gunners were at hand to man the pieces. All things being

at length in readiness, the place was wholly invested on the 27th, and two days afterward ground broken against Fort Christoval. The operations of the besiegers were pushed with extraordinary vigour, as Wellington was well aware that the success of the enterprise entirely depended on celerity; and on the evening of the 6th of June the breach

was declared practicable. At midnight the storming party advanced to the attack. They reached the glacis in safety, and descended unobserved into the ditch; but, upon arriving at the foot of the breach, it was discovered that after dark the rubbish had been cleared away from the bottom of the slope, so that it could not be ascended; but the troops, boiling with courage, refused to retire, and remained making vain attempts to get in by escalade, till the severity of the fire, and the stout resistance of the enemy, obliged them to retreat.‡

Taught by this check the quality of the enemy with whom they had to deal, the British took more precautions in their next attempt: the fire continued with great vigour, both on

Christoval and the body of the place, on the three following days, though, from the age and bad condition of the artillery, which had been drawn from Elvas, and of which a part was a hundred and fifty years old, a considerable proportion of the battering-guns had become unserviceable. A heavy fire was also kept up on the castle; but, although the breaching batteries played on it at the distance only of five hundred yards for seven days, from the 2d to the 9th of June, yet so defective was the ordnance, that, at the end of that time, the breach was hardly practicable; and, at any rate, it could not be stormed while the enemy held Christoval, as the guns from the latter fort swept along the foot of the castle wall and over the ground in its front. A second attempt, therefore, was made to carry the latter fort; but, though the storming party was stronger, and the ladders longer than before, a second defeat was experienced. The garrison, who, on the late occasion, had been only seventy-five, were now increased to two hundred men: their spirit, much raised by their former success, was now elevated to such a pitch that they stood on their bastions inviting the British, with loud cheers, to come on; and the provident care of the governor of the fortress, Philippon, whose great talents in this species of warfare were now fully manifested, had not only given each soldier four loaded muskets, but arranged a formidable array of bombs, hand grenades, and powder barrels on the top of the rampart, ready to be rolled over among the assailants the moment they reached the foot of the wall. Notwithstanding these obstacles, and the heroic valour of the garrison, who fought like lions in defence of their post, the assaulting columns united at the bottom of the breach: the scaling-ladders were applied, and some brave men reached the summit; but they were immediately bayoneted by the garrison, and at the same time the bombs and powder barrels, being rolled over, exploded with such violence that the order to retire was reluctantly given. The heroic French then listened to the cries of the British wounded who had been left in the ditch, and, desiring them to raise their scaling-ladders, themselves helped them into the fort, where they were kindly treated: an admirable instance of generosity at such a moment, but by no means singular on either side in the contest of these truly brave nations throughout the whole Peninsular war.*

Though the British army had lost four hundred men since they sat down the second time before Badajoz, and a few days more would unquestionably have put them in possession of that fortress, yet it had now become no longer possible to continue the siege. Napoleon, who fully concurred in Wellington's opinion as to the vast importance of this stronghold upon the issue of the campaign, had, early in May, sent positive orders to Marmont to collect his forces, and co-operate with Soult in the most vigorous manner for its deliverance; and for this object re-enforcements had been poured into the armies on the Portuguese frontier from all parts of Spain. Soult received four thousand men from the army of the North, and as many from that of the South: Drouet, with eight thousand men from the ninth corps, which had been dissolved, was already in march to join him: Marmont was directed to collect

Measures of Napoleon to raise the siege.

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 249.

† Jom., iii., 506, 507. Nap., iii., 557, 558.

‡ Well. to Lord Liverpool, June 12, 1811, Gurw., viii., 12. Nap., iv., 187, 190. Jones, i., 391. Vict. et Conq., xx., 249.

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 249, 250. Jones, i., 291, 292. Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 13, 1811, Gurw., viii., 12, 13. Nap., iv., 190, 192.

his forces on the Tagus, and second the operations of Soult for the relief of Badajoz: Bessières was to occupy Valladolid with ten thousand men, and push an advanced guard to Salamanca, to observe the Ciudad Rodrigo frontier; while Bonnet was to evacuate the Asturias, and take a position on the Orbigo, towards Leon, to observe the loose Spanish array which was collected on the Galician frontier.*

Nor was the anxiety of the emperor confined merely to measures calculated to effect the deliverance of Badajoz. Defensive precautions on the most extensive scale were made over the whole north of the Peninsula, as far back as Bayonne. Astorga was directed to be evacuated, and in part dismantled; strong works erected around the castle of Burgos, the importance of which he even then clearly discerned; a *tête-du-pont* constructed on the Ebro at Miranda, and another on the Bidassoa at Irun; the defiles between Vittoria and Bayonne secured by blockhouses and fortified posts; a citadel of great strength constructed at Santona, so as to render its peninsula impregnable, and serve as a *point d'appui* to a force sent by sea from Bayonne, to operate in the rear of an advancing army; a division under Vaendermaison crossed the Pyrenees, and was incorporated with the army of the North; four reserve brigades collected at Bayonne under General Monthion, who were instantly sent off into Spain as fast as they arrived, and replaced in that fortress by a fresh reserve division of 6000 men; and an entire new corps of reserve formed of the divisions of Reille, Caffarelli, Souham, and the Italian division of Seve-rolle, in all 40,000 strong, to whom the important duty was committed of occupying Biscay, Navarre, and the north of Old Castile, and keeping open the great line of communication with Bayonne. By these means, a very great addition was made to the strength of the French armies in Spain, which, by the end of September, were raised to the enormous amount of 368,000 men, of whom 314,000 were present with the eagles: a force so prodigious as apparently to render hopeless any attempt on the part of the English to dislodge them from the country. Nor were material preparations neglected for the equipment and support of the warlike multitude. Long convoys of ammunition and military stores of all kinds were incessantly traversing the Pyrenees. A million of rations of biscuit were prepared in each of the places of Bayonne, Burgos, and Valladolid; and, though last, not least, as an indication of the sense of Napoleon of the pressing necessity of arresting the English, the maxim that war should maintain war was for a while suspended, and forty millions of francs (£1,600,000) were despatched from Paris for the headquarters of the different armies.†

Although this general displacement and concentration of the French armies, in consequence of the offensive movement of Wellington, had the most important effects, ultimately, upon the war, and afforded the clearest indication of the importance which Napoleon attached to it, as well as the judgment with which the stroke had been directed, yet, in the first instance,

it of necessity compelled the retreat of the English army, and the raising of the siege of Badajoz: On the morning of the 10th, an intercepted letter was brought to Wellington. June 10. from Soult to Marmont, pointing out the enemy's intention immediately to concentrate their whole force in Estramadura, and converge, at the same time, to the banks of the Guadiana; while, on the same day, intelligence arrived from the frontiers of Castile that Marmont's corps were rapidly marching for the same destination, and would be at Merida by the 15th. The united strength of these armies, with the re-enforcements they had received, would have amounted to above sixty thousand men, to whom the English general could not, from the sickness of the British army, and the extraordinary diminution of the Portuguese troops—from the fatigues of the winter campaign, and the inefficiency of the local government—oppose more than forty-eight thousand. In addition to this, the Portuguese authorities had allowed the stores in Elvas to run so low, that enough did not remain in its magazines for a fortnight's defence of the place, far less to answer the demands of the siege of Badajoz: there were none in Lisbon; and no means of transport existed to bring up the English stores from their great dépôt at Abrantes, as no representations on the part of Wellington could induce the regency at Lisbon to endanger their popularity by taking any steps to draw forth the resources of the country for these necessary services. In these circumstances, the raising of the siege had become indispensable; and it took place, without molestation, on the 10th and 11th, the stores and heavy cannon being removed in safety to Elvas.*

It was not long before the wisdom of this retreat became apparent; for Soult Entry of Mar-
and Marmont soon appeared in most mont and
formidable strength on the banks of Soult into
the Guadiana. The former of these Badajoz.
marshals, having received a part of the re-enforcements destined for him, particularly those under Drouet, was strong enough to raise the siege himself, and for that purpose he broke up on the 11th from Llerena, and advanced towards Albuera, whither also Wellington repaired with the bulk of his forces, still maintaining the blockade of Badajoz, in hopes that the garrison, who were known to be in great want of provisions, would be compelled to capitulate before Marmont arrived. The English general, on this occasion, did not fail to occupy the hill which had been so fiercely contested on the former occasion, and the line, in other places, was strengthened by fieldworks. Soult, however, who was aware how rapidly Marmont was approaching, was too wary to be drawn into combat with equal forces, and he therefore kept off till the 17th, June 17. when the near approach of the army of Portugal made it indispensable for the whole allied army to raise the blockade and retire behind the Guadiana. In effect, that marshal, who had neither magazines nor a single horse or mule to convey his supplies, had, by the terrors of military execution, extorted the requisite provisions and means of transport out of the wretched inhabitants, who were reduced to despair;† and

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 253, 254. Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 13, 1811. Belm., i., 189, 190.

† Belm., i., 190, 191. Napoleon to Bessières, June 8, 1811, and Caffarelli, June 11, 1811. Marmont to Napoleon, June 21, 1811. Belm., App., i., No. 76, 78.

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 13, 1811, Gurw., viii., 14, 15. Jones, i., 393. Vict. et Conq., xx., 253, 254.

† "L'armée du Maréchal Marmont se trouvait sans magasins et sans un seul caisson ou cheval pour transporter les canons; tous les chevaux et les mulets du train des équipages militaires ayant péri en Portugal. Elle enleva dans le pays tous les bestiaux, tous les mulets, tous les ânes, toutes

setting out from Alba de Tormes on the 3d of June, he had advanced, by forced marches, through Ciudad Rodrigo and the Puerto de Bamos to Truxillo, which he reached on the 14th. On the 17th his advanced guard was at Merida, while Soult approached to Albuera;

and the British army having retired the same day across the Guadiana, the junction of the French armies was effected on the day following, and they entered Badajoz in triumph on the 28th, at the moment when Philippon and his brave comrades, having exhausted all their means of subsistence, were preparing the means of breaking through the British lines and escaping.*

A signal opportunity was now presented to the French generals for striking a great blow at the English army. By collecting their forces from all quarters, stripping the Asturias, Leon, and the two Castiles of troops, and having enough only in Andalusia to maintain the garrisons, they had assembled a prodigious army in front of Badajoz. Marmont brought 31,000 infantry and 5000 horse, and Soult 25,000 infantry and 3000 admirable horse: in all, 56,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry, with ninety pieces of cannon. To oppose this powerful array, Wellington, who had assembled his whole force from Beira, had only the British and Portuguese; the Spaniards, who took part in the battle of Albuera, having been detached under Blake to cross the Guadalquivir, and menace Seville. There were collected 42,000 infantry, however, and 4000 cavalry, with sixty-four pieces of cannon, around the standards of the British chief; and these were tried soldiers, who had all faced the enemy, and who had the confidence which experience alone can give in each other. Though the French superiority, therefore, especially in cavalry and artillery, was very considerable, and the plains in which the action would be fought, near the Guadiana, were eminently favourable to the action of those arms, yet Wellington justly conceived that, with nearly 50,000 British and Portuguese soldiers, he need not fear to give battle. Select-

ing, therefore, a defensive position behind the Caja, he awaited the approach of the enemy, who crossed the Guadiana in great force, and approached to reconnoitre his position. Everything announced a great and decisive struggle; and as the French had, with infinite labour and difficulty, concentrated their forces from all quarters, from the banks of the Guadalquivir to the mountains of Asturias, and the English had no reserves to fall back upon, it was undoubtedly for their interest to have brought on the fight.†

But at this perilous crisis it was seen of what avail the moral weight of an army is, and how completely it can compensate even the most considerable advantage in point of numbers and equipment in the array to which it is opposed. Though the British sabres and bayonets in the field did not exceed twenty-eight thousand, or scarcely half of the French army, the remainder being Portuguese, yet these were the soldiers of

Talavera and Busaco: the glory of Albuera shone around the bayonets of the right wing, the remembrance of Fuentes d'Onoro added terrors to the left. Despite all the advantages of their situation, and they were many—for the works of Elvas were in such a dilapidated condition that they could not have stood a week's siege, and the garrison had only ten thousand round shot left—the French marshals recoiled before the danger of hazarding the fate of the Peninsula on a pitched battle with such an army; and, after reoccupying Olivenza, which was abandoned on their approach, and reconnoitring the British position, they withdrew without fighting. Nothing occurred except a sharp cavalry action near Elvas, in which 600 British dragoons, at first successful, were at last drawn into an ambuscade by a feigned retreat of the French hussars, and defeated with the loss of 150 men. After remaining a few days together, the French noble array separated, Soult retiring by the way of Albuera towards Seville, and Marmont defiling towards Truxillo and the valley of the Tagus near Talavera.*

Wellington's principal reliance for the means of breaking up this great combined force, which threatened such dangers to Portugal in his front, was on Blake's troops, who, having separated from the British when they crossed the Guadiana on the 17th, had taken the road for Seville, now entirely denuded of defenders by the concentration of Soult's forces for the relief of Badajoz. Although the Spanish general did occasion a diversion on this favourable occasion in the French rear, yet he effected nothing compared to what, with more judgment and energy, might have been achieved. Having recrossed the Guadiana at Martola on the 22d, he reached Castilejos on the 24th, where he remained inactive till the 30th, as if with the express design of giving the enemy time to prepare for his approach. He then moved forward; but, instead of directing the bulk of his forces on Seville, of which he might have easily made himself master, and ruined the famous foundry there, from which the French were making all their ordnance for the siege of Cadiz, he turned to the right, and wasted three days in a fruitless siege of La Niebla, a walled town and castle, garrisoned by 300 men, in the mountains. Villemur and Ballasteros, meanwhile, with a small body, approached within cannon-shot of Seville, where the utmost alarm prevailed among the French depôts, who took refuge, with the Governor-general Daricau, in the fortified convent of La Cartusa; but Soult was by this time rapidly approaching, and the time for striking the blow had gone by. After blowing up the fortifications of Olivenza, he broke up from Badajoz on the 27th of June, relieved, with one of his divisions, the castle of Niebla early in July, despatched another with the utmost haste to secure Seville from assault, and himself crossing the Sierra Morena by Monasterio, re-entered the Andalusian capital on the 7th. Blake, upon the approach of the French, retired precipitately from La Niebla into Portugal, and thence descended to Agamonte, at the mouth of the Guadiana, where he fortunately met with an English frigate and three transports, which conveyed his infantry and cannon to Cadiz. Ballasteros, who, with the

les boitures, et emporta tout le blé qu'elle peut ramasser. La province se trouva complètement ruinée sur un rayon immense, et les habitants furent réduits au désespoir."—BELMAS, i., 192.

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 20, 1811, Gurw., viii., 36, 37. Marmont to Berthier, June 21, 1811, and Soult to Berthier, June 22, 1811. Belm., i., App. No. 78, 79.

† Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 20, 1811, Gurw., viii., 37, 38. Nap., iv., 202. Belm., i., 193, 194. Vict. et Conq., xx., 253, 257.

July 2. shot of Seville, where the utmost alarm prevailed among the French depôts, who took refuge, with the Governor-general Daricau, in the fortified convent of La Cartusa; but Soult was by this time rapidly approaching, and the time for striking the blow had gone by. After blowing up the fortifications of Olivenza, he broke up from Badajoz on the 27th of June, relieved, with one of his divisions, the castle of Niebla early in July, despatched another with the utmost haste to secure Seville from assault, and himself crossing the Sierra Morena by Monasterio, re-entered the Andalusian capital on the 7th. Blake, upon the approach of the French, retired precipitately from La Niebla into Portugal, and thence descended to Agamonte, at the mouth of the Guadiana, where he fortunately met with an English frigate and three transports, which conveyed his infantry and cannon to Cadiz. Ballasteros, who, with the

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 27, 1811, Gurw., viii., 57. Vict. et Conq., xx., 258, 259. Nap., iv., 201.

cavalry, covered the embarkation, afterward took refuge in the adjoining island of Canidas, where he threw up intrenchments, and there he remained till August, when he embarked at Villa Real, and sailed with his infantry to the mountains of Ronda, while his cavalry remounted the Guadiana and joined Castanos, who, with a small force, still kept his ground in the mountains of Estremadura.*†

While these momentous operations were going forward on the Guadiana, a feeble attempt at renewed vigour had taken place in Grenada and on the Murcian frontiers. The mountaineers of Ronda, who had never been subdued, were encouraged, by the departure of the whole disposable forces in Andalusia for the banks of the Guadiana, to make an attempt against the town of Ronda, the capital of their district; and 4000 armed peasants, under the Marquis Las Cuecos, had already reduced the French garrison there, 800 strong, to the last extremity. Soult immediately collected four columns from Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and Grenada, with

July 5. which he speedily raised the siege, and compelled the Spaniards to take refuge in their inaccessible cliffs, with the loss of some hundred men. Indefatigable in his activity, the French marshal next proceeded against the numerous but desultory array of the Murcians, who, to the number of 24,000 men, had advanced against Grenada during his absence on the north of the

July 8. Sierra Morena. The Spaniards made hardly any resistance. No sooner did the advanced guard of Soult make its appearance than the whole array, which was strongly posted at Venta de Bahal in front of Baza, with a strong ravine protecting their front, took to flight and dispersed; and nothing but the unnecessary circumspection of Godinot, who was destined to cut off their retreat, saved them from total ruin. So complete, however, was their rout, that when Blake, who had been despatched from Cadiz with his troops to take the command of this numerous army, arrived, it had entirely vanished, and no force whatever remained in the

Aug. 4. field. The fugitives, however, in great part took refuge in the city of Murcia: its intrenchments were strong; the yellow fever was raging in Cartagena at no great distance; and the French troops were so dreadfully worn out by the long marches and excessive fatigues of the campaign, that Soult refrained from undertaking the siege, and gave his wearied soldiers their long-wished-for rest amid the smiling villages of Andalusia.†

Consequences far more important followed on the other extremity of this vast line of operations. The evacuation of the Asturias by Bonnet, the concentration of the French forces in Old Castile, and the commencement of

defensive preparations at Burgos, on the Ebro, and even on the Bidassoa, in pursuance of the provident commands of Napoleon, which have been already mentioned,* produced an extraordinary excitement in the northern provinces. The inhabitants of these mountain regions, brave, hardy, and independent, in whom centuries of freedom had created elevation of character, and Alpine air nourished physical resolution, were universally roused by these apparently decisive indications of returning success, and with joyful steps repaired to the headquarters of the indefatigable chief who still, in their rocky fastnesses, maintained the standard of independence. The intelligence of the retreat of the French from Portugal, and the battles of Fuentes d'Onoro and Albuera, coupled with the defensive preparations made on so extensive a scale in all Biscay and Old Castile, produced a general belief on the frontier that the French were about to retire altogether from the Peninsula, and that a vigorous insurrection in the northern provinces would cut off their means of retreat, and effect, by a clap of thunder, the entire deliverance of the Peninsula. Upon a brave people, impressed with these feelings and expectations, Mina from Navarre, Mendizabel, who had disembarked in Biscay from Asturias, and Duran and the Empecinado in the northern parts of Old Castile, found no difficulty in making a very great impression. The insurrection spread like wildfire through all the hill country: every glen, every valley poured forth its little horde of men; the patriot bands swelled in all the principal towns; and, contrary to what had heretofore been observed, were filled with young men of the first families in the country.†

Mendizabel, who had landed in Biscay early in June, soon found himself at the head of twelve thousand men, and from Potes, his headquarters, extended his incursions to Burgos and

Operations of the insurgents in these provinces.

Vittoria: Mina was the chief of an equal force in Navarre, and, sweeping the country to the very gates of Saragossa, answered the atrocious proclamations, already noticed, of Bessières: by a counter one, breathing the indignant spirit of retaliation and defiance;‡ while the Empecinado and Duran, in Old Castile, had become so formidable that they laid siege to, and captured the important fortified town of Catalayud, though defended by five hundred men. So urgent did affairs become in the northern

June 5. provinces, and so uneasy was Napoleon at the insecurity of his communications in that quarter, that the Imperial Guard, which had entered Spain, were halted at Vittoria, and despatched to the right and left against the insurgents; succour was drawn both from the army of Portugal and that of the centre; and the large re-enforcements pouring through the Pyrenees into the Peninsula were in great part absorbed in this harassing and murderous warfare. Mina's hands were defeated on two occasions

June 9. with considerable loss by these formidable antagonists, but their success availed little to the victors. The defeated corps, as in the days of Sertorius, dispersed, having previously fixed on some distant and inaccessible point of rendezvous. The French retired from the country, thinking that the insurrection was

* Nap., iv., 209, 211. Tor., iv., 77, 81. Vict. et Conq., xx., 259, 265.

† A curious incident, attended with most disastrous consequences, took place in Estremadura at this period. As some of the Portuguese troops were firing a *feu-de-jote* in a cornfield in the neighbourhood of Badajoz in dry and sultry weather, the corn took fire, and the conflagration spread with such extraordinary rapidity and violence, advancing, as it always does, towards the northeast wind, which was blowing with gentle gales, that in three days it had reached Merida, a distance of above thirty miles, which only escaped total destruction by the ample stream of the Guadiana, which stopped the flames.—See TURRENO, iv., 75.

‡ Vict. et Conq., xx., 264, 267. Nap., iv., 211, 212. Tor., iv., 200, 207.

* Ante, iv., 449.

† Count Belliard to Berthier, June 3. 1811. Belm., i., App., No. 72, and i., 204.

‡ Ante, iii., 438.

§ Ante, iii., 438

subdued; and they were apprized of their mistake by learning that their enemy had reappeared in undiminished strength in some other quarter, or cut off some post of consequence at a great distance from the scene of action.*†

These threatening appearances in the north soon produced the most vigorous measures on the part of the French emperor to secure this, which, from the commencement of the war, he had always considered as the vital point of the Peninsula. The Imperial Guard, under Dorsenne, at Burgos, who soon after replaced Bessières in the command of the army of the North, was augmented to seventeen thousand men: thirteen thousand were collected at Benavente to observe the Galicians under Santocildes, who were beginning to assume a threatening position at the mouths of their glens on that frontier; and nearly forty thousand fresh troops, chiefly old soldiers, crossed the Bidassoa and entered Spain. The great amount of these re-enforcements, joined to the narrow escape which Badajoz had just made from falling into the hands of the British, induced Napoleon to make a material change in the distribution of his troops and the duties of his commanders. Marmont, withdrawn from the plains of Leon, which his troops had rendered a perfect desert, and the protection of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was confided to Dorsenne and the army of the North, was directed to take up his cantonments in the rich and comparatively unexhausted valley of the Tagus, from whence, without neglecting that fortress, he was to consider himself principally intrusted with the defence of Badajoz. For this purpose, he was to station two divisions at Truxillo, ready to succour whichever place might be first threatened; to construct a double-fortified *tele-dupont* at Almaraz, so as to secure that valuable passage of the Tagus; and to fortify the Puerte de Banos, so as to be master of that important pass through the mountains. For the support of his troops the whole province of Toledo was assigned to Marmont, who immediately began forming magazines from it at Talavera, to the infinite mortification of Joseph, who thus saw his principal granary and means of subsistence entirely diverted from his capital and court. Soult was enjoined to hold himself in readiness to advance with thirty thousand men to raise the siege of Badajoz, if it should be again threatened by an English army; while Dorsenne, with the army of the North, now augmented to sixty thousand admirable troops, was intrusted with the onerous and irreconcilable duties of at once guarding the northern passes against the insurgents of Navarre and Biscay, and protecting Ciudad Ro-

drigo from the enterprises of the British general.*

While Marmont was carrying these fresh instructions, which he immediately did, Wellington's into execution, and busily engaged in movement to constructing, at Almaraz, the double the north of forts at each end of the bridge, which Portugal. was to secure the passage of the Tagus, Wellington, who constantly had an eye on the frontier fortresses, and felt that the recovery of one or both of them was essential to any durable impression on the Spanish territory, made a corresponding movement to the frontiers of Beira with the bulk of his forces. Leaving Hill, with ten thousand infantry, fifteen hundred horse, and four brigades of artillery on the Estremadura frontier, at Portalegre and Villa Viciosa, he himself moved, with the remainder of his July 21. forces, about forty thousand strong, to Aug. 8. the north of the Tagus, and marching leisurely by Castlebranco, arrived on the Coa, opposite Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 8th of August.†

The French general imagined that this movement was intended to co-operate with Defeat of the Galicians on the Escla. July 9. an advance which had recently taken place on the part of the Galicians under Santocildes, who had descended from their mountains into the plains of Leon, and reoccupied Astorga, when the general concentration of the imperial forces for the relief of Badajoz left the northern provinces comparatively destitute of French troops. To defeat this supposed combination, Dorsenne resolved, in the first instance, to drive back the Spaniards, who were threatening his right flank; and this proved a task of no difficulty. The Galicians, destitute of everything, and almost starving, had dwindled away to thirteen thousand ill-disciplined men, who were stationed behind the Escla, and at Foncebudon. Attacked, in the end of August, by Dorsenne with greatly superior forces, the Spaniards, after some sharp skirmishes, in which they were roughly handled by the French dragoons, were cut off from their magazines at Villa Franca and Lugo, and forced back into the mountains around the Val des Orres, on the Portuguese frontier. The alarm was excessive in Galicia; and nothing saved the whole province from falling into the hands of the invaders but the advance of Wellington to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo, which instantly checked the progress of the victorious French on the road to Lugo, and compelled Dorsenne, who had reoccupied Astorga, in which he now left an adequate garrison, to call in his detachments from all quarters to provide for the defence of that important fortress. In his retreat from Villa Franca to Astorga, the French general entirely devastated a line of country above twenty leagues in length: a barbarous measure, and as impolitic as it was cruel, as, by the admission of their own historians, it destroyed a part of the resources of their principal army.‡

Though the march of the British from the banks of the Guadiana to those of the Coa was attended with this important collateral effect in rescuing Galicia, with its valuable harbours and naval establishments, from the grasp of the enemy, yet it was not the real object which Wellington's measures for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

* Napoleon to Marmont, July 10, 1811. Belm., i., No. 800, Appendix, and i., 194, 195.

† Nap., iv., 224. Belm., i., 196.

‡ Tor., iv., 245, 249. Nap., iv., 224, 226. Belm., i., 196, 197. Vict. et Conq., xx., 287, 289.

* Belm., i., 204, 205. Vict. et Conq., xx., 284, 285. Bessières to Berthier, June 6, 1811. Belm., i., Appendix, No. 73.

† "The army of the North is composed of forty-four thousand men, it is true; but, if you draw together twenty thousand, the communications are instantly lost, and the insurrection makes the greatest progress. The seacoasts will soon be lost as far as Bilbao. We are in want of everything: in fact, it is with the utmost difficulty that we can get subsistence from day to day. The spirit of the country is frightful. The journey of the king to Paris, the retreat of the army from Portugal, its march to the Tagus, and the evacuation of the whole country, not even excluding Salamanca, have turned the heads of the people to a degree which I cannot express. The insurgents recruit and swell in all quarters with extraordinary activity. If I am obliged to adopt a decided line, you must not reckon on the communications. Vittoria, Burgos, and Valladolid are the only points which I can hold."—BESSIÈRES TO BERTHIER, Valladolid, June 6, 1811, No. 73. BELMAS, i., 560. See also BERTHIER TO BERTHIER, Madrid, 3d June, 1811. Ibid., i., 358.

Wellington had in view. Ostensibly undertaken to remove his troops from the sands of the Guadiana, so well known in the autumnal months to be fraught with death, to a more healthy region, he hoped to realize from it not only increased healthiness to his ranks, but additional security to the realm intrusted to his defence. It was on Ciudad Rodrigo that his heart was fixed; and the dispersed situation of the French armies charged with its defence, joined to the defective state of the supplies with which the garrison was furnished, inspired him with a well-grounded hope that, by a sudden attack, it might be wrested from their hands. With this view he had, with all imaginable secrecy, prepared a powerful battering-train of iron guns at Lisbon, which, with a re-enforcement of British artillerymen, recently arrived from England, were ostentatiously embarked at that harbour as if for Cadiz; but at sea they were shifted on board small craft, which brought them first to Oporto, and then to Lamego, a hundred miles from the seacoast, near the Douro, which, being one of the great depôts of the army, the arrival of the carts containing them excited little attention. The operation, however, of bringing sixty-eight heavy guns, with all their stores complete, up sixty miles of water-carriage, and then across nearly forty more of rough mountain roads, was one of no ordinary magnitude: five thousand bullocks and a thousand militia were employed in transporting the train, and repairing the roads for several weeks together; and nothing but the universal and indelible hatred which the cruelty and exactions of the French in that part of Spain had excited, could have prevented the transport of this great armament from coming to their knowledge. As it was, however, they remained entirely ignorant of what was going forward: the guns, by vast exertions, arrived safe at the place of their destination, and Wellington had the satisfaction of thinking that, unknown to the enemy, he had secured a powerful battering-train within little more than sixty miles of Ciudad Rodrigo.*

The enterprise thus undertaken by Wellington was equally bold in conception, and cautiously provided for in execution. The battering-train was brought forward, still unknown to the enemy, to Villa de Ponte, only sixteen leagues in rear of the army; Don Julian Sanchez, with his guerillas, had for some time past established a blockade of the fortress; while the allied army remained in healthy cantonments on the high grounds around Fuente Guinaldo, almost within sight of its walls, ready at a moment's notice either to commence a siege, or move forward to protect the blockade. The fortress, it was known, had only provisions for six weeks; and though the French armies of Dorsenne, Marmont, and Soult could, by concentrating, bring ninety thousand men, or nearly double his own force, to its relief, yet the hopes of Wellington were founded upon the experienced impossibility of such a force being able, from want of provisions, to keep any time together; and though they might relieve it at a particular moment, he trusted that the time would ere long arrive when he might strike a successful blow during the time that they were still at a distance. The army was now greatly improved in health, in the highest spirits, and in ad-

mirable order: the re-enforcements recently arrived from England had raised its numerical amount to forty-eight thousand infantry, five thousand cavalry, and seventy-two guns, besides the battering-train; of this array, about forty-five thousand were under Wellington's own command, while the water-carriage in their rear enabled them constantly to keep together; and their central position went far, in the long run, to counterbalance the great superiority of force, which, by concentrating all their armies, the enemy might bring to bear against him.*

This concentration of the allied force in a position which constantly menaced Ciudad Rodrigo, was attended with this farther and most important advantage, that it entirely disconcerted a deep project which Napoleon had conceived at this period, and which Soult had warmly espoused, and was preparing in the South the means of carrying into execution: viz., of invading Portugal with the combined armies of Marmont and the South, and transferring the seat of war into the Alentejo. This design, which was unquestionably the true mode of attacking Portugal, as it led by the shortest road to Lisbon, and took the famous defences of Torres Vedras in rear, is to be found fully developed in a despatch by the French emperor to Marmont, of the date of the 18th of September, 1811. That marshal's force, which was estimated as likely then to amount to forty-one thousand men, was to be joined by several divisions of Soult's forces, of whom twenty thousand were still in Estremadura; and with the united force, above sixty-five thousand men, he was to besiege Elvas and inundate the Alentejo. If Wellington, as a set-off against this irruption, moved against Salamanca and the army of the North, Dorsenne was to fall back to Valladolid, or even Burgos, where fifty thousand men would be assembled to stop his progress; if, as was deemed more probable, the English drew towards Lisbon, and descended the valley of the Tagus, Dorsenne was to follow them with twenty-five thousand men; and in either case, Elvas, it was expected, would fall, and the French armies be placed in cantonments in the Alentejo about the same time that Suchet made himself master of Valencia. This well-conceived design, which perfectly coincided with what Soult had long been contemplating, was entirely based on the supposition that "the English had no heavy artillery for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; for, if that enterprise is once undertaken, you must march at once to its relief:" a striking proof of the important effects consequent on the admirable stratagem by which the English general had already secured that vital arm within a few days' march of the menaced fortress.†

Wellington, in the first instance, intended to have besieged Ciudad Rodrigo, as he conceived himself sufficiently strong to undertake that enterprise in the face of Marmont, and the succour of ten thousand men, which could alone, he conceived, be detached from the army of the North to its relief; and under this impression the preparations for the attack went on with great activity. He had not been many days, however, engaged in this

Project of Napoleon for invading the Alentejo by Soult and Marmont.

Wellington turns the siege into a blockade, and French approach to raise the siege.

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, July 18, 1811. Gurw., viii., 111. Nap., iv., 222, 224. Jones, ii., 28, 31.

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, July 18, 1811. Gurw., viii., 111, 112. Jones, ii., 29, 30. Nap., iv., 219, 221.

† Napoleon to Marmont, Sept. 18, 1811. Belin., i., App., No. 82.

undertaking, when he learned that nearly five- and twenty thousand admirable troops were disposable around Dorsenne's standards. Upon this, he changed his plan for the time to a blockade, and advanced his cavalry so as to straiten the fortress; while Almeida, in the rear, was put into a respectable posture of defence, in order to form a secure place of deposit for the battering-train, still at Villa de Ponte, in case of disaster. No sooner did the French generals receive intelligence of the danger with which the fortress was threatened, than they assembled their forces, and collected supplies for its relief: Dorsenne, with infinite difficulty, and by the most rigorous exertions, got together nine hundred wagons, laden with provisions, for that purpose; and bringing down the divisions Vaendermaison and Souham from Navarre, put himself at the head of above thirty thousand soldiers to cover their entry. Marmont, at the same time, who had been strongly re-enforced, and had now fifty thousand effective men around his eagles, in the valley of the Tagus, also collected a large convoy at Bejar, and advanced with a like body to form a junction with the army of the North. Their united forces, above sixty thousand strong, of whom six thousand were cavalry, with a hundred pieces of cannon, united at Tamañes on the 21st of September, and immediately advanced towards Ciudad Rodrigo, where Wellington, expecting their approach, had assembled all the forces, forty-five thousand strong, under his immediate command, to watch, and, if possible, prevent, their entrance.*

Every man in both armies conceived that the decisive moment had now arrived, and that a pitched battle between these gallant antagonist hosts was now to determine the fate of the Peninsula. But the crisis passed over without any momentous occurrence: the hour of Spain's deliverance had not yet struck. Wellington was too sagacious to trust to doubtful hazard what he felt confident he would ere long accomplish by skill. Though with the noble army at his command he had no reason to dread a battle even against the superior forces of the French marshal, yet there were many reasons which rendered it inexpedient at this time to incur the hazard an engagement on such a scale would necessarily occasion even with the best troops. The position which he held in presence of Rodrigo was extensive, and therefore weak: the height of El Bodon in its centre, which was in front of the whole, was indeed strong, and Fuente Guinaldo had been improved by fieldworks; but the wings, which occupied a great extent of country, were in the plain, where the enemy's great superiority in cavalry gave him a decided advantage; and the position, with the right wing alone across the Agueda, and the centre and left behind that river, was dangerous, from the high banks which lined its sides, and the sudden floods to which in autumn it was subject. The English general, too, was well aware that want of provisions must soon compel the vast array in his front to separate and return to their distant cantonments, and then he meditated a sudden attack with the heavy artillery, which, without their being aware of it, he had at hand. Still Wellington resolved to fight, if he could do so on terms at all approaching to equality; and for this purpose, without attempting to prevent the pas-

sage of the convoys, which entered on the 24th, he kept his troops on their ground, though with some hazard to the right wing, advanced beyond the river in order to compel the enemy to concentrate and show all his force, to protect that operation.*

When the French army approached the British, it was at first uncertain on which point they would direct their attack; but, after some hesitation, Monbrun, with fourteen battalions and thirty-five squadrons of splendid horsemen, crossed the Agueda by the bridge of Rodrigo and adjacent fords, and, pouring rapidly along the road, soon reached the heights of El Bodon. The British, at this point of their position, were not prepared for so sudden an onset; and, while Wellington sent to Guinaldo for a brigade of the 4th division, Major-general Colville, the officer in command, was directed to draw up his little force, consisting of the 5th and 77th British regiments and 21st Portuguese, with eight Portuguese guns and five squadrons of Alten's German dragoons, on the summit of the height, which was convex, towards the enemy, and secured on either flank by deep and rugged ravines. Though Picton, with the 4th division, made all imaginable haste to reach the scene of danger, the crisis had passed before he got up. On came Monbrun's cuirassiers like a whirlwind, in spite of the severe cannonade, which tore their masses in a fearful manner, and dividing into two bodies, when they reached the front of the hill, rode up the rugged sides of the ravines with the utmost fury, and were only checked by the steady fire of the guns and devoted intrepidity of the German horsemen at the summit, who, for three mortal hours, charged the heads of the squadrons as they ascended, and hurled them not less than twenty times, men and horses rolling over each other, back into the hollows. Monbrun, however, was resolute. His cavalry were numerous and daring; and by repeated charges and extreme gallantry, they at length got a footing on the top, and captured two of the guns, cutting down the brave Portuguese at their pieces; but the 5th regiment instantly rushed forward, though in line, into the midst of the horsemen, and retook their guns, which quickly renewed their fire; and at the same time the 77th and 21st Portuguese forced the horsemen down the steep on the other side. But, though this phalanx of heroes thus made good their post, the advance of the enemy rendered it no longer tenable. A French division was rapidly approaching the only road by which they could rejoin the remainder of the centre at Fuente Guinaldo; and, despite all the peril of the movement, Wellington ordered them to descend the hill and cross the plain, six miles broad, to Fuente Guinaldo.†

If the observations of Plutarch be just, that it is not those actions which lead to the greatest results, so much as those in which the greatest heroism or magnanimity is displayed, which are the most important subjects of history, never was a combat more deserving of remembrance than this extraordinary action. Descending from his rugged post into the plain, the dauntless Colville formed his infantry into two squares; and the German

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Sept. 29, 1811, *Garw.*, viii., 300, 301. *Nap.*, iv., 236, 238.

† Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Sept. 29, 1811, *Garw.*, viii., 301, 302. *Nap.*, iv., 239, 240. *Vict. et Conq.*, xx. 273 *Lond.*, ii., 211. *Beamish German Leg.*, ii., 15.

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Sept. 29, 1811. *Nap.*, v., 229, 237. *Belm.*, i., 197

dragons, altogether unable to withstand the enormous mass of the French cavalry in the open plain, being obliged to take shelter behind the Portuguese regiment which was first in retreat, the foot-soldiers in the rear, consisting of the 5th and 77th, denuded on all sides, were instantly enveloped by a whirlwind of horse. The thundering squadrons, with their scabbards clattering against each other, rending the air with their cries, shaking the ground beneath their feet, charged with apparently resistless force on three sides of the steady square; but vain, even in the bravest hands, is the sabre against the bayonet, if equally firmly held. A rolling volley is heard, spreading out like a fan around the mass; the steeds recoil as from the edge of a glowing crater; in an instant the horsemen, scorched, reeling, and dismayed, are scattered on all sides as by the explosion of a volcano; "the glitter of bayonets is seen on the edge of the smoke; and the British regiments, unscathed, came forth like the holy men from the Assyrian furnace."*†

Before the French could recover from this bloody repulse, Picton, who had used the utmost diligence to reach his comrades, joined the retreating squares; and the whole uniting together, retreated in admirable order for six miles over the arid plain, till they reached the position of Fuente Guinaldo, assigned for the general rendezvous in the rear. During this march was exhibited, in the most striking manner, the extraordinary steadiness which discipline and experience had given to each of the rival bodies. The British moved in close order with their flanks to the enemy, who, in great strength, rode on each side within pistol-shot. With eager glance the officers and men of both armies, during this long and anxious march, eyed each other, watching for any incident or momentary confusion which might afford an opportunity for an attack, but none such occurred; and the British reached their destination without being again charged or molested, save by the firing of six pieces of horse artillery which hung on the rear of their column, and poured in an incessant fire of round shot, grape, and canister.† Wellington now gave orders for concentrating his troops around Fuente Guinaldo. The light division was directed to retire across the Agueda and join the line, and the left, under Graham, to

come up from the Azaza; but Craufurd, who commanded the former, eager for fighting, only came a few miles nearer, and was still sixteen miles off. Graham was twelve; and at nightfall only fifteen thousand men were collected in front of the French army, when a general battle was confidently expected by both parties.*

Marmont had now gained a great advantage over the English general, but he was ignorant of the inestimable prize which was almost within his grasp. On the morning of the 26th he had collected his whole army, sixty thousand strong, with one hundred and twenty guns, within cannon-shot of the British centre. Wellington's position was now most critical; for, as neither his right nor left wing had come up, he had not more than fifteen thousand men at his disposal to resist the overwhelming force of the enemy; and retreat he would not, for that would be to abandon Craufurd and the light division to destruction. He accordingly stood firm, and the troops anxiously gazed on the enemy, expecting a decisive battle. The array which Marmont drew forth was indeed splendid, and calculated to inspire the most elevated ideas of the power of the French Empire. The enormous mass of cavalry, seven thousand strong, whose gallantry the allies had felt on the preceding day, stood in compact array before them; next came different bodies of infantry and artillery, above twenty-five thousand strong, who went through various evolutions with extraordinary precision: at noon twelve battalions of the Imperial Guard stood forth in close column, and by their martial air, admirable array, and bloody overhanging plumes, attracted universal attention. During the whole day, horse, foot, and cannon never ceased to pour into the French camp, and everything was made ready for an attack the next day on the British position. But Shakspeare's tide in the affairs of men was never more strikingly exemplified than on this occasion. While Marmont, in the vain confidence of irresistible strength, was thus making a useless display of his forces, when Wellington, with three divisions only, lay before him, the precious hours, never to be recalled, passed away: reinforcements came rapidly in to the English line; at three o'clock the light division came up; and the object for which the position of Fuente Guinaldo had been held being now accomplished, a retreat was by the English general ordered in the night to a new position much stronger, because narrower than the former, in the rear, where the allied army was now concentrated between the Coa and the sources of the Agueda; and the plumes of the Imperial Guard were not again seen by the British army till they waved over the fall of the Empire on the field of Waterloo.†

The British right wing retired by two roads on Albergaria and Aldea del Ponte, while the left fell back to Bismula; and with such regularity was the retreat conducted, that not only no sick or stragglers, but not even an article of baggage, was

* Nap., iv., 239, 240. Lond., ii., 213, 214. Beamish, ii., 16. Wellington to Lord Liverpool, September 29, 1811, Gurw., viii., 302.

† NAPIER, iv., 240, has the chief merit of this glowing description.

‡ "Picton, during this retreat, conducted himself with his accustomed coolness. He remained on the left flank of the column, and repeatedly cautioned the different battalions to mind the quarter-distance and the telling-off. 'Your safety,' said he, 'my credit, and the honour of the army, are at stake. All rests with you at this moment.' We had reached to within a mile of the entrenched camp, when Monbrun, impatient lest we should escape from his grasp, ordered his troopers to bring up their left shoulders and incline towards our columns. The movement was not exactly bringing his squadron into line, but it was the next thing to it, and at this time they were within half pistol-shot of us. Picton took off his hat, and, holding it over his eyes as a shade from the sun, looked sternly, but anxiously, at the French. The clatter of the horses and the clanking of the scabbards were so great when the right half squadron moved up, that many thought it was the forerunner of a general charge, and some of the mounted officers called out, 'Had we not better form square?' 'No,' replied Picton; 'it is but a ruse to frighten us, but it won't do.' And so, in effect, it proved. Each battalion, in its turn, formed the rear-guard to stop the advance of the enemy, and having given them a volley, they fell back at double quick time behind the battalion formed in their rear."—*Reminiscences of a Subaltern*, p. 182, and PICTON'S *Memoirs*, ii., 37, 39.

* Nap., iv., 241, 242. Lond., ii., 214, 215. Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Sept. 29, 1811, Gurw., viii., 302.

† Nap., iv., 241, 243. Lond., ii., 215, 217. Beamish, ii., 18. Gurw., viii., 302, 303.

‡ "When Marmont, next day, was informed of the slender amount of force which lay before him at Fuente Guinaldo on the 26th, and that the light division had not come up, he exclaimed, 'And, Wellington, thy star is too bright!'"—NAPIER, iv., 248.

left behind. By a strange coincidence, but of which a more memorable instance occurred afterward in the Moscow retreat, the French army at the same moment was also retiring, and for some hours these two gallant hosts were literally marching with their backs to each other! As soon as the British retreat was discovered, the French wheeled about and moved back in pursuit; but, before they could come up with the English army, the new ground was taken. A sharp action ensued at Aldea del Ponte,

Sept. 27 where a French column attacked a brigade of the 4th division, but was quickly repulsed; and the British, assuming the offensive, drove the enemy out of the village, which was held till the whole army had reached its destined ground, when the French again returned, and it was evacuated, with some loss. On the

Sept. 28, Wellington retired a league farther, to a very strong and narrow position in front of the Coa, where he meant to give battle, even with all the risk of fighting with a river, edged by rocky banks, in his rear. As it was, however, neither the strength nor the danger of the position was put to the test. Marmont, who was already severely pinched for provisions, retired towards Ciudad Rodrigo the same day, and shortly after passed the Puerte de Banos, and resumed his old quarters on the banks of the Tagus; while Dorsenne retreated to Salamanca and the Douro, and Wellington put his troops into cantonments on both banks of the Coa, the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo being resumed by Don Julian Sanchez and the British light cavalry.*

In these brilliant actions the allies sustained a loss of about three hundred men; that of the French was more than double this number, owing to the rapidity and precision of the fire of the infantry on their dense squadrons at El Bodon, and on the retreat to Guinaldo. The most heroic yet generous spirit animated both armies, of which an interesting instance occurred in one of the cavalry encounters. A French officer was in the act of striking at the brave Captain Felton Harvey of the 14th dragoons, when, seeing he had only one arm, he quickly let his sword fall to a salute, and passed on. Major Gordon,† who had been sent by Wellington's flag of truce to Marmont's headquarters, was hospitably received by the French marshal, with whom he frequently dined, and often accompanied on his rides round the outposts, on which occasions the prospects of the campaign and the qualities of the troops on both sides were freely discussed; and General Regnaud, governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, having fallen soon after into an ambushade laid by the indefatigable Don Julian Sanchez, and been made prisoner, he became a frequent guest at Wellington's table, where he occasioned no small entertainment by the numerous anecdotes he related of the French generals and armies. Such is war between brave nations, by whom all feelings of hostility are invariably laid aside, and glide into those of peculiar courtesy, the moment the individual ceases to act in the hostile ranks.‡

The allied army, which had been unhealthy during the whole campaign, became doubly so when the troops went into cantonments; and they

had not been at rest a fortnight before the sick had augmented to above seventeen thousand, the usual effect of the sudden cessation of active operations on men whose bilious secretions had been greatly increased by the long continuance of fatigue in warm weather, and which, now no longer exhaling in perspiration, induced fevers. The French, however, were nearly as unhealthy, and the penury of subsistence on the Portuguese frontier rendered it absolutely impossible for their generals to undertake any operation of importance. Dorsenne, in the north, took advantage of this intermission of active operations on the Portuguese frontier, to push Bonnet, with a strong division, into the Asturias, who without difficulty surmounted the passes of Cubillas and Ventana, which had been left unguarded by the enemy, and reoccupied Oviedo, Gihon, and all the principal posts in the country. This expedition, joined to the pressing necessity of subduing the insurrection in the northern provinces, and the dark clouds which were arising in the north, led, in December, to a fresh disposition of the imperial forces. Marmont received orders to establish his headquarters at Valladolid; Dorsenne was to retire to Burgos, and occupy strongly Biscay and Navarre; while the Imperial Guard was transferred to Burgos, where it was to hold itself in readiness to march into France: a series of arrangements which already revealed the secret views of Napoleon for a Russian campaign.*

This concluded the campaign of 1811, so far as the operations of the principal armies were concerned; but several important operations occurred with detached corps, which, like the red hue of the evening sky, already gave presage of the glorious dawn.

The first of these events was the surprise of Gerard's division at Aroyos de Molinos, on the 28th of October.

When Wellington concentrated his army at Fuente Guinaldo to oppose Marmont and Dorsenne, Hill was left in the northern part of Estremadura to watch Drouet, who remained opposite to him in that country. After a variety of marches and countermarches, which led to no result, both generals having orders not to fight unless an opportunity should occur of doing so to advantage, Hill received intelligence, on the 27th of October, that Gerard, with three thousand infantry and cavalry belonging to Drouet's corps, lay at Aroyos de Molinos, in such a situation as to be liable, by a sudden cross-march, to a surprise from the English troops. That able officer instantly made his dispositions: by a forced march he reached Aluescar, four miles from where Gerard lay, before nightfall, and passed the early part of the night in bivouac, without permitting any light to be made, or the slightest sound to escape which might lead the French patrols to suspect their vicinity. At two in the morning he broke up, and, advancing swiftly and silently, got close to the road by which he knew the enemy would march out on the following morning, yet concealed from their view by an intervening ridge. In that position they awaited the break of day, and as soon as the gray of the dawn appeared, the column divided into parts:

Reoccupation of Asturias by Bonnet, and concentration of French forces at Valladolid and Burgos.

Nov., 1811.

Surprise of Gerard at Aroyos de Molinos.

October 28.

* Gurw., viii., 304, 305. Nap., iv., 243, 245. Lond., ii., 217, 227. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 19, 21.

† Brother to the Earl of Aberdeen.

‡ Nap., iv., 225, 230, 252, 254.

* Gurw., viii., 384. Belm., i., 203, 204. Berthier to Joseph, Dec. 13, 1811. Ibid., Appendix, No. 84. Lond., ii., 225, 226.

the right, under General Howard, by a wide circuit into the rear of the town by which the French were to retreat; the left, under General Stewart, directly on the town from the Aluescar road. The latter column was to attack first; and it was hoped that the enemy, dislodged by a sudden attack from the town, would be completely destroyed by falling into the jaws of Howard's men on their line of retreat.*

On this occasion the British felt the benefit of that unbounded confidence and attachment with which they had inspired the Spanish peasantry; for, though the whole inhabitants of Aluescar and its vicinity knew perfectly of the arrival and the object which they had in view, not a man betrayed the secret, and Stewart's columns were within gunshot of the enemy before they were aware of their approach. Favoured by a thick mist and deluge of rain, the troops entered Aroyos, with drums suddenly beating and loud cheers, so unexpectedly, that the cavalry pickets were rushed upon before they had time to mount, and the infantry, who were under arms, beginning to muster, were so confounded, that, after a desultory struggle, they fled precipitately out of the town,† leaving a great many of their number prisoners. Once outside, however, they formed two squares, and endeavoured to resist; but, while a brisk firing was going on between their rear and Stewart's men pressing on in pursuit, Howard's column suddenly appeared directly in their rear on the great road to Truxillo, and no alternative remained but to surrender, or break and seek safety by climbing the steep and rugged sides of the Sierra on their flank. Gerard,‡ however, who was a gallant officer as well as skilful, though surprised on this occasion, for some time made a brave resistance; but seeing his guns taken by the 15th dragoons, and his hussars dispersed with great slaughter by the 9th dragoons and German hussars, he became aware that his situation was desperate, and gave the word to disperse. Instantly the squares broke, and all the men, throwing away their arms, ran as fast as their legs could carry them towards the most rugged and inaccessible part of the Sierra. Swiftly as they fled, however, the British pursued as quickly: the Highlanders, at home among the rocks and scours, secured prisoners at every step; the 28th and 34th followed rapidly on the footsteps of the flying mass; the 39th turned them by the Truxillo road; and Gerard himself, after displaying the greatest intrepidity, only escaped by throwing himself into rugged cliffs, where the British, encumbered with their arms, could not follow him. He joined Drouet, by devious mountain paths, at Orellano on the 9th of November, with only six hundred followers, without arms and in woful plight, the poor remains of three thousand superb troops who were around his eagles at Aroyos de Molinos, and were esteemed the best brigade in Spain.§ General Bron and Prince d'Aremburg, with thirteen

hundred prisoners, three guns, and the whole baggage of the enemy, fell into the hands of the victors.

This brilliant success, which was achieved with the loss only of twenty killed and wounded, diffused the highest satisfaction through the whole British army; and shortly after the health of the troops was materially improved by a considerable portion of them being moved into better supplied and more comfortable quarters on the banks of the Mondego and the Douro. The sick daily diminished, the spirits of the men rose, and soon the hospitals were relieved of half their inmates. Meanwhile, Wellington took none of the rest to himself which he allowed to his troops: with unwearied industry he laboured incessantly at the improvement of the transport service, which was soon put on a much more efficient footing, and the forwarding of stores and ammunition to the front, which clearly showed that Ciudad Rodrigo was ere long to be besieged. In spite of all his vigilance, however, the enemy contrived to throw more than one convoy into that Nov. 9. fortress, and in the end the blockade was almost abandoned, from finding that the investing force was more straitened for provisions than the invested. Wellington, however, did not care for the introduction of these supplies, as all his efforts had long been directed to besieging the place in form; for which purpose he had already prepared, with infinite pains and secrecy, a portable bridge, which was to be thrown, for the passage of the stores, over the Agueda, and rendered the Douro navigable for boats as far up as its junction with that river, forty miles higher than they had ever yet ascended. But ere the season for striking the meditated blow arrived, new and cheering advices had arrived from the south of Spain.*

Ballasteros, after his embarkation at Ayamonte, subsequent to the battle of French expedition against Albuerca, had landed in the south of Tarifa, which Spain, where he had drawn several thousand recruits to his standard; fails, Oct. 14, and Oct. 27. but, being unable to withstand the powerful force which Soult directed against him, he had more than once taken refuge under the cannon of Gibraltar. Meanwhile, the English government, desirous of alighting the war thus energetically revived in the southern extremity, despatched a body of two thousand men, of whom five hundred were British, who took possession of TARIFA, an ancient town situated on the most southerly extremity of Spain, nearer to the African coast than even the celebrated Pillars of Hercules, and surrounded by an old wall without wet ditch or outworks. Soult, who was well aware how narrowly the besieging force at Cadiz had escaped destruction from the combination which the allies had brought to bear upon them at the time of the battle of Barossa, resolved to dislodge them from this position; and the fortifications were so extremely weak that hardly any resistance was expected. Godinot, accordingly, with eight thousand men, having driven Ballasteros under the cannon of Gibraltar, received orders to turn aside and besiege this stronghold. In the march thither, however, he was so raked in traversing the road, which ran along the seashore, by the broadsides of the English ships of war which hung on his flank,

* Jones, ii., 39, 41. Nap., iv., 321, 322. Hill's Despatch, Oct. 30, 1811, Gurw., viii., 372.

† The 71st and 92d regiments, both Highland, led the attack in the town, and they entered with the baggage at their head, playing the celebrated Jacobite air, "Hey, Johnnie Cope, are you waking yet?" in allusion to the well-known incident of that commander in the conflict with the Highlanders under the Pretender, at Prestonpans, in 1745.

‡ Since Marshal Gerard, minister at war to Louis Philippe, who besieged and took the citadel of Antwerp in 1832.

§ Hill's Desp., Oct. 29, 1811. Gurw., viii., 374, 375. Jones, ii., 40, 41. Nap., iv., 322, 324. Viet. et Conq., xx., 275, 277.

* Jones, ii., 37, 39. Lond., ii., 237, 240.

that, after sustaining a severe loss, he abandoned the enterprise in despair, and returned to Seville, where, unable to bear the warm reproaches of Soult, who was irritated at his repeated failures, he blew out his brains.*

Soult, who was not to be diverted from his design, with the importance of which he was now fully impressed by this failure, now prepared an expedition against Tarifa on a larger scale, and intrusted the command to a very distinguished officer, General Laval, who approached its walls at the head of seven thousand men in the middle of December, while two other divisions of three thousand each came up, one from Cadiz, the other from Ronda. This formidable accumulation of force compelled Ballasteros again to take shelter in the lines of Gibraltar, and obliged Skerret, who commanded the allied force, to await the enemy's arrival within the walls, where he had eighteen hundred British and seven hundred Spaniards; and the English engineers, with great skill, constructed interior retrenchments on the side most likely to be assailed, so as to render the assault of the wall the least difficulty which the enemy would have to encounter. The houses within the place expected to be breached were loopholed, the streets barricaded, and an old tower, which commanded the whole town, armed with heavy artillery, at once to send a storm of grape on the assailants, and secure the retreat of the garrison to their ships, which lay in the bay. These precautions, though judicious, were not, however, put to the test. Laval broke ground before the place on the

Dec. 19. 19th of December; and so completely were the anticipations of the British engineers realized, that they did so exactly on the spot where they were expected, and behind which the preparations had been made. The approaches were pushed with great rapidity: the battering-guns, which opened their fire on the 27th, Dec. 27. soon brought the old wall down: and by the 30th the breach was sixty feet wide, and of easy ascent. But the British regiments were on the ramparts, each at its proper post: the 47th and a Spanish battalion guarded the breach, the 84th and rifles were dispersed around the walls.†

Little aware of the quality of the antagonists with whom they had to deal, a column of 2000 French commenced the assault at daylight on the 31st. Such, however, was the vigour of the fire kept up upon them from every part of the rampart where a musket or a gun could be brought to bear upon the mass, that it broke before reaching the wall, and the troops arrived at the foot of the breach in great disorder. Part tried to force their way up, part glided down the bed of a stream which flowed through the town, and a few brave men reached the bars of the portcullis, which debarred entrance above the waters. But the British soldiers now sent down such a crashing volley on the throng at the iron grate and at the foot of the breach, that they dispersed to the right and left, seeking refuge under any projecting ground from the intolerable musketry. The combat continued for some time longer, the French, with their usual gallantry, keeping up a quick, irregular discharge on the walls; but the ramparts streamed forth fire with

such violence, and the old tower sent such a tempest of grape through their ranks, that, after sustaining a dreadful loss, they were forced to retreat, while the shout of victory, mingled with the sound of musical instruments, passed round the walls of the town. This bloody repulse suspended for some days the operations of the besiegers, who confined themselves to a cannonade; and, meanwhile, the rain fell in such torrents, and sickness made such ravages in their ranks, that, according to their own admission, "the total dissolution of their army was anticipated." Laval persevered some days longer against his own judgment, in obedience to the positive injunctions of Victor, and the breach was so wide from the continued fire that a fresh assault was expected; but on the 4th he raised the siege and retreated in dreadful weather, having first drowned his powder and buried his heavy artillery. In this expedition, one of the most disastrous to their arms which occurred in the whole Peninsular war, the French lost their whole cavalry and artillery horses, and about five hundred men by the sword, besides an equal number by sickness and starvation, while the total loss of the allies did not exceed one hundred and fifty.*

The campaign of 1811, less momentous in its issue than that which preceded it, General when the great struggle of Torres Vedras was brought to a conclusion; campaign. and less brilliant in its results than the one which followed, when the decisive overthrow of Salamanca loosened the foundations of French power over the whole of Spain, was yet of most important consequences in the deliverance of the Peninsula. It is not at once that the transition is made from disaster to success. Victory is of as slow growth, if it is to be durable, to nations as wealth to individuals. To turn the stream, to change the gales of fortune, to convert the torrent of disaster into the tide of conquest, is the real difficulty; to make the first hundred pounds, often costs more to the poor aspirant after opulence than to make the next thousand. During the campaign of Salamanca, this first hundred was made. For the first time since the British standards appeared in Spain, something approaching an equality had been attained between the contending forces. The advantages of a central position, and of water-carriage in his rear, had counterbalanced the still decided superiority of number; and Wellington, with his 60,000 British and Portuguese soldiers, appeared on the offensive in the midst of 150,000 enemies. True, he had hitherto been foiled in his efforts; true, the siege of Badajoz had been raised; that of Ciudad Rodrigo prevented; the blood at Albuera had, to all appearance, streamed in vain; but, to the discerning eye which looked beyond the surface of things, these very disappointments were fraught with future hope. The British army had, throughout, taken the initiative and preserved the offensive. By slight demonstrations, they had put in motion the enemy's forces in every part of Spain. The war throughout had been maintained in his territories, and all insult to the Portuguese frontier averted. These enterprises had been rendered abortive only by accumulating against the English army the whole of the disposable force in the southwest and north of Spain. The tide of

* Vict. et Conq., xx., 271, 272. Tor., iv., 298. Jones, ii., 42, 43. Nap., iv., 329, 330.

† Nap., iv., 330, 334. Belm., iv., 17, 31. Jones, ii., 43, 44. Vict. et Conq., xx., 279, 280.

* Belm., iv., 33, 39. Nap., iv., 336, 338. Jones, ii., 44, 45. Vict. et Conq., xx., 280.

conquest had been arrested; the consolidation of the French power prevented in other quarters by these repeated concentrations; the desolation of the country precluded the possibility of such large masses continuing for any length of time together; and it was easy to see that, if circumstances should enable the British government to augment, or compel the French emperor to diminish, their respective forces in the Peninsula, the scale would ere long turn to the other side. The balance in military, as well as in political affairs, generally quivers for a time before it inclines decisively to a new side.

But, what was still more important, this campaign was productive, to all concerned in the British army, of one advantage of more ultimate value than any which they had hitherto gained—a sense of their own deficiencies. This invaluable acquisition, of such tardy growth to nations as well as individuals, had been forced alike upon the army, the offices, and the government, by its events. The soldiers saw that mere valour, though it might win a field, could hardly decide a campaign; that the loud murmur at retreat which forced on the carnage of Albuera, might be drowned in blood; and that the true soldier is he who, ready to fight to the last extremity when the occasion demands, is equally patient and docile in every other duty till that season has arrived. The officers learned that war is at once a difficult science and a practical art; that minute attention to details is indispensable to its perfection; and that the bluntness of intrenching tools, the failure of supplies, or ill-regulated sallies of valour in the field, may often mar the best-concerted enterprises. The government felt the necessity of straining every nerve to aid their zealous general in the contest: re-enforcements to a large amount arrived before the close of the campaign, though, unhappily, the uniform unhealthiness of the soldiers on first landing prevented their swelling, as might have been expected, the ranks of the army, and as much specie as could possibly be drawn together, though it was but little, was forwarded for its use. By the incessant efforts of Wellington, every department, both in the British and Portuguese service, was put on a better footing during the campaign: the government at Lisbon were at length induced to take the requisite steps to recruit the ranks, which had been so fearfully thinned by the fatigues and the sickness of the Torres Vedras campaign; the engineer and commissariat service were essentially improved, and all that had been found wanting obtained from England; the transport and ordnance trains put on a much improved footing, and the military hospitals relieved of many of those evils which had hitherto been so fatal to the lives of the soldiers. Before the close of the campaign, eighty-four thousand men stood on the rolls of the allied army, of whom fifty-six thousand were British and twenty-eight thousand Portuguese; and though, from the extraordinary sickness of the troops, the number in the field never exceeded fifty-seven thousand, yet the prevailing epidemics rapidly diminished when the cool weather came on; and everything announced that, before the next campaign opened, seventy thousand would be present with the standards of Wellington. Finally, the provident care of their chief had materially strengthened the interior defences of the

kingdom. The lines of Torres Vedras had been augmented; new ones near Almada, on the southern bank, constructed on a gigantic scale; and such were the preparations made at Lisbon, that the English general contemplated without anxiety an event, generally thought probable, and publicly announced in the French newspapers, that the emperor himself was coming to finish the war, by a clap of thunder, on the Tagus.*

Though this design was announced, however, it was no part of Napoleon's intention really to put himself at the head of such an armament. His secret despatches to Joseph, now in great part published by authority of the French war office,† contain no trace of any such design: the great re-enforcements which he poured into the country in autumn were intended only to compensate the immense losses of the Torres Vedras campaign, and re-establish on a secure basis the interrupted communications in the northern provinces. Napoleon neither contemplated nor desired anything more, at this period, than the re-establishment of the credit of his arms by the capture of Elvas, and the relief of his finances by the quartering of the army of Portugal in the hitherto untouched fields of plunder of the Alentejo.‡ It was upon Russia and the North of Europe that the whole attention of the emperor was now fixed: the war in Portugal he regarded as a useful auxiliary, which might exhaust the English resources, engross their military force, and prevent them from sending any effectual aid, either in men or money, to the decisive points on the banks of the Niemen.§ In this view, the balanced success of the campaign of 1811, the constant predictions of the opposition party in England that Great Britain must finally succumb in the Peninsular struggle, and the brilliant career of Marshal Suchet in Valencia at the same period, were eminently conducive to the ultimate deliverance of Europe: by inspiring the French emperor with the belief that all danger was now over in that quarter, or would speedily be removed by the accession of the Whigs to office, on the termination of the Regency restrictions, and, consequently, that he might safely pursue the phantom of universal empire even to the edge of the Russian snows.

Napoleon's real intentions at this period in regard to the war in Portugal.

* Nap., xx., 229, 233. Lond., ii., 236, 237. Gurw., viii., 222.

† See BELMAS, *Journau des Sièges dans la Péninsule*, vol. i., App., No. 47 to 92.

‡ Berthier to Marmont, Sept. 18, 1811. Belm., i., 585, 587.

§ Napoleon's real views at this period were, with more candour than he usually exhibited on such occasions, divulged in his address to the Legislative Body on June 18, 1811. "Since 1809 the greater part of the strong places in Spain have been taken after memorable sieges, and the insurgents have been beaten in a great number of pitched battles. England has felt that the war is approaching a termination, and that intrigues and gold are no longer sufficient to nourish it: she has found herself obliged, therefore, to alter the nature of her assistance, and from an auxiliary she has become a principal. All her troops of the line have been sent to the Peninsula: English blood has at length flowed in torrents in several actions glorious to the French arms. This conflict with Carthage, which seemed as if it would be decided on fields of battle, on the ocean, or beyond the seas, will henceforth be decided on the plains of Spain. When England shall be exhausted; when she shall at last have felt the evils which, for twenty years, she has with so much cruelty poured upon the Continent; when half her families shall be in mourning, then shall a peal of thunder put an end to the affairs of the Peninsula, the destinies of her armies, and avenge Europe and Asia by finishing this second Punic war."—See *Moniteur*, 16th of June, 1811.

CHAPTER LXIII.

FIRST INVASION OF SPAIN BY WELLINGTON, JAN.—NOV., 1812.

ARGUMENT.

First Invasion of Spain by Wellington, January to November, 1812.—Vast Power and Resources of Napoleon at this Period.—Remarkable Prediction of Napoleon's approaching Fall at the same Time.—Commencement at this Period of the Fall of the French Empire.—Wellington prepares to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo.—Commencement of the Operations.—Rapid Progress of the Siege.—Aspect of both Sides before the Assault.—The Third Division carry the great Breach.—Storm of the lesser Breach.—Hideous Disorders consequent on the Storm.—Vast Importance of this Capture.—Agitation it produced among the French Generals.—Secret Preparations made against Badajoz.—Movement of the British Army towards that Fortress.—Preparations for the Siege.—Its Commencement.—Storming of Picurina.—Plan of Attack of the Fortress itself.—Philippon's Preparations of Defence.—Unsuccessful Assault of the great Breaches.—Terrific Struggle at their Base.—The Castle is assaulted by Picton.—The Town is at length carried.—Walker's Division also gets in by Escalade.—Wellington's Conduct during the Assault.—Magnitude and Importance of this Conquest.—Soul advances from Andalusia, and retreats to it.—Marmont's Irruption into Beira.—Wellington moves to the Agueda.—His Efforts in his Cantonnements to supply the Fortresses taken.—Napoleon's Anger at the Fall of Badajoz.—Incorporation of Catalonia with the French Empire.—Reduction in the French Force in the Peninsula.—Spirit and Character of the Allied Army at this Period.—Description of the French Forts at the Bridge of Almaraz.—Hill's Preparations for their Attack.—Storming of the Forts.—Mirabete is saved by a false Alarm, and Hill returns to Badajoz.—Defeat of Ballasteros in Andalusia.—Defensive Measures taken in Estremadura.—Wellington's Preparations for the Invasion of Spain.—Soul's Plans at this Period.—Forces of the French in Spain.—Advance of Wellington to Salamanca.—Siege of the Forts there.—Marmont's ineffectual Attempt to raise the Siege.—Capture of the Forts.—Marmont retires behind the Douro.—His able Movements, and Wellington's Retreat.—Wellington's Difficulties from the Slowness of the Spaniards, and Lord William Bentinck's Failure in the projected Co-operation.—Wellington retreats across the Guarena.—Repulse of a Cavalry Attack at Castrillo.—Movements on both Sides during the Retreat to San Cristoval.—The British retreat to the Neighbourhood of Salamanca.—Critical Situation of the English Army.—Movements of both Armies immediately before the Battle.—False Movement of the French Left.—Wellington's Dispositions of Attack.—French Dispositions and Commencement of the Battle.—Progress of the Action, and Wound of Marmont.—Total Defeat of the French Left under Thomieres.—Splendid Charge of the British Cavalry on Foy's Division.—Repulse of the British at the Centre, and of the French at Arapelles.—Wellington and Beresford restore the Battle in the Centre.—Last Stand and final Defeat of the French.—Wellington pursues in the wrong Direction.—Results of the Battle.—Brilliant Charge of the German Dragoons on the French Rear-guard.—Rapid Retreat of the French to Valladolid.—Retreat of Joseph towards Madrid, and Action at Majalahonda.—Consternation which prevailed in that Capital.—Entry of the English into Madrid, and enthusiastic Joy which prevailed.—Measures.—Attack on, and Reduction of, the Retiro.—Great amount of warlike Stores found there, and Importance of the central Position which the English had now acquired in Spain.—Able Views of Soul at this Period for the Re-establishment of Affairs.—Refusal of Suchet to send any Succour to Joseph.—Operations of Hill and Drouet in Estremadura and La Mancha.—Wellington moves to the North to press upon Clausel.—The French retire to Burgos.—Description of the Castle there, and the French Works around it.—Commencement of the Siege, and Storming of the Horn-work of St. Michael.—Repeated unsuccessful Assaults.—Storming of the outer Intrenchments.—Increasing Difficulties of the Besiegers from the Want of Artillery.—Wellington's Resolution to retire, and Causes of the Failure of the Attack.—Operations of Hill in the Centre of Spain.—He evacuates Madrid, and retreats towards Salamanca.—Increasing Difficulties of Wellington's Retreat.—Junction of his Army and Hill's.—Junction of Soul and Clausel's Force.—Wellington offers Battle, which is refused.—He retreats to Ciudad Rodrigo.—Ex-

traordinary Hardships and Losses of that Retreat.—The Army is put into Winter-quarters.—Acrimonious Address of Wellington to his Officers.—Its Effect on the Troops.—Operations in the South and East of Spain.—Landing of the British Force at Alicante.—Battle of Castello, and Defeat of Suchet.—Want of Vigour with which this Success was followed up by the British General.—Operations in Catalonia during the Campaign, and in Asturias and Biscay.—General Result of the Campaign.—Its vast Effect in loosening the French Power in the Peninsula.—Wellington's great Merits in the Conduct of it.—Immense Advantages gained by the Allies.—Reaction upon themselves of the French mode of making War.

THE close of the year 1811, and commencement of 1812, witnessed the elevation of vast power and the power of Napoleon to its highest resources of Napoleon at this point; and such was the magnitude of the forces then at his disposal, and the paralysis which had seized the minds of men from the unbroken career of his success, that his empire appeared established on a foundation which could never be shaken. Every Continental state had successively attempted to combat it, and every one had been overthrown in the struggle: the alliance of Russia and Austria in 1805, of Russia and Prussia in 1806, of Spain and Austria in 1809, had been alike unable to restrain the rapid and portentous growth of his power. From pacific repose he rose up, like a giant refreshed by sleep, more formidable in numbers and organization than when the last strife terminated; from warlike struggles he emerged conquering and to conquer. It was hard to say whether his power had risen more rapidly in peace or in war; it was difficult to see what limit could be imposed to the growth of an empire to which the former brought only an increase of hostile preparations, the latter, an enlargement of pacific resources. The systematic exertions of military monarchies, the tumultuous array of popular enthusiasm, had been alike overthrown in the strife. Little could be hoped from the former, when the heroism of Aspern had failed; nothing expected from the latter, when the devotion of Saragossa had been subdued. The hopes awakened by the retreat from Torres Vedras had been chilled by subsequent disasters; the subjugation of the east of Spain seemed to prestage the speedy concentration of an overwhelming force against the battalions of Wellington in the west; and if he succumbed, nothing remained, from the shores of the Vistula to the Pillars of Hercules, capable of combating the French power, or resisting the imperial will. A general despair, in consequence, seized upon the public mind over all Europe. Even the bravest hearts hesitated as to the ultimate issue of a contest in which former Continental effort had terminated only in disaster; and many ages of military servitude were regarded by the strongest heads as the inevitable destiny of Europe, to be overthrown, perhaps, at last only by a fresh deluge of northern barbarians.*

* "These cursed, double cursed news, have sunk my spirits so much, that I am almost at disbelieving a Providence. God forgive me! But I think some evil demon has been permitted, in the shape of this tyrannical monster, whom God has sent on the nations visited in his anger,

It was at this dark and mournful period that a member of the Church of England thus addressed a British congregation: "There is a limit, my brethren, to human suffering; there is an hour in oppression when resolution springs from despair.

There are bounds in the moral, as well as the material system, to the dominion of evil; there are limits to the injustice of nations as well as the guilt of individuals. There is a time when cunning ceases to delude and hypocrisy to deceive; when power ceases to overawe, and oppression will no longer be borne. To that hour, to that avenging hour, Time and Nature are approaching. The cup of bitterness is full, and there is a drop which will make it overflow. Unmarked as it may be amid the blaze of military glory, the dread Hand is yet writing on the wall the sentence of its doom: the hour is steadily approaching when evil will be overcome with good, and when the life-blood of an injured world will collect at the heart, and by one convulsive effort throw off the load that has oppressed it. It is impossible that the oppressed can longer beckon the approach of a power which comes only to load them with heavier chains; it is impossible that the nations of Europe, cradled in civilization and baptized into the liberty of the children of God, can long continue to bend their freeborn heads before the feet of foreign domination; or that they can suffer the stream of knowledge which has so long animated their soil, to terminate at last in the deep stagnation of military despotism. Even the oppressor bleeds in the hour that he triumphs: his people are goaded to exertions which they loathe; his laurels are wet with the tears of those who have been bereaved of their children. For years, our attention has been fixed on that great and guilty country, which has been fertile in nothing but revolution; and from which, amid the clouds that cover it, we have seen that dark and shapeless form arise which, like the visions that appalled the King of Babylon, 'hath its legs of iron and its arms of brass.' Yet, while our eyes strain to measure its dimensions, and our ear shrinks at the threatening of its voice, let us survey it with the searching eye of the prophet, and we shall see that its feet are of 'base and perishable clay.' Amid all the terrors of its brightness, it has no foundation in the moral stability of justice.

"The Spaniards may have Roman pride, but they want Roman talent to support it; and, in short, unless God in his mercy should raise up among them one of those extraordinary geniuses who seem created for the emergencies of an oppressed people, I confess I see no hope. The spring-tide may, for aught I know, break upon us in the next session of Parliament. There is an evil fate upon us in all we do at home or abroad."—SIR WALTER SCOTT to ELLIS, 13th December, 1808, and September 14, 1809. LOCKHART'S *Life of Scott*, ii., 225, 227, 253.

To the same purpose, Sir James Mackintosh said, at this period, writing to Gentz at Vienna, "I believe, like you, in a resurrection, because I believe in the immortality of civilization; but when, and by whom, in what form, are questions which I have not the sagacity to answer, and on which it would be boldness to hazard a conjecture. A dark and stormy night, a black series of ages, may be prepared for our posterity before the dawn that opens the more perfect day. Who can tell how long that fearful night may be before the dawn of a brighter morrow? The race of man may reach the promised land, but there is no assurance that the present generation will not perish in the wilderness. The mischief has become too intricate to be unravelled in our day. An evil greater than despotism, even in its worst and most hideous form, approaches—a monarchy literally universal seems about to be established."—MACKINTOSH to GENTZ, 24th December, 1805; and to WILLIAM OGILVIE, Esq., 24th February, 1808. *Memoirs of MACKINTOSH*, i., 307 and 383.

It is irradiated by no beam from Heaven; it is blessed by no prayer of man; it is worshipped with no gratitude by the patriot heart. It may remain for the time that is appointed it, but the awful hour is on the wing when the universe will resound with its fall; and the same sun which now measures out with reluctance the length of its impious reign, will one day pour his undecaying beams amid its ruins, and bring forth from the earth which it has overshadowed the promises of a greater spring.* That ultimate triumph of virtue over oppression, which the foresight of the statesman could not venture to anticipate, and the courage of the soldier hardly dared to expect, was clearly foreseen, and confidently announced, at the darkest period of the struggle, by the undoubting voice of religious faith. The philosopher may admire the moral grandeur of the sentiments conveyed in these eloquent words; the historian may mark the exact accomplishment which the prediction they contained was so soon to receive, and its singular felicity at the moment it was uttered; but the author trusts he will be forgiven if he feels a yet deeper interest in the voice of a revered parent—now issuing from the tomb—and gives vent to an expression of thankfulness, that he has been permitted to follow out, in the narrative of this mighty convulsion, those principles on the moral government of the world which were invariably maintained and publicly expressed by his father during the whole of its continuance.

The subsequent chapters of this history contain nothing but the accomplishment of this prediction. The universe did, indeed, resound with the fall of the awful form which had overshadowed it, and the English historian may well feel a pride at the part which his country took in this immortal deliverance. The British army was the vanguard which broke the spell which had so long entranced mankind: it was from the rocks of Torres Vedras that the French arms first permanently receded; it was on the plains of Castile that the first mortal strokes to their empire were delivered. Before the Niemen had been crossed, the rivulet of the Albuera had run red with Gallic blood; before Smolensko had fallen, Badajoz had yielded to the resistless assault of the English soldiery: it was in the triumphs of Salamanca that the Russians sought the long-wished-for omen of ultimate victory; in the recovery of Madrid that they beheld, amid the flames of Moscow, the presage of their own deliverance.† The first to open the career of freedom to the world, England was also the last to recede from the conflict: the same standards which had waved over its earliest triumphs were seen above the reserve on whom the final throes of the struggle depended. Vain would have been the snows of Russia and the conquest of Leipsic, vain the passage of the Rhine and the capture of Paris, if British valour had not forever stopped the renewed career of victory on the field of Waterloo;‡ And mark the extraordinary coin-

* Fast Sermon, February 28, 1811, and Feb., 1806, by the Rev. Archibald Alison, Prebendary of Sarum, &c.—*Sermons*, vol. i., 272 and 408, 5th edition.

† The news of the battle of Salamanca was received by both the French and Russian armies the evening before the battle of Borodino; that of the taking of Madrid by Lord Wellington as Kutsoff was performing his circular march round Moscow, by the light of the burning capital.—*Vide infra*, chap. lxi.

‡ "If the English army," said Napoleon, "had been defeated at Waterloo, what would have availed all the Rus-

cidence between the termination of revolutionary triumph and the commencement of righteous retribution: both occurred at the same moment; it would seem as if a distinct line had been drawn by Omnipotence, beyond which victory should not fan the banners of guilt on the one side, nor disaster sink the spirit of virtue on the other.

"Fond, impious man, think'st thou yon sanguine cloud,
Rais'd by thy breath, hath quench'd the orb of day?
To-morrow he repairs the golden flood,
And warms the nations with redoubled ray."

On the 8th of January, 1812, the long series of Revolutionary triumphs terminated with the fall of Valencia; and the NEXT DAY Wellington led his army across the Agueda, and commenced the career of victory which never paused till the oppressor was hurled from his throne, and the British standards waved in triumph on the walls of Paris.*

Wellington no sooner perceived, from the dispersion of the armies of Portugal and the North in wide cantonments on the Upper Tagus and the Douro, in December, 1811, that Ciudad Rodrigo was abandoned to its own resources, than he judged that the favourable opportunity, so long watched for, of attacking that fortress with some chance of success, had arrived. His army, indeed, was still unhealthy: nearly twenty thousand were yet in hospital; for, though large re-enforcements had arrived from England, yet the new regiments, in great part affected by the Walcheren fever, were far more liable to sickness than the old soldiers: the pay was three months in arrear; supplies were still got up with difficulty; and the new clothing for the troops had not yet arrived. But in all these respects he was well aware the enemy's armies were in a still worse condition; while the new positions assigned to, and now taken by them, in conformity with the orders of the French emperor, issued in November, had removed them to such a distance as rendered it doubtful whether, especially at that inclement season, any adequate force could be assembled for its relief. Bonnet was in the Asturias, Monbrun at Alicante, and the bulk of the army of the North, now charged with the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, in cantonments on the Douro. The better, however, to conceal his real designs, Wellington, in the close of 1811, caused Hill to assume the offensive in Estremadura; and this was done with such success by that enterprising officer, whose slightest movements were watched with the utmost anxiety since the blow of Arroyo Molinos, that they abandoned Merida

Dec. 29, 1811. and Almedralajo, and concentrated their forces towards Llerena, while the English advanced posts occupied the latter town on the 2d of January, and spread themselves out in the neighbourhood of Badajoz. Such was the impression produced by this irruption into the French quarters, that Soult, conceiving Badajoz to be threatened, gave orders for assembling his forces through the whole of Andalusia, at the very moment that Wellington, having concealed his designs till the instant of their execution,† was making his troops prepare fascines and gabions in their respective villages, and laying down

sians, Austrians, or Prussians who were crowding to the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees?"—*NAPOLÉON, Memoirs*, ix., book 203.

* This is strictly true; every subsequent march in advance in Russia was a step towards ruin.

† *Vict. et Conq.*, xx., 281, 282. Jones, ii., 60, 61. Belim., i., 215. Nap., iv., 36^o, 371.

the portable bridge over the Agueda for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

All things being in readiness, the bridge was fixed on the 6th, but a heavy fall of snow prevented the troops from moving till the 8th: as if to make the termination of Napoleon's long career of conquest, by the surrender of Valencia, coincide exactly with the commencement of his fall by the English attack on CIUDAD RODRIGO. The light division only crossed on that day, and immediately formed the investment of the fortress; in the evening an advanced redoubt, situated on the great Teson, was carried by assault: the first parallel was established on the day following; and a few days after, the Convent of Santa Cruz was stormed. The garrison, alarmed at the progress of the besiegers, now made a vigorous sortie, and did considerable mischief to the head of the sap before they were repulsed; but the progress of the works was not seriously interrupted by this effort. On the same afternoon the batteries opened; and at night the fortified Convent of San Francisco, which flanked the right of the trenches, was carried by a gallant escalade of the 46th regiment. At half past four in the evening, just as darkness set in, the breaching batteries opened, and thirty heavy guns sent forth their crashing fire against the walls. "Then was beheld a spectacle at once fearful and sublime. The enemy replied to the assailants' fire with more than fifty pieces: the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground far and wide; the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements of the place, or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires; the shells, hissing through the air, seemed fiery serpents leaping from the darkness; the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and the distant mountains, returning the sound, appeared to moan over the falling city."†

On the three following days the fire continued with great vigour on both sides: the wall came down in huge masses, and though the besiegers were exposed to a most destructive cannonade, and the head of the trenches wellnigh stifled by the storm of grape and shells, eleven thousand of which were discharged by the enemy, yet the progress of the ruin was very evident; and by reserving all their fire for the ramparts, and not discharging a shot at the defences, the faussebraye was beaten down, and two large breaches were declared practicable in the rampart on the morning of the 19th. The nearest batteries were still above two hundred yards distant, and not one of the parapets was injured, circumstances which augmented greatly the difficulties of carrying the place by storm; but Wellington was, for many reasons, eager for the assault, for the prize to be gained by its capture was immense, and every day added to the danger of the fortress being relieved from without. The whole siege equipage and stores of the army of Portugal were deposited in the place, and the French had no other nearer than Madrid: its capture would render any attack on Almeida or the lines of Torres Vedras impossible for a very long period; the enemy's credit would suffer by the capture of so impor-

* Nap., iv., 375, 381. Jones, ii., 60, 62. *Gurw.*, viii., 525, 527. Belim., iv., 265, 271.

† *NAPIER*. Colonel Napier's descriptions of battles and sieges are, in some places, the finest passages that exist in that style in modern literature. Lord Londonderry's description of the same event is also uncommonly graphic and impressive.—*LONDONDERRY*, ii., 25.

Commencement of the siege. January 9.

Jan. 13.

Jan. 14.

Rapid progress of the siege.

tant a stronghold under the eye of two armies, each as strong as that of the besiegers, and the British would acquire by its reduction both a frontier fortress of approved strength, and a basis for future offensive operations of inestimable importance. Marmont, too, was collecting his troops and approaching: it was known that by the 28th or 29th he would be at Salamanca, only four marches distant, with forty thousand men; and the recent failure at Badajoz told but too clearly what might be the result of prosecuting the siege according to the established rules, and waiting till the countescarp was blown in, and the parapets commanding the breach all levelled by the besiegers' fire. The place was, accordingly, summoned on the 18th, and the governor having returned a gallant answer that he would not surrender, preparations were made for the assault.*

The perilous honour of this attack fell on the light and 3d divisions, whose turn it was to be that day on duty in the trenches. The latter, commanded by General M'Kinnon, preceded by the light companies under Major Manners, was to attack the main breach; the Portuguese of the division were in reserve in the trenches, ready to advance if occasion required. The latter, under General Vandeleur and Colonel Barnard, received orders to assault the lesser breach, and, as soon as they got footing on the summit, turn sharp to the right, in order to take in flank the defenders of the main breach, and assail in rear the interior retrenchments by which the enemy hoped to stop the progress of the assailants, even if they did win the rampart. This done, and a communication between the two columns being effected, an effort was to be made to burst open the Salamanca gate, and let in the rest of the division. Pack, with his brigade of Portuguese, as soon as the firing became general, was to make a false attack by escalade on the outwork of St. Jago, on the opposite side of the town, which might be converted into a real attack if a favourable opportunity of penetrating should occur. The storming parties received orders not to fire a shot, but push on with the bayonet; the bearers of the bags, ladders, and other engines of assault, were not even armed, lest any irregular skirmish should interfere with their smoothing the way for the other troops. The preparations of the besieged, however, were very formidable: bombs and hand-grenades lined the top of the breaches to roll down on the assailants; bags of powder were disposed among the ruins, to explode when they began to ascend the slopes; two heavy guns, charged with grape, flanked the summit of the larger breach, and a mine was prepared under it, to explode if all other defences failed. These obstacles, however, no ways daunted the British troops; and the last words of Wellington's instructions breathed the spirit of the whole army, as well as himself: "Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by assault this evening at seven o'clock."†

The evening was calm and tranquil: the moon, in her first quarter, diffused a sides before doubtful light over the scene, which, without disclosing particular objects, rendered their rude outline distinctly visi-

ble. The projecting bastions stood forth like giants in the gloom, darkly, yet clearly defined on the adjoining shadows; while in their sides, yawning gulfs, half filled up with ruins, showed where the breaches had been made, and the deadly strife was to ensue. In the British lines the trenches were crowded with armed men, among whom not a whisper was to be heard nor a movement perceived: so completely had discipline, and the absorbing anxiety of the moment, subdued every unruly feeling and stilled every dauntless heart. As the great clock, however, of the Cathedral tolled seven, the word was quietly passed along that all was ready; and, leaping at once out of the trenches, the men rushed forward to the breaches, led by their respective forlorn hopes: that of the third division headed by Ensign Mackie, with the forlorn hope, and General M'Kinnon leading the storming party; that of the light by Mr. Gurwood,* followed by Major Napier at the head of the storming party; and with the exploits of these brave men began THE FALL OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE.†

M'Kinnon's division crossed the open space between the trenches and the rampart. The third division under a tempest of grape and musketry from the walls, and in a few great breach, minutes reached the countescarp, which was found to be eleven feet deep. The sappers, however, instantly threw down their bags of hay, which soon diminished the depth by one half, and the men, hastily leaping down, arrived at the foot of the great breach; but there a most serious opposition awaited them. The shells, rolled down from the top, burst amid the throng with frightful explosions. Every shot of the close ranks of the French infantry told with effect on the dense mass below; and when, forcing their way up the slope, the British soldiers at length reached the summit, they were torn in pieces by a terrific discharge of grape from the heavy guns within a few yards' distance on either side, which at once, like a scythe, swept the whole warlike multitude down. Before these could be reloaded, however, those immediately behind pushed up and won the ascent of the fausse-braye, and at its top met two battalions which had mounted the perpendicular of the fausse-braye by escalade, and together they crowded up the breach of the rampart, which was speedily carried. But just as, in the tumult of victory, they were striving to penetrate the interior retrenchments, which the besieged had constructed to bar their farther entrance, the mine which had been worked under their feet was suddenly exploded, and the bravest and most forward, among whom was the gallant M'Kinnon, were blown into the air. Still the column which had won the great breach held the ground they had gained, and, finding it impossible to penetrate farther into the town, from the obstacle of the inner retrenchment, they established themselves among the ruins to await the result of the other attacks, and the scarlet uniforms came pouring in on every side.‡

In the mean while, the light division under Craufurd, and the Portuguese under Pack, were still more successful. Storm of the lesser breach. The former had three hundred yards of glacis to cross before they reached its crest;

* Gurw., viii., 526, 527. Nap., iv., 379, 383. Jones, ii., 61, 62. Belm., iv., 271, 277.

† Wellington to Lord Liverpool, Jan. 20, 1812, Gurw., viii., 527. Lond., ii., 259, 264. Nap., iv., 382, 384. Belm., iv., 274, 276.

* Now Lieutenant-colonel Gurwood, the worthy companion in arms of Wellington, and who has conducted the publication of his *Despatches*.

† Lond., ii., 263, 264. Nap., iv., 382, 384. Belm., iv., 177, 178. Gurw., viii., 527, 528.

‡ Lond., ii., 264, 265. Nap., iv., 383, 385. Gurw., viii., 527, 528. Belm., iv., 277, 278.

but this distance was swiftly passed, though the gallant Craufurd received a fatal wound during the rush; the counterscarp, eleven feet deep, was leaped down in the face of a dreadful fire of grape and musketry, and the lesser breach reached. It proved, however, to be extremely steep and narrow; and when two thirds of the ascent had been won, the struggle was so violent that the men paused, and every musket in the crowd was snapped under the instinct of self-defence, though not one was loaded. Major Napier, however, who was at this moment struck down by a grapeshot, called to the troops to trust to their bayonets. The officers all at once sprung to the front, and the summit was won. Then arose a loud shout from every quarter, for Pack's Portuguese at the same moment had escalated the walls on the opposite side. The light division now pushed on in great numbers, and, not forgetting their orders, turned sharp to the right, and with loud cheers assaulted in flank the intrenchment at the great breach, where the third division had been arrested, and by a mighty effort of both united, the barriers were burst through, and the troops rushed in. Some irregular fighting occurred in the streets, but no farther systematic resistance was attempted; and Mr. Gurwood, who, though wounded, had maintained his post at the head of the third division when they carried the breach, received the governor's sword, the deserved reward of his heroism, at the gate of the castle.*

A frightful scene of plunder, intoxication, and violence immediately ensued. The firing, which ceased for a moment when the tumult at the breaches subsided, was now renewed in the irregular way which denoted the commencement of riot and disorder, and shouts and screams on all sides fearfully intermingled with the groans of the wounded. The churches were ransacked, the wine and spirit cellars pillaged, and brutal intoxication spread in every direction. Soon the flames were seen bursting forth in several quarters: some houses were burned to the ground, others already ignited; and it was only by the interpidity of a few officers and soldiers, whose coolness deserves the highest praise, that a fire, wantonly lighted in the midst of the great powder-magazine, was extinguished. By degrees, however, the drunken men dropped down from excess of liquor, or fell asleep; the efforts of the officers, and fresh divisions which Wellington instantly ordered into the town, were incessant to restore order: the houses on fire, and not consumed, were happily saved; and before morning a degree of order was restored which could hardly have been hoped for by those who witnessed the first license consequent upon victory. Yet, even in these moments of unbridled passion, when the national vice of drunkenness appeared in its most frightful colours, some redeeming qualities were displayed: though all who combated were put to death without mercy, yet the unresisting everywhere received quarter; no slaughter, either of the citizens or enemy, took place; and, of a garrison consisting only of eighteen hundred men at the commencement of the siege, full fifteen hundred, still unwounded, were made prisoners.†

The storming of Ciudad Rodrigo was one of

the most brilliant exploits of the British army, and from none have greater or more splendid results immediately flowed. A hundred and fifty guns, including the whole battering-train of Marmont's army, and immense stores of every kind, fell into the hands of the allies, who had to lament the loss of thirteen hundred men, including two heroes cut off early in their career, Generals Craufurd and M'Kinnon. But it was not the material results, great and important as they were, which constituted its principal value. The moral influence with which it was attended was far more important. Wellington had now carried the frontier fortress of Spain, in the face of sixty thousand men, hastening from the army of Portugal and the north to raise the siege. In the depth of winter he had thrown a portable bridge over the Agueda, and collected his troops and battering-train with such secrecy and celerity, that the breaching batteries had opened their fire before the enemy had advices of the commencement of the enterprise, and the place was carried before they had begun to march for its relief. It was now evident that he had, for the first time since the Peninsular war commenced, obtained the ascendancy over his enemies; and that, with the initiative in operation, the war was to be carried into the territory occupied by the enemy. Nor was the proof afforded of the increased proficiency of the English in the art of war, and their improved skill in the multifarious duties connected with its successful prosecution, less gratifying or less prophetic of a revolution in the contest. Ciudad Rodrigo had been taken by storm, after a siege of twelve days, in the depth of winter, by an army of forty thousand men; whereas Massena, with one of eighty thousand, had been detained before its walls six weeks, in the height of summer. The intelligence of this unlooked-for success, therefore, excited the most enthusiastic joy in all the allied capitals. The Democrats of Cadiz were, for the time, overpowered, and the English general was created Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo, amid the unanimous acclamations of the Cortes and people. The Portuguese government forgot its jealousy of English interference, and conferred upon him the title of Marquis of Torres Vedras; while the thanks of the British Parliament were voted to the army, and a pension of £2000 a year settled on the earldom of Wellington.*

Great was the consternation produced in the French generals by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont had arrived, with the divisions under his immediate orders, at Valladolid, to take the command of the newly-organized army of Portugal, on the 13th of January, without any suspicions of what was going forward; and it was not till late in the evening of that day that he learned that the British had crossed the Agueda. Instantly orders were despatched to the troops in all directions to assemble. Bonnet was to hasten from the Asturian Mountains; Brennier from the valley of the Tagus; Dorsenne to call in all the detached parties which were on the banks of the Douro; and these troops were all to rendezvous at Salamanca on the 1st of February. Meanwhile, however, not only was Ciudad Rodrigo taken, but the breaches in the walls repaired, provisions for six weeks thrown in; and the British general, leaving a

* Baird's Report, Aug. 8, 1812. Belm., iv., 291. Lond., ii., 264, 265. Nap., iv., 383, 384. Gurw., viii., 527, 528. Belm., iv., 278, 279.

† Nap., iv., 386. Lond., ii., 256, 267. Belm., iv., 279.

* Nap., iv., 386, 390. Jones, ii., 64, 67. Gurw., viii., 542.

division to secure the place, had resumed his ancient positions at Fuente Guinaldo. It is impossible now to doubt that this rapid and brilliant success was mainly owing to the ill-judged dispositions of the French emperor, who had detached Munbrun to Valencia, dislocated his armies, and given almost all their divisions a new direction, at the very time when the decisive operation was undertaken, joined to the oppressive way in which he had always carried on war, which had so desolated the country as to render the dispersion of the troops to a prodigious distance indispensable to their subsistence; but it was never his custom to take blame to himself where he could by possibility throw it upon others; and his ill-humour at this disaster exhaled in violent invectives against both Marmont and Dorsenne, though it was his own directions which had led to neither the means of averting it.*†

No sooner had Wellington put Ciudad Rodrigo in a situation of defence against any sudden attack than he turned his eyes towards Badajoz, the remaining frontier fortress, which it was necessary that he should reduce before attempting his meditated invasion of the interior of Spain. As this enterprise required the united strength of the whole army, Ciudad Rodrigo, after having been repaired, and provisioned for six weeks, was delivered over to Don Julian Sanchez, with his division of guerillas; and the Spanish government was warned, in the strongest manner, of the necessity of taking immediate steps to have the breaches thoroughly repaired, and provisions for at least six months thrown in. Meanwhile, preparations were made for the siege with all imaginable activity; but as the French marshals were now thoroughly alarmed by the blow struck at Ciudad Rodrigo, and Soult, in particular, was sensitively alive to any demonstrations against Badajoz, they required to be conducted with all imaginable secrecy. The battering-train and engineers were, accordingly, embarked for Lisbon as if for Oporto, and at sea reshipped on board small craft, privately sent out from different parts of the coast to elude attention, and sent up the River Caldao, in the Alentejo, to Alsacer da Sal, where the country carriages could, without suspicion, convey them

to the banks of the Guadiana; while fascines and gabions were secretly prepared at Elvas, amid other repairs of its ramparts, ostensibly directed to the defence of that fortress. Arrangements were at the same time made for transferring the grand supply of the army from the artery of the Douro to that of the Tagus; a temporary depot was formed at Celorico, as if for the nourishing of preparations on the Beira frontier, and a grand magazine established beyond the Douro. So completely did these preparations impose upon the French emperor, that he entirely mistook the real point of attack; and in spite of the most urgent remonstrances of Marmont, who insisted that Badajoz was threatened, Napoleon wrote to him "that the English general was not mad, and that an invasion on the side of Salamanca was alone to be guarded against."**

Having thus completely outwitted the vigilance of the French emperor, and at length completed his well-concealed preparations for the important enterprise in that fortress, Wellington, on the 9th of March, suddenly commenced his march to the south, and the troops from all quarters converged towards Badajoz. One division of infantry alone remained on the Agueda, to succour Ciudad Rodrigo if necessary, and retard any incursion which the enemy might attempt on the Beira frontier, which was put in as good a position of defence as circumstances would admit. The English general arrived at Elvas on the 11th, March 11 place; but incredible difficulties, which wellnigh proved fatal to the whole enterprise, retarded, for a very considerable period, the commencement of the siege. No representations which either Wellington, or his able coadjutor, Mr. Stuart, the English ambassador at Lisbon, could make, could induce the Portuguese regency to put in hazard their popularity, by making the magistrates draw forth the resources of the country for the conveyance of the ordnance and siege equipment, either from Almeida, where some of it came, or from the River Caldao, where the remainder had been brought by water-carriage. Hence, though the troops crossed the Tagus on a bridge of boats at Vallabaho on the 9th and 10th, it was not till the 15th that the pontoons could be thrown over the Guadiana, nor till the 17th that the investment of the fortress could be completed. The delay of these days afterward required to be redeemed by torments of British blood.†‡

* Belm., iv., 216, 217. Berthier to Marmont, Feb. 11, 1812. Berthier to Marmont, Feb. 18, 1812. Belm., i., App., No. 88, 91.

† "The emperor is highly displeased at the negligence which you have evinced in the affair of Ciudad Rodrigo. Why had you not advices from it twice a week? What were you doing with the five divisions of Souham? This is a strange mode of carrying on war; and the emperor makes no secret of his opinion, that the disgrace of this disaster attaches to you. It would have fallen on General Thiebault if that general had not been able to show that he had not sufficient force to do anything; whereas the whole division of Souham was at your disposal. This humiliating check cannot be ascribed but to the defect of your dispositions and the want of consideration in the measures you have adopted."—BERTHIER to DORSENNE, 11th Feb., 1812. BELMAS, i., App., No. 88.

‡ "The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo is an affront to you; and the English are sufficiently acquainted with French honour to know that that affront may become the source of a burden to them, by forcing them to preserve the prize they have won. The emperor is far from being satisfied with your dispositions. You have the superiority over the enemy, and, instead of taking the initiative, you are always on the defensive. You fatigue and harass your troops without doing anything: that is not the way to carry on war. Never mind Hill and the army of the south: that army is strong enough to combat five divisions of the English army. You should have marched on Ciudad Rodrigo, and retaken it before the breaches were filled up or the place provisioned."—BERTHIER to MARMONT, 18th Feb., 1812. *Ibid.*, App., No. 91.

* Jones, ii., 67, 68. Nap., iv., 392, 393. Belm., iv., 217, 218.

† "You must suppose the English mad to imagine that they will march upon Badajoz, leaving you at Salamanca; that is, leaving you in a situation to get to Lisbon before them. Even if, yielding to imprudent counsels, they should move towards the south, you may at once arrest their movements by detaching one or two divisions towards the Tagus: by that you will cause yourself to be respected, and regain the initiative over the enemy. I repeat it, then, the instructions of the emperor are precise: you are not to quit Salamanca; you are even to reoccupy the Asturias; let your headquarters be at Salamanca, and never cease to menace the English from thence."—BERTHIER to MARMONT, 11th February, 1812. These instructions were repeated in still stronger terms, in spite of Marmont's representations to the contrary, in another despatch of Berthier to him of 18th February, 1811.—See BELMAS, i., No. 90, 91, Appendix.

‡ Nap., iv., 397, 398. Jones, ii., 68, 69. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 24, 25.

§ The rich city of Evora, which had suffered so dreadfully from Loison's massacre in August, 1808 (*ante*, iii., 77), and from the effects of British aid, and had never seen the fire of an enemy's bivouac since that time, refused to

To cover the siege, Hill was posted near Al-mendralejos with thirty thousand men, of whom five thousand were horse, while Wellington himself, with twenty-two thousand, commanded the besieging force. It was at first expected that Marmont would immediately co-operate with Soult in endeavouring to disturb the operations of the English army; but it was soon ascertained that his divisions had all marched through the Puerto de Pico, from the valley of the Tagus, into Castile, in obedience, as it is now known, to the absurd and positive orders of Napoleon; and, consequently, the British covering army was relieved of all anxiety except that arising from Soult, who was approaching from Andalusia. Meanwhile, the operations of the siege were vigorously conducted; but it was soon apparent that a most desperate, as well as skilful defence, might be anticipated. Philippon, whose great talents in this species of warfare had been experienced in the former siege, had been indefatigable, during the six months that had since elapsed, in improving the fortifications, and adding to the strength and resources of the place. He had five thousand men under his command, drawn by equal numbers from the armies of Marmont, Soult, and Jourdan at Madrid, in order to interest all these commanders in its defence: the old breaches were all repaired, and strong additional works constructed to retard the operations of the besiegers in the quarters from whence the former attacks had been made. The ditches had been cleared out, and in some places materially deepened, as well as filled with water; the glacis was everywhere elevated, so as to cover the scarp of the rampart; the *tête-du-pont* on the other side of the river, ruined in the former siege, had been thoroughly repaired, and ample provisions laid up for the numerous garrison. The castle, in particular, which is situated on a rock more than a hundred feet above the level of the Guadiana, and surrounded by walls twenty-eight feet in height, was deemed perfectly secure; and what between dread of the approaching siege, and the orders of the French governor, all the inhabitants, except four or five thousand of the most indigent class, had left the place, so that no failure of provisions was to be apprehended.*

These defensive preparations had rendered a renewal of the attack on Fort Christoval impossible; and therefore Wellington resolved to commence his operations against an outwork called Fort Picurina, with a view to the final attack on the rampart at the bastion of Trinidad, which could be breached from the hill on which it stood. Ground was broken against this outwork, unperceived by the enemy, in the night, and parallels established within two hundred yards of its walls. Alarmed at the progress of this approach, Philippon, two days after, ordered a sortie with fifteen hundred men, including some squadrons of cavalry, by the gates of La Trinidad. These gallant men, whose approach was covered by a thick fog, at first did great mischief in the British trenches, driving the whole working parties from their posts, sweeping away several hundred intrenching tools, and spreading con-

fusion as far even as the bivouacs and dépôts in the rear; but Picton's whole division immediately ran to arms, and the enemy were ultimately driven back with the loss of above three hundred men; though the British purchased their final advantage by the loss of a hundred and fifty men, including Colonel Fletcher, the able chief of the engineers. To guard against similar checks in future, Wellington removed his reserve parks nearly half a mile farther back, and established a reserve guard of six field-pieces near the trenches, with a signal-post on a neighbouring height to give timely warning of the enemy's approach. No farther attempt was made by the besieged to disturb the approaches of the British; but they had for some days a powerful ally in the rain, which descended in such floods that the trenches were filled with water, and the earth was so saturated that it was impossible to cut it into any regular form. At length, on the 24th, after a deluge of four days, the atmosphere cleared up, and the investment was completed on the right bank of the Guadiana, while a heavy fire was opened from eight-and-twenty guns on the Picurina, which soon beat down the outer palisades, the British marksmen keeping up such a fire from the trenches that no man ventured to look over the parapet. The defences were injured, though not breached; but, as they did not exhibit the appearance of great external strength, and time was of essential value, from the known energy of Soult, who was collecting his forces to raise the siege, it was determined, without farther delay, to endeavour to carry it by assault.*

The attack was made by General Kempt with five hundred of the third division. The night was fine, and the arrangements skilfully and correctly made; but when the troops, by a sudden rush, reached the palisades, they found them so far repaired as to render entrance impossible, while a streaming fire from the top of the walls cut down all who paused at that post of danger. The crisis soon became imminent and the carnage terrible, for the enemy's marksmen shot fast from the rampart; the alarm bells in the town rang violently, and the guns of the castle opened in rear on the struggling mass of the assailants. Amid this fearful tumult, the cool courage of Kempt skilfully directed the attack: the troops were drawn round to the part of the fort sheltered from the fire; the reserves were quickly brought up, and sent headlong in to support the front. The shock was irresistible: in an instant the scaling-ladders were applied, and the assailants, with loud cheers, mounted the rampart; while at the same time the axemen of the light division discovered the gate, and hewing down the barriers, also burst in on the side next the place. So sudden was the onset, so vehement the fight, that the garrison, in the confusion, forgot, or had not time to roll over the shells and combustibles arranged on the ramparts. The British lost above three hundred and fifty men in this heroic assault, which lasted an hour, but it contributed essentially to the progress of the siege; for Philippon had calculated upon retarding the besiegers four or five days longer by this outwork, and if the assault had not taken place on that day,† this would actually have happened, as the loopholed

furnish a single cart.—NAPIER, iv., 397, and WELLINGTON to STUART, 9th April, 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 52. WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL, 27th March, 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 19.

* Belm., iv., 311, 319. Jones, ii., 68, 69. Nap., iv., 397, 401.

* Belm., iv., 319, 329. Nap., iv., 406, 408. Jones, ii., 70, 71. Gurw., ix., 6, 17.

† Belm., iv., 329, 331. Nap., iv., 409, 410. Jones, ii., 70, 71. Gurw., ix., 18, 19.

gallery in the counterscarp and the mines would by that time have been completed.

No sooner did Philippon learn the capture of the fort than he opened a tremendous fire upon it from every gun on the bastions which could be brought to bear, and with such effect that the lodgment effected in it was destroyed, as the troops could not remain in the work; and a sally to retake it with three battalions was attempted, but was quickly repulsed. On the following night, however, the men were got under cover, and the second parallel being completed in advance of the fort, enfilading and breaching batteries were erected in it; and after five days' continued firing, the sap being pushed up close to the walls, the Trinidad bastion crumbled under the repeated strokes of the bullet, and soon three large yawning chasms appeared in its walls. By the morning of the 6th they were all declared practicable; and though the counterscarp was still entire, and the most formidable preparations were evidently making to retrench the summits of the ruined parts of the rampart, yet, as Soult was now approaching from Andalusia, and Marmont had concentrated his whole force at Salamanca, from whence he was expected to menace Ciudad Rodrigo, into which the Spaniards had never yet, notwithstanding the urgent representations of Wellington, thrown any provisions, he determined to hazard an assault on the following day.*

The plan of attack was suited to the magnitude of the enterprise, the extent of the preparations for repelling it which had been made by the garrison, and the known courage and ability both of the governor and his followers. On the right, Picton's division was to file out of the trenches, to cross the Rivillas rivulet, and endeavour to scale the castle walls, notwithstanding their rocky elevation and imposing height, when the tumult at the breaches had drawn the principal attention of the enemy to the other side of the fortress. On the left, Leith's division was to make a feint on the near Pardaleras outwork, and a real attack, by escalade, on the more distant San Vincente bastion, though the glacis was there mined, the ditch deep, the scarp twenty-eight feet high, and the ramparts lined with bold and determined men. In the centre, the fourth and light divisions, under General Colville and Colonel Barnard, were to assault the breaches. Like the other columns of assault, they were furnished with ladders and axes, and preceded by storming parties of five hundred men, led by their respective forlorn hopes. The light division was to assault the bastion of Santa Maria, the fourth division that of Trinidad, and the two together were nearly ten thousand strong. But they had need of all their strength, for the enemy was at once numerous and skilful, elated by former success, and confident of future victory; the ramparts were lofty, the breaches steep and narrow, and Philippon's skill had prepared the most direful means of destruction for the dark and massy columns that stood in the British lines, with hearts beating for the assault.†

Sixteen chosen companies were charged with the defence of the three breaches, and were ar-

rayed behind the parapets which had been constructed on the *terrepleine* of the ramparts; immediately behind them was placed a strong battalion, in a retrenchment which had been formed in the rear of the menaced bastion; a company of sharpshooters occupied a raft which was floated in the inundation which immediately adjoined the foot of the breaches and flanked the assaulting columns; and another battalion was in reserve at the gate of Trinidad, ready to carry succour to any point which might require it. Every soldier had four loaded muskets beside him, to avoid the delay of charging them at the critical moment; shells were arranged in abundance along the parapet, to roll down on the assailants the moment they filled the ditch; heavy logs were provided, to crush whole files by their descending weight; and at the summit of each breach an immense beam of wood, sunk three feet deep into the earth at either extremity, was placed, thickly studded with sword-blades, with the sharp end turned outward, so as to defy entrance alike to strength and courage. Similar preparations, with the exception of the sword-blades, were made at the castle and the bastion of San Vincente, which were menaced by escalade; and pits dug, in considerable numbers, at the foot of the great breach, to entangle or suffocate the brave men who might have descended into the fosse. Relying on these preparations and their own conscious resolution, the French soldiers confidently looked down from their lofty ramparts on the dark columns of the distant enemy, who were arrayed for the assault; and many a gallant breast there throbbed, not less ardently than in the British host, for the decisive moment which was to determine this long-continued duel between the two nations.*

It was intended that the whole points should be assailed at once, and ten o'clock was the hour assigned for this assault of the tack. But a bomb having burst great breach^{es} close to the third division, destined for the assault of the castle, and discovered their position, Picton was obliged to hurry on the assault; and as the ramparts now streamed out fire in all directions, the fourth and light divisions could no longer be restrained, but silently and swiftly advanced towards the breaches; while the guard in the trenches, leaping out with a loud shout, enveloped and carried the little outwork of San Roque, by which the column attacking the castle might have been enfiladed in flank. They were discovered, however, as they reached the crest of the glacis, by the accidental explosion of a bomb, and its light showed the ramparts crowded with dark figures and glittering arms, which the next instant was shrouded in gloom. Still not a shot was fired on either side. Silently the hay-pokes were let down, the ladders placed to the counterscarp, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties descended into the fosse. Five hundred of the bravest were already down and approaching the breaches, when a stream of fire shot upward into the heavens, as if the earth had been rent asunder; instantly a crash, louder than the bursting of a volcano, was heard in the ditch, and the explosion of hundreds of shell and powder-barrels blew the men beneath to atoms. For a moment only the light division paused on the edge of the crater; then, with a shout which drowned even

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, March 27, 1812, *Curw.*, ix., 16, 20. *Nap.*, iv., 412, 415. *Belm.*, iv., 333, 349. *Jones*, ii., 71, and *Curw.*, ix., 31.

† Wellington's Instructions, April 6, 1812, *Curw.*, ix., 36, 38. *Nap.*, iv., 417, 419. *Jones*, ii., 71, 72. *Belm.*, iv., 348, 349.

* *Belm.*, iv., 349, 350. *Nap.*, iv., 419, 421. *Jones*, ii., 75.

the roar of the artillery, they leaped down into the fiery gulf, while, at the same moment, the fourth division came running up, and poured over with the like fury.*

And now a scene ensued unparalleled even in the long and bloody annals of the Revolutionary war. Boiling with impetuosity, the British columns came rushing on; and, the rear constantly urging on the front, pushed down, no one knew how, into the ditch. Numbers, from keeping too far to the right, fell into the part inundated, and were drowned; but the dead bodies filled up the ditch and formed a ghastly bridge, over which their comrades passed.† Others, inclining to the left, came to the dry part, and shunned a watery grave; but they did so only to fall into the still more appalling terrors of fire. The space into which both divisions had now descended was a ditch of very confined dimensions, with the enemy's rampart in front and both flanks; so that the troops, crowded together in a narrow space at the bottom, were exposed to a cross, plunging fire on every side except their rear, where stood a ravine filled with British soldiers, whose loud cheers and incessant, though ineffectual, fire against the parapets rather augmented than diminished the general confusion. The enemy's shouts, also, from the breaches and walls, were loud and terrible; and the bursting of the shells, the explosion of the powder-barrels, the heavy crash of the descending logs, the continued stream of fire from the ramparts, the roaring of the guns from either flank, and distant thunder of the parallel batteries, which still threw howitzers on the breaches, formed a scene of matchless sublimity and horror. Still, even in this awful situation, the gallantry of the officers and the devotion of the men prompted them to the most heroic efforts: the loud shouts of defiance by the enemy were answered by vehement cheers even from dying lips, and roused the English to maddened efforts; again and again bands of daring leaders, followed by the bravest of their followers, rushed up the breaches, and, despite every obstacle, reached the summits. Vain attempt! the ponderous beams, thick studded with sword-blades, barred any farther progress; the numerous spikes set among the ruins transfixed their feet; discharges of grape and musketry, within pistol-shot on either flank, tore down their ranks; and even the desperation of the rear, who strove to force the front forward, in order to make a bridge of their writhing bodies, failed in shaking the steady girdle of steel. Some even strove to make their way under it, and, having forced their heads through, had their brains beat out by the butt-ends of the enemy's muskets. Never since the invention of fire-arms had such a slaughter taken place in so narrow a space: for two hours the men continued in that living grave, disdaining to retreat, unable to advance; and it was not till two thousand had fallen in this scene of horror that, by Wellington's orders, they retired to reform for a second assault.‡

While this tremendous conflict was going on at the breaches, a struggle of a different, but hardly less violent kind, took place at the castle.

There Picton's division were no sooner discovered by the explosion of the bomb among their ranks than the whole moved forward at a steady pace, about half an hour before the fight began at the breaches. They crossed the stream of the Rivillas by single file, under a terrible fire from the ramparts; for the enemy brought every gun and musket to bear on the advancing mass, and the light which spread on all sides showed each man as clear as day. Rapidly forming on the other side, they rushed quickly up the rugged steep to the foot of the castle wall. There Kempt, who had hitherto headed the assault, was struck down, and Picton was left alone to conduct the column. To the soul of a hero, however, he united the skill of a general; and well were both tried on that eventful night. Soon the palisades were burst through, and in ran Picton, followed by his men; but when they got through and reached the foot of the wall, the fire, almost perpendicularly down, was so violent that the troops wavered: in an instant the loud voice of their chief was heard above the din, calling on them to advance; and they rushed in, bearing on their shoulders the ponderous scaling-ladders, which were immediately raised up against the wall. Down in an instant, with a frightful crash, came huge logs of wood, heavy stones, shells, and hand-grenades; while the musketry, with deadly effect, was plied from above, and the bursting projectiles, illuminating the whole battlements, enabled the enemy to take aim with unerring accuracy. Several of the ladders were broken by the weight of the throng who pressed up them; and the men, falling from a great height, were transfixed on the bayonets of their comrades below, and died miserably. Still fresh assailants swarmed around the foot of the ladders: hundreds had died, but hundreds remained eager for the fray. Macpherson of the 45th, and Pakenham,* reached the top of the rampart, but were instantly and severely wounded, and thrown down. Picton, though wounded, called to his men that they had never been defeated, and that now was the time to conquer or die. "If we cannot win the castle," said he, "let us die upon the walls." Animated by his voice, they again rushed forward, but again all the bravest were struck down. Picton himself was badly wounded, and his men, despite all their valour, were obliged to recoil, and take shelter under a projection of the hill.†

The attack seemed hopeless, when the reviving voice of Picton again summoned the soldiers to the attack; and he directed it a little to the right of the former assault, where the wall was somewhat lower, and an embrasure promised some facility for entrance. There a young hero, Colonel Ridge of the 45th, who had already distinguished himself at Ciudad Rodrigo, sprung forward, and, calling on the men to follow, himself mounted the first ladder. As quick as lightning, he ascends the steps; his broadsword is in guard above his head; his trusty grenadier bayonets project from behind on either side—and he is on the summit! Canch, of the grenadiers, quickly mounts another ladder, and both stand side by side on the ramparts. The shouting troops press up after them, and the castle is won. Speedily the enemy were driven through the inner gate into the town;‡

* Nap., 420, 422. Jones, ii., 72. Belm., iv., 350, 351.

† "Ce n'est que par le grand nombre qui sont noyés que le passage en est permis aux autres."—BELMAS, iv., 351.

‡ Nap., iv., 424, 426. Belm., iv., 350, 351. Jones, ii., 72, 73. Wellington to Lord Liverpool, April 7, 1812, *Gurw.*, ix., 41, 42. Life of Picton, ii., 106, 107. Philippon's Official Account. Belm., iv., 419.

* Now Sir Edward Pakenham.

† Picton's Memoirs, ii., 96, 103. Nap., iv., 420, 421. Subaltern, 172. Belm., iv., 350, 351.

but a re-enforcement arrived from the French reserve; a sharp firing took place at the gate, and Ridge fell in the glorious sepulchre which his sword had won. The enemy made but a slight resistance in the castle after the ramparts were gained, but the fighting was still severe in other quarters; and Philippon, deeming the escalade of the castle impossible, disbelieved the officer who brought the account of it, and delayed to send succours till the English had established themselves in their important conquest.*

While these furious combats were going on at the breaches and in the castle, Walker's division also gets in by escalade. Walker, with his brigade, was escalating the distant bastion of San Vincente, so that the town was literally girdled with fire. They got near to the counterscarp undiscovered, and immediately, by means of their ladders, began to descend into the ditch; but at that moment the moon shone out, they were discovered, and a heavy fire began from the walls. The Portuguese in the division immediately threw down their ladders and fled, but the British pushed on, and soon reached the foot of the rampart. It proved, however, to be thirty feet high: the ladders were too short; a mine was sprung beneath their feet, the fire from the walls was quick and deadly, and logs of wood and shells thrown over, crushed or tore in pieces whole companies at once. Fortunately, during the alarm occasioned by the carrying of the castle, the assailants discovered a part of the scarp only twenty feet high, and there three ladders were placed against an empty embrasure. The ladders, however, were still too short, and the first man who got up had to stoop down and draw up his comrades, after being pushed up by them. Instantly the crowds came rushing on, and Walker himself, among the foremost, was struck down on the ramparts, severely, but not mortally wounded. The troops immediately advanced, with a rapid step and loud cheers, towards the breaches, where the incessant roar and awful conflagration told that the struggle was still going on. Strenuously fighting, they took several bastions, when the false alarm of a mine being sprung created a panic, and they were drawn back almost to the original one they had won; but a battalion left there, by a crashing volley arrested the pursuers, and the troops, rallying again, fought on towards the breaches, while another body marched towards the great square of the town. There their bugles sounded an English air in the heart of Badajoz; they were answered by a similar note from the castle. Soon the breaches were abandoned, and the victors poured in from all quarters; while Philippon crossed the bridge and took refuge in Fort Christoval, where he surrendered at discretion next morning, but not till he had sent off messengers to Soult to warn him of the disaster, and in time to avert a greater one from himself.†

* Picton's Memoirs, ii., 101, 103. Nap., 420, 421. Belm., iv., 354, 355. Philippon's Official Account, Belm., iv., 420, 421.

† Philippon's Official Account, Belm., iv., 419, 422. Nap., iv., 429, 430. Belm., iv., 357, 358. Jones, ii., 73, 74. Gurw., ix., 43, 47. Picton's Memoirs, ii., 113.

‡ For the description of this memorable assault, I have collated the inimitable narrative of Colonel Napier with the official despatch of Wellington in Gurwood's Despatches, and the animated accounts of Colonel Jones, Sir Thomas Picton's Memoirs, and the United Service Journal; and added many important facts from Philippon's official despatch, given, with many other valuable documents regarding the siege, in BELMAS, *Journaux des Sièges dans la Péninsule*, iv., 339, 342.

During the whole of this eventful night, Wellington remained in one position, near the quarries, anxiously listening to the awful roar, and receiving the accounts which the different aids-de-camp brought of the desperate resistance which the troops were encountering at the breaches. Albeit well aware of the dreadful loss which must be going forward, he calmly received the intelligence, knowing how much the fate of the war depended on perseverance at that decisive moment. At length an officer arrived from Picton's division, with intelligence that the castle was taken. "Who brings that intelligence?" said Wellington, in his usual quick, decided way. "Lieutenant Tyler," said the officer. "Ah, Tyler! well—are you certain, sir?" "I entered the castle with the troops, have just left it, and General Picton's in possession." "With how many men?" "His division." "Return, sir, and desire General Picton to maintain his position at all hazards." Enthusiastic joy immediately took possession of all present; but when Wellington, at a subsequent period of the night, learned the full extent of the havoc made in his brave men, his wonted firmness gave way, and he yielded to a passionate burst of grief.

Five thousand men and officers had fallen in all during the siege, including seven hundred Portuguese. Of these, Magnitude and importance of the conquest. eight hundred were killed, and no less than three thousand five hundred had been struck down during the assault: an unparalleled loss, proving alike the skill and intrepidity of the defence, and the desperate valour of the attack. But the prize was immense, and the consequences of the triumph decisive, in the end, of the fate of the Peninsula. A place of the first order, with the preservation of which the honour of three French armies had been wound up, in the best condition, garrisoned by five thousand choice troops, and commanded by an officer of equal courage and ability, had been captured after a siege of nineteen days, only eleven of which had been open trenches: less than half the time which Suchet, with superior means for the actual siege, had consumed in the reduction of Taragona.† One hundred and seventy heavy guns, five thousand muskets, and eighty thousand shot were found in the place; three thousand eight hundred men, including the Governor Philippon, were made prisoners; thirteen hundred had been killed or wounded since the commencement of the siege. But what was of far more importance than even the reduction of such a fortress in such a time, and with such means, Wellington had now clearly obtained the superiority over the French generals; their two border strongholds, alike a barrier for defence and a base for offensive operations on their side, had been reduced; the path was smoothed for the English army into the heart of Spain,‡ and the disunion, already obvious between the imperial marshals, might be reasonably expected

* Picton's Memoirs, ii., 118, 119. United Service Journal, Nap., iv., 433.

† Suchet broke ground before Taragona on the 21st of May, and the place was finally carried by assault on the 28th of June, a period of thirty-seven days. Suchet's force, which was all engaged in the siege (the enemy's disturbing force in the rear being very trifling), was 21,000, Wellington's at Badajoz, 19,000.—Vide SUCHET'S Memoirs, ii., 51, 109, and Ante, iv., p. 419, 422.

‡ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, April 7, 1812, Gurw., ix., 47, 49. Jones, ii., 74. Philippon's Official Account, Belm., iv., 420, 422.

to be increased rather than diminished by a disaster which would expose them both to the vials of the emperor's wrath.

It would be well for the English historian if he could stop here, and could re-
 Disgraceful pillage of the town. having displayed such heroic bravery in the assault, had not stained their victory by the usual excesses which, by the barbarous usages still observed in war, are so often, in the case of a town carried by assault, wreaked on the heads of the unoffending citizens. But this, unfortunately, is not the case: disorders and excesses of every sort prevailed, and the British soldiery showed, by their conduct after the storm, that they inherited their full share of the sins, as well as the virtues, of the children of Adam. The disgraceful national vice of intemperance, in particular, broke forth in its most frightful colours: all the wine-shops and vaults were broken open and plundered; pillage was universal; every house was ransacked for valuables, spirits, or wine; and crowds of drunken soldiers, for two days and nights, thronged the streets; while the breaking open of doors and windows, the report of casual muskets, and the screams of the despoiled citizens, resounded on all sides. At length, on the third day, Wellington, being highly incensed at the continuance of the disorders, marched two fresh divisions into the town: a gallows was erected in the great square, a few of the worst plunderers were executed, and thus order was restored. Yet, even in this humiliating scene, many redeeming traits were to be found: the worst characters, indeed, here, as on all occasions where popular passion obtains full vent, were the leaders; but hundreds risked, and many lost their lives, in endeavouring to put a stop to the violence. No blood was shed of the unresisting, and comparatively few of the more atrocious crimes usual on such occasions committed; while the French conquest of Taragona was disgraced by the slaughter, on their own admission, of four thousand, chiefly unarmed, citizens,* the British storm of Badajoz exhibited the glorious trophy of as many direful and bloodstained enemies rescued from death in the moment of hard-earned victory: the very horror which the British officers at the time felt and have since expressed at the brutal excesses of the men, only shows how abhorrent such usages were to the mild and humane spirit which prevailed in the English army.†

The Duke of Wellington said in Parliament, on occasion of the Chartist insurrection at Birmingham in July, 1839, that he had seen many towns in his life taken by storm, but he had never seen a town treated as Birmingham was in that quarter where the rioters had gained the superiority. This observation is clearly well founded in the sense in which it was obviously meant: viz., that no part of Badajoz, or any other town he had seen taken by assault, was treated so horribly as that part of Birmingham was where the rioters got the mastery; for if the Chartists had had possession of that town for three days, as the troops had of Badajoz, they

would have burned and destroyed the whole edifices it contained. In two hours three hundred Chartists in the Bull-ring burned three houses, gutted thirty, and consumed by fire the whole furniture, which they had dragged out before the eyes of the owners; while nothing but plunder and intoxication, with a few casual conflagrations, took place at Badajoz, even during the three days the disorders lasted: a memorable example of the increasing moderation which the humanity of recent times had infused even into the most awful of all moments—that of a town taken by assault, and of the furious passions which Democratic delusion had, at the same time, spread among the corrupted members of an opulent and pacific community.

Soult, never dreaming of this powerful fortress being carried in so short a period that there hardly seemed to be time for the breaching batteries to have approached the body of the place, had set out from Seville, on the 31st of March, with the whole force which he could collect, and debouched by Guadalcanal into the south of Estremadura on the 4th of April. On the 7th he was advancing from Fuente del Maestro to Santa Martha, at no great distance from Badajoz, with twenty-five thousand men, prepared to give battle to Hill's covering force, which was just before him, when the horsemen detached by Philippon brought the intelligence of the fall of that fortress. He immediately retraced his steps with great celerity, and regained Seville by the 14th; for he was in no condition to fight the whole English army, and the Andalusian capital, which was menaced by Villmur and Morillo, who had issued out of Portugal with four thousand men, and already approached to within ten miles of it, loudly called for his protection. In the course of the retreat, however, the British horse, two thousand strong, came April 12. up with them near Usagre, and a brilliant cavalry action took place, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, with an equal force of the enemy, who were broken and pursued four miles in great disorder, with the loss of a hundred and thirty prisoners, besides nearly as many killed and wounded.*

A great game now lay before the English general, and he was strongly tempted to Marmont's play it. Soult, with a disposable Marmont's army of twenty-five thousand only, Beira. was in Andalusia, and even by raising the siege of Cadiz, and exposing his troops to be assailed in rear by the powerful garrison of that city, he could only bring forty thousand into the field; and though they were among the very best troops in the French army, and commanded by one of their ablest generals, yet with forty-five thousand British and Portuguese, who were now gathered around his standards, Wellington might hope to strike a decisive blow against that important branch of the enemy's force. That he entertained this design is now proved by his despatches;† but he soon received intelligence from the north which compelled him to forego these prospects, how brilliant soever, and attend to the vital point of preserving his communications with his base of operations. Marmont having with infinite difficulty collected fifteen days' provisions for his troops—an indispensable preliminary to entering upon the wasted districts around Ciudad Rodrigo—had advanced from Salamanca in the beginning of April, and April 1.

* " Cette nuit fût horrible: le sang des Espagnols inondait les rues de cette malheureuse cité, et tout y présentait le spectacle affreux mais inévitable d'une ville prise d'assaut. Les Espagnols perdoient quatre mille hommes, tant de la garnison que des habitants."—BELMAS, *Journaux des Sièges dans la Péninsule*, iii., 547.

† Compare Nap., iv., 431, Jones, ii., 76, and United Service Journal, voce Assault of Badajoz.

* Belim., i., 219, 220. Nap., iv., 434, 435.

† Gurw., ix., 42.

immediately advanced to that fortress, which he invested. Thence, pushing on past Almeida, he entered Beira with above thirty-five thousand men, which he ravaged with the utmost cruelty; and Trant and Wilson, who had assembled the militia of the province, even with the aid of the troops which Wellington had left to guard the frontier, were unable to offer any effectual resistance, as Silveira had not yet come up with that of Entre Douro e Minho. Trant, however, was not discouraged, and that enterprising officer even formed the daring design of surprising the French marshal in his headquarters at Sabugal; and this was prevented by the singular coincidence of Marmont having on the same night formed a project of carrying off the English commander, which only failed from a single drummer having accidentally discovered the approach of his horsemen, and beat the alarm. The enemy having approached Celorico, Wilson, after having remained at his post there to the last moment, retreated, after having destroyed the magazines. In the retreat from that

April 14. place, the French came up with the rearguard of the retiring militia near the Mondego, who immediately, despite all the efforts of their officers, dispersed and fled; and Mar-

April 15. mont, taking advantage of the consternation, pushed on to Castel Branco, where there were large magazines, which, however, were fortunately transported in safety to the south of the Tagus, while Victor Alten, with his German dragoons, crossed that river at Villa Velho, leaving the northern provinces wholly uncovered.*

Urgent as affairs had now become to the north Wellington of the Tagus, Wellington would not moves to the have been diverted by these predatory Agueda. ry alarms from his great object of attacking Soult in Andalusia, but the state of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were such as to call for immediate attention. Notwithstanding the most urgent representations of the English general, the Spanish government had taken no steps for provisioning the former of these fortresses, and the Portuguese regency had been so remiss in their exertions for putting the latter into a good state of defence, that it was hardly secure against a *coup-de-main*. These circumstances rendered it indispensable for Wellington to return immediately to the Agueda; and, accordingly, after lingering in the neighbourhood of Badajoz a few days, in the hope that Soult, stung by the loss of that fortress, would fight a battle to retrieve his credit, he broke up for the

April 21. north upon finding that he had finally retired into Andalusia: the army crossed the Tagus at Villa Velho, and resumed its old position at Fuente Guinaldo; Sir Thomas Graham, who was left with a corps of ten thousand men at Badajoz, soon repaired the breaches, and put the place in a posture of defence, while Marmont retired without loss across the frontier and put his army into cantonments at Salamanca and on the Douro.†

Both parties, after this short but bloody campaign, stood absolutely in need of repose; and the exhausted state of the country rendered it impossible for the British army to move before the young, green crops afforded a supply of food for the horses; or the French,

until the harvest had afforded the means of replenishing the magazines of the men. Wellington employed this interval in the most strenuous exertions to put the frontier fortresses in a good state of defence; and as the supineness of the Spanish authorities inspired him with a serious dread "that he would lose both Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz before the summer was over by the habits of indolence and delay in the Spanish nation,"* he took the most extraordinary measures to guard against the danger. With this view, he laid on the Portuguese government the personal responsibility of victualling Elvas and Badajoz, and employed the whole of the carriages and mules belonging to his own army in bringing up supplies to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, his troops being, meantime, quartered in such a manner as to cover the lines of transit. In this way, the object of putting both the captured fortresses in a state of defence was at length, with infinite difficulty, accomplished, which never would have been done by the Spanish authorities, although this year, in addition to other assistance, they got a million sterling in specie from the British government.†

Great was the indignation of the French emperor when he learned the disaster at Badajoz, which he felt the more keen-^{Napoleon's anger at the fall of Badajoz.} ly, that matters had now proceeded to such a point in the negotiations with Russia, that war in the north was plainly inevitable, and was openly prepared for by both the powers. It was entirely in consequence of his own absurd orders that the fortress had been taken; for Marmont had clearly pointed out in good time that Wellington was too well aware of the destitute condition of his army as to provisions, to be diverted from his project by an irruption into Beira; and that, unless both he and Soult succoured Badajoz, it would infallibly be taken.‡ Though he could thus censure with reason no one but himself for the disaster, however, Napoleon, according to his usual custom, laid the blame in every other quarter; censured Marmont bitterly for not having acted with more vigour on the side of Ciudad Rodrigo and Al-

* Wellington to Sir H. Wellesley, April 28, 1812, Gurw., ix., 98.

† Nap., iv., 448, 449. Gurw., ix., 98. Wellington to Sir H. Wellesley, May 3, 1812, *ibid.*, ix., 111.

‡ "If the Spanish government insist upon my placing garrisons in the forts we have taken from the enemy, and I have made over to them, and do not take measures to place and support in them proper garrisons, I now give them notice I will destroy both Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; for I cannot be tied by the leg to guard these fortresses against the consequence of their failure to garrison or provision them."—WELLINGTON TO SIR H. WELLESLEY, 2d May, 1812, Gurw., ix., 111.

§ "The emperor's orders are so precise for me to assemble my army in Old Castile, that, whatever my own opinion may be on the subject, I consider it my duty to conform to them; but I have done so without any hope of a good result. The emperor appears to attach great weight to the effect which my demonstrations in the north will produce on the mind of Lord Wellington. I venture to entertain a contrary opinion, as I know that that general is well aware that we have no magazines, and appreciates the immense difficulties which the country presents, from the impossibility of getting subsistence. Lord Wellington knows perfectly that the army of Portugal at this season is incapable of acting, and that, if it advanced beyond the frontier, it would be forced to return after a few days, after having lost all its horses. He will never be disquieted by apprehensions of a siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, as he knows we have no heavy artillery. The emperor has ordered great works at Salamanca; he appears to forget that we have neither provisions to feed the workmen nor money to pay them, and that we are in every service on the verge of starvation."—MARMONT TO BERTHIER, 2d March, 1812, No. 94, BELMAS, i., Appendix

* Gurw., ix., 68, 69. Belm., iv., 220. Beamish, ii., 47. Jones, ii., 78. Nap., iv., 445, 448.

† Wellington to Lord Liverpool, April 7, 1812, Gurw., ix., 47. Belm., 220, 221. Nap., iv., 448.

meida; reproached Soult that he did nothing with eighty thousand of the best troops in the world; and announced his intention, upon his return from Poland, to assume in person the direction of affairs in the Peninsula.*†

Meanwhile, Napoleon deemed the time now arrived when he might begin to throw off the mask, and carry into execution his long-cherished project for the incorporation of the northern provinces of Spain with the French Empire. Catalonia, accordingly, was declared an integral part of the French territory, and divided into four departments, each with its chief town, prefect, adjoint, &c., and all the other appendages of the Empire. Great undertakings were at the same time set on foot to ensure the communication between the eastern Pyrenees and the banks of the Ebro. A new highway was opened from Mongat to Cabella, a distance of ten leagues, to avoid the fire of the English cruisers, which in that part of the old road commanded its course; another from Figueras to Olot, to avoid the defiles of Castelfolet, so celebrated in the Wars of the Succession; two others were opened from Palamos on the coast to Gerona; and a third commenced from that last fortress to Figueras by Pals, across the often flooded plains which lay between the great canal and the Ter. New fortified posts were everywhere established, and several points strongly barricaded; in particular, the Convent of the Capucines at Matara. Thus everything conspired to indicate that Napoleon was resolutely bent on consolidating the annexation of Catalonia to the French Empire; and yet never was a step more injudicious in itself, or more likely to prove prejudicial to his own interests and that of his family in that country. It at once entailed a burdensome acquisition on France, the evils of defending which would probably exceed its advantages; overstepped the durable barrier which nature has forever established between the two kingdoms in the Pyrenees; exasperated his brother, for the preservation of whose throne he had made such long-continued efforts, and alienated the affections even of his own partisans in the Peninsula, from a dynasty which thus commenced its career by inducing the partition of the monarchy.‡

Considerable reductions took place in the French troops in the Peninsula in May, in consequence of the necessity to which the emperor

was reduced of accumulating his whole disposable force to swell the enormous preparations for the Russian campaign. Dorsenne re-entered France with the Imperial Guard, ten thousand strong; the division Palombini was drawn from Suchet in the kingdom of Valencia; and the armies of the South, of the Centre, and of Portugal were weakened by twelve thousand veteran infantry, and two divisions of dragoons; while six Polish regiments, under Chlopiki, took their course from the army of Arragon for the shores of the Vistula. The total amount of the troops thus withdrawn was little short of forty thousand men; but the imperial muster-rolls still exhibited an army of two hundred and eighty thousand soldiers in Spain, of whom two hundred and thirty thousand were present with the eagles.* On the other hand, the British forces in Portugal at this period amounted to fifty-three thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery, of whom seven thousand five hundred were horse; and the Portuguese were about twenty-seven thousand, in all eighty thousand men.† But though the health of the troops materially improved in May, while they lay in cantonments on the Coa, yet such was the general sickness which prevailed, especially among the newly-arrived regiments, at a subsequent period, that the whole force which Wellington could ever, during the campaign, collect under his standards, was fifty-seven thousand men, of whom twelve thousand were under the orders of Hill in Estremadura, and forty-five thousand under his own command on the Ciudad Rodrigo frontier. Thus, so immense were the resources of the French emperor, that, notwithstanding all his draughts for the Russian war, his effective forces in the Peninsula were still four times as numerous as those of the English general; and it must always be a matter of pride to the British historian that both Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz had been taken, and the tide of imperial fortune turned into ebb before any draughts had been made from the French armies in Spain, and when Wellington was still confronted with the immense force with which Napoleon had laid his iron grasp on the Peninsula.‡

The Anglo-Portuguese army, however, had now, from the experience of five successive campaigns, attained to an extraordinary degree of perfection; and its central position and

Improved character of the British army at this period.

water-carriage in rear in great measure compensated its inferiority of numbers to the vast, but scattered, legions of Napoleon. It was no longer a body of brave and disciplined, but inexperienced men, admirable for a single fight, but unacquainted with the varied duties, and sinking under the protracted fatigues of a campaign. Experience, the best of all instructors, had, in a few years, conferred ages of education; necessarily, the mother not less of acquisition than inven-

* See *Imperial Muster Rolls*, May 15, 1812. Appendix, No. 1., to this chapter.

† The exact numbers of the British were, on the 25th of March, 1812:

Infantry.....	42,289
Cavalry.....	7,558
Artillery.....	3,322
Total.....	53,169

The loss at Badajoz was more than compensated by reinforcements which arrived in May, before the troops took the field.—*Adjutant-general's Report*, Appendix, 18, JONES, vol. ii.

‡ Nap., v., 618. Jones, ii., 377, Appendix. Belm., i., 227

* "Instead of studying and seeking to catch the spirit of the emperor's instructions, you seem to have taken a pleasure in not understanding them, and to have directly carried out the reverse of their intentions. The emperor earnestly recommends you to do your utmost to prevent forty thousand English from ruining the affairs of Spain, which will infallibly happen if the commanders of the different corps are not animated by that zeal for the public service, and pure patriotism, which can alone vanquish every obstacle, and prevent any sacrifice of the public interest to individual humour. On his return from Poland, the emperor will himself take the command in Spain."—BERTHIER to MARMONT, 16th April, 1812, BELMAS, No. 95, App., vol. i.

‡ The emperor asks himself, duke, how it is possible that six thousand English, and four or five thousand Portuguese, have carried off the magazines of Merida, advanced to the confines of Andalusia, and remained there a month in presence of your army, composed of eighty thousand of the best troops in the world, and able to assemble sixty thousand present under arms, with a cavalry so superior in numbers? Form instantly a corps of twenty thousand men, of your best troops, and enter into the Alentejo. This order is imperative. The emperor is distressed that so noble an army has yet achieved nothing against the English."—BERTHIER to SOULT, 19th February, 1812, BELMAS, i., App., No. 92, p. 695. † Belm., i., 217, 128.

† See Decree, Jan. 26, 1812, Belm., i., No. 97, Appendix; and i., 225

tion, had made both soldiers and officers acquainted with their most important duties; suffering, the most effectual regulator of impetuous dispositions, had cooled down the undue vehemence of youthful aspiration into the regulated valour of tried subordination. The British army now set forth in its career, confident not merely of conquering the enemy in the field, but of prevailing over him in the campaign. The difficulties of sieges, the duties of retreat, the necessity of protracted evolutions, had become familiar to all: it was universally felt that war is a complicated as well as a difficult science, but that there were none of its contingencies with which the British soldiers were not familiar, and none of its duties to which the British generals were not adequate. For the first time in English history, a British army now took the field in numbers somewhat approaching to those of the Continental powers, and with the experience of actual warfare superadded to the native courage of the Anglo-Saxon race, and the acquired energy of English freedom; and in the consequences of, this combination—the campaigns of Salamanca, Vittoria, and Waterloo—is to be seen the clearest evidence of the incalculable effect it was fitted to have produced on human affairs, and decisive proof of the universal empire to which it must have led, if its freeborn energies, like that of Rome, had been exclusively directed to military conquest, and its mission from Providence, instead of being the spreading the blessings of religion and the light of knowledge through the wilderness of nature, had been that of subjugating the states of civilized man.*

The capture of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, like the wrenching out of two huge corner-stones, loosened the whole fabric of French power in Spain: nothing was wanting but a blow at its heart to make the whole edifice crumble into ruins. But, whether to deliver that blow at Marmont in the north, or Jourdan in the centre, was the question. Wellington, judging, like Napoleon, that the vital point in Spain was the line of communication between Bayonne and Madrid, wisely chose the former;† but, before commencing his operations, he resolved to strike a blow at the French fortifications recently erected at Almaraz, which commanded the important bridge of boats over the Tagus at that place, their shortest and best line of communication from the southern to the northern banks of the river. All the permanent bridges, from Toledo downward, had been destroyed by one or other of the belligerents in the course of the war; and the roads leading from them, being almost all over mountain ridges, were scarcely practicable for carriages. Sensible of the importance of the only one remaining at Almaraz, Napoleon had, some time before, directed Marmont to construct strong works at both its extremities, capable of securing them alike against the Spanish guerrillas and the British incursions; and the French marshal had, in pursuance of his instructions, constructed forts at that important point of a very solid description.‡ On the left bank the bridge was secured by the *tête-du-pont* Lugar Nuevo, a square with bastions, surrounded by a high wall of four feet in thickness, loopholed, and enclosing a great dépôt of provisions. In front of that work, and to secure an eminence which com-

manded it, was the Fort Napoleon, a semicircular redoubt, constructed of earth, and protected in the gorge with a square loopholed tower of solid masonry. At a still greater distance, about a league from the Tagus, the fort of Mirabete had been constructed in the gorges of the mountains, forming the southern barrier of the valley of the Tagus, and commanding the road to Truxillo, the only route in that quarter practicable for artillery. Finally, on the right bank of the Tagus was the Fort Ragusa, placed on an eminence a hundred yards from the river, so situated as to command the other fortifications at the bridge-head, and deprive the enemy of an advantageous point for attacking them. These works were armed with eighteen pieces of cannon, and garrisoned by a battalion and several companies of gunners: in all, about eleven hundred men.*

To destroy these formidable fortifications at this important passage, Hill was in- Hill's prepar- trusted with a light column of six ations for the thousand men, including four hun- attack. dred horse, and twelve light and six heavy guns. The operation, however, which had been originally projected by Wellington previous to the attack on Badajoz, was now become one of extreme difficulty; for not only was Drouet, with nine thousand men belonging to Soult's forces, lying at Hinojosa de Cordova, nearer to Merida than Hill was to Almaraz, but Foy's division of Marmont's army was at Talavera, in the valley of the Tagus; and D'Armagnac, with a considerable body from the army of the centre, was also in the neighbourhood of that river. Thus, when Hill advanced so far up the valley of the Tagus as Almaraz, he was in a manner surrounded by enemies; for two divisions, each stronger than his own, lay at no great distance in his front, and another, by a rapid march, might, from the south, intercept his retreat. To provide against these dangers, Graham, with two divisions and Cotton's cavalry, was advanced to the neighbourhood of Portalegre, so as to be in a situation to advance to Hill's support, if required; but still Drouet, by a rapid march, might interpose between him and Hill, and beat them in detail; and the French in the upper part of the valley of the Tagus might suddenly fall with superior forces upon the troops so far pushed on as the bridge of Almaraz, and destroy them before any succour arrived; and thus the utmost celerity and secrecy were essential to the success of the enterprise.†

The better to deceive the enemy as to the real point of attack, rumours were spread that the invasion of Andalusia was in contemplation, and the militia of the Alentejo moved towards Niebla, to give the greater appearance of probability to the account; while the bridge at Merida, which had been broken down during the operations against Badajoz, and then only abandoned because neither the Spaniards nor Portuguese could furnish the means of drawing the guns, was restored, with the professed intention of transporting Hill's battering and pontoon train, which had been formed at Elvas, on the same destination. These precautions so completely imposed upon the enemy, that, although the bridge at Merida required a fortnight for its repair, and Hill, in consequence, could not break up from his cantonments at Al-mendralejos till the 12th, no suspicion existed on

* Jones, ii., 90. Nap., v., 9, 10. † *Ante*, iii., 66.

‡ Berthier to Marmont, July 10, 1811, *Belm.*, i., 580.

* *Belm.*, i., 221, 222. Hill's Despatches, May 21, 1812

Gurw., ix., 185. Nap., v., 11. Jones, ii., 93.

† Nap., v., 13. Jones, ii., 93. *Belm.*, i., 222.

the part of the French generals of the quarter where the blow was to be struck. On May 16. the morning of the 16th the troops reached Jaraicejo, and two days afterward arrived at the mountain range which separates the valley of the Tagus from that of the Guadiana, and in the highest part of the gorge through which the castle of Mirabete was placed. By drawing a range of fieldworks from this fort across the pass to a fortified house on the other side of the main road, the French had completely blocked up the only route practicable for artillery from the Guadiana to Almaraz. After reconnoitring the works in the pass, Hill, finding that the delay which had occurred in the march of his troops had rendered a surprise impossible, judged it most advisable not to attempt to force a passage; but, leaving his artillery at the summit of the sierra, at dark began to descend a rugged road, passable only for infantry, by the village of Romangordo, towards Almaraz; and, by taking every imaginable precaution against discovery, reached the close vicinity of Fort Napoleon, unobserved by the enemy, before daybreak on the following morning.*

Though the head of the column under General Howard got to the point of attack in such good time, yet such were the difficulties of a march six miles long through the mountains, that a considerable time elapsed before the rear was sufficiently closed up to permit an attack. Fortunately, during this anxious interval, the troops were concealed by a deep intervening ravine and some small hills from the enemy's observation; and the French soldiers on Fort Napoleon were crowding the ramparts, listening to the sound of cannon which now came rolling down from Fort Mirabete, and observing the volumes of smoke which mingled with the clouds on the summit of the sierra, when a loud shout broke on their ears, and the rush of British bayonets was upon them. Though surprised at the suddenness of the attack, they were not unprepared, as they had received intelligence of Hill's being in the vicinity, and the garrison of Fort Napoleon had, in consequence, been strongly re-enforced by some troops in the neighbourhood. A crashing volley of grape and musketry at once struck the head of the British column; but the men rushed on, headed by the gallant Howard, in the most undaunted manner, and, applying the scaling-ladders to the scarp, commenced the escalade. The ladders were much too short for the whole height, but they enabled them to reach an intermediate ledge or *berm*, as it is technically called; and, having got up, the assailants found it so broad that the ladders were a second time applied from it as a base, and the summit was reached. Instantly a loud cheer announced the success of the enterprise; the soldiers from behind came rushing over; victors and vanquished, pellmell, were borne backward to the central tower, which was carried in the first tumult of success. The garrison, upon this, fled in dismay to the bridge, closely followed by the pursuers, who, in the general confusion, got through the *tête-du-pont*; while the governor of Fort Ragusa, on the opposite side, seized with a sudden panic, not only cut the bridge before half his own men had got over, but hastily, and before he was attacked, abandoned his own fort, and retreated to Talavera. Thus

the whole works on both sides of the river, with all their artillery and immense stores, fell into the hands of the allies, who also made two hundred and fifty prisoners, among whom was the governor of Fort Napoleon, with the loss only of a hundred and eighty men.*

Having effected this brilliant exploit, Hill immediately destroyed all the forts, burned the bridge and stores, and on the same day retraced his steps to Fort Mirabete in the mountains, which, entirely isolated, and environed by enemies, might now be expected to fall an easy prey. In effect, operations, with every prospect of success, were commencing next day against this stronghold, against which the heavy guns had already been brought up, when an incorrect report, transmitted by Sir William Erskine, as to Soult with a formidable force being already in Estremadura, obliged Hill, much against his will, to abandon this second prize when just about to fall into his hands, and retire to Merida, which he reached on the 26th, after having suffered no molestation from the enemy. Foy, meanwhile, hastened from Talavera to Almaraz with his division; but arrived only in time to witness the expiring flames of the conflagration which had consumed the bridge and works, and Hill quietly resumed his old quarters in the neighbourhood of Badajoz. Wellington, however, who was aware that Erskine's false alarm was occasioned entirely by an exaggerated and confused account of Drouet's movements, and that Soult was altogether beyond the reach of doing mischief, was justly dissatisfied at this unlucky mistake, which rendered the success of the enterprise not so complete as it otherwise might have been; and he expressed his complaints on the want of judgment in separate command, on the part even of his bravest generals, in his private despatches to government. But the truth is, that the evil was owing to a general cause, not imputable to any individuals as a fault; and it is part of the price which the nation pays for those free institutions, and that general intelligence to which its greatness has been owing, but which, by bringing the mass of the people, who are incapable of judging correctly on the subject, to pass an opinion on the actions of all public functionaries, paralyzes them, when left to their own responsibility, by the painful reflection that difficulty will not be considered, nor failure forgiven, by those to whom, nevertheless, the final decision on all measures of importance is committed.†

Ballasteros took advantage of the absence of Soult, during his march towards Estremadura, to attack with his whole force, six thousand strong, a French detachment stationed at Bornos, a central position between Cadiz and Seville, which covered the principal communications between these points. This attempt, however, proved most unfortunate, and demonstrated how little reliance, notwithstanding all their experience and suffering, was to be placed on the Spanish troops. Conroux, who commanded the French, cautiously kept within his intrenched camp, as if fearful of a combat. This led the presumptuous Spaniards to imagine that he would fall an easy prey,

Mirabete saved by a false alarm, and Hill retires to Badajoz.

May 26.

Defeat of Ballasteros in Andalusia. June 1.

* Hill's Despatches, May 20, 1812, Gurw., ix., 186. Nap., ix., 16, 17. Jones, ii., 93.

* Hill's Report, Gurw., ix., 186. Nap., v., 19, 20. Jones, ii., 93, 94. Belm., i., 221, 222. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 35, 36.

† Wellington to Lord Liverpool, May 28, 1812, Gurw., ix., 191. Nap., v., 21.

and they accordingly assaulted the intrenched camp in a very disorderly manner. The result might easily have been foreseen. So far from waiting for the enemy behind his fieldworks, Conroux sallied forth unexpectedly upon them as they first came within fire, and instantly put them to the rout, with the loss of above fifteen hundred killed and wounded. The remainder, utterly disorganized, were driven for refuge to their old quarters in the camp of St. Roque, under the cannon of Gibraltar. This disaster was the more sensibly felt by Wellington, that it enabled Soult, now relieved from all disquietude about his rear, to re-enforce Drouet in Estremadura with two divisions of cavalry and one of infantry, which raised his force to twenty-one thousand men, of whom three thousand were superb horse, and at a time when the imprudent daring of the English dragoons under Slade drew them, in an action with the French cavalry under Lallemand, into an ambuscade, where they were ultimately defeated with the loss of one hundred and fifty men.*

As matters had now assumed a serious aspect in Estremadura, and Wellington was Defensive measures in anxious to be relieved from all anxiety in Estremadura. in that quarter before undertaking his projected offensive movement in the northern provinces, he re-enforced Hill, who had assumed the command there in consequence of Sir Thomas Graham having been obliged, by ill health, to return to England, to the amount of twenty thousand British and Portuguese, and three thousand Spaniards, of whom two thousand five hundred were horse; and recommended him, if pressed, to fall back and give battle on the old field of Albuera. Drouet's force, though somewhat inferior in numerical amount, was fully equal in real efficiency, from the homogeneous quality of the troops of which it was composed, and everything, therefore, seemed to prognosticate a second important battle to the south of Badajoz. Nevertheless, it did not take place, and the early period of the campaign passed away without any event of note in that quarter. Drouet, whose instructions from Soult were discretionary to fight or not, as occasion might offer, was too strongly impressed with the recollection of the dreadful battle last year at Albuera, to venture upon a second action on equal terms on the same ground, and, accordingly, he did not advance beyond Almendralejos; while Hill, whom the brilliant and daring exploits at Aroyos Molinos and Almaraz had inspired with a well-founded confidence both in his own talents and the quality of his soldiers, had the rare patriotic spirit to obtain the mastery of the strongest motives of individual ambition, and risk nothing where he might fairly anticipate immortal fame, lest he should interfere with the grand operations undertaken by Wellington in person on the banks of the Tormes.†

Wellington's preparations for this important movement had now nearly reached their maturity. With infinite care, he had established a powerful military police in his army, the officers of which were intrusted with the most extensive powers of summary chastisement, and which promised to produce, as, in effect, it did, that incomparable discipline and order in the field by which, not less than its astonishing victories, this

army was ever afterward distinguished. A month's provisions for the army was by the greatest efforts got together, and stored in Ciudad Rodrigo, even though the scarcity of money at headquarters at that period was such, owing to the vast preparations of France and Russia for the gigantic contest approaching in the North of Europe, as well as the long-continued drain of the Peninsular war, that specie was absolutely not to be had, and the English general had never, since the commencement of the contest, been reduced to such straits by its want.* Several hundred carts, which had been collected for the siege of Badajoz, were suddenly moved towards Ciudad Rodrigo, from the neighbourhood of that fortress and the Caldao River, where they had been hitherto employed in the important work of virtualizing its garrison for two months, which had at length been accomplished; the heavy howitzers, and some eighteen-pounders, secretly fitted on travelling carriages at Almeida; and, by the genius of Colonel Sturgeon of the engineers, the broken arch in the noble Roman bridge of Alcantara, a hundred feet wide and nearly a hundred and thirty high, was restored by means of a suspension communication formed of cables, so strongly twisted together, and fastened at either end, that the heaviest guns passed over in safety; and a more direct line of intercourse across the Tagus was thus opened between the two British armies than that of which they had formerly made use at Villa Velho.†

So vast were the French forces still in the Peninsula, notwithstanding all the drafts for the Russian war, that Soult's plans at this period. was not only secure in Andalusia, but, at the very time when Wellington was preparing for a great irruption into the northern provinces of Spain, he was taking measures for an invasion of the southern ones of Portugal. His plans for this purpose had, for nearly two years, been in preparation; and with such prudence were they conceived, and so large was the force at his disposal for their execution, that it was a mere question of time which general should move first, and which, by obtaining the initiative, succeed in driving the other from the Peninsula. For the success of this design it was indispensable that his rear should be secured, save against an incursion from the Isle of Leon, in which quarter Victor's gigantic lines appeared a sufficient barrier; and with this view he had resolved to crush Ballasteros, reduce Tarifa, Alicante, and Carthage; and, having thus pacified Andalusia, intrust its defence to Victor and the Spanish troops, nearly twenty thousand strong, raised in the province; while he himself, with his whole disposable force, about forty thousand veteran troops, should carry the war into the Alentejo, and threaten Lisbon on its least protected side. The effect of this, he hoped, even in the least favourable view, would be to draw back Wellington to his old stronghold at Torres Vedras; Marmont could, meanwhile, operate on his retiring columns; and, even if he were still able to make head against both, still the result would be, that the credit of the French arms would be restored, new fields of plunder opened, and the war driven up into a corner of the Peninsula. The repulse at Tarifa, in the close of the preceding year, had delayed this project; but the rashness and rout of Ballasteros at Bornos had

* Jones, ii., 95. Tor., v., 29, 30. Nap., v., 61, 63. Gurw., ix., 240. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 56, 57.

† Wellington to Hill, June 6, 1812, Gurw., ix., 218. Nap., v., 63.

* Gurw., ix., 142, 143.

† Jones, ii., 95, 96. Gurw., ix., 227, 230. Nap., iv., 372.

again smoothed the way for its execution: he only waited for the reaping of the harvest to collect provisions for the enterprise; in the mean while, the better to conceal his real object, he began a serious bombardment of the long-beleaguered Isle of Leon; and huge mortars, constructed to carry three miles, from the advanced works of Trocadero, now for the first time carried the flames of war into the streets of Cadiz.*

From intercepted returns which at this period fell into Wellington's hands through the never-ceasing activity of the Spanish guerillas, the real force at the disposal of the French marshals was accurately ascertained, and it was still much more considerable than he had been led to imagine. Suchet had seventy-six thousand men still in Catalonia and Valencia, of which sixty thousand were present with the eagles; forty-nine thousand, of whom thirty-eight thousand were effective, composed the army of the North in Biscay and Navarre, of which two divisions were destined to re-enforce Marmont; nineteen thousand, nearly all effective, lay under Jourdan at Madrid, and might be reckoned on as a reserve to support any quarter which might be exposed to danger; while in the front of the battle, Soult, with sixty-three thousand, of whom fifty-six thousand were present with the eagles, occupied Andalusia and the southern parts of Estremadura; and Marmont with seventy thousand, of whom fifty-two thousand were effective, occupied Leon, Old Castile, and the Asturias, besides twelve thousand who were on the march to join him from France: in all, three hundred thousand men, of whom two hundred and forty thousand were effective in the field, besides forty thousand Spaniards, who had been enrolled under the imperial banners and brought to a very efficient state: a mighty array—strong in its numbers, its generals, its discipline, and its recollections; but weakened by internal divisions, paralyzed by the devastation of plunder, scattered for the necessity of subsistence! Into the midst of this host of enemies Wellington was about to throw himself with sixty thousand effective men, of whom forty thousand were under his own immediate orders, and twenty thousand under those of Hill; but this force was confident of victory, skilfully led, and amply supplied; possessed of an internal line of communication, enjoying the confidence of the inhabitants, and strengthened by the justice with which its proceedings had been directed.†

All things being in readiness, Wellington, on the 13th of June, crossed the AGUE-Wellington to DA, and commenced that campaign Salamanca. which has rendered his name and his country immortal. Four days afterward he reached Salamanca, and crossed the Tormes in four columns, by the fords of Santa Martha and Los Cantos; Marmont retiring as he advanced, after throwing garrisons into the forts of the town, and the castle of Alba de Tormes, which commanded an important passage over the river. Then was seen the profound hatred with which the Peninsular people were animated against their Gallic oppressors, and the vast amount of evil which they had received at their hands. Salamanca instantly became a scene of rejoicing: the houses were illuminated, the peo-

ple alternately singing and weeping for joy; while the British army passed triumphantly through the shouting crowd, and took a position on the hill of San Christoval, about three miles in advance of the town. It was no wonder such joy was evinced at their deliverance from a bondage which had now endured four years: independent of innumerable acts of extortion and oppression during their stay, the French had destroyed thirteen out of twenty-five convents, and twenty-two out of twenty-five colleges, in that celebrated seat of learning, the stones of which were built up into three forts, which now, in a military point of view, constituted the strength of the place.*

San Vincente, named from the large convent which it enclosed, and situated on a perpendicular cliff which overhung the forts Tormes, was the most important of these strongholds. The two other forts, called San Cajetano and La Merced, were also placed on the loftiest of the steep eminences with which this romantic city abounds; and the whole three had bomb-proof buildings, deep ditches, perpendicular scarps and counterscarps, and the other defences which could only be reduced by a regular siege. They were, accordingly, immediately invested, and on the second day, after ground had been broken, the heavy guns began to batter in breach; and the artillery ammunition having become scanty from this unexpected resistance, an opening made in the palisades, considerable injury done to the scarp, and a part of the wall of the convent within fallen, an attempt was made to carry the forts of San Cajetano and La Merced by escalade. The attempt, however, though gallantly conducted by General Bowes,† failed, after one hundred and twenty men had fallen, from the entrance being still blocked up and impassable; and the operations were again unavoidably suspended from want of ammunition, while the aspect of affairs on the outside of the city seemed to prognosticate an immediate and decisive battle.‡

Marmont collected his whole army on the Douro, between the 16th and 19th, with the exception of Bonnet's division, which was still in the Asturias, and moved forward with about thirty-six thousand men, of whom three thousand two hundred were cavalry, and seventy-two pieces of cannon. Wellington had taken every imaginable precaution, by directing the Conde d'Amarante to move out of the north of Portugal, Castanos, with the army of Galicia, to attack Astorga, and all the guerilla chiefs in the north of Spain to harass the enemy's rear, to prevent such an accumulation of force against him; but the French gave themselves very little concern about these desultory efforts, and directed almost their whole force against the English army. Upon the approach of so formidable a body, concentrated in their position on the

* Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 18, 1812, Gurw., ix., 241. Nap., v., 122. Belm., i., 229.

† This brave man was slightly wounded early in the attack, as he headed the troops, and removed to a little distance in the rear to have the wound dressed. The surgeon was in the act of doing so, when the cry arose that the troops were driven back: Bowes, hurt as he was, immediately hastened to the front to rally the men, led them back to the foot of the walls, and was then shot through the heart.—See WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL, 25th June, 1812, Gurwood, ix., 255.

‡ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 25, 1812, Gurw., ix., 255. Nap., v., 128, 133. Belm., i., 228, 229.

* Nap., v., 57, 58. Belm., i., 228. Soult's Papers in Nap., at supra.

† Imperial Muster Rolls in Appendix, No. I. Nap., v., 100, 101. Gurw., ix., 225, 238, 239.

heights of San Christoval, a great battle was expected in both armies for the following day. The crisis, however, passed over without any event of importance: Marmont, after lying two days close to the British line, deemed it too strongly posted to admit of successful attack, and, de-

June 23. camping on the 23d, made a show of crossing the Tormes and threatening the British line of communication, in the hope that they would, in consequence, draw back in that quarter, and an opportunity might occur of carrying off the beleaguered garrisons. In this hope, however, he was disappointed; for Wellington stood firm, merely passing a brigade of Bock's German horse across the river to watch their movements. Next day Marmont sent twelve thousand men across the

June 24. Tormes, and seemed disposed to follow with his whole force; but Bock's steady dragoons retired slowly and in admirable order before them, and Graham, with two divisions, was immediately sent across to restore the balance on the other side; upon discovering which, the enemy desisted from their attempt, repassed the Tormes by the fords of Huerta, and resumed their former position in front of San Christoval.*†

While these movements were going forward in the rear of the besiegers, a fresh supply of ammunition was received in the Capture of the forts, June 27. trenches, and the fire of the breaching batteries renewed in a much more effective manner. On the evening of the 26th, red-hot shot, which had been prepared in the town, were thrown into the forts, which speedily set them on fire, and though the garrisons at first, with great activity, extinguished the flames, yet the bombardment having been continued with much vigour all night, next morning the Convent of San Vincente was in a blaze, and the breach of Cajetano so much widened that it was plainly practicable, and the storming party was formed. The white flag was then hoisted from Cajetano, and a parley ensued; but Wellington, deeming it only an artifice to gain time, allowed them only five minutes to make an unconditional surrender, and that period having elapsed without submission being made, the troops were ordered to advance to the assault. Very little resistance, however, was made: the conflagration in San Vincente paralyzed the garrisons, and the troops got in at breaches more formidable than those of Ciudad Rodrigo with trifling loss. Seven hundred men were made prisoners; thirty pieces of cannon, and large stores in arms, ammunition, and clothing, fell into the hands of the victors, who, since the commencement of the siege, had sustained in the field and in the trenches a loss of five hundred men.‡

On learning the fall of the forts, Marmont immediately retired, withdrawing the garrison from Alba de Tormes, the works of which, as well as those of

* Gurw., ix., 242, and 254, 255. Jones, ii., 97, 98. Nap., v., 129, 131. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 38, 39. Belm., iv., 439, 447.

† The faculty of rapidly withdrawing the mind from one subject and fixing it on another of a different description, is one of the surest marks of the highest class of intellectual powers. Of this a remarkable instance occurred at this period: for Wellington, on the day when he lay at San Christoval, in front of the French army, hourly expecting a battle, wrote out in the field a long and minute memorial on the establishment of a bank at Lisbon on the principles of the English ones.—See WELLINGTON TO SIR CHARLES STUART, 25th June, 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 249.

‡ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, June 30, 1812, Gurw., ix., 261, 262. Nap., v., 133, 134. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 39. Belm., iv., 449, 451.

the Salamanca strongholds, were immediately blown up by the British general. It then appeared evident that Wellington had been in error in not having attacked his adversary when he lay before him at San Christoval; for he now retreated to the Douro, in order to await the reinforcements from Bonnet in the Asturias and Caffarelli in Biscay, on their march to join him; and Joseph, with the army of the centre, was also in motion, to fall on the right flank of the invader; so that an overwhelming force might soon be expected to accumulate around the latter, and compel his retreat. Aware of the succours which were approaching, Marmont July 2. withdrew behind the Douro, and strongly occupied the fortified bridges of Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas, which defended the principal passages of that river. Wellington followed, and reached the southern bank, where preparations were immediately commenced for forcing the passage, and the army waited quietly till the waters, which were subsiding, should have fallen sufficiently to render the fords practicable. The position here of the French, however, guarded by a hundred pieces of cannon, was so exceedingly strong, that but little expectation could be entertained of forcing it in front; but Wellington had been led to form sanguine hopes that, being entirely destitute of magazines or stores of any kind, so large a body of men would soon consume the whole subsistence in their July 7. vicinity, and be compelled either to fall back to less wasted districts, or detach so largely in quest of food as might furnish an opportunity for striking a blow at their centre. In this hope, however, he was disappointed: the skill which long experience had given the French in extorting supplies out of a country, again on this, as on many previous occasions, exceeded what was conceived possible; and on the 7th Marmont was joined by Bonnet's division from the Asturias, which augmented his force to forty-five thousand men.*†

It was now Wellington's turn to feel anxious. for not only was the army in his front superior to his own, but Caffarelli, with ten thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, was rapidly approaching, and his own supplies were brought up with great difficulty, by a long line of communication, from the Agueda, which would ere long be threatened by the army of the centre, which was fast coming up from Madrid. It soon appeared that the French general, confident in his received and expected re-enforcements, was about to assume the offensive, and his measures with this view were taken with great ability. He first moved a considerable body of men towards his own right, July 15. as if with the design of crossing the Douro at Toro, this, of course, inducing a parallel movement of Wellington to his left; then, in order still farther to impose upon the enemy, two French divisions actually passed over at that

Able movements of Marmont, and Wellington's retreat.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 7, 1812, Gurw., ix., 275. Jones, ii., 100, 101. Marmont to Berthier, July 1, 1812, Belm., i., 653.

† "The army of Portugal has now been surrounded for the last six weeks, and scarcely a letter reaches its commander; but the system of organized rapine and plunder, and the extraordinary discipline so long maintained in the French armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the country in which it has been placed; and I am not certain that Marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater quantity of provisions and supplies of every sort than we have."—WELLINGTON TO LORD BATHURST, 21st July, 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 298.

place, and made a show of turning the British left. In the night, however, this movement was suddenly reversed: Marmont counter-marched with all his forces; those which had crossed at Toro were quickly withdrawn, and moved up the right bank of the river; and such was the expedition used, that by morning they were at Tordesillas, twenty-five miles above the former town! Immediately the river was passed at the latter point; the troops moved on with extraordinary celerity to Nava del Rey, on the left bank; and before nightfall the whole French army was concentrated in that neighbourhood, some of their divisions having marched forty, and even forty-five miles, without a longer halt than for a few hours.*

This able manœuvre of Marmont's reduced Wellington's difficulties from slowness of the Spaniards. Wellington re-established the communication between the army of Portugal and that under Joseph, which was rapidly approaching from the Guadarama pass, and which, with Caffarelli's reserves, would ere long raise the numerical amount under the French general to nearly seventy thousand men, with a hundred and forty guns. In addition to this, the diversions on which the English general had calculated to lighten the load likely to fall on him when he advanced into the centre of Spain, had, from one cause or another, proved entirely illusory. The Spaniards had been besieging Astorga, with twelve thousand men, for above a month; but, although the breach was practicable, their ammunition failing, and the garrison only eleven hundred strong, nothing could persuade them to hazard an assault. Mina had just received a severe defeat, which had seriously paralyzed the guerillas in the whole northern provinces, and the accounts from Cadiz were most discouraging. Soult's bombardment had at last struck a great panic into the citizens of that luxurious city, which had hitherto felt only the excitement, and suffered none of the horrors of war; the British meditations in the affair of the revolted colonies had failed, under circumstances which left no room to doubt that their influence with the Cortes was on the wane; and it was already suspected, what has since been ascertained by authentic evidence, that many members of that body had opened secret negotiations with Joseph; and that, if he would recognise the Democratic Constitution, they were prepared to acknowledge his authority, and admit the French troops within the walls of Cadiz.†

But, disquieting as these accounts were, they were neither the only nor the greatest of Wellington's mortifications at this critical juncture. It had been arranged with him, and directed by government, that Lord William Bentinck, who commanded in Sicily, should, at the same time that he himself invaded Spain from the westward, menace it from the east, where Alicante and Carthage still offered a secure basis for offensive operations. Wellington had relied much on the effect of this diversion; and although, if earlier undertaken, it might have been attended with still greater results, by repulsing the storm of Taragona, and preventing the siege of Valencia, yet at the eleventh hour it promised, if ably conducted, to be followed by

the most important consequences. He anticipated from it the recovery of one, perhaps both of these fortresses; and expected that Joseph and the army of the centre, distracted by the pressing necessity of succouring Suchet and the eastern provinces, would be unable to detach in any considerable degree to the army of Portugal, or interfere with his operations in Leon and Castile. It may readily be conceived, therefore, what was the disappointment of the English general when he received intelligence, as he lay fronting Marmont on the Douro, that Lord William Bentinck, instead of following out the concerted and directed plan of operations on the east of Spain, had been seduced into a hazardous and eccentric expedition to the coast of Italy, where no effective co-operation could be expected from the unwelcome inhabitants, and immediate success, even if attainable, could terminate only in ultimate disaster; and that, owing to this unhappy change, the whole army of the centre was disposable against him. And greater still was the immediate embarrassment produced by discovering that, at the very time when he was beyond all example straitened for money, in consequence of the unparalleled absorption of specie in the Russian expedition, and consequent impossibility of purchasing it, save at an enormous premium, in the South of Europe, no less than four millions of dollars, which his agents might otherwise have got at Gibraltar and Minorca, had been swept away by those of Lord William for the charges of this tempting, but Quixotic enterprise.††

These considerations, and, above all, the near approach of the army of the centre Wellington with fourteen thousand men, made retreats across Wellington feel the necessity of a retrograde movement. In the commencement of this retrograde movement, however, the British right wing was exposed to considerable danger, from which it was only saved by the admirable firmness of the troops engaged. Marmont brought the greater part of his forces to bear on the fourth and light divisions, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, which were then posted on the Trabancos, and which, during the night of the 17th, were, from the vast

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 14, 1812, Gurw., ix., 257, 259, and 290.

† "I have a letter from Lord W. Bentinck of the 9th of June. He had sent the first division of the expedition to Minorca, and the second was about to go to Sardinia, but neither of them for the operations concerted on the eastern coast of the Peninsula. He has determined, in lieu thereof, to try his fortune in Italy, with 15,000 instead of 6000, which he was to send into Spain. I hope he will succeed, but I doubt it: there is no solid foundation for his plan; he has not even fixed the degrees of latitude for his operations, much less the place of his landing."—WELLINGTON to GENERAL CLINTON, 16th July, 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 293.

"Lord William's decision is fatal to the campaign, at least at present. If he should land anywhere in Italy, he will, as usual, be obliged to re-embark; and we shall have lost a golden opportunity here."—WELLINGTON to SIR H. WELLESLEY, 15th July, 1812, *ibid.*, ix., 287.

"War cannot be carried on without money: we are to find money as we can, at the most economical rate of exchange; and then comes Lord William to Gibraltar, and carries off 4,000,000 of dollars, giving a shilling for each more than we can give; and, after all, he sends his troops upon some scheme to the coast of Italy, and not to the eastern coast of the Peninsula, as ordered by government and arranged with me."—WELLINGTON to SIR CHARLES STUART, 15th July, 1812, *ibid.*, 289.

Lord W. Bentinck was a most amiable man, and possessed many valuable qualities, but they were suited rather to pacific administration than warlike combinations, as his government in India evinced; and he was strongly tinged with those speculative views in regard to the regeneration of society then so prevalent, and which have since so generally terminated in disappointment, at least in the states of the Old World.

* Belm., i., 131. Jones, ii., 101, 102. Nap., v., 136, 149.

† Nap., v., 143, 146. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 14, 1812, Gurw., ix., 284, 289. Belm., i., 231.

Failure of Lord W. Bentinck in this projected co-operation.

accumulation of the enemy in their front, in great danger. At daybreak on the 18th, the
 June 18. French troops commenced the attack; but Cotton, with his two divisions, contrived to maintain his position till the cavalry of Bock, Le Marchant, and Alten, which Wellington immediately brought up in person, came to their support. The whole then retired in admirable order through Castrejon, and towards the Guarena, till they effected their junction with the main body of the army, which was now concentrated on that stream. The spectacle which ensued during this retreat was one of the most beautiful which ever occurred in modern war. The air was sultry; the country open like the downs in England; the troops, arrayed on either side in dense masses, marched close together, so near, indeed, that the officers in courtesy lowered their swords or touched their caps to each other; while the intervening space, hardly half musket-shot across, was filled with the German cavalry, who seemed stationed there to prevent a collision of the infantry till the proper season arrived. Forty French guns were collected on the high grounds on the French side of the river; and it was under the fire from these that Cotton's two divisions crossed the stream, after the two hostile bodies had marched for ten miles in this extraordinary state of close proximity.* Nevertheless, such was the thirst of the men from the excessive heat, that the fourth division stopped for a few moments, as they forded the water, to drink. The light division, whom long practice had rendered expert in all the arts of war, sipped the cool wave in their hands without halting.

Imboldened by this retreat, Marmont now moved the cavalry of his right wing, Repulse of a cavalry attack under Carier, across the Guarena at at Castriello. Castriello, and began to push a column forward in order to gain possession of an important ridge which lay above that town, at the junction of the Guarena with the little stream of the Canizal. Wellington, however, had expected this movement; and just as the French horsemen were entering the valley they were met by Alten's dragoons, and stopped by the successive charges of those gallant cavaliers. More cavalry, however, advanced to the support of the French, upon which Wellington ordered the 27th and 40th regiments, under Colonel Stubbs, to attack the flank of their foot, while the 3d dragoons came up to their support. These movements were entirely successful. The infantry came down the hill with an impetuous charge of the bayonet on the enemy's foot; and Alten's men being thus relieved, turned fiercely on their horse, who speedily gave way, and were driven back with the loss of one cannon, two hundred and forty prisoners, among whom was General Carier himself, and three hundred killed and wounded. The troops on both sides were highly excited by this action and their close proximity to each other, and a general battle was universally and eagerly expected, but the day passed over without any farther event.† Neither general was prepared for the combat. Marmont's men were worn out with two days and a half of incessant and rapid marching; and Wellington felt too strongly the great superiority of the enemy's artillery, which was nearly double his

own, to choose to hazard a battle, unless an occasion should offer of giving it with advantage.

The fatigues of both armies, and the extraordinary heat of the weather, which now glowed with all the ardour of the dog-days, prevented either host from moving on the following day till four in the afternoon, when Marmont took the initiative, and, drawing back his right, advanced his left, and moved his whole force up the course of the Guarena, which there runs nearly due north, along the ridge of high downs which forms the right bank of that stream. The English general moved in a parallel line along the heights on the left bank, and, crossing the Upper Guarena at Valles and El Olmo, took post for the night on the high table-land of Valles, where every preparation was made for a battle on the succeeding day. Marmont, however, instead of fighting there, continued his movement on the succeeding morning by his left; and, passing the English position, crossed the Guarena near Canta la Piedra, and, pressing rapidly forward, soon gained the immense plateau which stretches thence to the neighbourhood of SALAMANCA. Wellington followed in a parallel line on a corresponding ridge of heights on his side of the river, and the imposing spectacle of the 18th was again repeated, but on a much grander scale; for the whole of both armies were now massed together, and they marched on parallel heights within musket-shot of each other, and in the most perfect array, as the horse artillery and cavalry on either side hovered around the moving hosts, ready to take advantage of the slightest disorder that might ensue, or dash into the first chasm that appeared. Not a rank was broken, however, nor an opening left in either of these noble armies. Like one man, five-and-forty thousand moved on either side, while not a straggler nor a carriage was left behind them on their track; and, but for a few cannon-shot which occasionally interrupted the impressive stillness of the scene, it might have been supposed that they were allied troops executing evolutions on a magnificent scale on a chosen field day. Towards evening, however, it became manifest that the British were outflanked, and that they could not overtake the enemy so as to prevent their junction with the army of the centre; and Wellington, therefore, abandoned the parallel march, and, falling back towards Salamanca, encamped for the night on the heights of Caboza Velloso; while the sixth division and Alten's cavalry, by a forced march, reached and secured the important position of San Christoval in front of that city.*

The manoeuvres of these interesting days had turned entirely to the interest of the French marshal. Not only had he succeeded in assuming the initiative and taking the lead in operation, a matter always of the highest importance in war, but he had outflanked his opponent, and, by his indefatigable activity, changed his position from his front to his right flank, and interposed between the English army and the great road to Madrid. Nothing now could prevent Marmont from effecting his junction with the army of the centre, which was within a few days' march; and the English general, greatly outnumbered,

Movements on both sides during the retreat to San Christoval. July 19.

British retreat to the neighbourhood of Salamanca.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 21, 1812, Gurw., ix., 295, 296. Jones, ii., 102, 103. Nap., v., 151, 153. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 41, 42.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 26, 1812, Gurw., ix., 296, 297. Nap., v., 154, 155. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 41, 42.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 21, 1812, Gurw., ix., 297. Vict. et Conq., 42, 43. Nap., v., 158, 159. Jones, ii., 103, 104.

would then have no alternative but a retreat to the Portuguese frontier. Severely mortified at this untoward result, but still resolved not to hazard the fate of the war on an action unless its chances appeared to be favourable, Wellington,

July 21. on the 21st, drew back his whole army to its old ground on the heights of San Christoval; while Marmont followed with his forces, and extended his left wing across the Tormes, so as to seize the road from Salamanca to Ciudad Rodrigo, and threaten the British communications. To counteract this, Wellington made a corresponding flank movement, by the bridge and fords of Salamanca, and halted for the night on the heights near the left bank, still covering the city, and re-establishing his communications with Ciudad Rodrigo; and on the following morning the army was drawn out in position on that ground, extending from two bold rocky heights, called the Arapeiles, to the Tormes, below the fords of Santa Martha.*

The situation of the British general was now very critical; for not only was the army of the centre, fourteen thousand strong, rapidly approaching, but intelligence arrived in the night that Clausel, with the cavalry and artillery of the army of the North, had arrived so close in the rear of the French, that the junction of that additional force also would re-enforce Marmont on the following day. Nothing could prevent the junction of these formidable re-enforcements with the French army; and it was obviously, therefore, the policy of its general to remain on the defensive, and shun a general engagement till they had arrived. But in this decisive moment the star of England prevailed. Marmont was aware that he would be superseded in his command by the arrival of Joseph, or Jourdan, the senior marshal in Spain: the retreat of Wellington, and his declining to attack when formerly in position at San Christoval, had inspired the French general with a mistaken idea of his character; and he now openly aspired to the glory, before they came up, of forcing the English army to evacuate Salamanca, or possibly gaining a decisive victory, and snatching from the brows of its general the laurels of Busaco and Torres Vedras. Influenced by these feelings, the French marshal displayed an extraordinary degree of activity at this crisis; and observing that the two rocky heights of the Arapeiles were unoccupied on the British right, he pushed, at noon, a body of infantry out of the wood, where the principal part of his army was concealed, who stole unperceived around the more distant of them and gained possession of it. This success rendered Wellington's position very critical; for Marmont immediately crowned the height he had won with heavy artillery, which commanded the only line by which the British army could have retreated in case of disaster; while the French, encouraged by the result of their first attempt, made a dash at the second height; but here they were anticipated by the British, who gained the hill and kept it.†

The acquisition of the more distant Arapeiles by the enemy rendered necessary a change of position on Wellington's part. The first and light divisions, accordingly, were brought

up to front the enemy's troops on the right, and the whole army changed its front; what was lately the right became the left, while the new right was pushed as far as Aldea Tejada, on the Ciudad Rodrigo road. The commissariat and baggage-wagons, also, were ordered to the rear, and the dust of their trains was already visible to both armies on the highway to that fortress. This circumstance, joined to the British troops being only here and there visible, where the hollows of the ground opened a vista of part of their array, led Marmont to suppose that a general retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo was in preparation; and, in fact, he was not far wrong in his guess; for there can be no doubt that in that, or at latest the following night, this retrograde movement would have been undertaken. Fearing that they would get out of reach before his forces were fully concentrated, at two o'clock in the afternoon he took his resolution. Thomière's division, covered by fifty guns, which commenced a furious cannonade on the British columns within their reach, was pushed to the extreme left, to menace the Ciudad Rodrigo road; he was followed by Brennier and Maucunne; while the march of all the French divisions towards the centre was hastened, in order, with the remainder of the army, comprising four divisions, to fall on the flank of the British as they defiled past the French Arapeiles.*

Thomière's division, which headed the hostile array, reached the Pic of Miranda, False movement of a French regiment won the village of Arapeiles, by which it was intended the main body of their army should fall perpendicularly on the British; but they were speedily driven from the greater part of it again, and a fierce struggle was going forward. Meanwhile, Thomière's division, followed by Brennier's, exactly like that of the Russian centre in performing a similar flank movement in presence of the enemy at Austerlitz, advanced too rapidly, and a chasm, at first small, but rapidly increasing, appeared between their divisions and that of Maucunne, which succeeded them, and formed the nearest part of the centre. Wellington had descended from the English Arapeiles when intelligence of this false movement was brought him: instantly he returned to the height, and with a glass surveyed, shortly, but with close attention, their left wing, now entirely separated from the centre. Immediately his resolution was taken: "At last I have them!" was his emphatic exclamation, as he took the glass from his eye: orders were sent out to the commanders of divisions with extraordinary celerity; and turning to the Spanish general Alava, who stood by his side, he said, "Mon cher Alava, Marmont est perdu!"

So rapid were the movements, so instantaneous the onset of the British, that it seemed as if the spirit of a mighty wizard had suddenly transfused itself into the whole host. Independent of the imprudent extension of their left, Wellington had the advantage of his opponents in another particular; for his line formed the chord, while they were toiling around the arc, and, consequently, his dispositions were made with much greater ce-

* Jones, ii., 104, 105. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 24, 1812, Gurw., ix., 301. Nap., v., 160, 161.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 23, 1812, Gurw., ix., 302, 303. Nap., v., 162, 163. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 44.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 23, 1812, Gurw., ix., 302. Nap., v., 164, 166. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 44, 45. Belm., i., 232, 233. — † Ante, ii., 370.
† Gurw., ix., 303. Nap., v., 166, 167. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 46. Belm., i., 231. Jackson's Life of Wellington, ii., 221.

lerity, and his troops in a much more concentrated position than theirs could be. Instant use was made of this advantage. The first and light divisions, under Generals Campbell and Alten, and forming the left of the army, were placed in reserve behind the Arapeiles Hill; the fifth division, under General Leith, was moved from the centre to the right, which now consisted of that division, the third, and the fourth, under Pakenham and Cole; the sixth and seventh, under Clinton and Hope, were in reserve immediately behind them; the third division, under Pakenham, supported by D'Urban's cavalry, formed the extreme right of the army; while the first and light divisions, and Pack's Portuguese, all on the highest ground, were disposed in broad masses as a reserve. When this disposition was completed, the army formed a line in *echelon*, with the right in front. The attack was to be made first in that quarter: the onset was to fall on the French disunited, scattered, and partly in march; and Wellington, like Frederic at Leuthen and Rosbach, and Napoleon at Austerlitz,* was to give another example of the wonderful effects of the oblique mode of attack, when applied by a skilful general, and falling on an unwary adversary.†

Marmont's object in the early part of the day had been to assume a good defensive position; but at two in the afternoon this design was exchanged for that of a vigorous offensive, if a favourable opportunity should occur; and it was in order to facilitate this object that Thomière's division had been sent to occupy the high ground on the extreme left, which has already been mentioned. No sooner did he observe the concentration of troops on the British right than he ordered Maucunne and Brennier, with their respective divisions, to move to his support, and they were in the act of doing so when the tempest fell upon them. Thus, when the British line, in close order and admirable array, assailed the French, Thomière's division, on their extreme left, was two leagues from their centre, and Maucunne and Brennier imperfectly filled up the gap, being themselves separated, by a distinct interval, both from the one and the other. In vain Marmont, who, from the summit of the French Arapeiles, discovered the danger, strove to guard against it, and despatched orders to his left to close in again to the centre; and to the centre divisions to hasten to the left: before his orders could reach those distant columns, the British bayonets were upon them.

The dark mass of troops which occupied the English Arapeiles, "rushing," as an eyewitness relates, "violently down the interior slope of the mountain, entered the valley between them and the enemy amid a storm of bullets which seemed to shear away the very surface of the earth over which the soldiers moved."‡ Tranquil on the summit of the French Arapeiles, Marmont trusted that this terrible tempest would arrest the ad-

vance of the British infantry; nor was he disquieted even by their gallant advance in the midst of it, till he beheld Pakenham's division and D'Urban's cavalry move at right angles directly across Thomière's line of march, at the foot of the Peak of Miranda, while other broad masses of crimson uniforms were marching against him in front. Aware at once of the danger, he hurried in person towards the spot, when the accidental explosion of a shell from a distant British battery stretched him on the plain, with a broken arm and severe wound in the side. His fall, however, probably made little difference on the issue of the battle; for its fate was already decided by the scattered position of the French divisions, and the suddenness of the British attack.*

It was just five o'clock when Pakenham fell on Thomière, who, so far from being prepared for such an onset, had just reached an open hill, the last of the ridge over which he had extended, from whence he expected to see the allied army in full retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, and closely pursued by Marmont, defiling in the valley before him. To effect a change of front in such circumstances was impossible: all that could be done was to resist instantly as they stood. The British columns formed into line as they marched, so that the moment they came in sight of the enemy, they were ready to charge. In an instant the French gunners were at their pieces; and a crowd of light troops hurried to the front, and endeavoured, by a rapid fire, to cover the formations of the troops behind. Vain attempt! Right onward through the storm of bullets did the British line, led by the heroic Pakenham, advance; the light troops are dispersed before them like chaff before the wind; the half-formed lines are broken into fragments; D'Urban's Portuguese cavalry, supported by Harvey's English dragoons, and Arentschild's incomparable German horse, turned their left flank, scrambled up the steep sides of a bush-fringed stream which flowed behind the ridge, and got into their rear; while their right is already menaced by Leith with the fifth division. Encompassed in this manner with enemies, Thomière's division was forced backward along the ridge; yet, not at first in confusion, but skilfully, like gallant veterans, seizing every successive wood and hill which offered the means of arresting the enemy. Gradually, however, the reflux and pressing together of so large a body by enemies at once on front and flank, threw their array into confusion: their cavalry were routed and driven among the foot; Thomière himself was killed, while striving to stem the torrent; the allied cavalry broke in like a flood into the openings of the infantry; and his whole division was thrown back, utterly routed, on Clausel's, which was hurrying up to its aid from the forest, with the loss of three thousand prisoners.†

Nearly at the same time that this splendid success was gained on the extreme British right, Cole and Leith, with their respective divisions, moved forward at a rapid pace against that part of the enemy's left composed of Clausel's division, which was hastily formed to oppose them, flanked by Le Mar-

* "Imitating the example of Frederic at Rosbach, or, rather, my own at Austerlitz, he allowed the separation of our left to be decidedly pronounced, and then commenced the attack on the height of the Arapeiles by Beresford, and by an oblique march threw the weight of his force on the extreme left, which threatened to turn him."—JOMINI, *Vie de Napoleon*, iv., 23.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 23, 1812, *Guw.*, ix., 303. *Nap.*, v., 167, 168. *Jones*, ii., 106. *Jom.*, iv., 234.

‡ Marmont to Joseph, July 25, 1812, *Belm.*, i., 664. *Vict. et Conq.*, xxi., 47, 48.

* *Belm.*, i., 232, 233. Marmont to Joseph, July 25, 1812, *Ibid.*, 664. *Nap.*, v., 171.

† *Nap.*, v., 170, 171. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 23, 1812, *Guw.*, ix., 303. *Jones*, ii., 137. *Belm.*, i., 233. *Vict. et Conq.*, xxi., 47, 48. *Beamish*, ii., 74, 75.

chant's heavy dragoons and Anson's light cavalry, all led by Sir Stapleton Cotton. While warmly engaged with the infantry, who were gaining ground on them, in front, a cloud of dust suddenly filled an opening in the line between them and Pakenham; a loud trampling was heard, and out of it suddenly burst a glittering band of helmets, which, at full speed, came thundering down on their already shaken and bewildered lines. Hardly any resistance was attempted: whole companies threw down their arms and fled; the long swords of the British dragoons gleamed aloft as they passed, shouting, through the broken crowd; five guns were taken by Lord Edward Somerset with a single squadron; two thousand prisoners were made in a few minutes, and the whole French left, utterly broken and disordered, was thrown back into the wood in its rear, and, in a military point of view, annihilated. Great as this success was, it was dearly purchased by the death of the brave Le Marchant, who died in the moment of victory, while carrying the standards of England triumphant through the ranks of France.*

Meanwhile, a bloody and more doubtful contest was going on in the centre, where Pack's Portuguese advanced against the French Arapeiles, and the fourth and fifth divisions, headed by Leith and Cole, after clearing the village of Arapeiles, had driven Bonnet's troops backward, step by step, and with hard fighting, upon Clausel's and Thomière's broken remains. As soon as the combatants had passed the village of the French Arapeiles, the rock was assailed, but everywhere the most vigorous resistance was experienced. Pack's men gallantly ascended the rugged height: already they were within thirty yards of the summit, driving the enemy's skirmishers before them, when a loud shout arose, and the French masses, hitherto concealed, leaped out from among the rocks on their front and flank, and suddenly closed with their adversaries. The struggle was only of a few moments' duration: a stream of fire, followed by a thick cloud of smoke, burst forth like a burning volcano on the summit of the hill, and immediately the Portuguese were seen flying in disorder, closely followed by the French, to the bottom. This check was attended with still more serious consequences; for the fourth division, which by this time had got abreast of the French Arapeiles, still driving Bonnet's troops before them, was suddenly assailed in flank by three battalions and some horse, who had descended from the hill or stole round its shelter, in all the pride of victory; while, at the same time, twelve hundred fresh adversaries, starting upon the reverse side of the slope which they had so painfully won, poured in a volley in front. Notwithstanding all their gallantry, the fourth division was unable to withstand this double attack: the men staggered; Cole and Leith were both wounded; and at length, finding their rear menaced by some of Maucunne's battalions, now disengaged by the repulse at the Arapeiles, they broke, and fled in disorder down the ascent.†

These important advantages in the centre were immediately followed up with uncommon vigour by the French generals. Bonnet was wound-

ed; but Clausel took the command, and, by his able dispositions, had Wellington and Beresford restore the battle in the centre. wellnigh restored the battle. Ferey's troops assailed vigorously the front of the fourth division, and pursued them into the hollow behind; Brennier did the same to the fifth, and that gallant body being uncovered on the left, where the fourth division had stood, was overlapped, and lost ground; while a body of cavalry, which had been concealed behind the Arapeiles, issued forth, and fiercely assailed even Clinton's reserve division in the centre in flank. The crisis of the battle had arrived: everything depended on the immediate bringing up of reserves to the centre, where the decisive blows were to be struck. Beresford, who happened to be at hand, was the first who arrested the disorder: with great presence of mind, he brought up a brigade of the fifth division, and caused it to change its formation and face outward, so as to show a front to the troops of the enemy, who had issued from the hollows behind the Arapeiles. This movement checked the incursion in that quarter, and Beresford had the satisfaction of perceiving the danger abated before he received a wound which compelled him to leave the field. Meanwhile, Wellington, who throughout the whole day was to be seen in every part of the action where danger required his presence, hastened to the spot, and immediately ordered up Clinton's division from the rear; and their charge upon the enemy, already somewhat disordered by success, proved entirely successful. Halse's brigade, which formed the left of that division, and, consequently, was most exposed, were swept away by hundreds: they never for an instant, however, flinched, but, marching steadily forward with the 11th and 61st regiments in the van, regained all the ground which had been lost—an impetuous charge of the French dragoons only for an instant arrested the 53d—the southern ridge, which had been lost, was regained; Ferey was mortally, Clausel slightly wounded; over the whole centre the steady courage of the allies prevailed; and the allied host, righting itself like a gallant ship after a sudden gust, again bore onward in blood and gloom; for though the air, purified by the storm of the evening before, was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled along the basin, and within it was the battle, with all its sights and sounds of terror.*

Notwithstanding the failure of his efforts to change the fate of the day in the centre, Clausel skilfully bore up against the torrent, and manfully strove to collect such a body of troops as might make head against the victors, and prevent the defeat, now inevitable, from being converted into total ruin. Foy's division, which formed the extreme right of the French, was now coming into action, and the balls from his pieces already fell in the British ranks; the broken remains of the left were blended with the centre, and both retiring together towards the right, soon formed a compact body, which took post on the heights behind the Ariba streamlet, and presented a regular line in front of the forest, to cover the retreat of the reserve parks and artillery, and flight of the fugitives, who were hurrying in disorder through its lanes towards Alba de Tormes. Wellington

* Gurw., ix., 304. Nap., v., 172, 173. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 47. Jones, ii., 108.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 23, 1812, Gurw., ix., 304. Nap., v., 174, 175. Kausler, 864, 865.

* Nap., v., 175, 177. Gurw., ix., 304, 305. Jones, ii., 107, 108. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 47, 48. Kausler, 864, 865.

immediately took measures to drive this strong rear-guard from their ground, and complete the victory. The first and light divisions, with part of the fourth, which was re-formed, were directed to turn their right; while Clinton's and Pakenham's divisions, with Hope's and the Spaniards in reserve, assailed their front. The French, who were in hopes the British army had exhausted itself in the affray, were astonished to see a new host rise, as if out of the earth, at its close; but, nevertheless, they made a gallant defence: Foy's light troops and guns, with admirable skill, took advantage of every knoll and thicket to arrest the pursuers; and the marshy stream which ran from the wood down to the Tormes, and washed the foot of his last defensible ridge, was obstinately contested. Nevertheless, the British, animated by their success, pressed incessantly on: the stream was forced; and Clinton and Pakenham mounted the ridge, on the top of which the French last rear-guard, composed of Maucunne's division, was stationed. Aided by a brigade of the fourth division, these noble troops ascended the steep just as darkness set in: the flames vomited from the artillery on its summit, and the sparkling line of musketry along its crest, guided their steps; the chasms in their ranks showed how severely they suffered from the fire, but when they reached the summit Maucunne's task was fulfilled; the dazzling line of light disappeared, the forest had engulfed the foe, and the victors stood alone on the sable hill.*

While the last flames of this terrible conflagration were thus expiring on the ridge of Ariba, Wellington, marching in person with the leading regiment of the light division, was making direct across the fields for Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed on their advance, in the hope that the fugitives would make for the same passage, as the castle of Alba de Tormes, which commanded the only way of getting across the river, was still in the hands of the Spaniards in the morning, and the French were in no plight to have forced the passage. That fort, however, now become of vital importance to the beaten army, had been evacuated during the day by the Spanish colonel who held it, and his commander, Don Carlos d'España, had not even informed Wellington of the fact. Thus the pursuit of the light division was turned to the wrong quarter; and the French, who were well aware that the passage in their rear was open, all took that direction, and reached Alba de Tormes without farther molestation. This circumstance, joined to the darkness setting in just as their last rear-guard was driven from its ground, alone saved the French army from total destruction; for if either daylight had lasted two hours longer, or Alba de Tormes had been held by the Spaniards, two thirds of their number, and their whole artillery, must, from Wellington having reached the ford first, have been captured.†

The battle of Salamanca, however, such as it was, undoubtedly was one of the greatest blows struck by any nation during the whole Revolutionary war.

Results of the battle.

* Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 23, 1812, Gurw., ix., 304, 305. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 47, 48. Nap., v., 177, 179. Jones, ii., 108, 109. Kausler, 865.

† Nap., v., 179, 181. Gurw., ix., 305. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 48. Marmont to Joseph, July 24, 1812, Belin., i., Nos. 103 and 104, Appendix, p. 666.

The loss on the part of the allies was 5200 men, of whom 3176 were British, 2018 Portuguese, and only eight Spanish: a fair index, probably, to the proportions in which the weight of the contest had fallen on the three nations. The French loss has never been divulged; but if the victors lost above five thousand in killed and wounded, it may be presumed that the vanquished, in so decisive an overthrow, would have to lament at least seven thousand fallen or disabled in the fight; and, in addition to this, the victors took 134 officers and 7000 private soldiers prisoners, besides two eagles, six standards, and eleven cannon, wrested from them in fair fight. The French loss, therefore, may fairly be taken at fourteen thousand men. But this result does not rest on approximation or conjecture; for there exists decisive evidence, on the best of all authorities, that of General Clausel himself, that three weeks after the battle he could only collect twenty-two thousand men on the Douro to make head against the English army,* although it was proved, by intercepted returns immediately before it, that Marmont's strength had been forty-four thousand actually with the eagles, independent of six thousand two hundred in the Asturias, and the garrison lost in the forts.† The French, therefore, during the action and retreat, must have been weakened to the extent of twenty-two thousand, or half their army: a result which, how great soever, is easily accounted for, if the magnitude of the defeat, and subsequent losses, and the absolute necessity to which the French soldiers were reduced of straggling in quest of subsistence, from no magazine being provided by their generals, is taken into consideration. On the French side, Generals Ferey, Thomière, and Des Graviers were killed, and Marshal Marmont, and Generals Bonnet, Clausel, and Monnet wounded. The allies had to lament the loss of General Le Marchant killed, and Generals Beresford, Stapleton Cotton, Leith, Cole, and Alten wounded. Wellington himself was struck by a spent ball on the thigh; but, like Napoleon and Julius Cæsar, he bore a charmed life, and it did him no injury.‡

* "I have reached the Douro with the whole army. The difficulty of finding subsistence for the troops is almost insurmountable: all the inhabitants have taken to flight, and the numerous bands of guerrillas remove such as would remain by force. Thus the cultivator, if he escapes assassination from our soldiers, is sure to be punished, imprisoned, or carried off by the guerrillas, if he remains in the neighbourhood of the French army. The consequence is, that the army is obliged to seek its provisions in presence of the enemy, and it is always in want of everything. Our position in the middle of Castile is exactly what it was in Portugal, which was the cause of our ruin. I have taken the most vigorous measures to arrest the disorders: more than fifty soldiers have been seized by the provost-marshal and executed; the officers see that they will be punished also if they do not arrest the disorders they have tolerated, which have produced an abominable spirit in the army. The army consists of twenty thousand infantry, eighteen hundred horse, and fifty guns. I hope that four thousand or five thousand marauders, who have followed the convoys to Burgos and Vittoria, murdering and pillaging the whole way, will yet rejoin their colours."—CLAUSEL to DUKE DE FELTRE, Minister at War, Valladolid, 18th August, 1812, BELMAS, i., 673.

† "From the enclosed intercepted returns, the army of Portugal consisted, on the 1st of April, of 65,597 men, of whom 51,492 are effective, fit for duty; of these, 48,396 are infantry, 3204 cavalry, and 3393 artillery. There are, besides, 1500 infantry and 1000 horse at Salamanca; which, deducting 6200, under Bonnet, in the Asturias, will leave 43,800 infantry and 4000 cavalry in the field, with 93 guns."—WELLINGTON to SIR J. GRAHAM, 14th June, 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 238.

‡ Wellington to Lord Bathurst, July 23, 1812, Gurw., ix., 305, 309. Jones, ii., 109. Kausler, 865. Nap., v., 180. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 48.

With admirable diligence, Clausel got his whole army across the river at Alba de Tormes during the night; and with such expedition was the retreat conducted, that, although Wellington was in motion next morning by daylight, and moved straight in that direction, it was not till noon that they came up with the rear-guard, who were posted near La Serna. Such was the depression which prevailed among the French cavalry, that they gave way on the first appearance of the allied horse, and left the infantry to their fate. The foot-soldiers, however, stood firm, and formed with great readiness three squares on the slope of the hill which they were ascending, to resist the squadrons which soon came thundering upon them. The charge was made by Bock's German and Anson's brigade of English dragoons, and is remarkable as being one of the few instances in the whole Revolutionary war in which, on a fair field, and without being previously shaken by cannon, infantry in square were broken by cavalry. The German horse first charged, on two faces, the nearest square, which was lowest down the hill. The French soldiers stood firm, and the front rank, kneeling, received the gallant horsemen with the rolling fire of the Pyramids; but a cloud of dust, which preceded the horses, obscured their aim: a single horse, which dashed forward and fell upon the bayonets, formed an opening; at the entrance thus accidentally made, the furious dragoons rushed, and in a few seconds the whole square were sabred or made prisoners. Encouraged by this success, Bock's men next charged the second square, which also received them with a rolling fire; but their courage was shaken by the fearful catastrophe they had just witnessed: a few of them broke from their ranks and fled; and the whole now wavering, the horsemen dashed in, and the greater part of the battalion was cut down or taken. Not content with these triumphs, the unwearied Germans prepared to charge the third square, to which the fugitives from the two others had now fled, and which was at the top of the hill, supported by some horse who had come up to their assistance. The French cavalry were speedily dispersed, and the square, in like manner, broken by an impetuous charge of this irresistible cavalry. In this glorious combat, the Germans had above one hundred men killed and wounded, but nearly the whole of the enemy's infantry, consisting of three battalions, were cut down or made captives. The prisoners taken were above twelve hundred. This action deserves to be noticed in a particular manner, as having been, on the enemy's own admission, the most brilliant cavalry affair which occurred during the war.*†

After this defeat of the rear-guard, the French army fell into great confusion; and, Rapid retreat there being no supplies whatever of the French for the troops, great numbers dispersed in every direction in quest of subsistence. But with such extraordinary celerity was this retreat conducted, that Clausel's headquarters were at Flores de Avila, no less than *forty miles* from the field of battle, on the first night: a prodigious stretch, in little more than twelve hours, for any army, but especially one which, on the preceding day, had undergone the fatigues of a desperate battle. By this forced march, however, the French general both got beyond the reach of farther molestation from his pursuers, and got up to Caffarelli's artillery and horsemen, fifteen hundred strong, who joined from the army of the North, and took the place of the discomfited and weary rear-guard. Still continuing their retreat with rapid strides, they crossed the Douro, and never stopped till they got to Valladolid. Wellington continued the pursuit beyond that river to the same place, where he took seventeen cannon and eight hundred sick; but seeing no prospect of making up with the enemy, who were retiring towards Burgos, and aware that they were disabled, for a considerable time, from undertaking any active operation, having been reduced to half their numbers, he desisted from the pursuit, recrossed the Douro, and moved against the army of the centre and Madrid, leaving Clinton,* with his division and Anson's horse, and the Galicians, under Santocildes, to make head against the army of the North in his absence.†

Joseph was at Blasco Sancho on the 25th, when he received the stunning intelligence of the defeat, and was made aware by Clausel that he was unable to keep the field to the south of the Douro, and must immediately cross that river, in order to preserve his dépôts at Valladolid and Burgos. By a rapid movement upon Arevalo, he could still have effected a junction with the army of Portugal; but he wisely declined to link his fortunes with those of a beaten and dejected host, and retraced his steps towards Madrid, in order to preserve his communication with the unbroken forces under Soult in Andalusia, and Suchet in Valencia. Unwilling, however, as long as he could avoid it, to repossess the Guadarama, he moved first to Segovia, from whence he sent positive orders to Soult to evacuate Andalusia and join him on the frontiers of La Mancha; and, at the same time, transmitted to the minister of war at Paris the most bitter complaints against all his marshals, whose jealousies and separate interests rendered them, he affirmed, insensible to the

Retreat of Joseph towards Madrid, and action at Malajonda.

* Beamish, ii., 83, 85. Gurw., ix., 305. Jones, ii., 110. Belm., i., 234. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 52, 53. Nap., v., 182, 183.

† "The boldest charge during the war was made the day after the battle of Salamanca, by the Hanoverian general Bock, at the head of the heavy brigade of the king's German Legion."—Foy's *Guerre de la Péninsule*, i., 200. Colonel Napier, who is not favourable to cavalry as an arm in war, hardly seems to do justice to his brave comrades, the Germans, in this action, though he admits their uncommon gallantry.—Compare NAPIER, v., 184, and BEAMISH's *King's German Legion*, ii., 83, 85. Napier says, merely, that the dragoons "surmounted the difficulties of the ground, and went clean through the square: then the squares above retreated, and several hundred prisoners were made by these able and daring horsemen."—V., 183. This is hardly the due account of a charge which Wellington says "was one of the most gallant he ever witnessed, and the whole

body of the enemy's infantry, consisting of three battalions, were made prisoners" (GURWOOD, ix., 305), which JONES says took 900 prisoners (ii., 110), which BELMIS admits destroyed 900 men (i., 234), and which BEAMISH, in the *Annals of the King's German Legion*, asserts took nearly 1400 prisoners (ii., 85).

* Nap., v., 185, 186. Jones, ii., 111. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 4, 1812, Gurwood, ix., 330, 331. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 52, 53.

† At Olmedo, where the British entered on the 27th, the brave French general, Ferey, died of his wounds. The Spaniards had forced the body from the grave before the English soldiers came up; but when the light division arrived, the men rescued the remains of their gallant antagonist in arms from their infuriated enemies, remade the grave, and heaped rocks upon it for additional security. Recalled to their better feelings by this generous action, the Spaniards applauded the deed.—See NAPIER, v., 185-6.

public good, and doomed him to be the impotent spectator of the emperor's and his kingdom's ruin.* He was soon obliged, however, by the approach of the British, to abandon Segovia, and retreat across the Guadarama, where he was speedily followed by the allies, who, on the 11th of August, crossed the bridge, and occupied the Escorial. Joseph, with two thousand horse, was at Naval Carnero, to watch and retard the movements of the British; and a reconnaissance, made by him in the evening, brought on a shock at Majalahonda with the Portuguese cavalry, under General d'Urban, which formed the advanced guard of the allies. These squadrons, though they had behaved with great gallantry at the battle of Salamanca, were on this occasion seized with an unaccountable panic, and turned about before they reached the enemy, overthrowing in their flight three guns of horse artillery, which, in consequence, fell into the hands of the French cavalry. The German horse, however, who were immediately brought up to repair the disorder, behaved with their accustomed gallantry, and checked the pursuers, though not without a considerable loss to themselves, which, in all, amounted to three hundred men. The French again retired, after burning the gun-carriages they had taken; and on the same evening the allied advanced posts were pushed to the neighbourhood of Madrid.†

Great was the consternation which prevailed in that capital at the near approach of the English army. Rumour, with its hundred tongues, had even exaggerated the disasters of the French troops; faction was abashed at the awful presence of patriotic triumph; selfish ambition sunk into the earth at the prospect of the immediate overthrow of its golden dreams. Straitened as the court of Joseph had been for a long period, there were yet a multitude of persons who were implicated in its fortunes, and beheld with alarm the prospect of its overthrow. The monarch had collected around the seat of government a great number of idle retainers, and all that multitude of dependants, numerous in every country, but especially so in one so full of proud hidalgos as Spain, who are destitute of all public principle, and ready to accept the wages of servitude from any master who possesses the reins of power. The long continuance, also, of the war, and continued occupation of the capital by the French armies, had inspired a great number of persons of good feelings, but no extraor-

inary firmness, with the belief that the French power was irresistible, and they had, in consequence, become involved, more or less, with the Napoleon dynasty. All these individuals felt themselves at once exposed to the overthrow of their fortunes, and, possibly, the last extremities of popular vengeance; and, therefore, they began in excessive alarm to prepare for their departure as soon as the English advanced posts were seen on the southern side of the Guadarama range. On the other hand, the working classes, who had suffered extremely from the long occupation of the capital by the enemy, the continued suspension of commerce, the absence of the landed proprietors, and the exorbitant taxes by which Joseph, in the little circle around the metropolis, which alone was really subject to his authority, had endeavoured to realize a scanty revenue for the support of his court,* were extravagant in their joy at their approaching deliverance; and even the presence of the French troops could hardly prevent them from giving vent to it in every imaginable demonstration. Then, as is usually the case on the eve of a great civil convulsion, the people were variously affected by hope or terror, according as their interests were likely to be affected by the approaching change, but none viewed it with indifference; every heart was agitated, and few eyelids were closed in Madrid the night before the British entered the city.†

The population of the capital had been reduced by the French occupation and devastation of the country to a third of its former amount, but the people in the surrounding districts were highly excited when they heard that Joseph and his court were retiring; and when the long and mournful trains set out, on the evening of the 11th, for Toledo, crowds from all quarters hastened to Madrid to witness the entrance of their deliverers on the following morning. Long before the British soldiers were seen on the Guadarama road, every balcony, every window, every door was crowded with eager multitudes: joy beamed on every countenance, and the general exultation had led the people to array themselves in the best remaining attire in their possession, so that it could hardly have been imagined to what an extent misery had previously existed. No words can express the enthusiasm which prevailed when the English standards were seen in the distance, and the scarlet uniforms began to be discerned through the crowd. Amid a countless multitude, wrought up to the very highest pitch of rapturous feeling; amid tears of gratitude and shouts of triumph; through throngs resounding with exultation and balconies graced by beauty; to the sound of military music and the pomp of military power, the British army made their entrance into the Spanish capital, not as conquerors, but as friends; not as oppressors, but deliverers. On that day their chief drank deep of "the purest, holiest draught of power." The crowd

Entrance of the British into Madrid, and enthusiastic joy of the inhabitants. August 12.

* "The few troops at my command, in the army of the centre, are assembled in the environs of Madrid. The whole provinces of the centre are evacuated, and even the important positions of Somo Sierra and Baytrago. I should not have been reduced to these painful extremities if the general-in-chief of the army of the North had obeyed the instructions I have so often given him, to succour, at all hazards, the army of Portugal, and abandon for the moment all lesser points, as I have just done. I repeat it, M. Duke, if the emperor cannot discover means to make the generals of the north, of Aragon, and of the south, obey me, Spain is lost, and with it the French army. I have always told you, and I now repeat it, because affairs are daily becoming more urgent, that the generals who attend only to their own provinces, and not to the general result of the operations, ought to be dismissed as an example to their successors, who should be instructed, in the first instance, to obey me; and that I should no longer be condemned, as heretofore, to be the impotent spectator of the dishonour of our arms and the loss of the country."—JOSEPH to DUKE DE FELTRE, Minister at War, July 18, 1812, BELMAS, i., 662, 663, App.

† Joseph to Soult, July 29, 1812, Belm., i., 672. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Aug., 13, 1812, Gurw., ix., 349. Jones, ii., 112. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 63, 64.

* The taxes had become most oppressive. All the old imposts, though nominally repealed, were, in fact, collected as rigidly as before, and, in addition to them, a multitude of new duties on corn, oil, meat, and vegetables. Forced loans had repeatedly been exacted from the wealthier classes; and a tax, first of eight, then ten, then fifteen per cent., had been imposed on all houses. Employment there was none. The hospitals were crowded with sick and starving poor; and of the persons who had died in the first six months of 1812, two thirds had perished of actual want.—SOUTH, vi., 48, 49.

† Tor., v., 77. South., vi., 48, 49. Jones, ii., 113.

came forth to meet him, not with courtly adulation or bought applause, but heartfelt gratitude and deep enthusiasm; for famine had been among them, and the wan cheek and trickling eye of the multitude who thronged around him to kiss his hand or touch his horse, bespoke the magnitude of the evils from which he had delivered them. Incredible were the efforts made to manifest the universal transports. Garlands of flowers were displayed from every door; festoons of drapery descended from every balcony; men, women, and children came pouring out of every house to welcome their deliverers eagerly pressing on them fruits and refreshments, and seeking to grasp the hands which had freed their country. In the evening a general illumination gave vent to the universal rapture: all distinctions of rank, sex, and profession were forgotten in the festive blaze; and the servitude of four years seemed to be lost in the intoxicating joy of the first moments of emancipation.*

But while his troops were indulging in the glorious scene, and officers and men alike were sharing in the festivities of the Retiro, provided for them by the gratitude of the citizens, and feeling "the electric shock of a nation's gratitude,"† the anxious mind of their chief was revolving the means of securing the fruits of this important conquest, and maintaining the brilliant but hazardous position which he had won in the centre of Spain. The Retiro was still in the enemy's hands, and garrisoned by seventeen hundred men; but its possession was of the very highest importance, as it contained the greatest arsenal of military stores and artillery which the French possessed in the country; and its loss would entirely disable them, now that the Ciudad Rodrigo train had fallen into the hands of the British, from undertaking the siege of any considerable fortress for a long period of time. Its defences were immediately reconnoitred, and were found to consist of a double set of intrenchments:

one so large that an army would have been required for its defence, the other so contracted that the troops, if driven into it, could hardly be expected to withstand a vigorous cannonade. Wellington took his measures accordingly. Preparations were made for assaulting the outer intrenchments, and guns placed in battery to annihilate the enemy when he was shut up in the interior fort. These preparations, rapidly completed, had the desired effect: the commander, knowing the weakness of his post, no sooner saw the assaulting columns formed than he hastened to make his submission; and the fort was surrendered at discretion, with its whole garrison, one hundred and eighty pieces of artillery, twenty thousand stand of arms, and immense magazines of carriages, clothing, and military stores of all kinds. On the same day Don Carlos d'España was appointed governor of Madrid, and the Constitution proclaimed with great solemnity in the principal public places, amid shouting crowds, who fondly persuaded themselves that the Spaniards had now established their freedom as well as achieved their independence; and that, having gained the privileges, they were at once to evince the intelligence and earn the fame of the citizens of Athens and Lacedæmon.‡

Meanwhile, Joseph, who had retreated on the road to Aranjuez, was reduced to the most grievous state of perplexity. At the head of only twelve thousand soldiers, he was followed by a motley crowd of above twenty thousand persons of both sexes, and all ages and conditions, who were linked to the fortunes of his court, and whose loud lamentations, clamorous importunity, and real destitution, added inexpressibly to the difficulties of his situation. The mournful procession, which extended almost the whole way from Madrid to Aranjuez, resembled rather those lugubrious troops of captives leaving their homes under the stern severity of ancient war, of which classic eloquence has left us such moving portraits, than any of the ordinary events of modern warfare. The line of the soldiers' march was broken in upon by crowds of weeping women and wailing children; courtiers, even of the highest rank, were seen desperately contending with common soldiers for the animals which transported their families; multitudes of persons, bred in affluence and unused to hardship, eagerly sought from casual passengers the necessities of life. The unhappy monarch had earnestly besought help from Suchet, and been unsuccessful; he had commanded Soult to send ten thousand men to his aid at Toledo, and met with a positive refusal. Thus destitute alike of friends, consideration, or authority, he was surrounded by a starving crowd of needy dependants; he had literally all the burdens of a crown without either its power, its respect, or its means of beneficence. Such was the miserable condition of this immense array, that the cavalry alone of the allies would have sufficed to have driven the whole into the Tagus, and the bridge of Aranjuez might have renewed the horrors of the passage of the Loire,* or anticipated those of the Berezina; but Wellington restrained his soldiers, and suffered the crowd to pass over in safety, humanely feeling that the deliverance of the Spanish capital should not be sullied by the massacre of a considerable part of its citizens, and wisely judging that it was not politic to embarrass a fugitive monarch of a crowd of useless and destitute retainers.†

The French affairs in every part of the Peninsula now exhibited that general crash and ruin which so usually follow a great military disaster, and presage the breaking up of political power. At the same time that the Retiro, with its immense warlike stores, yielded to the arms of Wellington, Guadalaxara, with its garrison of seven hundred men, surrendered to those of the Empeinado, who had so long maintained a guerrilla warfare in the mountains in its vicinity: three hundred men had recently before been captured by the partidas near Valladolid; six thousand were shut up and blockaded in Toro, Tordesillas, and Zamora on the Douro; Astorga, long closely besieged, at last surrendered with twelve hundred men; soon after, Torden, with three hundred, capitulated; the castle of Mirabete, near Almaraz, had already been blown up; Talavera and the Puerto de Banos were evacuated, and the French troops in the valley of the Tagus withdrawn to the neighbourhood of Aranjuez. Symptoms, also, of the evacuation of Andalusia, at no distant

* Tor., v., 77, 78. Jones, ii., 113, 114. South., vi., 51.

52. Nap., v., 194. † Sir R. Peel.

‡ South., vi., 52, 53. Jones, ii., 113, 114. Tor., v., 78, 79. Gurw., ix., 354, 355. Nap., v., 194, 195.

* Ante, i., 346.

† Soult to Joseph, July 16, 1811, Belm., i., 655. Suchet to Joseph, June 30, 1812. Ib., i., 659. Nap., v., 192, 193.

period, were already apparent. In the middle of August the castle of Niebla was destroyed, and the whole district of the same name abandoned. All the archives and valuable effects at Seville were packed up, and the defences of the Cartusa Convent in its neighbourhood materially strengthened, while an unusual degree of bustle in the lines in front of Cadiz led to the suspicion that the French were about to retire from their position before that city. No decided movement,

Aug. 25. however, to that effect took place till the news arrived of the capture of Madrid; but no sooner was it received than the sudden bursting forth of fierce conflagrations in various parts of their lines, and violent explosions in all directions, announced that the long-beleaguered city was to be delivered. At nine on the

Aug. 26. following morning, the British and Spanish troops made a general sortie, and found the intrenchments deserted, and the work of destruction already far advanced. In a moment the labour of three years had been set at naught: the gigantic intrenchments, constructed at so incredible a cost of time and money, were abandoned; the principal forts were consigned to the flames; while the rapid approach of the besieged rescued from destruction enormous stores of shot and other warlike implements, which, with five hundred pieces of cannon mounted on the works, besides an equal number which had been destroyed before the garrison came up, constituted the proud warlike trophies of the battle of Salamanca.*

The situation of Wellington was now in the highest degree brilliant; and the consequences which had already attended his exertions both demonstrated the magnitude of the blow which had been struck, and the skill with which the quarter in which it was delivered had been selected. Never was a more just observation than that made by Napoleon at the very outset of the war,† "that the fate of the Peninsula was to be determined in the neighbourhood of Valladolid; for a stroke delivered there would paralyze all Spain." Already from its effects his power had been loosened in every quarter: the valley of the Tagus had been abandoned, that of the Douro conquered; Madrid had fallen into the hands of the allies; Andalusia was in the course of being abandoned by the French. What was of more importance in a military point of view, the army of the North was now irrevocably separated from that of the centre: the former, not above twenty thousand strong, was thrown back, routed and discouraged, into the neighbourhood of Burgos; the latter, encumbered with a host of fugitives, was flying in dismay over the plains of La Mancha. But these, certainly great advantages, were counterbalanced by corresponding dangers; and to the eye which, undazzled by present events, looked forward to the future issue of things, there were many causes for anxiety in the prospects of the English general, and not the least those which gave the greatest lustre to his present situation. The power of the French in Spain had been loosened, not destroyed: one victory, and the capture of two fortresses, could not overthrow the fabric reared by four years of conquest; the abandonment of the remoter provinces by the imperial generals would only augment the force which they could concentrate in the heart of the monarchy; and woful experience had sufficient-

ly demonstrated that no reliance was to be placed on Spanish co-operation, and that the liberation even of the richest provinces brought no corresponding accession of strength to the standards of Wellington. Thus, disaster might possibly, in reality, improve the situation of the French generals; and, by compelling them to concentrate their forces, and loosen their hold of the remoter parts of Spain, be the means of bringing an overwhelming force against Wellington in its centre.

Soult, even before matters had arrived at their present critical situation, had long entertained lofty, and yet reasonable views, for the maintenance of the French power in the Peninsula. Though they were founded, as those of all the marshals at that period were, upon the immediate interests of his own province, and proposed an arrangement which was to bring him into the supreme direction of its military affairs, yet it is doubtful whether, by any other combination, an equally formidable force could have been brought against the English general. His plan, founded on the necessity of retaining their hold both of Andalusia and Valencia as the great reservoirs of their resources, and the impossibility of doing so with effect while the centre of Spain was also occupied with insufficient forces, was, that Joseph himself should come to Andalusia with all the troops he could collect, and so re-enforce the army of Estremadura to such an extent as might enable them to resume the offensive in the Alentejo, and fix the seat of war in the Portuguese provinces on the left bank of the Tagus.* Impressed with these ideas, it was with the most poignant regret that this able commander received the formal order from the king, already mentioned, to evacuate Andalusia, and thus lose at once the fruit of three years' labours. "The southern provinces," he observed, "hitherto such a burden, now offer the means of remedying the present disasters. To sacrifice them for the sake of regaining the capital of Spain is folly: it is purchasing a town at the price of a kingdom. Philip V. thus lost it, and yet preserved his throne. The battle of Arapelles was merely a grand duel, which might be fought over again with a different result; but to abandon Andalusia, with all its stores and establishments, to raise the siege of Cadiz, sacrifice the guns, the equipments, the hospitals, and the magazines, and thus render null the labour of three years, would be to make the battle of Arapelles a prodigious historical event, which would be felt all over Europe, and even in the New World. Collect, then, the army of the centre, the army of Arragon, and, if possible, the army of Portugal, and march upon Andalusia, even if in so doing you should be obliged to evacuate Valencia. By doing this, a hundred and twenty

* "I see clearly the dangers of your majesty's position; but any troops which I could send you would be insufficient to re-establish your affairs, unless the whole army of the South should march, which would occasion the loss of Andalusia, and, by necessary consequence, of Valencia. From one post to another, we should be driven to the Ebro. Now all that might be avoided. We can, by a single word from your majesty, save six thousand sick and wounded, whom I shall be compelled to abandon, preserve two thousand pieces of cannon, the only reserve park that now remains in Spain, and abridge the war by at least six campaigns. I propose that your majesty should yourself come, with all the troops you can collect, to Andalusia; that will enable us to increase the army in Estremadura to such an extent as will fix the seat of war in the Portuguese provinces to the south of the Tagus."—SOULT to JOSEPH, 16th July, 1812, BELMAS, i., 656.

* Jones, ii., 115, 116, 119. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 55, 61. Nap., v., 194, 241.

† Ante, iii., 65.

thousand men will be assembled on the southern frontier of Portugal. If the army of Portugal remain on the north, let it do so: it can defend the line of the Ebro; and the moment eighty thousand men are assembled to the south of the Sierra Morena, the theatre of war is changed, and the English general must fall back to save Lisbon.*

Important and daring as these views for the maintenance of French ascendancy in Spain undoubtedly were, they involved a sacrifice of the capital, the central provinces of the monarchy, and the communication with France, to which Joseph could by no means reconcile his mind. Nor, if he had adopted Soult's views, would it have been an easy matter to carry them into execution; for the army of Portugal was totally unable to undertake any such march as that from the Ebro to the Guadalquivir; the army of the centre, with its fearful train of dispossessed and starving courtiers, would be rather a burden than an assistance; and Suchet, with the army of Arragon, so far from being prepared to sacrifice his hard-won conquests in the east of Spain, by following the king's standard into Andalusia, had positively refused to send him any succour, even to prevent his capital from falling into the enemy's hands.† The plan proposed by Suchet, that the retreat of the army of the centre should be upon Valencia, and that Soult, with that of the south, should be directed to fall back in the same direction, if less brilliant and daring, was more feasible and prudent than that of Soult—that the whole centre of the Peninsula should be evacuated, and the French forces assembled, in two masses, on the Ebro and Guadalquivir; and it had the great, and, in Joseph's estimation, decisive advantage, that it kept open the great lines of retreat and communication with France, both by the routes of Barcelona and Bayonne. Positive orders, accordingly, were transmitted Aug. 14. to Soult to continue and complete the evacuation of Andalusia, and fall back with all his forces towards Valencia. The marshal, much against his will, obeyed these instructions, and the French troops in every quarter took the road for Murcia; but such were the feelings of exasperation excited on both sides by these calamities, and this immense abandonment of territory, that mutual and most acrimonious complaints were made on both sides to Napoleon: Joseph accusing Soult of disobedience of orders, and a design to make himself king of Andalusia;‡ and Soult accusing Joseph, to the French

war minister, of disloyalty to his brother, and forgetfulness of the emperor's interests in the separate concerns of his own dominions.

When Wellington first moved into the plains of Leon, Hill received orders to remain on the defensive in Estremadura, and not fight with his opponent unless an opportunity should occur of doing so obviously to advantage. At this period it was Drouet's interest to have urged on a battle, as a serious loss in the south, even if consequent on a victory, might have compelled Wellington to detach, or even arrest his career of success in the north. He advanced, accordingly, with twenty-four thousand men to Santa Martha, with the intention of attacking Hill's corps; but the position at Albuera, now considerably strengthened by fieldworks, which the English general had assumed, was so formidable that he was deterred from the attempt, and retreated towards the Sierra Morena on the very day of the battle of Salamanca. A variety of affairs of outposts afterward ensued between the two armies, in July 24. one of which Slade's brigade of horse gained a brilliant advantage over the French cavalry. Nothing of importance, however, ensued between the two armies till the battle of Salamanca had imposed on Soult the necessity of withdrawing his troops altogether from Estremadura, preparatory to the general evacuation of the southern provinces; and then Hill followed Drouet, on his retreat to the Sierra Morena, till he received orders from Wellington to advance up the Jarama towards Madrid, to cover the city on the southern side, while he himself, with the bulk of his forces, proceeded northward to the siege of Burgos.*

Wellington was not long, after he arrived at Madrid, of perceiving that the north Wellington was the quarter in which matters had moves to the become most urgent, and that it was north against there that the struggle for the main- Clausel. tenance of his position in the Peninsula was to be undergone. The expected co-operation on the east coast of Spain had, as already mentioned, entirely failed; Clausel had been considerably re-enforced in the north; and Madrid had been very far indeed from realizing the sanguine expectations which had been formed as to the extent to which it might provide means for the campaign. A loan of £480,000 had, indeed, been asked from the city, and nominally agreed to; but such had been the exhaustion of its resources by the long previous impoverishment and exaction of the French troops, that it produced very little. The regency at Cadiz could not be prevailed on to contribute anything even for the subsistence of the troops; the military chest, so

* Soult to Joseph, August 12, 1812, Nap., v., 569, App.

† "I am well aware that the most formidable enemies which the emperor now has in the Peninsula are the English, and see clearly the importance it would be of, if I could send your majesty a corps of fifteen or twenty thousand men; but when the impossibility of doing so is as clearly demonstrated as it is at this moment, I conceive it is my first duty to make you aware of the advantage of preserving our conquests in Valencia. They offer a point of retreat at once to the army of the centre and that of the south, and preserve the great line of communication with France by the eastern coast. Valencia is the true point of retreat: Wellington will never fight so far from his ships. His object only by his invasion is to reap the harvests of Leon, and induce your majesty to evacuate Andalusia. My first duty is to act according to the emperor's instructions of the 24th of April: any detachment towards Madrid would compromise the fate of the provinces of Catalonia and Valencia. I see, with extreme regret, I have lost your majesty's confidence, and pray you to give me a successor."—SUCHET TO JOSEPH, June 30, 1812, BELMAS, i., 657, 661.

‡ Soult to the Duke de Feltré, Aug. 12, 1812, Nap., v., 591, and 236, 238.

§ "I have yesterday received the letter in cipher which

your majesty wrote to me from Requena on the 18th of October. At the distance the emperor is from his capital, there are some things on which we must shut our eyes, at least for the moment. If the conduct of the Duke of Dalmatia is equivocal and doubtful, if his proceedings even have the same aspect as those he formerly adopted when in Portugal, after the taking of Oporto, the time will come when the emperor may punish him, if he deems it expedient; and, perhaps, he is less dangerous where he is than here, where a few factious persons, from the depth of the prisons even where they were confined, meditated, and all but executed, a revolution against the emperor's authority on the 2d and 3d of October (Mallet's conspiracy). I think, then, sire, it is most prudent not to drive the Duke of Dalmatia to extremities; taking care, nevertheless, underhand, to thwart all his ambitious projects, and using every imaginable precaution to secure the fidelity of the army of the South towards the emperor, and also that of the Spaniards in his suite."—Confidential Letter, the DUKE DE FELTRÉ, Minister at War, to KING JOSEPH, Paris, 10th Nov., 1812, NAP., v., 598, App. * Jones, ii., 115, 125. Gurw., ix., 332, 333.

far as specie was concerned, was absolutely penniless; the war with America had, at the most critical period of the contest, closed the principal source from whence grain had hitherto been obtained for the army; and supplies could be procured only by purchasing corn for hard cash, and at a heavy expense, in Lisbon. The citizens had liberally fed the troops in garrison, and the stewards of the sequestered and royal lands had zealously given the produce of their harvest on the promise of future payment; but no steps whatever had been taken to augment the military strength of the country, or turn the enthusiasm of the people to any useful account: the guerillas were quietly settling down in the large towns, and striving to console themselves for their privations by the plunder they could collect; while the people of the capital, deeming the war at an end, were giving themselves up to feasts and bull-fights, without any thought of the serious concerns of their situation. Thus the whole weight of the contest, as usual, was likely to fall on Wellington and his English troops; and as the north was the vital point of the campaign, and the considerable re-enforcements which were coming from England had been directed to Corunna to join him on the Douro, he resolved without delay to direct a considerable part of his forces there, and proceed in person to endeavour to gain a base for the future operations of the war in the northern provinces.* Leaving, therefore, the two divisions of the allied army which stood most in need of repose at Madrid, Sept. 1. he himself set out on the 1st of September for Valladolid with four divisions. Hill was ordered to Aranjuez to assist in covering the capital; the British and Portuguese from Cadiz were ordered round by sea to Lisbon, with instructions to move up as rapidly as possible to the scene of action; the guards and re-enforcements from England were directed to land at Corunna, and thence cross Galicia with all possible expedition; and every effort made to bring together as great a disposable force as could be collected in the anticipated seat of war to the north of the Douro.†

The march from Madrid was conducted with great expedition. Leaving that capital on the 1st of September, the French retired to Burgos. English general passed the Douro on the 6th, at the fords of El Herrera, and on the 7th drove the enemy from Valladolid; and, following them closely, effected a junction with the army of Galicia, under Santocildes, at Palencia. Sept. 8. It was there seen how miserably fallacious had been the representations which had been held forth as to the support which might be anticipated from this portion of the Spanish troops. Instead of thirty thousand men who received rations as soldiers in Galicia, there only joined the army twelve thousand men, ill-disciplined, and almost in rags, of whom no more

than three hundred and fifty were horse. It was quite evident, the moment they made their appearance, that no reliance could be placed on them to withstand the shock of a single division of French troops. If, however, the appearance of the Spanish force was in the highest degree discouraging, that of the French troops was in a proportional degree satisfactory, and evinced, in the clearest manner, the vast chasm which the battle of Salamanca had made in their ranks. As Clausel retired, he broke down all the bridges over the numerous streams which, in that mountainous region, flow towards the Douro or the Ebro, the repairing of which sensibly retarded the advance of the British; but when Sept. 17. he drew near to Burgos, and took up a position covering that town, which compelled the allies to wait till the bulk of their army came up, it at once appeared how immensely his numbers had diminished from the effects of that memorable engagement. His battalions could be distinctly numbered, and the whole amount of his troops, including cavalry and artillery, did not exceed twenty-two thousand;* a sad contrast to the noble army of forty-five thousand who had so lately crowded the banks of the Guarena. With this force he did not conceive himself sufficiently strong to fight; and, therefore, abandoning Burgos to its fate, he retired to Briviesca, on its northern side, where he was next day joined by General Souham with nine thousand infantry of the army of the North, which increased his force, even after deducting two thousand left in garrison in the Castle of Burgos, to fully thirty thousand men.†

The Castle of BURGOS, which has acquired, from the consequences of the siege that followed, an historic character that would not otherwise have belonged to it, occupies the upper parts of an oblong conical hill, the lower half of which is surrounded by an uncovered wall of difficult access, while on its summit stands an old square keep, converted by the French into a modern casemated fort. Between these defences, which they found there when they commenced their operations, the French engineers had constructed two lines of fieldworks, well built and strongly palisaded, which enclosed the two summits of the hill, on the highest of which the old keep, surrounded by a strong battery, stood, while the lower was crowned by an ancient building called the White Church, which also had been converted into a sort of modern fortress. The battery called the Napoleon Battery, round the old keep, was so elevated that it commanded the whole country within cannon-shot around, with the exception of a hill called St. Michael, which was a lower eminence, on which the French had constructed a hornwork, with a scarp twenty-five, and a counterscarp ten feet high, encircled by strong palisades, and well furnished with heavy cannon, while its position, under the fire of the Napoleon Battery, rendered it peculiarly difficult to hold, even if won by assault. Twenty heavy guns and six mortars were already mounted in this fortress; and, independent of its importance as commanding the

Description of the Castle of Burgos, and the French works there.

* Such was the misery to which the poorer classes of Madrid had been reduced by the long-continued exactions of the French troops and authorities, that when the British arrived, so far from being in a condition to give them any support, they needed relief from them. Groans of famishing persons were, in the poorer quarters of the city, heard every night; while, in the morning, the numerous dead bodies thrown into the streets showed how intense the suffering had been; and the British officers of the third division and 45th regiment formed by contributions a soup-kitchen, which rescued hundreds from an untimely death.—See NAPIER, v., 257, 258.

† Wellington to Sir H. Wellesley, Aug. 23, 1812, Gurw., ix., 369, 371. Jones, ii., 122, 123. Nap., v., 258, 261. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 55.

VOL. III.—Q q q

* "Clausel had collected twenty thousand infantry, two thousand horse, and fifty guns, with which he had reoccupied Valladolid previous to Wellington's return from Madrid."—BELMAS, i., 238; and CLAUSSEL to JOSEPH, 18th August, 1812, *ibid.*, p. 672. *Pièces Just.*

† Belm., i., 238, 239. Jones, ii., 124, 125. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 64, 65. Gurw., ix., 419. Nap., v., 259, 261.

great road from Bayonne to Madrid, its acquisition was an object of the very highest importance to the allies, as the whole stores and reserve artillery of the army of Portugal were deposited within its walls; and its reduction, by depriving that force of its resources, would probably enable the English general to take up his winter-quarters, and fix the seat of war, on the banks of the Ebro.*

The first effort of the English general was directed against the hornwork of St. Michael, the possession of which was indispensably necessary to approaches against the body of the place. Such, however, was the vigour with which the French batteries, which commanded all the fords and bridges over the Arlanza stream, which required to be passed before it could be reached, were served, that it was not till the 19th that the passage was effected, and the outposts on the hill of St. Michael driven in. An assault was immediately ordered for the same night, and conducted by Major Somers Cocks, with the light infantry of the first division, Pack's Portuguese, and the 42d British regiment. As soon as it was dark, the troops moved to the assault; and as the works, though formidable, were not yet entirely finished, they succeeded in forcing their way, headed by the 79th, in by the gorge, at daylight the next morning, although the attempt to carry the work itself failed, from the great height of the scarp. The garrison, which consisted of a strong battalion, made a stout resistance; and, when they found the entrance in the enemy's possession, collecting themselves into a solid mass, they overpowered all opposition, burst through the assailants, and regained the castle, with the loss only of a hundred and fifty men, while that of the assailants was above four hundred.†

Batteries were now erected against the exterior line of defences, and Wellington had an opportunity of observing in person the strength of the place. Although the lines were far from being complete, and such as would easily have yielded to a very small battering-train, yet such was the almost total destitution of the British army in heavy artillery, that Wellington, from the very first, expressed the most serious apprehensions that he would not be able to breach its ramparts, and that his only chances of success consisted in the failure of the garrison's water, or in their magazines being set on fire.‡ The attempt, however, was made: twelve thousand men, comprehending the first and sixth divisions, with two Portuguese brigades, were intrusted with the siege; while twenty thousand, supported by ten thousand Spaniards, formed the covering force. Approaches in form were, accordingly, commenced; although the miserable battering-train, which consisted only of three eighteen-pounders and the five iron twenty-four-pound howitzers which had been used at the

siege of the forts of Salamanca, gave but little hopes of a successful issue to the enterprise. An attempt was made, after the breaching guns had played a few days, to carry the outer wall by assault; but although the troops got into the ditch, and the ladders were fixed against the scarp of the rampart, yet the few who reached its summit were immediately bayoneted, and, after a bloody conflict of half an hour, the assailants fell back, after having lost three hundred and fifty men.*

All the attempts to breach the wall of this outer intrenchment by means of the heavy guns having failed, and two out of the three having been silenced by the superior weight of the enemy's fire, an attempt was made to run a mine in such a manner as to blow it down, while the single gun which remained in a serviceable condition continued its ineffectual fire upon the rampart. The gun could do nothing; but the mine, which was exploded on the night of the 29th, made a chasm in the wall, though not sufficiently wide as to be deemed practicable by the assaulting columns, though a sergeant and four men, who formed the forlorn hope, had gained its summit; and before the next morning the garrison had, with surprising activity, run up such interior defences as rendered all entrance impossible. Recourse was now had to a second mine: a new gallery was run under the wall, and, at four in the afternoon of the 4th of October, it was sprung with a terrific explosion, which at once sent many of the French up into the air, and brought down above one hundred feet of the wall. An assault was instantly ordered, both there and at the old breach, and both proved successful. Holmes, with the 2d battalion of the 24th, quickly forced his way through the smoke and crumbling ruins, almost before the rattle of the explosion had ceased; while Lieutenant Fraser, of the same regiment, at the same moment carried the old breach, and, both uniting, drove the enemy into their interior line. This important achievement greatly elevated the spirits of the army, which had sunk considerably from the long duration and serious loss of life during the siege; and the speedy reduction of the castle was anticipated, the more especially as some supplies of ammunition had already been received from Santander, and more was known to be on the road, both from Ciudad Rodrigo and Corunna.†

But these promising appearances were of short continuance, and soon gave way to such a succession of disasters, as not saluted the only almost shut out all hope of a successful issue to the siege, but so seriously depressed the spirit of the army, as went far to counterbalance all the advantages of the campaign. Dubreton and his brave garrison, who throughout the whole siege discharged with incomparable vigour and talent the important duty intrusted to them, made the most strenuous efforts to dispossess the besiegers of the vantage-ground they had gained, and, in the first instance at least, with unlooked-for success. A sally, suddenly directed, on the afternoon of the next day, against the advanced posts of the Brit-

* Jones, ii., 125, 126. Belm., iv. Nap., v., 262, 263. Wellington to Sir E. Paget, Sept. 20, 1812, Gurw., ix., 432 and 436. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 65, 66.

† Vict. et Conq., xxi., 65, 66. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 21, 1812, Gurw., ix., 437. Jones, ii., 126, 127. Nap., v., 264.

‡ "I am apprehensive that the means which I have are not sufficient to enable me to take the castle. I hear the enemy, however, are ill supplied with water, and that their magazines are in a place exposed to be set on fire: I think it possible, therefore, that I may have it in my power to force them to surrender, although I may not be able to lay the place open to assault."—WELLINGTON to LORD BATHURST, 21st Sept., 1812, GURWOOD, ix., 436.

* Belm., iv., 273, 279. Jones, ii., 126. Nap., ii., 266, 267. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 66, 67. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Sept. 2, 1812, Gurw., ix., 450.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 5, 1812, Gurw., ix., 468. Jones, ii., 127. Nap., v., 273, 274. Belm., iv., 281, 284. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 67, 68.

ish within the outer wall, swept them all back Oct. 5. and regained both breaches; and though the garrison was driven in again the same evening, yet they had, in the mean time, destroyed this lodgment, and carried off the tools. The

Oct. 7 and 8. two following days were employed by both parties in indefatigable efforts: the allies increasing the front of their lodgment, and pushing their sap up to the second line; the French, by frequent sorties and an incessant fire, as well as by rolling of shells down the hill, striving to retard them. On the evening of the 8th, however, the head of the sap had, by strenuous exertions, been run to within ten yards of the wall; and Dubreton, seeing an assault of that line imminent, ordered a sally in the night, which succeeded so far, that, by a desperate rush, the trench was gained, and before the enemy could be driven in again, which was effected with the utmost gallantry by Major Cocks, who fell dead in the moment of success, the whole works, constructed with so much labour between the outer and inner line, were destroyed.*

It was now evident that, to push the sap on so The second narrow a front, without the aid of line is carried, artillery, was hopeless, and every but retaken. effort was therefore made to increase the fire on the inner line. The arrival of the ammunition from Santander enabled the engineers to do this. The one remaining gun was worked incessantly; and the five iron howitzers did such good service, that it was evident that, if an adequate supply of ammunition could be obtained, the place would speedily fall. But the failure of that indispensable article again suspended the operations, and it was not till the

Oct. 15. 15th that the fire in the breaching batteries could be renewed. It was then directed against the inner circle of the Napoleon

Oct. 17. Battery, while a mine, charged with nine hundred pounds of powder, was run under the White Church. This done, and the howitzers having cleared away the temporary obstructions run up in the breach of the second

Oct. 18. line, a final assault was ordered for the night of the 18th. At half past four in the morning, the signal was given by the springing of the mine beneath the White Church, which threw down a part of the wall; and Colonel Browne, at the head of a Portuguese battalion and some Spanish companies, after a violent struggle, established themselves in its ruins. At the same time, a detachment of the King's German Legion carried the breach of the second line; the guards, at another place, got in by escalade, and the intrenchment was won. Some brave men, in the tumult of victory, even rushed on and got to the summit of the breach of the third line, where the bodies of Major Wurmb and a Hanoverian colonel were found. Unfortunately, however, the efforts of these heroes were, in the darkness of the night, not adequately supported: the troops got dispersed in the space between the second and third line; and Dubreton, who had a powerful reserve in readiness to take advantage of such an incident, instantly rushed down with an overpowering force, and drove the assailants out of the lines they had so gallantly won, with the loss of two hundred men.†

This was the last effort of the besiegers. The siege, which had now continued without intermission for thirty days, Wellington raises the siege: causes of its failure. had not only occasioned a vast consumption of ammunition to the allies, which they could ill spare in the exhausted state of their supplies, but it had cost them two thousand brave men killed and wounded, and given the French generals time to assemble forces from all quarters for its relief. Souham's corps at Briviesca had been joined by the whole army of the North, and strong re-enforcements from Alaya, in consequence of which, Clausel, whose force was now raised to forty-four thousand men, had assumed an offensive attitude, which had obliged Wellington to unite nearly the whole besieging to the covering army, on the day of the last assault. He had even driven in the British pickets, and obtained possession of Quintana Palla on their left, though from this they were immediately expelled by Sir Edward Paget with two divisions. Accounts, however, were at the same time received from Madrid, which rendered it indispensable for the allies forthwith to provide for the security of the centre of Spain. Soult, who had without molestation assembled his whole forces in Andalusia, including Drouet's from Estremadura, had marched from Granada in the middle of Sep- Sept. 15. tember, by the way of Caravaca, and effected his junction with the army of the centre, under Joseph, on the 29th of the same Sept. 29. month, at Albante. Their united force was sixty thousand strong, without reckoning on any of Suchet's troops. Ballasteros, whose indefatigable activity and energy had hitherto so justly procured for him a high reputation, was so mortified at being directed by the Cortes to act in obedience to the directions of Wellington, that at this critical period he not only hung back, and kept his important force in a state of inactivity, but actually published a proclamation to his troops, appealing to the Span- Sept. 12. ish pride against the indignity of serving under a foreigner: a proceeding for which the government at Cadiz most justly deprived him of his command, and confined him in the fortress of Ceuta. But, meanwhile, the evil was done, and was irreparable: the whole army of the South had united with that of the centre, and was advancing rapidly against Madrid with sixty thousand men; while the re-enforced army of the North, mustering forty-five thousand soldiers, pressed on Wellington on the northern side. Thus, as usual, the whole weight of the contest had fallen upon the British generals, whose united force, after the losses and sickness of the campaign, being little more than half the number of the enemy's armies directed against them, a retreat to a central position became a matter of necessity; and the siege of the castle of Burgos was raised on the night of the 21st, not without severe regret on the part of the English general.*

Soult's first operations were directed against the castle of Chinchilla, a fort of Operations of great strength, situated on a high Soult and Hill rock at the point of junction of the in the centre of Spain. roads of Alicante and Valencia, and commanding the only route from the eastern provinces to the capital. It was garrisoned by two hundred and forty men, and, from its inac-

* Jones, ii., 128. Gurw., ix., 478. Nap., v., 274, 275. Belm., iv., 286, 290. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 68, 69.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 26, 1812, Gurw., ix., 508, 509. Jones, ii., 128, 129. Nap., v., 277, 279. Belm., iv., 291, 295. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 70, 71.

* Jones, ii., 130, 131. Nap., v., 288, 291. Gurw., ix., 508, 509. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 28, 1812. Belm., i., 239, 240. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 70, 73.

cessible situation, was wellnigh impregnable. Wellington had calculated upon the siege of this fort retarding the advance of the French from the south a considerable time; and Ballasteros was to have united with the whole guerilla parties from the southern provinces, who would have formed a mass of above twenty thousand combatants, and, united to thirty thousand Anglo-Portuguese under Hill at Toledo, might have seriously retarded, if they could not altogether prevent, the march of Soult and Joseph to the capital. But Ballasteros's disobedience of the orders he had received enabled Soult, without molestation, not only to assemble his forces, but continue his march with such rapidity, that he appeared before this fort on the 3d of October; and the castle being immediately invested, it sur-

rendered on the 6th, in consequence of Oct. 6. the singular circumstance of lightning having fallen on the garrison, killing the governor and eight men, and wounding a still greater number; whereupon the remainder, seized with superstitious dread, immediately hoisted the white flag. By this fortunate catastrophe, coupled with the no less auspicious disobedience of Ballasteros, Soult was enabled to bring his whole force, in conjunction with that of Joseph, in all sixty thousand men, to bear against the centre of Spain, where Hill, now re-enforced by the troops from Cadiz, with an army not at the utmost exceeding forty thousand, of whom part were Spaniards, was intrusted with the defence of the capital.*

In these circumstances, it became a matter of necessity to abandon Madrid, and nothing, it was evident, short of a union of the whole British force in the Peninsula, in a central situation on the plains of Leon, could afford them any chance of maintaining their footing in Spain. Wellington then experienced the truth of what he had long before expressed in his correspondence, viz., that the invasion of Andalusia and the siege of Cadiz, by retaining a large portion of the French force in a state of comparative inactivity, so far as resisting the British army was concerned, had been a sensible benefit to the allied cause; and that the battle of Salamanca, by inverting this order and bringing their masses concentrated together, from the mountains of Asturias to the Bay of Cadiz, upon the British host, would, in the first instance, at least, prove a disadvantage. He transmitted Nov. 2. orders to Hill, accordingly, to abandon the line of the Tagus, which he had hitherto held, evacuate Madrid, and fall back by the Guadarama pass to the neighbourhood of Salamanca. These orders were immediately obeyed; the preparations for the defence of the line of the Tagus were discontinued;† Madrid was evacuated, amid the frequent tears and mournful silence of the inhabitants; a dense mass of men, women, and children followed the troops for miles, bewailing their departure: on the same day Joseph made his entry, and the British army, at first in good order, took the road for the Guadarama pass.

Meanwhile, Wellington himself had extraordinary difficulties to encounter in his retreat from Burgos. No small difficulty was experienced at

the very outset, in getting the troops across the bridge of the Arlanza; for Great difficulties of Wellington's retreat. it was commanded by the castle, and the enemy, aware of the intentions of the besiegers, had brought every gun they possibly could to bear on the narrow archway. Such, however, were the precautions taken by the British engineers to prevent the carriages passing from making any noise, as the French had done twelve years before at the siege of the Fort of Bard in the valley of Aosta,* that the whole would have got over in the night in safety, had not some irregular Spanish horse heedlessly galloped past, and, by their ill-timed clatter, attracted the attention of the garrison, who instantly Oct. 21. commenced a heavy fire on the bridge,

then crowded with carriages, which at first was very destructive; but the aim was soon lost as the guns recoiled, and the remaining discharges, which continued through the whole night, did little or no mischief. This night march, which, from its extraordinary difficulty and boldness, had never been anticipated by the French generals, gave Wellington a full day's journey in advance of them, and the French cavalry did not overtake the allies in any force till the forenoon of Oct. 23. the 23d. Several sharp affairs between

the cavalry on either side then took place. In particular, at the passage of the Hormaza, General Anson's brigade twice charged the head of the pursuers' as they forded, and for three hours checked the pursuit. A more serious action took place near Vinta del Pozo, when the French cavalry, who had at length forced the passage, and were hotly pursuing Anson's horsemen, who were retiring in disorder, were received by two battalions of the King's German Legion drawn up in square. The imperial cavalry came on with their wonted gallantry and loud shouts, but they were unable to retaliate upon the Germans the disaster of the 23d of June:† the steady squares received them with a rolling volley; and after several ineffectual charges, in the course of which they sustained a severe loss, the French squadrons were obliged to retire, and the retreat on that day was continued without any farther molestation. The army retiring in two columns, crossed the Pisuergra, and headquarters Oct. 24. were fixed for the night at Cordovilla. Much disorder prevailed there during the night, in consequence of the soldiers, who already, from the commencement of the retreat, had become relaxed in their discipline, breaking into the subterranean caves in that vicinity, where the wine of the vintage was stored, and the effects of intemperance generally appeared when the troops began to move next morning; but, luckily, the enemy was not aware of the circumstance, and the retreat of twenty miles was conducted that day without molestation as far as Duenas, across the Carrion, where the Guards, who had disembarked at Corunna, joined the army nearly on the spot where Sir John Moore had commenced his forward movement against Soult four years before.

It had now become evident that the French cavalry, nearly double that of the allies, and fresh from cantonments, while the British and Portuguese were extenuated by the fatigues of a long campaign, could hardly be op-

Continuance of the retreat across the Carrion, and actions there.

* Jones, ii., 131, 132. Nap., v., 291, 292. Vict. et Conq., xx., 83, 84. Belm., i., 241. Nap., v., 308, 309.

† Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 28, 1812, Gurr., ix., 515, 516. Jones, ii., 132. Belm., i., 241. Nap., v., 310, 314.

* Ante, ii., 99.

† Ante, iv., 464.

‡ Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Oct. 26, 1812, Gurr., ix., 511, 512. Beamish, ii., 111, 116. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 76, 77. Nap., v., 295, 298.

posed with success in the open field; and, therefore, the utmost vigilance was requisite in conducting a long march, in presence of an enemy so superior in numbers generally, and especially predominant in that arm, so essential during a retreat. The troops, accordingly, were rested a day behind the Carrion, to recruit their strength and give time for concentration; the whole bridges over that river were mined for explosion,

Oct. 25. and on the day following the retreat was continued towards the Douro. Unfortunately, however, the bridges at Palencia over the Carrion had not been occupied in sufficient strength, and Foy drove out the troops who held the town, and gained the bridges before the explosion took place. A ford was also dexterously discovered by the enemy near Villamuriel, while the bridge over the Pisuerga at Tariesjo was prematurely fired, and failed in its effect, so that the French horsemen galloped over and made the party in possession of the town prisoners. These untoward events destroyed the strength of Wellington's position, for over the bridges thus won the enemy could pour in any numbers they chose; and the left was, accordingly, thrown back, which had been hotly engaged nearly the whole day. At length the English general, seeing that the enemy's progress in that quarter seriously endangered the whole army, repaired to the spot, and ordered an offensive movement to drive the French back again over the river. Those who had crossed the ford at Villamuriel were immediately attacked by two brigades under Major-general Oswald's orders, and driven across the Carrion with considerable loss, though the allies suffered severely, and Alava was wounded while heading the Spanish infantry in the pursuit.*

After this check, the army retired sixteen miles on the following day, without Junction of Wellington and Hill near Salamanca. molestation, to Cabezon, on the Pisuerga; and, as the ground on the southern bank of the river is very strong, and the approach to the bridge difficult, the troops were halted for two days there, while the destruction of the bridge at Tordesillas equally prevented their progress in that direction.

On the 29th, the bridges at Cabezon and Valladolid were both blown up, and the army retreated across the Douro, the whole bridges over which were destroyed. The French, however, having got a body of horse across by swimming, immediately commenced repairing the bridge at Tordesillas; upon which the British were moved in strength to that point, and immediately began throwing up batteries, which stopped the advance of the enemy in that quarter. Souham made no farther attempt to continue the pursuit beyond the Douro at this time, as he was unwilling to hazard a general engagement till the approach of Joseph and Soult enabled him to do so with a decided superiority; and the British remained unmolested behind its broad stream till

Nov. 6. the 6th of November, when the bridges both at Toro and Tordesillas having been restored, and the near approach of Soult, with an overwhelming force, from the south rendering the line of the Douro no longer tenable, the retreat was resumed. On the 8th, the army

Nov. 8. effected its junction with Hill's corps, and, both united, took up a position at Alba de Tormes and San Christoval, on the ground which the army had twice occupied before, and which was

hallowed by the recollection of the glorious victory of which it had been the theatre.*

While the British, who possessed the advantage of an interior line of communication, were thus concentrating their forces in front of Salamanca, Soult and Souham was following Hill's corps with all the expedition in his power, and stretching out his light troops to the northward, in order to feel for the corps of Souham, which was descending from the Douro. On the 6th, his headquarters were at Areolo, and on the day following the advanced posts of the two armies entered Nov. 7 into communication by Medina del Campo. The main bodies were not long in effecting a junction, and on the 10th the united Nov. 10. force advanced towards the British post at Alba de Tormes. General Hamilton, with a brigade of Portuguese, held the castle at that place, around which some fieldworks had been hastily constructed; and though Soult battered it with eighteen pieces of artillery, to which the allies had only four guns to reply, yet their fire of musketry was kept up with such vigour that the enemy did not venture upon an assault, but sought for and found a ford higher up the Tormes, at Galisancho. On the following day the whole French army passed over, and took post in a strong position near Mozarbes, from whence detachments of their numerous cavalry threatened the communication of the British with Ciudad Rodrigo. The force now at the disposal of the French marshals was very formidable, amounting to no less than ninety-five thousand men, of whom twelve thousand were superb cavalry, with a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon.†

To oppose this immense force, Wellington had fifty-two thousand British and Portuguese, including four thousand Wellington offers battle, which is refused. horse, and fourteen thousand Spaniards; but on the last little reliance could be placed in a regular engagement. With so great an inferiority, it was impossible for the English general to attack the French on the strong ground which they themselves had selected; but he offered battle in his own position, and for this purpose withdrew to the famous position of Arapelles. The sight of that memorable field strongly excited the soldiers of both armies: the French, conscious of their superiority in number, demanded, with loud cries, to be led to the combat, hoping to wash out the recollection of their former defeat on the very spot on which it had been sustained. The sight of the ground, still blanched by the skeletons of their countrymen, and strewed with fragments of casques and cuirasses, excited in the highest degree their warlike enthusiasm. The British, nothing doubtful of the result of a second battle of Salamanca, clustered in great strength on the two Arapelles and the ridge of Ariba, yet moist with the blood of their heroic comrades, and, gazing with stern resolve on the interminable masses of the enemy, panted for the thrilling moment which was to bring to a decisive issue their long-protracted contest. The opinions of the French generals, however, were divided as to the course which should be pursued. Jourdan, whose martial fire

* Vict. et Conq., xxi., 78, 83. Jones, ii., 135, 137. Nap., v., 302, 304. Gurw., ix., 512, 516.

† Jones, ii., 139, 140. Nap., v., 319, 321. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 85, 86. Belm., i., 241, 242. Gurw., ix., 520, 542, 552.

‡ "The three united armies mustered ninety-five thousand combatants."—BELMAS, i., 243.

* Jones, ii., 134, 136. Nap., v., 301, 304. Gurw., ix., 512. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 78, 79. Belm., i., 242.

age had not extinguished, was eager to fight immediately, and, for this purpose, to bear down at once on the allies, and hazard all on the issue of a single battle. Soult, on the other hand, better instructed in the character of the troops with whom he had to deal, hesitated to attack them where they stood, and, instead, moved a considerable part of his force to the left, so as to menace the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, much as Marmont had done, but on a wider circle, so as to be beyond the reach of the falcon swoop which had proved so fatal to his predecessor.*

Wellington, knowing that the immense superiority of the enemy, especially in Ciudad Rodrigo cavalry, rendered it an easy matter for them to outflank his position and disturb his communications, took the resolution, as they would not fight, to retreat: already the baggage had defiled through Salamanca, and at three o'clock in the afternoon several loud explosions in the British rear announced to both armies that the movement had commenced. The operation, however, was a very hazardous one; for, in performing it, the allied army, defiling almost within cannon-shot of the enemy, presented their flank, several miles in length, to his attack; and a daring general had the same opportunity for a brilliant stroke which had been presented to Wellington by Marmont, on the same ground, four months before. Possibly the extreme ardour of the French soldiers might, notwithstanding the prudence of their leader, have brought on a general action, but in that decisive moment the star of England prevailed: a violent storm of rain, accompanied by a thick mist, came on, which for two hours rendered it impossible to see any object more than a few yards ahead; and during this interval of darkness the whole British army, in three columns, having the advantage of moving on the high roads, while the enemy could only attack by cross-lanes, now almost impassable from wet, moved safely past the dangerous ground. A few cavalry alone followed the allies, and made only two hundred prisoners; and the single trophy which the enemy could show from a crisis which might have changed the fate of Spain and the world, was the English second in command, Sir Edward Paget, who accidentally fell, on the day following, into the hands of a small party of horse, while riding unattended from one column to the other, during the darkness of a severe storm.†

The retreat from the Arapelles to Ciudad Rodrigo lasted but three days, and it was only disturbed by the cavalry of the French, almost all their infantry and guns having halted at Salamanca. Nevertheless, the distress of the troops for the most part was very great, the disorders frightful, and the loss sustained very considerable. During the whole march the weather was to the last degree inclement: storms of wind and rain succeeded each other with hardly any intermission; and the spirit of the soldiers, already weakened by the long continuance and severe fatigues of the retreat, sunk in an extraordinary degree, and precipitated them into general confusion and insubordination. The roads were so deep that it was with the utmost difficulty that the guns and baggage-wagons could be

dragged through; the supplies, especially of Sir R. Hill's corps, almost totally failed from the troops having been thrown off their former communications without gaining any new ones; and the soldiers, compelled to straggle in quest of subsistence, fell into the usual disorders of a disorganized army, and in great part yielded to the unbounded passion for intoxication which breaks out in all men during severe distress, but has, in every age, been in a peculiar manner the disgrace of the English people. On the Nov. 16. 16th, the march of the army was through a continued forest, where vast quantities of swine were feeding under the trees; the soldiers immediately dispersed to shoot the game thus presented to their hand; and such a rolling of musketry was heard through the woods, that Wellington at first thought the enemy were upon them. A sharp skirmish took place as the rear- Nov. 16. guard of the army was descending the steep slope which leads from the high table-land covered with the forest to the Huebra stream, which, however, was passed with very little loss: a deviation from orders on the part of some of the officers in direction of columns had well-nigh occasioned a serious loss, by taking the men to a place where the road, though more direct, was crossed by the river in an impassable state of flood; from which they were only extricated by being led back by Wellington in person, happily without the enemy's knowledge, to the ford which he had originally assigned; and on the 17th the weather was so dreadful, Nov. 17. and the privations of the troops so excessive, that most serious disasters might be anticipated if the retreat were conducted farther in such calamitous circumstances. Happily, as this was the worst day of their sufferings, so it was the last: Soult, whose troops were suffering nearly as much as those of the allies, was compelled, by utter starvation, to discontinue the pursuit at the Huebra; a few squadrons only followed to the Tameses; on the 18th the weather cleared up; provisions in plenty were obtained from the magazines at Ciudad Rodrigo, and liberally served out to the famishing troops; and the wearied men, finding fuel and dry bivouacs on the sandy hills near that fortress, forgot their fatigues around the blazing watch-fires, and, after six months' incessant toils and dangers, sunk into the enjoyment of undisturbed repose.*

Both parties were now thoroughly exhausted with their fatigues, and not only rest, but a separation on either side in quest of subsistence, had become indispensable. If Soult had remained, with all his forces together, for a week longer, one half of his soldiers, and probably all his horses, would have perished of actual famine; and if Wellington's retreat in similar storms had continued a few days more, his army would have been wellnigh dissolved. Both the French and the English commanders, accordingly, put their troops into winter-quarters, and the vast arrays which had so recently crowded the banks of the Tormes were dispersed over a wide extent of surface. The British went into cantonments on the Coa and the Agueda, the left being thrown back to Lamego, and the right advanced so far forward as to hold the pass of Bejar. Headquarters were again established at Frenada. Soult's noble army was entirely dis-

* Belm., i., 242. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 87, 88. Jones, ii., 140. Gurw., ix., 552, 553.

† Vict. et Conq., xxi., 86, 89. Belm., i., 242, 243. Jones, ii., 140. Nap., v., 328, 330. Gurw., 552, 553.

* Nap., v., 334, 335. Jones, ii., 140, 141. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 88, 89. Belm., i., 243. Gurw., ix., 554, 555.

located: his own headquarters were established at Toledo in La Mancha; Joseph returned with his guards to Madrid; and the bulk of the army was cantoned in Old and New Castile, between the Douro and the Tagus, Salamanca being occupied in strength by two divisions. But the ground lost in the campaign was never again recovered: Asturias and Estremadura remained in the undisturbed possession of the Spaniards; the imperial standards never again crossed the Sierra Morena; and Andalusia, Murcia, and Grenada were forever delivered from the oppression of the invader.*

The losses sustained by the British and Portuguese during this retreat, by casualties or prisoners in the field, did not exceed fifteen hundred men; but the stragglers who fell into the enemy's hands were much more numerous, and the prisoners taken in this way exceeded three thousand. Altogether, from the time that the siege of Burgos was abandoned, the army had been weakened by the loss of nearly seven thousand men. The insubordination of the troops, and the frightful habits of intemperance to which, in many cases, they surrendered themselves, were the main causes of this serious diminution; for the retreat had been conducted with extraordinary skill; the men of both armies had retired above two hundred miles, in presence of greatly superior forces, without a single battalion being broken, or a gun or standard taken; no stores, treasure, or provisions had been destroyed; none of the sick and wounded abandoned; no night marches, with the exception of that under the cannon of the castle of Burgos, had taken place; the journeys gone over during the day had been far from excessive, and till the last three days, when the extraordinary throng had occasioned a deficiency in the supplies, no want of provisions had been experienced by the troops. When, notwithstanding these circumstances, it was still found that the loss from the defalcation of marauders and the capture of drunkards had been so serious, and that the discipline of the army had been relaxed to a great degree during the retreat, Wellington deemed it indispensable to make a great effort to recall all ranks to a sense of their duty; and, for this purpose, addressed a severe letter of admonition to the officers commanding divisions and brigades, complaining in an especial manner of the habitual inattention of regimental officers to their various duties, in so far as the subordination, discipline, and comforts of the troops were concerned.†

Never was a document published by a British commander which produced a stronger effect it produced on the hement feelings, than this celebrated army address. That the complaints were in great part well founded, and that every one's recollection could afford ample confirmation of the material facts stated, was, indeed, certain; but still, the necessity of publishing them to the army, and, consequently, by the English newspapers, to all Europe, did not appear equally apparent; and even if it had been necessary, it was urged that some allowance should have been made for men who had been engaged, for nearly eleven months, in constant sieges, marches, or battles, and whose efforts, during that period, had delivered half of the Peninsula, and drawn upon them the enemy's military force from the whole of Spain. The reproaches, too, though generally well founded, were not applicable to some corps, particularly the light division and foot-guards, who had joined from Corunna; and Wellington was not aware that his own admirable arrangements for the supply of provisions to his troops had been, in many cases, rendered totally nugatory from the impossibility of getting the means of transport for the stores, or the negligence of inferior functionaries in carrying his orders into execution; so that, when he supposed the men were getting three rations a day regularly served out, they were, in fact, living on acorns which they picked up, or swine which they shot in the woods. For these reasons, the reproof was, not without grounds, complained of as unjust by many; but there can be no doubt that, to the great body of the troops, the justice of the remarks was what rendered them so unpalatable; and that the cogency of the maxim, "the greater the truth, the greater the libel," never was more signally evinced than on this occasion. As usual after such admonitions, however, the reproof, though universally complained of, in the end produced salutary effects: the officers loudly declaimed against the injustice with which they had been dealt, but quietly set about remedying the disorders which they were well aware had crept into the service; vast improvements were effected in the organization and arrangements of the troops before the next campaign; and all admitted that it was in a great degree to their beneficial effect that the triumphs of Vittoria and the Pyrenees were to be ascribed.*

While this surprising campaign was going on in the centre and north of Spain, the Operations in the south and on the east coast, though not equally brilliant, sustained the character of the British arms, and, in their ultimate effects, were attended with important results in the deliverance of the Peninsula. It has been already noticed how much Wellington found his operations impeded, immediately before the battle of Salamanca, by the project of Lord William Bentinck to commence his grand diversion on the Italian shores, thereby reducing the British expedition destined to act on the east of Spain to six thousand men. Such as it was, however, this armament produced a very considerable impression, and clearly proved of what importance, on the general issue of the

* *Vict. et Conq.*, xxi., 85, 90. *Belm.*, i., 243. *Jones*, ii., 141. *Nap.*, v., 337, 340.

† *Gurw.*, ix., 675. *Wellington to Generals of Division*, Nov. 28, 1812. *Jones*, ii., 141. *Scherer*, ii., 209. *Jackson*, ii., 847.

‡ "The army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented; it has suffered no hardships excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a time when they were most severe. The necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops made such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. Yet, from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Madrid on the one hand, and Burgos on the other, the officers lost all command over the men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have been incurred. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed; but I am concerned to observe, that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect, in the late

campaign, to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever been, or of which I have ever read."—*Wellington to Officers commanding Divisions and Brigades*, ix., 574, 575.

* *Nap.*, v., 357, 359. *Jones*, ii., 143. *Jackson*, ii., 217.

† *Ante*, iv., p. 478.

campaign, the operations in that quarter, if more vigorously conducted, and with a larger force, might have been. General Maitland, who commanded this force, arrived at Port Mahon, in

July 20. Minorca, in the middle of July, and at first stood across for the coast of Catalonia, with a view, if possible, to a *coup-de-main* against Taragona; but finding that, though preparations for a considerable rising in that quarter had been made, there was no Spanish force in existence capable of keeping the field as a regular army, and that they could only bring

July 31. eight thousand Somatenes into the field, while the French had thirteen thousand disposable men in the province, besides Suchet's force, of a still greater amount, in Valencia, he wisely judged that it would be hopeless to attempt an effort in that province, and therefore made for Alicante, where a strong fortress, still in the hands of the Murcians, offered a secure base for his operations. There, accordingly, he landed,

Aug. 7. in the beginning of August; and his arrival was most opportune and beneficial to the common cause, as it saved that fortress, which was menaced with a siege, in consequence of the defeat of General O'Donnell, who, with the last reserves of the Murcians, six thousand

July 21. strong, had been totally routed by a division of Suchet's army under Harispe, only ten days before, at the mouth of the pass of Castalla, and was now wholly unable to keep the field.*

Maitland's forces were all disembarked at Alicante by the 11th of August; but, although he found himself in communication with a body of Spaniards considerable in point of numerical amount, yet no reliance could be placed upon them for operations in the field; and he was soon overwhelmed by the innumerable crosses, jealousies, and vexations to which every British commander throughout the war, without exception, was subjected, who attempted to combine operations with the Peninsular troops, and which the iron frame and invincible perseverance of Wellington alone had been able to overcome. The governor of Alicante, in the first instance, refused to give him possession of that fortress, and only a limited number of men were permitted to remain within its walls; of the British soldiers only three thousand were English or German, who could be relied on for the real shock, the remainder being Mediterranean mercenaries, whose steadiness in action was untried and doubtful; and the moment operations in the field were proposed, such extraordinary difficulties as to providing subsistence

Oct. 5. and the means of transport were thrown in the way by the Spanish authorities and commanders, that Maitland abandoned the attempt in despair, and not long after, under the combined influence of bad health and disgust, resigned his command. At the same time, twelve hundred men, under General, now Sir Rufane Donkin, disembarked at Denia, on the east of Alicante, but were speedily assailed by superior forces, and forced to re-embark. He was succeeded by General Mackenzie, who held the command only for a few weeks, when he was superseded by General Clinton; but he, too, was paralyzed by the difficulties with which he was

surrendered to the keeping of the British, still no offensive movement worth noticing was attempted. General Campbell came next with four thousand fresh troops from Sicily; but the season for active operations had now passed, and the winter was spent in strenuous efforts to put the army on a more efficient footing. It was fortunate that, at this period, Suchet was so far deceived by the habitual exaggerations of the Spaniards, that he attempted nothing, believing that the allies had fifty thousand men in his front; and thus this expedition, though it did nothing else, yet produced the important effect of detaining his whole force in that part of Spain, and preventing any part of it from joining the mass which was concentrating from all other quarters against Wellington in the plains of Old Castile.*

Though the war in Catalonia and the Asturias was not distinguished by any brilliant events during this campaign, Catalonia and yet the Spaniards were in both slowly Asturias.

regaining the ascendancy. The weight of the English army, though distant, operated with sensible effect in both these provinces, and by compelling the French to concentrate their forces to succour menaced points, or await contingent events, allowed the inhabitants to wrest from them several important points. In spring, Montserrat was abandoned by the invaders, and immediately occupied by Colonel Green, who, with some Spanish bands, again fortified that important stronghold. Decaen and Maurice Mathieu collected their forces, and in the end of July 29. drove the Spaniards a second time from it; but, instead of retaining their conquest, they set fire to the buildings, and the flames of the monastery told all the inhabitants of the adjoining plains that the holy mountain was no longer polluted by the presence of the spoiler. The bands of Lacy, D'Erolles, Rovira, and Melans, however, kept undisputed possession of the whole mountain ranges with which the country abounded; the power of the French extended Oct. 19. only over the fortresses which they held, and the plains, and their immediate vicinity; and so precarious was their authority in more remote quarters, that eight thousand men were required to keep open the communication between Gerona, Barcelona, and Taragona. In Asturias an English squadron, commanded by Sir Home Popham, appeared in the end of June on June 20. the coast, and did excellent service by keeping the French posts in a state of constant alarm, so as to prevent Caffarelli from detaching any considerable force to the aid of Marmont previous to the battle of Salamanca. Castro Urdiales, a strong fort on the seacoast, was taken in the beginning of July, which enabled July 6. the squadron to communicate freely with the insurgents in the interior; and although several attempts on Santander, Guetaria, and Bilbao failed, from the strong fortifications with which the French had established themselves in these towns, yet they were all evacuated and fell into the hands of the Spaniards on occasion of the general concentration of the French forces in the northern provinces, which Aug. 15. followed the disaster of Salamanca. Bilbao, indeed, was reoccupied by Caffarelli on the 27th of August, but the whole coast, from Corunna to Guetaria, remained in the hands of the allies, and the English vessels of war powerfully contributed

* Jones, ii., 121. Nap., v., 214, 230. Tor., v., 111, 112.

* Belm., i., 244. Nap., v., 341, 349. Tor., v., 112, 114. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 97, 103.

Nov. 2. to foment the insurrection in these important provinces; while in the centre of Spain the power of Joseph was so ephemeral, that when Soult, with the armies of the south and centre, passed on in pursuit of Hill's army in the end of October, Elío, the Empecinado,* and Bassecour, having united the bands in the neighbourhood of Madrid, reoccupied that capital, where they committed great excesses, and thrust out the garrison, who, with a crowd of unhappy dependants, again fell a burden on the unhappy monarch in the plains of Old Castile.

Such was the memorable campaign of Salamanca, the most glorious, in a military point of view, of which the English annals can boast; the most decisive in its results, in favour of the allied cause, which had yet occurred in the Revolutionary war. For the first time since the star of Napoleon had appeared in the ascendant, the balance had not only hung even between the contending powers, but inclined decidedly to the other side. At the opening of the campaign, the French armies occupied the whole of Spain, from the Asturian rocks to the Bay of Cadiz. The great frontier fortresses of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo were in their hands; and the British army, restrained within the bounds of Portugal, seemed unable to pass the giants who stood to guard the entrance into the Spanish territory. At its close, both these vital strongholds had been wrested from their arms: Andalusia, and the whole provinces to the south of the Sierra Morena, delivered from their oppression; a mortal blow to their power struck on the plains of Castile; Madrid had welcomed its deliverers within its gates; and Cadiz, revived after its three years' blockade, beheld the gigantic works of its besiegers, and their two thousand guns, the trophies of its deliverance. In Marshal Soult's words, the battle of Salamanca had, indeed, proved a great historic event, which had resounded through Europe and the New World. The campaigns of Marlborough had no such momentous triumphs to commemorate; the glories of Cressy and Azincour were, in comparison, sterile in durable results.

Great as was the disappointment felt, in the first instance, in England, at the loosening the untoward conclusion of the campaign, and the calamitous issue of the Peninsula. the retreat from Burgos, it was yet evident, on a calm retrospect of its results, and the relative situation of parties at its commencement and termination, that the success gained had been immense, and that the French power in the Peninsula had received a fatal wound. True, the British standards had been again driven from the Spanish territory; true, Wellington had reassumed his old positions on the Coa and the Agueda; but how had this been effected? By a concentration of the French forces from all parts of Spain, and the abandonment in one month of the fruits of four years of bloodshed and conquest. Such a sacrifice could not again be made: no second Andalusia remained to recruit the armies of the north after another overthrow. A fresh disaster like that of Salamanca would drive the invaders, as by a whirlwind, from the whole Peninsula. The sense of this, which pervaded the breasts of the officers and soldiers in both armies, consoled the allies for their retreat, and depressed the imperial legions even in the midst of their transient

success. The whole warlike establishments of the latter had been lost: in a military point of view, their hold of all the Peninsula to the south of the Ebro had been loosened. The great arsenals of Madrid, Seville, Ciudad Rodrigo, and the lines before Cadiz, had fallen into the enemy's hands, or been destroyed; no reserve parks remained to enable them to attempt the siege of the frontier places of Portugal; no fortresses were yet in their possession to delay the enemy, should he make a second inroad into the interior of Spain; a single disaster in the Douro would instantly compel the evacuation of Madrid and Valencia, and send the whole French armies in confusion behind the Ebro. A sense of this insecurity paralyzed the French as much as it animated the British army; the perception of it, joined to an ardent thirst for vengeance for the wrongs they had received, had again revived in a fearful degree the insurrection in the whole provinces of the kingdom not actually in the possession of the imperial troops. The recent appointment of Wellington as generalissimo of the Spanish armies promised to impart to them a degree of efficiency which they had never previously attained, and to direct them in one uniform plan of operations against the enemy; while the evacuation of more than half, and by far the richest half of the Spanish territory, proved a still more sensible wound to Napoleon, by depriving him of the means of longer carrying on his favourite system of making war maintain war, and throwing his armies in the Peninsula for their main supplies on the treasury of Paris, already severely drained by the unparalleled expenses of the Russian war.*

Memorable as the merits of Wellington had been since the commencement of the Peninsular contest, they were outdone by the shining exploits of this campaign. The secrecy of his preparations, the rapidity and force of his strokes, the judicious direction of his attacks, the vast effects which followed from them, all revealed the consummate commander, now for the first time relieved from the load which had oppressed him, and, by the celerity of his movements, and the skilful use of a central position, counterbalancing what would otherwise have been deemed an insurmountable superiority of numbers. When it is recollected that Wellington, with an army which never could bring sixty thousand men into the field, gained these wonderful successes over an enemy who had two hundred and forty thousand effective veteran troops at his disposal, and captured the two great frontier fortresses under the very eyes of two marshals who, as the event proved, could assemble a hundred thousand men for their relief, it is evident that more than fortune or national courage had been at work, and that consummate generalship had come to the direction of tried valour and experienced discipline. The secrecy of the preparation for, and the rapidity of the attack on Ciudad Rodrigo; the stern resolution of the assault of Badajoz; the eagle eye which caught the moment of decisive victory at Salamanca; the strategic skill which separated the armies of the North and centre, and recovered the advantages gained by Marmont on the banks of the Guarena, form so many models of military skill which will ever engage the attention and command the admiration of succeeding generations.

* Belm., i., 246, 247. Nap., v., 341, 343. Tor., v., 86, 89. VOL. III.—R R R

* Belm., i., 247. Vict. et Conq., xxi., 90.

In truth, however, here, as elsewhere in the great revolutions of the world, moral causes were at the bottom of the change; and the talents of individual actors intrusted with the direction of affairs were chiefly conspicuous in the sagacity with which they discerned, and the skill with which they availed themselves of, those general impulses to mankind, whose operation, how important soever, was shrouded from the eye of ordinary observers. The more that the memorable history of the Peninsular campaigns is studied, the more clearly will it appear that it was the oppressive mode in which the French carried on the contest which wrought out their ruin; and that it was to Napoleon's favourite maxim, that war should maintain war, that we are to ascribe his fall. Not only did this iniquitous system everywhere inspire the most unbounded and lasting hatred at their domination, but it imposed upon his lieutenants and viceroys the necessity of such a separation of their forces, with a view to the permanent levying and collecting of contributions, as necessarily exposed them to the danger of being cut up in detail, and precluded the possibility of any combined or united operations. The eccentric irruption into Andalusia, when Wellington in Portugal was still unsubdued, is the chief cause to which all the subsequent disasters in Spain are to be ascribed; and it arose clearly from the necessity of seizing upon hitherto untouched fields of plunder. The marshals were never weary of

Reaction upon themselves of the French mode of making war.

expressing their astonishment at the unwise policy which kept their armies detached from each other, and melting away in inglorious warfare in their separate provinces, when the English army retained a central position, menacing alike to them all. But the secret motive of Napoleon in so distributing his force was very apparent. If he brought them into large bodies to wage a united war with the English general, the occupation of many of the provinces would require to be discontinued, the levying of the contributions would cease, and the cost of his armies, hitherto wholly defrayed by Spanish resources, would fall with overwhelming weight on the imperial treasury. Hence arose the dispersion of the armies, the military governments, the jealousies of the marshals, the weakness of the king, the exasperation of the inhabitants, the triumphs of the British, and the loss of the Peninsula. The mighty fabric, based on injustice, reared in rapine, cemented by blood, involved in itself the principles of its own destruction. The very greatness of its power, the wide spread of its extension, only accelerated the period of its fall. All that was wanting was an enduring enemy, that had discomfitment enough to see, and talent adequate to improve, the chances thus arising in his favour, and a position where a sure refuge might be found till the period of reaction should arrive. The constancy of England presented such a foe, the eye of Wellington constituted such a commander, and the rocks of Torres Vedras furnished such a stronghold.

CHAPTER LXIV.

SKETCH OF THE TURKISH EMPIRE—WAR BETWEEN THE OTTOMANS AND RUSSIANS—1808 TO 1812.

ARGUMENT.

Durable Interest of the Eastern World.—Singular Extremes of Civilization and Refinement which there appear.—Present Interests and Prospects of the East.—Political Combinations of which it is becoming the Theatre.—Wide Difference between the Structure of Society in the East and West.—Constant Submission to Authority in the Former.—Rapid Progress of its early Civilization.—Proportionate rapid Growth of Corruption.—Provision made for its Correction, in the Energy of the Tartar and Arabian Tribes.—System of Oriental Government, and Descent of the Throne.—Precarious Tenure of inferior Authority.—Rapid Growth and ephemeral Duration of Wealth and Greatness.—Consequent Oppression to which Industry is generally exposed.—Seeds of Weakness, in consequence of the Want of hereditary Institutions.—Counteracting Causes which have preserved Society in the East.—The Simplicity and general Purity of Manners.—The Absence of the Corruption of Power among the People.—The Municipal Institutions and Village Communities.—The comparative Security of Mountain Fastnesses.—Vigour which the Mohammedan Religion and the hereditary Descent of the Throne have communicated to Turkey.—Physical Description of the Turkish Empire.—Causes of its Decline.—The Ottoman Mode of Fighting and System of War.—Description of the Theatre of War between the Danube and Constantinople.—Great Progress which the Russians have made during the last Hundred Years.—Negotiations between the Russians and Turks after the Treaty of Tilsit.—Commencement of the War with Turkey.—First Successes of the Russians on the Danube.—Siege and Fall of Braham.—Siege and Capture of Silistria.—Desperate Turkish Defence of the Breaches of fortified Towns.—Mode of Warfare by the Russians against the Turks.—Their more recent Tactics in Wars with them.—Turkish Mode of Fighting.—Great Effect of the Conquest of the Nomade Nations by the Russians.—Importance of the Unhealthiness of the Plain of the Danube on the Wars with the Russians.—Importance of the Fortresses on the Danube.—State of Turkey at the Opening of the War with the Russians in 1807.—Revolution at Constantinople.—De-thronement of Sultan Selim, and Accession of Mustapha.

—Counter-revolution at Constantinople.—Fresh Disturbances.—Deposition of Mustapha.—Death of Selim, and Accession of Mahmoud.—A third Revolution.—The Grand Vizier, Barayctar, is killed with Mustapha, and the Janizaries triumph.—Passive Indifference of the People during these Disorders.—Napoleon's Desertion of the Turks in the Treaty of Tilsit.—Causes which delayed serious Operations till the Spring of 1809.—Campaign of that Year.—Checked Successes on both Sides.—Annexation of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, and Campaign of 1810.—Great Trade of the English up the Danube into Germany at this Time.—First Operations of the Campaign of 1810.—Description of Schumla.—Unsuccessful Operations of the Russians against that Town.—Preparations for the Assault of Roudschouck.—Dreadful Defeat of the Assault.—Operations which followed this Disaster.—March of the Seraskier of Sophia for the raising of the Siege.—Kaminski's Plan of Attack on the Turkish Camp.—Battle of Battin.—Blockade, and final Capture of the Turkish Camp.—Capitulation of Roudschouck.—Evacuation of Roudschouck and Ruin of Sistova.—Conclusion of the Campaign.—Great Draught of Troops from the Danube to Poland.—Battle of Roudschouck.—Evacuation of Roudschouck by the Russians.—The Turks cross the Danube.—Measures for Assisting them taken by Kutusoff.—Distress of the Turks in their Intrenchments.—Great Part of them are obliged to Surrender.—Concluding Operations of the Campaign.—Commencement of Negotiations between the Russians and French for a Peace.—Treaty of Bucharest.—March of the Russian Troops for the Vistula.—Reflections on the Campaign.—Character of Sultan Mahmoud.—Incompatibility of Improvement or Renovation with the Mohammedan Institutions.

NOTWITHSTANDING all the prodigies of European civilization, and all the lasting benefits which, both in ancient and modern times, the race of Japhet has conferred upon the species, its history will never equal, in the profound interest which it will excite in the human breast to the remo-

Durable interest of the Eastern world.

test eras of existence, that which arises from the contemplation of the EASTERN WORLD. It is there that is to be found the birthplace of the human race; there the scenes alike of the earliest and the greatest efforts of civilization; there the spot from which the fortunes of the whole human family have taken their rise. The greatness of the states of modern Europe may have produced a more durable impression upon the fortunes of the species, the achievements of their intellect may have exalted higher the character of humanity, but they will never awaken so profound an interest as those which carry us back to the original separation of nations and the first cradle of mankind.

Independent of the interest which naturally attaches to the East, from the sublime events and heart-stirring episodes of which in every age it has been the theatre—independent of the obligations which we owe to it as the birthplace of letters and of figures, of knowledge and of religion—there is something in the simplicity of Eastern story, and the pathos of Asiatic incident, which must ever touch the inmost recesses of our hearts. Although the human race have existed longer there than in any other part of the globe; although wealth exhibited its earliest prodigies on the plain of Shinar, and commerce first began with the march of the camels through the Syrian deserts, yet society has always existed in a more romantic and interesting form in the Eastern than in the Western world. The extremes of civilization and simplicity, of wealth and poverty, of grandeur and humility, have always been there brought into close proximity with each other. The splendour of the capital is to be found close beside the rudeness of the desert; and the traveller, equally in the days of Herodotus and of the present time, on emerging from the greatest cities, finds himself surrounded by the camels of the children of Ishmael. The whole empires of Central Asia are penetrated in all directions by these nomade tribes. They have, in every age, formed a distinguishing feature of Asiatic society, and at times have exercised the most important influence on the fortunes of mankind. Through every subsequent stage of society, nations will recur with interest to these primeval occupations of their race. The scenes, the manners, the imagery of the East will always form the profoundest chords that can be touched in the human heart; and to the last ages of the world, man, by an indelible instinct, will revert to those regions of his pristine existence with the same interest with which the individual looks back to the scenes of his own infancy.

Present interest and prospects of the East. Nor are the present situation and future destinies of the Oriental states less calculated to awaken the interest alike of the heedless observer of passing events, and the contemplative student of the fortunes of mankind. By a mysterious agency, it would appear that the fate of man, even in the most advanced stages of his progress, is indissolubly united with the Eastern world; and the present course of events, not less clearly than the whole scope of prophecy, concur in demonstrating that it is there that the great changes calculated to affect the destiny of the species are to be brought about. The course of civilization, which hitherto constantly has been from east to west, has now, to all appearance, begun to alter its direction. The vast wave of civiliza-

tion is rolling steadily towards the Rocky Mountains, and its standard will, ere long, be arrested only by the waters of the Pacific. But the progress of human improvement is not destined to be thus finally barred. For the first time since the creation of man, the stream of improvement has set in in the opposite direction: the British Australian colonies are rapidly sowing the seeds of the European race in the regions of the sun; and even the sober eye of historic anticipation can now dimly descry the time when the Eastern Archipelago and the isles of the Pacific are to be cleared by the efforts of civilized men, and blessed by the light of the Christian religion.

Nor are political events less clearly bringing back the interests and the struggles of civilized man to the pristine scene of his birth. The two great powers which have now, in an indelible manner, imprinted their image upon the human species, England and Russia, are there slowly, but inevitably, coming into collision. Constantinople is the inestimable prize which, as it will soon appear, brought the empires of France and Russia into hostility, and led to the overthrow of the greatest efforts of European power by the energy of barbaric patriotism and the force of Asiatic cavalry. The same glittering object has retained the rival powers of Great Britain and Russia in thinly-disguised hostility since the fall of Napoleon's power; while "the necessity of conquest to existence," felt equally by the British Empire in India as by the French in Europe, has already impelled the British battalions over the Himalayan snows; brought the stream of victory, for the first time in the annals of mankind, from the shores of the Ganges to the steppes of Tartary; arrayed the sable natives of Bengal as victors in the cradle of the Mogul power and on the edge of the steppes of Samarcand, and brought the British battalions, though in an inverse order, into the footsteps of the phalanx of Alexander.

The structure of society, the condition of mankind, and the causes of human happiness or misery, have always been so different in the Eastern from the Western world, that it would appear as if a separate character had, from the very outset of their career, been imprinted by the finger of Providence on the various races of mankind. The descendants of Shem, the dwellers in the tents of the East, are still as widely separated from the descendants of Japhet, as when the superior vigour of the European race impressed upon the Roman poet the belief that to their iron race alone it was given to struggle with the difficulties of humanity, and unfold the secrets of nature.* Their joys, equally with their sorrows; their virtues and their vices, their triumphs and their reverses, the sources of their prosperity and the causes of their ruin, are essentially distinct in these two quarters of the globe; while the peculiarities of the third great family of mankind are still so strongly marked, that there is no reason to believe that it will ever be able to emerge from a state of submission and servitude; and that the

Political combinations of which it is becoming the theatre.

Wide difference between the structure of society in the East and West.

* "Audax Japeti genus
Igmem fraude mala gentibus intulit.
Post ignem æthereâ domo
Subductum, macies æ nova febrium
Terris incubuit cohors.
Nil mortalibus arduum est:
Cælum ipsum petimus stultitia.

HORAT., *Carm.*, lib. 1, ode 3.

prophecy will hold good equally in the last as in the first ages of the world. "God shall multiply Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant."*

Although civilization has subsisted from the very earliest times in the Eastern nations, and the labours of man have there achieved prodigies of industry far surpassing any which have been reared by the efforts of the Western world, yet no disposition to resist authority, or assert independent privileges, has ever appeared, even in those situations where, from the assemblage of mankind together in great towns, the chief facilities might be supposed to have existed for the extrication of the Democratic spirit. Revolts and civil wars innumerable have occurred, indeed, in every age of Asiatic story, but they have all been brought about either by the casual oppression of particular governors, or the hostility of rival candidates for the throne against each other. With the termination of this unbearable oppression, or the ascent of the throne by the successful competitor, all thoughts even of resistance have passed away from the minds of the people. The commercial cities of Asia Minor, which acquired Republican ideas and resisted the authority of Darius, were all of European origin. No attempt to organize a system of popular resistance to encroachment, such as in every age of European history, alike in ancient and modern times, has formed the great and deserving object of public effort, ever was thought of in the East. From the earliest times to the present moment, the whole Oriental world have been strangers alike to the elastic vigour, the social progress, and the Democratic contentions of the European race. It is not sufficient to say that they submit now without a thought of resistance to the grossest oppression of their governors, or whomsoever is placed in authority over them. The idea of opposition has never crossed their minds: they have done so without a murmur from the days of Abraham.

Owing to the prodigious fertility of their great alluvial plains, and the unbounded riches of nature, which there spring up almost unbidden to the hand of the husbandman, the progress of opulence has always been much more rapid in the Eastern than in the Western world. In the great plain of Mesopotamia, one half of which is composed of a natural terrace, sloping down with a gradual declivity from the Euphrates to the Tigris, and the other of a similar slope, inclining the other way, from the Tigris to the Euphrates,† the means of irrigation are provided, as it were, ready made by nature to the hand of man; and nothing is required on his part but to convey away into little channels the beneficent stream which, thus descending in perennial flow from the Armenian snows, affords the means of spreading continual verdure and fertility over a soil where vegetation ripens under the rays of a tropical sun. In the Delta of Egypt, a level surface of great extent is annually submerged by the fertilizing floods of the Nile; and the principal difficulty of man is to clear out the prodigious luxuriance of vegetation which springs up from the solar warmth, when the waters of the river have first regained their natural channel. In the European fields, again, the productive powers of nature require to be drawn forth and

assisted by years of human labour. The operations of draining, planting, and enclosing, which are essential to the improvement of agriculture, are the work of centuries; and the vast profits which in the East reward the first and infant efforts of human cultivation, are gained in the West only by the result of the accumulated labour of many successive generations. Agricultural riches, and consequent commercial opulence, spring up at once in the East with the rapidity and luxuriance of tropical vegetation. They are of slow and difficult growth in the West, like the oak and the pine, which arrive at maturity only after the lapse of ages.

But in proportion to the rapidity with which vegetation thus springs up under the genial warmth of an Eastern sun, is the fragile nature of the materials of corruption, of which it is composed, and the seeds of rapid decay which are involved in the splendid structure. The law of nature seems to be of universal application—all that rapidly comes to maturity is subject to as speedy decay—whatever is destined for long duration is of the slowest growth, and of the most tardy development. The early prodigies of Oriental civilization were of no longer duration, in the great year of human existence, than the first fruits of spring amid the quickly succeeding harvests with which the labours of the natural year are crowned. The seeds of decay were sown with no unsparring hand: from the native corruption of the human heart, they found a soil richly prepared for their growth in the physical ease and natural blessings with which man was surrounded. As quickly as the bounties of nature gave him opulence, did his own weakness engender wickedness; and the history of the East, from the earliest times, exhibits, in Gibbon's words, "the perpetual round of valour, greatness, discord, degeneracy, and decline."

If the extraordinary rapidity of the growth of wealth and civilization in the Eastern plains is considered, and the rapid development of the germs of corruption in the human heart under the genial influence of prosperity, it not only will appear no way surprising that corruption and degeneracy should so speedily have spread in the Asiatic monarchies; but the only circumstance that will attract wonder is, how the human race has ever been able to extricate itself from the vice and weakness thus incident to the very first steps of its progress. It is more than doubtful, indeed, whether, in a state of society where the working classes are universally and invariably obedient, and no spring of improvement or purification is to be found in the efforts of the lower orders for their political elevation, or the struggles of the poor to better their condition, any means of correcting or removing the wide-spread corruption consequent on early prosperity could be found in the bosom of society itself. But these means are provided with unerring certainty in the physical conformation of the Asiatic Continent, and the character which permanent causes have indelibly imprinted on the inhabitants of the greater part of that large portion of the globe.

It is only in particular districts of Asia, in the plain of Mesopotamia, on the banks of the Ganges, in the fertile fields of China, or in the alluvial beds of Asia Minor, that the natural riches and advantages are to be found which in every age have overspread the earth with the

* Gen., ix., 27.

† Gillies's Greece, v., 89.

early prodigies of human industry. In by far the greater part of the Asiatic Continent, the physical circumstances of mankind are widely different, and hardship and suffering have imprinted as bold and energetic a character upon the human mind as ease and opulence have softened and relaxed it in situations blessed with greater natural advantages. The children of the desert are ever at hand to punish the vices and obliterate the corruptions of the cities of the plain. In the southern portions of Asia, in the vast Peninsula of Arabia, a race of men have existed from the earliest times on whom hardship and difficulty have eternally imprinted the same bold and daring qualities. Differing in no respect from their ancestor in the days of Abraham, the children of Ishmael are still to be found in the deserts of Arabia, poor, sober, and enduring; mounted on their steeds, or seated on their camels, in quest of a scanty subsistence, and preserving pure, on a rocky soil and under the rays of a vertical sun, the simplicity and the energy of patriarchal life: still, as in the days of Cyrus, the pastoral nations of the North wander over the vast table-lands of Tartary, multiplying with the herds and flocks which graze around them, and possessing, even to profusion, that multitude of horses which in every age has constituted the strength of the Scythian tribes.* It is in the undecaying vigour and ceaseless multiplication of these nomade tribes that the means of the continual renovation of the human race in the Asiatic empires has been provided. As certainly as the wealth of the plain produces corruption, the hardihood of the North engenders rapacity; and the corrupted monarchies of the East have, in every age, fallen before the daring conquerors of the Scythian wilds, with the same certainty that the timid herds of inferior animals perpetually become the prey of the savage lords of the wilderness. The barbarian conquerors, when they settle in the opulent regions of civilization, in the course of a few generations become as corrupted as the nations they have conquered; but, nevertheless, a certain impulse has been communicated to human vigour, and the extraordinary degeneracy of the seats of opulence purified, for a season at least, by the infusion of barbarian energy.

The system of government in the East from the earliest times has been the same: we have no need to turn to modern travellers for a picture of the social system; it is to be found sketched out in the books of the Old Testament, and faithfully portrayed in the pages of Xenophon and Herodotus. Rank and authority are everywhere personal only: power is annexed to office, not to families, and depends for its establishment and continuance solely on the will of the sovereign. The throne itself is seldom found to follow the hereditary line of descent; the natural attachment of mankind to the families of their benefactors has commonly, for several generations, secured its continuance in the members of the family of a first founder of a dynasty; but no regular principle of succession has been followed, and the most energetic and audacious, whether of legitimate or illegitimate

birth, has usually, without opposition, seized the diadem. The people, with that disposition to passive submission which, in every age, has characterized the inhabitants of Asia, submit without a murmur to a change of dynasty. The victor, generally in a single battle, is instantly saluted as sultan by all the satraps and cities of the Empire; the stroke of fate is implicitly acquiesced in by all; and the descendants of a family which have enjoyed the throne for centuries are consigned, without regret, to the obscurity from which they sprung, and speedily lost among the multitudes of humble life.

The same instability and precarious tenure of power are to be found in a still ^{precari- ous} greater degree among the inferior tenure of infer- depositaries of authority. If the ^{inferior} authority. chances of victory or the mutability of fortune seat or unseat a dynasty on the throne, the favour of a sultan, the caprice of a minister, or the accidents of success, still more rapidly place or displace the rulers in the cities and the governors in the provinces. The changes of fortune, which from the earliest ages have existed in the East, appear incredible to those who have been accustomed to the more stable order of things in the Western world. The extraordinary adventures, the sudden elevations and as sudden depressions of human life portrayed in the Arabian Nights, are not the brilliant creations of Oriental fancy: they are the faithful picture of the continually occurring changes of fortune in the Eastern world. A barber may there any day become a vizier: a vizier, if he escapes the bowstring, may often esteem himself happy if he can become a barber. The education of all classes is the same; for this simple reason, that none can foresee with tolerable certainty any material difference in their destiny in life. Nothing is more common than to see, as chief ministers of the sultan, men who had formerly been trained to the humble duties of street porters: a shoemaker often becomes the high admiral of the Turkish fleet. The descents from greatness are still more rapid than the ascent: wealth often attracts envy, and cupidity on the throne seldom fails to find pretexts for confiscating the riches which the oppression of subordinate functionaries had extorted from the cultivators of the soil. When the inevitable hour arrives, the victim of imperial cruelty or vengeance submits to the stroke of fate: the ruler of millions of subjects, the master of thousands of soldiers, quietly stretches out his neck to the bowstring: his exorbitant possessions, the object of so much envy, are confiscated to the treasury, or handed over to a more fortunate successor; and his children, ere long, are found labouring with their hands in the fields, carrying water in the streets, or bearing lances, as private soldiers, in the ranks of their father's successor.

Improvement, and the spread of opulence in Europe, are the slow growth of successive generations, each of which has added something to the national wealth, or gained something for the public rights. The virtues or the vices, the weakness or the energy, of the sovereign on the throne, though by no means unimportant elements in the national fortunes, seldom produce a decisive influence on the destinies of the state. The public tranquillity depends on the bravery and virtue of the higher ranks; the public opulence, upon the industry and frugality of the lower. But in the East almost everything

* Among the Tartars to the north of the great range of the Caucasus, there is hardly an individual so poor as not to possess thirty or forty horses: the luxury of the great consists almost entirely in the number of these animals, which on these boundless grassy wilds cost nothing; and many of the chiefs possess three or four thousand steeds.—MALTE BRUN, vol. i., p. 172.

turns upon the energy, the talents, and activity of the sovereign on the throne. If he is possessed of martial qualities and shining abilities, the fortunes of the state are speedily raised to the very highest point of elevation: if he is sunk in indolence, or lost in the pleasures of the harem, external disaster and internal dilapidation as speedily ensue. The vigour of a great monarch, wielding the despotic powers of government, speedily makes itself felt in every department: order is maintained by the satraps and governors of provinces, each trembling for the preservation of his own authority; industry and property are protected among the poor; multitudes flock from the adjoining states to share in the protection of vigour and justice; warriors crowd from all quarters to follow the standards of victory and plunder. Internal triumph, external success, thus rapidly accumulate around the empire of energy and courage; and the immense movable or floating population of Asia speedily causes an extraordinary influx of inhabitants into the principal cities of the Empire. The whole history of the East from the earliest ages is composed of the successive elevations of dynasties or individuals by the efforts of the possessors of the throne, and their as uniform decline and ultimate extinction from the degeneracy and effeminacy of their unworthy successors.

In Europe, alike in ancient and modern times, a great degree of stability has been communicated to the acquirements of civilization, the conquests of power, and the accumulation of wealth; and although the progress of nations has been interrupted by casual vicissitudes of fortune, yet a long period of prosperity and greatness has been imparted to national existence, and its decline has been owing to a succession of causes, which have gradually undermined, and at last dried up, the sources of prosperity. But in the East a very different progress presents itself. The rise of power, the growth of civilization, the marvels of opulence, have been far more rapid than in the Western world; but, on the other hand, the catastrophes to which they have been subject have been much more rapid, the degeneracy by which they have been undermined infinitely more swift in its progress. Though the voice of reason, matured by the lessons of experience, cannot, as yet, affirm that the European communities, with all their advantages of religion and knowledge, have eradicated from their bosom the seeds of mortality, it may with confidence be affirmed that, as they have been slower of growth, so they will be more durable in existence than the Oriental dynasties; and that the causes of decline, common to humanity, have been combated in the Western by far stronger principles of vigour and renovation than have ever appeared in the Eastern world.

But, for the same reason, corruption, when it does spread through the vitals of the state, will be more deeply rooted in Europe than in Asia; and if degeneracy does overtake society in its last stages, it will be far more universal in the West than in the East. Nothing is so remarkable in the Asiatic states as the simplicity of manners and habits which prevails beyond the pale of those who actually enjoy the transitory wealth or power which are the consequence of the sultan's favour. That they speedily are corrupted by the

possession of wealth, and that the descendants even of the bravest men become so utterly degenerate as to be incapable of contributing anything to the defence of the state in a few generations, may be considered as decisively proved by every period of Asiatic history. But the great bulk of the people, as they share in none of the advantages of wealth and power, so they have at no period been generally affected by its corruptions. If a traveller enters an Asiatic town, he finds the manners of the people and simplicity of domestic life nearly as they appear in the sacred records and the early narrative of Herodotus. In Europe, on the other hand, as political power and opulence have descended far more generally through all classes of society, and communicated, in consequence, during the periods of public virtue, a far greater degree of durability and vigour to political prosperity, so the seeds of corruption, when they do spread, will be in proportion more generally diffused, and degeneracy, when it reaches the middle ranks, more universal and hopeless.

Polygamy is, and ever has been, a dreadful evil in the East; and the extraordinary rapidity with which all races of conquerors have degenerated, in a few generations after their establishment in the conquered districts, has been, doubtless, mainly owing to this ruinous institution, which, among the great and affluent, poisons the sources of manhood and energy in the cradle. The Scythian conqueror himself was bred up amid his herds and his flocks: wandering on horseback from morning till night, he acquired vigour from habit and hardihood from necessity. His degenerate offspring, after his conquests were completed, bred up in the seclusion of the harem, surrounded by women, wealth, and flattery, sensual, capricious, and tyrannical, could hardly be recognised as the offspring of such a parent. But polygamy, with all its attendant train of ills—fawning eunuchs, fiery passions, luxurious seraglios, female jealousy, and sensual corruption—never has, and never can be, a vice of the great body of the people. Necessity, the strongest of all laws, will, in every age and part of the world, confine men to a single wife: the cost of several, or a train of concubines, is so great, that, like a stud of hunters or race-horses in England, it is altogether beyond the reach of the vast majority of mankind. By leading to the speedy corruption of the higher ranks, this ruinous institution may, indeed, and always does, exercise a fatal influence on the national fortunes; but its effect on general manners, domestic purity, or the progress of population, is very inconsiderable. In none of these respects, perhaps, is it so powerful an instrument of corruption as the female profligacy and promiscuous concubinage, which, pervading all ranks, is felt as so consuming an evil in all the great cities of Western Europe.

As no protection, in any age or in any country of Asiatic history, has existed in the spirit of freedom which pervaded the middle or lower classes, or the bulwarks which they have constructed against the tyranny of the sovereign, human industry might have been almost destroyed, and the human race become wellnigh extinct in many of its most favoured regions, in consequence of the constant oppression of arbitrary power, or the periodical inroads of the

Ruinous effects of polygamy, which yet are confined almost entirely to the great.

Principles of vigour more powerful in the East than in Europe.

And those of corruption also.

Causes of decay compensated by other circumstances.

Scythian cavalry, if it were not for three circumstances eminently characteristic of Eastern civilization, which in every age have formed the principal sources of protection to Oriental industry.

1. The first of these is the institution of the village communities,* which has been already dwelt on in treating of the condition of the people in India, and which prevails generally throughout almost every part of the East. Society there appears in its very simplest form. A certain district around a village belongs in common to all its inhabitants. Some are devoted to the cultivation of the soil, and with their surplus produce maintain the other classes of the little society, among whom the different trades of blacksmiths, carpenters, bricklayers, masons, barbers, bakers, tailors, shoemakers, and others, are divided; each member of which is bound in his own profession to contribute, sometimes by money, at others by a return in kind, to the wants of the other members of the community. The general tax, or, rather, tribute, which is imposed upon the whole, is levied by certain persons chosen by all the members, who allocate with great nicety the share of the burden upon each individual, charge themselves with its collection, and account for it to the pacha or other collector of the revenue. The attachment of the people to these little commonwealths is so strong as to be almost inextinguishable: if the members of it are dispersed by foreign violence, it is perpetuated from generation to generation; the ancient landmarks are preserved; even the sites of the different cottages are imprinted on their memories, and handed down to their children; and if happier times return, and the dispersed community or their descendants can reassemble, they rebuild their fallen walls, and each family lights its fire as near as possible on the hearth of its ancestors. But if this village system operates as a protection to the community during prosperous, it comes to press often with dreadful severity in adverse, times: the government will rarely, if ever, remit anything of the fixed tribute from the community; the weight of the exaction thus often comes to fall upon the declining numbers; and so grievous does the burden become when the members in the community are seriously impaired by sickness or the sword, that the remaining members fly to the desert or the mountains, and the entire depopulation of the country ensues. It is to this cause that both Gibbon and Sismondi† ascribe the rapid decline of population in the rural districts of the Roman Empire; and the same circumstance is considered by recent observers as the cause of the rapid decrease of the population in the contemporary states of Turkey and Persia.

2. The next circumstance which has contributed to soften the weight of despotism in the East is the institution of the *azams*, and the corporate privileges which belong to the members of the different trades in the towns. The former of these are officers appointed by the people to watch over the interests of the cultivators, and shield them from the oppression of the pachas; the latter are the rights which members of the different trades in towns enjoy, and which interpose, between the individual and the oppression of the tax-collector,

the important shield of a community having a common interest with himself. Where the *azams* do their duty, they are frequently of essential service, and they have in every age delayed the ruin of many provinces. But they are often in league with the pachas, and are bribed, by the wealth which his extortion has produced, to connive at still farther enormities. The most effectual security, in consequence, is found to be the incorporating of trades in towns; and hence the observation so common in the East, that industry in the towns is much better protected than in the country, and that the numbers of their inhabitants are often stationary, or even increasing, amid the desolation and ruin of the fields of the country.*

3. The principal protection of the rural population, in unsettled and disastrous times, is to be found in the security of mountain fastnesses, which mountain fastnesses have afforded to the industry of the people. Mountain ridges of prodigious height and vast extent run through the East in almost every direction. Independent of the great stony girdles of the globe, the Caucasus and Himalaya, great numbers of considerable mountain ranges branch out from these huge chains in many different directions; and in their valleys the industry of the cultivators is comparatively undisturbed by the exactions of the pachas or the plunder of the janizaries. Water, also, that indispensable requisite to cultivation over almost all the East, is generally to be had in comparative abundance from the mountain torrents of these alpine regions; and wherever it can be carried, the green field, the flowery orchard, and the smiling cottage bespeak the residence of happy and industrious man. The rural population, accordingly, in many of the great mountain chains of the East—that of the Bulgarians among the wooded and thickly-peopled heights of the Balkan; of the Druses and Maronites on the terraced slopes or beneath the alpine cliffs of Lebanon; and of the inhabitants of Mount Taurus, among the clear streams and beside the wooded valleys of Asia Minor—often exhibit a degree of general felicity to which hardly a parallel is to be found in any other part of the globe. The cavalry of the pachas is unable to penetrate these rocky dells or wooded recesses: the stern valour of the mountaineers guards the entrance to these asylums of industry and innocence; the demands of government are commuted into a fixed tribute from the state; land is almost always subdivided among the cultivators; and every man, on his little freehold, enjoys undisturbed the fruits of his toil.†

The great strength of the East in every age has been found to consist in the multitude and admirable dexterity of its horsemen; and this arises from the number of nomade tribes who, in almost all Asiatic states, pervade every part of its territory; and who, constantly on horseback, have attained a proficiency in the care and management of that noble animal unknown in any other part of the world. The number of these nomade tribes who pervade the Persian monarchy is nearly a million; those in Asiatic Turkey are still more numerous.‡ Nor is the high estimation of horses confined to those who still adhere to the roving habits of their forefathers: it pervades the whole community, and descends to

* *Ante*, iii., 117.

† *Gibbon*, iii., 93; vii., 173, 174. *Sismondi*, iii., 233.

* *Volney*, ii., 87. *Olivier*, i., 201, 219.

† *Volney*, ii., 218, 18, 74. *Mariti*, ii., 34.

‡ *Malte Brun*, i., 301; ii., 107, 110.

the very humblest and most indigent classes of the people. A beggar in Arabia, with his family, asks charity mounted on several horses; the luxury of the great consists in the number and high breeding of their stallions. The Tartar chiefs to the north of Persia have often three or four thousand horses for their private property, and the poorest man in their tribe is master of three or four. Uniting the blood of the Arab to the strength of the Tartar horse, these incomparable animals will convey their riders on a predatory excursion of a thousand miles in ten days, carrying with them their scanty provender for crossing the desert which separates them from civilized regions as they go forth, and bearing the ample spoil which their daring masters have amassed on their return.* The Asiatic lives with his horse; his children play with it from their mutual infancy; the attachment on both sides grows with their growth and strengthens with their strength; and when he has arrived at the full maturity of his powers, the noble Arab steed, endowed almost with human sagacity, and fraught with more than human devotion, will die in the strenuous effort to save the playfellow of his infancy from captivity or death.†

If the purity of domestic manners be, as it undoubtedly is, the great source both of public grandeur and private happiness, a powerful antidote to the numerous evils by which they are oppressed has in every age been found from this cause in the East. Notwithstanding the immense superiority which Europe has long enjoyed from the energy of its character, the freedom of its in-

* I had this extraordinary fact from my accomplished friend, Sir John M'Neil, so well known and distinguished in the Eastern diplomacy of Great Britain.

† A most moving incident, illustrative of the extraordinary strength as well as attachment of the Arab horses, is given by Lamartine in his beautiful *Travels in the East*.

An Arab chief, with his tribe, had attacked, in the night, a caravan of Damas's, and plundered it: when loaded with their spoil, however, the robbers were overtaken on their return by some horsemen of the Pacha of Acre, who killed several, and bound the remainder with cords. In this state of bondage they brought one of the prisoners, named Abou el Marck, to Acre, and laid him, bound hand and foot, wounded as he was, at the entrance to their tent, as they slept during the night. Kept awake by the pain of his wounds, the Arab heard his horse's neigh at a little distance, and being desirous to stroke, for the last time, the companion of his life, he dragged himself, bound as he was, to his horse, which was picketed at a little distance. 'Poor friend,' said he, 'what will you do among the Turks? You will be shut up under the roof of a khan, with the horses of a pacha or an aga; no longer will the women and children of the tent bring you barley, camel's milk, or *dourra*, in the hollow of their hand; no longer will you gallop free as the wind of Egypt in the desert; no longer will you cleave with your bosom the waters of the Jordan, which cool your sides, as pure as the foam of your lips. If I am to be a slave, at least may you go free. Go: return to our tent, which you know so well; tell my wife that Abou el Marck will return no more; but put your head still into the folds of the tent, and lick the hands of my beloved children.' With these words, as his hands were tied, he undid with his teeth the fetters which held the courser bound, and set him at liberty; but the noble animal, on recovering its freedom, instead of bounding away to the desert, bent its head over its master, and, seeing him in fetters and on the ground, took his clothes gently in his teeth, lifted him up, and set off at full speed towards home. Without ever resting, he made straight for the distant but well-known tent in the mountains of Arabia. He arrived there in safety, and laid his master safe down at the feet of his wife and children, and immediately dropped down dead with fatigue. The whole tribe mourned him; the poets celebrated his fidelity; and his name is still constantly in the mouths of the Arabs of Jericho.—LAMARTINE, *Voyage dans l'Orient*, vi., 236, Edin., 1830. This beautiful anecdote paints the manners and the horses of Arabia better than a thousand volumes. It is unnecessary to say, after it, that the Arabs are, and ever will be, the first horsemen, and have the finest race of horses in the world.

stitutions, and the superiority of its knowledge, it may be doubted whether the sacred fountain of domestic life has been preserved so pure among the poor and needy as in the seclusion of the East. The unrestrained social intercourse of the sexes; the incessant activity which prevails; the close proximity in which the poor men and women in great cities are accumulated together; and the general license of manners which has flowed from the liberty that prevails, and the passion for ardent spirits which is so common among the working classes, have produced a far greater degree of general vice and misery in Europe than has ever obtained, at least among the middle and lower classes, in the East. The enormous mass of female profligacy which overflows almost all our great towns, is there almost unknown. From the seclusion of the harem have, in the middle classes,* flowed purer manners and a more elevated character than has resulted from the constant intermixture of the sexes, and the vehement passions to which it gives rise. It is this simplicity and honesty of disposition, joined to the unaffected devotion and martial qualities by which they are distinguished, which has blinded so many European travellers of the highest talents and discernment to the devastating effects of Asiatic government, and the ruinous consequences which have flowed, particularly during the decline of the Persian and Turkish empires, from the weakened authority of the throne, the deplorable contests between the princes of the same family, and the general oppression which the pachas have exercised in the independent sovereignties which they have erected in many of the provinces of these vast empires.†

Encamped for four centuries in Europe, the Turks have deviated in no respect from the manners and customs of their Asiatic forefathers. Although from the day that the cannon of Mohammed the Second opened the breach in the walls of Constantinople, which still exists to attest the fall of the Emperor of the East, they have been the undisputed masters of the fairest and richest dominion upon earth, yet the great body of them still retain the primitive customs and habits which they brought with them from the mountains of Koordistan. They have in no degree either shared in the improvement, or adopted the manners, or acquired the knowledge, of their European neighbours. Their government is still the absolute rule of the sultans and the pachas, the agas and the janizaries; notwithstanding their close proximity to, and constant intercourse

Immutable manners and customs of the Turks.

* The dreadful evils of polygamy among the rich and powerful, to whom, from its vast expense, it is almost entirely confined, have been already noticed. Among the middle classes it is rare; among the poor, unknown.

† For the preceding account of the civilization and manners of the East, the author has relied on the older travels of Olivier, Somini, Volney, Chardin, Eton, and De Tott, with the more modern narratives of Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Porter, Fraser, Morier, Walsh, Urquhart, and Slade. The particular references are, in general, not given on the margin, because they would cover it with too dense an array; and the authorities in the text are founded rather upon a comparison of their different accounts, and the conclusions which the author, after much reflection on the subject, has drawn from them, than from any particular passages which specially and to the letter support the statements which he has given. And he hopes that such a summary will not be deemed misplaced, even in a work of European history; the more especially when the important questions now wound up with the policy of the East are considered, and the intimate connexion which the English nation, both from its national policy and the extent of its Oriental dominions, has with the future destinies of that important portion of the globe.

with, the Democratic, commercial communities of modern Europe, they are yet the devout followers of Mohammed; notwithstanding that they everywhere admit that the star of the Crescent is waning before that of the Cross, they still adhere in all their institutions to the precepts of the Koran; they rely with implicit faith on the aid of the Prophet, although they are well aware that the followers of Christ are ultimately to expel them from Europe, and themselves point to the gate by which the Muscovite battalions are to enter when they place the Cross upon the dome of St. Sophia.

A very sufficient reason may be assigned for this invariable adherence of the Turks to their Asiatic customs, notwithstanding their close proximity to European civilization, and the innumerable evils which they have suffered from the superiority of the European discipline. Their religion renders them incapable either of alteration or improvement. The Koran contains several admirable precepts of morality drawn from the sages of antiquity, and many sublime truths borrowed from the Gospel; but in all the parts where it is original, it is either a wild rhapsody, inapplicable to the rest of the world, or a rude code, suited to none but a horde of Oriental conquerors. Nevertheless, it forms not only the religious standard of faith, but the civil code of law: the whole decisions of the cadis in Mussulman states are founded on texts of the Koran; all the maxims of the mufitis and supreme religious council are drawn, without comment or amplification, from its injunctions.* The celebrated saying of the Arabian conqueror who destroyed the Alexandrian library, "If these books contain the truth, it is already in the Koran, and therefore they are superfluous; if what they contain is not there, it is false, and therefore they should be destroyed," contains the whole system of their civil and ecclesiastical government.

Minutely specifying almost all the particulars of government, containing every possible direction for the regulation of the interests of society as it existed around the dwelling of Mohammed, and the cradle of his religion, it is necessarily inapplicable to a different state of society, where separate interests have arisen, and unforeseen passions and difficulties have emerged. All attempts, therefore, at the renovation or regeneration of the Turkish, as of every other Mohammedan empire, must necessarily fail, because, before they can be generally adopted, the people must have ceased to be Mohammedans; the priests must have ceased to be the expounders of the law; the sway of the sultan to be the delegated authority of Mohammed; the Koran to be the supreme code in all matters, civil and religious, from which there is no appeal. This is, with a view to their respective political effects, the grand distinction between the Christian religion and that of Mohammed. Prescribing nothing for external form, enjoining little for ecclesiastical government, studiously avoiding all allusion to political institutions, the Gospel directs all its efforts to the purification of that great fountain of evil—the human heart. Destined, in the end, to effect powerful changes, both in the heart of man, the frame of society, and the powers of government, it aims directly at neither of the latter objects: it is to work out the destined end, to accomplish

the ultimate designs of Providence, by its unobserved influence upon the human heart. The Koran, on the other hand, specifies *everything* which its disciples are to do, from the division of property among children, upon the death of a parent, to the number of daily ablutions to be performed by the faithful. Reform of institutions or change of manners, therefore, is impossible in a Mohammedan state; for it can be attempted only at the hazard of destroying the great bond of nationality, Mohammedanism itself. It is as impossible as for a child to grow to maturity who, in early youth, has been cased in a rigid suit of armour: his figure cannot enlarge unless his fetters are burst. The one faith proposes to reform the heart by the institutions; the other, to reform the institutions by the heart. Whoever will reflect on this distinction, cannot fail to perceive that the one religion, calculated with extraordinary sagacity to produce a great impression, and, in some respects, improvement among the Asiatic tribes for whom it was intended, was wholly unfit for the progressive destinies and different circumstances of mankind, while the other, though producing, in the outset, a less impression, from its enjoining no external ceremonial or outward institutions, was adapted for every imaginable state of human compression, and fitted to pour the stream of real regeneration into the human heart to the end of the world.

But, although the Mohammedan religion has thus opposed an invincible bar to the improvement of the Turkish Empire, or the ingrafting upon its aged stock of any part of the free institutions of Christian Europe, and rendered chimerical all the projects which have been formed, in recent times, for its political reformation, yet there can be no doubt that, for several centuries after it was established in Europe, the extraordinary strength and formidable power of the Turkish Empire were mainly owing to the religious fervour with which its Asiatic inhabitants were inspired. Not only were the conquests of the Osmanlis effected during the fervour of a new faith, when the Arabians, with the cimeter in one hand and the Koran in the other, poured into all the adjoining states to seek the houris of Paradise in the forcible conversion of the world; but the religious veneration with which the family of the first founder of the Empire was regarded, gave a degree of stability to its institutions which has never obtained elsewhere in the East. Alone of all the Oriental dynasties, the descendants of the same family have sat upon the throne for four hundred years; and, although many irregularities in the choice of the princes and the order of descent have occurred, the throne has never been filled but by the descendants of Othman. In this way, the Turkish Empire has been saved that perpetual recurrence of civil wars upon every accession, which has ruined the independence and halved the population of her immediate neighbours in Poland and Persia; and without the hereditary descent of the throne having been formally recognised, the Ottoman dominions have substantially obtained most of the benefits of that invaluable institution.

The provinces which fell to the Turks upon the overthrow of the Lower Empire were immense, and embraced, perhaps, the fairest portion and most delightful regions of the earth. It still extends, notwithstanding the great losses it has-

In the first instance the Mohammedan religion wonderfully strengthened Turkey.

Which must ever render all attempts at Turkish reform abortive.

* Malte Brun, iv., 266, 267.

sustained in the last seventy years, to 815,000 square geographical miles—a surface about nine times that of the British islands, which contain 90,000. Although, however, the extent of its surface is so great, and the climate so benign that the plains in general yield thirty or forty, in some places as much as two hundred fold;* although the mountains, cut in terraces, will yield fruits and crops to the height of several thousand feet above the sea, yet the population of the whole Empire in Asia and Europe does not at the highest estimate exceed twenty-five, and by the lowest estimate is brought down to eight or nine millions: the largest of which number only gives twenty-eight souls to the square mile, while the lower will only yield nine; while Great Britain, with far inferior climate and natural advantages, contains two hundred and sixty. More decisive proof cannot be figured of the desolation practically produced by the Turkish government, or of the extent to which the most boundless gifts of nature may be rendered nugatory by the long-continued oppression of Oriental tyranny. In fact, it is only in the great towns and mountainous regions of the country that any considerable population is to be seen: its finest plains are nearly desolate; nine tenths of the state of Mesopotamia, the garden of the world, capable itself of nourishing forty millions of souls, is a blowing desert; not a seventh of the rich alluvial soil in Wallachia or Moldavia is cultivated; and the wild grass of nature comes up to the horses' girths, from the gates of Constantinople to the mosques of Adrianople.†

Yet the world hardly afforded so noble a country as that which at this period was still desolated by the sway of the Osmanlis. Bounded by the Euphrates on the east, the Mediterranean, or Libyan Deserts, on the south, the Adriatic on the west, and the steppes of the Ukraine on the north; containing the isles of Greece, the forests of Macedonia, the cedars of Lebanon, in its bosom; numbering the Nile, the Danube, and the Euphrates among its inland streams; embracing all the nations who fought at Troy among its subjects, all the realms which have enlightened the world among its provinces; giving law at once to Egypt and Jerusalem, to Nineveh and Babylon, to Athens and Constantinople; connected together by a vast inland sea, navigated by hardy and skilful seamen, enjoying hundreds of the finest harbours in the world on its shores; with the vine and the olive clothing its slopes, the orange and the citron loading its isles, the oak and the pine flourishing on its mountains, the maize and the rice waving on its plains; it seemed to enjoy every advantage which the bounty of nature could accumulate to bestow happiness and contentment on the human race. But all these blessings were blasted by the despotism of the East and the rigidity of the Mohammedan rule; its noble plains were fast relapsing into deserts; its capacious harbours deserted; wild beasts were resuming their dominion amid the ruins of former magnificence; population, amid the rapid increase of the European states, was retrograding, and fears were entertained for the extinction of the human race in those realms of boundless riches where the species was first created.‡

* "In the plains of Mesopotamia, near Bagdad, the land, from the effects of irrigation, yields, under a very rude cultivation, two hundred fold."—MALTE BRUN, ii., 117.

† Malte Brun, ii., 166, 167.

‡ Ibid., ii., 117.

§ Upward of fifty years ago, fears were entertained of the

But amid the general decay of the Turkish Empire, the matchless situation and natural advantages of CONSTANTINOPLE still attracted a vast concourse of inhabitants, and veiled under a robe of beauty the decline of the Queen of the East. This celebrated capital, the incomparable excellence of whose situation attracted the eagle eye of Alexander the Great; which made the Romans forget the sanctity of the Capitol, and transferred the metropolis of the world to the shores of the Bosphorus; which rent in twain the dominion of the legions, and yet singly sustained for a thousand years the empire of the East; which drew aside the Crusaders from the storm of Jerusalem, and attracted the Osmanlis from their deserts to the shores of the Bosphorus; which threatened in one age every monarchy in Europe, and existed in another by their mutual jealousy at its acquisition—had long formed the real object of discord between the courts of Paris and St. Petersburg. The desires of the cabinet of St. Petersburg had been for above a century fixed on its acquisition: towards that object all their efforts had, since the days of Peter the Great, incessantly been directed, and it was only by the active interference of England that the total overthrow of the Turkish Empire had been averted, on the eve of the Revolutionary war, after the fall of Oczakoff.* So firmly bent was the Empress Catharine on this splendid acquisition, that she named her eldest grandson Alexander, and his second brother Constantine: hoping that the former would rival the glories of the Macedonian conqueror, and the latter again renew on the Bosphorus the empire of the cross and the lustre of the Eastern Empire. During the anxieties and dangers of that dreadful contest, the designs of the cabinet of St. Petersburg for the acquisition of Constantinople had for a time been suspended, but its projects, guided by aristocratic foresight, were never forgotten: even while still reeking with the blood of Friedland, Alexander turned his anxious attention to the long-cherished projects of his family and court; and Napoleon, bent on the acquisition of Spain for himself, gave a verbal consent, during the conference of Tilsit, to the entire expulsion of the Turks from Europe by the Russians.† But Roumelia and Constantinople were excluded from this partition, and their destination left in the dark, even when it was agreed that the Osmanlis should be expelled from all their other possessions in Europe. Napoleon, as he himself has told us, never could bring his mind to consent to the cession of the Queen of the East to his northern rival: it soon afterward, as will immediately appear, formed the subject of angry contention between them. Combined with jealousy concerning Poland, and the strict observance by Russia of the Continental system, it formed the secret cause of the Russian invasion; and one principal reason which directed the mighty conqueror to Moscow instead of St. Petersburg, was the secret project which he entertained of turning his victorious arms, after the subjugation of the Muscovites, to the southward,

Incomparable advantages and beauty of Constantinople, and designs of Russia upon it.

entire extinction of the human race in the eastern provinces of the Turkish Empire.—ETON'S *Turkish Empire*, 264. And the same fears are expressed by a more recent observer for some provinces of the western, particularly the plains of Roumelia, Wallachia, and Moldavia.—WALSH'S *Constantinople*, i., 193, 194, and BUCKINGHAM'S *Mesopotamia*, i., 212.

* *Ante*, i., 121.

† *Ante*, ii., 549.

and placing on his victorious brows the diadem of the Eastern Empire.*†

It is not surprising that Constantinople should thus in every age have formed the chief object of human ambition. Placed midway between Europe and Asia, it is at once the natural emporium where the productions of the East and West find their obvious point of contact, and the midway station where the internal water-communication of Europe, Asia, and Africa find their common centre: while the waves of the Mediterranean and the *Ægean* bring to its harbour the whole productions of Egypt, Libya, Italy, and Spain, the waters of the Danube, the Dneister, and the Volga, waft to the same favoured spot the agricultural riches of Hungary, Germany, the Ukraine, and Russia. The caravans of the Desert, the rich loads of the camel and the dromedary, meet within its walls; the ample sails and boundless riches of European commerce—even the distant pendants of America and the New World—hasten to its quays to convey the vast productions of the Old to the New Hemisphere. An incomparable harbour, where a three-decker can without danger touch the quay, and from the yard-arms of which a bold assailant may almost leap on the walls, affords, within a deep bay, several miles in length, ample room for all the fleets in the universe to lie in safety: a broad, inland sea, enclosed within impregnable gates, gives its navy the extraordinary advantage of a safe place for pacific exercise and preparation; narrow and winding straits on either side, of 15 or 20 miles in length, crowned by heights forming natural castles, render this matchless metropolis impregnable to all but land-forces. It is the only capital in the world, perhaps, which can never decline as long as the human race endures, or the present wants of mankind continue; for the more that the West increases in population and splendour, the greater will be the traffic which must pass through its gates in conveying to the inhabitants of its empires the rich products of the Eastern sun; and the more that Asia revives, or Russia advances in civilization, the more boundless must be the wealth which will be poured into its bosom from the vast arteries which collect from their plains the boundless streams of Eastern cultivation.

Nor are the beauty of Constantinople and the natural excellence of its situation inferior to the commercial advantages which, for a thousand years, prolonged the existence of the Byzantine, and now singly compensate the decay of the Turkish Empire. The powers of the greatest historical and descriptive painters of England and France have hardly sufficed to portray its varied charms; and if the pencils of Gibbon and Lamartine have, in it, found materials to crowd successive chapters of their immortal works, a subsequent writer can hardly be expected to do justice to it in a single paragraph. Situated, like Rome and Moscow, on seven hills, but enjoying, unlike them, the advantages of a maritime situation and the refreshing breezes of the ocean—exhibiting in its successive terraces, which rise from the margin of the water, a unique assemblage of

European domes, green foliage, and Eastern minarets; with the noble harbour of the Golden Horn, five miles in length, and yet capable of having its mouth closed by a single chain, thick-set with all the sails of Europe, lying in its bosom; and the blue expanse of the Sea of Marmora, studded with white sails and light barques, opening in its front—it presents an assemblage of striking points, unparalleled in any other quarter of the globe. But great as is the lustre of the capital, it is outdone to the real lover of the beauties of nature by the extraordinary variety and richness of the scenery in the channel of the Bosphorus, where the stream which unites the Euxine to the Sea of Marmora winds its devious course for nearly twenty miles through bold headlands and lofty promontories; one shore of which, resplendent with the smiling villas, umbrageous woods, and hanging gardens of the East, falls so rapidly into the sea, that the acacia dips its branches in the wave, and the sails of the largest merchantmen almost touch the dark green cypresses that crowd the shore; while on the opposite coast, the features bear the character of savage magnificence; where the villages bespeak the wildness of Oriental manners, and the havens the spontaneous bounty of nature; and where a seventy-four can lie in safety at the foot of the rocks, moored to the roof of the lofty evergreen oak, whose branches intermingle with its masts.*

The principal strength of the Turks, like that of all other Asiatic nations, has always consisted in their cavalry, and no cavalry of this kind ever was better provided with the light horse. Independent of the nomade tribes of Asia, which, as already mentioned, penetrate its eastern provinces in every direction, the European Mussulman proprietors, who hold their land under the tenure of military service as spahis, furnish at all times a powerful body of admirable cavaliers. Every Turk, and, in fact, almost every Orientalist, is by nature a horseman. From their earliest infancy they are accustomed to the saddle; from childhood upward their horses are their companions; in youth, their principal exploits and rivalry consist in the management of their steeds; and in maturer years, all their journeys are performed on horseback. Beyond the distance of a few miles from some of their great towns, there is no such thing as a carriage-way in any part of Turkey. Even the ladies of the harems perform their distant journeys in this manner, or on baskets slung on each side of camels; and in the management of the rein and the firmness of their seat, often rival the most accomplished horsemen of Western Europe.†

There are great varieties, however, in the quality of the Turkish horse; and none are comparable in dexterity and equipment to the spahis, who inhabit the broad and wooded Mount Hæmus. These horsemen are almost all proprietors of the ground, or their sons; and they hold their land by the tenure of military service, when called on by the grand signor. Accustomed from their infancy to climb the wooded declivities of their native hills, they early acquire an extraordinary skill and hardihood in horsemanship. A spahi will often ride at full gallop up and down hills, over torrents, through thick woods, along the edge of precipices, or where a European horseman would hardly venture even to walk. This extraordinary

* Chamb., ii., 234.

† Napoleon's designs on Constantinople were of very old standing, and had constantly occupied his mind since the treaty of Tilsit. Shortly after that peace, when one of the chief persons in his councils spoke on the subject of a general peace, he replied, with a frankness very unusual to him, "A general peace! it will be found only at Constantinople."—CHAMBRAY, ii., 235.

* Lamartine, Gibbon, Slade.

† Valentine, *Guerre des Turcs*, 12, 13.

boldness increases when they act together in masses. When so assembled, they dash down rocks, and drive through brushwood in the most surprising manner. No obstacles intimidate, no difficulties deter, no disorder alarms them. The attacks of such bodies are, in an especial manner, to be dreaded in rugged or broken ground, where European infantry deem it impossible for cavalry to act at all. The heads of two or three horsemen are first seen peeping up through the brushwood, or emerging out of the steep ravines by which the declivities are furrowed, wo to the battalion or division that does not instantly stand to its arms, or form square on such videttes appearing. In an instant, five hundred or a thousand horsemen scale the rocks on all sides; with loud cries they gallop forward upon their enemy; the Turkish cimicer is before their horses' heads, and in a few minutes a whole regiment is cut to pieces.*

Although, however, the Turkish horse constitutes the main strength of their armies, yet they have the command of a very numerous body of foot-soldiers. These originally consisted of the military feudatories, who held their land for service in war, just as the feudal tenants of Christian Europe. They constituted the main strength of the Ottoman armies in their best days, and their number was variously estimated at from sixty thousand to one hundred thousand men. But a new method of recruiting the foot service was adopted by Amurath the First, who selected a fifth part of the most robust of the prisoners of the Christian nations, whom he compelled to adopt the Mohammedan faith, and from whom, or their sons, he formed a new body of troops called the Yenetcheræ or Janizaries, who soon acquired an extraordinary celebrity in the wars with the Christian powers. Their discipline and mode of fighting were very similar to the English light infantry or French tirailleurs. From being constantly imbodied, they soon acquired a high degree of perfection and discipline; and at a time when no other power in Europe had a similar force to oppose them, they were wellnigh irresistible. At the siege of Malta, under Solyman the Magnificent, during the reign of Charles the Fifth, and in the repeated invasions of Hungary which took place in that time, till the siege of Vienna in 1683, they were the terror of all Christendom. This favoured body soon came to enjoy so many privileges, and so much consideration, particularly from the privilege of setting up a trade in any town, that great numbers of persons in all parts of the Empire enrolled themselves under their banners. Their whole number throughout the Empire might amount, at the treaty of Tilsit, to one hundred thousand persons, of whom eighteen or twenty thousand were to be found in Constantinople or the adjoining villages. Not more than a third of this number, however, were permanently imbodied, except on a particular crisis; but they were all liable to be called on when the service of the state required it; and sixty or seventy thousand excellent soldiers could in this way be arrayed around the standards of the Prophet.†

In addition to these regular forces of feudal And fellahs, militia, the grand signor was entitled at any time to call upon the foot-soldiers. whole Mohammedan population in his dominions capable of bearing arms; and al-

though such an array, often hastily brought together, and always undisciplined, would not in any European nation have been formidable, yet it was by no means to be despised, from the peculiar habits of the Ottomans. From the troubled state of the country, and the great pride which they take in costly weapons, every Turk is accustomed to the use of arms. They are all perhaps, adepts in the use of the gun, the pistol, the cimicer, and the lance. Being almost all either sturdy cultivators or hardy cavaliers, they are equally ready for the foot or the horse service; and, what was wholly unknown in any other army, an officer might, with perfect security, at any time put a janizary on horseback, or enrol a spahi among the companies of foot-soldiers. The Turkish artillery was long superior to that of the European powers; and although it had not kept pace with the progress of Western science, and had sunk from its former celebrity during the wars of the eighteenth century yet it was still formidable from the great number of guns which their armies brought into battle, and the rapidity with which their admirable horses moved them from one part of the field to another.*

An empire possessing military resources of this description, while animated by the spirit of religious zeal, and held together by the bond of successful plunder, was a most formidable object of apprehension to the Christian powers; and, on many occasions, it was only by the most strenuous efforts, and union of the Western powers that could hardly have been expected, that Christendom was saved from Mohammedan subjugation. But religious zeal and the lust of conquest, though two of the most powerful passions which can rouse the human breast, cannot be relied on for permanent efforts. The first generally burns so fiercely that it extinguishes itself after a few generations; the second, dependant on the excitement of worldly desires, is kept alive almost entirely by the continuance of worldly success. The vicious institutions and wasting tyranny of the Turkish Empire were incapable of furnishing that steady support to military power which arose from the hereditary aristocracy and free spirit of Western Europe. The Christians had, at first, the utmost difficulty in stemming the torrent of Asiatic invasion; and the destinies of the world never, perhaps, hung in so nice a balance as when Charles conquered the Saracens on the field of Tours, or when John Sobieski raised the siege of Vienna with the Polish lances. But these two memorable battles, by stopping the career of conquest, and cooling the ardour of fanaticism in their ranks, proved fatal to their cause both in Western and Eastern Europe. Disaster never ceased to succeed disaster, till, though after the lapse of many centuries, the arms of the Moors were forced backward from the banks of the Loire across the Straits of Gibraltar; and the jealousy of the European powers, excited by the inestimable prize of Constantinople, alone has prevented them, long before this time, from driving the Turks across the Bosphorus into their native seats in the deserts of Asia.

During the decline of the Ottoman Empire, which has now continued to recede for a hundred and fifty years, they have, however, maintained many long and bloody wars both with the Austrians and Russians; and the tenacity with

Varied population of which this empire is composed.

* Veterani, Campagne, 34. Valentini, 12.

† Malte Brun, ii., 138, 164. Valentini, 14, 15.

* Val., 13, 14.

which they still hold their territory, and the vigour with which they have so often risen from shocks which seemed fatal to their cause, prove what powerful elements of strength exist in the courage and energy of the Turkish population to resist so many external disasters, and the more unobserved but fatal influence of such long-continued internal oppression. This tenacity of life is the more remarkable when it is recollected that everywhere three fifths, in most, two thirds, of the whole population of the Empire are Christians; and that nations and sects of all imaginable varieties compose the motley array of the inferior classes of the Ottoman Empire. The merchants are almost all Greeks or Armenians; the sailors, islanders from the Archipelago; the money-lenders, Jews; the watermen and cultivators, generally the descendants of the inhabitants of the old Greek Empire. Three millions of Turks in Europe, and perhaps four millions in their Asiatic dominions, not more than a third of the whole inhabitants, not only retain all this varied population in entire subjection, but compel them to fight in their ranks, to labour for their support, and to pay taxes to their government: a fact which, however surprising, is thrown into the shade by the still more wonderful sway maintained by a much smaller number of British over the immense population of the Indian Peninsula.

The fortresses of Turkey are far from being worthy of respect, if the construction of their ramparts is alone taken into consideration, but they become most formidable strongholds from the manner in which they are defended by the Mussulman population. They have no idea of bastions or covered ways, nor of one rampart enfiling another, nor of the system of outworks, which form the strength of modern fortifications. Brahamlow, Widdin, and Belgrade, which possess these advantages, have all owed them to the Christian powers which, at different times, have had them in their hands. The real Turkish fortresses, such as Silistria and Roudschouk, on the Danube, are merely surrounded by a lofty wall, in front of which runs a deep ditch. Here and there a few round towers or bastions form so many salient angles, but they are of no other use than to mount a few cannon. On the top of the wall is placed a row of gabions, with embrasures for cannon, behind which the besieged are completely screened from the fire both of artillery and musketry; and at short distances are loopholed guard-houses, from which they keep up a destructive fire on the assailants. Subterraneous passages are worked under the ramparts, by which they are enabled to fill the lower part of the ditch above the water with musketeers, who often prove extremely fatal on an assault. The strength of the Turkish fortifications, therefore, does not consist in the solidity of the works or their scientific construction; but the obstinacy of the defence often renders them more formidable obstacles than the most regular ramparts of Western Europe.

A very sufficient reason may be assigned for the resolute manner in which the Ottomans defend their walls: it is necessity. The grand signor makes no distinction between misfortune and pusillanimity. The bowstring in general awaits alike the victim of superior power and the betrayer of patriotic duty; and such is the inveteracy with which war has long been carried on be-

tween the Mussulman and Christian powers, that all the inhabitants are well aware that death or captivity awaits them if the town is carried by assault, or even surrendered by capitulation, and that their only chance of safety is in the most resolute resistance. Thirty thousand persons, of whom one half were the inhabitants of the town, perished in the assault of Ismael in 1789, and fifteen thousand were made prisoners, and for the most part sold as slaves, or transported into the country of the conqueror. Thus the terrible maxim of ancient war, *Vae victis*, is constantly before the eyes alike of the citizens as the garrisons of Turkish fortified towns; and as the calamity involves persons alike of all religions who are found within the devoted walls, it unites all persuasions, Christians, Jews, and Mussulmen, in one common and cordial league against their ruthless assailants.*

The assault of the rampart is considered in Western Europe as the general termination of a siege: many brave commanders have deemed their duty sufficiently discharged when they held out till the breach was practicable; and even the more rigorous code of military duty established by Napoleon only required one assault to be withstood. In Turkey, on the other hand, the mounting of the breach is but the beginning of the serious part of the defence. The Turks seldom disquiet themselves about retarding the approaches of the besiegers; frequently do not return a shot to the breaching batteries; let the ruined part of the rampart take its chance; but lend their whole efforts to the preparation of the means of defence against the assaulting columns who get in by that entrance. For this purpose, every ledge, roof, window, and wall, which bears upon the approach to the breach, or the space inside of it behind the rampart, is lined with musketeers, and columns are arranged on either side of the opening within the wall, to assail the enemy when, disordered by the tumult of success, he has descended into the interior of the place. In the deadly strife which then ensues, the superior equipments and skill in the use of arms of the Turks generally prove superior to the discipline of the Europeans: in personal contests, the bayonet is no match for the cimeter, at least when wielded by the janizaries. Every Turk, besides his musket and bayonet, has a pair of pistols, a cimeter, and slightly-curved poniard, two feet long, of fearful efficacy in combats hand-to-hand; and they have all been accustomed almost daily to the use of these arms from their infancy. It may readily be conceived that, when the Christian columns, out of breath and disordered by the rush and ascent of the breach, find themselves suddenly assailed in front and on both flanks by such antagonists, it is seldom, indeed, that they can come off victorious; and, in fact, it would never happen, were it not that the Ottomans, though constitutionally brave, are sometimes seized with unaccountable panics, which lead them to take to flight at a time when the means of victory are still in their power.†

The long-established and often-experienced superiority of the Ottoman cavalry early led to a very peculiar organization and array of the Russian armies by whom they were to be opposed: squares of infantry were soon found

Desperate Turkish defence of the breaches of fortified towns.

Turkish fortresses.

* Malte Brun, ii., 137.

† Val., 62, 63.

* Val., 63, 65

† Val., 62, 63.

Mode of warfare by the Russians against the Turks.

to be the only effectual mode of resisting the attacks of that fiery and redoubtable horse, and for a considerable time their squares consisted of the whole army, which was drawn up in one solid column, like the corps of Korsakow, at Zurich, in 1799.* It was, in a great degree, owing to this defective organization that Peter the Great was reduced to such extremities on the Pruth in the early part of the eighteenth century. But it was at length discovered that the greater part of the Christian host was, under such an arrangement, kept in crowded ranks, in a state of perfect inefficiency; and, therefore, the more eligible plan was adopted of forming lesser squares, none of which were composed of more than twelve battalions. These squares had their artillery at the corners, the officers were in the centre, the cavalry outside, but ready to be withdrawn into the interior if necessary; and the masses were placed at such distances, in an angular manner towards each other, that the enemy's horse were generally exposed, on penetrating between them, to a fire on each flank: just as the Mamelukes were, by a similar arrangement on Napoleon's part, at the battle of the Pyramids. At the battle of Kagul, in 1770, the Russians had five of these squares; and at the affair of Schumla, on the 30th of June, 1774, Romanzoff advanced to the attack of the Turks in the same formation.†

More recently, however, and since discipline has so much improved in the Muscovite ranks, the ordinary system is to advance, like other troops, in open columns, from whence it is easy to form squares when the enemy are at hand. The constant habit of combating in this manner, and of looking for safety, not to flight, which would be utterly vain before the Turkish cavalry, but to the strength of their squares, has contributed, in no small degree, to the remarkable steadiness of the Russian infantry; while, on the other hand, the extreme ease with which they can always make their escape on their admirable horses, has increased the natural disposition of the Asiatic people to desultory warfare, and imprinted that tendency to dissolve after any considerable disaster, which, more or less, belongs to all but regular troops, and justifies the saying of the old Prince of Saxe-Cobourg, who, with Suwarrow, defeated them so severely in 1789, that, whenever he had once given the Turks a good beating, he felt no disquietude about them for the remainder of the campaign.‡

The Turkish method of fighting exactly resembles that of the ancients; and a battle with them recalls to us those actions between the Romans and Asiatics of which Livy and Polybius have left such graphic descriptions. They constantly fortify their camps; and, when the day of battle arrives, draw out their forces in regular array in front of their intrenchments, where their stores, tents, ammunition, and riches are deposited. When the combat begins, they pour down with loud cries and extreme impetuosity, often on three sides at once of the squares of their enemy; the whole plain is covered with their horsemen; while their numerous guns endeavour to shake the enemy's array; and it requires no small steadiness, even in veteran troops, to withstand *en charge*. In close or single combat, whether

in the field or in the breach, the European bayonet has never proved a match for the Turkish cimeter; and no other nation is likely to find it more efficacious, when it failed in the hands of the French grenadiers in the breach of Acre, and of the Russian infantry on the glacis of Schumla.* Generally speaking, accordingly, the Russian horse seek safety within the squares of their infantry. Often the Turkish cavaliers, half drunk with opium, pierce even the most solid squares; and instances are not wanting of their having, amid the smoke and the strife, gone right through, and escaped on the opposite side, without knowing where they had been. But if the first onset fails, as is often the case, the strength of the Ottomans, like the spring of a wild beast, is broken: it is no easy matter to make them rally for continued efforts; and if fortune proves, in the end, adverse, the vast array frequently disperses; every man returns to his home by the shortest road; the intrenched camp, with the whole stores and artillery of the army, is carried by storm; and the vizier, who had a few days before been at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand men, is sometimes scarcely able to collect ten thousand around the standard of the Prophet.†

The bloody war from 1736 to 1739, in which Marshal Munich bore so distinguished a part, and which more than repaired the disasters of the Pruth, contributed in an essential manner to weaken the Turkish military power, by withdrawing from their dominion, and arraying definitively under the Russian banners, the Cossack and nomade tribes who, in former wars, had proved such formidable antagonists to their arms. Since that time the Muscovite battalions no longer invade the Ottoman plains, trusting to their squares of foot alone, and painfully toiling, like the legions of Crassus in ancient, or those of Peter the Great in modern times, in the midst of never-ceasing clouds of Asiatic horse: the lances of the Cossacks are seen on their side; the nomade tribes wheel round their masses; and, although their little hardy ponies are no match in the shock of a charge for the superb steeds of the Osmanlis, and the lance, even in the bravest hands, can hardly ward off the keen edge of the Damascus cimeter, yet, in performing the duty of light troops, and scouring the country for provisions, they are decidedly their superiors. No Turkish army can now contend with the agility and address at the outposts of the Cossack horsemen; and the fate of Peter the Great, on the banks of the Pruth—that of being starved out by clouds of light horse—would now, perhaps, befall the Turkish army which should venture to trust itself in the open plains in their presence.‡

Such has been the importance of this change, and of the increasing strength of the Russian and decline of the Ottoman power, that the Balkan must have been crossed, and Constantinople taken long before this time, had it not been for another circumstance which, for more than half a century, has prolonged the existence of the Turkish Empire. This is the

Great effect of the conquest of the nomade nations by the Russians.

The present tactics of the Russians in the Turkish wars.

Turkish mode of fighting.

Importance of the unhealthiness of the plain of the Danube in the wars with the Russians.

* *Ante*, ii. 46.

† Bounbord, 72. Val., 18, 20.

‡ Val., 26, 28. Jom., *Guerres de la Revol.*, i., 236.

* Fifteen thousand Muscovites there perished under the Turkish cimeter; and the vizier wrote to the grand signor, that, so numerous were the heads taken off the infidel, that they would make a bridge from earth to heaven.

† Val., 9, 11, 26. Jomini, *Art de la Guerre*, ii., 590, 591.

‡ Val., 18, 19. Von Hammer, xix., 24, 27.

desert and pestilential nature of the vast plains forming the lower part of the basin of the Danube, which have always formed the theatre of war between them and the Christian powers. The flat parts of Wallachia and Moldavia, as well as of Northern Bulgaria, five sixths of which, from the devastation of long-continued war, and the ceaseless oppression of the Turks, are in a state of nature,* are exceedingly unhealthy in the autumnal months. Their low situation exposes them to frequent inundation and deluges of wet in the winter and early part of the season, which the great heats and long drought of summer dry up, and render the source of marsh miasmata of the most fatal kind in the close of the season. At this time vegetation is withered; the pasture for the cavalry disappears; the earth, parched and hardened, cracks in several places, and pestilential effluvia spread with the exhalations drawn up from the dried pools by the burning sun. Upon the German troops, in particular, this malaria generally proved so fatal, that it cut off more than half their numbers in every campaign; and though upon the Russian constitution it was somewhat less destructive, yet it never failed to occasion greater ravages than the sword of the enemy. If these provinces were traversed by roads passable for wheel carriages, it would be an easy matter to reach the foot of the Balkan range from the Russian frontier while the plains are still healthy, and the yet green herbage afford ample pasturage for the horses; but the difficulty of dragging the artillery and wagons over several hundred miles of uncultivated plains, where there are no roads, and provisions are so scanty that the army must bring its whole supplies within itself, is such, that it is hardly possible to reach the northern face of the mountains before the great heats have commenced; and, when this is done, the strength of Schumla, and the courage of the inhabitants of the Balkan, have hitherto always arrested the invaders till the pestilential gales of autumn obliged them to retire. Thus, in its last stage of decrepitude, Turkey has derived safety from the effects of its own devastations; and, secure behind the desert which itself has made, has found that security in the desolation which it probably would not have done from the prosperity of its empire.†

The only artificial barrier, in a military point of view, which Turkey possessed on its northern frontier, was the line of the Danube, on which several fortresses stood, which, if the Ottomans had possessed the military skill of the French, would have rendered it as impervious as the Rhine to hostile invasion. Brahilow, Giurgevo, Silistria, Roudschouck, Hirsowa, and Widdin, besides several others of less note, constituted this formidable line of defence; and though their fortifications would not bear a comparison with the works of Vauban and Cohorn, yet, manned by Turkish garrisons, and defended by the dagger and the cimeter, they constituted a most effectual barrier. An invading army from the North found itself compelled to secure one or more of these barrier fortresses before it ventured to cross the Danube; the desperate defence of the janizaries and inhabitants prolonged, in almost every

instance, the siege for some months, and, meanwhile, the season of spring and the early part of summer had passed; the Mussulman proprietors had assembled in the great intrenched camp of Schumla; the Balkan, bristled with daring cavaliers; and the invading army, after it had effected with toil and bloodshed its conquest of the guardian fortress of the Danube, found itself doomed to traverse several hundred miles of open, waterless plains, teeming with pestilential exhalations, only to see its numbers melt in inglorious warfare at the foot of the great mountain barrier of Constantinople.*

War is the natural state between the Muscovites and the Turks: the intervals of peace are only truces. The slightest cause can at any time blow up the slumbering embers into a conflagration; and, if pretexts are wanting, the radical and paramount duty of destroying the infidel is a sufficient reason when it seems expedient for renewing hostilities. In the present instance, however, it was not the interest, as it certainly was not the wish, of the Turks, to continue hostilities, when they had been deserted by Napoleon after the conclusion of the treaty of Tilsit. They had been involved in the contest in consequence of the dispute about the appointment of the hospodars or governors of Wallachia and Moldavia, of which an account has already been given, and the impolitic invasion, by the Russian armies under General Michelson, in the autumn of 1806, on the eve of the war between Prussia and France,† and the still more injudicious and calamitous attack by the English on Egypt in the spring of 1807, which, without weakening their power, increased their irritation.‡ It has been already mentioned that the Turks, who at that period were weakened by the revolt both of the Pacha of Widdin, a strong place on the Danube, and Czerny George, the far-famed Pacha of Servia, who had succeeded in erecting an independent principality in that province, where he was at the head of fifty thousand men, were unable to withstand the invasion of forty thousand Russian troops on the plains of Moldavia and Wallachia; and that, accordingly, they abandoned entirely these provinces to the enemy, and prepared only to defend the line of the Danube, the fortresses of which they put in a good state of defence.§

War was formally declared by Russia against Turkey in January, 1807; and although the bold and well-conceived, but ill-executed expedition of Sir John Duckworth against Constantinople, had a powerful effect in rousing the Mohammedan spirit in the Empire, yet a tragical event which soon after ensued seemed again to prostrate its reviving strength, and expose it, all but defenceless, to the blows of its inveterate enemy. Sultan Selim, an amiable and well-informed young man, had become sensible of the inveterate weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and, like his more vigorous and undaunted successor, he conceived that the true remedy for these evils, and the only means of maintaining the independence of Turkey in the European commonwealth, was by gradually ingrafting on its inhabitants both the civil and military institutions of Christendom. These attempts, hazardous in some degree in all

* Malte Brun, vi., 232, 238.

† Val., 14, 34, 40. Jomini, Art. de la Guerre.

* Val., 48, 57. Jom., iii., 86, 387.

† Ante, ii., 506, 508.

‡ Ante, ii., 511.

§ Val., 42.

¶ Ante, ii., 508.

old-established countries, were in an especial manner to be dreaded in Turkey, from the political influence, as well as military power, of the numerous body of janizaries, who had contrived to engross almost all the official situations of consequence in the state. What in the first instance excited their jealousy was the corps of *Nizam-Genittes*, or new troops, who were disciplined in the European method, and lodged in the principal barracks of Constantinople. They were intended, as they were well aware, to form the nucleus of a military force adequate to curb, and perhaps in the end punish, their excesses. The intrusting the forts of the Bosphorus, the gates of the capital, to these young troops, in an especial manner excited their jealousy. Emissaries from the janizary corps, unknown to the sultan, mingled in their ranks; the powerful body of the ulemas, or priesthood, began to preach insurrection upon the ground of the sultan aiming at the overthrow of the fundamental institutions of the Koran and the Empire; and a wide-spread conspiracy was formed among the disaffected for the destruction of the reforming sultan and his confidential minister, Mahmoud.*

Mahmoud was the first victim. A well-concerted conspiracy among the guards of the forts of the Bosphorus, some of whom had been won over by the janizaries, proved fatal to that minister. He was assailed by some perfidious yamacks at the moment when he ordered them to put on the uniform of the new troops, which they had declared their willingness to do; and though the sultan's faithful guards rescued him from their hands, it was only to meet death on the Asiatic coast, at Buyukdere, when he disembarked from a boat into which he had thrown himself to escape from their fury. The yamacks now everywhere broke out into open insurrection; the janizaries favoured them; the castles of Europe and Asia, the guardians of the Dardanelles, fell into their hands. The ulemas declared against the sultan, upon the ground of his having attempted to subvert the fundamental institutions of religion; the heads of the principal persons in Constantinople were successively brought by the ferocious bands of assassins to the square of the Etmeidan, the headquarters of the insurgents; the sultan himself only purchased a momentary respite by delivering up to their fury the Bostange-Backy, who was particularly obnoxious; and the ferocious Cabakchy-Oglou, the chief of the rebellious yamacks, gained the entire command of the capital. After two days of bloodshed and confusion, which recalled the worst days of prætorian license, Selim was formally dethroned by the grand mufti, who announced to him in person his deposition. He was consigned to prison; at the entrance of which he met his nephew Mustapha, who was brought out thence to be placed on the throne, and whom he embraced in passing, wishing him prosperity, and commending his subjects to his care. Immediately the cannon of the castles announced the commencement of the reign of the new sultan; the foreign ambassadors all recognised his authority; the immense population of the city submitted, with acclamations, to his officers; and the unfortunate Selim, shut up in a dungeon, was soon as completely forgotten as if he had never existed.†

But although the revolution appeared to be thus completely successful in Constantinople, a greater degree of fidelity lingered in the breasts of the troops on the Danube, and the progress of events in the capital paved the way for a second revolution. Frivolous, sensual, and apathetic, the new Sultan Mustapha proved himself entirely unequal to the direction of the fearful tempest which had elevated him to the throne. Disunion soon broke out among the chiefs who had headed the revolt, whose common rapacity rendered them alike an object of horror to the people. The perfidious Carmican, who had been the main cause of Selim's overthrow, was seized, deposed, and his property confiscated; the ferocious Cabakchy became all-powerful, and substituted in his stead Tayar Pacha, formerly pacha of Trebizonde, who had been displaced by the former sultan. Tayar, however, soon showed himself not less tyrannical and rapacious than his predecessor. Prince Suzzo, the first dragoman of the Porte, was, by his orders, massacred at the gates of the seraglio, upon suspicion of having revealed to the ambassador of France the secret intention of the Divan to treat with England. Tayar's extortions roused the populace against him, who crowded around the gates of the seraglio demanding his head. His old ally, Cabakchy, yielded to the torrent, and proclaimed himself his enemy; and the tyrannical Carmican, abandoned by all, was glad to escape to Roudschouck, where Mustapha Barayctar, the commander of that place, was secretly collecting the disaffected, and fomenting a counter-revolution. The arrival of Tayar, and his imminent danger, determined their measures. Selecting a choice body of four thousand horse, followed by twelve thousand infantry, chiefly the new troops, who could be relied on, he crossed the Balkan to Adrianople; and, together, they marched to Constantinople, bearing with them the *Sandjak-cheriff*, or standard of Mohammed. Barayctar combated the rebels with their own weapons. Hadgy-Ali, fortified by a firman of the grand vizier, surrounded the house of Cabakchy in the night with troops, surprised him in the middle of his harem, and cut off his head, which he sent to Constantinople, May 21, 1808. Barayctar. The cries of the women of the harem having alarmed the neighbourhood, the yamacks assembled to arms: disregarding the firman of the grand signor, they attacked and overthrew the handful of troops with which Hadgy-Ali had destroyed Cabakchy, and shut them up in some houses, to which they set fire. The intrepid Ali, however, sallied forth sword in hand, cut his way through the besiegers, and threw himself into one of the castles of the Bosphorus, from whence, after being vainly besieged by the yamacks for three days, he made his way to the victorious army of the grand vizier, now at the gates of Constantinople.*

At the entrance of the capital, Barayctar made known his conditions to Sultan Mustapha, viz., that he should exile the grand mufti and disband the yamacks. Too happy to extricate himself from such a crisis by these concessions, the sultan agreed at once. Barayctar feigned entire satisfaction, and the deluded sovereign resumed with undiminished zest his favourite amusements. But the undaunted Pacha of Roud-

* Dumas, Pr. Hist., xix., 110, 111. Jom., ii., 430, 431.

† Dumas, xix., 113, 117. Jom., ii., 431, 432.

* Dumas, xix., 123, 126. Jom., iii., 382, 383

schouck had deeper designs in view. A few days after, learning that the grand signor had gone to pass the day with the ladies of his harem at one of his kiosks, or country residences, he put himself at the head of a chosen body of troops, and, as the grand vizier hesitated to accompany him, violently tore from his hands the seals of office, made himself master of the *Sandjak-cheriff*, and, preceded by that revered standard, marched to the seraglio to dethrone the reigning sultan, and restore the captive Selim. The outer gates of the palace flew open at the sight of the sacred ensign; but the bostangis at the inner gates opposed so firm a resistance, that time was afforded for the sultan to return by a back way, and regain his private apartments. Meanwhile, Barayctar's troops thundered at the gates, and loudly demanded that Selim should instantly be restored to them, and seated on the throne. To gain time, Mustapha's adherents feigned compliance; but, meanwhile, he himself gave orders that Selim should be strangled in prison. The order was immediately executed, and the dead body of the unhappy sultan thrown into the court to Barayctar's troops. Pierced to the heart, the faithful Barayctar threw himself on his master's remains, which he bedewed with his tears. In a transport of rage, he ordered the officers of the seraglio to be brought before him and instantly executed.* Sultan Mustapha was dethroned, and shut up in the same prison from which Selim had just been brought to execution; and his younger brother, MAHMOUD, the last of the royal and sacred race, put on the throne.

It might have been supposed that this bloody catastrophe would have terminated these frightful revolutions; but fortune was not yet weary of exhibiting on this dark stage the mutability of human affairs. Barayctar, as the just reward of his fidelity and courage, was created grand vizier, and for some months the machine of government went on smoothly and quietly; but it was soon discovered that Sultan Mahmoud was not less determined to reform the national institutions than Selim had been; that to this disposition he joined an inflexibility of character which rendered him incomparably more formidable; and that the great capacity of the grand vizier rendered it highly probable that their projects would soon be carried into complete execution. The jealousy of the janizaries was again awakened. A large portion of the army which had overthrown Sultan Mustapha had been withdrawn to make head against the Russians on the Danube, and the opportunity seemed favourable for again assailing the new order of things. The ulemas, the mufti, and the leaders of the disaffected, again organized an insurrection, and it broke out in the middle of November.

Notwithstanding all the precautions which Mahmoud and the grand vizier Barayctar could take, the party of the janizaries on this occasion proved victorious. A furious multitude of these haughty prætorians surrounded the noble barracks of the new troops, set fire to them, and consumed several hundreds in the conflagration, while another body directed their steps to the palace of the grand vizier, and a third to the seraglio itself. Four thousand chosen guards defended the sultan, and defeated all the efforts of the insurgents at that point; but the few faithful

defenders of the grand vizier were driven into his palace, to which the savage multitude immediately set fire; and the heroic Barayctar, to shorten his sufferings, himself set fire to a powder-magazine, which he had provided as a last resource against his enemies, and, with his whole household, was blown into the air. Indignant at these scenes of horror, Sultan Mahmoud gave orders for his troops to sally forth from the seraglio, and others from the adjoining forts of the Bosphorus to enter the town; and Constantinople immediately became the theatre of general bloodshed, massacre, and conflagration. The insurgents set fire to every quarter of which they obtained possession to augment the confusion; and men, women, and children perished alike by the sword or in the flames. At length, after forty-eight hours of continued combat and unceasing horror, the party of the janizaries prevailed: great part of the new troops perished by their hands; the remainder surrendered; and the sultan, who had previously strangled his rival Mustapha in prison, was compelled to purchase peace by the sacrifice of all his ministers who were bent on the new order of things. Yet even in these moments of victorious insurrection, the force of old attachment and long-established loyalty to the sacred race was apparent. Mahmoud, the last of the race of Othman, with which the existence of the Empire was thought to be wound up, became the object of veneration even to the rebels who had subverted his government;* and he reigned in safety, with despotic power, by the support of the very faction who would have consigned him to the dungeon, and probably the bowstring, had his imprisoned relative survived to be elevated to the throne.

In these sanguinary tumults, the great bulk of the people remained in a state of passive indifference, ready to submit implicitly to either of the factions which might prove victorious in the strife. The contest lay between the ulemas, the mufti, the janizaries on the one side, and the court and officers of state, with such of the new troops as they had organized, on the other. The multitude took no part in the combat till the insurgents roused their passions by the hope of plunder or the sight of conflagration. Like the Parisian populace, on occasion of the contests for power between the Club of Clichy and the bayonets of Augereau in 1797, or the grenadiers of Napoleon and the Council of the Five Hundred,† they submitted in silence to power which they could not resist, and avoided a contest in which they had no interest. Years of revolution had produced the same result in the metropolis of France which centuries of despotism had done in that of Turkey; and in the social conflicts which convulsed the state, fanaticism and tyranny in the East produced almost as great atrocities as infidelity and Democracy had done in the West of Europe.‡

These repeated convulsions at Constantinople proved highly injurious to the Ottoman cause in the field of diplomacy, because they gave Napoleon, as already noticed, a pretext at the treaty of Tilsit for holding out, as he did, that his engagements were with Sultan Selim; that he was under no obligation to keep faith

Passive indifference of the people during these disorders.

Napoleon's desertion of the Turks in the treaty of Tilsit.

* Dumas, xix., 194, 130. Jom., iii., 383, 384.

* Jom., iii., 383, 385. Ann. Reg., 1808, 238.

† *Ante*, i., 493, 577.

‡ Dumas, xix., 129

with the ferocious rabble who had overthrown his government, and consigned himself to a dungeon; and that the Turks had now proved themselves a mere horde of barbarians, who could no longer be tolerated in Europe. It was one of the conditions, accordingly, of the treaty of Tilsit, that France was to offer its mediation to effect an adjustment of the differences between Russia and the Sublime Porte; and that, in the event of the latter declining the terms arranged between Alexander and Napoleon, she was to be jointly attacked by them both. Russia was to be at entire liberty to annex Wallachia, Moldavia, and Bulgaria to her empire; while Macedonia, Thrace, Greece, and the islands of the Archipelago, were to be allotted to the French emperor, who immediately commenced inquiries and surveys as to his share in the partition.* By such shameful desertion of his ally did Napoleon requite the Turks for the fidelity with which they had stood by his side, when the British squadron under Sir J. Duckworth threatened Constantinople with destruction, and, if more energetically led, might have effected it.

Russia, however, had other and more pressing objects of ambition nearer home, which were also amply provided for by the treaty of Tilsit. The situation of her principal armies in the north of Poland pointed them out as immediately deserving of attention, and the conquerors of Eylau defied in great and irresistible strength through St. Petersburg, on their route for Finland. The prosecution of the war in that province, long the object of desire to the cabinet of St. Petersburg, which will immediately be considered, rendered the Russian government unwilling to engage in hostilities at the same time on the Danube; and the Turks, distracted by the cruel dissensions at Constantinople, were too happy to prolong a negotiation which might relieve them, during their agonies, from the Muscovite battalions. But the war in Finland having terminated, as might have been expected, by the annexation of that province to the Russian dominions, and peace having been concluded, as will immediately be detailed, with the court of Stockholm, the Czar turned his ambitious eyes to the Turkish dominions. Napoleon formally abandoned the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to the conquest of his powerful Northern ally; the army on the Danube was re-enforced by sixty battalions; and orders were sent to its commander, Prince Prozorowsky, to cross that river and carry the war with vigour into the heart of the Turkish territories.†

The Russians, however, were far from reaping that benefit from the distractions of the Ottoman Empire, and their own surpassing strength, which might have been anticipated. Prozorowsky, though an able general, was little acquainted with the very peculiar mode of war required in Turkish warfare, where the enemy's infantry throw themselves into fortresses, which they defend with desperate courage to the last extremity; and their horse, scouring in vast multitudes a desert and unhealthy country, disappear upon a reverse, and again assemble in undiminished strength if a farther advance by the enemy is attempted. His

force was very great—one hundred and twenty-five battalions, ninety-five squadrons, and ten thousand Cossacks, presented a total of eighty thousand infantry and twenty-five thousand horse, to which the Turks, severely weakened by their internal dissensions and the defection of Czerny George, who had declared for the Russians, had no force to oppose which was capable of keeping the field. They wisely, therefore, confined themselves to throwing strong garrisons into the fortresses on the Danube, and directed their principal forces against Serbia, where their undisciplined militia were more likely to meet with antagonists in the field over whom they had a chance of prevailing. This plan proved entirely successful. Sultan Mahmoud succeeded in rousing the military spirit of the Ottoman population in European Turkey; and eighty thousand Turks, to whom Czerny George could only oppose thirty thousand mountaineers, soon com- May, 1809.
pelled him to recede from Nizza, to which he had advanced, to retire with loss behind the Morava, and finally take refuge under the cannon of Belgrade. A corps of Russians now advanced from the north to the support of their Serbian allies, and in some degree changed the face of affairs. The Ottomans, on the side of Bosnia, which held out for the grand signor, were driven back into their own territories, but still their grand army kept July, 1809.
possession of the greater part of Serbia, and threatened Belgrade; and it was evident that, unless a powerful diversion was effected on the Lower Danube, the campaign would terminate entirely to the advantage of the Turks.*

Prozorowsky's first enterprise was against Giurgevo, near the mouth of the Danube; and, ignorant of the quality of the enemy with whom he had to deal, as well as misled by the suc- Checked successes on both sides. May 19, 1809.
cessful issue of the assault of Ismael and Ocza-kow in former days, he ventured to attempt to carry it by escalade. A bloody repulse, in which he lost two thousand men, taught him his mistake. Abandoning this presumptuous attempt, the Russian general next invested Brahi- June 6.
low, on the right bank of the river, and began to batter its walls with heavy cannon, though without going through the form of regular approaches. Deeming it practicable to carry the place by escalade before the walls were breached, an assault was attempted in that manner; but the steady valour and deadly aim of the Mussulmen who manned the ramparts again baffled all the efforts of the Muscovite June 14.
infantry, and they were repulsed with the loss of above seven thousand men. To conceal these disasters, the Russian general now merely converted the siege into a block- Aug. 2.
ade, crossed the Danube at Galacz, and openly proclaimed his resolution to carry the war to the foot of the Balkan. But this operation was not prosecuted with any activity; and the Turks, emboldened by their success at Giurgevo and Brahilow, ventured, under Aug. 4.
the grand vizier, to cross the Danube at the former of these towns, and began to ravage the plains of Moldavia. Meanwhile, Prozorowsky died, and he was succeeded in the command by Bagrathion, who, in order to draw back the Turks from their incursion on the northern bank of the river, immediately advanced against Silistria, the most important fortress on the whole

* Ante, ii., 545, where the clause of partition is quoted.
† Jom., iii., 385, 386. Val., 44, 45.

* Jom., ii., 388, 389. Val., 44, 45.

northern frontier. But the Turks having thrown fifteen thousand men into that stronghold, the Russian general did not deem himself in sufficient force to undertake the siege of a place of such strength so defended, and therefore confined himself to a simple blockade, in maintaining which his troops suffered most severely from the

unhealthiness of its environs in the autumnal months. The grand vizier, however, alarmed for a fortress of such importance, at length recrossed the Danube, and detached fifteen thousand men to beat up the enemy's quarters in its vicinity, in the end of October. Bagrathion advanced against this body, and an action, with no decisive result, ensued at

Nov. 3. Tartaritz, in which, however, it soon appeared that the Russians had been worsted; for Bagrathion immediately recrossed the Danube, and raised the blockade. Ismael, however, which Sept. 21. had been long blockaded, surrendered on the 21st of September; and Bagrathion, after so many reverses, succeeded in throwing a radiance over the conclusion of the campaign by the reduction of Brahamlow, which had been long invested on both banks of the river, and surrendered by capitulation, from want of provisions, in the end of November: thereby giving the Russians the great advantage of a solid fortress, which secured their passage of the Danube.*

The Swedish war in 1808, and the Austrian one of 1809, had operated as important diversions in favour of the Ottoman forces; but in the beginning of 1810, the cabinet of St. Petersburg resolved to carry on their operations with much greater vigour against the Turks, fearful lest the

present favourable opportunity afforded by the conclusion of the peace with Napoleon should glide away without its being turned to due advantage by the agreed-on conquests from the Ottomans. In the beginning of the

Jan. 21, 1810. year, accordingly, an imperial ukase appeared, formally annexing Moldavia and Wallachia, which for three years had been occupied by their troops, to the Russian Empire, and declaring the Danube, from the Austrian frontier to the sea, the southern European boundary of their mighty dominion. This decisive step was immediately followed up by the most extensive military preparations. The Muscovite army on the Danube was augmented to a hundred and ten thousand men, of whom thirty thousand were horse. Bagrathion, whose checkered success had been far from answering the expectations of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, was replaced by Kaminski,† a general learned, brave, and in the flower of his age, but by no means possessing experience in Turkish warfare adequate to the difficult task with which he was intrusted. Seeing himself at the head of so great a force, and desirous to signalize the commencement of his command by decisive success, he resolved to divide his troops into two parts; and while, with the left, he himself advanced by Hirsova to Schumla, the right was to lay siege to Silistria and Roudschouck, and the lesser fortresses on the Danube, so as to become master of the whole line of that important stream. The project was

well conceived, as it offered the important advantage of crossing the plains and barren hills between the Danube and the Balkan before the unhealthy heats commenced, and when the yet green herbage offered ample subsistence for the horses of the army; but it failed from not sufficiently estimating the desperate valour of the Turks in the defence of fortified places, which has so often rendered abortive the best-laid plans for the subversion of the Ottoman Empire.*

During the winter a sort of tacit armistice, attended by very singular effects, prevailed between the two armies. Great trade of the English up the Danube into Germany. Though the Russians were masters of many batteries on the left bank of the Danube, and, by their possession of Brahamlow, had the command of its principal mouth, yet, during the whole winter of 1809-10, they made no attempt to obstruct the navigation of that river; the Turkish and Austrian vessels continued to ply upon it as during a period of profound peace, and English goods to an enormous amount mounted the stream, paid duties to the Pacha of Widdin, and were carried through the Rothenbourg, on men's heads and horses' backs, into Hungary, and thence through the whole of Germany. The secret of this extraordinary traffic was to be found in the Continental system of Napoleon, then in full activity in Northern Europe, which had so immensely enhanced the price of all kinds of British merchandise, that the vast profits of the merchants who were fortunate enough to get any introduced, enabled them to bribe the authorities in all the different countries through which they passed, to wink at the transit of the goods, even in direct violation of the engagements of their respective sovereigns. Thus, at the very time that the French emperor flattered himself that, by the treaty of Tilsit, and the accession of the Russian autocrat to the Continental coalition, he had closed the last doors against the introduction of English manufactures to the Continent, the generals of the very power he had subdued were conniving at the system against which he had made such strenuous efforts, and found in their conquests the means of extending it: a striking proof of the extreme difficulty, even with the greatest power, of extinguishing that mutual intercourse which arises out of the wants, and grows with the happiness of mankind.†

The right of the Russians crossed the Danube, in the middle of March, at Casimir, First operations of the but it was not till the middle of May campaign of 1810. that the left wing of their army entered upon the campaign, and advanced to Bazarjik. Meanwhile, the grand vizier, Kora-Jussuf Pacha, already known by his defence of Acre against Napoleon,‡ had been indefatigable in his endeavours to accumulate and discipline a formidable force in the great intrenched camp of Schumla, and strengthen the numerous redoubts by which it is defended; but when the Russians approached, he cautiously kept his still ill-disciplined host within their ramparts. Ka- June 3. minski immediately laid siege to Bazarjik, which, after a short siege, and the capture of eight hundred of its garrison in an unfortunate sortie, was carried by assault in the beginning of June, with two thousand prisoners. The Russians, who were sixty thousand strong on

* Val., 45, 47. Jom., 389, 390.

† Son of the general of the same name, who commanded the Russians in the commencement of the Polish war in 1807, and went mad during the first retreat from the Vistula.—Ante, iii., 473.

* Jom., iii., 464, 465. Val., 64, 68.

† Ante, i., 523.

‡ Val., 66, 67.

the Lower Danube, finding no enemy to oppose them in the field, divided their forces; and while the main body, under Kaminski in person, advanced towards the Balkan, Langeron, with his corps, was despatched to besiege Silistria, and lesser bodies sent against Tourtoutkai and Rasgrad. Langeron proved entirely successful: in seven days after he appeared before its walls, Silistria, one of the strongest places on the Danube, surrendered by capitulation, though the sap was still one hundred and eighty yards from the ditch, on condition only of the garrison and inhabitants retiring where they chose; while Tourtoutkai and Rasgrad yielded, soon after, to the terrors of a bombardment. These successes, which proved that a golden key, or favourable conditions to the inhabitants, could sometimes be as effectual as an iron one, or force, in opening the Turkish gates, encouraged the commander-in-chief, without awaiting the issue of the operations of his right wing against Roudschouck, to advance towards Schumla; and he appeared, accordingly, with forty thousand men, in front of that celebrated stronghold, hitherto the *ne plus ultra* of Muscovite advance towards Constantinople, on the 22d of June.*

Schumla, which, in all the wars between Russia and Turkey, has been a place of the highest importance, is a considerable town, situated on the northern slope of the Balkan, where the great road from Belgrade and Bucharest to Constantinople first ascends the slopes of the mountains. To the traveller who approaches it from the open and desert hills extending southward from the Danube, it exhibits the appearance of a triangular sheet of vast extent spread over the hollow of the mountains, and extending up the heights on either side: not unlike the distant view of Algiers over the waves of the Mediterranean. Thirty thousand industrious inhabitants fill its streets with animation, and a clear torrent, descending through its centre, secures, both to them and the inmates of the intrenched camp, which extends far beyond their dwellings, an ample supply of the indispensable element of water. The town cannot be said to be regularly fortified, even though its position, at the point of intersection of the principal roads which cross the Balkan from north to south, renders it a strategical point of the very highest importance; and it is overhung, in rear, by a succession of eminences, which rise one above another, till they are lost in the woody thickets of Mount Hemus. But these heights, of difficult access, and covered with thick brushwood, are entirely inaccessible to European cavalry and artillery; the vast circuit of the intrenched camp renders it almost impossible to invest or blockade its circumference; supplies are thus introduced with ease from the rear; and though the redoubts consist only of a ditch and rampart of clay, and they are placed merely on the commanding points, leaving often a space, several hundred yards broad, open without any defence, yet, in the hands of the Turks and janizaries, they constituted a most efficient barrier. In 1744 these fieldworks had repulsed the utmost efforts of the Russians, under Marshal Romanzoff; and at this time, when they were garrisoned by Jussuf Pacha, the defender of Acre, with thirty thousand chosen troops, who had employed months in clearing

out and strengthening them, it seemed an undertaking beyond the strength even of Kaminski's army to effect their conquest.*

The Russian general commenced his operations on his own right, in order to turn the Turkish camp, and, establishing himself on the heights in its rear, interpose between the grand vizier and Constantinople. He succeeded in establishing a division on these rugged and wood-clad eminences; but the difficulty of dragging artillery up such broken ravines, and the danger of risking a large part of the army in a position where, if defeated, it would be deprived of a retreat to the Danube, deterred him from establishing himself in that important position. Several inconsiderable actions took place, particularly at the heights of the Grotto, in the rear of Schumla, and the Russians were entirely masters of the road from that town to Constantinople; but the investment was never complete: a large convoy of provisions was introduced into the Turkish camp soon after, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the besiegers; the desperate valour of the janizaries rendered the contest for every thicket or rocky eminence a scene of blood, in which the assailants generally lost more men than the enemy; the strength of the works in front, to the north of the town, precluded the hope of a successful assault; and, after several weeks spent in fruitless efforts, Kaminski was obliged to renounce his enterprise. To cover the disgrace of an open retreat, he left thirty thousand men, under his brother, to continue a distant blockade, and himself hastened, with twelve thousand choice troops, to co-operate in the siege of Roudschouck.†

This fortress, which became justly celebrated by the murderous assault which followed, is a Turkish town containing thirty thousand inhabitants, with a single rampart and wet ditch, but without either bastions, counterscarps, glacis, or outworks, like the other Turkish fortresses which have already been described. It did not possess more powerful means of defence than Braham, nor so much so as Silistria; but every defect was supplied by the resources of the governor, BOSNIAK AGA, a man of cool judgment and inviolable resolution, at the head of a garrison of seven thousand men, and whose example had roused the whole male population of the place capable of bearing arms, nearly as numerous, to the determination of unflinching resistance in defence of their hearths and their liberty. When Kaminski joined the besieging force, its number was raised to above twenty thousand men; and, as the rampart was in part ruined, though it could hardly be said that a practicable breach had been formed, an assault was ordered. Every effort was made to animate the soldiers: Kaminski himself, in full uniform, rode through the ranks, speaking to the men on the exploits of their regiments in former times, and animating their courage for the decisive assault which was approaching. The clergy joined in the efforts to animate the men; and the attack was ordered on the 3d of August, a day held in peculiar veneration in Russia, from being the fête-day of the empress-mother.‡

Bosniak Aga, from the time that the cannon

* Jom., iii., 465. Val., 68, 71.

* Malte Brun, vi., 238. Walsh, 158. Clark's Travels, viii., 241. Val., 49. † Jom., iii., 465, 466. Val., 77, 93. ‡ Val., 98, 101, Jom., iii., 466.

Dreadful of the besiegers had begun to rattle the de- against his walls, had not returned sault. Aug. 3. a shot; and from this circumstance, the younger Russian soldiers flattered themselves that very little resistance was to be anticipated, while the veterans feared, from long experience, that he was only reserving his whole strength for the decisive moment of assault. During the whole preceding night, a vehement fire was kept up from all the batteries, and at daybreak the troops advanced to the attack in five massy columns, one of which was charged with mounting the breach, while the others were to endeavour to effect a diversion by escalating the rampart in those situations where it was still uninjured. The troops advanced with their wonted steadiness to the assault, and soon reached the foot of the scarp; but it was soon found that the pacha's previous silence had neither arisen from terror nor inattention. From every roof, every window, and every loophole that could bear upon the assailants, a dreadful fire issued the moment that they came within range: the parapet and the *terre-pleine* were lined with undaunted Mussulmen, who opened a well-sustained discharge upon the enemy; and the troops, staggered by the severity of the fire, recoiled from the foot of the ditch, to exchange musket-shots with their visible and invisible antagonists. In vain the officers, tired with this fruitless butchery, leaped into the ditch, mounted the scaling-ladders, and reached the summit of the rampart: in that exposed situation they were speedily cut off by the Turkish cimeters; and two columns, which the besieged permitted to enter, were almost entirely destroyed by the dreadful attack of the janizaries, armed with their daggers and sabres.* At noon the Turkish flag still waved on all the minarets, and it was not till six at night that the commander-in-chief reluctantly sounded a retreat, leaving eight thousand killed and wounded in the ditch and around the walls, of whom four thousand were immediately decapitated by their valiant, but, in this respect, ruthless enemies.†

This dreadful repulse wellnigh prostrated the strength of the besiegers, and necessarily disabled them from attempting anything beyond an ineffectual blockade; and, if the grand vizier at Schumla had taken advantage of it to sally forth with all his forces and harass the enemy, the result, probably, would have been, that the Russians, at all points, would have been driven across the Danube. But, with true Turkish apathy, he remained quiet where he was, without attempting anything serious, and thus Kaminski gained a precious breathing-time to repair his disasters. A sally, a few days afterward, by the grand vizier, near Schumla, was repulsed with the loss of three thousand men, though the victory was far from being bloodless to the Russians, who lost above half that number, and they soon afterward raised the investment of Schumla, and retired to Bazarjik and the Danube; while Kaminski, from numerical weakness, was obliged

to abandon the island in the Danube which he had occupied opposite Roudschouck, which was immediately occupied by the besieged, who destroyed the works erected there, so that their communication with the country was in a great degree restored. Nevertheless, the Russians, with great perseverance, still kept their ground before the fortress, on the north bank of the Danube, and an opportunity soon occurred of striking an important blow.*

The Divan ordered the Seraskier of Sophia, a considerable potentate in European Turkey, to assemble a force for the deliverance of Roudschouck, the pacha of which was now making the most vehement representations of his inability to continue the defence much longer if he was not relieved;† and for this purpose he assembled a body of thirty thousand men on the River Jantra, at the distance of about forty miles from the fortress. Sensible, however, that his troops, which were for the most part mere undisciplined militia, would be wholly unable to withstand the Russian army in the open field, he took post on the river near BATTIN, and, after the Turkish fashion, immediately proceeded to fortify his camp. Its situation was well selected, being a half-deserted plain at the confluence of the Jantra and the Danube, with a few fruit-trees scattered over its surface, and watered on two sides by those ample streams. When seen from a distance, this surface appeared level, but on a nearer approach it was discovered to be intersected by several rocky ravines. Two of these fissures, which were impassable even for foot-soldiers, fortified the sides of the camp, which rested on the Danube near the confluence of the two rivers in rear, while the neck of land which lay between them, and by which alone access could be obtained to its interior, strengthened by two redoubts, was covered, in the interval between them, with thick bushes and underwood, where the janizary light infantry would have a decided superiority over the Russian tirailleurs, and through which it would be difficult for the latter to bring up their numerous artillery to counterbalance this disadvantage. Nevertheless, Kaminski, desirous to wipe off the disgrace of the repulse at Roudschouck, and fearful of the approach of Ali Pacha, the far-famed ruler of Albania, who, with his hardy mountaineers, was slowly approaching, at the summons of the grand signor, to co-operate in the operations, resolved to hazard an attack.‡

For this purpose, having previously strengthened the besieging force before Roudschouck with half of the forces which had been withdrawn from Schumla, and detached General Kulneff with a division of six thousand men to reconnoitre the Turkish camp, and prevent them from foraging beyond its limits, the general-in-chief set out from the environs of Roudschouck with twelve thousand men, and, following the right bank of the river, appeared in front of the Turkish intrenchments. They appeared to be so strong, that, notwithstanding the Russian superiority, especially in artillery, of which they had a hundred pieces, it was deemed

Operations of the Seraskier of Sophia for the raising of the siege.

Kaminski's plan of attack on the Turkish camp. August 27

* A circumstance characteristic of the Russian armies at this period occurred at this assault. Many soldiers, under pretence of being wounded, as usual in similar cases, strayed from the scene of danger, and got into the rear; Kaminski caused them all to be examined, and such as were unhurt were sent back to their posts with strokes of the whip. This laborious operation consumed a considerable time, which might have been more profitably employed in pushing forward the assault.—VALENTINI, 104.

† Val., 101, 103. Jom., iii., 466.

* Jom., iii., 466. Val., 102, 107.

† "We have almost lost our eyesight in straining to see the columns approaching to deliver us. Our loss already amounts to six thousand men, and we have only provisions for ten days."—Boniak *Agé to the Grand Vizier*, August 12, 1810. VALENTINI, 107.

‡ Val., 110, 115. Jom., iii., 467.

impracticable to hazard an attack in front, at least unless strongly supported by simultaneous operations on either flank. The enemy, it was soon discovered, had two intrenched camps, the works of which mutually supported each other, and their guns were so disposed as completely to command in rear the navigation of the Danube, on which they also had a powerful flotilla destined for the relief of Roudschouck. The only practicable way of reaching them that remained was by an attack in flank, near the village of Batin, where the ravine, though steep and rugged, was practicable for foot-soldiers; while as heavy a fire as possible was opened on the intrenched camp in front nearest the isthmus, from an eminence which had been with great judgment seized and strengthened by the Cossacks. Meanwhile, strong re-enforcements were ordered up, under Woinoff, from Silistria; and, as a strong recon-

noise, under Kulneff, on the front of the enemy's position, with the troops in square, had led to no advantage, and was attended with considerable loss, Kaminski made every effort to collect troops from all quarters; and

Woinoff having at length come up with five thousand men, the grand attack was fixed for the 7th of September.*

The battle commenced at daybreak: Kaminski himself, at the head of the whole cavalry, advanced to within cannon-shot of the principal camp, while another column of infantry moved up in squares to the front of the lesser one, and Kulneff, with the left, was despatched to the other side of the ravine, which formed the western defence of the Turkish position; but the latter general did not arrive at the point of attack assigned to him till considerably after the time calculated on, which led to the discomfiture of the Russians on the first day. Kaminski himself, with the centre, stormed the principal heights which commanded one of the intrenched camps, though with great loss, and put all the Turks who defended them to the sword; but Kulneff failed in his attack on the left from the side of the ravine, and, though one of his columns succeeded in penetrating into the camp, yet it was immediately cut to pieces by the Turkish cimizers; while on the right the brave Ilowolski, who conducted the assault on the other intrenched camp, was mortally wounded on the edge of the ditch, and the bravest of his followers who crossed it left their heads in the hands of the Turks, who fought like desperadoes. Thus the attack having failed on both flanks, though a most important advantage had been gained in the centre, Kaminski desisted from farther attempts for the night; merely retaining the important heights which he himself had won, and concentrated his troops as much as possible in that quarter, while Kulneff got under shelter in the bottom of the rocky ravine which he had crossed.†

The Turkish camps were now completely surrounded by the Muscovite troops, and many of the imperial generals, seeing the desperate manner in which they had been defended on the preceding day, strongly recommended the general-in-chief to make a bridge of gold for a retreating enemy, and withdraw Kulneff's divisions from the ravine during the night, so as to leave them a retreat up the course of the Danube. The Turks, also, elated by their success, gave way to every dem-

onstration of joy; and, in sight of both armies, went through the barbarous operation, on the top of their intrenchments, of decapitating the Russians who had been left on the field.* But Kaminski was resolute: orders were given to renew the attack at daybreak, the principal effort being directed against the gorge of the camps, where the works, owing to the natural strength of the ravines in their rear, were least formidable. Kulneff, who had had a violent altercation with the general-in-chief, was put under arrest, and the command of his troops devolved to Sabanejef, and the whole artillery brought to bear on the enemy's camp: that on Kaminski's heights firing down from above, that of Kulneff being pointed up from the ravine below, so as to throw his howitzers upward into the intrenchments.†

The attack of Sabanejef proved entirely successful: after encountering a vigorous opposition, his troops, gallantly led by their general, made their way into the camp to which he was opposed; but the Turks, seeing their position no longer tenable, adopted and bravely executed a most extraordinary resolution. Suddenly assembling the whole of his cavalry and the bravest of his infantry, Muktar Pacha, abandoning his camp and all its contents, poured up by one of the gates like a torrent, and, making straight across the plateau, sought the shelter of the ravine on the right, which was not occupied by the Russians in any force. This unlooked-for deluge had wellnigh swept away Kaminski himself, who was moving at the time from the left to the centre, in order to direct an attack on the front of the camp. For a considerable time this singular evacuation remained unknown to the Russian centre, who, seeing the standards of Mohammed still floating on the intrenchments, and a multitude of foot-soldiers on the rampart firing vehemently, and shouting "Allah!" deemed the tumult owing only to a partial sally from the works. But at length they, too, left the rampart: its fire gradually died away; the standards alone remained on the summit; and the fact becoming known, the Russians on all sides poured with loud shouts into the enclosure, and with savage revenge, excited by the Turkish cruelty to the prisoners, put all they still found within to the sword. The guns on the intrenchments were instantly turned against the flying swarms of Ottomans, and the Russian cavalry quickly pursuing, came up even with their horse, and did considerable mischief. But the decisive trophies of the victory were the principal camp of the Ottomans, with fourteen guns and two hundred standards, the whole flotilla which lay in the Danube, laden with provisions and ammunition for the relief of Roudschouck, and five thousand men, whom the lesser camp were obliged to surrender as prisoners of war, with Achmet Pacha, the second in command. The brave seraskier had died the same day of his wounds.‡

The immediate consequence of this great victory was the capture of Sistowa, a fortified place on the Danube, the neighbourhood, which surrendered a few days afterward, with the whole Turkish flotilla which had taken refuge under its

* The Prince de Ligne observed, on this practice of the Turks to cut off the heads of the wounded or prisoners, that it was "more formidable in appearance than reality; for it could do no harm to the dead, it was often a relief to the wounded, and that it was rather an advantage to the unhurt, as it left them no chance of escape but in victory."—VALENTINI, 69.

† Val., 129, 133. Jom., iii., 467.

‡ Val., 129

* Val., 115, 125.

† Val., 124, 127.

alls. Meanwhile, Count Langeron, with the troops now considerably re-enforced at Roudschouck, was pressing the siege of that fortress with the utmost possible activity, and had made himself master of the island in the Danube, which forms the point of communication between it and the fortress of Giurgevo, situated on the opposite bank. Seeing the commander of the latter place, which was the weaker of the two, thus separated from his colleague, Langeron summoned him to surrender; but the reply was in the true laconic style: "Giurgevo is not yet swimming in its blood." Bosniak Aga, however, seeing the flotilla on which his whole hopes of relief were fixed, captured, became sensible of the necessity of coming to terms of accommodation; but the conqueror of Battin, elated with his recent success, and the effects of a similar severity to Achmet Pacha, refused any terms but those of absolute surrender, upon which, the proud Turk declared he would die in the breach first. The intelligence, however, which the Russian general received, shortly after, of the elevation of Bernadotte to the rank of crown-prince and heir-apparent of Sweden, coupled with accounts of the sacred standard having been unfurled at Constantinople, induced him to relax from this ill-timed rigour; and by the intervention of Count Langeron, a capitulation was at length agreed on, in the end of September.

Sept. 26. In virtue of which the pacha was permitted to retire with his whole troops and inhabitants, leaving only the walls, cannon, standards, and military stores to the Russians. These conditions, the fair reward of his heroic defence, were so favourable, that Bosniak Aga would probably have willingly acceded to them in the beginning of the siege; and the Pacha of

Sept. 28. Giurgevo immediately after capitulated on the same favourable terms.*

Though the Russians had thus made themselves masters of these important strongholds on the Danube, yet the obstinate resistance of Bosniak Aga had entirely ruined their designs for the campaign. The rainy season had now set in; the evacuation of Roudschouck, which the Turks prolonged as much as possible, took nearly a month; Kaminski did not consider it safe to undertake any other enterprise till he was finally delivered of his formidable antagonist; and even when the Russians were put entirely in possession of the fortress in the end of October, they got nothing but half-ruined walls and a deserted town, tenanted only by five hundred of the lowest of the people; while the long trains conveying the garrison and inhabitants, the real strength of Roudschouck, to the southward, formed an army in the field little less formidable than it had been behind its bloodstained ramparts. A deplorable catastrophe, characteristic of the envenomed character of these semi-religious wars, took place at the same period. Kaminski, disquieted at the prolonged resistance of Roudschouck, and the intelligence of great armaments at Constantinople, despatched orders to General St. Priest, in command at Sistowa, to destroy that town, and bring all his forces to the main army. These orders, dictated in a moment of groundless alarm, were too faithfully executed: Sistowa was reduced to a heap of ruins; its inhabitants, twenty thousand in number, transported to the opposite side of the Dan-

ube, where they were sheltered from the drenching rains in huts newly constructed; great flocks of wild pigeons settled in the ruins of this once flourishing town; and its smiling environs, composed of vine-clad hills, intermingled with roses, were soon choked by weeds, and tenanted only by the wild foxes from the neighbouring solitudes.*†

It was necessary, however, to do something to give eclat to the conclusion of the campaign; and for this reason, the siege of Nicopolis was undertaken; October 29.

a considerable town on the southern bank of the Danube, though not so flourishing as Sistowa had been. Kaminski, accordingly, sat down before it with thirty thousand men, while the indefatigable Bosniak Aga approached Tirnova with seventeen thousand who had followed his standard from Roudschouck, and soon formed the basis of a respectable army. The commander of that place, however, shut his gates against such formidable guests; and Bosniak at length found refuge in Plewne, while the Pacha of Giurgevo was received in Tirnova. Mean-

Dec. 12. while, Nicopolis capitulated, and the Russians recrossed the Danube, and took up their winter-quarters for the most part in Wallachia and Moldavia, leaving three divisions only on the right bank at Nicopolis, Roudschouck, and Silistria. Soon after, the cabinet of St. Petersburg, worn out with this endless war of sieges, in which they frequently combated at a disadvantage, and foreseeing a formidable struggle nearer home, where they would need all their strength, sent orders to Kaminski to destroy all the fortified places on the right bank of the Danube, with the exception of Roudschouck, which was to be retained only as a *tête-à-pont*. In pursuance of these directions, the walls of Silistria and Nicopolis were blown up, and Roudschouck put in a respectable posture of defence; but before any offensive operations could be commenced, Kaminski was seized with the malady of which he soon after died; and he was succeeded by an officer destined to immortal celebrity in a more glorious war—GENERAL KUTTSOFF.‡

The campaign of 1811, however, of necessity was laid out upon a defensive plan merely; for, although the Russian army had been re-enforced in the early part of the winter by a strong division under General Suwarow, son of the great marshal of the same name, in consequence of which, Kaminski, before his illness rendered him unfit for service, had made a vigorous winter march against Loweza, which was surprised and taken, with four thousand men, in the depth of winter; yet, immediately afterward, the relations between the cabinet of St. Petersburg and that of the Tulleries became so menacing, that the Emperor

Great draught of troops from the Danube to Poland. January 19.

Feb., 1811.

* Val., 139, 142. *Jom.*, 467.

† A singular proof of the extraordinary fertility of the soil, and its adaptation for the cultivation of the vine, occurred at Roudschouck at this period. The whole slopes in its vicinity are covered with vines, which grow in that district with such luxuriance, that, though the besieging army had feasted on them for some weeks before the armistice began, yet the inhabitants there, during its continuance, reaped a very fair crop from their gardens. The combined efforts of two armies were unable to consume the profuse fruit of a few miles square. The vine, which is there indigenous, grows with such tenacity on the slopes, that it is hardly possible, by any efforts of cultivation, to extirpate it.—VALENTINI, 47.

‡ *Jom.*, iii., 467. *Val.*, 141, 151.

* *Jom.*, iii., 467. *Val.*, 135, 139.

Alexander gave orders for five divisions of the army to break up from their winter-quarters on the Danube, and direct their march, not towards the Balkan and Constantinople, but to Poland and the Vistula. This great deduction at once reduced the Russians to one half of their former amount; and with fifty thousand men merely, it was not only impossible for Kutusoff to prosecute offensive operations to the south of the Danube, but difficult for him even to maintain his footing on the south of that river in the few strongholds of which they still retained possession. Encouraged by this great diminution in the strength of their enemies, and thoroughly roused by the dangers they had incurred in the preceding campaign, the Turkish government made the most vigorous efforts for the prosecution of the war, and not only put themselves at all points into a good posture of defence, but prepared to take advantage of the weakness of their enemies, and regain all the strongholds which they had lost on the right bank of the Danube. Achmet Pacha, who had gained such renown at the assault of Brahamlow, commanded the main army, which numbered sixty thousand combatants, with seventy-eight pieces of artillery admirably equipped; he advanced, in the middle of June, towards Roudschouck at the head of this imposing force, while, at the same time, a corps of twenty thousand men was detached to the left, towards Widdin, to keep in check Czerny George and the Servians, and nearly the same number to the right, to observe Silistria, Nicopolis, and Tourtoukai, and occupy any of these places which might be evacuated by the enemy.*

It affords a strong proof of the native vigour which, despite the innumerable errors of their political institutions, animated the Turkish Empire, that they were capable, in the third year of the war, and without any external aid, of putting forth such formidable forces. Their approach immediately made Kutusoff concentrate his troops, July 2. and he himself crossed the Danube, and took post with eighteen thousand men in front of Roudschouck. As the superiority of the enemy, especially in cavalry, was so great, the Russian general remained on the defensive, and awaited their approach in the regular squares, which had so often dissipated the innumerable hordes of the Osmanli horse. The attack of the Ottomans was made in their usual manner—charging with loud shouts these squares on three sides at once; but in the tumult of the onset, and when the infantry were in a manner encircled by their enemies, the discernment of the grand vizier had prepared a separate corps, which was to penetrate into the town. This able plan all but succeeded. The Turkish guns, admirably directed, ploughed through the Russian squares, while the spahis, in every quarter, threw themselves upon them with impetuosity over the whole position. The squares on the right, where they had the advantage of having one flank secured by the precipitous banks of the River Lomin, withstood the shock; but the centre suffered severely from the cannonade of the Turkish batteries, and the left was wellnigh swept away by the torrent of their incomparable horse. Kutusoff brought up his cavalry to keep at a distance the increasing squadrons of the spahis, but then was seen how inadequate the European is to the encounter of the Asiatic horse. In a mo-

ment the advancing mass of the Muscovites and Cossacks was charged in flank, pierced through, and overthrown. Four regiments were almost destroyed; and the Ottoman horsemen, deeming the victory won, dashed through the intervals of the squares with deafening cries, disregarding the fire which assailed them on either flank, and penetrated in the rear even as far as the gardens of the town. All seemed lost; and, if the grand vizier had had infantry at hand to support his cavalry, it would have been so. But the gallant horsemen, having no aid from foot-soldiers, were unable to establish themselves in the fortress: the grapeshot from the ramparts shook their ranks, and they were compelled to retreat through the steady squares, who stood immovable as if rooted to the ground, and again poured in a deadly volley on either side of their now diminished squadrons. This completed the discomfiture of the Turks, who took refuge in their intrenched camp; but although Kutusoff, seeing the field deserted, advanced to the front of its rampart, he did not venture to storm the works, and soon after withdrew within the walls of Roudschouck, with the loss of three thousand men, the Turks being weakened by at least an equal number.*

Though this memorable battle was highly honourable to the discipline and intrepidity of the Russians, considering the great numerical superiority of their enemies, and the admirable quality of their cavalry, yet it convinced Kutusoff of the impossibility of maintaining his footing on the right bank of the Danube. The extensive works of Roudschouck required a garrison of at least ten thousand men—nearly half the disposable force of which he had the command. He wisely resolved, therefore, to prefer a campaign in the field, where the discipline of his troops might give them the advantage, to the murderous contest behind walls, where the Turks were so formidable; and, abandoning to his antagonist the object of so much bloodshed, withdrew from Roudschouck after barbarously burning the town, and crossed over entirely to the left bank of the river. Bosniak Aga, amid the pomp of Oriental power and the clang of military instruments, again took possession of the ramparts which he had so nobly defended; the fugitive inhabitants of the fortress returned in joyful crowds to their much-loved and long-deserted homes; the standards of Mohammed were again displayed from the battlements; the beautiful vineyards in the environs were cleared out and dressed by the hands of their owners; and, contrary to the order of things for above a century, the Crescent appeared triumphant over the Cross.†

Overjoyed at this great success, the grand vizier determined to cross the Danube, and expel the Russians from all the Turkish territory which they held in Wallachia and Moldavia. After six weeks spent in repairing the fortifications of Roudschouck, and collecting forces on all sides, the passage was effected in the night of the 8th of September: the grand vizier having, with great skill, drawn the attention of their antagonists to a feigned point of passage, whereby the real one was overlooked. No sooner, however, was the passage discovered, than the Russians, under Boulatoff, who were nearest at hand, commenced an assault on the Ottomans;

Evacuation of Roudschouck by the Russians.

The Turks cross the Danube.

Sept. 8.

* Jom., iii., 542. Val., 150, 152.

* Jom., iii., 543. Val., 152, 155.

† Val., 150, 158. Jom., iii., 543.

but the latter, with great skill, had already thrown up some rude works: the thick brushwood with which they were surrounded prevented the advance of the Muscovites in masses; the Ottomans maintained their wonted superiority in bush-fighting; batteries, erected on some heights on the right bank, spread death through the Russian ranks, and under cover of their fire the passage was continued with such vigour, that, by noon, six thousand men, almost all janizaries, and six pieces of cannon, were established on the left bank. Boulatoff, however, was not to be discouraged: having received reinforcements, which raised his force to eight thousand men, he hazarded a third assault, but with no better success; and, after losing two thousand of his best troops in this murderous contest, besides a gun and a standard, the Russians retired, and the Turks, with deafening shouts and sabre in hand, sallied out of their intrenchments, and cut off the heads of the slain and unfortunate wounded.*

General Sabinejev, during these events, had succeeded in forcing his way through the brushwood, and established a battery within half cannon-shot of the Turkish intrenchment on the left bank, which effectually cut off all communication between it and the remainder of the army on the right; but Kutusoff ordered this advanced position to be abandoned in the night; and issuing orders, in all directions, to concentrate around the outside of the intrenchment, brought up his flotilla to cannonade the enemy on the northern shore. But it was too late for success in this way: the enemy were now solidly established on the left bank; the flotilla was so roughly handled by the Turkish artillery, that one of its number sunk in the river; the passage of troops continued incessantly, and by the 18th, thirty thousand men, with fifty pieces of cannon, were established on the left bank in a large intrenched camp, with redoubts at its angles; while an equal force on the right, under the grand vizier in person, had established a sort of city, in which his tent was conspicuous, decked out with unusual splendour. At this period, the Russians around the intrenchments were so weak, that, if Achmet Pacha had fallen vigorously on his opponents, he would probably have gained such decisive success as would have restored Wallachia and Moldavia to the Ottoman arms. But the precious time, big with such portentous events, was consumed in erecting intrenchments around the troops which had passed over; and, in the mean time, two strong divisions of infantry and a large body of Cossacks came up, which raised the Russian force to thirty-five thousand men. Kutusoff now resolved to take advantage of the exposed situation of the enemy, and, if possible, by cutting off the communication of those passed over to the right, compel them to surrender. He allowed the Turks, accordingly, after severe fighting, to extend their camp, and even erect a redoubt a mile in advance of its former limits; but while his troops were lost in astonishment at the supineness of their general, he was preparing, with the secrecy and finesse peculiar to his character, the means of involving the enemy in a signal calamity.†

* Val., 159, 160. Jom., iii., 543.
† Jom., iii., 543. Val., 161, 165.

gradually pushed his troops forward, covering themselves with intrenchments and redoubts as they advanced, till he got possession of the village of Malka, about two miles farther on, where there were considerable magazines, which he meant also to fortify, and thereby acquire a solid footing on the northern bank. To defeat this project, the Russian general, on the night of the 29th, erected four large redoubts in an exterior circle around the Ottoman camp, and these were soon succeeded by eight more. Alarmed at the progress of this line of circumvallation, which, in the form of a semicircle, enclosed their camp with both ends resting on the Danube, the Turks, after several bloody combats, erected a new redoubt near the river, to cover their communication with the southern shore; but the Russians stormed it before the works were finished, and put the garrison, consisting of four hundred Albanians, to the sword. A sally of the Ottomans, immediately made to regain this important post, was repulsed with the loss of above fifteen hundred men. After this severe check, the Turks remained quietly within their intrenchments, while the Russian general erected a ninth redoubt on his extreme right near the Danube, which completed the investiture of the Turkish camp, and considerably straitened their communications with the opposite bank of the river.*

As long, however, as the Ottomans had a communication of any sort open with the other side, it was impossible that they could be reduced to any serious difficulties for want of provisions, and Kutusoff was therefore tempted to hazard an expedition to the other bank, in order, if possible, to dislodge the enemy from the ground on the opposite side, from whence the grand vizier's camp was supplied with food and re-enforcements. This important operation was intrusted to General Markoff, who, with ten thousand men, set out from the Russian camp after dark on the night of the 10th of October, and succeeded, early the next morning, in throwing his light troops and Cossacks across. The flotilla, which had been ordered to the point in order to transport across the main body, could not get down, from the violence of the current; in consequence of which their passage was delayed for twenty-eight hours, and was not effected till the morning of the 13th. During this time the greatest anxiety prevailed at headquarters, where very scanty information of their proceedings had been received; but, strange to say, though the point where the Russians had been disembarked on the right bank was not above six miles from the Ottoman camp there, it remained entirely unknown to its generals. Kutusoff's disquietude, however, was at length dissipated. Markoff having got over ten battalions and five hundred horse, proceeded instantly to the attack of the Turkish camp on the right bank, leaving the remainder to continue their passage. The surprise was complete: the Turks, never dreaming of being assailed on their own side, made scarcely any resistance; the civil functionaries of the grand vizier, the merchants and traders who thronged the encampment, took to flight in the utmost consternation, and, not deeming themselves in safety at Roudschouck, which had been

Kutusoff's measures to circumvent the enemy.

Sept. 29.

Oct. 3.

Oct. 4.

Surprise and total defeat of the Turks on the right bank.

Oct. 10.

Oct. 13.

stripped of nearly all its heavy artillery for the use of the camp, took the road for Rasgrad and Schumla. The magnificent tents of the grand vizier, the whole baggage and stores of the army, an immense number of horses, camels, and carriages, and prodigious booty, fell into the hands of the victors, who did not lose eight men in this felicitous attack. Markoff, however, without casting a thought on the booty, seized the Turkish batteries, which he turned against the enemy on the other side, where the remainder of the Russian army were drawn up in battle array, witnesses of his triumph; and, while eighty pieces of cannon thundered against the Ottoman camp, demanded with loud cries to be led to the assault.*

Had Kutusoff possessed the daring of Alexander or Cæsar, he would have taken advantage of the enthusiasm of the moment and the consternation of the enemy, and instantly led his troops to the attack of the intrenched camp on the left bank; and there can be little doubt that, if this had been done, it would have been carried, and the whole Turkish army destroyed. But his genius was essentially cautious, and he never would owe to hazard what he hoped to gain by combination. Repressing, therefore, the ardour of his troops, he contented himself with a furious cannonade; and, meanwhile, the grand vizier himself, who was on the right bank, escaped in a boat to Roudschouck, after in vain proposing an armistice with a view to negotiations for peace. Pacha Tschappau-Oglou, son of one of the richest princes of Asia Minor, then took the command, and, by his firmness and resources in the most trying circumstances, extorted the admiration even of his enemies. The circumstances of the Turks were wholly desperate. The Russian artillery, now augmented to two hundred pieces of cannon, on the opposite sides of the Danube, kept up an incessant fire upon them night and day; a strong flotilla, both above and below, precluded all access or escape by water; a formidable semicircle of redoubts, with batteries in their interstices, enclosed them on the land side; their provisions were soon exhausted; forage there was none for their horses; their tents were burned for fuel; and the troops, during the damp nights of autumn, lay on the open ground, exposed to the ceaseless tempest of shot. Yet all these accumulated horrors could not shake the firm mind of the Turkish general. He repeatedly refused the most advantageous offers of capitulation; and, after having consumed his last horses, he was forming the audacious project of cutting his way by a sudden irruption through the Russian left, and intrenching himself opposite to Roudschouck, and under the shelter of its guns, when a convention concluded at Giurgevo, Oct. 28. in the end of October, with a view to a peace between the two powers, put an end to the miseries, and saved the honour, of these brave men.†

It was stipulated that they should be fed from the Russian magazines till their fate was finally determined by the plenipotentiaries of the two powers, then assembled at Giurgevo—a condition which was faithfully performed; and on the 4th of December they finally quitted their camp, in virtue of a convention by which they were to evacuate it, without their arms or cannon, and be quartered in the villages in the neighbourhood

of Bucharest, on condition of having them restored only if peace was concluded. The Russians immediately entered their bloodstained Dec. 3. intrenchments, the object of such desperate strife, and their interior told how dreadful had been the sufferings of their heroic defenders. The ground was strewn with the dead bodies of men and horses, which the survivors had not possessed sufficient strength to inter; limbs struck off by the cannon-shot, broken arms, overturned gun-carriages, and putrid corpses, lay on all sides; the earth even was ploughed up in many places by the shot; but the survivors, though pale and emaciated, still preserved their calm and resolute air. Five thousand, amid the respect of their enemies, delivered up their arms, with fifty-one guns; above twelve thousand had perished, by disease or the sword, since the cannonade commenced.*

This concluded the operations of the campaign, and put an end to this bloody Conclusion of the campaign in Little Wallachia. war, in which both parties had made prodigious efforts, and neither had gained decisive success. In Little Wallachia, Ismael Bey had invaded the Russian side of the river with thirty thousand men; and General Sass, who commanded in that quarter with very inferior forces, was at one period so hard pressed, that Kutusoff, in the middle Sept. 16. of September, sent him orders to evacuate the province entirely, and join him in his camp before the grand vizier; but that general, with admirable skill, maintained his ground, defeated the enemy in several partial encounters, and at length compelled him to retire back to the right bank about the same time that the great disaster befell the army of the grand vizier in the neighbourhood of Roudschouck.†

Negotiations in good earnest were carried on for peace, for both parties were sincerely desirous of an accommodation. Peace of Bucharest. May 28, 1812. The Russians, well aware of the formidable contest which was impending over them with Napoleon, were anxious, at any price, to terminate the hostilities on the Danube, and bring Kutusoff's force to the assistance of the grand armies on the Niemen. At first sight, it might have been supposed that, what it was so much the interest of the Russians to obtain, it could not be for the advantage of the Turks to concede; but in this instance it was otherwise, and the good sense of the Turks triumphed over all the efforts which the French ambassador, Latour Maubourg, made to retain them in hostilities with Russia. By a singular, but just retribution, all the powers whose ambassadors or envoys assisted at these conferences, were either threatened by, or had been offered a share of, Napoleon's spoliations; and their concurring testimony removed all doubt from the minds of the Turkish ministers as to the imminent danger to which they would be exposed if Napoleon should obtain the same supremacy in Western which he had long enjoyed in Eastern Europe. The English made them acquainted with the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, already mentioned; whereby, in consideration of the fidelity with which they had adhered to his fortunes during the war in Poland, and through the disasters of Eylau, the French emperor had not only agreed to the entire partition of their European dominions, Constantinople and Roumelia alone

* Val., 169, 173. Jom., iii., 543, 544.

† Jom., iii., 544. Val., 173, 175.

* Val., 175, 176.

† Val., 176, 177. Jom., iii., 544.

‡ Ante, ii., 545.

excepted, but had actually stipulated the largest shares, viz., Greece, the islands of the Archipelago, Albania, and Macedonia, to himself. Russia, a party to that scheme of plunder, and intimately acquainted with all its details, revealed them fully to the Turkish ambassadors: the secret conferences of Erfurth were made known, and documents, bearing the official signatures of the French plenipotentiaries, were exhibited to them by Kutusoff, which left no doubt of the truth of their representations; Austria disclosed the offer made to her of Servia and Bosnia, if she would concur in the partition; while Czerny George, alarmed at the clear proofs which had been adduced of the intention to dethrone him in the scramble, gave ample details of the inquiries and surveys made by Marshal Marmont, immediately after the treaty of Tilsit, to ascertain the most expedient mode of effecting the conquest of the French share in the partition.* Struck by the concurring representations of all these powers, and the clear evidence which was adduced to support them, the Divan no longer hesitated: the Turks saw clearly that, if Napoleon gained the mastery of Russia, he would instantly turn the force of both empires against them—that Moscow would be but a step to Constantinople.† They strove hard, for a considerable time, to obtain restitution of all the provinces conquered by the Russians in the beginning of the war to the north of the Danube; but, finding the Russians resolute to retain, at least, the provinces to the east of the Pruth, and rather to run the hazard of a continuance of the war than consent to their restoration, they at length agreed to allow that river to form the boundary of the two nations, and peace was concluded on these

May 26, 1812. terms in the end of May. The treaty with Turkey was speedily followed by one with Great Britain, which was signed on the 18th of July. By the first treaty, although the cabinet of St. Petersburg lost Wallachia and Moldavia, which they had declared part of their Empire, they gained Bessarabia, which gave them the inappreciable advantage, in a contest both with Turkey and Austria, of commanding the mouths of the Danube; and Admiral Tchichagoff, who had been sent from St. Petersburg to conclude the treaty, as Kutusoff's proceedings were esteemed too dilatory, set off from Bucharest for the Vistula on the 31st of July, at the head of forty thousand men, who appeared with fatal effect on the great theatre of Europe at the passage of the Beresina.‡

Napoleon has repeatedly said that the folly of the Turks in making peace at Bucharest with the Russians, their hereditary enemies, was such, that it altogether exceeded the bounds of reasonable calculation; and, therefore, that he was not to be blamed for the disastrous consequences which flowed from the appearance of Tchichagoff's army in his rear when he lay at Moscow. In truth, however, the Turks were not, in this instance, so limited in their political vision as the French writers are desirous to represent; and their conduct in con-

cluding that treaty was rather the result of that clear judgment and strong common sense which, whenever the facts of a case are distinctly brought before them, has always distinguished the Ottoman councils. They knew well the hostility of Russia, and they had often experienced the weight of its arms; but they had felt the ingratitude of France, and the desertion of a friend sinks deeper into the breast than the enmity of a foe. They were aware of their danger from Muscovite ambition, but they were also no strangers to the power and designs of Napoleon; and they apprehended, with reason, immediate destruction from his power, if, by subjugating Russia, he was put in a situation to direct the whole resources of Europe against their devoted capital. They never forgot their desertion at Tilsit by the French emperor, nor the unprovoked project of spoliation on his part which succeeded it; and justly feared that, though the mutual jealousy of the two imperial allies had hitherto preserved them from destruction, they could not look for a continuance of their respite if the forces of both were concentrated in one hand.

The vigorous and unlooked-for resistance which Turkey at this period opposed to all the efforts of the Russians, sufficiently illustrates the elements of strength which at that period lay dormant, till roused by present danger, in the Ottoman Empire; and may, perhaps, suggest the necessity of modifying some of those opinions as to the declining condition of the power of the grand signor, which have so long been received as political maxims in Europe. When it is recollected that Russia for three years directed her whole force against the Turks; that, in the year 1810, she had a hundred thousand men upon the Danube; and that this array was composed of the conquerors of Eylau, it certainly appears not a little surprising that the Ottoman Empire was not overthrown altogether in the shock. Nevertheless, the contest was extremely equal; and though the forces with which the Ottomans had to contend on the Danube fully equalled those which fronted Napoleon on the Vistula, yet they opposed nearly as effectual a resistance to the Muscovite arms as the conqueror of Western Europe. The contest began on the Danube, and it terminated, after three years' bloodshed, on the same river, with the loss of only one or two frontier towns to the Ottomans. This broad and decisive fact proves that, although the political power of Turkey has unquestionably declined for the last century and a half, and the enormous abuses of its civil government have occasioned, during that period, a constant diminution in its inhabitants and strength, yet it still possesses great resources when they are fairly drawn forth by impending danger; and that in the native bravery of its inhabitants is often to be found, as in the English soldiers, more than a compensation for all the errors of their direction or government.

Sultan Mahmoud, who attempted to arrest this decay, and draw forth, under Character of more enlightened guidance, the still Sultan Mahmoud. powerful resources of the Ottoman Empire, was one of those remarkable men whose character has stamped a mighty impress on the age in which he lived. Albeit bred in the seclusion and effeminacy of the harem, he possessed the native courage and hardihood of his race; albeit little informed by education or social intercourse, he had sagacity enough to perceive the increasing inferiority of the Mohammedan

* *Ante*, ii., 546.

† "Made aware, by my enemies, of the stipulations of Erfurth, and by Austria of the project for the partition of Turkey which I had proposed to her, the Turks abandoned themselves, without reserve, to the counsels of England. The British ambassador soon resumed all his former credit with the Divan."—JOMINI. NAPOLEON, iii., 545.

‡ *Jom.* iii., 545. Val., 178, 180. See the Treaty in Martini, iii., 397, 226.

to the Christian empires, and courage to undertake what was thought to be the remedy. Instead of ascribing the decline of his dominions, like most of his countrymen, to the irresistible decrees of fate, and submitting to it with the apathy of a predestinarian, he set himself vigorously to avert the evil, and sought, by the destruction of the privileged classes, and the introduction of European discipline and usages, both in civil and military affairs, to communicate to his aged empire a portion of the energy of Western civilization. The contest with ancient habits, inveterate from custom, ingrafted upon law, and sanctified by religion, was long and obstinate; and the catastrophe by which it was concluded, in the destruction of the janizaries in 1825, was one of the most awful recorded in history. Whatever the ultimate effect of that tremendous event may be, it stamped Mahmoud's character for all future ages, and bespoke the fearless energy, the undaunted courage, the unflinching rigour, which, braving the perils which had proved fatal to so many of his race, could thus subdue them all, and fix, by his single hand, a different impress upon the institutions of a vast empire.

Nevertheless, Sultan Mahmoud did not bear a comparison with Peter the Great; and the destruction of the janizaries will, to all appearance, be attended with very different effects from the overthrow of the Muscovite strelitzes. Mahmoud would never have been found in the workshop of Saardam: he was not at the head of his troops under the walls of Varna, nor on the field of Koniah. Political regeneration, difficult in all, is impossible in Mohammedan states: the religion and institutions of the Koran preclude the possibility of expansion or alteration; they are inconsistent with the adoption of improvement by foreign usages. The power of Turkey has been irrecoverably broken by the destruction of part, and the alienation of the whole of

the janizary body; the national resources have been ruined without the vigour of a different civilization being acquired; the strength of Asia has been lost without that of Europe being gained. Like the kingdom of Mysore, in Hindostan, the Ottoman Empire has sunk to the earth in the attempt to substitute the military system of the West for that of the East. This, accordingly, appeared decisively in the next contest which ensued: the line of the Danube was no longer maintained; the Balkan ceased to be an impassable barrier; in two campaigns Russia was at Adrianople; in one, the Pacha of Egypt was within a few days' march of Scutari. The janizaries were doubtless a serious evil, and they opposed an impenetrable barrier to every species of improvement; but they constituted the military strength of the nation, they were identified with its religious spirit, they were interwoven with its most venerable institutions. It is one thing to see that a disease has overspread a vital part of the frame; it is another, and a very different thing, to be able in mature life to cut it out. The real bond of union in every great empire is its religion; it is that which knits together the high and the low, the rich and the poor; it is that which constitutes its vital spirit. Change, even for the better, is generally fatal; the substitution of Christianity itself for heathenism undoubtedly accelerated the fall of the Roman Empire. Let every state which has attained mature years, and consolidated its power, beware of making a great change in its institutions, especially of a religious character. Even though those which are introduced may be preferable, in the general case, to those which are abandoned, it is rare that the transition can be made with safety: a certain character has been imprinted by the hand of nature upon every old-established nation, as upon every full-grown individual, and any considerable change will only accelerate the descent of both to the grave.

CHAPTER LXV.

ACCESSION OF BERNADOTTE TO THE SWEDISH THRONE, AND CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE RUSSIAN WAR OF 1812.—1808-1812.

ARGUMENT.

Greatness of Sweden in former Times.—Decline of Sweden from its ancient Celebrity.—Description of the Scandinavian Peninsula.—Character of the Swedes.—Their political Institutions.—Unprovoked Attack upon them by the Emperor Alexander after the Treaty of Tilsit.—Brave Determination of the Swedes to resist.—Commencement of the War.—Capture of Sveaborg, and Conquest of Finland.—Consternation produced in Sweden by this Event, and general Wish for a Change of Government.—Dethronement of Gustavus.—Peace with Russia.—Intrigues for the Election of the Crown-prince.—Part which France and Russia took in the Transaction.—Election of Bernadotte.—His History and Character.—Continued Encroachments of Napoleon in Central and Northern Europe.—Annexation of the Duchy of Oldenburg and the Hanse Towns to the French Empire.—Jealousy of Russia.—Her Apprehension of the Restoration of Poland.—Russian Commercial Ukase in the End of 1810.—Progress of the angry Negotiations and mutual Recriminations of the two Courts.—Birth of the King of Rome.—Resolute Conduct of Napoleon on this Occasion.—Napoleon's Military Preparations.—His Treaty with Prussia.—With Austria.—Tyrannical Conduct of Napoleon towards Bernadotte.—The multiplied Grievances of Sweden, and angry Correspondence with France.—Inclination of Sweden towards Russia and England.—Treaty with the former of these Powers.—Napoleon's Proposals of Peace to England.—Answer of Great Britain.—War becomes inevitably the Ultima-

tum of Russia.—Feelings in Europe on the approaching Conflict.

In former days, Sweden maintained a distinguished place in the European com- Greatness of monwealth, and she can number Sweden in among her sons some of the most former times. illustrious men whom modern times have produced. The Goths, who spread through Poland and the Ukraine into the Roman provinces, and appeared as suppliants on the banks of the Danube, from whence they were ferried across by Roman hands, never to return, originally came from the southern part of the Scandinavian Peninsula, and the province of Gothland still attests the original seat of the conquerors of Rome. On many occasions, their descendants, who remained in their native plains, have caused their prowess to be felt, and their virtues respected, by the neighbouring nations, and interfered with decisive effect in the most interesting contests in which Europe has been engaged. The name of Gustavus Vasa is still repeated, in every civilized tongue, among the patriot heroes whose actions have contributed to bless mankind: Prot-

estant Europe will ever acknowledge, with gratitude, the inestimable services rendered to the great cause of religious, and, through it, of civil, freedom, by the heroic valour and great warlike abilities of Gustavus Adolphus; and the interest of youth to the end of the world will be fascinated by the marvellous story of Charles XII.; while the student of the military art will study with care the history of those wonderful abilities which enabled the little kingdom of Sweden, with hardly two millions of souls, to render its armies a match, and at one period more than a match, for the gigantic strength of Russia, led by the consummate talents of Peter the Great. Nor has science less reason to acknowledge the lustre with which the light of Swedish genius has illuminated the long night of the arctic circle: for she gave birth to Copernicus, who first discovered the true system of the planetary motions, and in Linnæus she has forever unfolded the hidden key by which the endless variety of floral beauty is to be classified, and the mysterious link is preserved between vegetable and animal life.

But with the advent of times when greater empires were brought into the field, and the wars of nations came to be carried on by numerous standing armies, drawn from the population and maintained by the resources of vast empires, Sweden was unable to continue in this elevated station. Her physical resources are wholly inadequate for such protracted efforts; and the attempt which Charles XII. made to engage her in long and arduous wars, so completely drained the resources of the country, that they did not recover the loss for half a century. The population of the Swedish monarchy in 1808, including Finland, was hardly three millions, and these scanty numbers were scattered over so vast an extent of surface, above three times that of the British isles, as greatly diminished the national efficiency in external warfare.* The country, however, possesses great natural advantages. Though the climate, from its situation, is rigorous in winter, yet it is often less so than might have been supposed in so northern a latitude: the cold, damp fogs of Germany are wanting; the bottoms of the valleys in Gothland and the southern provinces, which are the residence of two thirds of the inhabitants of the country, are capable of producing admirable crops of wheat, barley, and oats; rich pastures are to be found on the hillsides; and the vast mountain ranges which it contains are clothed with noble forests of pine, birch, and oak. A lofty range of mountains, rivalling the Alps in grandeur and elevation, intersects the whole Scandinavian Peninsula, nearly from the North Cape to the waters of the Sound, and forms the eternal barrier between Sweden and Norway; but the descent to the Baltic is more gradual than that to the German Ocean, and a much greater quantity of level and arable land is to be found than in the mountain clefts and alpine vales which enclose the happy Norwegian peasantry. The level part of Sweden is intersected in many places by long ridges of granite rock of no great

elevation, which form, as it were, the natural walls of its beautiful valleys; but within these rude barriers beautiful spots of verdure and rich fields are to be found, while rich woods of beech and oak frequently clothe their base. A vast number of inland lakes, easily susceptible of artificial communication, both diversify the scene in the interior and furnish the means of an extensive inland commerce; rich iron mines have long poured a perennial stream of wealth into Dalecarlia; and farther to the north, where the rigour of the climate almost precludes the raising of grain crops, the bounty of nature has given a short but warm summer, which brings to maturity the richest pastures, and innumerable lakes and mountain torrents, which furnish acceptable stores for the long winter; nor is a more delightful picture of human happiness anywhere to be found than in these woody recesses, where human industry has cleared out a few green spots amid the surrounding gloom, and primeval man dwells in plenty and contentment.*

Inter aquas
Nemorumque noctem.

The political circumstances of this highly interesting country are not less favourable than its physical advantages. The ancient free spirit of the north, that noble spirit which has spread the European race through every part of the world, and is ultimately destined to subdue it, has always flourished in its native seats. From the earliest times, Sweden has enjoyed the advantage of a free constitution and representative form of government; and although the want of considerable towns and the absence of the mercantile genius, over the greater part of their territory, have prevented the vigour of the proper Democratic spirit from rising among them, yet the rural cultivators have always preserved in a high degree the sturdy spirit of Gothic freedom. The monarch is hereditary, but his power is defined and limited by the Constitution. The states of the realm must concur in all laws: they are exclusively vested with the right of laying on taxes and managing the public. They consist of four orders: the noblesse, in which each noble family has a representative; the clergy, represented by the bishops and certain deputies from the rural pastors; the burgesses, chosen by the several burghs; and the representatives of the peasants, elected by themselves in open assemblies. The people are universally educated; landed property, especially in the northern provinces, is very much divided among them; and no country in the world possesses, in proportion to its population, a greater number of clergy, who instruct the people in the pure tenets of the Protestant religion. Yet, notwithstanding these circumstances, of all others the most favourable for the development of the principles of freedom, and despite the presence of a House of Peasants, peculiar, of all the European monarchies, to Sweden and Norway, many of its monarchs have ruled the country almost with unlimited authority; and it is only since the Constitution was settled in 1772 that the requisite boundaries of power have been ascertained; while the luminous fact that the states, except on particular emergencies, assemble only once in five years, demonstrates how far the popular part of the Constitution is from having yet attained the importance and consideration which

	Square miles.	Population.
* Sweden Proper now contains, in	200,000	2,800,000
Finland.....	102,432	1,380,000
Total in 1826.....	302,432	3,680,000
Do. in 1808, about...		3,000,000
Population per square mile....	14	
Do. in England.....	260	

—MALTE BRUN, viii., 561, 565; and vi., 631.

* Clarke's Travels, ix., 172. Malte Brun, viii., 537, 549.

it long ago acquired in the commercial realm of Great Britain; and may teach us how materially the practice of government sometimes differs from its theory, and how much real freedom is dependant on the spirit and energy of the people, rather than the mere forms of the Constitution.*

Industry, till of late years, was very little drawn forth in Sweden. In 1828 there were only seven thousand manufacturers in the whole country, and three thousand traders: a state of things which amply explains the distant intervals at which the states are assembled, and the great functions which, in the practical administration of government, have come to be devolved on the sovereign and royal council. But the national character is admirable, and the manners of the people, except in one unhappy particular, worthy of general imitation. Brave, kind-hearted, and hospitable, sincere in their devotion, enlightened in their intellects, gentle in their disposition, obedient to the laws, and yet jealous of their own rights, the Swedish peasantry exhibit as fair a specimen of European rural civilization as is to be met with in the whole domains of the family of Japhet. But one fatal indulgence has wellnigh obliterated all these advantages, and let in upon this simple, kind-hearted people, the whole catalogue of human sins. Drinking is universal: the liberty of distilling in every separate house, on paying a trifling duty to government for the right to use a still, has from time immemorial been established among the whole peasantry of the country; and at this moment there are no less than one hundred and fifty thousand of these manufactories of "liquid hell-fire," as it has been well denominated, which distil annually *thirty millions* of gallons of spirits for the consumption of three millions of people! The consequences of this calamitous facility in producing and obtaining spirituous liquors have been to the last degree disastrous. Notwithstanding the small number of manufactures which are established in the country, the general simplicity of rural life, the absence of great towns, and the moderate size of its capital, which contains only eighty thousand inhabitants, the average amount of crime over all Sweden equals that of the most depraved cities in Great Britain. The illegitimate births are to the legitimate, over the whole country, as one to thirteen; while in the capital they have reached the astonishing number of one to two and three tenths, exceeding even that of Paris itself! So completely does this destructive passion inflame the blood and generate crime, even in the coldest latitudes; so perfectly is it adequate to counteract all the efforts of reason, prudence, morality, and religion; and so deplorably fallacious is the system, which, proceeding on the mistaken assumption that the people will of themselves abstain from such enjoyments as are pernicious, allows them to manufacture, without limit, for themselves this most seducing and dreadful of all physical and moral poisons.†

* Malte Brun, viii., 557, 558.

† Malte Brun, viii., 565. Laing's Sweden, 322, 113, 323.

‡ The illegitimate births in Sweden, over the whole country, are to the legitimate as one to thirteen.—MALTE BRUN, viii., 565. In Middlesex it is one to thirty-eight; over all England, one to twenty.—PORTER, i., 21. The proportion of serious crime over Gothland, to the whole population, is as one to four hundred and eighty-four. In Glasgow, in the year 1839, it was one to four hundred and ninety-six. Over all Sweden the persons committed for all offences, serious and trifling, are one in one hundred and seventy, a greater proportion than either England or Scot-

The Scandinavian Peninsula, now happily united in one monarchy, numbering about four millions and a half of souls in its united territory, increasing at the rate, as it now does, of doubling in sixty years,* and separated from Russia by the impassable deserts which surround the Gulf of Bothnia, and from all the rest of the world by the encircling ocean, may reasonably hope, with the aid of England, to be ultimately able to maintain its independence; but the case was widely different in 1808, when Norway formed part of a separate and hostile power, and the valuable possessions of the Swedish crown on the other side of the Baltic lay close to the metropolis and power of Russia. The cabinet of St. Petersburg had long beheld with covetous eyes this valuable province running up, as it were, to the very gates of their capital, embracing the noble fortress of Sweaborg, the key to the northern part of the Baltic in its territory, and alone wanting to render that inland sea the boundary of their dominions from the mouths of the Vistula to the provinces bordering on the Frozen Ocean. They had never forgotten that, in the last war with Sweden, the cannon of the Swedish fleet had been heard by the Em-

In 1789. press Catharine in her own palace at St. Petersburg; and they were feelingly alive to the insult as well as danger to which their capital would be always exposed while it was situated so close to the territory of a neighbouring, and sometimes hostile, power. It has been already mentioned, accordingly, that the cabinet of St. Petersburg lost no time in declaring war against Sweden early in 1808, and immediately invading Finland with a large portion of the troops who had been rendered disposable by the termination of the war in Poland; although they could assign no better reason for their hostility than the honourable adherence of the court of Stockholm to those principles and that cause which they themselves had so recently embraced, and from which they had only been driven by the untoward issue of the battle of Friedland.† But the real reason was the agreement formed by the two emperors at Tilsit for the division of the Continent between them; and that Alexander had got a *carte blanche* as to Finland and Turkey, in consideration of Napoleon getting the same as to the Spanish Peninsula.

However much the patriot historians of Sweden, whose first duty is to have the interests of their country chiefly at heart, may with reason regret the determination which the Swedish monarch at this crisis adopted of holding out, and at all hazards standing by his engagements, the general historian of Europe cannot but regard it as a signal instance of magnanimity, and such as, if it had been general among crowned heads and their ministers, would have achieved, years before it actually occurred, the deliverance of Europe. In this determination the king was supported, with mournful resolution, by the Swedish nation and parliament, although the circumstances of North-

Brave determination of the Swedes to resist the commencement of the war.

land.—LAING'S Sweden, 112, 113, 323. Mr. Laing's work on this subject, though valuable in many respects, is, however, entirely fallacious, if not examined by a person familiar with the subject, from its comparing the total commitments in Sweden with the commitments for trial in England and Scotland: keeping out of view the summary commitments in the latter countries, which are at least five times as numerous.

* Malte Brun, viii., 565.

† Ante, ii., 507.

ern Europe left hardly any hope that they could succeed in braving the hostility of their colossal neighbours. In effect, it soon appeared that the determination of the Czar drew after it the hostility of all Northern Europe. Denmark

Feb. 28. declared war a few days after Buxhowden's proclamation on the part of Russia, and

March 11. Prussia did the same on the 11th of March. But the determination of the cabinet of St. Petersburg to unite Finland, at all risks, to their dominions, was the real motive

March 28. which had led to the war; for on the 28th of the same month an imperial ukase appeared at St. Petersburg, which bore, "We unite Finland, conquered by our arms, forever to our empire, and command its inhabitants forthwith to take the oath of allegiance to our throne.*"

Although the Russians were very far indeed from having conquered Finland at the time when this audacious proclamation was issued, requiring its inhabitants, before any treaty had been signed, or any cession made by their legitimate monarch, to take the oath of allegiance to their new masters, yet the success of their arms had been such as to justify the belief that the whole provinces on the eastern shore of the Baltic would ere long be in their possession. The King of Sweden, brave, chivalrous, confiding even to excess, and believing that he would find the same good faith, at least in legitimate monarchs, which he felt in his own bosom, never could be brought to believe that he would become an object of hostility to Russia merely because he continued faithful to his engagements, and the honour which he had pledged to that power. He had made, accordingly, very little preparation for the defence of Finland; and the Russian government, well aware of that circumstance, resolved to precipitate the attack before he had awakened from his dream of high-minded but credulous simplicity. Early in February, 1808, Buxhowden, disregarding the rigours of a winter of unusual severity, entered Finland at the head of an army of twenty thousand Russians. The Swedish troops, in no condition to make head against so formidable

Feb. 9, 1808. an enemy, were obliged to retreat, and the fortresses of Trevastus, Helsingfors, and ultimately Abo, the capital of the province, fell into the hands of the invaders. In the harbour of the latter town the great fleet of Swedish galleys was burned, to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy. Encouraged by these successes, the Russian general approached Sweaborg, the Gibraltar of the north, a fortress of the first order, built upon seven rocky islands altogether detached from the shore, strongly fortified with seven hundred pieces of cannon on the ramparts, containing the great naval and military arsenal of Finland, and a harbour equal to any in the world for capaciousness and depth. It was garrisoned by three thousand regular troops, and an equal number of militia, under the command of Admiral Cronstedt, an officer who had hitherto bore an unblemished reputation. But it soon appeared that, if Alexander hoped to rival his great predecessor of the same name in the ancient world by the lustre of his military exploits, he had not neglected the golden key by which his father, at little cost of blood or treasure, secured such important acqui-

sitions to the Macedonian monarchy. The investment of Sweaborg commenced in the first week of March, when the still frozen March 8. waves of the Baltic permitted the troops to approach the walls on their icy surface; and, after a pretence of a bombardment of three weeks, the governor shamefully surrendered at discretion.* By this great blow the Russians became masters, in addition to an impregnable fortress, a noble harbour, and vast arsenal of two thousand pieces of cannon on the ramparts and in the magazines, of a large flotilla, which the governor had orders to burn rather than suffer to fall into the hands of the enemy.†

This dreadful blow, which at once gave the Russians a firm footing in Finland, Consternation where before the end of the campaign produced in Sweden by Sweden by augmented to forty thousand men, this event. broke the heart of the Swedes; and the danger of their situation soon became apparent from the capture of the important islands of Åland and Gothland, which took place immediately after, whereby the Muscovites acquired, as it were, so many stepping-stones across the Baltic, from which they might menace the independence of Sweden itself. Universal consternation, in consequence, prevailed; nor was this feeling of disquietude diminished by observing how insensible the king was to the manifest danger of his situation. Instead of supporting the troops in Finland, who so gallantly bore up against treason at Sweaborg, and the overwhelming numbers of the enemy in the field, he first alienated the whole diplomatic body in Europe by arresting, early in March, M. Alopaus, the Russian minister at Stockholm—a vio-

March 3. lation of the law of nations, noways justified by the Muscovite invasion of Finland, as the ambassador, at least, had no share in that unjustifiable aggression; and next, dreaming of Charles XII. and the conquest of Norway, he actually assembled twenty thousand men for the subjugation of that kingdom. Nor was the depression produced by those untoward events, and the general coalition of Northern Europe against them, diminished by the unexpected turn which, in the course of the summer, events took in their favour. Åland and Gothland, which had yielded to the Russian arms, were retaken in May, as soon as the opening of the Baltic enabled the Swedish fleet, re-enforced by a British squadron, to put to sea, and Admiral Bodiskow, with the Muscovite garrison, were made prisoners. General Klingspor, also, at the head of the

May 17. Swedish troops in Finland, after having July 7. retreated as far as Uleaborg, boldly resumed the offensive; turned fiercely on his pursuers, and, re-enforcing his army by a large body of gallant peasants, who fought with heroic valour to avert the dreaded Muscovite yoke, forced the Russians to retreat, defeated them in several encounters, captured ninety-nine pieces of cannon, and expelled them from the whole province of East Bothnia. At sea, also, the Swedish arms prevailed over those of Russia. Admiral Kani-koff set sail with the Muscovite fleet, and omitted no opportunity of attacking the Swedish squadron with superior forces; but the next day, the British fleet, under Sir James Saumarez,

* Bign., vii., 351, 352. Jom., iii., 75, 76.

† His instructions were precise: to defend the fortress to the last extremity, and burn the flotilla rather than permit it to fall into the hands of the enemy.—*Mem. de GUSTAVE ADOLPHE*, 1814, p. 16.

having joined the Swedes with some ships of the line, the Russian admiral was glad to make the best of his way to his own harbours. A chase ensued, in the course of which two British line-of-battle ships, under Sir Samuel Hood, took a Russian seventy-four gun-ship, and the admiral having, with signal incapacity, taken refuge in the open harbour of Baltisch Port, on the Russian coast, his whole fleet might with ease have been destroyed, had not the British admiral prudently, and agreeably to his instructions, abstained from an act which, how glorious soever, might have inflamed the national feeling of Russia, and converted a doubtful into a real enemy, and contented himself with blockading it there till the approach of winter obliged him to withdraw from the Baltic.*

The cabinet of St. Petersburg strongly urged Napoleon to take an active part in the Swedish war, by means of the powerful force he possessed in Holstein; and, in consequence of their representations, Bernadotte entered Zealand at the head of thirty thousand men, among whom were the Spanish corps of the Marquis of Romana, who were shortly after rescued from their thralldom, as already noticed, and restored to the patriot standards in the Peninsula.† The French emperor, however, though abundantly willing to take his own share in the partition, had no desire to accelerate the period of Russia obtaining hers; and he, accordingly, wrote

from Bayonne to Caulaincourt, his ambassador at St. Petersburg, "I have nothing to gain by seeing the Russians at Stockholm." The British government, however, who were not aware of this reluctance, were seriously apprehensive of the passage of the Sound by the French troops, and the entire subjugation of Sweden by the arms of France, and, therefore, they despatched an expedition of ten thousand men, under Sir John Moore, to assist Sweden in resisting the combined powers, which arrived at Gothenberg in the middle of May. It was soon discovered, however, that the views of the British government and the Swedish monarch were widely at variance as to the disposal of this force. Gustavus, full of chivalrous enthusiasm, no sooner saw so considerable a body of troops arrive to his assistance than he began to dream of projects of foreign conquest; and proposed to the British general, either to employ them in a descent upon Zealand, with a view to the reduction of Copenhagen, or in an expedition against Norway, or in an attack on one of the fortresses on the coast of Finland, and subsequent operations for the recovery of that province. Moore's instructions, however, which were to expose his troops as little as was consistent with the maintenance of the independence of Sweden, and mainly to watch over the passage of the Sound by the French troops, would not permit him to engage in any of these enterprises; and after repairing to Stockholm, with a view to concert operations with the king, which proved impossible, he was recalled, with his troops, by the British government, who perceived a more feasible object of Continental operations in the Spanish Peninsula, where they arrived, as already noticed, immediately after the battle of Vimiera.‡

The departure of the English expedition completed the discouragement of the Swedish nation, by plainly evincing that, in the estimation of that power, their cause was considered as hopeless, or their king impracticable; the glorious successes in the Gulf of Bothnia had shod only like a brilliant meteor through the gloom of their arctic night; the Russian government, roused by their unexpected reverses, had poured immense re-enforcements into Finland; Buxhowden, at the head of forty thousand men, compelled the Swedish troops again to retire, Nov. 19. and by the end of October had nearly overrun the whole province; and the brave Klingspor, unable any longer to avert the stroke of fate, was compelled, in November, to sign a convention, in virtue of which the whole of Finland to the east of the Gulf of Bothnia was ceded to the Russian forces.*

These calamitous events, which affected the Swedes the more sensibly from the General wish warmth of their patriotic feelings, for a change of and their long exemption from political catastrophes, produced a very general opinion among the most influential classes that a change on the throne had become indispensable. It soon became generally known that, undeterred by the loss of Pomerania and Finland, the brightest jewels in his crown, Gustavus was determined to disregard the convention concluded in Finland by his generals, and renew the war in the following year as early as the season would admit; and the Swedes, seeing that the British expedition had left their shores, and that the whole forces of that power were engaged in the Peninsular contest, justly anticipated the entire subjugation of their country, and ruin of their independence, if the strife were any longer delayed. Influenced by these considerations, which the urgency of the case soon rendered general, and swayed, also, not a little by a suspicion as to the sanity of the monarch, which many symptoms had rendered more than doubtful, a general understanding, as in England in 1688, took place among all parties, and for a time suspended their political differences, viz., that the dethronement of the reigning monarch, and the elevation of his uncle, the Duke of Sudermania, to the throne had become indispensable; and this virtual, though not yet expressly formed conspiracy, soon acquired consistency, and became ripe for execution by the leading officers in the army engaged in it.†

The real object of the conspirators was to obtain for Sweden the support of some foreign power able to support its independence against the united forces of France and Russia, and for this purpose they offered the crown to the Duke of Gloucester.‡ But the British government wisely declined, at so critical a moment, an acquisition which, how flattering soever to the national character, was likely, in the end, to embroil them with the Northern courts, and would have been contrary to all the principles on which they had hitherto maintained the contest with France. They therefore declined the perilous offer. The same party then applied to Napoleon; but he replied, in an evasive manner, that his honour was pledged to the Emperor of Russia and the Prince Royal of Denmark. The Swedish

* Ann. Reg., 1808, 237. Bign., vii., 359, 365. Hard. x., 278. † Ante, iii., 88. ‡ Ante, iii., 86.

* Ann. Reg., 1808, 237, 238. Bign., vi., 357, 361. Hard. x., 278, 282. Jom., iii., 76, 78.

† Bign., viii., 159, 160. Hard. x., 279, 280. Mem. de Charles Jean, i., 103, 104, par St. Donat.

‡ St. Donat., 105.

malecontents, therefore, were compelled to trust to their own resources for the maintenance of their independence; and there can be no doubt that, in the course which they adopted, they acted the part of good patriots, when the great dangers with which they were surrounded, and the imminent hazard of the independence of their country being irrevocably destroyed, are taken into account. The army on the Norwegian frontier was the first to prepare itself. Early in March,

March 7. Colonel Adlesparre set out himself from that force at the head of three thousand men, and marched upon Stockholm, while the remainder of the troops took possession of Gottenburg and the principal harbours in the southern provinces of the kingdom. No sooner was Gustavus informed of these events, which were accompanied by a violent popular fermentation at Stockholm, than he quitted his country palace at Haga, where he happened to be at the time, and hastened to the capital, where he shut himself up in his palace, all the avenues of which were strongly occupied by his guards. The king, however,

March 13. soon found that even these faithful defenders could not be relied on: the night was passed in great agitation, and in giving the most contradictory orders; but the great object of the unhappy monarch, upon finding himself deserted by all his subjects, was to get the command of relays of horses, and to raise some money for his immediate necessities upon the credit of the English subsidies. But he soon found it impossible to attain either of these objects. At the same time, the committee of insurrection in Stockholm, which embraced all the principal men in the capital, particularly the Baron d'Adlercrantz, who justly enjoyed a large share of public confidence, and General Klingspor, recently so distinguished by his

March 12. defence of the province of Bothnia, deemed it of essential importance not to permit the monarch to quit the capital. And the keepers of the public treasury prevented the king from getting any money, by refusing to discharge any orders which had not the authority of the states of the kingdom.*

In this extremity, as Gustavus still persevered in his resolution to quit the capital, and as the Duke of Sudermania could not prevail upon him to abandon his design, the Baron Adlercrantz and General Klingspor, whose connexion with the insurgents was not known, were called in to assist in the deliberations. The former began an energetic remonstrance against the king's proposed departure, in the middle of which he was interrupted by Gustavus, who exclaimed, "Treason! Treason! You shall all be punished as you deserve." "We are not traitors," replied the baron, calmly, "but good Swedes, intent only on the happiness of your majesty and of the country." At these words, the king drew his sword and threw himself on the baron, but the latter avoided the plunge and seized the monarch by the middle, while Colonel Silflesparre got possession of his sword. "Rescue, rescue!" cried the king. "I am assassinated." Upon hearing his cries, the guards outside attempted to enter, and, finding the door of the apartment locked, they were proceeding to break it open; upon which the undaunted Adlercrantz himself unlocked it, and, seizing the sabre of a hussar

who stood near, and the baton, the ensign of command of the adjutant-general of the guards, threw himself before the troops, who had their swords drawn, and exclaimed, in a loud voice, "I am now your adjutant-general, and in that quality I command you guards to retire." The king himself also, from a feeling of humanity, to prevent the useless effusion of blood, made a motion with his hand for them to withdraw. Overawed by his manner, and conceiving the monarch deposed, the guards retired; but in the confusion the king had made his escape by a back door, which communicated with a postern stair, and seized in his flight the sword of Count Stromfeld. Thus armed anew, he was running across the inner court of the palace towards a guard-house, where he would immediately have found troops ready to support him, when he was met by a forester of the name of Grieff, who threw himself in his way, and, though wounded in the arm, continued to hold the king until some of the conspirators arrived, by whom he was immediately disarmed a second time, and reconducted into the state apartments. The Duke of Sudermania was immediately proclaimed regent; next day, the king was conducted as a prisoner to the castle of Drottingholm, from whence he was transferred to the palace of Grippsholm, from which, a fortnight after, there appeared his formal renunciation of the crown, grounded on the alleged impossibility of continuing the government in a manner consistent with the interests of the kingdom. So completely were the public in Stockholm prepared for this event, that no disturbances whatever took place there on the change of dynasty;† and even the theatres of Stockholm were open on the night on which it took place, as if nothing unusual had happened.‡

This violent but bloodless revolution was immediately followed by the elevation of Adlercrantz, Klingspor, and Adlesparre to the highest offices in the Swedish ministry, and on the 5th of June the Duke of Sudermania was proclaimed king. The states of the kingdom had previously solemnly deposed, not only the dethroned monarch, but his whole race;§ and nothing remained but to declare his successor, who as-

Elevation of the Duke of Sudermania to the throne, and peace with Russia. May 3.

* St. Donat., i., 109, 113. Bign., viii., 161, 163.

† Suspicions had always been entertained of the legitimacy of Gustavus the Fourth; and a story is told by some historians, that, in an interview between the queen-mother and the dethroned monarch, she revealed to him the secret of his birth, and that, to conceal her shame, the king was prevailed upon voluntarily to abdicate the throne. No evidence, however, is adduced to give countenance to this rumour, which rests upon a very suspicious authority, considering the interests which his successors on the throne have to throw doubts on the legitimacy of the deposed monarch.—St. DONAT., i., 3, and BIGNON, viii., 163, note.

‡ "We abjure, by this present act, all the fidelity and obedience which we owe to our king, Gustavus the Fourth, hitherto King of Sweden, and we declare both him and his heirs, born or to be born, now and forever, dethroned from the throne and government of Sweden." This is the most open and undisguised dethronement of a monarch by the states of a kingdom which is perhaps recorded in history; and it is not a little remarkable, that it not only was accomplished without the death of the reigning monarch, but without the spilling of a single drop of blood on the part of his subjects. The Swedish historians may well take pride in the dignity, unanimity, and humanity of this great national movement, which offers so marked and pleasing a contrast to the dreadful convulsions which, both in England and France, followed the dethronement of the reigning monarch, and the hideous royal murders by which they were both consummated.—See BIGNON, viii., 164, and MONTGAILLARD, vi., 397, 398

* St. Donat., Mem. de Charles Jean, i., 105, 108. Bign., viii., 161, 162. Hard., x., 282, 284.

cended the throne by the title of Charles the Thirteenth. The first care of the new monarch was to conclude a peace with Russia; and in order the better to attain that object, he wrote to Napoleon, stating "that he placed the integrity of the Swedish throne under the safeguard of the generosity of Napoleon."* The French emperor, however, who was at that instant engaged in a doubtful war with Austria on the shores of the Danube, had no inclination to embroil himself with the court of St. Petersburg on account of the integrity of Sweden; and, in addition to that, he was expressly bound, by the conferences at Tilsit, to surrender Finland to Russia in consideration of himself being permitted to seize upon the kingdom of the Spanish Peninsula. Napoleon, therefore, turned a deaf ear to the petition of the Swedish monarch, and the cabinet of St. Petersburg, determined to seize upon their prey, notified to the court of Stockholm that they were immediately to resume hostilities. The Swedes were in no condition to make any resistance; for, independently of the paralysis of their national strength which had arisen from the change of dynasty, and the universal desire for immediate peace to which it had been owing, the Russians had gained an extraordinary advantage in the spring of that year, by the bold march of a general destined to the highest celebrity in future times, Count Barclay de Tolly, who, taking

March 7. 1809, had the hardihood to cross the Gulf of Bothnia on the ice, and had arrived in the middle of March on the Swedish side as far as Golby, on the road to Stockholm. This extraordinary event, which alone was wanting to complete the marvels of the French Revolutionary war, put a decisive period, as well it might, to the contest in the Scandinavian Peninsula. The cabinet of St. Petersburg was inexorable: the entire cession of Finland was resolved on; and on these terms peace was at length concluded on the 17th of September. By

Sept. 17, 1809, this treaty Russia acquired Finland, the isles of Aland, Savollax, Quirille, and some lesser ones in the Baltic, and the whole province of West Bothnia, as far as Tornea, at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, and from thence, by the course of the River Jocki, almost to the mouth of the Frozen Ocean. Sweden also declared its accession to the Continental system; and, in return for so many concessions, the Duchy of Pomerania was restored to the Swedish crown, and Prince Holstein Augustenburg, son of the Duke of Holstein Augustenburg, was declared the crown-prince, or, in other words, the successor to the throne. This treaty was shortly afterward followed by the conclusion of a treaty between Sweden and France, the only remarkable feature of which was the extraordinary rigour with which the Continental system was imposed upon the Swedish monarchy.†

The flames of war appeared now to be finally Death of the stillled on the shores of the Baltic, Crown-prince and Sweden, adhering to the policy of Sweden. of endeavouring to procure a counterpoise in France against the exorbitant power of Russia, had made secret propositions to Napoleon for an alliance between the Prince Augustenburg, the heir-apparent to the throne, and a princess of the imperial family of France. This proposition, however, was coldly received by

Napoleon, who had no inclination May 13, 1810: to precipitate the contest which he saw would sooner or later arise with the Russian Empire. But all these projects were rendered abortive by the sudden death of the young prince, who was seized with a stroke of apoplexy on horseback when reviewing a regiment of guards at Quidinge in Holstein, and died immediately after. This unexpected event, as it deprived Sweden of a successor to the throne, immediately opened up a vast field of intrigue in the North of Europe; and various efforts were made to procure the election of different persons to the dignity which should secure the ultimate ascent to the Swedish throne. The right of election was vested in the states of Sweden; but it was easy to see that they would be swayed by external influence in their choice, and the two powers between whom the contest necessarily lay were France and Russia.*

It was obviously the interest of Russia to place on the throne of Sweden a prince who might incline to its protection in any political crisis that might arise, and the secret wishes of that power lay towards the young prince, son of the late king; but there was an obvious difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Swedish Parliament to a measure, the effect of which might be to involve almost all the leading men in the kingdom, at some future period, in the penalties of high treason. The principal object of Napoleon was to secure, in the successor to the Swedish throne, some counterpoise to the power of Russia; for, amid all the professions of mutual regard by the two emperors, their interests had already begun to clash, and symptoms of estrangement already appeared in their diplomatic intercourse with each other. Candidates, however, were not wanting for the situation. The King of Denmark openly aspired to the honour, and endeavoured to impress upon Napoleon the great political advantage which would arise to France from the union of the three crowns of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, on one head, as a counterpoise to the power of Russia; but the King of Sweden, well aware that such a project would be viewed with extreme repugnance by the nobles and people of Sweden, who were actuated by a jealousy of very old standing towards their Danish and Norwegian neighbours, inclined towards the young Prince of Holstein Augustenburg, younger brother of the prince who had just perished; and, in a secret correspondence with Napoleon, he disclosed his wishes to the emperor, who professed himself favourable to the design, and gave the most flattering assurances of his support; and, in particular, the advantages it would bring to both countries to have the royal families of Sweden and Denmark united by closer ties. But the King of Denmark, who was brother-in-law to the Prince of Augustenburg, prohibited him from acceding to the wishes of the King of Sweden, and openly set forth his own pretensions to the dignity in a letter to the latter monarch.†

Matters were still in a state of uncertainty at Stockholm, when an article in the *Journal des Debats*, which at that period was entirely under the direction

Intrigues for the election of his successor. Part which France and Russia took in them.

Election of Bernadotte.

* Letter of July 20, 1809.

† See the Treaties in Martin's Sup., i., 19, 232. Hard., x., 288, 290. Bign., viii., 168; ix., 201.

* St. Donat., i., 119. Bign., ix., 207. Hard., xi., 123.

† Letter, Prince Holstein to Charles XIII., July 17; and King of Denmark to King of Sweden, July 18, 1810. Bign., ix., 210, 213.

of the cabinet of the Tuileries, openly avowed that the election of the King of Denmark to the Swedish throne would be agreeable to the French emperor. No sooner was this paper received in Sweden than it produced the greatest consternation. The leading men in that kingdom at once saw that they were about to be sacrificed to the balance of power in Northern Europe, and that, under the pretence of the necessity of providing a counterpart in that quarter to the exorbitant power of Russia, by uniting the three Baltic crowns on one head, they were, in effect, to be subjected to the rule of their old and inveterate enemies. Colonel Surenaim, a Frenchman by birth, but long aid-de-camp to the present King of Sweden, let fall the expression, in the midst of the general disquietude, "The lowest French-general would be better received here than the King of Denmark." Many examples had recently occurred of the elevation of French generals to European thrones, and the Swedes were too clear-sighted not to perceive that possibly, by the election of such an officer, they might, without hazard to their own independence, secure the powerful support of France against the encroachments of Russia. A powerful party in Sweden, accordingly, turned their eyes to Bernadotte, who commanded the large French army on the shores of the Baltic, and who, as already mentioned, had gained the affections of a great number of the best families in Sweden, from his kindness to a body of Swedish prisoners, taken in the Polish war of 1807.* A committee of twelve was, according to the form of the Swedish law, appointed to recommend a successor to the Diet; and, at first, eleven votes declared for the young Prince of Augustenburg, and only one for Bernadotte. Before the final day of election a French agent arrived at Oerebro, where the Diet sat, and announced, though, as it afterward appeared, without any authority, that the wishes of Napoleon were in favour of the election of his victorious general. This intelligence immediately altered the determination of the committee. At the public election, a few days afterward, ten of the twelve voted for Bernadotte, and their choice was immediately afterward confirmed by the Swedish Diet. He was shortly after adopted as son by Charles XIII.; and as soon as Napoleon received the intelligence, although he expressed his surprise at it, and wrote to his ambassador at St. Petersburg that he would have preferred to see the King of Denmark on the throne, yet he, nevertheless, advised Bernadotte to accept the dignity of the crown-prince, and advanced him a million of francs for the expenses immediately consequent upon it.†

* *Ante*, ii., 480.

† Napoleon to the King of Sweden, Sept. 6, 1810, *Bign.*, ix., 222, 228. Monte, viii., 28, 31.

‡ Although Napoleon immediately disavowed the agent at Oerebro who had used his name in this transaction, and although the minister of foreign affairs wrote to the French ambassador at Stockholm, that "he could not bring himself to believe that that individual would have had the impudence to declare himself invested with any diplomatic mission, or authorized to make the least insinuation relative to the election," yet it is more than probable that that agent was, in fact, authorized by the French emperor, who adopted that method of securing the elevation of one of his generals to the throne of a monarchy bordering on Russia, without openly committing himself in his cause. It is extremely improbable that any unauthorized individual would have ventured to interfere in such a transaction, and still more unlikely that the French minister at Oerebro would have been the dupe of an impostor. The extreme anxiety which Napoleon evinced, for some time afterward, to con-

Charles John, Prince of Pontecorvo, Marshal Bernadotte, and now King of Sweden, ^{His history.} was born at Pau, in Bearn, in the south of France, on the 6th of January, 1764. He was the son of a lawyer, and first embraced the profession of arms by entering as a private in the regiment of royal marines.* In that capacity he served in India during the American war, and was present at the taking of Pondicherry. Upon returning to Europe, when peace was concluded between France and England in 1783, he at first thought of quitting the service, and embracing the profession of the law in his native town; but he was prevented by the favour of his colonel, who fixed the destinies of the young soldier by promoting the future Marshal of France and King of Sweden to the rank of sergeant. At the breaking out of the Revolution in 1792, he enjoyed the satisfaction, at Marseilles, of rescuing from a ferocious mob the colonel who had promoted him, and saving his life at the hazard of his own. When the war broke out in 1792, he distinguished himself in several combats in Flanders, and had attained to the rank of a general of brigade, at the battle of Fleurus, in 1794. He continued to distinguish himself in the war on the frontier of the Rhine, particularly at the passage of the Rhine at Niderworth, in the year 1796. In 1797 he repeatedly signalized himself in the war with Austria, especially at the passage of the Piave, and in the siege of the fortress of Gradiska. In June, 1798, he was appointed ambassador at Vienna, and soon after married the daughter of a merchant at Marseilles, of the name of Clary. In 1799 he refused the command of the army in Italy, and took the command of that on the Upper Rhine, where he soon reduced Mannheim, and, in the end of June in that year, he was appointed minister of war at Paris. To the zeal and ability which he displayed in restoring the shattered ranks of the Republican armies, Napoleon was mainly indebted, as already observed, for his astonishing success at Marengo.† But he was dismissed from the office of minister of war by Napoleon, to whom his sturdy Republican opinions had proved highly obnoxious, on the occasion of the 18th of Brumaire. Napoleon, however, who was aware of his abilities, afterward appointed him to the head of the army which invaded Hanover in 1803; in 1804 he was made a marshal of the Empire; in 1805 the corps which he commanded had a great share in the successes of Ulm, whither Bernadotte had led it from Hanover; in 1806 he was distinguished in the campaign of Jena, and effected the destruction of Blücher's corps at Lubeck, and, after the peace of Tilsit, received from Napoleon the military command of the Hanse Towns. He was immediately afterward intrusted by Napoleon with the formation of a Saxon corps at Dresden, which afterward took part in the battle of Wagram, and the address to whom from their commander, as already shown, excited in a peculiar manner the indignation of the French emperor.‡ After this he fell into a sort of dis-

vince the cabinet of St. Petersburg that he had taken no concern in this election, only renders it the more probable that he was, in reality, at the bottom of the transaction.—See *HARD*, xi., 127, 128; *BIGNON*, ix., 226, 228.

* When he put on his uniform in this regiment at Pau, he exchanged, in a frolic, his dress with that of a companion, who at the same moment had entered the regiment. The latter, in giving him his uniform, said, "Go: I make you a Marshal of France."—*ST. DONAT*, i., 122.

† *Ante*, ii., 79.

‡ *Ante*, iii., 255

grace, and it was without the knowledge of Napoleon that he was sent by the minister of war from Paris to arrest the progress of the English on the banks of the Scheldt, after the taking of Flushing. Napoleon, after he learned the election of his old lieutenant to the rank of Crown-prince of Sweden, had an interview with him, at which, though warmly solicited, he refused to absolve him from his oath of allegiance to France. Bernadotte, however, was firm; and, after some altercation, Napoleon yielded, and dismissed him with these words: "Well—be it so: set off. Let our destinies be accomplished."*

It need hardly be said that he must have been a most remarkable man who thus raised himself from the rank of a private soldier to that of Marshal of France and King of Sweden; and, still more, who, after the fall of Napoleon, and the general overthrow of the Revolutionary authorities in Europe, could succeed in maintaining his place upon the throne, amid the fall of all the other potentates who had owed their elevation to his triumphs. In truth, Bernadotte was unquestionably one of the ablest men of the age, fruitful as it was in the greatest ability and the most heroic characters. He was gifted by nature, not merely with the most intrepid courage, but with an uncommon degree of calmness in danger, which early attracted the notice of his comrades, and was the principal cause of his rapid elevation in the Revolutionary armies. Difficulties never found him unprepared: dangers always undaunted. He belonged in early life to the extreme Republican party, and was so closely allied with many of the worst characters in the Revolution, that he narrowly escaped destruction on occasion of the Revolution in 1799, which elevated Napoleon to the throne. But, fortunately for Bernadotte, his duties in the army kept him, in general, far removed from the atrocities of the Revolution; and his Democratic principles, how strong soever, were not so deeply rooted but what they readily gave place to the suggestions of individual elevation. He was ambitious, and, like most of the other marshals, little scrupulous in the means which he adopted to increase his fortune; but, though rapacious when accident or success gave him the means of plunder, he had nothing cruel or vindictive in his disposition; and he was mainly indebted to the kindness which he showed to the Polish prisoners in the war of 1807, for his elevation to the throne of Charles XII. After his destiny was fixed, he attached himself, in good earnest, to the interest of Sweden: the unbearable arrogance of Napoleon combined with the influence of the monarchy to which he had been elected, to make him espouse the cause of Russia in the great struggle which ensued in 1812 between France and that power; and although afterward, when the fortunes of Napoleon appeared on the wane, he evinced a natural repugnance to push his old general to extremities, and was only held to his engagements by the strenuous efforts of the British envoy at his headquarters, Lord Londonderry, yet equity must, perhaps, rather approve than condemn a feeling which, when the interests of his adopted country were secured, led him to incline to that of his birth. He is gifted with remarkable talents for conversation, and shares in all the disposition to vanity and gasconade which belongs to the province of his birth; but he is endowed with great

penetration and solidity of judgment; his wise administration has gone far to reconcile the Norwegians to the hated government of Sweden; and although a powerful party in the latter kingdom secretly indulge the hope of the restoration of the legitimate successor to the throne, he has done as much to transmit the crown to his posterity as can possibly be the case with a dynasty resting on a violent, even though a necessary, revolution.

While these important events were occurring in the North of Europe, and determining in their ultimate effects the fate of the Scandinavian Peninsula, Napoleon was pursuing, with now undisguised avidity, his career of pacific aggrandizement in the central parts of Europe. It has been already mentioned that Louis Bonaparte, unable to endure the indignities to which he was subjected by the tyrannical disposition of his imperial brother, had, in July, 1810, resigned the throne of Holland, which was immediately incorporated by Napoleon with the French Empire; and that the first seeds of a serious outbreak between him and the Emperor Alexander arose from the irritation produced in the breast of the latter by the preference given by Napoleon to the Archduchess Marie Louise over the Grand-duchess Paulowna,* with whom also he was in treaty for marriage. These aggressions and causes of irritation were soon afterward followed by others of a still more serious complexion. On the 12th of November, the Republic of the Valais, commanding the important passage of the Simplon into Italy, was incorporated with the French Empire, upon the ground that it was a necessary consequence of the immense works which the emperor had for ten years carried on in that part of the Alps.†

The same *senatus consultum* announced to the world other strides in the north of Germany of a still more serious and alarming character. The preamble to this part of the decree was: "The British orders in council, and the Berlin and the Milan decrees for 1806 and 1807 have torn to shreds the public law of Europe. A new order of things reigns throughout the world. New guarantees having become necessary, I have considered that the union of the mouths of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine, of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, to the French Empire, and the establishment of an interior line of communication with the Baltic Sea, have appeared to me to be the most important. I have, accordingly, caused a plan to be prepared, which will be completed in five years, that will unite the Baltic with the Seine. Indemnity shall be given to the princes who may be injured by this great measure, which necessity commands, and which makes the right of my empire rest on the Baltic Sea." This immense measure of spoliation, which extended the limits of the French Empire almost

Continued encroachments by Napoleon in Central and Northern Europe.

July 7, 1810

Nov. 12.

Annexation of the Hanse Towns and the Duchy of Oldenburg to the French Empire. Dec. 13, 1810.

* Ante, iii., 332, 337.

† The preamble of the *senatus consultum* bore, "The union of the Valais to France is a consequence, long foreseen, of the immense works which I have executed for ten years past in that part of the Alps. When, by my act of mediation, I separated the Valais from the Helvetic Confederacy, I did so from foreseeing that, one day or other, this union, so useful to France and Italy, could no longer be delayed. It has now become indispensable, from the distracted state of the canton, and the abuse which one part of the people has made of its sovereignty over another."—BRENON, ix., 335, 336.

* St. Donat, i., 121, 159. Hard., xi., 127. Monte, vii., 31.

to the frontiers of Russia, involved alike the possessions of the members of Napoleon's own family, and of the relations of those independent powers which it was most his interest to have conciliated. Five hundred thousand souls were by it swept off from the dominions of the King of Westphalia, Napoleon's own brother, and two hundred thousand from the territory of the Grand-duchy of Berg, which he had bestowed upon one of his lieutenants; but, what was much more serious, it swallowed up the whole possessions of the Grand-duke of Oldenburg, the brother-in-law of the Emperor Alexander, and, besides entirely cutting off Prussia from the coast of the German Ocean, brought the French Empire up to Lubeck, almost within sight of the Russian frontier.*

This monstrous encroachment of Napoleon, serious as it was from the immense Jealousy of Russia at these encroachments, porated with the French Empire, and which extended its dominion from 84 to 130 departments, and its population to forty-two millions of souls, excited the most violent feelings at St. Petersburg, and blew into a flame those feelings of irritation which had existed in the emperor's breast ever since the slight thrown upon his sister by the marriage of Napoleon. The encroachment, great as it was, was rendered still more alarming from the manner in which it was carried into effect; for here an immense tract in the North of Germany was at once annexed to the French Empire, without either the formality of diplomatic sanction, or the right acquired by the power of conquest. The French emperor took upon himself the right to dispose of free cities and independent potentates in the north of Germany, as an Eastern sultan would of the fortunes of his dependant pachas. But, however great and unprecedented the stretch might be, it was obvious that Napoleon was prepared to make it good by the sword, and that it would be wrenched from him only by force of arms: for, Sept. 27, 1810.

shortly before, he had, without any apparent reverse to justify the measure, issued a decree, ordering the levy of forty-five thousand men for the service of the navy, and one hundred and twenty-five thousand men for the army, taken from the youth who had arrived at the age of nineteen in the years 1810 and 1811.†

But, in addition to this great and well-founded cause of complaint, Russia had other sources of disquietude, which were not so strongly established in sound reason, but arose rather from the apprehensions of injustice that her ill-gotten gains would be wrested from her. The Grand-duchy of Warsaw was a continual object of jealousy to the cabinet of St. Petersburg; and although Napoleon, as already mentioned, had done his utmost to remove their uneasiness on this head, and expressed his desire "that the name of Poland should disappear, not only from the political transactions of Europe, but even from the page of history,"‡ yet he had by no means succeeded in allaying their apprehensions. The Russian minister saw very little of this disposition in the large augmentation

which he had given to this duchy out of the spoils of the Austrian monarchy, after the treaty of Vienna in 1809; and so anxious did the Emperor Alexander become on this subject, shortly after the conclusion of the Austrian treaty, that he opened a negotiation with Napoleon, with a view to the conclusion of a convention which should forever allay all the apprehensions which he felt on the subject. A convention, accordingly, was drawn up, which Champagny expressly authorized Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, to sign, which was done, accordingly, early in 1810, by Jan. 4, 1810.

"that the kingdom of Poland shall never be re-established. The high contracting parties mutually agree that the name of Poland and Poles shall never, in future, be applied to any of the districts or inhabitants who formerly composed the kingdom of Poland, and that that name shall be effaced forever from every public and official act: the Polish orders of chivalry shall be abolished; and the Grand-duchy of Warsaw shall never be extended over any farther portion of what formerly constituted the ancient kingdom of Poland." The Emperor of Russia testified the most extreme satisfaction at the conclusion of this convention, and professed his delight at again feeling himself at liberty to give free vent to his admiration of so great a man as Napoleon, and his anxious hope that his "family might occupy the French throne forever."*

Had this convention, as signed by his ambassador, been ratified by Napoleon, his destiny might possibly have been different, and his family, according to Alexander's wish, still on the throne of France. But the convention arrived in Paris at a critical time, when Napoleon, as already mentioned, had taken umbrage at the impediments thrown in the way of the proposals he had made for the Grand-duchess Paulowna, and when he was already in secret treaty for the Austrian archduchess.† He declined, therefore, to ratify the convention: proposing, in lieu of the first article of it, regarding the kingdom of Poland never being re-established, to insert one "binding himself to give no encouragement to any attempt tending to its re-establishment." The Emperor of Russia, piqued at this declination, the more so as it occurred at the very time of the slight thrown on his sister, insisted warmly with Caulaincourt for a simple adhesion to the original convention, as it stood signed by the ambassador of France; but he never could achieve this object; and, in a private conversation with Caulaincourt, he said, "If affairs change, it is not my fault: I will not be the first to trouble the peace of Europe; I will attack no one; but, if they come to seek me, I will defend myself."‡

Napoleon, however, never could be brought to agree to a convention stipulating that the kingdom of Poland should not be restored, and he answered the Russian ministers in very warm terms when pressed on the subject. The cabinet of St. Petersburg, therefore, became apprehensive that an attack on their Polish possessions was meditated by Napoleon. So serious had their fears become, that a great augmentation of their force in Poland had already taken place: extensive intrenchments had been erected

* Decree, December 13, 1810, *Moniteur*. Bign., ix., 354, 359. Hard., xi., 209, 210.

† Martin's Sup., v., 347. *Moniteur*, September 27, 1810. Bign., ix., 361, 365. Mont., vii., 39, 40.

‡ *Ante*, iii., 273 CHAMPAGNY to ALEXANDER, 20th Oct., 1809.

* Bign., ix., 101, 103.

† *Ante*, iii., 333.

‡ Bign., ix., 99, 111. Duke de Vicenza to Caulaincourt, March 11, 1810.

at Drissa on the Dwina, capable of containing a vast army, and a new levy had been ordered throughout the vast dominions of the Czar. These defensive measures, in their turn, excited the jealousy of Napoleon, who with reason saw no sufficient explanation of them in the pretext alleged of the losses of the Turkish war; and he directed his ambassador at the court of St. Petersburg to demand explanations on the subject.* Alexander, on being pressed to give his reasons for these fieldworks, retorted by referring to the continued march of French troops, and a large park of artillery, into the north of Germany; observed that he took no umbrage at similar defensive works at Modlin, Thorn, Warsaw, and Torgu; that the demands now made by Napoleon for a rigorous execution of the Continental system were unauthorized by any agreement; and that the only favour which he had yet asked of him not contained in the treaties, viz., a convention concerning Poland, had been refused.†

Alexander was no sooner informed of the spoliation of the Grand-duke of Oldenburg by Napoleon, and the extension of the French Empire to the shores of the Baltic, than he replied in a manner which affected Napoleon in the most sensitive point. On the 31st of December, 1810, he published an imperial ukase, which, under the colour of regulating the affairs of commerce, in effect contained a material relaxation of the rigour of the decrees hitherto in force in the Russian Empire against English commerce. Colonial produce was admitted, if under a neutral flag: a thin disguise, which the commercial enterprise of England was soon able to throw over the most extensive mercantile speculations. Many articles of French manufacture were virtually prohibited, by not being included in the list of goods which might be admitted on payment of a duty, particularly laces, bronzes, jewelry, silks, ribands, and gauzes. These regulations were attended by an order for the establishment of a coast-guard of eighty thousand men to enforce obedience to them, a step which it might be easily seen was but a cloak for the augmentation of the regular army. In addition to this, the cabinet of St. Petersburg presented a diplomatic note to all the courts in Europe, formally complaining of the annexation of the Duchy of Oldenburg to the French Empire.‡

The imperious disposition of Napoleon strongly appeared in the course of the year 1810, in the transactions with his kingdom of brother, the new king of Westphalia. He had, by a solemn deed, made over to that monarch all the rights which he possessed by conquest over the Electorate of Hanover: under the burden, according to his usual practice, of a large

portion of the revenues of the electorate, which he reserved to himself, as a fund from which to reward his favourite generals or officers, and those of the King of Westphalia, being at the sole expense of supporting the French troops who might ever be stationed in his territory. The payment of these French troops, however, did not proceed with great regularity; and Napoleon made this a pretext for declaring to his brother Jerome, "that he found him- Oct. 25, 1810. self, with regret, under the necessity of resuming the administration of Hanover; that he regarded the treaty as annulled by the King of Westphalia himself; and that he felt himself at entire liberty to dispose of the Hanoverian territory as his interests might dictate." In effect, it was shortly after incorporated with France, under the name of the 32d military division, on occasion of the union of the Hanse Towns to the "Grande Nation."*

The clouds, however, which, from so many concurrent causes, were seen to be threatening the French Empire in the North of Europe, were, in the es- Birth of the King of Rome, March 20. timation of the emperor, more than compensated by the fortunate event which occurred at Paris in March. The Empress Marie Louise, who had long promised an heir to the throne, on the 20th was seized with the pains of childbirth; but though she had the aid of the most skilful medical assistance which France could afford, she suffered long and dreadfully before the delivery took place. The calm resolution of Napoleon was signally evinced on this occasion, so interesting to his feelings, and vital to the stability of his throne. The sufferings of the empress were so protracted and severe, that the medical attendants declared to him that either she or the infant must perish before the delivery could be effected, and they insinuated a question which should be sacrificed. Napoleon, without hesitating an instant, replied, "Act as you would towards the wife of a burgher in the Rue St. Denis: if possible, save both; but, at all events, preserve the empress." This bold but feeling advice was attended with a happier result than was anticipated: the infant was saved, and proved a son; and at six in the morning, the cannon of the Invalides announced to the capital that the much wished-for event had taken place, and that the King of Rome was born. It had been previously intimated that, if the infant were a princess, twenty-one guns only would be fired; but if a prince, a hundred. At the first report, all Paris wakened, and the discharges were counted with intense interest, till, when the twenty-first gun had gone off, the anxiety of all classes had risen to an unbearable pitch. The gunners delayed an instant before the next piece was discharged, and some hundred thousand persons held their breath; but when the twenty-second, double-charged, was let off, the whole inhabitants, of all ages and sexes, sprung on their feet, and universal joy testified the profound hold which the emperor had acquired of the affections of the people. Innumerable addresses were presented by the public bodies from all parts of France, in which the whole flowers of European rhetoric and Eastern adulation were exhausted, to express the universal enthusiasm at this auspicious event.†

The secession, now hardly disguised, of Rus-

* Bign., ix., 236, 238.

† Thib., viii., 341, 342. Mont., vii., 45 49 Las Casas.

* "It is in vain to dissemble, that these fieldworks of such extent indicate bad dispositions on the part of the Russian cabinet. After having concluded peace with the Porte, as they have soon the prospect of doing, are they about to come to an understanding with the English, and violate the treaty of Tilsit? Such a measure would at once place them in a state of hostility with France. I do not desire war, but I will be always ready to undertake it; and such is the nature of things, that, to continue at peace, the Continent must make war on England as long as England makes war on France."—NAPOLEON to DUKE DE CADORE (Champagny), 5th Dec., 1801, BIGNON, ix., 368.

† Coulinacourt to Napoleon, December 7, 1810, Bign., ix., 368, 369.

‡ Martin's Sup., i., 348. Bign., ix., 370, 371.

Tyrannical conduct of Napoleon towards Bernadotte. - sias from the severity of the Continental system, had the effect only of rendering Napoleon more urgent in exacting the most exact and rigorous execution of his decrees from the other powers in the North of Europe. From Denmark he met with the most willing compliance, and a disposition even to anticipate his wishes in the war against the hated commerce of England; for the cabinet of Copenhagen shut her ports absolutely to all neutral vessels whatever bearing colonial produce, a measure which effectually excluded the possibility of subterfuge. Against Prussia he fulminated the most menacing complaints for her alleged connivance at a contraband traffic; and with such effect, that the cabinet of Berlin was compelled to sign a treaty on the 28th of January, 1811, by which it was stipulated that the Prussian confiscations of British goods should be accounted for to France, but be taken as a deduction from the amount of the Prussian debt still unpaid from the war contributions. Towards the court of Sweden he assumed a still more threatening tone. He loudly complained that, under pretence of a traffic in salt, a contraband trade was still carried on in the Swedish ports in British colonial produce; and declared that he would greatly prefer open war with himself to such a state of covert communication with his enemies. "I begin to see," said he, "that I have committed a fault in consenting to the restoration of Pomerania to Finland. Let the Swedes know that my troops shall instantly re-enter that province if the treaty is not carried into execution to the very letter."* Nor was his language softened by the arrival of the new Crown-prince Bernadotte at Stockholm, and the consequent direction by him of the principal affairs of government. On the contrary, he only expected and exacted a more complete submission to his will from his former lieutenant than from an independent power. "Choose," said he, "between cannon-shot against the English vessels which approach your coasts and the confiscation of their merchandise, or an immediate war with France. Sweden is now doing me more mischief than the whole five coalitions put together. You tell me Sweden is suffering? Bah! Is not France suffering? Are not Bordeaux, Holland, Germany, suffering? We must all suffer to conquer a maritime peace. Sweden is the sole cause of the crisis I now experience; it must be ended: at all hazards, we must conquer a maritime peace."[†]

Napoleon had good reason for saying that France and her dependances were suffering at this terrible crisis. Such was the exhaustion and stoppage of industry in the principal towns of the Empire, that the paupers amounted, in many places, to a third, in some to two thirds of the whole population.† In Russia the system of paper credit was entirely ruined by the effects of the Continental system; and government paper had fallen so low, that the ruble in government paper in the loan negotiated with Pichler, on the 27th of March, 1810, was estimated at just one half of the silver ruble; and, taking this depreci-

ation into view, the interest stipulated by the lenders in reality amounted to twenty-eight per cent.* But, bad as this was, the financial and individual ruin in Prussia was incomparably greater: industry was everywhere at a stand from the want of external commerce, and the absorption of all domestic funds in the French requisitions; the exchequer was penniless, and the national credit extinct; a strong feeling of necessity and patriotic duty alone induced the few remaining capitalists to come forward to enable the king to meet the rigorous demands of Napoleon's tax-gatherers. The augmentation of the troops in her territory, in the course of 1810 and 1811, all of whom were fed, clothed, paid, and lodged at the expense of the bleeding state, was such as to exceed belief, if it were not attested by contemporary and authentic documents.† It may readily be conceived that it was not without extreme difficulty that such prodigious sums could, by the united efforts of the French and Prussian authorities, be extracted from the people; but here, too, the enormous power and irresistible forces of France had provided the means of extortion: the great fortress of Magdebourg had been converted into a prison for the defaulters in the state contributions from all the surrounding provinces; and into that huge bastille Davoust, at the head of an army of seventy thousand men, incessantly poured new shoals of victims. Yet, in spite of all their efforts, the demands of France could not be satisfied; and the books of Daru, the inspector-general of accounts, exhibited a continual and hopeless array of arrears undischarged, and debt accumulating.‡

It may readily be conceived that, in these circumstances, Prussia would willingly have thrown off her fetters if she could have done so with the slightest prospect of success. But such was the prostration and exhaustion of the country, and the universal terror excited by the arms of Napoleon, that the boldest heads and warmest hearts in that country could see no other mode of prolonging the national existence, and averting the immediate stroke of fate, but in a close alliance with, and unqualified submission to the dictates of Napoleon. Under the influence of these feelings, and overawed by the violent seizure of Swedish Pomerania, which Marshal Davoust entered in February, 1812, and immediately overran, at the head of twenty thousand men, on the one side, and the dread of the resumption of Silesia by its old owner, Austria, now in close alliance with France, on the other, the cabinet of Berlin not only acceded to, but invited the conclusion of a treaty, offensive and defensive, with France, whereby it was stipulated that there should be an alliance offensive and defensive between the two monarchs; that they should mutually guaranty the integrity of each other's territories; and that the Continental system should be enforced with the

* Hard., xi., 108.

† In a secret report by Chancellor Hardenberg to Baron Krusemark, by order of the king, on the 30th of August, 1811, it appeared that "the Saxon army was cantoned within in two days' march of the king's palace; Dantzic alone contains an army, in lieu of the 10,000 men stipulated by the treaties; France has augmented the troops on the Oder to 23,000 men, and their support alone cost the state 250,000 francs a month. The garrison of Stettin has been augmented to 17,500 men."—Report BARON HARDENBERG, 30th August, 1811, Hard., xi., 251.

‡ Hard., xi., 239, 249, 251. Schoell, x., 99, 100.

* Napoleon to Charles XIII., May 23, 1810.

† Napoleon to Charles XIII., Oct. 26, 1810, Bign., ix., 337, 341. Hard., xi., 129, 130.

‡ At Rome in 1810, of 147,000 souls, were paupers 30,000
At Amsterdam, of 217,000 " " " 80,000
At Venice, of 100,000 " " " 70,000
—HARDENBERG, xi., 253.

utmost rigour in all the Prussian harbours. It was stipulated, however, in secret articles, that the contingent of Prussia, which was fixed at twenty thousand men and sixty guns, besides twenty thousand men in garrison, "should not be exigible on account of any wars in which the emperor might engage beyond the Pyrenees, in Italy, or Turkey." In addition to this, the most minute stipulations were inserted, in separate conventions, concerning the march of troops through the Prussian territories, the supplies which were to be furnished to them, and the co-operation of Prussia in the projected war with Russia. The effects of this treaty appeared in the entrance of a hundred and eighty thousand infantry and seventy thousand cavalry, which immediately spread like a deluge through the Prussian territory, occupied all its fortresses, and devoured, as a cloud of locusts, the whole remaining resources of the country; while the Prussian contingent of twenty thousand men was, in a manner, drowned in the prodigious multitude by which it was surrounded. Shortly after, the French general, Durutte, was appointed governor of Berlin; and a royal edict prohibited the introduction of colonial produce, on any pretence, from the Russian into the Prussian territory.*

This treaty was immediately followed by another between France and Austria, which not only relieved Napoleon of all anxiety regarding the latter power, but put a considerable part of her resources at his command. Austria, since the peace of Vienna, had been treated in a very different manner from the dominions of Frederic William, or the lesser German States: her territory was respected, her fortresses garrisoned by her own troops, and the arrears of contributions collected and remitted by her own authorities. The same difference

March 14,
1812.

appeared in the treaty which was concluded between the cabinet of Vienna and that of the Tuileries. Austria was to furnish an auxiliary force of thirty thousand men and sixty pieces of cannon; the integrity of the dominions of the Sublime Porte was guaranteed against Russia; the two powers mutually guaranteed each other's dominions, and concluded an alliance offensive and defensive. By another secret treaty, which was attended with most important effects in the sequel, it was provided that the *casus fœderis* should not apply to the war beyond the Pyrenees, but expressly to one with Russia; that the province of Galicia should be guaranteed to Austria, even in the event of the kingdom of Poland being restored; that part of Galicia specified in the treaty might, in that event, be exchanged for the Illyrian provinces; and that due compensation, in the shape of an adequate aggrandizement of territory, should be provided for Austria in the event of a prosperous issue of the war. Turkey was to be invited to accede to the confederacy; and Prince Schwartzberg, still ambassador at Paris, was appointed to the command of the army.†

Nothing can paint Napoleon's astute policy better than these treaties. While in the secret treaty with Prussia he expressly provides for the case of a French war with Turkey, which he clearly contemplated, and which was declared

not to be within the *casus fœderis*—by the secret treaty with Austria, at the very same time, he disarmed the fears of the latter power on the Ottoman question, by expressly guarantying the integrity of the Ottoman dominions, and inviting that power to accede to the general league against Russia. And while, in his negotiations with Russia relative to the much-desired convention regarding Poland, he again and again expressed his readiness to sign an engagement "not to favour any design tending to the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland," he at the same time, in the secret treaty with Austria, provided for that very restoration, and stipulated the indemnity which she was to receive in Illyrian provinces for any Polish cessions she might be required to make for its completion.

While Napoleon was thus fortifying himself, by the accession of Austria and Prussia, for the great and decisive struggle which was approaching, England and Russia, on their part, were not idle; and an ally was gained for the cause of European independence in a quarter where it could least have been anticipated, but whose co-operation proved, in the end, of the most decisive importance in the subsequent contest. Sweden, farther removed from the scene of danger, and more deeply interested than either Prussia or Austria in the preservation of foreign commerce from the sterility of its territory, was not so immediately under the control of Napoleon; and both Charles XIII. and Bernadotte justly apprehended the overthrow of their infant dynasty, if they acceded, in all its rigour, to the imperious demands of the French emperor for war with England, and the exclusion of British manufactures from the Swedish harbours. M. Alquier, the French ambassador at Stockholm, never ceased to urge, in the most menacing manner, in the latter months of 1810, the necessity of an immediate choice of either a war with France, which would be followed by the conquest of Pomerania, or the immediate commencement of hostilities with England. To these demands, Bernadotte answered that a war with England would almost entirely destroy the Swedish revenue; that the estates of the kingdom would not submit to any direct imposition; that the arsenals, in consequence of the disastrous issue of the late war with Russia, were empty; that salt, an article of primary necessity to Sweden, could only be obtained from England; that the fleet at Carlscrona could not possibly be got to sea without a great expenditure; and that, so far from having the funds requisite for that purpose, the government had not even wherewithal to put the fortifications of that harbour in a state of defence against the English fleet. Napoleon remained perfectly deaf to all these representations; and as he left them no alternative, war was declared by Sweden against England in the middle of November, 1810.*†

* Bernadotte to Napoleon, November 19 and December 8, 1810, Schoell, x., 94, 96. Hard., xi., 128, 134.

† Napoleon's reply to these representations was in his usual laconic and imperious style. "You tell me that you wish to remain at peace with France; but I say, let me have proofs of this disposition. Foreign commerce is the present *cheval de bataille* of all nations. I can instantly cause you to be attacked by the Danes and Russians, and I will instantly do so if, in fifteen days, you are not at war with England. I have been long enough the dupe of Sweden as well as of Prussia; but the latter power has at last learned, by the catastrophe of Holland, that it was necessary to take a decided line. I cannot reckon always on the alliance of Russia. I loved the King of Holland, but, never-

* See Treaty in Martin, Sup., i., 414, and Secret Articles in Hard., ix., 325, 326, and Schoell, x., 116, 120.

† See Treaty in Martin, Sup., i., 427, and in Schoell, x., 123, 124.

Perfidious policy of Napoleon in these treaties.

The Swedish government, however, soon found that their condition was by no means ameliorated by their declaring war against England, so far as France was concerned; and they had ample opportunity of contrasting the manner in which they were treated by the English, against whom they had declared, and France, for whose alliance they had made such ruinous sacrifices.

Feigning to be ignorant of the Swedish declaration of war, the British cruisers committed no hostilities on the Swedish merchantmen; but, on the other hand, the French captured without mercy the Swedish vessels, under pretence that they were trading with England and were not

Dec. 26, 1810. furnished with French licenses, confiscated the cargoes, and threw the seamen into prison. Meanwhile, Napoleon demanded two thousand sailors from Sweden; and, as they were not immediately furnished, he insisted upon them sending twelve thousand.

Bernadotte answered, that Sweden had iron in its harbours to the value of a million sterling; and that, if Napoleon would take that instead of the seamen, it would be some relief to Swedish industry; but the emperor declined this, alleging that he had plenty of iron without going to Sweden for it. He next insisted that French custom-house officers

June 9, 1811. should be established at Gottenburg, and that Sweden should accede to a northern confederacy like that of the Rhine, of which he himself was to be the head, and which was to consist of Sweden, Denmark, and the Grand-duchy of Warsaw; but the Swedish monarch, aware of the change which had taken place in the close of 1810 in the policy of the Russian cabinet, and feeling his dependance upon Russia and England, both for his resources and his existence, declined the proposal. The consequence was, that, early in January,

Jan. 27, 1812. 1812, Napoleon entered Pomerania, overran the whole country, seized the fortress of Stralsund, confiscated all the Swedish ships in the harbour, imposed enormous contributions on the inhabitants, and armed all the merchant vessels in the harbours as privateers against the English commerce;* while the French civil authorities, who everywhere, like vultures, followed in the rear of their armies, established themselves in the whole country, and began to levy contributions for the use of the imperial treasury.

This last act of hostility, following on so long a train of injuries, determined the policy of the Swedish cabinet. Bernadotte lent a willing ear to the suggestions of Russia; and, on the 5th and 8th of April, 1812, treaties were concluded between the courts of St. Petersburg and Stockholm, by which the two contracting parties mutually guaranteed each other's possessions; and it was stipulated, on the one hand, that, in the event of a war with France, Sweden was to assist Russia with a corps of thirty thousand men, who were to operate, in conjunction with twenty thousand Rus-

The Swedish government allies itself with Russia and Great Britain. April 5, 1812.

sians, in the north of Germany; and that, in return, the Emperor of Russia was to guaranty Norway to Sweden, upon the latter power receiving an adequate indemnity in Pomerania; and, in the event of Denmark refusing to agree to this exchange, Russia was to aid Sweden with thirty-five thousand men to conquer Norway. These treaties were shortly afterward secretly communicated to the British government, from whom they met with the most favourable reception. Lord Wellesley, and subsequently Lord Castlereagh, who succeeded him in the direction of foreign affairs, exerted themselves to the utmost to promote these amicable dispositions; and, in consequence, a treaty of peace was concluded between Great Britain and Sweden, at Oerebro, on the 12th of July, 1812,* July 12, 1812. The British harbours were immediately opened to the Swedish vessels, and amicable relations immediately re-established between the two countries.†

Previous to engaging in hostilities, Napoleon's preparations were of so extensive a kind as indicated his sense of the magnitude of the contest in which he was about to engage. By a decree of the Senate, of the 13th of March, 1812, the whole male population of France capable of bearing arms was divided into three bans; a hundred cohorts of the first of which, estimated at 900,000 men, was to be immediately organized and put into active service, to guard the coast and frontier fortresses; and the two others, disciplined and equipped, without leaving their respective departments, but ready to take the field, when called on, for the service of the country. By these means, it was calculated that a reserve of 1,200,000 men could be raised to assist the French army.‡

According to his usual custom, when about to commence the most serious hostilities, Napoleon made proposals of peace to England. The terms now offered were, that the integrity of Spain should be guaranteed; that France should renounce all extension of her empire on the side of the Pyrenees; that the reigning dynasty in Spain should be declared independent, and the country governed by the national constitution of the Cortes; that the independence and security of Portugal should be guaranteed, and the house of Braganza reign in that kingdom; that the kingdom of Naples should remain in the hands of its present ruler, and that of Sicily with its existing king; and that Spain, Portugal, and Italy should be evacuated by the French and British troops, both by land and sea. To these proposals, Lord Castlereagh replied, that if by the term "reigning dynasty" the French government meant the royal authority of Spain and its

Napoleon's vast military preparations. March 13. 1812.

Napoleon's proposals of peace to England. April 17.

* Schoell, x., 101, 107.
† When Napoleon discovered that Sweden was inclining to the Russian alliance, he made the most vigorous efforts to endeavour to regain the former power to his own interest. For this purpose he offered to evacuate Pomerania, on condition that Sweden should aid him with thirty-five thousand men in his attack upon Russia; and if they did so, he offered to restore to them Finland, and admit them into participation of the benefits of the Confederation of the Rhine. But it was too late. Sweden had taken her part, and formed a sound judgment as to the real interests of her subjects; and the proposals, therefore, were rejected, even though supported by all the influence of the Austrian minister at the court of Stockholm.—Schoell, x., 100, 101.
‡ Moniteur, March 13, 1812. Bign., x., 172. Thib., viii., 372, 374.

theless, I confiscated his dominions, because he would not obey my will. I did the same with the Swiss. They hesitated on confiscating the English goods. I marched my troops into their dominions, and they soon obeyed. On the fifth day from this war must be declared, or my ambassador has orders to demand his passports. Open war or a sincere alliance. These are my last words."—NAPOLEON to BERNADOTTE, 11th Nov., 1810. HARDENBERG, xi., 130.

* Schoell, ix., 96, 101. Hard., xi., 131, 135.

government, as now vested in Joseph Bonaparte and the Cortes assembled under his authority, and not the government of Ferdinand VII., the true monarch of Spain, and the Cortes assembled by his authority, no negotiation could be admitted on such a basis. No reply was made by Napoleon to this answer; and it is evident that the proposal was made with no real prospect of an accommodation, but merely to sow suspicion between the courts of London and St. Petersburg, or to give him the advantage which he always desired, of being able to hold out to Europe, at the commencement of a new war, that he had in vain made proposals of accommodation to his enemies.*

When hostilities had been thus long and openly anticipated between France and Russia, it is of little moment to inquire what were the immediate and ostensible grounds which led to the rupture between the two cabinets. Down to the very commencement of hostilities, notes continued to be interchanged between Champagny and Romanzoff, which did little more than recapitulate the mutual grounds of complaint of the two cabinets against each other.† Napoleon continually reproached Russia with the imperfect execution of the Continental system, the imperial ukase of the 31st of December, 1810, the armaments in the interior of Russia, and the fortifications on the Dwina; the transference of powerful forces from the Danube to the Niemen; and the protest of Alexander against the incorporation of the Duchy of Oldenburg with the French Empire. On the other hand, the ministers of Russia represented that these measures, though apparently hostile, were defensive merely, rendered necessary by the immense accumulation of French troops in Poland and the north of Germany, the invasion of Swedish Pomerania, the extension of the French Empire over the whole Hanse Towns and to the Baltic Sea, and the incorporation of the Duchy of Oldenburg with Napoleon's empire. Nevertheless, Alexander offered to come to an accommodation, and dis-

miss his armaments, on condition that France would evacuate Prussia and Swedish Pomerania, reduce the garrison of Dantzic, and come to an arrangement with the King of Sweden. This ultimatum remained without any answer on the part of the French government, and it was soon sufficiently evident that the decision of both sovereigns had been finally come to; for on the 29th of April Alexander arrived at Wilna, and in the middle of May Napoleon set out for Dresden.*

All Europe was held in anxious suspense by the evident approach of the dreadful conflict which had so long been preparing between these two colossal empires, which were thus about to bring the whole forces of Christendom into the contest. Influenced, however, by the calamitous issue of all former wars against Napoleon, but slender hopes were entertained of any successful result of this last resistance now attempted in the north. The power of Napoleon appeared too great to be withstood by any human efforts; and even the strongest heads could anticipate no other issue from the war than the final prostration of Russia, the conquest of Turkey, and the establishment of French supremacy from the English Channel to the Black Sea. The English still followed with intense interest the energetic career of Wellington in the Peninsula; but his fate too, it was evident, was wrapped up in the issue of the approaching contest; and even the most sanguine could hardly hope for anything but disaster to the British arms if Napoleon, victorious over Russia and Turkey, were to bring back his conquering legions from the Vistula and the Danube to the banks of the Ebro. A general despair, in consequence, seized the minds of men: it seemed doubtful if even the British navy in the end could secure the independence of this favoured isle; and the general subjugation of the whole civilized world was anticipated—probably to be rescued from slavery only by a fresh deluge of northern barbarians.

* Schoell, x., 128, 129. Parl. Deb., xxii., 1074, 1075.
† Maret.

* Maret to Romanzoff, April 25, 1812. Kourakin to Maret, April 24, 1812. Schoell, x., 130, 135. Hard., xi, 371, 375.

CHAPTER LXVI.

ADVANCE OF NAPOLEON TO MOSCOW.

ARGUMENT.

Napoleon's secret Reasons for the War with Russia.—Vast Force which he had collected for that Enterprise.—Universal Enthusiasm with which the Expedition was regarded in the French Empire.—Different Feelings of the Troops of different Nations.—Disinclination of the Marshals and older Officers for the Campaign.—Views of the Russian Government on the approaching Contest.—Religion and Patriotism the Principles to which they appealed.—Plan of the Russian Government to resist the Invasion.—Desponding Feelings of the English.—Military Preparations of the French Emperor for the Contest.—Force of the French Army.—Force of the Russians.—Forces which they had collected on the Frontier to oppose the Invasion.—Division of Napoleon's Forces at the Outset of the Campaign.—General Aspect of the Polish Provinces adjoining Russia.—Napoleon leaves Paris.—Splendour of his Residence at Dresden.—His confident Anticipations of Success in the Campaign.—Distress in Poland on the first Entrance of the French Army.—Prodigious Efforts of the Emperor for the Supply of his Troops, and to elevate their Spirit.—Approach of the French Army to the Niemen.—Napoleon's Proclamation to his Soldiers on Crossing the River.—Splendid Scene on the Crossing of the River.—Proclamation of the Emperor Alexander to the Russians on the Invasion.—Noble Resolution of the Russian Army and People.—Their Forces retreat on all Sides.—Napoleon enters Wilna, and remains there seventeen Days.—Enthusiasm of the Poles on that Event.—Address of the Polish Diet to the Emperor.—His Views on the Subject, and Reply.—Movements of Jerome Bonaparte against Bagrathion.—Their ill Success, and consequent Displeasure of Napoleon.—Combat at Mohilow.—Bagrathion effects his Retreat to Smolensko.—Retreat of the Russian main Army to the intrenched Camp at Drissa, and thence to Polotsk.—Napoleon advances to the Dwina.—Rendezvous of the principal Part of his Forces in Front of Witepsk.—Position of the Russians, and Force which Barclay had collected there.—Intelligence from Bagrathion induces him to retreat to Smolensko.—Admirable Order in which the Retreat was conducted.—Advance of the French to Witepsk, and Reasons for their Halt there.—Immense Difficulty experienced in providing Subsistence for the invading Army.—Causes to which it was owing.—The Emperor Alexander repairs to Moscow to hasten the Armaments in the Interior.—Proclamation to the Nation.—Generous and patriotic Devotion of the Inhabitants of Moscow.—Departure of the Emperor for St. Petersburg.—Opinion of Napoleon on these Proclamations.—First Operations of Count Wittgenstein on the Dwina.—Oudinot, reproached by Napoleon, again moves against him.—Operations of Tormasoff against Schwartzenberg.—Information received at Witepsk of the Conclusion of Peace between the Russians and Turks, and an Alliance between Sweden and England.—Argument against any farther Advance at the French Headquarters, and Answer of Napoleon.—Reflections on this Determination.—Barclay advances against the Right of the French Army.—Napoleon advances against Smolensko.—Heroic Action of Newerofski, near Krasnoi.—Both Armies approach Smolensko.—Description of that City.—First Attack of Ney on the Citadel, which is repulsed.—Napoleon's Dispositions for a general Attack on the Town.—Noble Appearance of the attacking Army.—The Russian Army retires in the Night, leaving a strong Rear-guard only in the City.—Bloody Attack on the Town, which proves unsuccessful.—Repulse of Napoleon, and Results of the Battle.—Splendid Appearance of the burning City at Night.—Retreat of the Russians from Smolensko.—Circular March of Barclay to regain the Moscow Road and Bagrathion's Corps.—Battle of Valentina.—Measures of Napoleon to restore the Combat.—Desperate Valour displayed on both Sides.—Results of this bloody Action.—Singular good Fortune of the Russians on this Occasion.—Napoleon's Visit to the Field of Battle.—General Uneasiness and Depression of the French Army.—Enormous Losses already sustained from Sickness and Fatigue.—Napoleon's Reasons for a farther Advance.—Reasons which induced the Russian Generals to prepare for a Battle.—Operations of Schwartzenberg against Tormasoff, of St. Cyr against Wittgenstein, and of Macdonald against Riga.—Advance of Victor to Smolensko, of Augereau from the Oder, and of the National Guard of France to the Elbe.—Advance of Napoleon towards Moscow.—Appointment of Kutusoff to the supreme Command.—His Character and previous Achievements.—Arrival of Kutusoff at the Headquarters of the Army.—Extraordinary Skill and Order of the Russian Retreat.—Order of the French Pursuit.—Description of the Country through which the French Army passed in advancing to Moscow.—The Russians take post at Borodino.—Description of their Position there.—Napoleon's Arrival on the Field of Battle.—Attack on the Redoubt in Front.—Napoleon receives the Account of the Battle of Salamanca.—Night previous to the Battle.—Napoleon's Proclamation to his Soldiers.—Efforts of the Russians to animate the Spirits of their Troops.—Forces engaged on both Sides.—Davoust's Plan of Attack, which is rejected by the Emperor, who resolves to attack by *echelon*, from the Right.—Russian Dispositions for the Battle.—French Preparations for the Attack.—Proclamation of Kutusoff to his Troops.—Feelings of the Soldiers on both Sides.—BATTLE OF BORODINO.—Commencement of the Action.—Success of Ney and Eugene in the Centre.—Ney and Davoust, after an obstinate Conflict, carry the Heights of Semonowkoie.—The great Redoubt is taken and retaken.—Alarm on the Left by an Irruption of Russian Cavalry.—Grand successful Attack on the great Redoubt.—Its Capture leads to no decisive Result.—Fresh Advance of the Russian Centre.—Final Operations of the Day.—Magnitude and Importance of this Battle.—Loss on both Sides.—Want of Vigour evinced by Napoleon in this Battle.—Sound Reason, nevertheless, which prevented him from engaging his Reserves.—Reflections on the Battle.—Distressed Condition of the French Army at its Termination.—Orderly Retreat of the Russians towards Moscow.—Debate in the Russian Council of War whether they should evacuate Moscow.—Reasons given in the Council of War, by Kutusoff, for abandoning Moscow.—Total Deficiency of Supplies, if known to the Russians, would have forced the French to halt and retreat.—Universal Desertion of the City by the Inhabitants.—Arrival of the French at Moscow.—Description of that City.—Transports of the French Troops at the Sight.—The French enter, and find the City deserted.—Preparations made by the Russians for burning it.—First Night of the French in Moscow.—Commencement of the Conflagration.—Awful Appearance of the Fire during the following Night.—Disorder and Consternation in the City.—Napoleon at length leaves the Kremlin.—Horror of Moscow after the Fire had ceased.—Semicircular March of the Russian Army round the City.—Feelings of the Soldiers in the Russian Army on this Occasion.

They are little acquainted, says Marshal St. Cyr, with the progress of ambition, Napoleon's secret reasons who are surprised that Napoleon undertook the war in Russia. It is for the war the nature of that desire, as of all with Russia. other vehement passions, to be insatiable. Every gratification it receives only renders it the more vehement, until at length it outsteps the bounds of physical nature, and quenches itself in the flame it has raised. Napoleon knew well that his empire was founded on the *prestige* of popular opinion; that, to maintain that opinion, it was necessary that he should continually advance; that the moment his victories ceased his throne began to totter. The public, habituated to victory by his successes, were no longer to be dazzled by ordinary achievements: he felt that his later triumphs must eclipse those of his earlier years; that if he only equalled them, he would be thought to have retrograded; that victories might have sufficed for the General of the Republic, but conquest must attend the steps of the Emperor of the West. To overthrow Austria, or conquer Italy, might suffice for his earlier

years; but nothing could revive the enthusiasm of the people in later times but the destruction of the Colossus of the North. From the moment that he launched into the career of conquest, he had perilled his fortune on a single throw—universal dominion or a private station.* Such is the universal law of nature: the principle which leads to the punishment of national equally as individual sins; the curb at once on the pride of aristocracy, the madness of Democracy, and the rage of conquest; the fetter which checks the excesses of men, and the limit which restrains the rulers of nations.

Since the fall of the Roman Empire, no monarch had ever attained the commanding station which Napoleon occupied at the commencement of the Russian war. The influence of Charlemagne extended over a smaller surface, and embraced only barbarous states: the hordes of Timour were hardly as numerous, and incomparably inferior in discipline and equipment. Even the myriads of Attila or Genghis Khan exhibited no such combination of the muniments of war, and foreboded no such permanent subjection of the liberties of mankind. From the shores of the Baltic to the mountains of Calabria, from the sands of Bourdeaux to the forests of the Vistula, the whole forces of Europe were marshalled at his will; the accumulated wealth of ages was turned to the support of one gigantic power; and the military prowess, which centuries of glory had fostered in rival states, combined under the banners of one victorious leader.

The acknowledged supremacy of his genius had extinguished the jealousies even of the armies who had suffered most in his career. The Austrians and Italians, the Prussians and Bavarians, marched in the same ranks with the French and the Poles. The partition of Poland, the humiliation of Prussia, the conquest of Austria, were for a time forgotten: the conquerors of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena, were to be seen side by side with the vanquished in these disastrous combats. However much the sense of present humiliation might oppress the governments, or the recollection of recent wrongs rankle in the minds of the people he had vanquished, the necessity of present submission was felt by all: one only passion, the desire of conquest, animated the varied bands who followed his standard; one only career, that of military glory, remained to the youth in the realms he had subdued.†

During the spring of 1812, the whole roads of France and Germany were thronged by cavalry, infantry, and artillery, hastening to the scene of the approaching conflict. The varied aspect and splendid equipment of these troops excited the strongest feelings of enthusiasm in the military people through whom they passed. It appeared impossible that any human efforts could resist the immense force which was converging towards the Vistula: the presence of Napoleon ensured victory, immediate advancement and lasting glory awaited those who distinguished themselves in the combats. Such was the general enthusiasm which was excited in every part of the emperor's vast dominions, that young men of the richest and the noblest families eagerly solicited employment

in an expedition where success appeared certain, and danger unlikely.† All heads were turned by the torrent; ambition, in every age and rank, was dazzled by the apparent brilliancy of the prospect. The expedition, said they, which is preparing will throw that of Egypt into the shade. Never had the instinct of war, the passion for military glory, more strongly seconded the ambition of the chief of an empire. "We are setting out for Moscow, but we will soon return," were the words with which the joyous youth everywhere took leave of their parents, their relations, their friends. The march to Petersburg or Moscow seemed only a military promenade—a hunting party of six months' duration, in which little danger was to be met, but ample excitement experienced—a last effort, which would place the empire of Napoleon and the glory of France beyond the reach of danger. The magnificence of the spectacle and the brilliancy of the prospects spread these feelings even among the people of the vanquished states: the expected restoration of Poland and humiliation of Russia gave an air of romance to the approaching expedition; and thousands breathed wishes for its success, who were destined soon to be aroused by nobler emotions, or to perish in a holier cause.*

Notwithstanding, however, the general enthusiasm which animated the warlike multitude, the different nations of whom it was composed were inspired by very different feelings; and, though the resplendent chains of the Empire held them all for the time in willing obedience, yet the elements of discord existed, and, it might have been foreseen, would break out if any serious disaster befell the head of the confederacy. The Prussians beheld with ill-suppressed grief their banners associated with those of the conqueror and oppressor of their country; the Austrians, after having contended for twenty years with France, blushed at being themselves ranged as auxiliaries under the power with whom they had so long struggled for mastery; even the Germans of the Rhenish Confederacy, notwithstanding their longer union with the troops of Napoleon, were filled with discontented feelings, and could not disguise the conviction, that every victory they gained for the imperial despot was riveting more firmly the fetters about their own necks. The Poles alone, cheered by the anticipated restoration of their country, and indignant at the repeated wrongs they had experienced from Russia, advanced with joyful steps to the conflict, and prepared to strike for the cause of national independence, not the interests or ambition of any external power. Yet, such is the marvellous effect of military subordination, and of the point of military honour, that the enormous assemblage of armed men were animated by one common feeling of warlike enthusiasm, and the commands of Napoleon were as readily obeyed by the Italians, Germans, or Prussians, as the guards of the French Empire.‡

In one important particular, however, the composition of the army was very different from what it had been in the earlier periods of the Republic. Though the young officers and fresh conscripts were animated with the utmost ardour, yet the older generals and marshals, whose fortunes were made, and in whom

* St Cyr, Hist. Militaire, iii., 2, 3. † Ségur, i., 125.

* Ségur, i., 101, 128, 131. Fain, MS. de 1812, i., 46, 47 De Pradt, Varsovie en 1812, 58.

‡ Chambray, Guerre de Russie, i., 165, 166.

age was beginning to extinguish the fires of youth, were by no means equally eager for the contest. Having nothing farther to look to in military advancement, and not feeling "the necessity of conquest to existence," which, in every period of his career, was so strongly experienced by their chief, they beheld with ill-disguised aversion the mortal conflict in which they were now about to be engaged, and sighed for their palaces, their châteaux, and their pleasures, instead of the hardships and privations of a Russian campaign. Napoleon perceived and lamented this change in his old companions in arms: he felt no such refrigeration in himself, and was astonished that they did not follow him in the close of his career with the same ardour as in its commencement. Unable, however, to overcome their repugnance for bold counsels, he gradually estranged himself from their society, concentrated his burning thoughts in his breast, and not unfrequently withdrew from a council of marshals into an embrasure of a window,* where he opened his mind in unreserved communication with some young general of division, whose ideas were more in harmony with the undiminished energy which he felt in his own bosom.

The Russian government was fully aware of the approaching danger, and had for a considerable period been silently preparing to meet it. Upward of a year before, a large portion of the Turkish army, as already noticed, had been withdrawn from the Danube, and the main strength of the Empire collected on the Niemen.† The Emperor Alexander had, by the address of his aid-de-camp Chernicheff, obtained an apparently accurate, though, as was afterward experienced, deceptive detail of the strength of the "Grand Army," its destination, and the several corps of which it was composed. He resolved to oppose to the vast preparations of the French emperor the indomitable perseverance of northern valour; and, without provoking the contest, to undergo everything rather than yield in the strife. The nobles, at this crisis, rallied around the throne with a spirit worthy of the Roman senators; and the poor peasants, ignorant of the magnitude of the danger by which they were to be assailed, prepared to die in defence of their country and their religion.‡

Military spirit prevailed to a considerable degree in the Russian army, but by no means to the extent which subsequently existed after the unparalleled successes of the war. The disastrous issue of all preceding contests with France, and the doubtful event of the war with the Turks, had spread a desponding feeling both through the government and the country. Alexander and his council were prepared, indeed, to resist, but it was rather with the mournful and magnanimous resolution of perishing in defence of their country, than from any confident hope of being able to achieve its deliverance. They had to contend with a monarch of consummate military talents, whose career of victory had been unbroken, with an army inured to conquest by twenty years of success, and who now led on more than half the forces of Continental Europe to overwhelm the resistance of its only remaining independent power. In such a conflict they were well aware the chances of victory, the hope of success, lay all on the other side. Wordly mo-

tives, usually so powerful in the human breast, could in vain be appealed to; but Alexander found the means of meeting it in those higher and more generous principles, which, unknown in ordinary times, unfelt by ordinary men, yet exist in every heart, if not overwhelmed by the intensity of selfish desires, and not unfrequently defeat all the calculations of the most experienced observers, by the brilliancy with which they shine forth on extraordinary occasions. RELIGION and PATRIOTISM were the principles to which the Russian government appealed in the awful crisis, and they met with a responsive echo in every heart within their dominions. Every proclamation to the people, every address to the nobles, breathed the language of religious or patriotic devotion. The emperor, neither confident nor depressed, appeared prepared to combat to the last man in defence of his country, and, if necessary, be the last martyr in its cause. The French, like mankind in general, ridiculed sentiments of which they were ignorant, and stigmatized as fanatical the efforts of the Russian authorities to imprint a religious character upon the contest: little aware that the forces of revolution, in other words, the passions of the world, cannot be successfully combated but by an appeal to religious emotion, that is, the motives of heaven; and that, when the Emperor Alexander elevated the standard of the Cross, he invoked the only power that ever has, or ever will, arrest the march of temporal revolution.*

It was not without due consideration, and a full appreciation of the sacrifices with which it would be attended, that the cabinet of St. Petersburg had adopted the resolution of engaging in a war of life or death with the French Empire. They had carefully studied the warfare of Wellington in Portugal; and a military memoir of extraordinary ability, still preserved in the archives of St. Petersburg, had pointed to that sagacious and scientific campaign as the model on which the defensive system of Russia should be founded.† To support the plan of operations, an intrenched camp, capable of containing the whole Russian army, had been constructed at Drissa to cover the approach to St. Petersburg. A strong *tête-du-pont* at Borissov covered the passage of the Berezina by the route of Moscow; and the ramparts of Smolensko, the bulwark of Old Russia, were armed with cannon, and put in a respectable state of defence. But none of these strongholds were capable of resisting the vast forces which Napoleon had at his disposal. They were intended as obstacles only to retard the advance of his army, leaving it to other and more powerful agents to accomplish his destruction. For this purpose, the Russian armies, like those of Wellington down the valley of the Tagus, were to retire slowly into the interior of the Empire; the country, as they fell back, was to be denuded of its inhabitants and laid waste; clouds of light horse were to harass the flanks and cut off the foraging parties of the advancing enemy; and every effort made to rouse the rural population, and inspire them with a religious zeal in the great contest in which they were about to be engaged. By these means it was hoped the forces of the French emperor, great as they undoubtedly were, would be gradually wasted away. Every step they advanced in a desolate realm would bring them nearer their ruin; and the very

* Fain, i., 46, 47.

† Ante, iii., p. 511.

‡ Bout, i., 103, 106. Sav., iii., 140.

* Fain, i., 76, 317. Chamb., i., 176.

† Hard., ix., 274.

magnitude of his army would ultimately prove an insupportable encumbrance, from the impossibility of providing subsistence for such a multitude. But it was impossible to rouse a national spirit in Lithuania, because its inhabitants, ancient Poles, being seized with the desire of recovering their independence, were animated with the strongest spirit in favour of the invaders; and therefore this system could really be carried into effect only when the army reached Smolensko, the ancient frontier of Russia; and the erroneous information which Chernicheff had obtained at Paris as to the strength of the French army, led the emperor to miscalculate the force which would be requisite to repel it, and rendered necessary a much farther retreat, and more extensive sacrifices, than had at first been relied on.*

The repeated defeats of the Russians, in the preceding wars with Napoleon, spread feelings of a desponding feeling throughout the English. English people in regard to the approaching contest. Taught by the disastrous consequences of former coalitions, the British government made no attempt to stake the last chance of Europe on the hazardous issue of Continental war; and, contrary to all former precedent, they neither offered, nor would Russia accept, any pecuniary assistance. Mr. Perceval stated, in the House of Commons, that Russia engaged in the contest on her own responsibility,† and without any instigation on the part of England; and the Czar sought to animate the patriotism of the people by the assurance that they stood alone in the contest, and would share with none the glory of success.

The forces which Napoleon at that period commanded amounted to the enormous number of nearly twelve hundred thousand men, almost all in the highest state of discipline and equipment. Of these eight hundred and fifty thousand were native French, and of that body only three hundred thousand were engaged in the Spanish war. A population of forty-three millions in the French Empire, and eight more in the kingdom of Italy and the Illyrian provinces, afforded apparently ample means of recruiting his losses; but as the conscription had ceased to be productive from the arrival of the period when those occasioned in the early Revolutionary war produced a chasm in the births of 1794 and 1795, and, consequently, in the population between eighteen and twenty years of age, he resorted to an extraordinary method of providing for the security of his dominions: All the inhabitants of the French Empire, and of the kingdom of Italy, capable of bearing arms, were formed into three bans, as they were called: the first comprehending all those from twenty to twenty-six years of age; the second, from twenty-six to forty; the third, from forty to sixty years of age. One hundred and twenty thousand of the first ban was immediately placed at the disposal of the minister of war. This extraordinary measure, unknown in any former contest, demonstrates both how fatally the conscription had operated upon the male population of France, and may be regarded as one of the first prognostics that the Empire had reached the limits of physical nature, and approached its fall. The weakness of age fell at once upon it, when the chasms occasioned by the dreadful wars of 1793

and 1794 appeared in the male population which should be available for the purposes of the conscription. The total failure of the conscription after 1811 demonstrated that the early wars of the Revolution had mowed down the race from which the defenders of the Empire should have sprung.*

The Grand Army itself, which was now concentrated in Poland, or ready to support the movements of those in advance, was divided into thirteen corps of infantry and four of cavalry, and amounted to the immense aggregate of above five hundred thousand men.† Of these, above eighty thousand were cavalry, and they were supported by thirteen hundred pieces of cannon. Nearly twenty thousand chariots or carts, of all descriptions, followed the army; and the horses employed in the artillery, the cavalry, and the conveyance of the baggage, amounted to the unprecedented number of one hundred and eighty-seven thousand. No such stupendous accumulation of armed men had yet been formed in modern times, or probably since the beginning of the world.‡ Of this prodigious armament, however, only two hundred thousand were native French; the remainder were Germans, Italians, Poles, Swiss, and Austrians, whom the terror of the French arms had compelled, how unwillingly soever, to follow their banners. "Exercitus mixtus ex colluvione omnium gentium quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis; alius habitus, aliae vestes, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra."§

The forces which the Russian Empire had to oppose to this crusade were much less considerable at the commencement of the campaign, but they were constantly increased as the war rolled into the interior of the Empire, and before its close the armies on the two sides were nearly equal. Its regular forces amounted, in the close of 1811, to five hundred and seventeen thousand men; but of these nearly seventy thousand were in garrison, and the remainder dispersed over an immense surface, from the Danube to the Gulf of Finland, and from the Niemen to the Caucasus. Two successive levies had, however, been effected since that period, which furnished most seasonable supplies of disciplined men to the armies, as they were successively thinned by the casualties of war.||

To oppose the invasion of the French, the Russians had collected two hundred and seventeen thousand in the first line, and thirty-five thousand in the second; and the army of Moldavia, amounting to fifty thousand, ultimately appeared on the scene, and took an active share in the close of the campaign. Their united strength was nearly three hundred thousand, of which above fifty thousand were cavalry, and they brought into the field upward of eight hundred pieces of cannon.¶ The forces of the French, therefore, exceeded those of the Russians by nearly three hundred thousand men; but the former were at an immense distance from their resources, and had no means of recruiting their losses, whereas the latter were in their own

* Bout., i., 80, 81, 88, 89. Jom., iv., 52. Sav., v., 273.

† See note A, Appendix.

‡ Jom., iv., 52. Chamb., i., 386.

§ Liv., i., 28. c. 12. Jom., iv., 52. Chamb., i., 386.

|| Ginski, iii., 138.

¶ Bout., i., 106.

¶ See note B, Appendix.

* Chamb., i., 176, 177. Fain, i., 176. Bout., i., 164.

† Parl. Deb., July 13, 1812.

country, and supported by the devotion of a patriotic and devoted people. By the foresight of the government, thirty-six depôts, in the provinces bordering on the supposed theatre of war, had been formed, to supply the losses occasioned by the campaign, and proved of the most essential service in the progress of the war.*

Napoleon's forces, at the commencement of the campaign, were divided into three great masses. The first, two hundred and twenty thousand strong, under the immediate orders of the emperor, was destined to overwhelm the first Russian army, under the command of Barclay de Tolly, who had only one hundred and twenty-seven thousand; the second, consisting of seventy-five thousand, under Jerome, was to crush Prince Bagration, whose forces were only forty-eight thousand; the viceroy, at the head of seventy-five thousand, was charged with the important task of throwing himself between these two Russian armies, and preventing their reunion. Besides these great armies, the right wing of the French, thirty thousand strong, under Schwartzberg, was opposed to Tormasoff, who had forty thousand under his orders; and the left, of the same strength, under Macdonald, was destined to act against Riga, where Essen, with an inconsiderable force, awaited his approach.†

The face of the country on the western frontier of Russia is in general flat, and in many places marshy. Vast woods of pine cover the plains, and the rivers flow in some places through steep banks, in others stagnate over extensive swamps, which often present the most serious obstacles to military operations. Cultivation in Lithuania is so inconsiderable, that the fields of corn seem cut out of gloomy forests; the villages are few and miserable; the little industry which exists is owing to the Jews, who reside in the towns in great numbers. Inhabiting a rich country, the Poles are destitute of the common necessities of life: employed in raising magnificent crops of wheat, they seldom taste anything but rye-bread, oats, or the coarsest fare. The miserable aspect of the country attracted the notice even of the careless followers of Napoleon's army; but the warlike spirit of the people was undecayed, and the peasants, equally with the nobles, retained that aptitude for war, and facility at assuming its discipline and duties, which in every age have formed their honourable characteristic.‡

Napoleon left Paris on the 9th of May: the Empress Marie Louise accompanied him to Dresden. The whole splendour of reigns of Germany were there assembled, including the Emperor Francis and the King of Prussia. The empress had left Germany as a sacrifice to the interests of her country: she returned beside the conqueror of the world, surrounded by the pomp of more than imperial splendour. The theatres of Paris had been transferred to Dresden; the assembled courts of Europe there awaited her approach; the oldest potentates yielded to the ascendancy of her youthful diadem. During the magnificent series of pageants which followed her arrival, flattery exhausted its talent and lux-

ury its magnificence; and the pride of the Cæsars was forgotten in the glory of one who had risen upon the ruins of their antiquated splendour. No adequate conception can be formed of the astonishing power and grandeur of Napoleon, but by those who witnessed his residence on this occasion at Dresden. The emperor occupied the principal apartments of the palace; his numerous suite were accommodated around; the august guests of the King of Saxony all looked to him as the centre of attraction. Four kings were frequently to be seen waiting in his antechamber; queens were the maids of honour to Marie Louise. With more than Eastern magnificence he distributed diamonds, snuff-boxes, and crosses among the innumerable crowd of princes, ministers, dukes, and courtiers, who thronged, with Oriental servility, around his steps; whenever he appeared in public, nothing was to be heard but praises of his grandeur and magnificence. The vast crowd of strangers, the superb equipages which thronged the streets, the brilliant guards which were stationed in all the principal parts of the city, the constant arrival and departure of couriers from or towards every part of Europe, all announced the king of kings, who was now elevated to the highest pinnacle of earthly grandeur.*

No fears for the issue of the gigantic expedition which he had undertaken ever crossed the mind of the emperor, or the cortege of kings and princes by whom he was surrounded. "Never," said he, "was the success of an expedition more certain: I see on all sides nothing but probabilities in my favour. Not only do I advance at the head of the immense forces of France, Italy, Germany, the Confederation of the Rhine, and Poland, but the two monarchies which have hitherto been the most powerful auxiliaries of Russia against me, have now ranged themselves on my side: they espouse my quarrel with the zeal of my oldest friends. Why should I not number in a similar class Turkey and Sweden? The former at this moment is, in all probability, resuming its arms against the Russians: Bernadotte hesitates, it is true, but he is a Frenchman; he will regain his old associations at the first cannon-shot; he will not refuse to Sweden so favourable an opportunity of avenging the disasters of Charles XII. Never again can such a favourable combination of circumstances be anticipated: I feel that it draws me on; and, if Alexander persists in refusing my propositions, I will pass the Niemen."† Marvellous as is the contrast between these anticipations and the actual issue of the campaign, the penetration of few men in Europe could at that time presage a different result from the French emperor; and Madame de Staël expressed the almost universal opinion, that "when Napoleon was at Dresden in 1812, surrounded by all the sovereigns of Germany, and commanding an army of five hundred thousand men, it appeared impossible, according to all human calculation, that his expedition should not succeed."‡

No sooner had he arrived in Poland than the emperor was assailed by the cries of the peasantry, who were ruined by his soldiers. Notwithstanding the utmost exertions on his part to prevent pillage, and to provide for their necessities, the enormous multitude of men and horses

* Bout., i., 112, 152, 154.

† Bout., i., 152, 157. Jom., iv., 51, 53. Ségur, i., 139.

‡ Bout., i., 122, 123. Labaume, 20. Burnett's Poland, i., 90.

* Ségur, i., 108. Jom., iv., 40, 41. Fain, i., 63, 67. De Pradt, Varsovie, 36, 37. Las. Cas., ii., 361.

† Fain, i., 68, 69. ‡ De Staël. Réc. Franç., ii., 401.

Distress in Poland on the first entrance of the French army. June 17.

who were assembled speedily exhausted the country. It was in vain that his prudent foresight had provided numerous battalions of light and heavy chariots for the provisioning of the army: innumerable carriages laden with tools of every description, twenty-six squadrons of wagons laden with military equipages, several thousand light caissons, carrying luxuries, as well as objects of necessity of every description, and six complete sets of pontoons; the wants of such a prodigious accumulation of troops speedily exhausted all the means of subsistence which the country afforded, and all the stores they could convey with them. Forced requisitions of horses, chariots, and oxen from the peasantry, soon became necessary; and the Poles, who expected deliverance from their bondage, were stripped of everything they possessed by their liberators. To such a pitch did the misery subsequently arrive, that the richest families in Warsaw were literally in danger of starving, and the interest of money rose to eighty per cent.* Yet such was the rapidity of the marches at the opening of the campaign, that the greater part of these exactions were abandoned or destroyed before the army had advanced many leagues into the Russian territory.

Enormous magazines had been formed to provide for the wants of the troops in the campaign. By the treaty, already mentioned, concluded with Prussia a short time before, that unhappy country was compelled to furnish

Prodigious efforts of the emperor for the supply of his troops.

220,000 quintals of oats, 24,000 of rice, 2,000,000 bottles of beer, 400,000 quintals of wheat, 600,000 of straw, 350,000 of hay, 6,000,000 boisseaux of oats, 44,000 oxen, 15,000 horses, 3600 carriages, harnessed and furnished with drivers and horses, and hospitals provided with every requisite for 20,000 patients. At Dantzic, the grand dépôt of the army, innumerable military stores were collected, and magazines capable of being transported by water through the Frischaff to Königsberg, and by land across the country to Interberg, where they were received on the Niemen. The active and impassioned mind of the emperor had long been incessantly occupied with this object: the whole day was passed in dictating letters to his generals on the subject; in the night he frequently rose from bed to reiterate his commands. "For masses such as are now to be put in movement," said he, "the resources of no country can suffice. All the caissons must be ready to be laden with bread, flour, rice, vegetables, and brandy, besides what is requisite for the movable columns. My manoeuvres may assemble in a moment four hundred thousand men at one point: the country will be totally unable to provide for them; everything must be brought by themselves."[†]

Before approaching the Niemen, the emperor reviewed the principal corps of his army. On these occasions, according to his usual practice, he passed through the ranks of the soldiers, and inquired minutely into their wants and equipments. The veterans he reminded of the battles of the Pyramids, of the glories of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena; the conscripts seemed equally the object of attention: was their pay regularly received,

were their rations faithfully served out, had they any complaints to make against their officers? Frequently he halted in the centre of a regiment, and, calling the troops around him, inquired what commissions were vacant, and who were most worthy to hold them; and, having ascertained the age, services, and wounds of those specified, immediately appointed them to the vacant situations in the presence of their comrades. By attentions such as these, Napoleon gained the hearts of his soldiers, and produced that enthusiastic attachment to his person which, as much as the splendour of his military talent, distinguished every period of his career.*

At length he approached the Niemen, and the numerous battalions of the Grand Army converged towards Kowno, which, being the extreme point of a salient angle, where the Prussian projected into the Russian territory, seemed a favourable point for commencing operations. The infantry arrived in good order, and left but few stragglers behind; but the cavalry and artillery had already begun to suffer severely: the grass, the hay, the meadows, were soon entirely consumed by the enormous multitude of horses which passed along, and the succeeding columns suffered severely from the devastation of those which had preceded them. Two hundred and twenty thousand men, and a hundred thousand horses, now concentrated at the point of junction of four different roads at Interberg on the Pregel, presented a mass of combatants unparalleled in modern times for their efficiency and splendour. Before setting out for the Niemen, the troops were all served with provisions to convey them beyond that river to Wilna, the capital of Russian Poland. But all the care of the emperor and his lieutenants was unable to provide subsistence for such stupendous masses: the carriages and cattle which had been seized in Old Prussia, under a provision that they should be sent back as soon as they reached the Niemen, were still kept for service beyond that river, and the unhappy owners resumed the road to their homes, destitute either of money or provisions, and uttering the loudest complaints against the injustice with which they had been treated. Pillage and disorder were already universal on the flanks of the army, and it was easy to foresee that want of provisions would prove the great difficulty of the campaign. The masses, however, pressed on without intermission; and at length, on the 23d of June, before daybreak, the imperial columns

approached the river, which as yet was concealed by the great forest of Pilwisky, and the emperor immediately mounted on horseback to reconnoitre the banks. His horse suddenly fell as he approached the shore, and he was precipitated on the sand. Some one exclaimed, "It is a bad omen—a Roman would have retired;" but, without regarding the augury, he gave orders for the construction of three bridges, and retired to his quarters, humming the tune, "Marlborough s'en va à la guerre," and repeating, with martial emphasis, the line, "Ne sait quand il reviendra."[†]

On the approach of night the following proclamation of the emperor was read to the troops: "Soldiers, the second war of Poland is commenced: the first was terminated at Friedland and Tilsit, when Russia swore an

* Chamb., i., 164, 170. Ségur, i., 114, 115. Fain, i., 62, 83. De Pradt, 85, 91, 93. Gourgaud, i., 103.

† Ségur, i., 120, 121, 124, and Gourgaud, i., 127. Fain, i., 92. Chamb., i., 164.

* Ségur, i., 123.

† Ségur, i., 143. Fain, i., 92, 93. Jom., iv., 52. Chambray, i., 170, 173.

eternal alliance with France and war with England. Now she violates her oaths. She refuses to give any explanation of her strange conduct till the French eagles have repassed the Rhine, leaving our allies at her discretion. *Fate drags her on—let her destinies be fulfilled.* Does she imagine we are degenerated? Are we not still the soldiers of Austerlitz?

We are placed between dishonour and war; our choice cannot be doubtful. Let us, then, advance, cross the Niemen, and carry the war into her own territory. The second Polish war will be as glorious as the first; but the peace we conclude shall be its own guarantee, and put an end to the fatal influence which for fifty years Russia has exercised in the affairs of Europe." The soldiers, grouped in circles, heard these animating words with enthusiasm, and immediately the signal to advance was given: vast columns delined out of the forest, and hollows with which the banks of the river abounded, and pressed in silence to the margin of the stream; not a sound was heard but the measured tread of marching bands, not a light was suffered to shine on the vast and disciplined array of France. The troops halted and lay down on the edge of the river, too impatient to sleep, and eagerly gazing through the gloom at the Russian shore.*

At one in the morning the corps of Davoust broke up and crossed the river, and shortly after its advanced guard took possession of Kowno. The tent of the emperor was placed on an eminence three hundred paces from the bank, and, as the sun rose, he beheld the resplendent mass slowly descending to the bridges. The world had never seen so magnificent an array as lay before him: horse, foot, and cannon, in the finest order, and in the highest state of equipment, incessantly issued from the forest, and wound down the paths which led to the river; the glittering of the arms, the splendour of the dress, the loud shouts of the men as they passed the imperial station, inspired universal enthusiasm, and seemed to afford a certain presage of success. The burning impatience of the young conscripts; the calm assurance of the veteran soldiers; the confident ardour of the younger officers; the dubious presentiments of the older generals, filled every heart with thrilling emotion. No sinister presentiments now were visible on the countenance of the emperor: the joy which he felt at the recommencement of war communicated a universal degree of animation. Two hundred thousand men, including forty thousand horse, of whom twelve thousand were cuirassiers, cased in glittering steel, passed the river that day in presence of the emperor. Could the eye of prophecy have foreseen the thin and shattered remains of this countless host, which, a few months afterward, were alone destined to regain the shore of the Niemen, the change would have appeared too dreadful for any human powers of destruction to have accomplished it.†

The passage of troops continued incessantly during the 24th and 25th, and the cavalry under Murat, passing Davoust's corps, took the lead in the advance. The viceroy and Jerome, at the head of their respective armies, crossed, some

days afterward, at Pilyon and Grodno, the former at the head of seventy, the latter of sixty-five thousand men, and immediately began to advance against the corps of Bagration, which lay in the opposite country, while Macdonald passed the Niemen at Tilsit, and on the 2d of July Schwartzberg crossed the frontier by passing the Bug at Mogulnica.*

The Emperor Alexander was at a ball at a country house of General Benningsen, in the neighbourhood of Wilna, when the intelligence of the passage of the river reached him. He concealed the despatches, and remained with the company till its close, without exhibiting any change of manner, or revealing in any way the momentous news he had received. On the same night, however, after the festivities were over, he prepared and published the following proclamation to the nation and army: "For long we have observed the hostile proceedings of the French emperor towards Russia, but we always entertained the hope of avoiding hostilities by measures of conciliation; but, seeing all our efforts without success, we have been constrained to assemble our armies. Still, we hoped to maintain peace by resting on our frontiers in a defensive attitude, without committing any act of aggression. All these conciliatory measures have failed: the Emperor Napoleon, by a sudden attack on our troops at Kowno, has declared war. Seeing, therefore, that nothing can induce him to remain at peace, nothing remains for us but to invoke the succour of the Most High, and oppose our forces to the enemy. I need not remind the officers and soldiers of their duty to excite their valour: the blood of the brave Selavonians flows in their veins. Soldiers, you defend your religion, your country, and your liberty. I am with you: God is against the aggressor." To the nation the commencement of the war was announced in a letter addressed to the governor of St. Petersburg, which concluded with these remarkable words: "I have the fullest confidence in the zeal of my people and the bravery of my soldiers. Menaced in their homes, they will defend them with their wonted firmness and intrepidity. Providence will bless our just cause. The defence of our country, of our independence, and national honour, have forced me to unsheath the sword. *I will not return it to the scabbard as long as a single enemy remains on the Russian territory.*"†

The intelligence of the invasion of the French, and these moving addresses, excited the utmost enthusiasm in the people and the army. It was not mere military ardour or the passion for conquest, like that which animated the French army, but a deep-rooted resolution of resistance, founded on the feelings of patriotism and the spirit of devotion. Less buoyant at first, it was more powerful at last: founded on the contempt of life, it remained unshaken by disaster, unsubdued by defeat. As the French army advanced, and the dangers of Russia increased, it augmented in strength; and while the ardour of the invaders was quenched by the difficulties of their enterprise, the spirit of the Russians rose with the sacrifices which their situation required.‡

It was with feelings of regret, therefore, that

* Lab., 31, 32. Bout., i., 173. Chamb., i., 173. Fain, i., 168, 172.

† Bout., i., 163, 165. Oginski, iii., 154. Hard., x., 142.

‡ Bout., i., 164. Chamb., i., 177, 178.

* Ségur, i., 144. Moniteur, July, 1, 1812.

† Ségur, i., 144, 145. Bout., i., 162. Fain, i., 167.

Chamb., i., 172.

the Russian army received orders to retreat on all sides. The resolution had been previously taken, and all the commanders furnished with directions as to the route they were to follow. The enormous superiority of Napoleon rendered it hopeless to attempt any resistance till time and the casualties incident to so long a march had thinned his formidable ranks; nor was it long before the wisdom of this resolution became apparent. The sultry heat of the weather at the crossing of the Niemen was succeeded by a tempest, the fury of which resembled the devastating hurricanes of tropical climates. Upon the countless multitudes of Napoleon, who traversed an exhausted country, covered with sterile sands or inhospitable forests, its violence fell with unmitigated severity. The horses perished by thousands from the combined effects of incessant rain and unwholesome provender; one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon and five hundred caissons were left at Wilna without the means of transport; above ten thousand dead horses were found on the highway leading to that city alone; thirty thousand disbanded soldiers spread desolation around the army; and before it had been six days in the Russian territory, or a single shot fired, twenty-five thousand sick and dying men filled the hospitals of Wilna and the villages of Lithuania.*

Barclay left Wilna on the 28th of June, and on the same day Napoleon entered it. He remained there for seventeen days: a delay which military historians have pronounced the greatest fault in his whole life. It is certain that it gave time to the Russian commanders to retire in admirable order, and exhibits a striking contrast to the rapidity with which he pursued his broken enemy after the battle of Jena, or the combats of Ratisbon and Echemuhl. Already the extraordinary consumption of human life in the campaign had become apparent; for, as the emperor reviewed the troops at Wilna, they were almost struck down by the pestilential smell which the westerly wind blew from the long line of carcases of horses and bodies of men which lay unburied on the road from Kowno.† But, on the other hand, it is to be recollected that Lithuania afforded none of the resources for a victorious army which the opulent and cultivated plains of Saxony or Bavaria presented. Vast forests of pine, or deserts, heaths, and sands, offered no resources for the troops. Contrary to what obtains in the old civilized states of Western Europe, the vicinity of the highways was hardly more peopled or better cultivated than the unfrequented districts; and if the army outstripped the convoys which accompanied it, the soldiers would have perished of want, or the military array been dissolved by the necessity of separating for the purpose of marauding and pillage. The unparalleled magnitude of his present forces necessarily impeded the emperor's movements; and he felt that if he advanced, without due precaution, into so sterile a region, he ran the risk of perishing, like Darius, from the multitude of mouths which he had to feed.

The ancient and unforgetten patriotism of the Poles burst forth without control for some days after the occupation of Wilna. Napoleon entered that city

Enthusiasm of the Poles on that event.

* Ségur, i., 147. Bout., i., 155. La Baume, 32. Chamb., i., 182, 183.
† Dumas, Souv., iii., 426.
‡ Bout., i., 172. Jom., iv., 72. Chamb., i., 187.

at the head of the Polish regiment commanded by Prince Radzivil, amid the acclamations of the inhabitants, who regarded him as their liberator. The national banners were raised amid the acclamations of multitudes; the young embraced and wept in the public streets; the aged brought forth the ancient Polish dress, which had almost been forgotten during the days of their humiliation. The Diet of Warsaw declared the kingdom of Poland re-established, convoked the national diets, invited all the Poles to unite together, and called upon those in the Russian service to abandon its standards.

Napoleon took some steps at first calculated to favour the hope that a national restoration was in contemplation. The few days devoted, at Wilna, to the repose of the army, were given by the emperor to the organization of a provincial government, extending over all Lithuania. The country was divided into four governments, and prefects, mayors, and assistants, elected as in the French Empire. Six regiments of infantry and one of cavalry were directed to be raised, one of which formed part of Napoleon's guard; and the constant presence of Maret, his minister for foreign affairs, whose anxiety for the restoration of Poland was well known, in all his diplomatic labours, inspired the general hope that some decisive measure for the reversal of the great act of injustice under which it had suffered was in contemplation. Altogether, the Poles furnished to Napoleon, in the course of the campaign, no less than eighty-five thousand men.*

The first address of the Polish Diet to the emperor was signally characteristic of the profound feelings of undeserved Polish Diet to injury by which that gallant nation the emperor. were animated: "Why have we been effaced from the map of Europe? By what right have we been attacked, invaded, dismembered? What have been our crimes, who our judges? Russia is the author of all our woes. Need we refer to that execrable day, when, in the midst of the shouts of a ferocious conqueror, Warsaw heard the last groans of the population of Praga, which perished entire by fire or sword? These are the titles of Russia to Poland: force has forged them, force can alone burst their fetters. Frontiers traced by a spoliating hand can never extinguish our common origin or destroy our common rights. Yes! we are still Poles! The day of our restoration has arrived: the land of the Jagellons and the Sobieskis is to resume all its glory." The clergy were next admonished to solicit the Divine protection; and an address published to the Lithuanians in the Russian army, calling upon them to range themselves under the banners of their country.†

But though Napoleon was not insensible to the advantages which the co-operation of the Lithuanians offered him, His views on the subject, yet political considerations of insurmountable weight prevented him from taking that decisive step in favour of the restoration of Poland by which alone its independence, in the midst of so many powerful neighbours, could be effected, viz., the reunion of all its partitioned provinces under one head. He was well aware of the ardent, but unsteady and factious character of the Poles, and deemed the aid of their tumultuous Democracy dearly purchased, if the friendship of Austria or Prussia, his present firm allies, were endangered in its acquisition.

* Ségur, i., 153, 154, 158. Oginski, iv., 5. Fain, i., 181, 183.
† Chamb., i., 195. Fain, i., 181.

He replied, therefore, to the address of the Polish Diet, "I approve of your efforts, and authorize you to continue them. I will do all in my power to second your resolutions. If you are unanimous, you may indulge the hope of compelling the enemy to recognise your rights; but, in these remote and widely-extended countries, it is solely in the unanimity of the efforts of the population that you can find hopes of establishing it. Let Lithuania, Samogitia, Volhynia, Podolia, and the Ukraine be animated by the same spirit which I have witnessed in the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and Providence will crown your efforts with success. I must, at the same time, inform you that I have guaranteed the integrity of the Austrian dominions, and can sanction no movement which may endanger the peaceable possession of her Polish provinces." These words froze every heart with horror. It was evident that he was willing enough to disturb Russia by a revolt in her Lithuanian dominions, but had no inclination to embroil himself with Austria or Prussia, by a general reunion of the Polish provinces; and without that, it was universally felt the restoration of the kingdom would prove an illusory dream. The provincial government which he had established did not possess the confidence of the nation; no guarantee for the restoration of the monarchy was given; distrust and dissatisfaction succeeded to the transports of inconsiderate joy; and Napoleon, by yielding to the dictates of a cautious policy, lost the support of a gallant people.*

While Napoleon, with the main body of his army, moved upon Wilna, Jerome Jerome against Davoust advanced against Bagrathion. Bagrathion, who was forced to fall back, by an eccentric line of retreat, towards Bobrinsk. The rapidity of the advance of the French centre cut off the communication between the two Russian armies; and, by pushing back Barclay five days before the position of Bagrathion was disturbed, he hoped to repeat the oblique attack on a great scale which had proved so fatal to the Austrians at Lissa. Bagrathion, in consequence, fell back; but finding that his advanced posts, in consequence of the oblique advance of the French centre, encountered the corps of Davoust, whom Napoleon had detached from the Grand Army to prevent his rejoining the Russian centre, he was obliged to make several detours; and in the course of one of these, his cavalry, consisting chiefly of Cossacks, encountered, at Mir, the advanced guard of Jerome's army, composed of three regiments of Polish cavalry. A sharp action ensued, which terminated favourably to the Russians, and the day following a still more serious combat took place between six Polish regiments and the Cossack cavalry, which also terminated in the repulse of the invaders. These brilliant affairs, which were the first engagements of the campaign, produced the utmost enthusiasm in the Russian army; but Bagrathion, wisely judging that even a total defeat of Jerome's army, by drawing him farther from the interior, would only enable Davoust to interpose between his army and the retreating columns of Barclay, continued his retreat, and reached in safety the ramparts of Bobrinsk, on the Berezina, on the 18th of July.†

The object of Napoleon in these movements was to separate entirely Bagrathion from Barclay de Tolly, and enclose the former between Jerome's army, which pressed his rear, and Davoust's corps, which was destined to fall perpendicularly on its flank, or occupy the termination of the roads by which it was retreating, or might seek to regain by cross-roads the intrenched camp of Drissa, where the whole army was ordered to rendezvous. But the rapidity and skill of the Russian movements, joined to the inexplicable tardiness of Jerome's pursuit, having rendered this well-conceived design abortive, the emperor deprived his brother, with bitter reproaches, of his command, and placed the corps of Junot and Poniatowsky under the orders of Davoust.* This change did not improve the success of the movements for the capture of Bagrathion. That general reached Minsk on the 8th, and on the 12th resumed his march for Witepsk. Both armies advanced with great expedition to occupy Mohilow, which commanded the entrance of the defiles by which the cross movement towards Barclay was to be effected; but, in spite of the utmost diligence of the Russians, they found it already in the hands of Davoust, who defended its approaches with thirty thousand men, and had adopted every imaginable precaution to secure it from attack. On the 23d of July, Bagrathion pushed forward General Raffekoi, with twenty thousand men, to attack the French position, which was extremely strong, in the defiles of a forest which was filled with artillery and tirailleurs. An obstinate conflict ensued, in which the Russians displayed their characteristic intrepidity in sustaining unmoved for hours, at the entrance of the ravine, the most terrible fire of musketry and grapeshot; but being unable to force the French from their strong ground, Bagrathion wisely commenced a retreat, which was conducted in admirable order, and with little molestation. The loss on both sides was nearly equal, consisting of somewhat above three thousand men on the Russian, and three thousand two hundred on the French part.†

The junction of Count Platoff having raised Bagrathion's army on the following day to fifty-five thousand men, he might, without difficulty, have forced Davoust from his position, and continued his movement by Mohilow, as Davoust had not more than thirty-four thousand to oppose him. But the favourable position of the French army, which communicated by an interior line with the centre, under Napoleon, rendering that a hazardous operation, he prudently retired to Novo-Bichow, from whence he crossed the Borysthènes, and leisurely advanced by Mes-tailau to Smolensko, where he joined the main army, under Barclay, on the 3d of August. Davoust, intimidated by the severity of the combat at Mohilow, did not venture to follow his rival

Their ill success, and consequent displeasure of Napoleon.

Combat of Mohilow.

Bagrathion effects his retreat to Smolensko.

* "I am extremely displeased at the King of Westphalia (Jerome) for not having sent his light troops in pursuit of the enemy under Bagrathion. It is impossible to manoeuvre worse than he has done. Had Poniatowsky only a single division, he should have been sent forward on that duty; whereas, in fact, he had his whole corps. By thus forgetting all rules, as well as his express instructions, Bagrathion has gained time to make his retreat with perfect leisure. The whole fruit of my manoeuvres, and the finest opportunity of the war, have been lost by his singular forgetfulness of the first principles of the military art."—FAIN, i., 230.

† Jom., iv., 76, 77. Bout., i., 236, 237. Chamb., i., 273, 279.

* Ségur, i., 153, 158. Oginski, iii., 274. Chamb., i., 195, 196. Fain, i., 183, 185.

† Bout., i., 190, 228. Jomini, iv., 66. Chamb., i., 199, 200. Fain, i., 208, 213, 216.

across that deep and marshy river; and thus the whole measures of the French for the separation or capture of Bagrathion's forces, though conducted by two armies, each of which was as numerous as his own, ultimately proved abortive.*

Meanwhile, the main Russian army, after leaving Wilna under Barclay, retired to the intrenched camp of Drissa, on the River Dwina. The emperor on the 8th of July, being the anniversary of the battle of Pultawa, published an energetic address to his soldiers, who were somewhat discouraged by their long retreat before the enemy.† This camp, intrenched with the utmost care, and capable of containing a hundred thousand men, had been selected and fortified long before as a favourable position for covering the road to St. Petersburg. It was defended by ten redoubts and 354 pieces of cannon. But it became entirely useless and even perilous, when Napoleon, moving the mass of his forces towards his right, threatened not only to advance in the direction of Moscow, but to throw the Russian army towards Livonia and the sea, and sever it from its communication with the heart of the Empire. To avoid such a catastrophe, and, at the same time, facilitate the long-wished-for junction with Bagrathion, who, since his repulse at Mohilow, had been driven to the circuitous route of Borissov and Liady, with a view to join Barclay at Witepsk or Smolensko, the general-in-chief resolved to evacuate the camp of Drissa, and retire by the right bank of the Dwina to Witepsk. On the 14th of July, Barclay broke up from his intrenchments, and on the 16th the headquarters were established at Polotsk, where the emperor quitted the army and hastened to Moscow, to stimulate by his presence the patriotic efforts of that important capital, which was evidently about to become the principal object of the efforts of the enemy.‡

On the 16th of July, Napoleon moved from Napoleon advanced to Wilna, and advanced with nearly two hundred thousand men towards the camp of Drissa. Finding it evacuated at his approach, he halted for six days at Gloubokoie; and on the 22d continued his movement towards Witepsk, and reached the Dwina on the 24th, at Benchenchowitz. Barclay, perceiving that he was throwing the mass of his forces on the right towards Witepsk, resolved to anticipate him in his march to that place, in order to preserve his own communication with Smolensko, where he expected to effect his junction with Bagrathion. In conse-

quence, the Russian headquarters were advanced, with great rapidity, to Witepsk, on July 23, the 23d, and a large part of the army was crossed over to the left bank of the stream—a perilous operation, and which exposed the troops to the dangers which had been so severely experienced when a similar movement was made to the left of the Niemen in presence of the enemy at Friedland. The delay of Napoleon at Gloubokoie, however, preserved the Russian army from a similar disaster. His advanced posts did not reach Ostrowno till the 25th, by which time Barclay had assembled all his forces, eighty thousand strong, in the neighbourhood of Witepsk; and the vanguard, consisting of twelve thousand men, was strongly posted, under Ostermann, on the wooded heights which adjoin the former town. No movement in the campaign was of more vital importance to the Russians than this advance upon Witepsk; and if Napoleon had not delayed six days, apparently without a cause, at Gloubokoie, he could with ease have anticipated the enemy at that important point; permanently interposed the bulk of his forces between Barclay and Bagrathion; and, throwing back the former towards St. Petersburg, and the latter on Smolensko and Moscow, cut off the former from the southern provinces and principal resources of the Empire.*

With such precision had the orders of Napoleon been obeyed, that the whole corps of the army which he commanded in person reached the rendezvous on the Dwina at the same hour, though their march had begun a hundred leagues in the rear from the banks of the Niemen. The assemblage of one hundred and eighty thousand men at the same point produced for some time an inextricable confusion; but by degrees the different corps defiled to the separate posts assigned to them, and before midnight silence reigned in the midst of that innumerable army.†

On the 25th and 26th, Murat, at the head of 10,000 horse and 2000 light troops, the advanced guard of the French, attacked Count Ostermann near Ostrowno, and several severe actions ensued, in the course of which he charged in person at the head of the Polish lancers. The Russian infantry, strongly posted in the thick woods with which the country abounded, arrested by a heavy fire the advance of the French cavalry; and many charges were made on both sides with various success, and without any decisive effect. During the delay occasioned by these actions, both parties brought up the main body of their forces; and on the morning of the 27th, the whole Russian army, eighty-two thousand strong, was to be seen posted on an elevated plain which covered the approaches to Witepsk. Their superb cavalry, amounting to above ten thousand soldiers, were stationed, in double lines, in front of the right of the position; the infantry in the centre, behind the deep bed of the Leizipa; and a magnificent array of artillery occupied the left on a series of wooded eminences. Napoleon, at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand men, made every preparation for an attack on the following day. Several severe skirmishes between the advanced guards, in presence of their respect-

Rendezvous of the principal part of his forces in front of Witepsk.

Position of the Russians, and force which Barclay had collected there July 26.

* Jom., iv., 76, 77. Bout., i., 238, 239.

† "Soldiers! When the enemy dared to cross our frontiers, we were so much scattered, that it was necessary to July 9. retire in order to effect the reunion of the troops.

Now this is effected. The whole of the first army is here assembled: the field of battle is open to your valour; so docile to rule, so ardent to maintain the reputation which your valour has acquired, you are about to gain laurels worthy of yourselves and of your ancestors. The remembrance of your valour, the éclat of your renown, engage you to surpass yourselves by the glory of your actions. The foes of your country have already experienced the weight of your arms. Go on, then, in the spirit of your fathers, and destroy the enemy who has dared to attack your religion and national honour even in your homes, in the midst of your wives and children. God, who is the witness of the justice of our cause, will sanctify your arms by his divine benediction."—CHAMBRAY, i., 215.

‡ Bout., i., 180, 198, 199. Chamb., 213, 217. Fain, i., 274, 275.

* Bout., i., 211, 215. Jom., iv., 72, 73. Chamb., i., 221, 223. Fain, i., 273.

† Ségur, i., 194, 195. Chamb., i., 227, 228.

ive armies, with alternate success, elevated the hope of the contending parties; and the soldiers on both sides sharpened their weapons, and prepared for a mortal struggle on the following day. Napoleon's last words to Murat at nightfall were, "To-morrow, at five, the sun of Austerlitz!"*

In truth, the Russian general, notwithstanding the vast disproportion of numbers, had taken the bold resolution to give battle on the following day, in order to avoid the danger of being attacked by the French while defiling by a flank movement in the direction of Orcha, where he had appointed Bagrathion to meet him. But during the night intelligence was received which, fortunately, induced him to change his determination. It appeared, from letters brought by one of his aids-de-camp, that Bagrathion, having been arrested by Davoust at Mohilow, and unable, in consequence, to continue his march to Orcha, had crossed the Dnieper, and was moving towards Smolensko. Barclay immediately resolved to discontinue his intended flank movement towards Orcha, and, abandoning Witepsk, to effect his junction in the neighbourhood of that renowned bulwark of the Russian Empire.†

Brilliant watch-fires were kept up in the Russian lines during the night, to induce the belief that they were resolved to give battle; but, meanwhile, the whole army broke up from its encampment, and the important and perilous duty of protecting the rear was intrusted to Count Pahlen. Early on the morning of the 28th, Murat, who had bivouacked with the advanced posts, approached the enemy's station, but found their camp entirely deserted. With such skill had the retreat been conducted, that not a weapon, not a baggage-wagon, not a straggler, had been left behind—

"'Twould seem as if her mother earth
Had swallow'd up her warlike birth."

Following on the traces of the enemy, the advanced guard was unable, at the separation of the two roads of St. Petersburg and Moscow, to ascertain which their opponents had followed! The French officers beheld with astonishment the science and discipline of their enemies, and were obliged to acknowledge, with shame, that there was more order in the Russian retreating than in their own advancing columns.‡

The viceroy at length discovered the Russian rear-guard slowly retiring, in admirable order, over the plain towards Smolensko. Some charges executed against it by the French chasseurs were not only repulsed, but the assailants destroyed. The exhausted state of the horses rendered it impossible for the cavalry to act with effect, and the retreating riders could only save their extenuated horses by leading them by the bridles; the rays of a powerful sun overwhelmed the soldiers, and everything conspired to indicate the necessity of repose. In truth, the losses of the army during their long march had been such, that it was absolutely necessary to make a halt. Napoleon had accomplished the advance from Kowno and Grodno to Witepsk, without magazines or convoys, in little more than thirty days; whereas Charles XII.

had taken eight months to traverse the same space, with the whole stores of the army accompanying its columns. From the want of magazines, and the impossibility of conveying an adequate supply of provisions for so immense a host, disorders of every kind had accumulated in a frightful manner on the flanks and rear of the army; neither bread nor spirits were to be had; the flesh of overdriven animals and bad water constituted the sole subsistence of the soldiers; the burning sun during the day, and cold dews at night, multiplied dysenteries to an extraordinary degree. Pillage was universal: the necessities of the soldiery burst through all the restraints of discipline; and a crowd of stragglers and marauders on all sides, now swelled to above thirty thousand, both seriously diminished the strength and impaired the character of the army. Napoleon yielded to the necessities of his situation: the headquarters were established at Witepsk, and his numerous corps cantoned in the vicinity of the Dwina and the Borysthènes; while the Russian army, no longer molested in its retreat, slowly retired to Smolensko, where Bagrathion was awaiting its approach.*

Already it had become apparent that a difficulty was to be encountered in this war to which Napoleon, in all his former invasions, had been a stranger. Immense difficulty experienced in providing subsistence for the invading army. Pillage and disorders are always the inseparable concomitants of the assemblage of large bodies of men, and were far from being unknown in his previous campaigns; but on these occasions they had been the accompaniment only of the advancing columns; order and discipline were soon established in the rear; and when the troops went into quarters and received their rations regularly, they were maintained with almost as little difficulty as in their own country. But in the Russian war, when disorders once commenced they never ceased; and, whatever discipline the emperor established in the immediate vicinity of his own headquarters, the whole lines of communication in the rear were filled with stragglers, and presented a scene of pillage, confusion, and suffering. Napoleon was perfectly aware of the existence of these disorders, and indefatigable, not only in his censure to his lieutenants for permitting their existence, but in his own efforts to arrest them, yet it was all in vain: the evil went on continually increasing to the close of the campaign, and proved one great cause of the disasters in which it terminated. The reason was, that the expedition was conducted on a scale which exceeded the bounds of human strength, and had to combat with difficulties which were only augmented by the multitude who were assembled to ensure its success.†

Russia differed essentially from all the countries, with the exception of Spain, in which the French had hitherto carried on war. Causes to which it was owing. It has neither the navigable rivers which in Germany, Italy, or the Low Countries, serve as so many arteries to distribute subsistence and resources through the mass of an army; nor the rich fields and far-spread ancient cultivation, which in their fertile plains had so often enabled the emperor to dispense with the formation of magazines and the

* Ségur, i., 200, 204, 205. Bout., i., 218, 220. Fain, i., 279, 282. Chamb., i., 229, 231.

† Bout., i., 220, 222. Fain, i., 286.

‡ Ségur, i., 209. Bout., i., 222, 224. Fain, i., 287. Chamb., i., 237.

* Bout., i., 223, 225. Ségur, i., 210. Chamb., i., 241, 243.

† Chamb., i., 244, 247. See Napoleon to Berthier, July 10, 1812, Fain, i., 243; and Dumas's Report, Aug. 12, 1812, Chambray, i., 376.

encumbrance of convoys, and plunge, regardless of his flanks and rear, into the heart of his adversary's territory. The roads in many places traverse immense forests, where no human habitations are to be seen for leagues together; and often for a whole day's journey, a few wretched hamlets alone break the gloomy monotony of the wilderness. No distributions of provisions to the soldiers, no efforts made to procure convoys, could for weeks together furnish subsistence to several hundred thousand men and horses, while traversing such a country. It was from the very outset of the campaign, in consequence, found necessary to reduce the rations served out to the soldiers to one half; and the pittance thus obtained was inadequate to the support of men undergoing the fatigue which their long marches imposed upon the troops. Such as it was, however, it was, in general, denied to the detachments or convalescents coming up in the rear, who, finding the magazines emptied by the enormous multitude who had passed before them, were, in general, sent on without anything, to find subsistence as they best could, in a country often desert, always wasted by the passage of the corps which were then on the march. Pillage, and the dispersion of the troops for several leagues on either side of the high roads in quest of subsistence, became thus a matter of necessity: no order or discipline could prevent it; a large proportion of the stragglers who thus inundated the country never rejoined their colours, or were only collected in confused multitudes by the light columns organized by the emperor to arrest the disorders; and before a great part of the army had even seen the enemy, it had already undergone a loss greater than might have been expected in the most bloody campaign.*

While these movements were taking place in the armies, the Emperor Alexander hastened to Moscow, to accelerate by his presence the armaments in the interior of the Empire. By an edict dated from the camp at Drissa the 12th of July, he had already ordered a new levy of one in one hundred males in the provinces nearest to the seat of war; but this supply not being deemed sufficient, a proclamation, couched in the most energetic language, was addressed, a few days afterward, from Polotsk to the inhabitants of Moscow: "Never," said he, "was danger more urgent. The national religion, the throne, the state, can be preserved only by the greatest sacrifices. May the hearts of our illustrious nobles and people be filled with the spirit of true valour, and may God bless the righteous cause! May this holy spirit, emanating from Moscow, spread to the extremities of the Empire! May the destruction with which we are menaced recoil upon the head of the invader, and may Europe, freed from the yoke of servitude, have cause to bless the name of Russia!"†

A similar address was on the 18th published to the whole Russian people: "The enemy has crossed our frontiers and penetrated into the interior of Russia. Unable by treachery to overturn an empire which has grown with the growth of ages, he now endeavours to overturn it with the accumulated forces of Europe. Treachery in his heart, honour on his lips, he seeks to seduce the credulous ears and enchain the manly arms; and

if the captive hardly perceives at first his chains under the flowers in which they are hid, tyranny ere long discloses itself in all its odious colours. But Russia has penetrated his views! The path of duty lies before her; she has invoked the protection of the Most High. She opposes to the machinations of the enemy an army undaunted in courage, which burns with the desire to chase the enemy from its country; to destroy those locusts who appear to overload the earth, but whom the earth will reject from its bosom, and deny even the rights of sepulture. We demand forces proportioned to such an object; and that object is the destruction of a tyrant who oppresses the universe. Great as is the valour of our troops, they have need of re-enforcements in the interior to sustain their efforts. We have invited our ancient metropolis of Moscow to give the first example of this heroic devotion. We address the same appeal to all our subjects in Europe or Asia, and to all communities and religions. We invite all classes to a general armament, in order to co-operate with ourselves against the designs of the enemy. Let them find at every step the faithful sons of Russia ready to combat with all their forces, and deaf to all his seductions: despising his fraud, trampling under foot his gold, paralyzing, by the heroism of true valour, all the efforts of his legions of slaves. In every noble may he find a Posankoi, in every ecclesiastic a Palistyn, in every citizen a Menin. Illustrious nobles! in every age you have been the saviours of your country; holy clergy, by your prayers you have always invoked the Divine blessing on the arms of Russia; people, worthy descendants of the brave Sclavonians, often have you broken the jaws of the lions which were opened to devour you! Unite, then, with the cross in your hearts and the sword in your hands, and no human power shall prevail against you!"‡

While the minds of all ranks were in the highest state of excitement from these proclamations, and a sense of the crisis which awaited their country, the emperor arrived in Moscow from the army. On the 27th of July, the nobles and the merchants were invited to a solemn assembly at the imperial palace. Count Rostopchin, the governor of Moscow, then read the emperor's address, and invited all the nobles to contribute to the defence of their country. A levy of ten in one hundred of the male population was immediately proposed and *unanimously* adopted, and they farther agreed to clothe and arm them at their own expense. It was calculated that, if the other parts of the Empire followed this example, which they immediately did, it would produce five hundred thousand warriors. Nor did the assembly of merchants evince less zeal in the public service: a contribution proportioned to the capital of each was instantly agreed to; a voluntary additional subscription was farther opened, and in less than an hour the sum subscribed exceeded £180,000. While all hearts were touched by these splendid efforts, the emperor appeared in the assembly, and after openly explaining the dangers of the state, declared, amid a transport of generous enthusiasm, that he would exhaust his last resources before giving up the contest.† "The disasters," said he, "with which you are menaced,

Generous and patriotic devotion of the inhabitants of Moscow. July 27.

Proclamation to the nation.

* Chamb., i., 246, 250.

† Bout., i., 199, 201.

‡ Bout., i., 204. Chamb., i., 370, 371. Fain, i., 316, 317. † Fain, i., 313. Guillaume de Vaudoncourt, 106. Bout., i., 205, 209.

should be considered as the means necessary to complete the ruin of the enemy." History affords few examples of so generous a confidence on the part of the sovereign, and such devoted patriotism on the part of his subjects.

By these means a powerful auxiliary force was created in the interior, destined to fill up the chasm in the regular army. The example of Moscow was speedily followed by the other cities and provinces in the centre of the Empire; and the patriotic levies thus formed powerfully contributed to the final success of the campaign. Having taken these energetic measures, the emperor set out for St. Petersburg, where he arrived on the 15th of August; and, by an edict published on the 16th, an additional levy was ordered in all the provinces not actually the seat of war.*

These proclamations, and some rumours of the extensive preparations going forward in the interior, speedily reached the French headquarters, where they excited no small astonishment. The religious strain of the addresses especially, and the repeated appeals to the protection of Heaven, were the subject of unbounded ridicule among the gay and thoughtless officers of the Grand Army. Not so, however, Napoleon: he received with equal surprise, but very different feelings from those of contempt, the report of these energetic efforts to give a devotional character to the contest. Again and again he caused the proclamations, and the still more impassioned addresses of the metropolitan Archbishop of Moscow to the clergy of the Empire, to be read to him; and long did he muse on their contents. "What," said he, "can have wrought such a change in the Emperor Alexander? Whence has sprung all this venom which he has infused into the quarrel? Now there is nothing but the force of arms which can terminate the contest: war alone can put a period to war. It was to avoid such a necessity that I was so careful, at the outset of the contest, not to implicate myself by any declarations in favour of the re-establishment of Poland: now I see my moderation was a fault."†

While the centre of the French army thus advanced to Witepsk, and Barclay retired to Smolensko, Count Wittgenstein, with twenty-five thousand men, was detached from the army of the latter, in order to retain a position upon the Dwina and cover the road to St. Petersburg. Oudinot was opposed to him by Napoleon, and he occupied Polotsk with twenty-seven thousand excellent soldiers. On the 30th of July, he advanced against the Russian general, and a severe action ensued on the following day: the Russian vanguard, under Kutusoff, in the first instance imprudently crossed the Drissa, and was driven back with the loss of a thousand men; but the French, under Verdier, hurried on by the eagerness of the pursuit, committed the same fault, and brought on a general action, in which the Russians, after a long and bloody struggle, were victorious. Oudinot, weakened by the loss of four thousand men, retired across the Drissa, and took shelter under the walls of Polotsk, where he was shortly after joined by St. Cyr, at the head of twelve thousand

Bavarians, which raised his army, notwithstanding its losses, to thirty-five thousand men.

Napoleon was no sooner informed of this check on the Dwina, than he gave vent to severe invectives against Oudinot, who, he insisted, was superior in force to the enemy, and, instead of awaiting an attack, should have taken the initiative, and assumed a victorious attitude towards the enemy. Stung to the quick by these reproaches, which he was conscious were by no means deserved, the brave marshal obeyed his orders, and advanced against his antagonist; while the emperor, who felt the full importance, during his advance into the interior, of preserving his left flank on the Dwina secure, ordered up St. Cyr with his corps of Bavarians, who were estimated at twenty-two thousand men, but who had already wasted away to half that number, by forced marches to Polotsk; and he arrived there on the 6th of August. Alexander, on his side, Aug. 6. who was not less interested in the operations of a corps which at once covered the road to St. Petersburg and menaced the communications of the French army, ordered up powerful re-enforcements, sixteen thousand strong, under Count Sternheil, who had been stationed in Finland, but were now rendered disposable by the conclusion of the treaty with Sweden, to the same destination; and the militia of St. Petersburg also received orders to advance to his support. Thus everything announced that the war on the Dwina would become of great, if not decisive importance, before the close of the campaign.*

On the other flank, Tormasoff, finding that the Austrians under Schwartzberg were not advancing against him, fell suddenly on the corps of Saxons under Reynier, at Kobrin, and on the 23d of July made prisoners an entire brigade of their best troops. It became indispensable, therefore, to support the Saxon corps by the Austrians' under Schwartzberg; and thus Napoleon lost the support of that auxiliary force, on which he had reckoned to supply the prodigious waste of human life in the campaign.†

While Napoleon lay inactive at Witepsk, he received two pieces of intelligence which had a material influence upon his ulterior views in the campaign. The first was the peace of Bucharest, concluded on the 14th of July between the Russians and the Turks, whereby a large part of their army on the Danube was rendered a disposable force; and the second, the discovery of the treaty of the 24th of March preceding, between the Swedes and the Emperor Alexander, which not only promised to set free the Russian army in Finland, but threatened his rear with a descent from the Swedish forces. Information, at the same time, was received of powerful re-enforcements to the army of Tormasoff, which were approaching from the Danube, and of great additions to the corps of Wittgenstein, which might soon be expected from the army of observation in Finland. At the same period, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was signed between Russia and England, by which a subsidy

Oudinot, reproached by Napoleon, again moves against Wittgenstein.

Operations of Tormasoff against Schwartzberg.

Information received at Witepsk of the conclusion of peace between the Russians and the Turks, and the alliance by Russia with Sweden and England.

* Bout., i., 210.

† Fain, i., 317, 318.

‡ Jom., i., 80, 81. Ségur, i., 242. Fain, i., 297, 298.

* Chamb., i., 265, 267. Napoleon to Berthier, July 26, 1812, *ibid.*, i., 378.

† Jom., iv., 80. Fain, i., 291, 292. Bout., ii., 75, 76.

of £800,000 was provided to the former power; and it was stipulated that, in the event of the French invasion endangering the Russian fleet, it should be removed, as a measure of security, to the British shores.*

These important events, and the intelligence of the prodigious armaments preparing in the interior by the activity of the Emperor Alexander, and the patriotic efforts of his subjects, led to the most serious reflections on Napoleon's headquarters. The

Arguments against any farther advance at the French headquarters, and answer of Napoleon.

expedience of an advance into the heart of the Empire was discussed in his military council for some days. Several of his generals openly dissuaded him from the enterprise, as fraught with the greatest hazard; but after they had all delivered their opinions, the emperor expressed his own as follows: "Why should we remain at Witepsk? the vicinity of the rivers, indeed, makes it a defensible position in summer, but in winter what would avail their frozen streams? We must, therefore, construct everything for ourselves: whereas at Moscow all is ready-made to our hands. A return to Wilna would be still more dangerous: it would necessarily lead to a retreat to the Vistula, and the loss of the whole of Lithuania. At Smolensko, again, we shall find at least a fortified town, and a position on the Dnieper. The example of Charles XII. is out of place: he did not fail because his enterprise was impracticable, but because he had not force sufficient to accomplish it. In war, fortune has an equal share with ability in success: if we wait for an entirely favourable train of circumstances, we shall never attempt anything: to gain an object we must commence it. No blood has yet been shed: Russia is too powerful to yield without fighting: Alexander will not treat till a great battle has been fought. It is a mistake to suppose he is retiring from any premeditated design: his armies retreated from the Dwina to effect a junction with Bagrathion; from Witepsk, to unite with him at Smolensko. The hour of battle is arrived: you will not have Smolensko without a battle; you will not have Moscow without a battle. I cannot think of taking up my winter-quarters in the middle of July. Our troops are always in spirits when they advance: a prolonged and defensive position is not suited to the French genius. Are we accustomed to halt behind rivers? to remain cantoned in huts? to manœuvre in the same spot during eight months of privations? The line of defence of the Dwina or Borysthènes is illusory: let winter come with its snows, and where are your barriers? Why should we leave the fanatical people of the East time to empty their immense plains and fall upon us? Why should we remain here eight months, when twenty days are sufficient to accomplish our purpose? Let us anticipate winter and its reflections. We must strike soon and strongly, or we shall be in danger. We must be in Moscow in a month, or we shall never be there. Peace awaits us under its walls. Should Alexander still persist, I will treat with his nobles: Moscow hates St. Petersburg; the effects of that jealousy are incalculable." With such arguments did Napoleon justify his resolution to advance into the interior of the Empire; but, in truth, the campaigns of Echmuhl and Jena had spoiled him for the delays of ordinary war, or the precaution requisite between equal combatants; his career seemed blasted, unless he

stepped from victory to victory; and even the dangers of a Russian winter were preferable, in his estimation, to the insupportable tedium of a lengthened residence at Witepsk.*

In truth, the result is not always a proof of the wisdom either of military or political measures, because many things enter into its composition which cannot be foreseen by the greatest sagacity: a due appreciation of all the considerations which present themselves at the moment is the utmost that can be effected by human ability. Before we condemn Napoleon's advance to Moscow as imprudent, we should recollect that similar temerity had, in all his former wars, been crowned with success; that the experience he had had of Russian firmness at Austerlitz and Friedland afforded no ground for supposing that the emperor would resist the force of circumstances which had more than once constrained the pride of Austria and Prussia to submit; that a throne raised by the sword would be endangered by the least pause even in the career of success which had established it; that the peace with Turkey and Sweden would shortly expose his flanks to attack from forces which could not, as yet, be brought into the field; and that the fact of his actually entering Moscow with a victorious army, demonstrates that he possessed the means of reducing the Russians to that extremity in which, according to all former experience, he might expect a glorious peace. These considerations, while they tend to exculpate Napoleon from blame in the important step which he now took, enhance to the highest degree the glory of the emperor and people of Russia, by showing that the success which ultimately crowned their efforts was owing to a degree of firmness in adversity which was deemed beyond the bounds of human fortitude.

The first step in the renewal of hostilities was taken by the Russian general, whose forces, since his junction with Bagrathion, were raised to one hundred and twenty thousand men. The dispersed cantonments of the French army presented an opportunity for striking a blow with something approaching to equality of numbers—an object of the utmost importance, as their vast amount, when all collected, was still too great to justify the risking of a general battle; and it was indispensable, by all means, to protract the war, in order to give time for the completion of the armaments in the interior. With this view, the Russians broke up early on the morning of August 7, and advanced in three great columns against the French quarters. The mass of their forces, one hundred and fourteen thousand strong, was directed towards Roudnia, while Platoff, with a chain of Cossacks, covered their movements. At Inkowo, this enterprising commander fell upon the advanced guard of Murat, under Sebastiani, consisting of six thousand horse and a regiment of light infantry, and defeated it with the loss of five hundred prisoners. This check roused the genius of Napoleon. He instantly despatched couriers in all directions to collect his corps, and assemble them in a body around his headquarters, and moved from Witepsk on the 13th of August, in the direction of Smolensko.† To repair the error which he had committed in leaving his forces so much dispersed, and giving the enemy the ad-

Reflections on this determination.

Barclay advances against the right of the French army.

Aug. 7.

Aug. 8.

* Ségur, i., 224. Fain, i., 321, 324.

† Chamb., i., 292. Ségur, i., 246, 251. Bout., i., 247.

* Jom., iv., 81, 82. Ségur, i., 244. Fain, i., 311

vantage of the initiative, he resolved to turn the left of the Russian army, and, by crossing the Dnieper, gain possession of Smolensko, and thus cut them off from the interior of the Empire.

With this view, on the 13th, three bridges were thrown over the Dnieper, and two hundred thousand men suddenly assembled on the shores of that river. Among them, the corps of Davoust was particularly distinguished by the strength of its divisions, and the admirable state of its discipline and equipment. Napoleon passed in a day the woody and rugged ridge which separates the Dwina from the Dnieper, and beheld, with a transport of youthful enthusiasm, that celebrated stream, which the Romans knew only by their defeats, and whose course to the Black Sea awakened those dreams of Oriental ambition, which, from his earliest years, had been floating in his mind.*

The French army crossed the Dnieper at several fords in order of battle, with the emperor in the centre on horseback, and at Liady entered the territories of Old Russia. Advancing forward, Marshals Ney and Murat, who headed the leading column of the army, overtook, near Krasnoi, General Newerofskoi, who, with the rear-guard, six thousand strong, and twelve hundred horse, was slowly retreating in the direction of Smolensko. This little corps, which had been detached by Barclay to the other side of the Dnieper, after he had retired with the remainder of his troops to the left, found itself assailed on all sides by eighteen thousand horse, without the possibility of obtaining assistance from its comrades, who were on the opposite side of the river. The head of the retreating column being overtaken and stopped by the light cavalry of the French, the horsemen who formed the advance were speedily driven into the ranks of the infantry; and the situation of the Russians was the more critical from the inexperienced nature of their troops, who were new levies that had never seen fire. Many generals, in such circumstances, would have deemed resistance impossible, and proposed a surrender; but Newerofskoi thought only of his duty. Instantly dividing his little army into two hollow squares, which were soon after united into one, he retired slowly, and in admirable order, over the immense open plains which adjoin the Dnieper, enveloped on all sides by innumerable squadrons, who charged them more than *forty times* during the day, and in some instances broke through the rampart of bayonets, and cut down the Russian officers in the very centre of their squares. Nevertheless, they always formed again; and this little band of heroes, still forming a lesser square when the larger was broken or weakened by loss, steadily retired during the whole day, repulsing, by an incessant rolling fire, the repeated charges of the French cavalry, and at length, on the approach of night, reached Korytnia with unbroken ranks, though with the loss of eleven hundred men and five pieces of cannon.†

Napoleon continued to press upon the retreating Russian columns; but on the following day Newerofskoi effected a junction with Raefskoi, and their united force being nineteen thousand men, they

resolved to throw themselves into Smolensko, and there defend themselves to the last extremity, in order to afford time for the main body of the Russian army to advance to its succour. Barclay and Bagrathion, meanwhile, being apprized of the approach of the French towards that town, and the imminent danger of their columns on the other side of the river, retreated with the utmost expedition in that direction. At daybreak on the morning of the 16th, the main Russian army marched on Smolensko, where Raefskoi and Newerofskoi, with nineteen thousand men, were shut up in presence of the whole French army.*

The ancient and venerable city of Smolensko is situated on two hills, which there restrain within a narrow channel the stream of the Dnieper. Two bridges secure the communication between the two divisions of the city and opposite sides of the river. An old wall, thirty-five feet high and eighteen feet thick, surmounted by thirty lofty towers, formed its principal protection. In front of this rampart was placed a dry ditch, a covered way, and a glacis; but the ditch was shallow, and exposed to no flanking fire, and the covered way had no communication with the body of the place. Fifty guns of old construction were mounted upon the ramparts, but they were without carriages, and in bad order; and the ditch was wholly wanting where the walls adjoined the Dnieper. Three gates only formed an entrance into the town, one of which led to Krasnoi, one to a suburb, and the third across the Dnieper to Moscow. Near the gate of Krasnoi was a half-moon beyond the ditch, intended to cover a breach in the walls, still called the "Royal Breach," made by Sigismund, king of Poland, in the days when Sarmatian grandeur had not yet been torn in pieces by Democratic phrensy and external cupidity. A citadel of more modern construction was still less capable of defence, from the decayed state of its ramparts, which, in many places, might be ascended without difficulty. The Cathedral, a venerable old edifice with vast gilded domes, was an object of the highest religious veneration to the peasantry of Russia; and, being the frontier and one of the chief cities of the old Empire, the preservation of the place was an object of the utmost solicitude to the soldiers.†

At four in the morning, Murat and Ney appeared before Smolensko; and the emperor, having arrived an hour after, ordered an immediate attack on the citadel by Ney's corps, which Raefskoi repulsed with great loss before any succour from the main army arrived. Still the utmost anxiety filled the breast of the Russian generals, and every eye was anxiously turned towards the side of Krasnoi, from which the main army might be expected; for the French columns, in enormous masses, were fast crowding around the town, and already the standards of a hundred and fifty thousand men might be counted from the spires of the Cathedral. At length vast clouds of dust were seen afar off, in the plain on the opposite side of the river, and through their openings long black columns, resplendent with steel, appeared, advancing with the utmost rapidity towards the walls of the city. It was Barclay and Bagrathion, hastening to the relief of their comrades, at the head of a hundred

Description of that city.

First attack of Ney on the citadel, which is repulsed. August 16.

* Fain, i., 354. Ségur, i., 252. Bout., i., 253. Chamb., i., 292.

† Bout., i., 255. Fain, i., 359. Ségur, i., 260. Chamb., i., 302, 303.

* Bout., i., 257. Ségur, i., 265, 266.

† Ségur, i., 266. Bout., i., 258, 259. Chamb., i., 311, 312

and twenty thousand men. Bagrathion was the first to enter, and, having secured the important communication of the bridges, instantly re-enforced the heroic band who had so nobly maintained their post against the enemy.*

Napoleon, conceiving that the enemy was resolved to defend Smolensko with all his forces, immediately made his dispositions for a general attack on the following day. His army, exclusive of the corps of Junot and the viceroy, which were not come up, amounted to a hundred and eighty thousand men, with five hundred pieces of cannon. The Imperial Guard was in the centre: Murat, Ney, and Davoust, at the head of their respective forces, were prepared to commence the attack. The emperor planted his tent in the midst of the first line, almost within cannon-shot of the city.†

Never was a nobler spectacle presented in military annals than the French army exhibited on the day preceding the grand attack on Smolensko. The simultaneously converging of so vast a multitude from all directions to the westward, presented to those who watched their movements from the domes of the Cathedral, at first a confused multitude of men, horses, artillery, and chariots, who covered the earth as far as the eye could reach; but by degrees order began to appear in the chaos; the different corps and squadrons took up their allotted ground; the artillery ranged itself on the prominent eminences, and the admirable arrangements of modern discipline appeared in their highest lustre. Silently the troops defiled out of the crowd, and took up their appointed stations: no sound of drums or trumpets was heard, as on a day of parade; the solemnity of the occasion, the awful nature of the contest which awaited them, had impressed every heart; even the voice of the chiefs, when giving the word of command, was grave, sometimes faltering, though with other emotions than those of fear.‡

But the Russian general had no intention of hazarding a general battle in a situation where he was exposed to the risk of being cut off from his communications with Moscow and the interior. Contrary to the opinion of Bagrathion and the principal officers of both armies, he resolved to retreat, and hold Smolensko merely by such a rear-guard as might enable the troops to withdraw on the road to Moscow in safety. Bagrathion, accordingly, defiled out of the city at four in the morning of the 17th, in the direction of Elnia, to secure the road to the capital, and took post with the main body of the army behind the little stream of the Kolodnia, about four miles distant; while Barclay, with the corps of Doctoroff and Bagawouth, still held the ramparts of Smolensko. Napoleon, exasperated at the sight of the retiring columns, and unable, after several efforts, to find a ford in the river, in order to reach them, ordered a general assault, and at two o'clock in the afternoon all the columns approached the ramparts.§

Ney advanced to the attack of the citadel; Davoust and Lobau towards the suburbs which

lay before the ramparts; while Poniatowsky, with sixty pieces of cannon, was destined to descend and enfilade the banks of the Dnieper, and destroy the bridges which connected the old and new city. But the Russians were not unprepared for their reception. The suburbs were filled with musketeers prepared to contest every inch of ground; and the ramparts, defended by two hundred pieces of heavy cannon and thirty thousand admirable troops, vomited an incessant fire on the assailants; while the French masses, preceded by a numerous artillery, advanced with stern regularity to the attack. After an obstinate conflict, the besiegers established themselves in the suburbs, and a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, within pointblank range, battered the walls of the city. The French army, stationed on the amphitheatre of surrounding heights, beheld with breathless anxiety the impending conflict, and announced with loud shouts the advance of their comrades. The viceroy's corps and that of Junot successively arrived before five o'clock, and formed the reserve of the assailants; so that nearly two hundred thousand combatants were engaged in the assault, or grouped around the town, prepared to support the more advanced columns. But it was in vain that their batteries thundered against the ancient walls; that column after column advanced through a storm of shot to the assault of the citadel; and that the ardent intrepidity of the Poles sought to wrest from Russia the key of their independence, so often in former days mastered by their arms. The thickness of the ramparts defied the efforts of the artillery, and the valour of the assailants sought in vain to wrest the gates from their defenders. Towards evening the French howitzers succeeded in setting fire to some houses near the ramparts, and the flames, seizing on the wooden streets, spread with frightful rapidity; but the firmness of the Russians remained unshaken, and, placed between the fire of the enemy in front and the burning city behind, they continued to present an undaunted resistance to the assaults of their enemies.*

Discouraged by the failure of such repeated and bloody attacks, and having experienced the total inability of his Napoleon, and artillery, without regular approach- results of the battle. Repulse of Napoleon, and the town, Napoleon, at seven in the evening, commanded his troops to draw off, and at nine the cannonade ceased at all points. The Russians, after an arduous conflict, remained masters of the city, and their advanced posts reoccupied the covered way. Thus the French emperor, who had brought seventy thousand men to the attack, had the mortification to find all his efforts foiled by a Russian corps whose force never exceeded thirty thousand men, supported by the formidable ramparts which he had the boldness to expect to carry by a *coup-de-main*. Fully fifteen thousand men were lost to the invaders in these fruitless assaults; while the Russians, on the 17th alone, lost nearly six thousand, and during the whole conflict not less than ten thousand men.†

The weather was calm and serene, and the unclouded sky reminded the Italian soldiers of the sunset in their beautiful country. To the

Bloody attack on the town, which proves unsuccessful August 17.

* Ségur, i., 268. Fain, i., 363, 364. Bout., i., 260. Chamb., i., 298. † Ségur, i., 270. Fain, i., 367.

‡ Chamb., i., 309, 310.

§ Ségur, i., 275. Bout., i., 262, 299. Fain, i., 367, 368. Chamb., i., 314, 315.

* Ségur, i., 275, 277. Bout., i., 266, 267. Fain, i., 368, 371. Chamb., i., 315, 318.

† Bout., i., 268. Ségur, i., 276. Chamb., i., 333. Fain, i., 377, 378.

Splendid appearance of the burning city.

roar of artillery and the tumult of mortal conflict succeeded a night of tranquillity unusual in the midst of such numerous assemblages of men, the result of the fatigue and exhaustion of the preceding days. In the midst of this momentary repose the fire spread with unresisted violence, and a vast column of flame ascended from the interior of the city. Around this blazing centre the corps of the French army were grouped in dense masses for several miles in circumference; the light of their watch-fires illuminated the heavens; but every eye was arrested by the spectacle of the burning city within. A dark band in front marked the yet unbroken line of battlements; every loophole and embrasure was clearly defined by the resplendent light behind, whence volumes of flame and burning smoke arose, as from a vast volcano, over half the heavens: a lurid light, like that of Vesuvius, was cast over the extended bivouacs of the French army, while the lofty domes of the Cathedral, still untouched by the conflagration, stood in dark magnificence above the ocean of flame. The troops beheld with dismay the splendid spectacle, and, uncertain of the event, rested in suspense all night on their arms.*

At three in the morning, a patrol of Davoust scaled the walls, and penetrated without resistance into the interior of the town. Finding neither inhabitants nor opponents, he returned to his corps, and the French advanced guard speedily entered the walls. They found the streets deserted. The work of destruction, begun by the French howitzers, had been completed by the voluntary sacrifice of the inhabitants, who had fled with the retiring corps of their countrymen; and the invading columns, in all the pomp of military splendour, traversed in silence a ruined city, filled only with smoking walls and dying men. Never did the horrors of war appear in more striking colours than to the French troops as they entered that devoted city. Almost all the houses were consumed or in ruins; dying soldiers or citizens encumbered the streets; a few miserable wretches were alone to be seen ransacking the yet smoking remains for any relics of their property which might have survived the conflagration. In the midst of this scene of woe, the Cathedral and churches which had withstood the flames alone offered an asylum to the unfortunate inhabitants; while the martial columns of the French army, marching in the finest order to the sound of military music through the wreck occasioned by their arms, afforded a grand and imposing spectacle. So skilfully, however, had the Russian retreat been managed, that the magazines in the town had all been destroyed; the wounded, and great part of the inhabitants, withdrawn; and the bridges over the Dnieper broken down, amid the horrors of the nocturnal conflagration following that dreadful day, leaving naked walls, and the cannon which mounted them, as the only trophy to the conqueror.†

The abandonment of Smolensko, long regarded as the bulwark of Old Russia, was a matter of profound regret to the Russian soldiers, and furnished Napoleon with abundant matter for congratulation in his bulletins. But he soon found that the retreating enemy had lost none of their courage from this catastrophe. A column

of French having passed the Dnieper at a ford, and entered the eastern suburb of Smolensko, were instantly attacked, and driven back across the river, by Baron Korf and the Russian rear-guard, while the main body leisurely continued their retreat towards their brethren under Bagrathion.*

In conducting this retreat, however, the Russian commander had considerable difficulties to encounter. Bagrathion had retired by the route to Moscow, in order to prevent the enemy from interposing between the army and that metropolis; while Barclay, finding that route exposed to the fire of the French artillery when his columns began to withdraw, had taken the road to St. Petersburg, and every mile that he advanced led him farther from his comrades. On this occasion, the bad effects of the independent and co-ordinate command which Barclay and Bagrathion had of their respective armies, and the jealousy and misunderstanding to which it necessarily gave rise, had wellnigh proved fatal to the Empire; for if the two armies had marched a day longer on these diverging lines, their subsequent junction would have become impossible, and Napoleon, with his immense host interposed between them, would have proved irresistible. In these circumstances, a circular flank movement became necessary: a hazardous operation at any time, but more especially so to a retreating army, encumbered with an immense train of cannon, and in presence of an enterprising enemy. Nevertheless, Barclay, seeing no alternative, adopted this perilous course, and for a day the fate of Russia was suspended by a thread; for a vigorous attack by Napoleon on the moving columns would have renewed the disasters of Austerlitz. Fortunately, Napoleon was ignorant of the advantage which lay within his grasp, or was not in a condition to avail himself of it; and a severe action with the rear-guard alone took place, in circumstances when a general action might have been expected. Barclay, fully sensible of the impending danger, detached a strong body from his army to re-enforce the rear-guard of Bagrathion on the Moscow road, with instructions to proceed by forced marches to the point of junction, and defend, to the last extremity, the first tenable position, in order to give the main army time to regain, by cross-roads, the Moscow route.†

Napoleon, having re-established the bridges over the Dnieper, advanced his columns both on the roads of Smolensko and St. Petersburg. Ney passed the river before daybreak on the 19th, by the light of the burning suburbs, and advanced on the Moscow road as far as Valentina, where the Russian rear-guard, stationed by Barclay to cover his cross movement from the Petersburg to the Moscow road, was strongly posted on the opposite side of a ravine, through which the little stream of the Kolodnia flowed. The troops engaged were at first inconsiderable, but they were gradually strengthened on both sides, and the combat which ensued was of the most obstinate description. Notwithstanding his utmost efforts, the Russian general, Touczoff, was driven from his first position, and compelled to retire behind the rivulet; but, being there re-enforced by fresh troops, and eight pieces of heavy artillery, which

* Ségur, i., 277. Bout., i., 269. Chamb., i., 318, 319.

† Ségur, i., 279, 280. Lab., 105. Chamb., i., 320. Bout., i., 269, 270. Larrey, iv., 30.

* Bout., i., 270. Ségur, i., 281. Moniteur, Sept. 2, 1812.

Chamb., i., 321.

† Bout., i., 272. Jom., iv., 96, 99. Chamb., i., 222, 223

Barclay brought up in person to the scene of danger, he renewed the conflict, and drove the enemy back again across the stream.*

Napoleon was no sooner informed of the serious and unexpected resistance which Ney experienced from the Russian rear-guard, than he despatched orders to the division Gudin of Davoust's corps, already signalized at the battle of Auerstadt,† to advance to his support; and at the same time, fearing that the whole enemy's army had assembled for battle, gave directions to Morand, who, with another division of Davoust's corps, was a little in the rear on a cross-road, which would have brought him direct upon the Russian flank, to halt and retire. This retrograde movement was performed with great difficulty, as at the time the order was received Morand's troops were involved in an old pine wood, where the intermixture of the advancing and retreating columns created extreme confusion; and it was hard to say whether the Russians engaged owed most to this unusual want of decision on the part of the emperor, or to the hesitation of Junot, who, having received orders merely to take a position on the right bank of the Dnieper immediately after crossing it, had not moral courage enough to undertake the responsibility of attacking the Russian rear-guard posted beyond that river, when engaged with Ney, though his position would have enabled him to assail it with every advantage in rear, at the moment when it was already hard pressed by the enemy in front, and he was strenuously urged to do so by Murat.‡

Thus left to his own resources, with the assistance only of Gudin's division, Desperate val- our displayed on both sides. ever, resolutely maintained the contest. He repeatedly attacked the enemy, both with musketry and the bayonet: Gudin's men outdid even their former glorious exploits: four times did they cross the stream with the utmost intrepidity, and ascend the opposite bank with fixed bayonets; but they were constantly driven back by the devoted heroism of the Russians, who, aware of the vital importance of maintaining the position, were resolved to perish to the last man rather than abandon it. The generals on both sides came up to the spot: General Gudin was struck down by a cannon-shot when bravely leading his men to the charge; and General Touczoff§ made prisoner, in the midst of his staff, by a furious irruption of the French cavalry. But the loss of their leaders made no diminution in the fury of the combat: both sides fought with invincible obstinacy. The contest continued, with various success, till nightfall; but at the close of the day the Russians retained their position, and, under cover of their heroic rear-guard, the main army of Barclay had regained in safety the Moscow road.||

This action, in which the French lost eight thousand, and the Russians six thousand men, had an important effect on the spirit of both armies. Ney commenced the combat with twenty-five thousand men; and, by the accession of Gudin, his

force was raised to thirty-five thousand; while General Touczoff had hardly five thousand under his orders in the first instance, and the whole re-enforcements which were afterward brought up to his assistance did not raise his force to above twenty-five thousand men. The brave General Gudin was killed by the cannon-shot which felled him while leading his troops across the stream, already red with human blood; and his loss, in the opinion of Napoleon, would more than have balanced a victory.*

Notwithstanding their devoted valour, however, the Russians owed much to fortune on this occasion. Had Napoleon pressed forward with the main body of his forces, all the firmness of their rear-guard could not have saved their army from total defeat while accomplishing their perilous movement. They themselves were astonished at not being attacked in flank by the cavalry under Murat; and the conduct of Junot in not hastening to the scene of action appeared so inexcusable, that it was with the utmost difficulty the emperor was dissuaded from at once depriving him of his command. Morand, with his numerous division of Davoust's corps, was abreast of Valentina, at so short a distance from the Russian right that every cannon-shot was distinctly heard; and, if not restrained by the emperor's orders, he might, by suddenly appearing, have decided the victory; and, finally, Napoleon himself did not arrive on the field till three on the following morning, when he found only the dead and the dying, instead of the desperate conflict which his eagle eye might have converted into an important victory.†

The Russians, in the night, continued their retreat, and retired by the Moscow road without farther molestation from their enemies; and Napoleon visited, at the break of day, the field of battle. The regiments of Gudin's division were reduced to skeletons: the soldiers black with powder, and their bayonets bent with the violence of the encounter; the earth ploughed with cannon-shot, the trees torn and mutilated, the field covered with broken carriages, wounded horses, and mangled bodies. The horrors of the scene had filled the minds of the survivors with melancholy, but the presence of Napoleon restored their military ardour. He was prodigal of his praise, and of those acts of kindness by which he won the hearts of his soldiers. "With such men," he exclaimed, "you might conquer the world: this is the most glorious of our fields; the dead have won immortal glory." With his own hands he delivered an eagle to the 127th regiment, which had not hitherto acquired that honour, and loaded the troops of the other corps with decorations: the regiments were formed successively in hollow circles, in the midst of which the emperor inquired of the officers who were the most deserving, and, if the men confirmed their nomination, the appointment of the persons named to superior rank was instantly completed. These honours, bestowed at such a moment, and from such hands, filled the troops with enthusiasm; and the shattered remains of the regiments, proud of their diminished numbers, exulted in the thought that Europe was resounding with their praise.‡

* Bout., i., 276. Chamb., i., 328. Jom., iv., 100.

† Ane., ii., 446.

‡ Fain, i., 385, 386. Chamb., i., 325, 326. Bulletin, Moniteur, Sept. 2, 1812.

§ The commander of the cavalry, not the general of division bearing a similar name.

|| Jom., iv., 100, 102. Bout., i., 276, 283. Fain, i., 382, 384. Ségur, i., 299, 300. Chamb., i., 325, 330.

* Compare Bout., i., 284. Jom., iv., 102. Ségur, i., 299, 300. Chamb., i., 327.

† Ségur, i., 301, 304, 305. Jom., iv., 103. Chamb., i., 329. Fain, i., 385, 386.

‡ Ségur, i., 307, 309. Fain, i., 390. Chamb., i., 330.

In truth, a great effort was necessary to support the spirit of the army, which was considerably damped by the fatigues and dangers of the campaign. The objects that met the eye in Germany, and as far as the Oder, reminded the soldiers of France, but in Poland and Lithuania everything wore a novel and gloomy aspect. The troops were seized with disquietude at finding themselves incessantly advancing through gloomy forests, intersected only by swampy streams or rocky dells: their spirits sank at the interminable solitudes which surrounded them in every direction; and the consciousness of their numbers added only to their apprehensions, from the obvious inadequacy of the country to provide for their necessities. The young conscripts, who advanced upon the traces of the Grand Army, were depressed by the melancholy remains which everywhere presented themselves: dead horses, broken carriages, and dying men obstructed the roads and infected the atmosphere; while the veterans who had combated in the front contrasted the miserable quarters which they had gained amid the ruins of Smolensko with the smiling villages they had abandoned in their native land. Even the generals were shaken by the general contagion; and those who had risen to the highest rank sighed to think that, after a life spent in arms, and wealth honourably acquired, they were reduced; like common soldiers, to the never-ending hardships of wretched food, incessant fatigue, and squalid habitations.*

Nor were the reports of the hospitals or the commissariat calculated to allay these gloomy anticipations. Already the march through Lithuania had cost the allied troops a half, the native French a fourth of their army, miserable victims of intemperance, disease, and fatigue: out of thirty thousand Bavarians who set out from Munich, only twelve thousand entered upon the first actions on the Dwina.† Typhus fever and dysentery, the well-known attendants on military suffering, had everywhere broken out in the most alarming manner, and swept off thousands in all the great hospitals of the army. Wilna and Witepsk were converted into vast charnel-houses, where contagion completed the unfinished work of human destruction; and even the spacious convents of Smolensko, which had not suffered from the flames, were incapable of containing the multitudes of wounded who had been disabled under its walls. Such was the accumulation of corpses around the ramparts of that city, that they exceeded all that the strength of the survivors could

bury; and the smell which they diffused in every direction gave rise to a frightful epidemic, which in the end proved more fatal to the troops than the sword of the enemy. All the cottages in its environs were filled with wounded soldiers, both French and Russian, who, crowded together often without either straw or provisions, made known their existence and sufferings by the groans and lamentations which they uttered. Hundreds were forgotten, and perished miserably in the general confusion: the streets were blocked up by the endless files of chariots, bearing the sick and maimed, which incessantly traversed them; and such was the multitude of amputated limbs which there was no time to destroy, that they accumulated in bloody heaps, and infected the air with their smell.*

To any other mind than that of Napoleon, these disastrous circumstances would have furnished reasons for delay; but to him they afforded only additional and cogent arguments for an advance. He was aware how much his empire depended on opinion, and how rapidly these sinister auguries would be known to Europe if not eclipsed by the lustre of a victory. "The condition of the army," said he, "is frightful: I know it. At Wilna, one half were stragglers; now they amount to two thirds: there is not a moment to lose: we must grasp at peace, and it can only be found at Moscow. Besides, the state of the army is such as to render a halt impossible: constant advance alone keeps it together; you may lead it forward, but you cannot arrest its movement. We have advanced too far to retreat. If I had nothing in view but military glory, I would have nothing to do but to return to Smolensko, and extend my wings on either side so as to crush Wittgenstein and Tormasoff. These operations would be brilliant: they would form a glorious termination to the campaign, but they would not conclude the war. Peace is before us: we have only to march eight days to obtain it: so near our object, it is impossible to deliberate: let us advance to Moscow."†

On the other side, the feelings of the Russian generals, as to the propriety of a farther retreat, underwent a change. The object in retiring from the frontier had been to draw the enemy into a situation where his original superiority of force might be diminished by the fatigues and the diseases incident to a protracted advance. These causes, joined to the bloody battles recently fought, had already operated so powerfully, that the effective French army was little more than half its original amount, while the losses of the Russians were more than supplied by the great armaments prepared in the interior. But a farther retreat would sacrifice all these advantages, because it would surrender to the enemy the capital, and the richest provinces of the Empire, from whence the principal resources for maintaining the war were to be drawn, while the invader would reap all the fruits of a victory without its dangers. The troops had long murmured at continually retreating before their enemies; and the prospect of abandoning Moscow without a struggle was likely to excite the utmost dissatisfaction not only in the army, but the nation. These reasons induced Barclay to resolve to give battle on the

* Ségur, i., 286, 287, 291.

† "At its departure from the Bavarian States, this corps was estimated at thirty thousand men; on leaving Wilna it was still twenty-five thousand; but the march to Witepsk, without any other subsistence than two rations of bad bread each man, reduced it a half: so that on its entry into Polotsk, without having ever seen the enemy, it could only muster twelve thousand combatants. Thirteen thousand five hundred men had been lost by fatigue or want of provisions; of whom eight thousand were already no more, and the greater part of the sick gave no hope of recovery. It may easily be imagined, from this, in what a miserable state the troops under arms were: all, generals and soldiers, had been seized with a violent dysentery, which, in many cases, was combined with other complaints. It could not be otherwise; for the soldier had nothing to nourish him but meat without either bread or vegetables, in a country where the water was bad. There were no fermented liquors, and the mills were destroyed. It was the same with all the other corps in the French army."—MARSHAL ST. CYR, *Histoire Militaire*, iii., 62, 63.

* Ségur, i., 291, 312, 313. Chamb., i., 333. St. Cyr, *Hist. Mil.*, iii., 79, 105, 62.

† Ségur, i., 293. Fain, i., 407, 408.

first a convenient situation; and he despatched orders to General Milaradowitch to hasten the levies in the interior, and direct the corps, when formed, to Wiazma.*

Napoleon was still farther encouraged to advance from Smolensko by the intelligence which he received at that juncture from the armies on his two flanks. On the 12th of August, Schwartzenberg, who had arrived with his corps of Austrians to the support of Regnier, attacked Tormasoff with nearly forty thousand men, who could only collect to oppose him twenty-five thousand. In an early part of the engagement, the left wing of the Russians was turned, notwithstanding the strength of their position, which was covered both in front and flank by morasses; but the Austrians did not follow up their advantages with sufficient vigour; and, by throwing back his left wing, Tormasoff contrived to prolong the contest without serious loss till nightfall, when he retired from the field, and got behind the Styr, with the loss of four thousand men and a few pieces of cannon. This victory, though by no means decisive, preserved the Grand-duchy of Warsaw from invasion, and relieved Napoleon, for the time at least, from the disquietudes which he was beginning to feel for the communications in his rear.†

On the other side, Wittgenstein, on the day on which Tormasoff was engaged with the Austrians, attacked the advanced guard of Oudinot on the Svoiana, and drove it back with the loss of fifteen hundred men. Oudinot, in consequence, fell back to Polotsk, where he was joined by the Bavarians, and his army raised to above thirty-five thousand men. Wittgenstein, with only twenty-four thousand, had the courage to hazard a general attack on the French lines posted in front of Polotsk, and a bloody action ensued on the 17th of August, without any decisive advantage on either side, but in which Oudinot was severely wounded. On the 18th the battle was renewed, and both sides fought with the utmost obstinacy; but, in the end, although their cavalry had driven the French to the walls of the city, the Russians retired with the loss of seven cannon and two thousand men: the French, however, who had suffered nearly as much, were in no condition to follow up their advantage. St. Cyr, who commanded after the loss of Oudinot, was, in consequence, made a marshal of the Empire; but, notwithstanding his success, he did not move forward till the 22d, when his advanced guard, consisting of the Bavarians under Gen. Wrede, made an attack on the Russian rear-guard, but experienced a severe defeat. Wittgenstein removed his headquarters to the fortified position of Sewokhino, where he awaited the re-enforcements which were expected from Finland and St. Petersburg.‡

Still farther to the right, Marshal Macdonald having advanced to the neighbourhood of Riga with the corps under his command, consisting chiefly of Prussians, General Essen made a vigorous sortie, and attacked General Grawert at Eckaw, whom he defeated with the loss of twelve hundred men. The operations, in consequence, languished on the side of Livonia, and nothing of

importance occurred till a later period of the campaign.*

The corps of Marshal Victor, which had now come up to the Dwina, became a body of great importance, as it occupied a central position on the road to Smolensko, in such a manner as to constitute the reserve at once of the Grand Army, Oudinot, and Schwartzenberg. Napoleon gave orders to him to advance to Smolensko, and intrusted the whole of Lithuania to his orders. Thirty thousand men stationed in that strong position, directly in the rear of the Grand Army, and on its line of communications, appeared to give great security to the enterprise of the emperor. His instructions were, "To direct all his attention and forces to the general object, which is to secure the communication from Wilna, by Minsk and Smolensko, with the imperial headquarters. The army which you command is the reserve of the Grand Army; if the route by Smolensko to the Grand Army is interrupted, you must reopen it at all hazards. Possibly I may not find peace where I am about to seek it; but even in that case, supported by so strong a reserve, well posted, my retreat would be secure, and need not be precipitate."†

The advance of Victor to Smolensko left a void between the Niemen and the Vistula which it was essential to fill up; and here, too, the provident care of the emperor had arranged what seemed the means of absolute security. Augereau's great army, above fifty thousand strong, received orders to move on from the line of the Elbe and the Oder, where it lay, to the Niemen, and occupy all the principal points of communication from Berlin to the Lithuanian provinces; while the hundred cohorts of the National Guard of France, which had been put on a respectable footing before the emperor's departure from Paris, were moved forward from the fortresses of the Rhine, where they had been completing their discipline and organization, to the strongholds on the Elbe. Instructions were at the same time sent to Schwartzenberg, who was re-enforced by some Polish regiments, to advance against Tormasoff, and secure the rear of the Grand Army from insult or injury from that quarter. Finally, to provide a reserve in France itself, and complete the great chain of communication from the Seine to the Moskwa, the emperor ordered the levy by conscription of one hundred and twenty thousand men, from the youth who attained the age of eighteen to nineteen in 1813. Thus, the whole of Western Europe was to be precipitated on the devoted realm of Russia; and the vast army of five hundred thousand, which the emperor commanded in person, was but the advanced part of the mighty host which was to drive back to Asia the Tartar race.‡

Encouraged by these successes, and having completed those dispositions which appeared to secure his rear, Napoleon left Smolensko with his guards, and followed the Russian army, which was slowly retiring on the Moscow road. Barclay fell back by Dorogobouge to Wiazma, and from thence to Gjatsh, where Milaradowitch, with a reserve of sixteen thousand men, joined the army. He was surveying the

* Bout., i., 286, 287. † Jom., iv., 105. Ségur, i., 285.
‡ Bout., ii., 55, 60. Jom., iv., 106, 107. Fain, i., 398, 402. St. Cyr, iii., 60, 100.

* Bout., ii., 30, 62. Jom., iv., 108.
† Napoleon to Victor, Aug. 9, 1812, Fain, i., 425, 427.
‡ Fain, i., 428, 429.

Operations of
Schwartzenberg
against Torma-
soff. Aug. 12.

And of St. Cyr
against Witt-
genstein. Au-
gust 12.

Aug. 17.

Aug. 18.

And of Augereau from the Oder, and the National Guard of France to the Elbe.

Advance of Napoleon towards Moscow. August 22.

ground, with a view to the choice of a field of battle, when he was superseded in the command by General Kutusoff, whom the emperor had named commander-in-chief of all the armies. The wisdom of nominating to the supreme command a Russian by birth, endeared to the soldiers by his recent victories over the Turks, and who might direct the movements of the scattered forces from the Danube to the Baltic, cannot be doubted; but though Barclay was thus deprived of the fruit of his measures at the very moment when he might have expected to reap them, yet he gained immortal honour by the campaign which he had previously conducted. He had retreated above four hundred miles, in presence of an army twice as numerous as his own, headed by a general unrivalled for his talent in pursuing an enemy, without a single battalion having been broken, a single standard taken, or sustaining a greater loss in prisoners or artillery than he had inflicted on his pursuers. Scotland has good reason to be proud of having given birth to a leader capable of such achievements. History can furnish no parallel to a retreat of such peril performed with such success.*†

Kutousoff, who was thus in her last agony called by the unanimous voice of Russia to the command of her armies, was at St. Petersburg when the eventful change befell him. He had been engaged, as we have already seen, in a campaign, in which signal reverses had been succeeded by glorious triumphs on the Danube; and, beyond any other general in the Russian army, he enjoyed the confidence of the soldiers. Accustomed, in the great majority of instances, to be commanded by foreign officers, they beheld with unbounded enthusiasm a native Russian at the head of their battalions, and were confirmed in this attachment by the brilliant successes with which he had redeemed the campaign on the Danube, and restored to the Muscovite standards the triumphs of Ismael and Oczakoff.† Though victories so brilliant, however, had lately attended his arms, and a solemn *Te Deum* had been chanted at St. Petersburg, in presence of the emperor and court, on account of the peace with the Turks, Kutousoff himself laboured under a sort of disgrace at court, in consequence of its having been supposed that he had not conducted the negotiations at Bucharest with the expedition which the critical state of the Empire required. The courtiers, observant of the least cloud which overshadows the fortunes of a leading character, were already shunning his society; and so low had the prospects of the future saviour of Russia fallen, that he received with tears of gratitude the visit of Count Oginski, a Polish nobleman, who had formerly enjoyed his intimacy in Lithuania, and had moral courage enough not to desert him in his adversity. Alexander was most unwilling, and justly so, to deprive Barclay of the command, as he with reason regarded his retreat from the Niemen to the Moskwa as a model of military skill, and destined, perhaps, in the end, to prove the salvation of the Empire. But the public mind was now agitated to the greatest degree by the fall of Smolensko, and the

continued retreat of the Russian armies towards Moscow; the ferment at St. Petersburg was extreme, and all classes concurred in demanding, with loud cries, the appointment of Kutusoff, as the only guarantee for the integrity of the Empire. Alexander yielded to the torrent, and the veteran general was appointed to the supreme command. The universal transports of Aug. 12. all classes, nobles, army, and people, upon this appointment, proved how much he had endeared himself to the nation: the people threw themselves at his feet when he went to the Cathedral in state, to offer up his supplications for the success of the armies, and besought him to save Russia. Loaded with their benedictions, accompanied by their prayers, he set out for the army, charged with the salvation of his country and the deliverance of Europe.*

The whole life of the veteran who was now called to the momentous duty of directing the armies under the walls of Moscow, and whose brief career was attended with such extraordinary results upon the fortunes of Europe, had been devoted to the service of his country. He was upward of seventy when he was summoned to measure swords with Napoleon, but the snows of age had given him the caution of experience without extinguishing the fires of youth. He was descended from a noble Russian ancestry, and connected by marriage with the principal families of Moscow. His military renown had suffered less than might have been expected from the reverse of Austerlitz, as it was well known that the fatal cross march which brought on the disasters of that unhappy day had been undertaken contrary to his advice; and his recent successes in the war against the Turks had completely re-established his reputation. He had been repeatedly wounded in his different campaigns, and one of his injuries had deprived him of an eye. His height was moderate, his figure corpulent, and his manners distinguished by good-humour and *bonhomie*; but under this apparently simple exterior he concealed a remarkable degree of *finess* and diplomatic address peculiar to his country, and which in the end proved more than a match for all the ministers of Napoleon. He had studied war profoundly, not only in the field, but in the closet, and had brought an extensive theoretic acquaintance with military principles to bear on the experience which a long and active life in harness had given of its actual details. The soldiers were warmly attached to him, from the conviction, acquired by experience, that, without relaxing in the necessary rigour of discipline and subordination, he was at all times careful not to overload them with needless exactions, and ever solicitous about their material comforts; while the recent and glorious victories which he had gained over the Turks inspired them with a confidence which no general had enjoyed since the days of Suwarrow. The companion in arms of that illustrious warrior, he was, like him, attached to old customs, and ingrafted the affection of the soldiers on national manners, a custom somewhat antiquated, and a scrupulous regard for the observances of religion, the great lever by which the public mind in Russia is to be affected. These qualities, from a knowledge of their influence on the soldiers, recommended him also to the higher and more enlightened classes, and

* Ségur, i., 358. Bout., i., 290, 296.

† Barclay de Tolly was of an old and respectable Scotch family, the Barclays of Towy in Aberdeenshire. The old family tower of the chief who baffled the great invasion of Napoleon is to be seen close to the highway, on the left-hand side, between Fyvie and Turriff, on the great road from Aberdeen to Inverness. † *Ante*, iii., 517, 522.

* Oginski's Memoirs, iii., 186, 187. Bout., i., 302, 303.

De Staël, *Dix Années d'Exil*, 348

† *Ante*, ii., 369.

compensated in general estimation the disadvantage of the advanced age of seventy-four years, and the recollection of the fatal reverse, which, under his command, the Russian arms had experienced at Austerlitz; and it may safely be affirmed, that never did commander undertake a hazardous and difficult duty more warmly supported by all classes of his countrymen.*

The arrival of Kutusoff diffused general joy among the Russian troops. The successful termination of the Turkish war was considered as a presage of victory by the nation. His engaging manners and paternal solicitude for their welfare had long endeared him to the soldiers; confidence speedily succeeded to depression, and the troops began to burnish their arms and sharpen their flints, in expectation of an immediate engagement. But it was no easy matter to justify these expectations. The army was now

Aug. 29. hardly fifty leagues from Moscow, and that capital could only be saved by a general battle; yet how engage in one with any prospect of success, with an army still (notwithstanding the arrival of sixteen thousand new levies and ten thousand of the militia of Moscow) greatly inferior in number to their opponents, and grievously depressed by the length of their retreat? Nevertheless, it had become indispensable to run such a hazard, in order to check the consternation which, since the fall of Smolensko, was beginning to spread in the interior of Russia; and Kutusoff readily embraced the views of Barclay as to the necessity of no longer delaying the perilous alternative.†

During their march from Smolensko, the French army experienced great difficulties, which could only have been overcome by the experience and resources of their chiefs. The Russians, retiring, burned the principal towns, and the inhabitants of the country voluntarily left their houses to avoid the tempest which was lowering in their rear. With such skill was the retreat conducted, that neither cannon, equipage, nor prisoners fell into the hands of the invaders; and on one occasion, when the rear-guard was attacked by Murat, the French, after an obstinate conflict, were repulsed from the field. Davoust, in a report to the emperor upon the retreat of the Russians, observed, "It must be confessed that their retreat is conducted in admirable order. The nature of the ground determines the position of their rear-guard, and not the manœuvres of Murat. Their positions are so well chosen, and defended with such vigour, that it seems as if their movements are the result of a plan previously determined on, and executed with scrupulous exactness."‡

Murat, at the head of a long column of twenty Order of the thousand cavalry, headed the pursuit; but it was in vain that the squadrons fought through clouds of dust, from morning till night, under a burning sun; the horses sunk under their fatigues, without being able to reach the enemy. After this enormous body of horse came the infantry, marching in three great columns, all abreast: that in the centre kept to the high-road, and was composed of the corps of Davoust, still the first both in num-

bers and discipline; on the right, within the fields, marched the corps of Poniatowsky; on the left that of Eugene; the Imperial Guard on the highway behind Davoust, and Ney in the rear. The artillery of these corps found their way, as they best could, along the country roads or open plains parallel to the great road. The enormous body advanced with astonishing rapidity, without any regard to difficulties or the means of subsistence: the weak, the sickly, broken carriages, dismounted guns, lame horses, were left behind; but the head of the column still pressed on with ceaseless march, devastating the plain in its progress, and trampling under foot the whole fruits of the earth, as if a gigantic rolling stone had been drawn along its surface.*

The physical character of the country through which the army marched during its advance from Smolensko, had singularly facilitated this remarkable mode of sweeping, like a devastating flood, over a comparatively narrow space; but at the same time, it had impressed the most sombre and gloomy presentiments on the minds of the soldiers. Its great rivers are the only striking features of that boundless plain; everything else is lost in the immensity of space. Hardly any brooks are to be met with, so frequently does the sand obstruct their course or drain away their waters. No variety of trees is to be seen: the eternal birch alone, planted in rows along the roadsides, relieves the monotony of nature. Even the absence of stones is felt as a subject of regret, so much is the mind faigued by never perceiving new objects, or being permitted to repose on hills, rocks, or valleys. You see nothing on either hand but vast plains of corn, which appear to have been cultivated by invisible hands, so rare does the population appear in the boundless expanse around. A few woods of birch, villages separated by vast distances from each other, all formed of wooden houses constructed in the same manner, constitute the only objects which relieve the general uniformity of the scene. Even the approach to towns is indicated by no symptoms of greater animation: fruits and flowers are to be seen only in a few enclosures; orchards or vineyards are nowhere to be met with. Such is the vast expanse of Russia that everything is lost in it; even the chateaux of the nobility and the cottages of the people disappear. You would suppose that you were traversing a country of which the inhabitants had migrated to some other quarter of the globe. Even birds are wanting; animals are rarely to be met with; the unbroken extent has banished every other object except the extent itself, which incessantly haunts the imagination.†

Napoleon, perceiving, from the approach to Moscow, that a general battle was at hand, gave three days' rest to his army, ordered a general muster-roll to be called of his troops along the whole line, and warned his detachments that, if they did not join their respective corps, they would lose the honour of the approaching conflict. Orders were, at the same time, despatched to the parks of reserve ammunition to advance, to the artillery to have their pieces in the best order, to the cavalry to refresh their horses, and to the soldiers to sharpen

Description of the country through which the French army passed in advancing to Moscow.

The Russians take post at Borodino. Description of their position there.

* Chamb., ii., 27, 28. Bout., i., 302. Valentin, Guerre des Turcs, p. 174.

† Bout., i., 303, 305. Chamb., ii., 28, 29.

‡ Bout., i., 287. Ségur, i., 318, 334. Jom., iv., 111. Chamb., ii., 23.

* Chamb., ii., 26, 27.

† De Staël, Dix Années d'Exil, 248, 250.

their sabres and examine the locks of their muskets. Meanwhile, the Russians took post at Borodino, which appeared to Kutusoff to present an eligible position for defence. The little stream of the Kolotza, flowing in a rocky dell, covered the right of the line as far as the village of Borodino, which stood in the centre of the position, on an elevated ridge. On the left the army extended to the village of Semenowskoe, and the approach to it, though of easier access, was intersected by broken ravines, which promised to embarrass the movements of the enemy. To aid the advantages of nature, intrenchments were hastily thrown up by the Russian army on some parts of their line; a wood on the right was strengthened by some fieldworks; and in the centre, on the sloping banks of the Kolotza, two heavy batteries were placed; while between the centre and the left, where the position was most accessible, a great redoubt was erected on a height which commanded the whole plain in front of the army. On the extreme left three other batteries were placed, to aid by their cross fire the great redoubt; while, at the distance of nine hundred toises in front of the line, another redoubt was erected on an eminence, to retard the advance of the attacking host.*

On the 5th of September the French army, in three great columns, passed the vast field of battle. and gloomy Convent of Kolotskoi without meeting an enemy; but as it approached the destined field, clouds of Cossacks were seen traversing the plain, and behind them the Russian army, in a dense and imposing mass, was descried drawn up in battle array. At this sight the advanced guard halted, and Napoleon, instantly coming forward to an eminence in the front, surveyed the position with the eye of a conqueror, and fixed, with the rapidity of lightning, on the points of attack.†

The first object was to seize the redoubt in front of the position, where Prince Gorczakoff commanded ten thousand men, supported by twelve pieces of heavy artillery. The attack was conducted by Murat, with an immense body of cavalry, the division of Campans, and the corps of Prince Poniatowsky. With an intrepid step the French infantry arrived to within twenty yards of the redoubt: the cannon on either side vomited forth grapeshot on their opponents, and the dauntless antagonists stood at that short distance discharging musketry at each other. At length, after a frightful struggle, the redoubt was carried by an assault of the 57th French infantry; but the Russians, returning to the charge, destroyed the troops who had entered it, and it was three times taken and retaken in the course of the evening.‡ Finally, it remained, before night, in the hands of the French. On the following morning, when the emperor passed the 61st regiment, he asked the colonel where the third battalion was: "Sire," he replied, "it is in the redoubt;" and, in truth, the whole of that brave corps had perished in the intrenchments which it had conquered.

During the course of the evening, intelligence was received at headquarters of the disastrous battle of Salamanca. Napoleon, though on the verge of fate himself, showed on this occasion no in-

dulgence for the faults of his lieutenants, and bitterly inveighed against the rashness of Marmont, which had endangered all his successes in Spain. About the same time a portrait of the King of Rome was received from the empress at Paris. At the sight of the much-loved image, the emperor, who was tenderly attached to his son, melted into tears: the anxiety and danger of the moment were forgotten in the recollection of those he had left behind him. With his own hands he placed the picture on the outside of his tent, and called the officers and privates of his faithful guard to share in the emotion which it had awakened in his mind.*

When the musketry ceased, both armies took up their positions, and the fires of the bivouacs were lighted. Those of the Russians flamed in an immense semicircle, which illuminated the half of the heavens; those of the French were more scattered and unequal, as the troops successively arrived and took up their ground. Napoleon's tent was pitched on the left of the great road, amid the squares of the Old Guard; but he slept little, being continually occupied in despatching orders and asking questions. He could not be induced to lie down till he was assured by those on the outside that, from the number of the shadows of moving figures which surrounded their watchfires, it was evident that the enemy remained firm on the ground they had chosen. He passed almost all the night in dictating orders, and it was not till midnight was far past that he could be prevailed on to take a few hours of repose. A young officer of his guard never closed his eyes during that anxious night: Augustus Caulaincourt lay on the floor, wrapped in his cloak, with his eyes fixed on the miniature of his young bride, whom he had quitted a few days after their marriage, and whom he was never destined to see again in this world. His remains lie in the "red monument which his good sword hath dug" in the great redoubt on the field of Borodino.† The army passed, for the most part, a sleepless night: the common men being engaged in repairing their arms, the officers in protecting themselves from the cold, which already was severely felt at night, and in watching the Russian position to see whether a retreat was commencing. But no sound was heard along the whole line; their fires burned with a steady flame; and morning alone extinguished the light of their bivouacs.‡

When the dawn discovered the Russian army still in their position, and it was evident that a general battle was to take place, a universal feeling of joy pervaded the French troops, and the anxiety of the men evinced itself in a general murmur throughout their lines. The fatigues of the campaign, the distance from home, the approaching dangers, were forgotten in the intense solicitude of the moment. The emperor, at break of day, withdrew the curtains of his tent, and, advancing into the middle of the circle of officers, who awaited his approach, mounted on horseback, and, riding to the heights in front, surveyed the whole of the Russian position: the weakness of he left made him resolve to make the principal effort at that point, and against the redoubt in the centre. At five, the sun, breaking through a fog,

Napoleon receives the account of the battle of Salamanca.

Night previous to the battle.

* Chamb., ii., 30, 31. Bout., i., 307, 308. Ségur, i., 360, 365. Fain, i., 447; ii., 4, 5.

† Ségur, i., 364. Fain, ii., 2, 3.

‡ Ségur, i., 366, 367. Bout., i., 313, 314. Lab., 131.

Fain, ii., 3, 4. Gourg., 104. Chamb., ii., 44.

* Ségur, i., 384, 385. Fain, i., 7, 8, 18.

† Ségur, i., 384, 385. Fain, i., 18, 19.

‡ Ségur, i., 369, 370, 386. Lab., 132. Fain, i., 18, 19.

appeared in cloudless splendour: "It is the sun of Austerlitz!" said Napoleon, and immediately the trumpets sounded, the drums beat, and the following proclamation was read to the troops: "Soldiers! the battle is at hand which you have so long desired: henceforth the victory depends on yourselves. It has become necessary, and will give you abundance; good winter-quarters, and a speedy return to your country! Conduct yourselves as you did at Austerlitz, Friedland, Witepsk, and Smolensko, and let the remotest posterity recount your actions on this day: let your countrymen say of you all, He was in that great battle under the walls of Moscow." The troops heard with enthusiasm these heart-stirring words, and their shouts were re-echoed from the Russian lines.*

Nor did the Russians neglect the most powerful means to animate the courage of their troops. On the evening of the 6th an unusual movement was observed in their position, and shortly a procession of dignified clergy, carrying an image to which miraculous powers were supposed to belong, passed through the whole lines of the army. The soldiers everywhere knelt before it, and mingled with the religious strains which rose from their ranks fervent prayers for their country, their families, and their religion. The priests bestowed their blessings on the prostrate army, and all, down to the meanest soldier, felt penetrated by the resolution to defend their country, or perish in the attempt.† Shortly afterward, preceded by a venerated image, and followed by all his staff, Kutusoff himself rode along the front of the line, immediately

after which the following proclamation was read to the troops: "Brother companions in arms! You see before you in that image, the object of your pious regard, an appeal addressed to Heaven to join its aid to that of men against the tyrant who disturbs the universe. Not content with destroying millions of human beings, the images of God, that arch rebel against all laws, human and divine, has penetrated with an armed force into our sanctuaries, defiled them with blood, overturned our altars, and exposed the arch of the Lord, consecrated in that holy image of our Church, to the desolation of the elements, and the profanation of impious hands. Fear not, therefore, that the Almighty, who has called that reptile from the dust by his power, should not be with you. Fear not that he will refuse to extend his buckler over your ranks, and to combat his enemy with the sword of St. Michael. It is in that belief that I set out to combat, to conquer, if needs be, to die—assured that my eyes shall behold victory. Soldiers! Perform your duties: think of your cities in flames; of your children who implore your protection; think of your emperor, who considers you as the strength of his arm; and to-morrow, before the sun has set, you will have traced your fidelity and faith on the soil of your country with the blood of the aggressors.‡"

The sound of the prayers of the soldiers was heard in the French lines, and great was the ridicule bestowed in that unbelieving host on what they deemed the mummery of the exhibition. But the event proved that they are not the worst

soldiers who are the best Christians; and the experienced observer, who reflects on the vast variety and force of the temporal stimulants to exertion which were arrayed under the standards of Napoleon, will gratefully acknowledge the wisdom which led the Russian chiefs to invoke the aid of higher influences; and will discern in the principles of religion, how much soever disguised under the forms of uncivilized worship, the only power that can, in the last resort, withstand the shock of that concentration of worldly ambition which occasions, or is occasioned by, a revolution.

The forces on the two sides were nearly equal; but the French had a vast superiority in cavalry, and in the quality of their troops. The Russian force was a hundred and thirty-two thousand, with six hundred and forty pieces of artillery; but of these ten thousand were militia from Smolensko and Moscow, who had never seen service, and seven thousand Cossacks: so that, for the shock of battle, they could only count on a hundred and fifteen thousand.* The French force consisted of a hundred and thirty-three thousand, of whom thirty thousand were cavalry, and they brought into the field no less than five hundred and ninety pieces of cannon.†

Davoust proposed to the emperor to move to the Russian extreme left, during the night, with forty thousand men; and when the battle was engaged along the whole front, to attack the redoubts suddenly in flank, and, advancing rapidly from left to right of the whole Russian position, terminate the war on the field of battle. But Napoleon, deeming the detachment of so large a portion of his force hazardous at such a distance from his resources, rejected the advice. He resolved to attack, by echelon, from the right, and disposed his masses to act accordingly. Marshals Ney and Davoust led the attack, at the head of their respective corps.‡

While these vast preparations were going on in the French lines, the Russians, in their part, were making every thing ready to oppose to them the most vigorous resistance. The village of Borodino was occupied by a strong detachment of the Imperial Guards, and may be considered as an advanced post in front of the line. The great road from Smolensko to Moscow ran perpendicularly through the centre of their position: on its right, Bagawouth and Ostermann occupied the plateau which bordered the Kolotza; the second next the road, the first on the extreme right. On the left of Ostermann, and on the left also of the road, the massy columns of Doctoroff extended as far as the great redoubt, with the defence of which his left was charged. Beyond the redoubt, Rajewskoi lay with his right resting on that bulwark, and his left on the village of Semenowskoie; while the corps of Borosdin and division

* Bout., i., 320.

† Ségur, i., 328. Bout., i., 320. Jom., iv., 114. Gourgey, i., 220. Chamb., ii., 33. Fain, ii., 21.

‡ Great disputes have taken place as to the forces engaged in this memorable battle, but they are now ascertained, in an authentic manner, on both sides: on that of the Russians, by the official returns of Kutusoff, published by Boutourlin; that of the French, from the imperial muster-roll called on the 2d of September by orders of Napoleon, and published by Chambrey from the archives of the war office at Paris.—See BOUTOURLIN, i., 320, and CHAMBERAT, ii., 32, 33.

§ Ségur, i., 376, 377, 390. Jom., iv., 117.

* Bout., i., 323. Bulletin, Moniteur, September 28, 1812. Fain, ii., 18, 19.

† Bout., i., 321. Fain, ii., 11. Ségur, i., 384.

‡ Chamb., ii., 51, 52.

of Newerofskoie, on an eminence, stretched beyond it to woods occupied by tirailleurs; beyond which, on the extreme left, Touczkoff had taken a position at the village of Ulitza, on the old road to Smolensko, with his own corps and the militia of Moscow, which were placed under his orders: the Imperial Guard was in reserve, behind the centre. All these corps were drawn up in two lines, with the exception of that of Touczkoff, on which, as he stood on the old road, a furious attack was anticipated, and which was in four. The whole cavalry was drawn up in a third line in rear of the infantry, with the exception of one corps, which was on the extreme right near the Moskwa, while the formidable artillery lined the whole front of the position.*

On the side of the French, the preparations for attack were on a corresponding scale of magnitude. On the extreme right, Poniatowsky was placed on the old road to Smolensko, opposite to Touczkoff; next to him three divisions of Davoust, still, notwithstanding all their losses, thirty thousand strong, stood near the redoubt carried on the evening of the 5th; on his left, Ney's corps was stationed, with Junot's directly in his rear, between the redoubt and the stream of the Kolotza; the heavy cavalry of the reserve was behind the wood on one side of the captured redoubt, while the whole Imperial Guard, also in reserve, was on the other. Morand and Gerard's divisions of Davoust's corps were placed on the left of Ney and Junot, under the orders of Eugene, whose corps, with the heavy cavalry of Grouchy, formed the extreme left of the line. Thus the great bulk of the French army was concentrated around the captured redoubt, within cannon-shot of whose batteries eighty thousand veterans and three hundred guns were accumulated; and it was easy to foresee that there the principal efforts of Napoleon were to be made.†

Both armies passed a restless, agitated night, so strongly had the intense anxiety of the moment come to operate on the excited frame of the soldiers. Never, in truth, in modern times, had interest so great, feelings so vehement, been brought into collision; never were such results dependant on the arm of the soldier. On the one hand was the flower of the warriors of Europe, led by the consummate talents of Napoleon, which, after having subjugated all the states of the Continent, had now penetrated beyond the old frontiers of Europe into the wilds of Asiatic rule: on the other, a nation originally sprung from the Tartar race, and but recently emerged into civilized society, singly maintained the strife against the mighty conqueror, and brought to bear against the accumulated forces of civilization the unsubdued energy of the desert. The destinies of Europe, every one felt, hung on the contest: the battle about to be fought was the most momentous which had occurred in modern times; off its result depended whether the liberty of nations was to be maintained, or one overwhelming power was to crush all lesser states within its grasp. Still more, the moral destiny of mankind was at stake: on one side was arrayed talent, energy, perseverance, the acquisitions of science, the glories of civilization, the wonders of discipline; but the lustre of these brilliant qualities was tarnished by the purposes to which they were applied

in the hands of the conqueror; they were employed only to gild the chains of despotism, and deck out the banners of infidelity: on the other were to be seen courage, resolution, devotion, the vigour of rising civilization, the pride of unbroke conquest, the ambition of boundless dominion; but the harsher features of these aspiring feelings were concealed by the patriotic grandeur of the cause in which they were engaged, and the sanctity of religion threw a veil over the intermixture of worldly qualities by which its cause was to be maintained.*

At six o'clock on the morning of the 7th, a cannon, fired from one of the batteries of General Sorbier, announced the commencement of the battle. Battle of Borodino. Sept. 7.

The French columns advanced in *echelon*, with the right, under Davoust, in front: their masses moved on steadily, without firing, under cover of their artillery, notwithstanding an incessant discharge of all arms from the Russian position. Davoust soon had a horse shot under him, and several generals were killed as they hurried over the plain, or toiled at the foot of the intrenchments: the ground was covered by moving masses, which incessantly rolled forward to the line of flame which marked the position of the hostile batteries. General Campans was severely wounded at the head of his division; Rapp, who succeeded him in the command, soon shared the same fate; Desaix also was struck down, who succeeded Rapp; and Davoust himself, injured by a contusion received in the fall of his horse, was for a short time disabled. The successive loss of all their chiefs for some time threw indecision into the French attack, but at length the redoubts on the left were carried: they were immediately retaken, however, by the second line of the Russians, which Bagrathion brought up to the attack: the combat continued with the utmost fury; and Kutusoff, foreseeing that the left wing could not long withstand the repeated attacks which Napoleon directed against it, moved the corps of Bagawouth, from the right of the army, to its support.†

While this fierce conflict was raging on the right centre, under Davoust, Ney, im- Partial success of Ney and Eugene in the centre patient for the fight, was still inactive in the centre. He was so near the station of Napoleon, that the emperor's aid-de-camp called the marshal to receive his last orders. At length, the moment being arrived for him to support the left of Davoust, the orders to attack the redoubts were given: the drums beat, and Ney's three divisions precipitated themselves to the charge, preceded by seventy pieces of cannon, and Murat prepared to aid them with ten thousand of his redoubtable cavalry. Soon the heads of the columns arrived in the awful tempest of grapeshot, but nothing could restrain their impetuosity. Gallantly facing the storm, they pushed on till they reached the foot of the intrenchments, and then, breaking off to the right and left, passed between them, and entered the redoubts by the gorge. Shortly after, however, Bagawouth's corps came up from the extreme Russian right, where it lay unengaged, and Bagrathion, putting himself at its head, not only expelled the enemy from their intrenchments, but pursued them for some distance into the plain. On the extreme right, Poniatowsky, in the first instance, carried Ulitza by a rapid

* Bout., i., 324, 327. Chamb., ii., 48, 49.

† Chamb., ii., 47, 48. Fain, ii., 17, 18.

* Chamb., ii., 52, 53.

† Jom., iv., 122. Ségur, i., 390. Bout., i., 327, 330. Fain, ii., 23, 26. Chamb., ii., 61, 62.

charge, but he was soon after arrested by Touczkoff in the woody marshes which lay around that village, where the nature of the ground would only permit tirailleurs to be employed. Eugene, however, on the left, carried the village of Borodino, on the right bank of the Kolotza, and immediately crossing his divisions over the bridges of that stream, prepared to assail the great redoubt in the centre of the Russian line, where Barclay lay with the flower of the Russian infantry.*

These contests, however, at this period were subordinate: it was in the right centre, where Davoust and Ney were striving for the heights of Semenowskoie, that the decisive blows were to be struck. These important heights soon became the principal objects of contention: both parties strove, by accumulating forces upon that important ridge, to gain possession of an eminence which promised to render them masters of the field. After four hours' hard fighting, Ney, finding himself overmatched by superior forces, anxiously demanded succour; and Napoleon, perceiving that these heights were still in the hands of the Russians, made preparations for a grand attack. The Young Guard, and great part of the cavalry in reserve, were sent to the support of Davoust: four hundred pieces of cannon were brought to bear upon the redoubts; while, under cover of this tremendous fire, immense columns of infantry and cavalry advanced to the assault. In vain the fire from the Russian batteries swept off whole battalions as they approached: the survivors closed their ranks, and advanced with a firm step and unbroken front against the rampart of death. Bagrathion, perceiving that the French were gradually gaining ground, ordered the whole left wing to issue from their intrenchments, leaving only the reserves to guard the works. The shock in the plain was terrible. Eighty thousand men, and seven hundred pieces of cannon, accumulated in a small space, strove with unparalleled fury for above an hour, without any perceptible advantage, till Bagrathion and the chief of his staff, St. Priest, being both severely wounded, and Friant's division of Davoust's corps having assailed their flank, the Russians began to give way. General Konownitsyn, with admirable presence of mind, however, immediately assumed the command, and, drawing back his troops, with their whole artillery, from the disputed ridge, established them in a strong position in the rear, behind the ravine of Semenowskoie. The conquerors endeavoured to pursue their advantage, and the cavalry under Nansouty fell with the utmost fury upon the extreme left of the new Russian position; but all their efforts were defeated by the devotion of the regiments of the Russian guard, who formed squares under a tremendous fire from their abandoned works, now lined by French cannon, and for the remainder of the day maintained their ground alike against the impetuous charges of the horse and the fatal ravages of the artillery.†

Meanwhile, an obstinate conflict was going on in the centre, where Barclay, after having lost the village of Borodino, still resolutely defended the great redoubt. The viceroy, after having crossed the Kolotza, advanced with the utmost intre-

pidity through the broken ground which lay in his front, overthrew the division of General Paskewitch, and, aided by General Bonami with his brave brigade, in the midst of the fire of eighty pieces of cannon, carried that formidable intrenchment. Kutusoff, sensible of the necessity of repairing the disaster, instantly brought forward his best troops, and, after an arduous conflict, not only retook the redoubt, and made Bonami and part of his troops prisoners, but, pursuing the broken battalions of the assailants, carried confusion and dismay into the French centre. Napoleon was anxiously solicited to support that point by the Imperial Guard, but he deemed it imprudent to risk that last reserve at so great a distance from support. After much hesitation, he refused the succour, and Eugene was left for two hours to support, unaided, the terrible fire of the great redoubt, and the repeated charges of the Russian cavalry.*

The attention of the emperor, however, was soon arrested by a violent outcry and confusion on the left. While Bagrathion and Ostermann were traversing the field of battle from the Russian right to their left, to aid in the defence of the heights of Semenowskoie, Kutusoff ordered Ouvaroff, with eight regiments of Cossacks, to cross the Kolotza, and cover the movement by an attack on the left flank of Eugene's corps. This irruption was attended with the most signal success. A brigade of cavalry under Ornano was speedily overthrown; soon the Cossacks passed Borodino; Delzon's Italian division avoided destruction only by throwing themselves into squares; the viceroy himself escaped being made prisoner only by throwing himself into one of the squares of infantry; the baggage and artillery drivers fled in confusion; and Napoleon himself deemed the attack so serious that he hastily galloped to the spot, accompanied by the cavalry and artillery of the Guard. It turned out, however, to be a false alarm, as Ouvaroff, unsupported by infantry, retired across the Kolotza when he found himself threatened by large bodies of the enemy; but this diversion had an important effect, and, by withdrawing a portion of the reserve destined for the attack of the great redoubt, sensibly retarded the success of the day.†

When the Russian intrenchments, however, on the left were carried, Napoleon resolved to make a desperate effort to regain his advantages in the centre. For this purpose, more than two hundred pieces of cannon were directed against the great redoubt; and, while the viceroy re-formed his divisions for the assault, Caulaincourt, in command of Monbrun's division of cuirassiers, which he had assumed, as that general had just been struck down by a cannon-shot, was directed to penetrate through the Russian line, and, wheeling round, enter the intrenchment by its gorge. "You will see me immediately, dead or alive," was the answer of the brave general, and he set off at the gallop at the head of his followers; and the glittering mass was soon lost in the volumes of smoke, as he approached the intrenchment. The Russians hastened, by all possible means, to support the point of attack: the corps of Ostermann was placed in front, and the regiments of the guards,

Alarm on the left by an irruption of Russian cavalry.

Grand successful attack on the great redoubt.

* Fain, ii., 27, 28. Chamb., ii., 62, 65.
† Bout., i., 338, 340. Ségur, i., 398, 400. Chamb., ii., 65, 66. Fain, ii., 31, 34.

* Ségur, i., 406, 407. Bout., i., 332. Chamb., ii., 67, 68.
† Fain, ii., 32, 33. Chamb., ii., 69, 70.

Preobazinski and Semenowskoie, were stationed as a reserve in their rear. Caulaincourt, advancing with the utmost rapidity, overthrew the regiments of Russian horse whom Kutusoff had opposed to him, while the great redoubt continued to vomit forth an incessant fire upon its assailants. Eugene, with his infantry, was advancing to the attack: the bayonets of his troops were already gleaming on its slopes, when the columns of the cuirassiers were seen ascending through the clouds of smoke which enveloped the intrenchment; its sides seemed clothed in glittering steel; and the fire from its summit, after redoubling in fury for a few seconds, suddenly ceased. The flames of the volcano were extinguished in blood; and the resplendent casques of the French cuirassiers appeared, when the smoke cleared away, above the highest embrasures of the intrenchment.*

The death of Caulaincourt, who met a glorious end at the entrance of the redoubt, did not prevent the French from establishing themselves in their important conquest. The Russian soldiers charged with its defence, refusing quarter, had almost all perished in the assault; and the interior presented a frightful assemblage of dismounted cannon, dying men, broken arms, and wounded horses. Grouchy, hoping to profit by the consternation which its capture had occasioned, advanced at the head of his cavalry against the corps of Ostermann, drawn up on the heights in the rear; but they were met by the chasseurs of the Russian guard; overthrown, and driven back with severe loss. Encouraged by this success, and perceiving that the French on the left of the great redoubt kept themselves at a distance to avoid the terrible fire of the Russian batteries on the heights in the rear, Kutusoff resolved to make a forward movement, in order to reoccupy the ground on which his army originally stood in the centre at the commencement of the action. Ostermann's corps, with great part of the guard and a large body of cavalry, advanced on this perilous mission. Slowly, and in admirable order, the Russian masses moved forward under the fire of the redoubtable batteries which the French had established on the heights won from the Russians, and even reached the foot of the intrenchments, where eighty pieces of cannon thundered on their close ranks, with a severity of fire unexampled in war; while their cavalry, by several gallant charges, even carried some of the redoubts, and erected the Russian standards on their old strongholds. It was all in vain: they were speedily retaken, and the Muscovite battalions, unable to advance, unwilling to retire, toiled and died at the foot of the fieldworks which they had lost. Wearied, at length, with the fruitless butchery, Kutusoff drew off, covered by his immense artillery, and the Russians were again re-established along the whole line on the heights, immediately in rear of their original position.† Meanwhile, Milaradowitch planted the Russian batteries on the heights behind the redoubts; and from this second line the fire of artillery was so severe and incessant, that the French, far from advancing to the conquest, were obliged to shelter themselves on their knees, behind the intrenchments they had

won. Poniatowsky alone, desirous of emulating the successes of the centre, advanced in the evening against the corps of Bagawouth, which then occupied the great road to Smolensko, on the left of the Russian line, and, after an obstinate struggle, carried the position, from which his opponents retired to the heights occupied by Bagrathion's corps, at a short distance in the rear. Thus the Russians at all points, at the close of the day, had lost their original line of defence. But, though driven from their first line, their columns, with an immense artillery, were ranged in unbroken ranks on a second position still stronger than the first; while the enemy, exhausted by an engagement of unparalleled severity, were in no condition to commence a second battle to complete their successes. The cannon continued to fire with the utmost violence on both sides till night, but no farther operations of importance were attempted; the French, exhausted with fatigue and carnage, at length fell back to the ground they had occupied before the battle, and the Russians strengthened themselves in their new position behind the ravine of Semenowskoie.*

Such was the terrible battle of Borodino, the most murderous and obstinately Magnitude and disputed of which history has pre- importance of served a record. The wars of this battle. Tismour or Attila may have witnessed a greater display of physical force, and been attended by a more prodigal waste of human life, but in no previous contest were such formidable masses of disciplined forces assembled, or so gigantic an array of the implements of destruction exhibited. The armies of the whole Continent were here pitched against each other: not, as at Chalons or Tours, the fierce squadrons of invading barbarians against the tumultuary levies of feudal power, but the disciplined forces of civilized ambition against the steady firmness of regulated patriotism. The wealth of Europe was exhausted for the equipment of the expedition, its talent concentrated in the direction of its force: the whole resources of Russia were required to oppose it, its whole energy strained in resisting its fury.

The dreadful loss on both sides demonstrated the unparalleled obstinacy of the contest. The Russians had to lament the Loss on both sides. loss of one of their bravest and ablest generals, Prince Bagrathion, who fell nobly as he defended the redoubts on the left, and subsequently died of his wounds; and of Generals Kaitaisoff and Touczkoff killed, and thirty generals of inferior rank wounded. Fifteen thousand killed, thirty thousand wounded, and two thousand prisoners, presented a total loss of nearly fifty thousand men. On the French side, besides Generals Monbrun, Caulaincourt, and many others killed, thirty generals were wounded; and the total loss was twelve thousand killed and thirty-eight thousand wounded. The trophies of victory were equally divided: the Russians took ten pieces of cannon from their enemies, who could boast of thirteen captured from them.†

Napoleon has been severely censured by some writers for not bringing forward the Want of vig- Imperial Guard towards the close of the action, in order to confirm the Napoleon in this battle. successes of the viceroys and Ney.

* Ségur, i., 408, 409. Lab., 144. Bout., i., 341. Chamb., ii., 71. Fain, ii., 34, 36.

† Chamb., ii., 71, 73. Bulletin, Moniteur, Sept., 1812.

* Bout., i., 345, 347. Ségur, i., 410, 411. Lab., 152. Fain, ii., 36, 37. Chamb., ii., 77, 78.

† Bout., i., 349, 350. Ségur, i., 414, 422. Larrey, iv., 46. Fain, ii., 41.

Certain it is, that, in this battle, he was far from having exhibited the vigour or capacity which he had so frequently displayed on former occasions, and which had nowhere shone forth with brighter lustre than on the field of Wagram. His mental powers appear to have been, in a great degree, overwhelmed by the corporeal fatigue which he had recently undergone, and a painful malady which had, for the time, debilitated even his constitution of iron. A severe attack of rheumatism had deprived him of much of his former activity; and such was the state to which he was, in consequence, reduced, that at ten o'clock in the morning his strength required to be recruited by stimulating liquors. "He remained," says an unexceptionable eyewitness, General Mathieu Dumas, "during the engagement, on a position from whence he beheld the whole field of battle, immovable, seated on the edge of a ditch, or walking to and fro over a small space. It was not till half past six that he mounted on horseback, and rode forward to the field, which was then strewn with dead."* The position thus chosen was so far from the theatre of action as to render correct observation with the eye impossible, and the communication of orders frequently tardy. At the most critical moments the emperor evinced great irresolution. He appeared struck with apathy; and it may truly be said that he proved himself inferior, on this vital occasion, both to his previous reputation and his present fortunes.†

Sound reasons, nevertheless, which prevented him from engaging his reserves.

Notwithstanding all this, however, it may reasonably be doubted whether, had Napoleon enjoyed in this great battle all his former vigour, sound policy would have dictated any other course than that which he actually pursued. The reasons which he himself assigned to General Dumas and Count Daru, the very night of the battle, for not aiming at more decisive results, appear perfectly satisfactory. "People will, perhaps, be astonished that I have not brought forward my reserves to obtain greater success; but I felt the necessity of preserving them, to strike a decisive blow in the great battle which the enemy will probably give to us in the plains in front of Moscow. The success of the action in which we have been engaged was secured; but it was my duty to think of the general result of the campaign, and it was for that that I spared my reserves."‡ Eight years afterward he repeated the same opinion at St. Helena. In truth, had the guard been seriously injured at Borodino, it is doubtful if any part of the army, of which it was the heart, and of which, through every difficulty, it sustained the courage, would have repassed the Niemen. It is one thing to hazard a reserve in a situation where the loss it may sustain can easily be repaired; it is another, and a very different thing, to risk its existence in the centre of an enemy's country, at a distance from re-enforcements, when its ruin may endanger the whole army. The fatal result to the French of the battle of Waterloo demonstrates the extreme peril of engaging the reserves before the strength of the enemy's force has been finally broken; and the risk of a rout at Borodino was incomparably greater than on the French frontier. Though driven from their first line, the Russians still presented an undaunted front to the field of battle: they were masters of a strong position, defended by above

six hundred pieces of cannon; and, notwithstanding their losses, nearly seventy thousand men were still under arms. The recent advantages had been too dearly purchased to admit the hope of decisive success; and, if the action was renewed on the following day, no other force remained either to ensure victory or avert disaster.*

In truth, the battle of Borodino affords one example of a fact which was abundantly demonstrated during the remainder of the war, that, when troops are naturally brave, and their courage has been improved by discipline, the superiority of generalship loses much of its importance. If large bodies of armed men lay down their arms the moment they are turned or cut off from their comrades, a skilful and vigorous attack is almost certain of success; but if they resist to the uttermost, and turn fiercely on their assailants, the peril is nearly as great to the assailing as the defending force. The attacks in column of Napoleon were frequently crowned with the most signal success against the Austrians and Prussians, but they seldom prevailed against the steady valour of the Russians, and never against the murderous fire of the English infantry.†

The French army, sensible of the magnitude of their loss, passed a melancholy night after the battle. The marshals were divided as to the prudent course to be adopted. The heroic Ney himself strenuously recommended a retreat. Such was the enormous accumulation of the wounded, that they far exceeded all the resources of the French surgeons, and they lay for days together neglected on the field. The little bread which remained was soon exhausted, and the wounded were compelled to live on horseflesh. Even straw was wanting in the abbey of Kolotskoi and the neighbouring villages, which were converted into temporary hospitals, and the miserable wretches lay on the floor without either bedding or covering. During the night the Cossacks made an irruption into their lines, and the Imperial Guard were obliged to stand to their arms: a humiliating circumstance after what was held out as a decisive victory.‡ On the following day, the emperor visited the field, but the soldiers were too much depressed to receive him with their wonted enthusiasm: grouped in small bodies round their eagles, stained with blood, and scorched with powder, their shouts of triumph were feebly heard amid the cries of the wounded. The field of battle, over its whole extent, was strewn with dead bodies, broken guns, casques, cuirasses, and helmets, among which the wounded raised their heads to implore relief. Bleeding horses, maddened by pain, were alone seen moving in this scene of wo. The wounded had crept in great numbers into the ravines, to seek shelter from the storm of shot, or the severity of the tempest which succeeded it; their last breath uttered the names of their country, their mother, or their offspring.§

The Russians retired, the day after the battle, on the great road to Moscow. The magnitude of their loss rendered it too hazardous to risk the remainder of the army in a general action with

Reflections on the battle.

Distressed condition of the French army at its termination.

Orderly retreat of the Russians towards Moscow.

* *Souvenirs de M. Dumas*, iii., 438.

† *Chamb.*, ii., 76, 77. *Souv. de Dumas*, iii., 438, 439.

* *Dumas's Souvenirs*, iii., 440. *Gouv.*, 244. *Nap. in Month.*, ii., 94. *Fain*, ii., 38.

† *Jom.*, iv., 638.

‡ "Un événement," says Ségur, "assez fâcheuse la veille d'une victoire."—*Ségur*, i., 241.

§ *Ségur*, i., 421. *Larrey*, iv., 57, 58. *Chamb.*, ii., 82, 91.

the French, who had been considerably re-enforced since the battle. But no signs of confusion appeared on their track: neither chariots, cannon, nor prisoners attested the retreat of a broken army. A severe engagement in front of Mojaïsk with the rear-guard terminated, without any decisive advantage, in the loss of two thousand men to each side, and sufficiently taught the French that neither the courage nor discipline of their opponents had suffered any abatement. The good countenance preserved by this gallant rear-guard on this occasion was of essential service to the Russian army: it enabled Kutusoff to retain Mojaïsk till not only his whole artillery and chariots, but almost all the wounded were removed, before the town was evacuated on the following morning at ten o'clock. With such skill was the subsequent retreat conducted, that, when the French arrived at the separation of the roads of Moscow and Kaluga, they were for some time uncertain, as at Witpeck, which of the two the retreating army had followed.*

No farther engagement of consequence took place. Napoleon, on the same day on which it was abandoned by the Russians, entered Mojaïsk, and established his headquarters in that town, while his guard bivouacked round it, and the other corps of the army slowly followed the enemy towards the capital. The retreat was conducted in so leisurely a manner, and the pursuit was so slack, that the army was considerably re-established in its equipments and organization, after the desperate shock it had received, before it approached Moscow; and on the 13th a position was taken up half a league in advance of that city, where fieldworks had been commenced. Though Kutusoff at this period numbered only fifty thousand regular soldiers, with twenty thousand militia and Cossacks around his banners, yet they were animated with the best spirit, and unanimous in the desire to fight another battle for the defence of the capital. A council of war was held to deliberate on the question whether they should adopt this bold resolution. Some were of opinion that the position they occupied was not tenable, and that they should retire to a central position between the northern and southern provinces; Bennigsen and Doctoroff were clear for fighting where they stood, as they maintained the army still mustered ninety thousand men, and the loss of Moscow would spread consternation through the Empire. Kutusoff and Barclay supported the proposal of a retreat, assigning as a reason that it was indispensable to preserve the army entire, and draw near to the expected re-enforcements; and that the abandonment of the metropolis "*would lead the enemy into a snare, when his destruction would be inevitable.*" These prophetic words determined the assembly, and orders were immediately given for the troops to retire in the direction of Kolomna. On the morning of the 14th, the army continued its retreat, and in silent grief defiled through the streets of the sacred city.†

Debate in the Russian council of war whether they should evacuate Moscow.

Reasons given in the council of war by Kutusoff for abandoning Moscow.

Notwithstanding these plausible, and, indeed, invincible reasons for a retreat, according to the information which the Russian general possessed, nothing is more certain than that, if they had been aware of the real state of the French army, they would have stood firm; and that Napoleon, if he had hazarded a battle, would have been defeated, or driven, if he had declined it, to a disastrous retreat. Unknown to them, the French emperor had advanced so inconsiderately, and with so little previous preparation, from Smolensko, that he was literally destitute of the means of fighting another battle. The bold front assumed by Murat and the advanced guard alone concealed the real weakness of the Grand Army, and, above all, its scanty supply of ammunition. All his care for the supply of the army had been confined to providing for his base at Smolensko: from that point he had plunged into the heart of Russia, with no magazines and little provisions, except what the soldiers could collect on their line of march, already wasted by the systematic devastation of the retreating enemy. At Vienna, little more than a third of the way, the want of everything had begun to be experienced; and from that time, as they advanced onward towards Moscow, the necessities of the troops had gone on continually increasing. The houses, to the distance of several miles on both sides of the great road, were invariably burned, either by accident or design, when the leading columns passed through; and those which followed found the country a perfect desert. In the ruins of the dwellings, men, horses, and baggage-wagons were indiscriminately huddled together, after the manner of barbarians. The ammunition of the army was adequate only for a single battle; and that of Borodino, where ninety-one thousand cannon-shot had been discharged, had reduced the reserved stores so low, that there did not remain enough for a second general engagement.*

A large convoy, it is true, had on the 7th of September passed Smolensko; but it could not reach the army for a fortnight to come, and it was utterly impracticable for the troops to maintain themselves in front of Mojaïsk till that supply arrived. The little bread and flour which the soldiers brought with them from Smolensko had been long ago exhausted; the mills were all destroyed, and the grain removed; the soldiers subsisted on nothing but horse-flesh, and the few potatoes or vegetables which they could discover in the earth; medicines for the sick, bandages and beds for the wounded, were nowhere to be

of success than I had then: our dangers are increased by the proximity of Moscow, where I should lose half my army if it was necessary, after a reverse, to traverse the capital. On the other hand, if we retire without combating, we must abandon it: a cruel sacrifice, it is true, but which does not draw after it the destruction of the Empire. On the contrary, the enemy, far removed from his resources, possessing as his only communication the road from Smolensko to Moscow; on the eve of experiencing reverses on the Dwina, by the arrival of the armies of Moldavia and Finland, will find himself in the most critical situation. The army is in a bad position, and is inferior in numbers to the enemy: such were the losses which it experienced at Borodino, that entire brigades are now commanded by field-officers, and regiments by captains; the same precision in its movements, therefore, is not at present to be expected as heretofore. Everything, therefore, conspires to prove that we should be beat if we fought a battle. The safety of the country depends on the preservation of the army: a victory would not rid us of the enemy, while a disaster so near Moscow would occasion its entire destruction."—See *Mémoire de Barclay de Tolly sur le Conseil des Officiers Supérieurs à Moscou*, given in CHAMBRAY, ii., 257, et. seq. * FAIN, ii., 47.

* Ségur, i., 423, 428. Bout., i., 352, 356. Chamb., ii., 87, 88, 97.

† Bout., i., 362, 363. Chamb., ii., 99, 100.

‡ "Notwithstanding," said Kutusoff, "the valour which my army displayed at Borodino, I was obliged, as you know, to yield to numbers, and commence my retreat. Since that time the enemy has received numerous re-enforcements, and at present I have fewer chances

found. So universal was the distress, that General Mathieu Dumas, who held the high situation of adjutant-general to the army, has declared that he regarded the burning of Moscow as an advantage, from the belief that it must force the emperor to an immediate retreat. Had the Russians been aware of these disastrous circumstances, they would doubtless have held firm at Moscow, and Napoleon would have been driven to a retreat, even in sight of the prize which he so eagerly coveted. But they could not conceive that so experienced a commander would have precipitated himself three hundred miles into an enemy's country without magazines or provisions, and ammunition only for a single battle: therefore they abandoned the capital; and to this ignorance of the real state of the French army, and consequent resolution to abandon their metropolis, the total overthrow of Napoleon which ensued is, beyond all question, to be ascribed.*

Nothing could exceed the consternation of the inhabitants of Moscow at finding themselves thus abandoned by their defenders. They had been previously led to believe, from the reports published by the Russian government, that the French had been defeated at Borodino, or, at all events, that their entry into Moscow was out of the question; and no preparations for leaving the city had been made by the inhabitants, though arrangements to that effect had been made by the governor, Count ROSTOPCHIN, whose name has acquired an immortal celebrity from the awful catastrophe which soon followed. Speedily, however, the inhabitants left the city: in that extremity they reverted at once to the nomadic life of their ancestors. In a few days, nearly three hundred thousand had departed. The troops entered the gates with dejected looks, shedding tears of despair; the streets, almost deserted by their inhabitants, mournfully re-echoed the sound of their tread: it seemed as if Russia was attending the obsequies of her metropolis. Notwithstanding the confusion of the people, however, the march of the soldiers was conducted in admirable order; and the army, abandoning the cradle of the Empire, prepared in silence to revenge its fall.†

At eleven o'clock on the 14th, the advanced guard of the French army, from an eminence on the road, descried the long-wished-for minarets of Moscow. The domes of above two hundred churches, and the massy summits of a thousand palaces, glittered in the rays of the sun: the form of the cupolas gave an Oriental character to the scene; but, above all, the cross indicated the ascendancy of the European religion.

The scene which presented itself to the eye resembled rather a province adorned with palaces, domes, woods, and buildings, than a single city. A boundless accumulation of houses, churches, public edifices, rivers, parks, and gardens, stretched out over swelling eminences and gentle vales as far as the eye could reach. The mixture of architectural decoration and pillared scenery, with the bright green foliage, was peculiarly fascinating to European eyes. Everything announced its Oriental character. Asia and Europe meet in that extraordinary city. It resembles Rome, not

in the character of its edifices or architecture; but in the strange variety of styles which are to be met with, and which at once bespeak the queen of half the globe. Many of its palaces are of wood, coloured green, yellow, or rose, and with the exterior ornamented with sculpture in Moorish or Arabesque taste. Nowhere does luxury and magnificence appear in a more imposing form, or are placed close beside poverty in a more humiliating aspect. The Kremlin, the ancient palace of the Czars of Muscovy, where they alternately defended themselves against the Poles and Tartars, is surrounded by a high loop-holed wall, flanked by towers, which resemble rather the minarets of a Turkish mosque than the summits of a European fortress. But, how Oriental soever the character of the scene may be, the number and magnificence of the domes and churches, with their gilded cupolas and splendid crosses, tell the beholder at every step that he is in the midst of the rule of the Christian faith.*†

Struck by the magnificence of the spectacle, the leading squadrons halted, and exclaimed, "Moscow! Moscow!" the troops at and the cry, repeated from rank to rank, at length reached the emperor's guard. The soldiers, breaking their array, rushed tumultuously forward; and Napoleon, hastening in the midst of them, gazed impatiently on the splendid scene. His first words were, "Behold, at last, that famous city!" the next, "It was full time!" Intoxicated with joy, the army descended from the heights. The fatigues and dangers of the campaign were forgotten in the triumph of the moment, and eternal glory was anticipated in the conquest which they were about to complete.‡

Murat, at the head of the cavalry, speedily advanced to the gates, and concluded a truce with Milaradowitch for the evacuation of the capital. But the entry of the French troops speedily dispelled the illusions in which the army had indulged. Moscow was found to be deserted. Its long streets and splendid palaces resounded only with the clang of the invaders' march. Not a sound was to be heard in its vast circumference: the dwellings of three hundred thousand persons seemed as silent as the wilderness. Napoleon in vain waited till evening for a deputation from the magistrates or the chief nobility. Not a human being came forward to deprecate his hostility; and the mournful truth could at length be no longer concealed, that Moscow, as if struck by enchantment, was bereft of its inhabitants. Wearied of fruitless delay, the emperor at length advanced to the city, and entered the ancient palace of the Czars amid no other concourse than that of his own soldiers.§

The Russians, however, in abandoning their capital, had resolved upon a sacrifice greater than the patriotism of the world had yet exhibited. The governor, Count Rostopchin, had already set the example of devotion by

* De Staël, *Dix Années d'Exil*, 281. Chamb., ii., 111. Lab., 183. Ségur, ii., 34. Larrey, iv., 63.

† The most graphic description of the interior of Moscow in the English language is from the pen of the Marchioness of Londonderry, the brilliancy of which induces a feeling of regret that the noble authoress should not have recorded her observations in a more durable form than the pages of an ephemeral periodical.

‡ Ségur, ii., 33, 34. Lab., 183.

§ Bont., i., 366, 367. Ségur, ii., 36, 41. Lab., 196. Chamb., ii., 102, 107.

* Chamb., ii., 36, 38, 78. Fain, ii., 47. Larrey, iv., 58, 62. Dumas's *Souv.*, iii., 450.

† Bont., i., 363, 364. Chamb., ii., 88, 105. Dumas's *Souv.*, iii., 444.

preparing the means of destruction for his country palace, which he had set fire to by applying the torch with his own hands to his nuptial bed; and to the gates of the palace he had affixed a writing with the following inscription: "During eight years I have embellished this country house, and lived happily in it, in the bosom of my family. The inhabitants of this estate, to the number of seven thousand, quit at your approach, in order that it may not be sullied by your presence. Frenchmen, at Moscow I have abandoned to you my two houses, with their furniture, worth half a million of roubles; here you will find nothing but ashes."* The nobles, in a public assembly, determined to imitate the example of the Numantians, and destroy the city they could no longer defend. The authorities, when they retired, carried with them the fire-engines, and everything capable of arresting a conflagration; and combustibles were disposed in the principal edifices to favour the progress of the flames. The persons intrusted with the duty of setting fire to the city only awaited the retreat of their countrymen to commence the work of destruction.†

The sight of the grotesque towers and venerable walls of the Kremlin first revived the French in the emperor's imagination, and Moscow.

rekindled those dreams of Oriental conquest which, from his earliest years, had floated in his mind. His followers, dispersed over the vast extent of the city, gazed with astonishment on the sumptuous palaces of the nobles and the gilded domes of the churches. The mixture of architectural decoration and shady foliage, of Gothic magnificence and Eastern luxury, excited the admiration of the French soldiers, more susceptible than any other people of impressions of that description. Evening came on: with increasing wonder the French troops traversed the central parts of the city, recently so crowded with passengers, but not a living creature was to be seen to explain the universal desolation. It seemed like a city of the dead. Night approached: an unclouded moon illuminated those beautiful palaces—those vast hotels—those deserted streets: all was still—the silence of the tomb. The officers broke open the doors of some of the principal mansions in search of sleeping-quarters. They found everything in perfect order: the bedrooms were fully furnished, as if guests were expected; the drawing-rooms bore the marks of having been recently inhabited; even the work of the ladies was on the tables, the keys in the wardrobes; but still not an inmate was to be seen. By degrees a few of the lowest class of slaves emerged, pale and trembling, from the cellars, showed the way to the sleeping apartments, and laid open everything which these sumptuous mansions contained; but the only account they could give was, that the whole inhabitants had fled, and that they alone were left in the deserted city.‡

But the terrible catastrophe soon commenced.

On the night of the 13th a fire broke out in the Bourse, behind the Bazar, which soon consumed that noble edifice, and spread to a considerable part of the crowded streets in the vicinity. This, however, was but the prelude to more extended

calamities. At midnight on the 15th, a bright light was seen to illuminate the northern and western parts of the city, and the sentinels on watch at the Kremlin soon discerned the splendid edifices in that quarter to be in flames. The wind changed repeatedly during the night, but to whatever quarter it veered the conflagration extended itself; fresh fires were every instant seen breaking out in all directions; and Moscow soon exhibited the spectacle of a sea of flame agitated by the wind. The soldiers, drowned in sleep or overcome by intoxication, were incapable of arresting its progress; and the burning fragments floating through the hot air began to fall on the roofs and courts of the Kremlin. The fury of an autumnal tempest added to the horrors of the scene; and it seemed as if the wrath of Heaven had combined with the vengeance of man to consume the invaders in the city they had conquered.*

But it was chiefly during the nights of the 18th and 19th that the conflagration attained its greatest violence. At that time the whole city was wrapped in flames; and volumes of fire of various colours ascended to the heavens in many places, diffusing a prodigious light on all sides, and attended by an intolerable heat. These balloons of flame were accompanied in their ascent by a frightful hissing noise and loud explosions, the result of the vast stores of oil, tar, rosin, spirits, and other combustible materials with which the greater part of the shops were filled. Large pieces of painted canvass, unrolled from the outside of the buildings by the violence of the heat, floated on fire in the atmosphere, and sent down on all sides a flaming shower, which spread the conflagration in quarters even the most removed from those where it originally commenced. The wind, naturally high, was raised by the sudden rarefaction of the air to a perfect hurricane. The howling of the tempest drowned even the roar of the conflagration; the whole heavens were filled with the whirl of the burning volumes of smoke, which rose on all sides, and made midnight as bright as day;† while even the bravest hearts, subdued by the sublimity of the scene, and the feeling of human impotence in the midst of such elemental strife, sunk and trembled in silence.‡

The return of day did not diminish the terrors of the conflagration. An immense crowd of hitherto unseen people, and disorder who had taken refuge in cellars or in the city. vaults of the buildings, issued forth as the flames reached their dwellings: the streets were speedily filled with multitudes, flying in every direction with the most precious articles of their furniture; while the French army, whose discipline this fatal event had entirely dissolved, assembled in drunken crowds, and loaded themselves with the spoils of the city. Never, in modern times, had such a scene been witnessed. The men were loaded with packages, charged with their most precious effects, which often took fire as they were carried along, and which they were obliged to throw down to save themselves. The women had generally two or three children on their backs, and as many led by the hand, which,

Consternation, and disorder

in the city.

* Lab., 209. Ségur, ii., 48, 51. Dumas, Souv., iii., 447, 448. Chamb., ii., 119, 120. Larrey, iv., 72, 73.

† "At the distance of three quarters of a league from Moscow I could, at midnight, read the despatches which the major-general of the army addressed to me."—DUMAS, Souvenirs, iii., 450.

‡ Larrey, iv., 73, 74. Dumas, Souv., iii., 449, 450.

* The author received this anecdote, in 1814, from the lips of Count Rostopchin himself, at Paris.—See also CHAMBRAY, ii., 271. *Pièces Just.*

† Bout., i., 370. Lab., 218. Chamb., ii., 119, 120.

‡ Dumas, Souv., iii., 444, 445. Ségur, iii., 47. Lab., 184.

with trembling steps and piteous cries, sought their devious way through the labyrinth of flame. Many old men, unable to walk, were drawn on hurdles or wheelbarrows by their children and grandchildren, while their burned beards and smoking garments showed with what difficulty they had been rescued from the flames: often the French soldiers, tormented by hunger and thirst, and loosened from all discipline by the horrors which surrounded them, not content with the booty in the streets, rushed headlong into the burning edifices, to ransack their cellars for the stores of wine and spirits which they contained, and beneath the ruins great numbers perished miserably, the victims of intemperance and the surrounding fire. Meanwhile the flames, fanned by a tempestuous gale, advanced with frightful rapidity, devouring alike in their course the palaces of the great, the temples of religion, and the cottages of the poor.*

The emperor long clung to the Kremlin, in Napoleon at the hope that the cessation of the length leaves fire would enable him to retain his the Kremlin. long-wished-for conquest. But at length, on the 16th, the conflagration had spread in every direction: the horizon seemed a vast ocean of flame, and the cry arose that the Kremlin itself was on fire. He gave vent to his rage by commanding the massacre of the unfortunate men who had been intrusted with the duty of commencing the fire, and, yielding to the solicitations of his followers, abandoned the Kremlin. The wind and the rush of the flames was so violent, that Berthier was almost swept away by their fury; but the emperor and his followers arrived in safety before night at the country palace of Petrowsky. General Mathieu Dumas and Count Daru, who were among the last that left the Kremlin, could scarcely bear the intense heat as they rode along the quay to follow the emperor; and, on leaving it, their horses were with difficulty brought to pass between two burning houses at the entrance of the street, which formed the sole issue that remained to them. Arrived at length at Petrowsky, they had leisure to contemplate the awful spectacle which was presented by the conflagration. Early on the following morning, Napoleon cast a melancholy look to the burning city, which now filled half the heavens with its flames, and exclaimed, after a long silence, "This sad event is the presage of a long train of disasters!"†

For thirty-six hours the conflagration continued, and during that time above nine tenths of the city were destroyed. The remainder, abandoned to pillage and deserted by its inhabitants, offered no resources for the army. Moscow had been conquered, but the victors had gained only a heap of ruins.‡

Imagination cannot conceive the horrors into which the remnant of the people who could not abandon their homes were plunged by this unparalleled sacrifice. Bereft of everything, they wandered amid the ruins, eagerly searching for a parent or an infant amid the smoking heaps: pillage became universal, and from the scene of devastation the wrecks of former magnificence were ransacked alike by the licentious soldiery and the suffering multitude. The city, aban-

doned to pillage, was speedily filled with marauders; and, in addition to the whole French army, numbers flocked in from the country to share in the general license. Furniture of the most precious description, splendid jewelry, Indian and Turkish stuffs, stores of wine and brandy, gold and silver plate, rich furs, gorgeous trappings of silk and satin, were spread about in promiscuous confusion, and became the prey of the least intoxicated among the multitude. A frightful tumult succeeded to the stillness which had reigned in the city when the troops first entered it. The cries of the pillaged inhabitants, the coarse imprecations of the soldiers, were mingled with the lamentations of those who had lost their parents, their children, their all, in the conflagration. Plunder became universal in those days of unrestrained license: the same place often beheld the general's uniform and the soldier's humble garments in search of pillage. The ground, in the parts which had been consumed, was covered with a motley group of soldiers, peasants, and marauders of all countries and aspects, who sought, in the smoking ruins, the remains of the precious articles which they formerly contained. The Church of St. Michael, containing the tombs of the emperors of Russia, did not escape their sacrilegious violence; but no treasures were found to reward the cupidity of the depredators. The shouts of the marauders were interrupted by the shrieks of the victims of military license, and occasionally drowned in the roar of the conflagration; while not the least extraordinary part of the clamour arose from the howling of the dogs, who, being chained to the gates of the palaces, were consumed in the flames with which they were surrounded.*

While these terrible scenes were passing in the metropolis, the Russian army retired on the road to Kolomna, and, after falling back two marches in that direction, wheeled to the left, and by a semicircular march regained the route to Kaluga, in the neighbourhood of the Smolensko road. By this masterly movement, Kutusoff at once drew near to his reinforcements, covered the richest provinces of the Empire, secured the supplies of the army, and threatened the communications of the enemy. The city of Kaluga, stored with ample magazines, served as the base of the future operations of the army. The camp at Tarutino, where he took post, was speedily filled with provisions, and the multitude of recruits who daily arrived from the southern provinces restored the spirits of the soldiers. Placed on the central route between Moscow and Kaluga, this position enabled the Russians to defend all the avenues to that important city, and the event soon showed of what consequence the admirable selection of this station was to the future success of the campaign.†

In making this circular march, the troops were filled with the most melancholy feelings. The fugitives from the metropolis had already spread the intelligence of the fire, and the lurid light which filled one half of the heavens attested too plainly the truth of their tale. The roar of the flames and the fury of the tempest, occasioned by the extraordinary heat of so large a portion of the atmosphere, was

* Lab., 210, 211. Ségur, ii., 49, 52. Chamb., ii., 121, 122. Larrey, iv., 75, 76.

† Ségur, ii., 55, 59. Gourg., 274. Dum., Souv., iii., 440, 450. Chamb., ii., 121. Bulletin, Moniteur, Sept. 4, 1812.

‡ Bout., i., 370. Goug., 276.

* Lab., 211, 215. Ségur, ii., 67. Chamb., ii., 123, 126. † Jam., iv., 152. Bout., i., 375, 384.

Semicircular march of the Russian army around Moscow.

Feelings of the soldiers in the Russian army on this occasion.

heard even at so great a distance; and, as the troops marched at night, their steps were guided by the glare of the conflagration. One only feeling pervaded every breast, that of profound and ineffaceable indignation; one only passion animated every bosom, that of stern and collected vengeance. The burning of the holy city had effaced all lighter feelings, and impressed a religious solemnity on that memorable march. Words there were none spoken in that vast array; the hearts of all were too big for utterance; the tread of the men alone was heard from the ranks; but the silent tears which trickled down the cheek, and the glance of fire which was turn-

ed towards the heavens, bespoke the deep determination that was felt. Silent and mournful they continued their way, interrupted only by the burning fragments which occasionally fell among their ranks, and for a moment illuminated the stern visages of the soldiers. They left behind them their palaces and their temples; monuments of art and miracles of luxury; the remains of ages which had passed away, and of those which were yet unfinished; the tombs of their ancestors and the cradles of their descendants: nothing remained of Moscow but the remembrance of the city and the resolution to avenge it.*†

CHAPTER LXVII.

RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.

ARGUMENT.

General Inclination of Conquest from the North to the South.—Final Cause of this Law of Nature.—Arrival of the Era in the French Wars when the North rolled back Conquest to the South.—Moral Renovation of Europe which sprung from these Events.—Calamitous Situation of Russia at this Period, and heroic Courage of the Emperor and Kutusoff.—Heroic Sentiments of the Emperor in Private.—Plan of the Russian General for surrounding the French.—Extraordinary Magnitude of these Combinations.—Measures of Napoleon at this Time to secure his Communications.—His unsuccessful Attempt at a Negotiation.—Kutusoff's Opinion at this Period on the Advantages of the Russian Position.—Napoleon in vain expects Submission from the Court of St. Petersburg.—His Reasons for a protracted Stay at Moscow.—Continued Fineness of the Weather there.—Ruin of the Discipline of the French Army.—Increasing Strength and admirable Situation of the Russian Host.—Feelings and Aspect of the Recruits who crowded to the Russian Standards.—Kutusoff's clear Views of the Advantages of his Situation.—Ruinous Partisan Warfare which went on on the Flanks and Rear of the French.—Disastrous Effect of the Plunder of Moscow on the French Army.—Increasing Danger thence arising to the French Position.—Napoleon's early Preparations for a Retreat.—Extreme Difficulty of keeping open the Communication in his Rear.—Alexander's firm Resolution not to treat for Peace.—First Appearance of Snow, and increasing Disquiet of the French Soldiers.—Napoleon makes Preparations for a Retreat.—Kutusoff's Picture of the State of his Army at this Period.—He resumes offensive Operations.—Successful Attack on Murat on the 18th of October.—Napoleon marches towards Kaluga.—Force which left Moscow.—Strange Caravans which followed the Army.—Advance of Napoleon to Maloi-Jaroslavit, and desperate Battle there.—Results of the Battle.—Napoleon's grievous Embarrassment at the Result.—He narrowly escapes being made Prisoner.—Deliberations at the French Headquarters on the Course to be pursued.—Dreadful Appearance of the Field of Battle.—A Retreat is resolved on.—Kutusoff moves towards Kaluga to bar his Passage in that Direction.—Dejection which ensued among the Troops.—Views of Napoleon in commencing the Retreat.—Kutusoff moves in Pursuit on a Parallel Line.—Woful Spectacle exhibited on passing the Abbey of Kolotkoi.—Severe Action at Wiazma.—Results of the Battle, and Failure of Kutusoff to push his Advantage to the utmost.—Ney assumes the Command of the Rear-guard.—Commencement of the great Frosts, and Appearance of the Atmosphere.—Dreadful Depression they produced on the Minds of the Soldiers.—Increasing Distresses of the Troops.—Effects of these Horrors on the Minds of the Soldiers.—Continuance of the Retreat to Dorogobouge.—Disasters of the Viceroy in his Retreat to the same Place.—Movements of Kutusoff in his parallel March at this Time.—Napoleon receives Intelligence of Mallet's Conspiracy at Paris.—Effort of Napoleon to provide Magazines along his Line of Retreat.—Disastrous Intelligence from the Armies on both Flanks.—Important Operations of Wittgenstein on the Dwina.—Check of Count Steinhill, and continued Successes of Wittgenstein.—Napoleon orders Victor and Oudinot to attack Wittgenstein, which is done without Success.—Operations of Tchichagoff on the other Flank.—Operations of Schwartzberg against Sacken.—Capture of Minsk and the Bridge of Borisow by Tchichagoff.—Partial Completion of the Plan for surrounding Napoleon.—Alarmed by these Disasters, Napo-

leon resolves to Retreat from Smolensko to the Niemen.—Arrival of Kutusoff at Krasnoi.—Order of the French Retreat from Smolensko, and Napoleon is allowed to pass with the Guard.—Reasons which induced the Russian General to do this.—Effect which the Name of Napoleon and the Grand Army still produced on Men's Minds.—Successful Attack on Eugene's Corps.—Arrangements for cutting off Davoust as he passed.—Napoleon's heroic Resolution at all Hazards to support him.—Battle of Krasnoi.—Imminent Danger and brave Conduct of Ney.—General Results of the Battles of Krasnoi.—Dreadful Confusion which prevailed in the French Army.—Heroic Conduct of Ney during his Retreat.—Prodigious Losses of the French Army.—Cessation of the Frost, and Discontinuance of the Pursuit by Kutusoff.—Napoleon's hazardous Situation, and Plans at this Period.—His admirable Arrangements for bursting through the Force which Tchichagoff had to oppose him.—Breaking down of the Bridge of Borisow, and Junction of Victor and the Grand Army.—Napoleon's Measures to deceive the Enemy as to his real Point of crossing.—The first Part of the Army surprise the Passage.—Tchichagoff's Movements on hearing of the Passage.—Capture of Partonneaux's Division by Wittgenstein.—Preparations for a general Attack on the French on both Sides of the River.—The French force their Way through Tchichagoff's Corps.—Furious Attack by Wittgenstein on the Troops remaining on the left Bank of the River.—Generous Devotion shown by many at this awful Passage.—Its general Results.—Dreadful Disorders which now ensued in the Army.—Napoleon leaves it for Paris.—Sufferings of Poland during the Campaign.—Napoleon's Arrival at Warsaw.—His Conversation with the Abbé de Pradt at Warsaw.—His extraordinary Ideas.—Increased Severity of the Cold, and dreadful Sufferings of the Troops.—Prodigious Losses of the Detachments which joined the Grand Army at this Period.—Singular Difference between the Inhabitants of the South and the North of Europe in bearing the Cold.—Retreat from Wilna to the Niemen.—Passage of the Bridge of Kowna.—Heroic Conduct of Ney on this Occasion.—His Appearance at Gumbinnen to General Dumas.—Terrible Contrast to the Passage of the River at the same Point five Months before.—Operations against Macdonald near Riga.—Schwartzberg evacuates the Russian Territory.—Retreat of the Remains of the Grand Army to Königsberg and Dantzic.—Arrival and generous Conduct of Alexander at Wilna.—Noble Proclamation of the Emperor Alexander to his Soldiers.—Losses of the French in the Campaign, and of the Russians.—Reflections on the Military Causes of this prodigious Overthrow.—Great Ability of Napoleon generally in this Campaign.—Heroic Constancy of the Russians.—The Severity of the Russian Winter will not explain the Disaster.—The Cold was unusually long of setting in, and it affected the Russians as much as the French.—Napoleon's long Stay at Moscow was not what ruined him.—Burning of Moscow did not occasion his Destruction.—Real Causes, in a Military Point of View, of the Disaster.—Importance of the Asiatic Light Horse of Russia on the Campaign.—Extraordinary Ability of Kutusoff's Conduct of the Pursuit.—Grandeur of the Conduct of the Emperor and People of Russia.—Moral Causes of Napoleon's Overthrow.—The Necessity of Conquest to Existence.—Reaction of the World against his oppressive Mode of making War, and Government. *

THE stream of conquest in every age has

* Guil. de Vaud, i., 209. Ségur, ii., 72. † Karamsin.

General inclination of conquest from the North to the South.

flowed from the North to the South. The superiority of arms, or the power of knowledge, have sometimes given the civilization of refined, a temporary advantage over the courage of barbarous states; but all the great settlements of mankind have come from the Northern regions. The fanaticism of Arabia, the discipline of Rome, for a time subdued the fairest regions of the globe, but the dynasties they established were of no permanent duration. The empire of the califs hardly survived the immediate descendants of Omar; the crescent of Mohammed wavered till it was steadied by the conquests of Turkestan; the discipline of Rome more easily conquered the whole of Asia than a few semi-barbarous tribes in the north of Germany; and all the courage of the legions could not subdue the nations beyond the frontier of the Danube, or prevent the provinces of their dominion from at length becoming the prey of an artless but courageous Northern enemy.

It is by the continued operation of this military superiority of the North over the South that the purity of the moral atmosphere is preserved, and the progress of wealth rendered consistent with the preservation of virtue and energy among mankind. Civilization, it is true, induces opulence, and opulence gives birth to corruption; but courage as certainly accompanies poverty, and courage, in the end, ensures conquest. The accumulated wealth and decaying hardihood of civilization at once provoke hostility and disarm resistance, while the augmented numbers of turbulent barbarism both require expansion and compel obedience. The stream of conquest overwhelms for a time the monuments of civilization, and buries the labours of useful industry; but the victors insensibly acquire knowledge from the people they have vanquished, and yield to the superiority of more advanced civilization; while the conquered provinces are regenerated by the infusion of barbarian valour, and regain, amid the hardships of life, the virtue they had lost by its refinements. Ages elapse during the mighty change, and generations seem doomed to misfortune during the winter of existence; but the laws of nature are incessantly operating, and preparing in silence the renovation of the world.

The era of Napoleon was not destined to form an exception to this general tendency. The enthusiasm which the French Revolution had occasioned, the talent it had developed, the military abilities of its chief, had rolled the tide of conquest backward to its source, and pushed far beyond the utmost limits of the Roman Empire the dominion of Southern civilization; but the concurrence of these extraordinary events could not permanently alter the destinies of mankind. The flames of Moscow were the funeral pile of the French Empire: from its ashes arose a spirit which could never be subdued. From that period commenced a succession of disasters which brought back the tide of conquest to the shores of the Rhine, and re-established the wonted ascendancy of the Northern over the Southern regions. But the second invasion of the Northern nations was not stained by the barbarities which marked the first: the irruption of Attila was very different from that of Alexander. Other conquerors have preceded him in the path of military glory; other nations have bowed beneath the yoke

of foreign dominion; and other ages have seen the energies of mankind wither before the march of victorious power. It has been reserved to our age alone to witness, it has been the high prerogative of Russia only to exhibit, a more animating spectacle: to show us power applied only to the purposes of beneficence, victory made the means of moral renovation, conquest become the instrument of political resurrection. After resisting the mightiest armament which the power of man had ever assembled against the liberties of mankind, we have seen her triumphant arms issue victorious from their desolated country, give liberty to those who had been compelled to attempt their subjugation, and seek to avenge the ashes of their own capital by sparing the cities of their prostrate enemy. Before the march of her victorious power, we have seen the energies of the world revive; we have seen her triumphant voice awaken every fallen people to nobler duties, and recall the remembrance of their pristine glory; we have seen her banners waving over the infant armies of every renovated people, and the track of her chariot-wheels followed, not by the sighs of a captive, but the blessings of a liberated world.

In this moral renovation of nature all ranks have been compelled to participate. The high and the low, the rich and the poor, have been alike found at the post of honour. The higher orders, by whose weakness and vice an inlet was opened for these misfortunes, have been purified in the misfortunes themselves, and in the school of adversity trained to nobler employments, and called to the exercise of more animating duties. The lower orders, by whose cupidity and ambition they were subsequently occasioned, have learned wisdom and gained experience in the course of the same arduous struggle; and the misfortunes of states have given them a weight and an importance unknown in the former ages of the world. Even the sovereigns of Europe have felt the influence of the same causes: they have been compelled to leave the abodes of ease and of affluence to join in the soldier's duties and partake of the soldier's glory; they have been compelled to justify the eminence of their rank by the display of all the qualities by which it is ennobled. All that is great and all that is noble in Europe have been assembled in one memorable field: the prayers of emperors have ascended to Heaven for the success of the soldier's arm; and the meeting of the sovereigns of Europe within the walls of Leipsic has realized all the magnificence of Eastern imagination, and all the visions of chivalrous glory.

But the dawn of the day which was fraught with these mighty events, and destined to set amid this blaze of glory, was dark and gloomy to Russia. The necessity of abandoning the metropolis, the ruin of the ancient capital, spread dismay through the Empire. On the 16th of September Kutusoff announced the melancholy event, adding, as the only matter for consolation, "that the city was bereft of the population, who constituted its strength; that the people are the soul of the Empire; and that, where they are, there is Moscow and the empire of Russia." The emperor displayed in these trying circumstances a heroism worthy of ancient Rome. His address to the nation, announcing the fall of Moscow, concluded with these remarkable and prophetic

Moral renovation of Europe which sprung from these events.

Arrival of the era in the French wars when the North rolled back conquest to the South.

Calamitous situation of Russia at this period, and heroic courage of the emperor and Kutusoff. September 16.

words: "Let there be no pusillanimous depression; let us swear to redouble our courage and perseverance. The enemy has entered Moscow deserted, as into a tomb, without the means either of ruling or subsistence. He invaded Russia at the head of three hundred thousand men; half have perished from the sword, famine, or desertion; the other half are shut up in the capital, bereft of everything. He is in the centre of Russia, and not a Russian has yielded to his power. Meanwhile, our forces increase and surround him. He is in the midst of a warlike people, whose armies envelop him on every side; soon, to escape from famine, he will be compelled to cut his way through our brave battalions. Shall we, then, yield when Europe is in admiration at our exertions? Let us show ourselves worthy of giving her an example, and bless the Hand which has chosen us to be the first of nations in the cause of freedom. In the present miserable state of the human race, what glory awaits the nation, which, after having patiently endured all the evils of war, shall succeed by the force of courage and virtue, not only in reconquering its own rights, but in extending the blessings of freedom to other states, and even to those who have been made the unwilling instruments of attempting its subjugation! May the blessing of the Almighty enable us to return good for evil; by the aid of his succour may we be enabled to triumph over our enemies; and in saving ourselves, may we become the instruments of his mercy for the salvation of mankind!"*

Nor did the private sentiments and conduct of the emperor fall short of these magnanimous declarations. On the morning on which the intelligence of the battle of Borodino reached St. Petersburg, he sent for the English ambassador, Lord Cathcart. Without attempting to disguise that they had been overpowered in that bloody fight, and that the sacrifice of Moscow would be the consequence, he desired him to inform his government that not for one nor twenty such calamities would he abandon the contest in which he was engaged; and that, rather than submit, he would abandon Europe, and retire altogether to the original seats of his ancestors in the Asiatic wilds.†

The preparations of the Russian government corresponded to the magnitude of these anticipations, and their firmness was worthy of the cause in which they were engaged. The peace with Turkey had rendered disposable the greater part of the Moldavian army; while the treaty with Sweden, concluded by the emperor in August at Abo, enabled the regular forces of Finland to be withdrawn for the re-enforcement of the corps of Count Wittgenstein. While the main Russian force, therefore, retired before Napoleon, and drew the war into the interior of Russia, two powerful armies were preparing to intercept his communications and cut off his retreat. The corps of Wittgenstein, augmented by the greater part of the troops of Finland, under Count Steinhill, and the militia of St. Petersburg to the numerical force of fifty thousand men, received orders to act vigorously against St. Cyr, and drive him from Polotsk, in order to approach the bank of the Oula and the line

of retreat of the main French army. At the same time, the army of Moldavia, under Tchichagoff, of an equal force, was directed to advance from the southern provinces, to pass the corps of Schwartzenberg, and establish itself on the line of the Beresina, and at the important bridge of Borisow. Thus, while Napoleon was resting in fancied security among the ruins of Moscow, and impatiently expecting the submission of Russia, a formidable force of a hundred thousand men was moving towards Poland, to cut off his retreat to Western Europe. The Empire was pierced to its heart, but, instead of yielding up the contest, it was extending its mighty arms to stifle the aggressor.*†

History can furnish no parallel to the magnitude of these military combinations, Extraordinary or the sagacity with which they magnitude of were conceived. Had subsequent these combinations not rendered their complete execution impracticable, they unquestionably would have led to the surrender of the whole French army. From the forests of Finland to the steppes of the Ukraine, from the confines of the Frozen to those of the Torrid Zone, multitudes of armed men were directed to one centre; the days of their march were accurately calcula-

* Bout., ii., 128, 130. Chamb., ii., 191, 192, 289.

† The orders to this effect, from Alexander in person, which subsequently received Kutusoff's approbation, and were despatched to Tormasoff, Tchichagoff, Wittgenstein, and Steinhill, are dated September 18, 1812, and are given in Boutourlin, ii., 241, and Chambray, ii., 289. The precision with which the directions were given and the marches calculated, so as to secure the grand object of combining a hundred thousand men at Minsk, Borisow, and the line of the Beresina, from the 15th to the 20th of October, directly in the rear of the main line of communication and retreat of the French army, is worthy of unqualified admiration. "Tchichagoff was ordered to be at Pinsk by the 2d of October, and thence to march by Nieswig to Minsk, so as to reach the latter town by the 16th, and thence advance to the line of the Beresina, and fortify Borisow and all the points susceptible of defence on the line of the enemy's retreat; so that the army of Napoleon, closely followed on its retreat by Prince Kutusoff, should experience at every step a formidable resistance. He was in this position to cut off all communication, even by couriers, between the French army in the interior and the remainder of Europe, and await the progress of events. Tormasoff received instructions to commence offensive operations on the 8th of October against Schwartzenberg, with a view to drive his force from the environs of Nieswig and Minsk, and leave the line of the Beresina clear for the occupation of Tchichagoff and Wittgenstein, who were to descend from the north at the same time, in the same direction. Wittgenstein himself was to be re-enforced by the 8th October by eleven thousand of the militia of St. Petersburg, nine thousand old soldiers from Finland, and eight thousand of the militia of Novogorod; and, after having collected all his re-enforcements, he was directed to commence offensive operations on both sides of the Dwina, and strive to expel the enemy from Polotsk, and overwhelm the corps of Oudinot, who was to be driven off in the direction of Wilna, so as to separate him from the French Grand Army. Having accomplished this success, Wittgenstein was to leave the care of looking after Oudinot's remains to Count Steinhill, who was placed farther to the west, in the direction of Riga, and move himself with the utmost rapidity to Doksitzky, where he was to be by the 22d of October, and open up a communication with Tchichagoff at Minsk. In that situation he was to wait the course of ulterior events, and meanwhile do his utmost to secure every pass by which the enemy might retire from Smolensko by Witpeisk towards Wilna. Lastly, the corps of Count Steinhill, which had been drawn from Finland, was to approach Riga, upon which the governor of that fortress was to march out with about twenty thousand men, and co-operate with him in such a manner as to draw the whole attention of Macdonald, and prevent his sending succours to St. Cyr or Oudinot; and, in the event of those marshals being beaten by Wittgenstein, ordered to fall upon their remains." These movements, taken in conjunction with those of the Grand Army in the neighbourhood of Moscow, and directing the concentration of forces from the Danube to the Gulf of Finland, directly in the rear of the French army, are the greatest, and perhaps the most skilful military operations recorded in the annals of the world.

* Bout., ii., 133, 134. Segur, ii., 73, 74.

† I received this striking anecdote from the lips of my venerable friend Earl Cathcart himself.

ted, and the point of their union previously fixed. The neighbourhood of Borissow, and the 22d of October, were assigned as the place and time of their junction—a place about to acquire a fatal celebrity in French history. It is not to be forgotten that the orders which assembled these distant masses were issued from St. Petersburg, during the consternation which immediately followed the fall of Moscow, and when Napoleon confidently calculated on the immediate submission of the Russian government.*

In advancing to Moscow, the French emperor, on his part, was not unmindful of his line of communication. The corps of Victor, thirty thousand strong, had been, agreeably to the directions already given, stationed at Smolensk, with the double view of protecting the rear of the Grand Army, and aiding, in case of need, the forces of St. Cyr on the Dwina; while the corps of Augereau, amounting to fifty-two thousand men, was stationed in *echelon*, through the Grand-duchy of Warsaw and the kingdom of Prussia. Schwartzberg, at the head of the Austrians, was more than a match for Tormasoff; and St. Cyr, with the corps of Oudinot and the Bavarians, was destined to keep in check the army of Wittgenstein. It is remarkable that the penetrating eye of the French emperor, so early as the 26th of August, and, of course, prior to the battle of Borodino, discerned the probable importance of the country between Minsk, Smolensk, and Witepsk, in the ulterior operations which might be expected before the close of the campaign, and that he made, in consequence, every imaginable effort to strengthen his forces in that vital point of his communications. Victor received the command-in-chief of the forces in Lithuania: he was to establish his headquarters at Smolensk; and powerful re-enforcements, especially of Polish and Lithuanian troops, were directed from all quarters to various points from that city by Borissow to Minsk. The great objects of this marshal were to be, keeping up on the one side a communication with Wilna, where a strong garrison and vast magazines were stationed, and on the other with the Grand Army in the interior of Russia.†

Napoleon returned to the Kremlin, which had escaped the flames, on the 20th of September, and anxiously awaited the impression which the intelligence of his success should produce on the Russian government. To aid the supposed effect, Count Lauriston was despatched to the headquarters of Kutusoff, with authority to propose an armistice; and Murat had an interview with Oct. 21, 1812. General Benningsen. Prince Wolkowsky was forwarded with the letter of Napoleon to Petersburg, while the French deputation were amused by hopes of accommodation held out by the Russian generals.‡

Meanwhile, Napoleon lay inactive at Moscow, expecting the submission of the Russian government. But day after day, and week after week, rolled on without any answer to his proposals: the winter was visibly approaching, and the anxiety of the troops in regard to their future destination could not be concealed. His first proposal was to burn the remains of Mos-

cow, march by Twer to St. Petersburg, and then form a junction with Macdonald, who was still in the neighbourhood of Riga. But the difficulty of advancing with an army encumbered with baggage and artillery on a single chaussée, traversing morasses and forests, at the commencement of the winter season, was too obvious to his generals, and speedily led to the abandonment of the design. He risked the existence of his army, therefore, by a continued residence at the Kremlin, and allowed the precious hours, which could never be recalled, to pass away, without taking any steps towards securing permanent quarters for the winter.*

It is not to be supposed from this circumstance, however, that he was insensible to the dangers of his position, or the increasing perils of a retreat during a Russian winter. These dangers were fully appreciated by his discerning genius; but, great as they were, they were overbalanced in his estimation by the necessary consequences of so fatal a measure as a general retreat. The illusion of his invincibility would instantly be dispelled, and Europe would resound with the intelligence of his overthrow. "I am blamed," said he, "for not retreating, but those who censure me do not consider that it requires a month to reorganize the army and evacuate the hospitals; that, if we abandon the wounded, the Cossacks will daily triumph over the sick and the isolated men. A retreat will appear a flight, and Europe will re-echo with the news. What a frightful course of perilous wars will date from my first retrograde step! I know well that Moscow, as a military position, is worth nothing; but, as a political point, its preservation is of inestimable value. The world regards me only as a general, forgetting that I am an emperor. In politics, you must never retrace your steps: if you have committed a fault, you must never show that you are conscious of it: error, steadily adhered to, becomes a virtue in the eyes of posterity."† By such specious arguments did this great man seek to justify the excessive self-love which formed the principal blot in his character, and strive to vindicate the postponement, the painful acknowledgment, of defeat; or, rather, the career of ambition, like that of guilt, is interminable, and, when once it pauses in its course, immediate ruin ensues.

Contrary to the usual course of nature in that latitude, the climate, during the first weeks of October, continued fine, and the sun of autumn shed a mild radiance over the scene of approaching desolation. The emperor, in his bulletins, compared it to the weather at Fontainebleau in the close of autumn. The Russians, accustomed to see the snow begin to fall at that period, regarded the fineness of the weather as a sign of the Divine favour to their enemies, little imagining that it was lulling them into a fancied security on the eve of their destruction.‡

Meanwhile, the discipline and efficiency of the French army were daily declining amid the license which followed the pillage of Moscow. All the efforts of their commanders were unable to arrest the growing insubordination of the troops. Pillage had enriched numbers; but amid the

* Bout., ii., 128, 244, 248.

† Napoleon to Berthier, Aug. 26, 1812; and Berthier to Victor, Aug. 27. Fain, ii., 61, 63. Jom., iv., 111.

‡ Bout., ii., 134, 136. Ségur, ii., 96. Chamb., ii., 304.

* Ségur, ii., 60, 63. Jom., iv., 146. Fain, ii., 94, 95.

† Ségur, ii., 93, 94.

‡ Lab., 241; 23 and 25. Bulletin, Moniteur, October 13 and 21, 1812.

Measures of Napoleon to secure his communications.

His reasons for a protracted stay at Moscow.

His unsuccessful attempt at a negotiation.

Napoleon in vain expects submission from the Russians.

general misery with which they were surrounded, the most precious articles were of no real value, and were gladly exchanged for a temporary supply of the necessaries of life. Miserable horse-flesh was eaten by the officers, arrayed in the richest furs and silks of the East, out of golden dishes: the common men were often on the point of starving. The emperor sought to conceal his anxiety, and restore the military spirit of his soldiers, by daily reviews at the Kremlin; and, notwithstanding the fatigues and consumption of the campaign, the troops exhibited a brilliant appearance when they defiled through the palace of the Czars.*

Very different was the spectacle exhibited in the patriot camp of the Russian army. Discipline, order, and regularity were there conspicuous: the chasms in the battalions were filled up by the numerous levies who arrived from the southern provinces; all the necessaries of life were to be had in abundance, and even many luxuries were brought thither by the wandering merchants from the neighbouring cities. The camp at Taroutino, now become the last hope of European freedom, presented the animating spectacle of universal enthusiasm: the veterans burned with desire to revenge the wrongs they had witnessed inflicted on their country; the young soldiers, to prove themselves worthy of their heroic brethren in arms. None of the provinces refused to answer the call for patriotic exertion: the roads were covered by recruits, joyously marching to the common rendezvous; the accustomed restraints to prevent desertion were abandoned, when all were pressing forward to the scene of danger. In the enthusiasm of the moment, the natural ties of affection seemed subdued by a holier feeling: the lamentations usually heard in the villages at the departure of the conscripts were exchanged for shouts of exultation, and mothers wept for joy when they learned that fortune had selected their sons to be the defenders of their country. The Cossacks of the Don took arms in a body at the call of Platoff, and twenty-two regiments soon joined the army, composed chiefly of veterans whose period of service had expired, or youths who had never borne arms, but who joyfully resumed or took up their lances when their country was in danger. These rude allies entered the camp uttering loud shouts, which resounded within the French lines; and the ancient war-cry of the crusaders, *Dieu le veut! Dieu le veut!* was heard from the descendants of the enemies of the champions of Jerusalem.†

The savage aspect of the horses which these warriors brought with them from the wilderness, their uncombed manes, which still swept the ground, their wild and unbroken carriage, attested how far the spirit of resistance had penetrated, and the strength of the feeling which had brought the children of the desert into the dwellings of civilized life. Constant discharges of musketry from the Russian lines indicated the multitude of recruits who were receiving the elements of military instruction. The troops at the advanced posts did not dissemble from the French the danger they ran by remaining longer in their present position: they expressed their astonishment at the security of their invaders on the approach of winter; "in

fifteen days," said they, "you will see your nails drop from your fingers, and your muskets fall from your hands: had you not enough of food in your own country, room for the living, tombs for the dead, that you have come so far to leave your bones in a hostile land?"*

Kutusoff clearly felt, and nobly expressed in his letters to the emperor, both the sacrifice which it cost him to abandon Moscow, and the immense advantages which his present position gave him with a view to the future operations of the army. "Foreseeing," said he, "the necessity of the abandonment," I had already taken measures for removing from the city the chief part of the public and private riches it contained. Almost all the people have quitted the capital: that venerable city is left like a desert of ramparts and private houses; what the body is when the soul has quitted it, such is Moscow abandoned by its inhabitants. The soul of the Empire is the people; and where they are, there is Moscow and the Empire. Doubtless, the desperate resolution to abandon the venerated city of our ancestors will wound every heart, and leave in the minds of the Russians ineffaceable regrets; but, after all, it is but a town for the Empire—the sacrifice of a part for the salvation of the whole. That sacrifice will procure me the means of preserving my whole army. I am master of the road to Tula and Kaluga; and I cover, by the extended line of my troops, the magazines of our resources, the most abundant provinces of the Empire, which furnish to our armies their flocks and their harvests. If I had taken up any other position, or had obstinately insisted upon preserving Moscow, I should have been obliged to abandon these provinces to the enemy, and the consequence would have been the destruction of my army and of the Empire. At present, I preserve entire my communication with Tormasoff and Tchichagoff; and am in a situation to form, with my whole forces, a continuous line, which will completely intercept the communications of the enemy, and even straiten his intercourse with Smolensko itself. Thus, I trust, I shall be able to intercept all the succour which may be forwarded to him from his rear, and in the end constrain him to abandon the capital, and confound all his haughty projects.†

Meanwhile, though a species of armistice reigned between the main armies, a destructive warfare began on the flanks and rear of the French position, which proved of the utmost moment in the sequel of the campaign. After the example of the Spaniards, the Russians established a chain of partisans round the French army, which cut off all their foraging parties, and, growing bolder from success, soon held them almost imprisoned in their cantonments. The militia of the contiguous provinces, aided by the Cossacks of the Don, formed a vast circle round Moscow, occupying every road, and cutting off all supplies of provisions to the invading army. The want of forage was soon so severely felt, that the cavalry were obliged to penetrate to a considerable distance in quest of subsistence; and these detachments, in most cases, fell into the hands of the numerous corps of the hostile circle. So early

Kutusoff's clear views of the advantages of his situation. Sept. 16.

Increasing strength and admirable situation of the Russian army.

Feelings and aspect of the recruits who crowded to the Russian standards.

Ruinous partisan warfare which went on on the flanks and rear of the French.

* Ségur, ii., 66, 67. Lab., 237. Chamb., ii., 123, 124.

† Ségur, ii., 90. Bout., ii., 117, 118.

* Ségur, ii., 90. Bout., ii., 121. Chamb., ii., 279

† Kutusoff to Alexander, Sept. 16, 1812. Chamo. ii., 278, 279.

as the 10th of October, General Dorokoff captured a whole battalion of Westphalians, and numerous magazines in the town of Vereia; while Colonel Davidoff, on the great road to Smolensko, destroyed numerous detachments even of the Imperial Guard. This latter officer had the merit of recommending, and himself setting the example of the organization of this formidable species of force in the Russian war; and the event soon proved that it was calculated to effect far greater changes there than in the mountains of Spain, as the long line of communication in the French rear was open to their attacks, and the irregular hordes from the Don furnished an ample supply of troops admirably calculated for this kind of warfare. During the first three weeks of October, the partisans round Moscow made prisoners of no less than four thousand one hundred and eighty French soldiers; and the reports from Murat announced the alarming intelligence, that *one half* of the whole surviving cavalry of the army had perished in these inglorious encounters.*

Although the principal object of the Russians in the conflagration of Moscow had been to render it impossible for the French to remain there, yet the effect which did take place was not, in the end, less disastrous to the army of the invaders than the design which was originally in view could have been. After the troops returned to the capital, immense stores of all sorts were discovered, which had been deposited in the innumerable cellars with which the city abounded, and escaped the conflagration. The magnitude of the booty which thus came to be at their disposal proved fatal to the discipline of the soldiers, while it in no degree relieved the real wants of the army. Wine, brandy, and rice; gold and silver vessels; sumptuous apparel, rich silks, embroidered stuffs, superb pelisses, and gorgeous draperies, were to be had in abundance; but corn and forage there was none for the horses, though there was immense ammunition for the guns.† These were the real wants of the army, and they were in no degree relieved by the vast and rich stores which, when the conflagration ceased, were extracted from the cellars of the city. Thus the French suffered more from the continued occupation of Moscow than they could possibly have done from being obliged to abandon it; for they found amid its ruins luxuries which proved fatal to their discipline, while they did not obtain the stores necessary to their existence.‡

The eyes of the French army were now opened to the imminent danger which they had incurred in advancing to Moscow after the battle of Borodino, and how well founded had been the advice so strenuously given by Marshal Ney, to retire at once from that fatal field. To gain the victory on that occasion required the sacrifice of so large a portion of the army, and especially of the cavalry, that they were no longer able to keep the field except in large masses. In proportion as the light troops of the enemy were augmented by the concourse of the nomade tribes

from the eastern provinces of the Empire, the shattered squadrons of France, which had escaped the carnage of Borodino, melted away before the fatigues and the dangers of incessant warfare. It was in vain, therefore, that above a hundred thousand veteran troops still occupied the capital, and that a thousand pieces of cannon still guarded the approaches to the Kremlin: this vast assemblage of armed men was in danger of perishing, from its very numbers, for want of subsistence, in the midst of an exhausted country; this formidable train of artillery might soon become an unserviceable burden from the rapid destruction of the horses which conveyed it. The French infantry, like the Roman legions, would be powerless in the midst of the Scythian cavalry; and the disasters of Antony and Julian appeared about to be renewed in the midst of the solitudes of Russia.*

Impressed with these ideas, a general feeling of disquietude filled the French army, and the more intelligent of the officers were seized with the most gloomy forebodings as to the fate of the army, if the stay at Moscow was prolonged for any considerable time. So strongly impressed was one of the ablest of its officers with these dangers, that he has told us himself that he regarded the burning of Moscow as a fortunate event, as it was likely to render a stay in the heart of Russia impossible, and compel the emperor, how unwilling soever, to a retreat.† Napoleon himself, though he had opened a negotiation with Kutusoff, from which he still hoped the happiest results, yet in private was well aware that, if these attempts at a negotiation proved fruitless, he would be driven to that extremity. In the first days of October, only three weeks after he had entered the capital, he gave orders for evacuating the hospitals on Smolensko; and, on the 6th of the same month, he wrote to Berthier, strongly urging the adoption of the measures necessary for a retreat by Mojaïsk and Wiazma to that city.‡

In truth, however, the commands of Napoleon to keep his rear clear, and secure the communication with Smolensko, were more easily issued than obeyed; for the commander along the line to Wilna, notwithstanding all the pains he had taken to station troops in *echelon* along the whole road, was quite unable to keep off the enemy; the number and audacity of the parties who infested that vital artery soon became so excessive, that Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was in command at Wiazma, wrote to Berthier, so early as the 26th of September, that the number of the partisans by whom he was surrounded was daily augmenting; that he was entirely destitute of provisions or ammunition, and could not exist unless a magazine were formed at his station; and that he was under the necessity of stopping the convoys for Moscow, to get food and ammunition for his own troops; and ten days afterward he wrote that he was as completely blockaded at

Increasing dangers thence arising to the French position.

* Davidoff. *Guerre des Partisans*, 127. Ségur, ii., 88, 90. Bout., ii., 119, 120, 138. Chamb., ii., 127. Fain, ii., 96.

† "We have found in Moscow 2,000,000 of cartridges, 300,000 pounds of powder, 300,000 of saltpetre and sulphur, and an immense quantity of cannon and balls. It is triple what we consumed in the last battle. We can now fight four such battles as Borodino."—NAPOLEON to GENERAL LARIBOISSIERE, 16th September, 1812, FAIN, ii., 137.

‡ Chamb., ii., 207, 163. Fain, ii., 101, 137.

* Guil. de Vaud., 274.

† Dumas, *Souv.*, iii., 450.

‡ Fain, ii., 147, 148.

§ "Give instant orders to the generals commanding on the road to Smolensko to make themselves masters of a circuit of ten leagues round their respective stations, and collect all the horses and carriages which they contain to convey our wounded. Charge the Duke of Abrantes, on his highest responsibility, to evacuate the wounded here and at Koletskoi on Wiazma; and the commander there to do the same on Smolensko."—NAPOLEON to BERTHIER, Oct. 16, 1812, Fain, ii., 418.

Smolensko as at Wiazma; that he had not troops sufficient to guard a single convoy; that the regiments which came up to join him from the Vistula were little better than skeletons, with almost all their officers dead; that without re-enforcements the passage could no longer be kept open; that eight times the forces at his disposal were indispensable; and that, notwithstanding his urgent entreaties, he had not received a man to aid him in his efforts.*

During this critical period, big with the fate of Russia and of the world, Napoleon was amused by the show of a negotiation, which, as already seen, he had opened with the Russian commander-in-chief. But astute as he was, alike in the cabinet as the field, he here proved no match for the diplomatic talent of the Russian generals, and suffered himself to be duped by that profound dissimulation, in all ages the mark of the Russian character, and which in an especial manner distinguished their grayhaired chief. Kutusoff's real object was to gain time till winter set in, and retreat became impossible, or obviously ruinous to the French army. But even this shadow of a negotiation, at so critical a period, was in the highest degree displeasing to the Emperor Alexander, who was no sooner informed of the reception of Lauriston at the Russian headquarters, and the commencement of an opening for conferences, than he wrote to Kutusoff, expressing his high displeasure at the proceeding, and his absolute command to "admit of no negotiation whatever, or relation tending towards peace with the enemy."[†]

At length, on the 13th of October, a shower of snow fell, and announced the approach of another danger of a still more formidable kind. At the same time, Kutusoff made the French lines re-echo with discharges of artillery, in commemoration of the entry of Madrid by the English troops. In a proclamation addressed to his soldiers, he declared, "The campaign, finished on the part of the enemy, is only commencing on ours. Madrid has fallen. The hand of Omnipotence presses on Napoleon. Moscow will be his prison or his tomb: the Grand Army will perish with him: France will fall in Russia."[‡]

Alarmed by the visible approach of winter, Napoleon at length made more serious prepar-

ations for his retreat. Orders were issued for the purchase of twenty pares to re-thousand horses: the trophies of the treat.

Kremlin, the great Cross of St. Ivan, and the wounded, were directed to move upon Mojaïsk; the muskets of the wounded at Kolotskoi, and the caissons of the reserve, were ordered to be destroyed. The troops were commanded to be provided with forage and subsistence for a long march: a vain attempt in a country totally exhausted of resources, and in which he was hemmed in by a circle of enterprising enemies.*

Kutusoff, at this period, wrote in the most encouraging terms to the emperor on the immense advantages which he had derived from the position in front of the southern provinces, which he had so skilfully obtained. "The army," said he, "is at rest, and daily receives re-enforcements. The different regiments fill up their chasms, and complete their numbers, by means of recruits who daily arrive from the southern provinces, and who burn to measure their strength with the enemy. Abundant forage and good water have entirely re-established our cavalry. The troops experience no want of provisions. All the roads in our rear are covered with convoys of provisions coming from the most abundant provinces. Convalescent officers and soldiers daily rejoin their standards; while the sick and wounded, nursed in the bosom of their country, enjoy the inestimable advantages of receiving the tender cares of their families. On the other hand, such is the state of disorganization of the French army, that they are not in a condition to undertake anything against us. They can only obtain provisions with extreme difficulty; and all the prisoners concur in declaring that they have nothing but horseflesh, and that bread is even more rare than butcher meat. Their artillery horses, and those of the cavalry, suffer immensely: the greater part of their dragoons perished in the battle of Borodino, and those which remain are fast melting away under the destructive attacks of our light horse. Hardly a day passes in which we do not make three hundred prisoners. The peasants, from the tops of their steeple, give signal of the enemy's approach, and join in attacking them. Such is their spirit, that numbers everywhere come forward demanding arms, and they inflict summary chastisement on the backward and deserters. The arm of the Most High is evidently upraised against our enemies. I have just received the account of the capture of Madrid by the Spaniards and English."[†]

At length, having completed the re-organization of his army, the Russian general resolved to resume offensive operations. The French advanced guard, under Murat and Poniatowsky, thirty thousand strong, was posted in the neighbourhood of Winkowo, and kept so negligent a guard as to offer a tempting opportunity for a surprise. Nevertheless, the Russian commander hesitated at striking so important a blow, lest he should awaken Napoleon from his fancied security before the commencement of winter had rendered a regular retreat impracticable; but when it became evident that the French army was about to retire, he no longer hesitated, and intrusted the execution of

* Baraguay d'Hilliers to Berthier, Sept. 20 and 30, 1812, Chamb., iii., 280, 286.

† Bout., ii., 131. Chamb., ii., 208, 303.

‡ "The report of Prince Michel Larionowitz has informed me of the conference you have had with the French aide-camp Lauriston. The conversations I had with you at the moment of your departure for the army intrusted to your care, have sufficiently made you aware of my firm resolution to avoid with the enemy every sort of negotiation or conference tending to peace. I now repeat, in the most solemn manner, the same injunction; and it is my command that this resolution should be acted upon in the most rigorous and immovable manner. I have in like manner learned, with the most extreme displeasure, that General Benningsen has had a conference with the King of Naples, and that, too, without any assignable motive. I now order you to make him acquainted with my high displeasure, and I require of you the most rigorous solicitude and watchfulness to prevent any such unauthorized step being taken by any of your generals or officers in future. All the instructions you have received from me; all the determinations contained in my orders; in a word, everything should conspire to convince you that my resolution is not to be shaken, and that at this moment no consideration on earth can induce me to terminate the war, or weaken the sacred duty of avenging our injured country."—ALEXANDER to KUTUSOFF, 9th Oct., 1812, CHAMB., ii., 304.

§ Bulletins, iv., 112. Ségur, ii., 103. Chamb., ii., 271.

* Ségur, i., 100, 103. Chamb., ii., 217. Fain, ii., 149, 157.

† Kutusoff to Alexander, Oct. 12, 1812, Chamb., ii., 305.

the attack to General Benningsen. The attacking force was divided into five columns: the first, under the command of Count Orloff Denisoff, was destined to turn the enemy's left, and cut off his retreat; the second, under the orders of General Bagawouth, supported by sixty pieces of cannon, was directed to attack the left, and support Count Orloff; Count Ostermann, with the third column, was ordered to maintain the communication with the last two columns, under the orders of Generals Doctoroff and Raefskoi, which, with seventy-two pieces of cannon, were intended to attack the enemy in front, and prevent him from sending succours to the left, where the serious impression was expected to be made. To cover the whole movement, General Milaradowitch, with the advanced guard, was to remain in his old position till the firing had commenced, when he was to support the column which led on the attack in front, and push on with Raefskoi towards Winkowo.*

At seven in the evening of the 17th of October, the attacking columns broke up tack on Murat from the camp at Taroutino, and at Winkowo. marched during the night to the different stations assigned to them. The attack was intended to have been made at daybreak on the 18th, but the delays consequent on the march of so many detached bodies delayed the commencement of the battle till seven.

The French, though taken by surprise, defended themselves bravely till the appearance of Count Orloff, in the rear of their left, threw the cavalry of Sebastiani into disorder, which soon communicated itself to their whole line. If the third column, destined to support Orloff, had been on their ground at the appointed time, the Russians might have seized the great road to Moscow, and entirely cut off the enemy's retreat; but the non-arrival of this corps having deprived him of the expected succour, Benningsen thought himself compelled to forego this immense advantage, and allow the enemy to retain possession of the road in their rear. Nevertheless, their retreat was conducted in such confusion, that fifteen hundred prisoners, thirty-eight pieces of cannon, forty caissons, and the whole baggage of the army, fell into the hands of the victors, who had only to lament the loss of General Bagawouth, who was struck by a cannon-shot while bravely leading on his column, and five hundred men killed and wounded. Had the third column arrived on its ground at the appointed time, or had Benningsen acted with more vigour even with the troops which had come up, the French corps would have been totally destroyed. The capture of the baggage proved the extreme want which prevailed in the French encampment. In the kitchen of Murat were found roasted cats and boiled horseflesh.†

This disastrous intelligence reached Napoleon as he was reviewing the corps of Marshal Ney in the Kremlin, previous to its departure from Moscow.‡ He instantly despatched couriers in every direction: a thousand orders were given in the course of the evening; the fire of his youthful years reappeared in his visage.§ Before daybreak on the morning of the 19th, he left the Kremlin, exclaiming, "Let us march on Kaluga, and wo to those who interrupt our passage!"

Napoleon left Moscow at the head of one hundred and five thousand combatants, six hundred pieces of cannon, and two thousand military chariots: an imposing force, and seemingly still capable of conquering the world. His infantry had increased by ten thousand men during his residence at the Kremlin; partly from the recovery of the wounded, partly the arrival of re-enforcements from the West of Europe. But the most alarming diminution was perceptible in the cavalry: numerous corps of dismounted horsemen had been formed, and those who were still mounted had evidently the greatest difficulty to urge on their exhausted steeds. The long train of artillery was slowly dragged forward; and it was obvious that, after a few days' march, the horses that moved it would sink under their fatigue.*

In the rear of the still formidable mass of warriors marched a long and seemingly interminable train of chariots, wagons, and captives, bearing the pillage and riches of the devoted city. The trophies of imperial ambition, the Cross of St. Ivan, and the Persian and Turkish standards found in the capital, were mingled with the spoils of individual cupidity. The common soldiers strove to support the weight of Asiatic finery which they had ransacked from the ruins; the carriages groaned under the load of Eastern luxuries, which the troops vainly hoped to carry with them to their own country. The followers of the camp, in number nearly forty thousand, of all nations and sexes, and clothed, for the most part, in the sumptuous dresses which they had obtained during the pillage, formed a motley train, whose clamours augmented the general confusion; and in the chariots were many young Russian females, the willing slaves of their seducers, abandoning the country of which they were unworthy. In the midst of this fantastic train, which covered the country as far as the eye could reach, were to be seen columns of that redoubtable infantry which had borne the French standards in triumph through every capital of Continental Europe, and which still preserved, amid the motley group, its martial array; but the artillery horses were already sinking under their fatigues, and the diminished regiments of the cavalry told too clearly how fatally the war had affected that important branch of the service. Confusion was already apparent in the line of march: no human efforts could force along that stupendous array of artillery, caissons, baggage-wagons, and carts; the rear-guard, in despair, passed on before the whole had defiled before them, and quantities of rich booty were, at every step, abandoned to the enemy. The whole resembled rather a wandering caravan, or a roving nation, than an army of disciplined troops; and forcibly recalled to the imagination the predatory warfare of antiquity, when the northern barbarians returned to their deserts loaded with the spoils of captive provinces.†

Kutusoff broke up from the camp at Taroutino at the head of 80,000 regular troops, and nearly 30,000 militia or Cossacks. These irregular bands of horsemen, in the pursuit of a retreating army, were more serviceable than the élite of the Imperial Guard. The

Force which left Moscow.

Strange caravans which followed the army.

Kutusoff moves towards Kaluga to bar the passage of Napoleon.

* Bout., ii., 140, 143.

† Jom., iv., 163. Bout., ii., 144, 147. Fain, ii., 159. Chamb., ii., 212. Ségur, ii., 106, 107.

‡ Ségur, ii., 106, 107.

§ Ségur, ii., 108.

* Ségur, ii., 112. Jom., iv., 164. Chamb., ii., 316. Fain, ii., 161.

† Chamb., ii., 316, 317. Fain, ii., 161. Ségur, ii., 113. Jom., iv., 164. Lab., 249.

army was immediately marched towards Malo-Jaroslawitz, the strongest position on the new road from Moscow to Kaluga, in the hope of anticipating the French emperor in the occupation of that important position; while General Winzingerode, who lay in the neighbourhood of Klin, on the route to Twer, with ten thousand men, advanced towards Moscow. He marched without opposition through the ruined streets of the capital; but, having imprudently approached the Kremlin to summon the garrison to surrender, he was made prisoner by Marshal Mortier, who commanded the French rear-guard that still occupied its walls. Shortly afterward, however, the invaders retired, leaving to the Russians the ancient palace of the Czars, armed by forty-two pieces of cannon; but, before his departure, the French general blew up a part of its venerable edifices by the express command of Napoleon: a despicable piece of revenge on the part of so great a commander, and singularly expressive of the envenomed state of his mind.*

Advance of Napoleon to Malo-Jaroslawitz, and desperate battle there.

Napoleon, after advancing on the 19th on the old road to Kaluga, which led straight to the Russian position of Taroutino, for some hours, turned suddenly to the right, and gained, by cross-roads, the new route, which led to the same place by Malo-Jaroslawitz. This skilful manœuvre was concealed from the Russians by the corps of Marshal Ney, which continued slowly advancing towards the old position of Taroutino. In consequence, Platoff, with fifteen regiments of Cossacks, was, at first, only detached to Malo-Jaroslawitz, and the main body of the army did not move in that direction till the evening of the 23d. The corps of Doctoroff, by a rapid night march, reached that important position at five in the morning of the 24th, but found it already occupied by General Delzons, with two battalions of French infantry. These troops were immediately attacked and expelled from the town by the Russian chasseurs: the viceroy, however, having come up shortly after with his whole corps, drove out the light troops of Doctoroff, but was, in his turn, compelled to yield to the vigorous attacks of the Russian infantry. The combat continued with the utmost fury on both sides till evening. The town, which speedily took fire, was taken and retaken seven different times: the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst of the burning houses, but at length the viceroy succeeded in finally dislodging the enemy. During the action, however, the army of Kutsoff gained the precious hours requisite to reach the other road: his columns, during the whole day, were seen, in two long, black lines, rapidly advancing towards the heights behind the scene of action, and before night they were firmly established on the wooded eminences in the rear of Malo-Jaroslawitz. The viceroy, after a glorious combat, found himself master of a mass of bloody and smoking ruins, dearly purchased by the loss of five thousand of his best troops; while one hundred thousand men, and seven hundred pieces of cannon, posted on a semicircle in his front, precluded the possibility of a farther advance towards Kaluga without a general battle.†

The loss of the Russians was as great as that of the French; and they had to lament the death of the brave General Dorokhoff, who fell in an early period of the

engagement. The French remained masters of the field of battle, but the advantage gained by Kutsoff was of incalculable importance. By interposing his whole army between the enemy and Kaluga, and occupying the strong position behind the town, he compelled Napoleon either to fight at a great disadvantage, or renounce his projected march upon Kaluga, and fall back on the wasted line of the Smolensko road. Either of these alternatives was equivalent to a defeat; and the event proved that the consequences of this bloody engagement were more disastrous to the French than any event which had befallen them since the commencement of the Revolution.*

Napoleon remained in the neighbourhood of the field of battle the whole of the night of the 24th, and sent out numerous parties to reconnoitre the Russian position. The strength of the ground, in the opinion of his most experienced officers, precluded the possibility of a successful attack. No alternative remained but to fall back on the Smolensko road. The agitation of his mind, in consequence, became so excessive, that his attendants dared not approach him. Upon returning to his miserable cottage, he sent for Berthier, Murat, and Bessières. They sat around a table where was spread out a map of the country, and the emperor spoke to them at first of the change which the arrival of Kutsoff in the high grounds beyond Malo-Jaroslawitz had made in his situation. After a little discussion, however, he became meditative, and, resting his cheeks on his hands, and his elbows on the table, his eyes fixed on the map, he remained for above an hour in moody silence, without motion or uttering a word. The three generals, respecting his mental agony, preserved silence, merely looking at each other during that long period; then, suddenly starting up, he dismissed them without making them acquainted with his resolution. Immediately after, however, he sent to Davoust, ordering him to put himself at the head of the advanced guard, as he was to be at the outposts, with his guards, at daybreak on the following morning. Ney, who was at a short distance, was directed to take a position between Barowsk and Malo-Jaroslawitz, after leaving two divisions to protect the reserve parks and baggage at the former of these towns.†

At daybreak on the 25th, he set out in person to examine the ground, and was advancing through a confused mass of baggage-wagons and artillery, when suddenly a tumult arose: the cry was heard, "It is Platoff—they are ten thousand!" and a large body of Cossacks were seen directly bearing down upon the imperial escort. It turned out to be Platoff, at the head of ten regiments of Cossacks, who made a dash to seize a park of forty pieces of artillery stationed near the village of Gorodnia, where the headquarters of Napoleon were placed. The emperor himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner: General Rapp was thrown down while bravely combating, and his immediate attendants were compelled to use their sabres against the lances of the enemy. The squadrons on service who were immediately in attendance on the emperor were overthrown, and pierced through by numbers; and it was not till the grenadiers *à cheval* and the dragoons of the

Napoleon's grievous embarrassment at this result.

Napoleon is nearly made prisoner.

* Jom., iv., 170, 171, 172. Bout., ii., 163, 167. Ségur, ii., 125.

† Chamb., ii., 334, 335. Ségur, ii., 127, 129.

* Fain, ii., 169. Bout., ii., 155. Jom., iv., 166, 171.

† Bout., ii., 157, 161, 162. Ségur, ii., 119, 141.

Guard appeared that the irruption was stopped. The Cossacks, ignorant of the inestimable prize which was within their grasp, dashed through his attendants, and seized the artillery; but they were only able to carry off eleven pieces, from the want of horses to convey them, and the rapid appearance of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard. Napoleon, after this distressing incident, returned to Gorodnia, but again left it at ten o'clock, and advanced to Malo-Jaroslawitz. According to his usual custom, he rode over the whole field which had been the theatre of such desperate strife on the preceding day, and moved on so as to see with his own eyes the elevated plateau which the Russian army, three quarters of a league in advance, still occupied. This done, he returned at five in the afternoon to Gorodnia, and nothing farther was attempted on either side that day.*

This incident, however, was more than irritating: it proved the ruinous inferiority of the French to their enemies in light troops. Napoleon, in consequence, deemed it too hazardous to attempt to force the enemy's position, and returned pensively to his miserable habitation. An emperor, two kings, and three marshals were there assembled: upon their deliberations hung the destinies of the world. Murat, with his usual fire, recommended the boldest course. "Why should we fear the formidable position of the Russians? Give me but the remains of the cavalry and that of the Imperial Guard, and I will plunge into their forests, and open the road to Kaluga at the sword's point." But Bessières, who commanded the cavalry of the Guard, and deemed its preservation essential to the emperor's safety, immediately observed, "That the moment was passed, both in the army and in the Guard, for such efforts: already the means of transport were beginning to fail, and the charge of Murat would be feebly supported. And who were the enemies against whom he proposed thus to risk a hazardous attack? men who had evinced, in the combat of the preceding day, a heroism worthy of veteran soldiers, though they were recruits who had hardly learned the use of their arms. A retreat had become unavoidably necessary." The emperor unwillingly acquiesced in the proposal, observing, "Hardihood has had its day; we have already done too much for glory: nothing remains to be thought of but the safety of the army." Davoust then proposed that "the retreat should be conducted by Medyn to Smolensko, a line of road hitherto untouched, and abounding in resources for the wounded; whereas the Mojaïsk line was utterly wasted, and presented only dust and ashes." This advice was strongly resisted by Murat, who represented the extreme hazard of "exposing the flank of the army during so long a march to the attacks of the numerous light troops of the enemy." Napoleon adopted the opinion of the King of Naples, and orders were issued for the retreat of the army by Borowsk and Mojaïsk to Smolensko.†

The ruins of Malo-Jaroslawitz exhibited the most terrible spectacle. The streets could be distinguished only by the heaps of dead who were piled upon each other, while smoking ruins and half-consumed skeletons marked the position of

the houses. From beneath these ruins the wounded occasionally dragged their wasted forms, and besought, with earnest cries, the passengers to put a period to their sufferings.* Napoleon, notwithstanding his familiarity with scenes of this description, was startled at the sight; and the proof it afforded of the determination of his enemies, contributed not a little to the resolution which he adopted.

At daybreak on the 26th, the fatal retreat commenced; and the victor in a hundred battles, for the first time in his life, ^{A retreat is resolved on.} retired in the open field from his enemies. By a singular coincidence, the Russian troops at the same moment abandoned their positions, and fell back in the direction of Kaluga. Both armies, struck with mutual awe, were flying from each other. The reason assigned by Kutusoff for this singular measure was the inquietude which he felt for the road by Medyn to Kaluga;‡ but the adoption of it was a serious fault, which had nearly endangered all the advantages of the campaign.

Meanwhile, the French army, ignorant of the movements of the enemy, silently and mournfully continued its retreat. The ^{Dejection which ensued among the troops.} most gloomy presentiments filled the minds of the soldiers: experience had already made them acquainted with the length of deserts they had to traverse before reaching a friendly territory, and that, on this long line of more than two hundred and fifty leagues, Smolensko and Minsk alone offered resources for their use. Dejection and despondency, in consequence, universally prevailed; and the discipline of the troops, accustomed to victory, but unused to disaster, became relaxed from the moment that they began to retreat before their enemies.‡

Napoleon calculated chiefly upon the support of Victor, who, with above thirty ^{Views of Napoleon in connection since the beginning of September in the neighbourhood of Smolensko.} thousand fresh troops, had been stationed since the beginning of September in the neighbourhood of Smolensko. This corps, joined to the re-enforcements which were daily arriving from the westward, and the detached soldiers of the Grand Army who might be re-formed into battalions, would amount to fifty thousand men; and with such support he hoped to maintain the line of the Dwina till the return of spring. But the operations of Wittgenstein and Tchichagoff rendered this project impracticable; and, even without their assistance, the superiority of the Russians in cavalry would have rendered any position within their territory untenable for any length of time. The French retired by Borowsk to Vereia, where the emperor's headquarters were established on the 27th. The weather was serene: it was still compared by Napoleon to the autumn at Fontainebleau.§

In the course of their retreat, they destroyed all the towns through which the army passed: Borowsk and Vereia shared the fate of Moscow. At the latter town the emperor was joined by Marshal Mortier, who, after blowing up, as already mentioned, part of the Kremlin, had fallen back on the main army with his detachment. Winzingerode, made prisoner at the Kremlin, was then presented to the emperor: his appear-

* Lab., 264. Ségur, ii., 132.

† Bout., ii., 168, 169. Ségur, ii., 142, 143.

‡ Ségur, ii., 145.

§ Bulletins, iv., 143. 20th and 27th Bull. Ségur, ii., 145.

* Chamb., ii. 336, 337. Fain, ii., 250, 251. Ségur, ii., 131. Bout., ii., 165.

† Ségur, ii., 137, 138. 27th Bulletin. Bull., iv., 146.

Dreadful appearance of the field of battle.

ance excited one of those transports of rage which were not unusual in his irritable moods, but which, on this occasion, happily passed away without actual violence to the Russian general.*

As soon as Kutusoff was apprized of the enemy's retreat, he resolved, instead of pursuing them on the wasted line which they had adopted, to move the main body of his army by a parallel road towards Mojaïsk and Wiazma, and to harass their retreating columns by a large body of Cossacks and light troops. General Milaradowitch, in consequence, at the head of twenty-five thousand light troops, was directed to move along a road parallel and near to the great Smolensko route, while Platoff, with the Cossacks, pressed the French rear-guard, and Kutusoff himself, at the head of the whole army, moved in two columns towards Wiazma.†

The whole French army had regained the Smolensko road on the 29th. The corps pass the field of Borodino.

journey from each other, and for some days were not seriously harassed by the enemy. In passing through a heap of ruins, the soldiers recognised some features of a scene formerly known to them: it was Mojaïsk, formerly the scene of so much glory. The steeple alone remained in the midst of the desert; and its clock, still "unheard, repeated its hours." They approached an open plain, and soon the multitudes of unburied dead, whose bones had begun to whiten in the sun—the broken and ruined redoubts which appeared at intervals—the rugged surface of the ground, which was still torn by the cannon-shot, announced the bloody field of Borodino. Thirty thousand skeletons, innumerable fragments of helmets, cuirasses, and arms, broken guns, carriages, standards, and bloody uniforms, formed the sad remains of that scene of glory. The soldiers, in passing, gazed in silence at the great redoubt, so lately the theatre of mortal strife, now marked by the silence and devastation of an extinguished volcano: regret for the loss of their companions in arms was mingled with the painful sense of the fruitlessness of the sacrifice; and they hurried from the scene of desolation with melancholy recollections of the past, and gloomy anticipations of the future.‡

In passing the great Abbey of Kolotskoi, the army received a lamentable addition to its numbers in a multitude of wounded men, who had escaped from that scene of horror to join their retreating companions. Thousands had perished in the hospital from the total inadequacy of the means of relief to the prodigious accumulation of wounded who had been left; but a greater number than could have been expected had been saved, in consequence of the heroic and skilful efforts of the French surgeons. These miserable men crawled to the side of the road, and, with uplifted hands and lamentable cries, besought their comrades not to leave them to the horrors of famine or the fury of the enemy. At the distance of two leagues from Mojaïsk, five hundred of these unhappy wretches had collected around a deserted barn: for several days they had received no food; an officer and twenty-five men were on the spot to guard them, and two surgeons were in attendance to dress

their wounds; but the former had no food to give them, and the latter no linen or salves to apply to their mangled limbs. Napoleon made the greatest efforts to get them the means of conveyance; but the troops, whom misery had already begun to render selfish, murmured at displacing the spoils of Moscow by their bleeding companions, and could with difficulty be constrained to give them a place in their chariots.*

Although only a few Cossacks, as yet, harassed the rear of the retreating army, the discouragement of the troops had become very great, and the dreadful features of the retreat already began to appear. Baggage-wagons were abandoned at every step, from the failure of the horses which drew them; the infantry and cavalry marched pellmell in the utmost confusion; and the incessant explosions along the whole line demonstrated how many of the ammunition-wagons required to be sacrificed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. The retreat was rapidly becoming a flight, the troops were beginning to separate from the marching columns in quest of plunder or subsistence, and numbers of horses were slain to furnish food for the hungry multitudes who surrounded them.†

On the 2d of November, the headquarters reached Wiazma. The emperor flattered himself that he had got the start of Kutusoff by several marches, and that his troops would not be disquieted by the enemy during the remainder of the retreat; but this delusive quiet was not of long continuance. On approaching that town, the corps of Davoust, which formed the rear-guard of the army, found, on the 3d, the advanced guard of Milaradowitch posted on the southern side of the great road, while Platoff, with a large body of Cossacks, pressed the rear of the army. The emperor, with the Guard and the first corps of the army, was already advanced on the road to Smolensko, and the corps of the viceroy and Ney alone remained to resist the attack. By a vigorous charge, the Russian cavalry, under Wassilichikoff, in the first instance broke in upon the line of the French retreat, and established themselves astride on the great road, in the interval between the corps of the viceroy and that of Davoust; while Platoff, the moment the cannonade commenced, attacked the rear of the latter at Federowskoie. If the infantry of Milaradowitch had been at hand to support his cavalry while the Cossacks pressed his rear, the corps of Davoust would have been totally destroyed. But the infantry, unable to keep pace with the rapid advance of the cavalry, was still far behind; and General Wassilichikoff was left, for more than half an hour, to resist, alone, all the efforts of the enemy to dislodge him from his position. Meanwhile, the viceroy, hearing of the danger of Davoust's corps, retraced his steps, and drew back his advanced guard, which had already reached Wiazma, to the scene of danger. Milaradowitch, in his turn, was now severely pressed between the advancing troops of Davoust and the returning corps of Eugene, but he bravely maintained his post near the great road till the infantry of Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg came up to his support. But the moment of decisive success was now over. Davoust, with admirable presence of mind, had contrived to get his artillery and baggage across the

* Ségur, ii., 152, 153. 26th and 27th Bull., iv., 146.

† Bout., ii., 180, 181. Jom., iv., 173.

‡ Lab., 275, 276. Ségur, ii., 160. Bout., ii., 173, 182. Fain, ii., 117.

* Ségur, ii., 164. Lab., 280. Chamb., iii., 252.

† Bout., ii., 183. Lab., 283. Ségur, ii., 165. Fain, ii., 118, 120.

fields in the neighbourhood of Wassilchikoff during the continuance of the action, and the united French corps were now intent only on securing their retreat to Wiazma. In doing so, however, they were keenly pursued by Milaradowitch, who was now supported both by his own infantry and the Cossacks of Platoff; a numerous artillery thundered on their retreating columns; and, though the soldiers of the viceroy still kept their ranks, those of Davoust, exhausted by the fatigues of the retreat, fell into confusion. At this critical moment, the vanguard of Kutusoff beyond Wiazma was heard to commence a cannonade on the corps of Ney, which was in advance of the viceroy, and the troops, conceiving themselves beset on all sides, fell back in disorder into Wiazma. General Paskewitch, at the head of his brave division, rushed into the town, and drove the enemy through the streets at the point of the bayonet. In the midst of the general confusion, the houses took fire, which stopped the pursuit; and the shattered corps of Davoust, in their bivouacs beyond the walls, counted their diminished ranks, and re-formed their battalions by the light of the conflagration.*

In this engagement the French lost above six thousand men, of whom two thousand were made prisoners, while the loss of the Russians did not exceed two thousand. The corps of Davoust had, before the battle, lost ten thousand men, by fatigue or desertion, since the retreat commenced at Malo-Jaroslawitz, and twenty-seven pieces of their artillery had fallen into the hands of the enemy. When the troops resumed their march on the following day, they were astonished at the smallness of their numbers. There seems to be no room for doubt that, had Kutusoff supported by a sufficient force the bold advance of Milaradowitch, or hastened his own march so as to anticipate the French vanguard at Wiazma, he would have had every chance of destroying a great part of their army; and his own troops were grievously disappointed at the opportunity being allowed to escape. But the Russian commander, knowing the severity of the season which was about to commence, and the multiplied obstacles which were preparing to arrest the retreat of Napoleon, deemed, and perhaps wisely, that the surer course was to let the enemy waste away before the cold of winter before he attempted to envelop the main body, and confine his attacks at present to the rear-guard, whose fatigues had already reduced them to that state of debility which might soon be expected to become general in the whole army.†

The corps of Davoust, which had suffered so severely, was now replaced by that of Marshal Ney as the rear-guard; and this heroic general began to cover that retreat, mortal to so many others, immortal to him. On the 4th and 5th the retreat continued, and, in passing the Lake of Semlewo, the grand Cross of Ivan and the armour of the Kremlin, the trophies of Moscow, were buried in the waves.‡

The weather, though cold and frosty at night, had hitherto been clear and bright during the day; and the continued, though now level and

powerless sun, had cheered the hearts of the soldiers. But on the 6th of November the Russian winter set in with unwonted severity. Cold fogs first rose from the surface of the ground, and obscured the heretofore unclouded face of the sun; a few flakes of snow next began to float in the atmosphere, and filled the army with dread: gradually the light of day declined, and a thick, murky darkness overspread the firmament. The wind rose, and soon blew with frightful violence, howling through the forests, or sweeping over the plains with resistless fury: the snow fell in thick and continued showers, which soon covered the earth with an impenetrable clothing, confounding all objects together, and leaving the army to wander in the dark through an icy desert. Great numbers of the soldiers, in struggling to get forward, fell into hollows or ditches which were concealed by the treacherous surface, and perished miserably before the eyes of their comrades: others were swallowed up in the moving hills, which, like the sands of the desert, preceded the blast of death. To fall was certain destruction: the severity of the tempest speedily checked respiration; and the snow, accumulating around the sufferer, soon formed a little sepulchre for his remains. The road, and the fields in its vicinity, were rapidly strewn with these melancholy eminences; and the succeeding columns found the surface rough and almost impassable, from the multitude of these icy mounds that lay upon their route.*

Accustomed as the soldiers had been to death in its ordinary forms, there was something singularly appalling in the uniformity of the snowy wilderness which, like a vast winding-sheet, seemed ready to envelop the remains of the whole army. Exhausted by fatigue or pierced by cold, they sank by thousands on the road, casting a last look upon their comrades, and pronouncing with their dying breath the names of those most dear to them. Clouds of ravens, like the birds which are only seen at sea when a shipwreck is at hand, issued from the forests, and hovered over the dying remains of the soldiers: while troops of dogs, which had followed the army from Moscow, driven to fury by suffering, howled in the rear, and often fell upon their victims before life was extinct. The only objects that rose above the snow were the tall pines, whose gigantic stems and funereal foliage cast a darker horror over the scene, and seemed destined to mark the grave of the army amid the deathlike uniformity of the wilderness.†

The weight of their arms soon became intolerable to the least robust of the soldiers: their fingers frequently dropped off while holding their muskets, and the useless load was thrown aside in the struggle for the maintenance of life. Amid the general ruin multitudes left their ranks, and wandered on the flanks or rear of the army, where they were speedily massacred by the peasants, or made prisoners by the Cossacks. But the troops now felt the consequences of their former licentiousness: the whole country, to the breadth of seven or eight leagues on either side of the great road, had been laid waste during the advance of the army, and the exhausted soldiers

Commencement of the great frosts, and appearance of the atmosphere. Nov. 6.

Dreadful depression produced thereby on the minds of the soldiers.

* Ségur, ii., 177, 179. Bout., ii., 185, 189, 192. Lab., 293. Fain, ii., 121, 125. Chamb., iii., 263, 269.

† Bout., ii., 192, 195. Ségur, ii., 171.

‡ Ségur, ii., 165, 168.

* Lab., 299, 300. Ségur, ii., 181. Chambray, ii., 274. Fain, ii., 138, 140.

† Guil. de Vaud., 284. Ségur, ii., 182. Lab., 300.

were now unable to reach the limits of their former devastation. By a degree of reckless violence, also, of which it is difficult to form a conception, the first columns of the army destroyed, along the whole line of the retreat, the few remaining houses which had survived the march in summer; and the rear-guard, in consequence, suffered as much from the madness of their comrades who preceded, as the hostility of their enemies who followed them: fire was before them with its ashes; winter followed them with its horrors. The horses of the cavalry and artillery, especially those which came from France and Germany, suffered dreadfully from the severity of the cold. In less than a week after it commenced, thirty thousand had perished. Caissons and cannon were abandoned at every step: the ascent from a stream, or the fall of a bridge, occasioned the abandonment of whole parks of artillery. Famished groups threw themselves upon the dead bodies of the horses to satisfy the cravings of nature; and, in many instances, even the repugnance of our nature at human flesh was overcome by the pangs of protracted hunger.*

Night came, but with it no diminution of the sufferings of the soldiers. Amid the howling wilderness, the wearied men sought in vain for the shelter of a rock, the cover of a friendly habitation, or the warmth of a fire: the stems of the pine, charged with snow and hardened by frost, long resisted the flames lighted by the troops; and when, by great exertions, the fire was kindled, crowds of starving men prepared a miserable meal of rye, mixed with snow-water and horseflesh. Sleep soon closed their eyelids, and for sixteen long hours the darkness was illuminated by the light of the bivouacs; but numbers never awoke from their slumbers; and on the following day the sites of the night-fires were marked by circles of dead bodies, with their feet still resting on the extinguished piles.†

Upon the great body of the soldiers the continuance of these horrors produced the usual results of recklessness, insubordination, and de-

spair. The French soldiers, more susceptible than any others of warm impressions, early perceived the full extent of their danger, and became desperate from the accumulation of perils from which they could perceive no possibility of escaping. In the general ruin, the sympathies and generous feelings of our nature were for the most part extinguished: the strong instinct of self-preservation concentrated, in these terrible moments, every one's energies on his own safety; and the catastrophes of others were unheeded, when all anticipated similar disasters for themselves. Some, however, of a firmer character, resisted the contagion, and preserved, even in the wreck of nature, the gayety and serenity of indomitable minds.*†

In the midst of these sufferings the army arrived at Dorogobouge. The imperial column and the corps of Davoust, after a short rest, proceeded on the road to Smolensko; while the corps of Eugene was directed to move towards the north, in order to assist Oudinot, who was severely pressed by Count Wittgenstein. Ney, with his corps, now severely weakened by the fatigues of the retreat, was still intrusted with the perilous duty of protecting the rear; but he never failed in its performance—discharging at one time the duty of an able commander, displaying at another the courage of a simple grenadier. In his reports to Napoleon, he portrayed in true colours the frightful condition of the army; but in the field he was always to be found with the rear-guard, combating with as much alacrity, though a marshal and prince of the Empire, as when he was a private soldier in the Revolutionary army.‡

The viceroy, in advancing towards the Dwina from Dorogobouge, met with a succession of disasters. Before arriving at the banks of the Wop, he had been compelled to abandon sixty-four pieces of cannon and three thousand detached soldiers to his pursuers; but on the margin of that stream a new difficulty awaited him: the bridge which he had ordered to be constructed could not be raised, and his troops were obliged to cross the stream amid floating masses of ice, with the water up to their middles. All the efforts of the artillerymen could not obtain a passage for the cannon, and, in consequence, the whole remaining artillery and all the baggage of the corps were abandoned to the Cossacks. The bivouac of the following night was eminently disastrous: the troops, soaking with the water of the Wop, sought in vain for shelter, and multitudes perished from the freezing of wet garments around their exhausted limbs. On the snow around them was to be seen the plunder which could no longer be dragged along: the riches of Paris and Moscow lay scattered on an unknown strand, amid the dead and the dying.

* Bout., ii., 193. Ségur, ii., 171, 182, 183. 29th Bull., Bull., iv., 158.

† Lab., 300. Ségur, ii., 184. Larrey, Chir. Mil., iv., 91.

‡ It is seldom that cold at all comparable to that which is here described is felt in the British islands; but, during the great frost of spring, 1838, the author was twice fortunate enough to experience it. On the 5th and 9th of February in that year, the thermometer, at his residence at Possil House, near Glasgow, fell, at eleven at night, to four degrees below zero of Fahrenheit; and he immediately walked out and sat down under the old trees in the park, to experience a sensation which he had long figured to himself in imagination, and might never in life feel again. A vivid recollection of the Russian retreat made him attend minutely to every object he witnessed, and every sensation he felt on the occasion. The night was bright and clear: not a speck or film obscured the firmament, where the moon shone forth in surpassing splendour; the trees, loaded with glowing crystals, glittered on all sides as in a palace of diamonds; the snow, dry and powdery, fell from the feet like the sand of the desert; not a breath waved even the feathery covering of the branches; and the mind, overpowered with the unthought splendour of the scene, fell into a state of serene enjoyment. The sensation of the cold, even when sitting still, was hardly that of pain; the moment the body entered the external air, it felt as if plunged into a cold bath, against which it was at once evident that even the warmest clothing afforded little protection; and after resting a short time, a drowsy feeling, the harbinger of death, began to steal over the senses. When walking, however, the circulation was preserved, and no disagreeable feeling experienced; but the astonishment felt at the moment, upon experiencing how soon repose induced drowsiness, was how, under a much severer cold, any men or horses survived in either army during the bivouacs of the Russian retreat.

* Ségur, ii., 184, 185, 191. Lab., 303. Fain, ii., 287 Chamb., ii., 382, 383.

† The death produced upon almost all the soldiers who perished from the cold was the same. The persons affected fell into a state of paralytic torpor, which led them to approach the fires of the bivouacs, where they speedily fell into an apoplectic slumber, from which they never awakened. Those of the officers and men who were able to perform the whole journey, and had preserved a little sugar and coffee, resisted the cold most effectually. Mortification in particular limbs ensued in innumerable cases, against which the best preservative was found to be walking on foot.—LARREY, *Mém. de Chirurgie Militaire*, iv., 91.

‡ Ségur, ii., 187. Bout., ii., 198.

This terrible night effected the total disorganization of the corps; and, to complete his misfortunes, the viceroy, on arriving the following day at Doukhowtchina, found that town already occupied by two regiments of Cossacks. But in these critical circumstances he did not lose his presence of mind. Forming the Italian Guard and a few squadrons of cavalry, which still preserved their horses, into a square, he attacked and carried the town; and, finding that a retreat in the direction of Witepsk would expose his detached corps to certain destruction, he made in all haste for Smolensko, where he arrived with the shattered remains of his troops on the 13th of November, and found the other corps of the French army already assembled.*

Meanwhile, the main Russian army, still advancing in two columns, was moving in the chord of the arc of which Napoleon was describing the curve. They advanced by Jelnia to Tchelianowo, where the headquarters were established on the 12th, on the road leading from Smolensko to Roslawl; and thus threatened the communications of the French army, and precluded the possibility of their remaining in the former town. By following this route, Kutusoff not only got the start of his enemies, and compelled them to continue a disastrous retreat, after they hoped to have arrived at its termination, but had the immense advantage of quartering his troops under cover in the villages, in a country as yet unwasted by war, during the severity of the winter nights. The march of the army was so rapid, that several detached bodies of the French, who had not yet received orders to retreat, fell into their hands: in particular, the advanced guard of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, under Augereau, with two thousand men, were made prisoners by Count Orloff Denisoff and Colonel Davidoff, who preceded the main body of the army with their light troops; and a depot of one thousand three hundred men was captured at Klemenstiewo by another corps of partisans under Colonel Bistrom.†

Between Dorogobouge and Smolensko Napoleon received intelligence of the conspiracy of Mallet at Paris, of which a full account will shortly be given, and by which a few daring men for a few hours gained possession of the seat of government, made prisoner the chief of the police, and had nearly overturned the imperial government. He now perceived on what a sandy foundation his fortunes were rested, even in France itself, and exclaimed to Daru, "What if we had remained at Moscow!" From that moment his whole thoughts were concentrated on Paris; and all the disasters of his present situation could hardly withdraw his impassioned imagination from the convulsions which he anticipated in the centre of his power.‡

The successive arrival of the different corps at Smolensko, where they continued to drop in from the 9th to the 13th, presented the most dismal spectacle. At the sight of the long-wished-for towers, the soldiers could no longer restrain their impatience: the little remaining discipline instantly gave way, and officers and privates, infantry and

cavalry, precipitated themselves in an undistinguished mass upon the gates. The famishing troops rushed into the streets, and the gates of the magazines were instantly surrounded by crowds, demanding, with earnest cries, the food which they had so long been promised. Bread in sufficient quantities could not be furnished: large sacks of grain were thrown out to the applicants, and the miserable soldiers fought with each other for a few pounds of dried roots or grain. The old and new guard alone preserved their ranks in the midst of the general confusion; and their steadiness seemed, in some degree, to justify that indulgence to their sufferings which excited such violent dissatisfaction among the other troops.*

The emperor had made the greatest exertions to provide magazines along the line of his retreat. Immense quantities of provisions had been collected at Smolensko, Minsk, and Wilna: gigantic efforts had been made to transport them to the places of their destination; the roads of Germany and Italy were covered by herds of cattle and trains of wagons hastening to the theatre of war. But all these efforts were insufficient: the arrival of the convoys was retarded by the state of the roads, which the passage of so many thousand carriages had almost rendered impassable; the oxen sank under the fatigues of their lengthened marches, and the impatience of those who drove them; the stores of grain, however immense, could not suffice for the number of sick and isolated men who were left in the rear of the army, and the famished multitude who arrived from Moscow. The genius and foresight of Napoleon were not wanting: the most minute orders had been forwarded to the authorities in the rear to provide for the wants of the army; but everything failed, because the magnitude of his demands outstripped the bounds of human exertion.†

The intelligence which the emperor received at Smolensko from his two flanks would alone have been sufficient to compel his retreat to the Niemen, even if ample means of subsistence had been found for the army. The secondary armies of Russia had everywhere resumed the offensive: the gigantic plan of Alexander for the capture of the Grand Army was rapidly advancing to maturity: the flames of Moscow had set the whole Empire on fire.‡

Wittgenstein's army, having been raised, by the junction of Count Steinhill with ten thousand regular troops from Finland, the militia of St. Petersburg, and some additional reinforcements from the capital, to fifty thousand men, that general resumed the offensive. Having divided his army into two columns, at the head of thirty-six thousand men, he advanced on the right bank of the Dwina against Marshal St. Cyr, while Steinhill, with thirteen thousand, operated against his rear on the left bank of the river. Shut up in Polotsk, the French general had only thirty thousand men to oppose to these formidable masses. The Russian militia, incorporated with the regular army, soon acquired the

* Bout., ii., 205, 207. Ségur, ii., 196, 201. Lab., 308, 312.
† Bout., ii., 201, 203. Ségur, ii., 230. Chamb., ii., 391, 393.
‡ Ségur, ii., 188, 189. Fain, ii., 285. Chamb., ii., 417, 418.

* Ségur, ii., 205, 207. Lab., 334. Chamb., ii., 418, 419. Fain, ii., 288.
† Napoleon to Victor, October 6, 1812. Fain, ii., 293. Ségur, ii., 210, 211. Jom., iv., 180. Gourg., ii., 172. Fain, ii., 273.
‡ Jom., iv., 182. Lab., 303. Bout., ii., 254.

discipline and hardihood of veteran soldiers. On the 18th of October, being the very day on which Kutusoff attacked Murat at Winkowo, Wittgenstein advanced against Polotsk, where St. Cyr occupied an entrenched camp, and an obstinate battle began along the whole line of intrenchments. General Diebitch, who commanded the advanced guard, supported by the Russian tirailleurs, composed for the most part of militia, carried the French redoubts in the centre, while Prince Jachwill drove them under cover of the cannon of the city on the right; but on the left, the French, after a furious engagement, maintained their ground. Night put an end to the battle, and the Russians withdrew from the intrenchments which had been the scene of so much carnage. On the following morning at ten o'clock, the cannon of Count Steinhill, on the left of the river, gave the joyful intelligence to the Russians that they were supported; to the French, that their retreat was in danger. St. Cyr immediately made dispositions for a retreat, and the artillery were silently drawn across the bridges; but towards night the Russians, who, during the whole day, had been establishing their batteries, perceiving the movement, opened a concentric fire on all sides upon the city. The wooden houses having been set on fire by the shells, the flames threw so bright a light around the intrenchments, that the troops fought at midnight as in full day. At two in the morning the Russians carried the ramparts, and drove the enemy with the bayonet through the burning streets. The French, nevertheless, disputed the ground so bravely, that they saved almost their whole artillery, and reached the opposite bank with the loss only of four thousand killed and wounded, and two thousand prisoners, having previously broken down the bridge over the Dwina.*

The Russians in these engagements had about three thousand killed and wounded; and on the following day Count Steinhill, having been attacked by a superior force detached by St. Cyr, was defeated and compelled to recross the Dwina, leaving eighteen hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy. There appears to have been a want of concert in the movements of the Russian generals on the opposite sides of the stream. Had they attacked vigorously at the same moment, there seems no doubt, not only that the check of Count Steinhill would have been avoided, but the greater part of the French army made prisoners. It had been intended by Wittgenstein to turn the right of St. Cyr, and thus cut him off from his communications with Smolensko and the Grand Army. But the difficulty of throwing bridges over the river at Goriany having rendered that design abortive, the French general retired towards Smoliantzy, where he formed a junction on the 31st of October with Victor, who came to his support from Smolensko with twenty-five thousand men. The pursuit of the Russians was retarded for several days by the difficulty of re-establishing the bridges, but they overtook them near Smoliantzy, and took eight hundred prisoners from the rear-guard. Wittgenstein immediately established himself, in conformity with the plan of the campaign, on the banks of the Oula,† and detached a division to take possession of Witepsk,

which was captured, with a slender garrison and large magazines, on the 7th of November.

Napoleon, alarmed by the near approach of Wittgenstein's corps, ordered Victor and Oudinot, who now had resumed the command of St. Cyr's corps, to drive it back, without advancing too far from the line of the Grand Army. The Russians, perceiving the enemy's intention, took a strong position at Smoliantzy, and called in their detached columns to give battle. On the 14th the French columns began the attack, which continued with various success during the whole day; but at length, after the village of Smoliantzy had been six times taken and retaken, the French marshals, disconcerted by the heavy fire of the Russian batteries, and desirous not to risk the retreat of the emperor by a more serious contest, withdrew from the field. The loss of each party was about three thousand men; but the success of the Russians was evinced by the retreat of their adversaries, and the re-establishment of their remaining position on the banks of the Oula.*

Meanwhile, Tchichagoff, having rapidly advanced from Bucharest, which he left on the 31st of July, by Jassy, Chotsin, and Zaslav, to Ostrog, effected his junction, behind the Sty, with Tormasoff on the 14th of September. Schwartzenberg, the whole of whose force, including Saxons and Poles, did not exceed forty-three thousand, immediately commenced his retreat; while the Russian generals, at the head of above sixty thousand men, resumed offensive operations. The Austrians fell back from the banks of the Turia to those of the Bug, with the loss, during their retreat, of two thousand killed and wounded, and five thousand prisoners. Tchichagoff having thus cleared the country of these enemies, and compelled them to fall back in the direction of Warsaw, changed the direction of his movements, and leaving to General Sacken, with a part of his army, the task of observing Schwartzenberg and preventing him from returning to the theatre of war, moved himself, with the main body of his forces, in the direction of the Beresina. Sacken was re-enforced by the corps of Count Essen, which raised his force to twenty-seven thousand men; while Tchichagoff, with thirty-eight thousand and one hundred and fifty-six pieces of cannon, moved in the direction of Minsk. He there expected to force a junction with the little army of General Ertell, who, with twelve thousand men, had maintained his ground in the neighbourhood of Bobrinsk since the beginning of the campaign, and thus bring a force of fifty thousand men to operate on the communication of the Grand Army.†

The Austrians having begun to recross the Bug with a force which re-enforcements had raised to forty-five thousand men, in order to act against Sacken, the Russian general advanced to attack them in detail before their whole force was across the river. By a rapid advance, he succeeded in drawing the whole attention of Schwartzenberg upon himself, and, when pressed by superior forces, took post in the vast forest of Bialsewe; but the Austrian commander having

Napoleon orders Victor and Oudinot to attack Wittgenstein, which is done without success.

Operations of Tchichagoff on the other flank.

September 14.

Operations of Schwartzenberg against Sacken.

* Ségur, ii., 220, 223. Bout., ii., 274. Jom., iv., 182. Fain, ii., 263, 266.

† Bout., ii., 275, 284. Ségur, ii., 223, 227. Fain, ii., Chamb., iii.

* Bout., ii., 287, 294. Jom., iv., 191.

† Bout., ii., 192, 112, 312. Jom., iv., 183. Chamb., ii., 399, 403.

manœuvred with great skill and vigour, succeeded in interposing a column between him and Tchichagoff, and thereby compelled him to fall back to Bozest. The Russian general, by a happy mixture of boldness and prudence, succeeded, however, first by an offensive movement, in drawing upon himself the whole force of his adversary, nearly double his own; and then, by a skillful retreat, in withdrawing his troops, without any serious loss, in such a direction as to preclude his opponents from throwing any obstacles in the way of the decisive measures which were commencing on the Beresina.*

* During these operations, Tchichagoff advanced with great expedition in the direction of Minsk. That town, containing the immense magazines and dépôts which Napoleon, during the whole summer, had been collecting for his army, was garrisoned by six thousand men, chiefly new levies, under the Polish General Bronykowski. The Russians, after destroying several smaller detachments which they met on the road, came up with and totally defeated the garrison at Kidanow, with the loss of three thousand prisoners. The immediate consequence of this success was the capture of Minsk, on November 16, with its immense magazines, and above two thousand wounded men. By the loss of this important point, the French not only were deprived of their principal dépôt, but of their best line of retreat. Bronykowski fell back to the bridge of Borissov, which commanded the only remaining communication of the Grand Army. Dombrowski, who commanded a Polish corps of eight thousand men in that quarter, instantly hastened to the defence of this important post; but, notwithstanding all their efforts, the bridge, with its *tête-du-pont*, was forced on the 21st by the corps of Count Lambert, who captured eight cannon and two thousand five hundred prisoners, besides destroying two thousand of the enemy's best troops. This decisive blow gave the Russians the command of the only remaining bridge over the Beresina, and seemed to render the escape of Napoleon a matter of absolute impossibility. At the same time, Count Chernitcheff, who had been detached by Tchichagoff to open a communication with Wittgenstein, succeeded, after extraordinary exertions and by a long detour, in reaching the headquarters of that enterprising commander. In crossing the great road from Smolensko to Warsaw, he had the singular good fortune to fall in with and liberate General Winzingerode, who was moving as a prisoner towards the French dominions.†

In this way the gigantic plan formed by the Russians for the destruction of Napoleon's army approached its accomplishment. The forces of Wittgenstein and Tchichagoff, drawn from the opposite extremities of Europe, had successfully reached their destined points: the lines of the Oula and of the Beresina were guarded by seventy thousand men; Minsk, with its vast magazines, Borissov, with its fortified bridge, were in the hands of the Russians; while Napoleon, with the shattered remains of his army, was still engaged with the whole forces of Kutusoff in the neighbourhood of Smolensko. The plan so ably traced by the cabinet of St. Pe-

tersburg had, nevertheless, not been fully carried into execution. Instead of seventy, they had calculated on one hundred and twenty thousand being assembled in the rear of the Grand Army; and the armies of the Russian commanders, though approaching, were not in such close proximity as to be able to support each other in case of danger. The principal causes of this disappointment were the non-arrival of General Ertell, who had failed to join Tchichagoff with his troops, and the disasters which had reduced to one half the corps of Count Steinhill. Nevertheless, the force in his rear, such as it was, would have rendered the escape of any part of the French army altogether desperate to any other commander than Napoleon.*

The French emperor, perceiving, from the exhausted state of the magazines, the loss of Polotsk, and the advance of Tchichagoff, that a protracted stay at Smolensko was impossible, prepared for a continuance of his retreat. The remains of the cavalry, reduced from forty thousand who crossed the Niemen to eight hundred, were formed into one body, and placed under the orders of Latour Maubourg; the shattered battalions blended into separate corps; and the emperor, putting himself at the head of the Old Guard, set out from Smolensko on the 14th. His troops amounted to nearly seventy thousand men, but of this body not more than forty thousand were in such a state of organization as to be capable of offensive operations. They had already lost three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon; but nearly two hundred and fifty were still dragged along, destined, ere long, to augment the long catalogue of the victors' trophies.†

Kutusoff, continuing his parallel march, had already arrived in the neighbourhood of Krasnoi with his whole army, expecting the Cossacks under Platoff; but it did not now exceed fifty thousand men. Thirty thousand soldiers had been left behind during the rapid march from Malo-Jaroslavit from fatigue and the severity of the weather, which affected the Russian troops even more than those from the South of Europe. The Russian soldiers had the advantage of the French in the enthusiasm of success, in having marched over an unwasted country, in having preserved a greater number of their artillery horses, and in not ultimately losing the men who fell behind; but the cold of winter was as severe upon them as upon the invaders; and the diminution of their ranks for present operations was fully as great as that of their adversaries.‡

The French troops marched, as on the previous part of the retreat, in successive columns: the emperor, with the Old and New Guard, came first; next that of the viceroy; then Davoust, while Ney still continued to bring up the rear. On the 14th the Old Guard occupied Krasnoi. Kutusoff having brought up the greater part of his army to the neighbourhood of the great road early on the morning of the 15th, opened a heavy fire of artillery on the French guards, while Milaradowitch crossed the great road, and drove back the heads of the advancing columns. In the night, however, Napoleon attacked the

Alarmed by these disasters, Napoleon resolves to retire from Smolensko to the Niemen.

Arrival of Kutusoff at Krasnoi.

Order of the French retreat from Smolensko.

Nov. 14.

Partial completion of the plan for surrounding Napoleon. Nov.

* Bout., ii., 311, 314, 349. Fain, ii. Chamb., iii., 399, 400.

† Bout., ii., 331. Fain, ii., 326, 329. Chamb., iii., 403, 405.

* Bout., ii., 349, 350. Chamb., iii., 12, 26. Fain, ii., 328, 329.

† Segur, ii., 235, 237. Bout., ii., 208, 237, 239.

‡ Bout., ii., 232. Larrey, iv., 111, 112.

Russians with the best divisions of the Young Guard, and succeeded in clearing the route to Krasnoi; and on the following morning the emperor himself passed the dangerous part of the road in the midst of the Old Guard. Kutusoff, fearful to encounter that formidable body, withdrew his troops from the road, and harassed their march only by a distant cannonade. The veterans closed their ranks round their monarch as they passed the Russian batteries, and played in the hottest of the fire the celebrated air, "*Ou peut on être mieux qu'au sein de sa famille?*" "Say, rather," exclaimed the emperor, "let us watch over the safety of the Empire."*

In truth, on this occasion, as during the whole remainder of the retreat, the French army owed their safety chiefly to the circumstance that the Russian generals were far from being aware of the miserable condition to which their antagonists were reduced; and took their measures to resist the Grand Army when, in truth, it was only the skeleton of that awful array which was before them; and by a more vigorous onset they might, in all probability, have effected its entire destruction. This illusion, so natural from the heroic deeds of the French army, was increased by the circumstance that, in several intercepted despatches from Berthier to the marshals of the army, which fell into the hands of the Russians, he spoke of different corps of the armies as if they still existed in considerable strength, when, in fact, they were little better than shadows. The imagination could not conceive the extent of disaster which had befallen the French army: the remembrance of its deeds still affected the minds of men; and Napoleon was still the mighty conqueror at the head of the Grand Army, when, in truth, he could not collect thirty thousand men around his standards in a condition to face the enemy.†

No sooner had the Guard passed, than Kutusoff made his dispositions to block attack on Eugene's corps. the viceroy. Prince Dolgoroucki, with his corps, was placed astride upon the great road fronting Smolensko, while General Raefskoi was established parallel to its line to take the advancing columns in flank. Eugene, after passing a miserable night around the fires of his bivouac, was advancing slowly on foot along the road in the middle of his staff, when he was met by an officer of Milaradowitch, who summoned him to surrender. The French general Guyon, the sole survivor of his brigade, instantly repelled the insulting proposal; but immediately the heads of the column were arrested by a shower of cannon-shot; the hills on the left of the road were seen bristling with armed men, and a fence of levelled bayonets closed the front. Far from being dismayed by so fearful a spectacle, the brave Eugene, worthy of the crown which he wore, formed his troops into three divisions, and advanced with firmness to attack the Russian batteries; but the French squares in vain strove to cut their way through the hostile ranks: their battalions melted away under the fire of the grapeshot, while numerous squadrons poured down from the eminences on the left to destroy the scattered columns. Finding it impracticable to force his way along the great road, the viceroy placed himself and the royal guard at the

head of his best troops; and while the enemy were actively engaged on the left, defiled across the fields during the obscurity of evening, and joined the emperor at Krasnoi. In this affair he lost twenty-two hundred prisoners, a still greater number killed, one eagle, and eighteen pieces of cannon; but he saved the honour of his corps by his intrepidity and skill.*

Encouraged by this success, Kutusoff resolved, on the 17th, to bring his whole force to bear upon the remaining corps of Davoust and the Guards. For this purpose, he divided his army into three columns: the first, under the orders of General Tormasoff, who had been called to the main army since the death of Bagrathion, was destined to advance towards the great road beyond Krasnoi in the direction of Orcha, so as to threaten the communications of Napoleon, and prevent him from sending succour to his distressed lieutenants; the second, commanded by Prince Gallitzin, received orders to move upon Krasnoi, and attack the enemy in front; while the third, under the orders of Milaradowitch, was commanded to allow the corps of Davoust to defile along the road towards Krasnoi till the whole body was past, and then fall upon his rear. In this manner, he hoped that the corps of Davoust and the Guards, pressed together, and attacked in front and on both flanks at the same time, would be thrown into disorder and destroyed.†

Napoleon, feeling the necessity of making an effort to disengage that marshal from his perilous situation, prolonged his stay on the 17th at Krasnoi, and accepted the combat. Before daylight the divisions of Roguet of the Guard surprised and defeated a Russian detachment in the village of Ojarowski: a success of great importance, by the circumspection which it produced in the Russian commander. He drew up his troops in two lines fronting the Russian centre, with their right resting on the town of Krasnoi, and their left on the ravine of the Lossmina. At daybreak the emperor set out from Krasnoi on foot, in the direction of Smolensko, to lend his aid to Davoust, who was coming up. On seizing his sword, he exclaimed, "I have long enough acted emperor: now is the moment to resume the general."‡

The action commenced by Prince Gallitzin, with the Russian centre, attacking General Roguet and the Young Guard. After an obstinate conflict, in the course of which a square of the Imperial Guard was broken and destroyed by the Russian cuirassiers, the Russians established themselves on the banks of the Lossmina, near the centre of the French position. At the same time, the corps of Davoust, which had been suffered to pass by Milaradowitch, appeared in sight, slowly moving on in the midst of a cloud of Cossacks, which enveloped its ranks. The position of Napoleon was now in the highest degree critical. In front, on the right and left, the horizon was flaming with the enemy's fire; Krasnoi was speedily filled by a crowd of fugitives from the centre and Davoust's corps, which could no longer maintain their ground against Prince Gallitzin and the increasing force of Milaradowitch, which

* Ségur, ii., 250, 255. Lab., 347, 352. Bout., ii., 212, 214. Fain, ii., 304, 305. Chamb., iii., 441, 444.

† Bout., ii., 215, 217.

‡ Ségur, ii., 256, 262. Bout., ii., 217. Gourg., ii., 97. Chamb., ii., 491.

* Ségur, ii., 242, 244, 245. Bout., ii., 208, 210. Fain, ii., 202. Gourg., ii., 202. † Chamb., iii., 91.

pressed on from the south and east. At this dreadful moment, if the corps of Tormasoff had appeared on the road to the right, between Krasnoi and Liady, there seems no doubt that the whole French army would either have been compelled to surrender, or driven back upon the Dnieper, and lost in the marshes and forests which border that deserted stream. But Kutusoff, having discovered that the emperor, with his Guards, was in Krasnoi, delayed the march of his left wing till eleven o'clock, so as to give the Guards and Mortier time to defile towards Liady before Tormasoff crossed the road—overawed, it would appear, by the thoughts of driving to desperation so great a conqueror, or desirous of securing, without loss to himself, the destruction of the corps of Davoust. The consequence was, that Napoleon, with the half of his Guards who had survived the battle, retired in safety to Liady, while Prince Gallitzin carried by assault the village of Krasnoi; and the corps of Davoust, severely pressed in rear by the troops of Milardowitch, and cut in two by the advanced guard of Tormasoff, which at length arrived at its ground, was almost totally destroyed. In this battle, the Russians took above six thousand prisoners, forty-five pieces of cannon, two standards, and an immense quantity of baggage, among which were the baton of Marshal Davoust and part of the archives of Napoleon.*

Meanwhile, the corps of Marshal Ney, which brought up the rear, left Smolensko on the morning of the 17th, after blowing up part of the ramparts. On their route they speedily saw traces of the ruin of the Grand Army: cannon, caissons, dead horses, wounded men, arrested their progress at every step, amid a tremendous cold and an unusual accumulation of snow. Kutusoff, informed of the situation of this corps by the papers of the emperor found at Krasnoi, prepared for his reception. The army was established in two columns on the great road, facing both ways, in order to prevent any attempt at a rescue by the French troops who had got on towards Liady, while a body of cavalry was detached to prevent him defiling by the right of the great road. The French columns, ignorant of their danger, approached on the 18th, under cover of a thick fog, the banks of the Lossmina, strewn with the bodies of their comrades, when they were suddenly assailed by repeated discharges of grapeshot from forty pieces of cannon; while the whole heights on their front and flank appeared crested by dense black columns of infantry and artillery, ranged in order of battle. To a proposition for a capitulation, the intrepid Ney replied, "A marshal of France never surrenders!" and, instantly forming his columns of attack, advanced with the utmost heroism against the Russian batteries. His soldiers, worthy of their immortal commander, closed their ranks, and marched with hopeless devotion against the iron bands of their adversaries; but after a fruitless action, and the loss of half their numbers, they were thrown into disorder, and driven back to a considerable distance from the field of battle, with the loss of three thousand five hundred prisoners, and above two thousand killed. The marshal, perceiving that the enemy's position could not be forced in front, and that they were extending to the north of the

great road, to prevent him from escaping, as Prince Eugene had done, formed a body of four thousand out of the most efficient of his troops, and with these retired for an hour on the road to Smolensko, when he suddenly turned to the north, and moved towards the Dnieper. The severity of the cold had frozen part of the course of that river: at the village of Syrokenei, his advanced posts fell in with a peasant, who conducted them to a point where the passage was practicable, and he succeeded, during the night, in transporting three thousand, without horses or artillery, over the fragile ice, to the opposite shore. He even waited three hours on the bank before venturing across the river, to give time for his stragglers to join his little detachment; and during this anxious period the heroic marshal, wrapped in his cloak, slept quietly on the margin of the stream. The remainder of his corps, amounting to eight thousand five hundred, with twenty-seven pieces of cannon, and the whole baggage of the corps, fell into the hands of the Russians. In the morning of the 19th, a column of two thousand five hundred men were surrounded by the Russian cavalry in the neighbourhood of Winnia-Louki, and made prisoners; and the remnant of Marshal Ney's corps was assailed by the Cossacks, who had come from Smolensko along the north bank of the river, and compelled to abandon three hundred prisoners and ten pieces of cannon.*

The result of the actions on the 16th, 17th, and 18th, besides one hundred and twelve pieces of cannon abandoned near Smolensko, was the capture of twenty-six thousand prisoners, three hundred officers, and one hundred and sixteen pieces of cannon, and ten thousand killed or drowned, with the loss to the Russians of only two thousand men. The history of the Revolutionary wars can afford no parallel to such a success achieved at so small a sacrifice to the victorious party. Napoleon himself bore testimony to the ability with which the manœuvres on his flank had been conducted.† The skill of the Russian movements is the more to be admired, because, with a force inferior, upon the whole, to their antagonists, they were always superior at the point of attack. Napoleon left Smolensko with seventy thousand men, of whom one half were still efficient: Kutusoff arrived at Krasnoi with only fifty thousand, nearly as much debilitated by suffering as their opponents.‡ It must, however, be admitted, that the caution of the Russian commander, however praiseworthy on former occasions, was misplaced on the 18th at Krasnoi: the Russians there, though not superior in number to their antagonists, were supported by all the excitement of victory, while successive disasters had sunk the spirit of the French; and the chance of capturing Napoleon, or even his principal generals, was worth purchasing at the hazard even of a defeat to a corps of the army.§

Although the emperor and part of the army had escaped this imminent danger at Krasnoi, yet it was a painful sight for his officers to behold the straits to which he was reduced, and the utter dis-

* Bout., ii., 225, 229. Ségur, ii., 258, 292, 300. Fain, ii., 310, 312. Chamb., ii., 462, 473. † Ségur, ii., 278.

‡ "The Russian army was as much weakened by stragglers, sick, and the cold, as the French; but it had the great advantage in the end of not losing those left behind."—Fain, ii., 313.

§ Bout., ii., 229. Gourg., ii., 215. Chamb., ii., 448, 449. Fain, ii., 308, 313.

* Bout., ii., 218, 223, 224. Ségur, ii., 265, 275. Fain, ii., 306, 307. Chamb., ii., 445, 449.

Horrible confusion which reigned in the French army. organization which pervaded every part of the army. The horses having all perished, or been reserved, by the emperor's orders, for the wounded, Napoleon himself marched on foot, with a birch stick in his hand, to avoid falling on the icy roads, surrounded by a body of officers who still preserved some sort of regularity of appearance; but it was with extreme difficulty that they could force their way through the crowd of straggling soldiers, baggage-wagons, chariots, cannon, and camp-followers, who, pellmell and in utter confusion, crowded the roads in the most frightful disorder. Nothing but the devotion of the officers who surrounded him preserved any sort of order in this disorganized multitude; but their efforts were incessant to watch over the safety of the emperor, and thus succeeded in bringing him safely through the frightful confusion with which he was surrounded.*

Ney was severely harassed by Platoff in his retreat, after crossing the Dnieper. Heroic conduct of Ney during his retreat. For above twenty leagues he marched in the midst of six thousand of these Scythians, who hovered incessantly around his wearied columns. "On one occasion, the Cossacks got the start of his advanced troops; and the sudden apparition of flashes of artillery, in the midst of the darkness of the forest, announced that they were surrounded by their enemies. The bravest fell back in dismay, and gave themselves up for lost; but the marshal, with admirable presence of mind, ordered the charge to be beat, and exclaimed, 'Comrades, now is the moment; forward, they are ours!' At these words, the surprised soldiers, imagining that the enemy were cut off, resumed their courage, and the Cossacks, dreading an overthrow, fled in confusion. At length, after undergoing innumerable hardships, the heroic commander brought the remnant of his corps, hardly amounting to fifteen hundred armed men, to the neighbourhood of Orcha; and the emperor, who heard with the utmost joy of their approach, sent the viceroy's corps to their assistance, which enabled them to rejoin in safety the other corps of the army. Napoleon exclaimed, 'I have three hundred millions in my coffers in the Tuileries: I would willingly have given them to save Marshal Ney!'"†

The whole French army was now assembled near Orcha, but they exhibited a prodigious losses of the French army. my. Out of thirty-five thousand of the Guard there remained only six thousand; but they were in tolerable condition, and had preserved their artillery. Davoust had only saved four thousand out of seventy thousand; Eugene, eighteen hundred out of forty-two thousand; Ney, fifteen hundred out of forty thousand. The marshals vainly attempted to re-establish order, and established gendarmes to arrest the stragglers, and bring them back to their standards: the punishment of death had lost its terrors to men who expected only a few hours of life.‡

The severity of the weather abated at Orcha; to the intense frost of the preceding fortnight succeeded a thaw, which rendered the bivouacs at night less intolerable; magazines in abundance were formed in the

town, and a park of artillery supplied the losses of the corps in that essential particular. The garrison of the town and the Polish cavalry in the neighbourhood were joined to the army. Kutusoff, finding that, during the delay occasioned by the action with Marshal Ney's corps, the remains of the French army had gained the start of him by several marches, resolved to relinquish the pursuit to his advanced guard, and give the main body some repose. For this purpose he moved his headquarters, by easy marches, to Kopy, on the Dnieper, leaving to Wittgenstein and Tchichagoff the task of completing the destruction of the French army.*

Napoleon's first intention was to join his forces to those of Victor and Oudinot, and, with their united force, fall upon Wittgenstein, and force his way across the Oula, on the direct road to Wilna. But the excessive difficulty of the roads in that direction, leading through forests and morasses, which offered no resources for the army, and the experienced strength of the Russian position at Smolensko, having compelled him to abandon that design, he moved direct upon the Beresina. On the road he received the disastrous intelligence, first, of the capture of Minsk, and then of the bridge of Borissof, by Tchichagoff's army: the only passage over the river was now in the enemy's hands, while the sudden thaw had broken up its wintry covering, and filled the stream with fragments of floating ice, which rendered it apparently impossible to re-establish a communication with the opposite shore. In front was Tchichagoff, guarding the stream with thirty thousand men; on the right, Wittgenstein, in an impregnable position; on the left, Kutusoff, with the main Russian army.†

In these critical circumstances the emperor displayed his usual genius and firmness of mind. Far from despairing of his fortunes, he resolved to accumulate his force and overwhelm the army of Moldavia, which obstructed the direct line of his return to Europe. For this purpose he strengthened his army with the corps of Victor, Oudinot, and Dombrowsky, and all the detachments which he could collect in the neighbourhood, and, placing the corps of Oudinot in front, and that of Victor in the rear, set out on his perilous march. By concentrating his whole force in this manner, he presented an imposing mass of seventy thousand combatants; for, though the remains of the Grand Army, reinforced by the wreck of Dombrowsky's corps, did not exceed twenty thousand men, the united army of Victor and Oudinot brought an accession of fifty thousand troops, with all their artillery and appointments in good order, and the united artillery of the army amounted to two hundred and fifty pieces. After making every allowance for the disorganization of a part of this force, there can be no doubt that Napoleon had at his disposal a body of forty thousand combatants, perfectly armed, and in a condition to fight; that they were supported by a powerful train of artillery, and that all were penetrated by the conviction that their only chance of safety lay in their own courage and resolution.‡

* Bout., ii., 235. Gourg., ii., 112. Ségur, ii., 273, 274.

† Jom., iv., 192, 195, 196. Ségur, ii., 323, 326. Bout., ii., 352. Fain, ii., 327, 328.

‡ Compare Bout., ii., 355, 362. Gourg., ii., 128, and 158. Jom., iv., 196. Chamb., iii., 49, 50. Fain, ii., 397. Tchichagoff, 44, 47.

* Dumas, Sour., iii., 467. Larrey, iv., 94. Chamb., ii., 447, 448.

† Gourg., ii., 116. Ségur, ii., 308, 310. Bout., ii., 135. Fain, ii., 324, 325. ‡ Ségur, ii., 276, 274. Chamb., ii., 445.

To oppose this still formidable force, Tchichagoff had only at his disposal thirty-three thousand men, of which one third was cavalry, nearly unserviceable in the marshy shores and wooded banks of the Beresina; and his artillery did not exceed one hundred and fifty pieces. He had no chance, therefore, of opposing the passage of the river by main force; but the real danger of Napoleon consisted in this, that he might fall with superior numbers upon the French advanced guard before the main body could come across to their assistance, or, by destroying the bridge over the marshes on the road to Timbue, render their farther progress impracticable, even after passing the stream, or delay it till the approach of Wittgenstein endangered the whole army.*

The advanced guard of Tchichagoff, advancing beyond the bridge of Borisow, in order to approach Wittgenstein's corps, was met, on the 23d, by the vanguard of Oudinot, and totally defeated, with the loss of above one thousand men. His troops, in consequence, repassed the river in the utmost confusion; but they had the presence of mind to destroy the bridge of Borisow in their flight. This circumstance still exposed Napoleon to the difficulty of throwing a bridge and crossing the river in the face of the enemy's army: a difficulty which was not diminished by the intelligence that, on the same day, Wittgenstein had fallen on his rear-guard under Victor, and made fifteen hundred prisoners. The corps of Victor, in consequence, was thrown back upon the centre of the army, under Napoleon in person. They met suddenly, in the middle of a pine forest; and Victor's men then beheld, for the first time, the ghastly remains of that once splendid army, traversing the wood more like a troop of captives than a body of armed men. The squalid looks of the soldiers; the silent tread and sunk visages of the men; their long beards and smoke-besmeared countenances; the vast numbers of officers and generals marching without troops, promiscuously with the common men; the extraordinary dresses of the army, composed of women's pelisses, old carpets, or torn cloaks, threw the troops of Victor, who had been kept ignorant of the disasters of the Grand Army, into consternation; and disorder, the most contagious of all maladies, began rapidly to spread through the ranks.†

To conceal his real intention, Napoleon made demonstrations towards the Lower Beresina, as if his design was to cross there, and unite his forces to those of Schwartzberg. He even went so far as to make considerable preparations for a bridge nearly opposite Brill in that quarter. Meanwhile, the main body of his forces were collected on the heights of Borisow; and, finding that his demonstrations had attracted the whole attention of the enemy to the lower part of the river, he began, under cover of a battery of forty pieces, to throw two bridges, on the night of the 25th, over the stream, nearly opposite to Studienka. Nov 24. A severe frost, which set in on the 24th, facilitated the approach of the artillery

and caissons to the river, over the marshy meadows which lined its sides; but this fortunate circumstance redoubled the difficulty of forming the bridges, by reason of the floating ice which was brought down by its waves. But nothing could arrest the French engineers. With heroic devotion, the corps of sappers threw themselves into the river, with the water up to their shoulders; while the cavalry of General Corbineaum swam across the stream to drive back the Russian detachments which were beginning to collect on the opposite shore. The enemy were defeated; and the bridge for infantry being at length completed by the incredible exertions of General Eblé and the French engineers, a brigade of infantry was soon transported in safety to the opposite shore.*

By a singular piece of fortune, General Tchaplitz, who commanded the Russian troops on the western side of the river, had been recalled by Tchichagoff, on that very night, to the Lower Beresina, to resist the attack which was anticipated in that quarter. In the morning of the 26th, the French, who had passed a sleepless night watching the Russian forces, beheld with astonishment their bivouacs deserted, and their batteries in retreat, at the very time that the bridge was beginning to acquire consistency. Tchaplitz, who was soon informed of the passage, made all haste to return, but he found the advanced guard so firmly established, that it was impossible to dislodge them from their position. Another bridge was speedily completed for the passage of the carriages and artillery: fifty pieces of cannon, besides the artillery of the whole corps, defiled in a short time to the western bank; the whole of Oudinot's corps was transported across; and the Russians being driven back to the thickets, at a distance from the river, Napoleon found himself master of the important defiles that lead to Zembin, and the passage for his army secured.†

During these critical operations, Tchichagoff, with the main body of his forces, lay inactive at Chabachwiezi, obstinately adhering to his opinion that the serious attempt was to be made on the lower part of the river. He even adhered to this opinion after he heard of the passage having commenced at Studienka, conceiving that that operation was only a feint to withdraw his attention from the real intentions of the emperor. But being at length convinced, by repeated advices from Tchaplitz, that the passage was seriously going forward at that point, he made all haste to march his troops in that direction; while Wittgenstein, having received intelligence that the French were escaping over the river, attempted to march straight to Studienka, in order to destroy the rear-guard on the left bank; but the state of the roads rendering that project impracticable, he was compelled to move to Staroi-Borisow. In this way he hoped either to cut off Victor, if he had not yet passed that place, or to follow him up in the direction of Studienka, if he had anticipated his movement.‡

The corps of Victor was extended along the left bank of the Beresina as far as Borisow,

* Gourg., ii., 143. Bout., 402, 403. Tchichagoff's Narrative, 45, 46.

† Ségur, ii., 332, 333. Bout., ii., 356, 357. Chamb., iii., 12, 13.

* Jom., iv., 197, 198. Bout., ii., 366, 367. Gourg., ii., 142. Fain, ii., 375, 376. Chamb., iii., 47, 49.

† Bout., ii., 367, 368. Gourg., ii., 142. Ségur, i., 344.

‡ Bout., ii., 363, 371. Jom., iv., 197, 198. Fain, ii., 380, 382. Chamb., iii., 52, 53.

Capture of
Partonneaux's
division by
Wittgenstein.
November 27.

which was occupied by General Partonneaux with a strong division. During the whole of the 27th the passage of the army continued, while Victor's corps gradually drew nearer to the bridge; but the division of Partonneaux, which formed his rear-guard, was commanded by Napoleon not to leave Borissov and move upon Starol-Borissov till six in the evening. The consequence was, that, before he could reach the latter town, Wittgenstein's army was firmly established across the great road, with his front facing the line by which alone the French could approach. Partonneaux, finding his progress interrupted by so formidable a force, attempted to cut his way through; but his troops being defeated with great loss in their attempt, and finding their retreat to Borissov cut off by Platoff, who had come up with his Cossacks, was compelled to capitulate with seven thousand men, including eight hundred cavalry in the best condition. He himself endeavoured, with four hundred men, to elude his pursuers during the obscurity of the night; but, after wandering some hours in the dark through the snowy desert, and finding every outlet blockaded by the enemy's fires, he was obliged to lay down his arms.*

On the same day, General Yermoloff, with the advanced guard of Kutusoff's army, arrived at Borissov, and a bridge of pontoons having been established by Tchichagoff, his corps was instantly passed over to re-enforce the army of Moldavia on the right bank; and the Russian generals having met from Moscow, Finland, and Bucharest, at Borissov on the night of the 27th, concerted measures for a general attack on the French army on both sides of the river for the following day. Tchichagoff, supported by Yermoloff, was to assail Oudinot and the French main body on the right bank, while Wittgenstein pressed upon Victor, and threw back his corps upon the bridge of Studienka.†

Tchaplitz began the action, on the morning of the 28th, by a spirited attack on the corps of Marshal Oudinot; but the French vanguard having been successively re-enforced by the remains of Ney's corps, the legion of the Vistula, and the Imperial Guard, the Russians, after an obstinate conflict, were compelled to give way, with the loss of twelve hundred prisoners. The French cuirassiers charged with so much impetuosity, that the day would have been irretrievably lost, if Tchaplitz had not bravely thrown himself upon the victorious squadron at the head of the Russian hussars; and Tchichagoff having at length brought up the main body of his forces, the battle was restored: but it was too late for decisive success: the road to Zembin was secured, traversing for some hundred yards defiles through the marshes where the narrow road was laid on wood, which might have been burned, and the retreat of the French entirely stopped; and during the action the Guard and the corps of Davoust defiled in that direction. The battle continued in the wood between Brill and Stackhow with inconceivable fury till midnight; the French fighting with the courage of despair, the Russians with the ardent desire

to complete the destruction of their enemies. The loss was nearly equal on both sides; that of the French amounted to nearly five thousand in killed and wounded.*

While this was going forward on the right bank, Wittgenstein commenced a vigorous attack on the corps of Victor, now severely weakened by the loss of Partonneaux's division. After a severe struggle, General Diebitch established a battery of twelve pieces so far in advance as to command the bridge, and the confused crowd of soldiers, chariots, and baggage-wagons which was assembled in its vicinity, and soon the balls from his guns began to fall among them. A dreadful tumult instantly commenced, and the whole crowd rushed towards the bridges, crushing each other in their flight, and blockading the passage by their efforts to get over. As the Russian corps successively gained ground, their batteries formed a vast semicircle, which played incessantly on the bridges till night, and augmented to desperation the terror of the multitudes who were struggling at their entrance. In the midst of the confusion, the artillery-bridge broke, and the crowd who were upon it, pushed forward by those behind, were precipitated into the water, and perished miserably. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, now rushed promiscuously to the other bridge, which was speedily choked up; through the frantic crowd, the caissons and cannon were urged forward with unpitiable fury, cloughing their way, like the car of Jugernaut, through the dead and the dying, while the weaker were everywhere pushed into the stream; and thousands perished amid the masses of ice which were floating on its waves.†

In these moments of hopeless agony, all the varieties of character were exposed naked to view. Selfishness there exhibited all its baseness, and cowardice its meanness; while heroism seemed clothed with supernatural power, and generosity cast a lustre over the character of humanity. Soldiers seized infants from their expiring mothers, and vowed to adopt them as their own; officers harnessed themselves in the sledges, to extricate their wounded comrades; privates threw themselves on the snow beside their dying officers, and exposed themselves to captivity or death to solace their last moments.‡ Mothers were seen lifting their children above their heads in the water, raising them as they sunk, and even holding them aloft for some moments after they themselves were buried in the waves. An infant, abandoned by its mother near the gate of Smolensko, and adopted by the soldiers, was saved, by their care, from the horrors of the Beresina; it was again saved at Wilna, on the bridge of Kowno, and it finally escaped all the horrors of the retreat.

It was in the midst of this terrific scene that the rear-guard of Marshal Victor, Frightful scenes when the bridges were broken— which had nobly sustained, during the whole day, the arduous duty of protecting the passage, arrived at the entrance of the bridge. His troops, with stern severity, opened a passage for themselves through the helpless multitude, and in vain endeavoured to persuade them to pass over to the

Furious attack of Wittgenstein on the troops on the left bank.

Generous devotion shown by many at this awful passage.

* Ségur, ii., 354, 357. Bout., ii., 371, 374. Fain, ii., 405, 467. Chamb., iii., 60, 61.

† Bout., ii., 375. Ségur, ii., 363. Jom., iv., 201. Fain, ii.,

* Bout., ii., 378. Jom., iv., 201. Tchichagoff. Fain, ii., 395, 400.

† Ségur, ii., 367, 368. Lab., 393. Bout., ii., 379, 380. Chamb., iii., 65, 66. Fain, ii., 400.

‡ Ségur, ii., 368, 371. Lab., 393. Ségur, ii., 389. Chambray, iii., 71.

opposite shore. Despair and misery had rendered them incapable of the exertion. At length, as morning dawned, and the Russian troops approached, the rear-guard were drawn across the bridge, which was set on fire. A frightful cry now rose from the multitude on the opposite bank, who awakened too late to the horrors of their situation; numbers rushed over the burning bridge, and, to avoid the flames, plunged into the waves; while thousands wandered in hopeless misery along the shore, and beheld their last hopes expire with the receding columns of their countrymen. When the ice dissolved in spring, the magnitude of the disaster became manifest: twelve thousand dead bodies were found on the shores of the river.*

Such was the dreadful passage of the Beresina—glorious to the French arms, yet this dreadful how fatal! The talent of the emperor, the firmness of the soldiers, was never more strongly exemplified, but it completed the ruin of the Grand Army. Twenty-five pieces of cannon, sixteen thousand prisoners, and above twelve thousand slain, were the price at which the passage was purchased. The corps of Victor and Oudinot were reduced to the deplorable state of the troops who had come from Moscow; the army no longer preserved the appearance of military order, but a confused mass of fifty thousand men marched in detached groups along the road to Wilna.

To complete the disaster, the frost, which for some days had been comparatively mild, set in on the 30th with increased severity. The general disorder now reached its height: the horses of Victor and Oudinot's corps, and all those which had been collected on the retreat, shared the fate of those which had accompanied the Grand Army; the artillery was gradually abandoned; the cavalry melted away; and Marshal Ney with difficulty could collect three thousand men on foot to form the rear-guard, and protect the helpless multitude from the attacks of Platoff and his indefatigable Cossacks. For some days Victor shared with him the post of danger; and by their incessant exertions successive rear-guards were formed, which rapidly disappeared under the severity of the weather or the attacks of the enemy. Tchaplitz and Platoff continued

to press the rear-guard, and on the 4th of Dec. 4. December captured twenty-four cannon, and two thousand five hundred prisoners. In the midst of the general ruin, a guard, called the "Sacred Squadron," was formed of officers, to surround and protect the emperor. The gentlemen who composed it discharged with heroic fidelity the duty assigned to them, and executed, without murmuring, all the duties of common soldiers; but the severity of the cold soon destroyed their horses, and the emperor, in the midst of his faithful followers, was obliged to march on foot through the snow. At night, the bivouac was formed in the middle of the still unbroken squares of the Old Guard. These brave men sat round the watchfires on their haversacks, with their elbows on their knees, their heads resting on their hands, and seated close together; striving by this posture to repress the pangs of hunger, and gather additional warmth by resting on each other.†

On the 5th, Napoleon arrived at Smorgoni. He there collected his marshals around him, dictated the famous 29th bulletin, which fully developed the horrors of the retreat, explained his reasons for immediately returning to Paris, and, after bidding them all an affectionate farewell, set out in a sledge at ten at night for the French capital, accompanied by Caulaincourt and Lobau, leaving the command of the army to Murat.*

During the time that this long course of disasters was befalling the Grand Army, sufferings of Warsaw and the Grand-duchy of Poland during Lithuania had been the victims of the campaign, the most uninterrupted suffering. Great as was the spirit of the people, and ardent their desire to regain their national independence, and throw off the hated yoke of Russia, they had yet sunk under the enormous burdens imposed upon them by the continual passage of the troops, and the enormous requisitions of the French emperor. The Grand-duchy of Warsaw, though possessing only a population of little more than four millions of souls, had already, during the campaign, furnished eighty-five thousand men to the Grand Army, and their swords had drunk as deep of the Russian blood as those of any troops in the vast array, both at Smolensko and Borodino. This supply of men, great as it was, however, was far from keeping pace with the gigantic conceptions of Napoleon; and the Polish battalions were so completely lost in the immense multitude of armed men by whom they were surrounded, that Napoleon frequently complained that he had never seen any Poles at all in his army. Nevertheless, situated as the grand-duchy was, it was truly surprising how its inhabitants had been capable of making the efforts which they actually did. The pay of the troops had long since ceased; the government, deeply in debt, was unable to borrow money from any of the capitalists in Europe; and the greatest proprietors were obliged to pay *eighty per cent.* for the money they were compelled to borrow to meet the requisitions. Prince Czartorinski was obliged to leave Warsaw from absolute inability to maintain his family there; and the Princess Radziwill, wife of the richest noble in Poland, was so reduced, that she could not command money to send home two lady's maids whom she had brought from France and England; the whole public authorities were six months in arrear of their salaries; and those to whom the great proprietors were indebted were unable to extract from them a single farthing in payment. In the midst of this universal misery, the requisitions for the Grand Army were incessant: no representations could convince Napoleon of the state of impoverishment to which Poland had been reduced: taxes, at his command, were laid on, but they produced nothing; and movable columns of troops traversed the country in every direction, seizing without mercy the agricultural produce of the peasants, who were universally reduced to beggary by the exactions.†

In the midst of this scene of unparalleled suffering, it was announced to the Abbé Napoleon de Pradt one morning early, on the 10th of December, that a travelling-carriage, in great haste, had driven into the Hôtel d'Angleterre at Warsaw, and that his immediate presence was required. He lost no time in going there,

* Ségur, ii., 393, 394. Gourg., ii., 176.

† De Pradt, l'Ambassade à Varsovie en 1812, 84, 89, 184 Oginski, iv., 5.

* Ségur, ii., 373. Bout., ii., 383, 386. Jom., iv., 203. Fain, ii., 408, 409. Chamb., iii., 71. Lab., 395.

† Ségur, ii., 375, 379, 389. Jom., iv., 188. 29th Bull. Bout., ii., 391. Lab., 398. Gourg., ii., 132.

and found in the courtyard a small travelling britschka, placed, without wheels, on a coarse sledge made of four pieces of rough fir-wood, which had been almost dashed to pieces in entering the gateway. Two other travelling-carriages, still ruder in their construction, stood beside it. Caulaincourt speedily appeared, and, taking the abbé by the hand, led him into a small, dark apartment, with the windows half shut, and in a corner of which a servant girl was striving in vain to light a fire with green, damp billets of wood. A figure, wrapped up in a rich pelisse, was placed with its back to the fire as the abbé entered; it turned round on hearing the sound of footsteps, and Napoleon stood before him.*

"Ah! is it you, ambassador?" said the emperor. "You have given me much uneasiness," replied the abbé, with deep emotion; "but I see you well, and I am content." After some farther conversation, the abbé, upon the emperor inquiring what contributions could be furnished by the grand-duchy, explained to him the state of destitution to which Poland had been reduced, and the great exertions it had made for furnishings for his army. "What!" rejoined the emperor, "I have not seen a Pole in my ranks." "There were eighty-two thousand, nevertheless; but they were drowned in the immensity of your majesty's armament." "What would the Poles be at?" rejoined the emperor. "To be Prussians if they cannot be Poles? And then, why not Russians?" with a sarcastic air. "Come, abbé, we must raise ten thousand Polish Cossacks; a lance and a horse are enough for each man. With them we will soon stop the Russians. From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step. Dangers! I have seen none of them. I am never so well as in agitation: the greater the tumult, the better I feel. None but the *rois fainéants* grow fat in their palaces. Horseback and camps for me. *From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step.* I see you are all in alarm here. Bah! The army is superb. I have a hundred and twenty thousand men: I have always beaten the Russians; they never venture to stand against me. They are no longer the soldiers of Eylau and Friedland. We will maintain our position at Wilna. I am going to raise three hundred thousand men. Success will imbolden the Russians. I will give them two or three battles on the Oder, and in six months I will be again on the Niemen. I have more weight on the throne than at the head of the army: I left the troops, indeed, with regret; but it was necessary, to watch over Austria and Prussia. All that has happened is nothing; it is the effect of the climate, and nothing more. The enemy are nothing: I have beat them wherever I met them. They thought they would cut me off at the Beresina; but I soon got quit of that fool of an admiral (I never could pronounce his name). Their position was superb; fifteen hundred toises of a marsh, a river. But what then? I got through them all. It is then you see who have the strong minds. I have often been harder pushed before. At Marengo, I was beaten till six o'clock at night; next day I was master of all Italy. At Essling, they thought they would stop me; that archduke has published I know not what on the subject. I could not prevent the Danube from rising sixteen feet in one night; but for that, it was all over with Austria. But

it was written in heaven that I should marry an archduchess.

"So also in Russia. Could I prevent it from freezing? They came and told me Extraordinary every morning that I had lost ten ideas which thousand horses during the night, he expressed. Well: a good journey to them. Our Norman horses are less hardy than the Russian; they cannot resist more than nine degrees of cold. It is the same with the Germans. Go and look for the Saxons or the Bavarians. You won't find one of them alive. Perhaps they may say I lingered too long at Moscow: possibly I did so; but the weather was fine, and I expected peace: the winter set in before its usual time. I sent Lauriston, on the 5th of October, to negotiate for peace: I thought of going to St. Petersburg; I had time enough to winter there, or in the south of Russia. The King of Naples will hold good at Wilna. Politics are a great drama: he who ventures nothing will win nothing. *From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step.* The Russians have shown themselves: they have clouds of Cossacks; that nation, after all, is something. The crown peasants love the government; the nobles are mounted on horseback; they proposed to me to declare the slaves free; I would not do so: a general massacre would have followed. I made a regular war on Alexander; but who could have thought they would have struck such a stroke as the burning of Moscow? They attribute it to us, but it was truly themselves who did it. It would have done honour to ancient Rome. I will have nothing to do with the *corps diplomatique*. They are nothing but titled spies sent to send bulletins of what we are about to their courts. I won't go through Silesia—ah, ah! Prussia. *From the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step.*" The emperor ran on in this way for above three hours, during which time the fire, which had at length kindled, gradually went out, and all in the apartment were perishing of cold; but the emperor experienced no inconvenience, so completely was his mind absorbed in the subjects of the conversation. At length, it being announced that the carriage was ready, he and Caulaincourt mounted the sledge, and upon the persons present inquiring anxiously for his health, he exclaimed, "I never was better: if I had the devil himself on board, I think I would not be a bit the worse!" With these words he waved adieu to his attendants, set out in his humble conveyance, and was soon lost in the gloom of a Polish winter. In setting off, the sledge was all but overturned by running against the post of the gate of the courtyard of the inn.*

The departure of the emperor, though a matter of congratulation to the troops, completed the disorganization of the army. The cold increased in intensity as they approached Wilna, and at length reached twenty-six and thirty degrees of Reaumur, corresponding to twenty-eight and thirty-six below zero of Fahrenheit. The officers ceased to obey their generals, the generals disregarded the marshals, and the marshals contested the authority of Murat. The private soldiers, relieved of the duty of preserving the emperor, forgot everything but the instinct of self-preservation. The colonels hid the eagles in their haversacks or buried them in the ground; the officers, who had hitherto marched round that sacred stand-

* De Pradt, 203, 210.

* De Pradt, 212, 220

ard, dispersed to attend to their own safety: nothing was thought of in the army but the urgent pangs of hunger, or the terrible severity of the cold. If a soldier dropped, his comrades instantly fell upon him, and, before life was extinct, tore from him his cloak, his money, and the bread which he carried in his bosom; when he died, one of them frequently sat upon his body, for the sake of the temporary warmth which it afforded; and when it became cold, fell beside his companion to rise no more. The watchfires at night were surrounded by circles of exhausted men, who crowded like spectres round the blazing piles; as the wood was consumed, they continued to gaze with indifference on the decaying embers, incapable either of rising to renew the fuel, or of seeking another bivouac; and when, at length, the flames were extinguished, fell dead beside the ashes. The position of these melancholy bivouacs was marked in the morning by the circles of dead bodies which surrounded them, and attested the successive groups who, during the night, had been attracted by their light.*

In vain numerous detachments joined the army between Smorgoni and Wilna; the terrible severity of the cold, and the sight of the sufferings of the Grand Army, speedily effected their dissolution. The division of Loison, six thousand strong, which marched from Königsberg to re-enforce the army, was almost totally destroyed in a few days, and three skeleton battalions only reached their unhappy comrades. Twenty thousand recruits had joined between the Beresina and Wilna; and yet scarcely forty thousand of the whole troops reached that city, all in the last stage of misery and despair. During this disastrous retreat, the Russians incessantly pressed upon the retreating army. On leaving Smorgoni, their rear-guard was attacked by General Tchaplitz, and totally destroyed, with the loss of twenty-five cannon and three thousand prisoners; between Smorgoni and Ochixiany he again came up with the enemy, and dispersed the new rear-guard, with the loss of sixty-one pieces of cannon and four thousand prisoners; and at Medniki he captured sixteen cannon and thirteen hundred prisoners. On the road to Wilna he captured thirty-one pieces, and penetrated into the town, where the French were hardly established; while Platoff proceeded on the road to Kowno, and cut off a whole column of one thousand men, with twenty-eight pieces of artillery.†

It is a very remarkable circumstance, but attested by the most unexceptionable medical evidence, that, during the whole of this dreadful retreat, the French, to whom the cold was unusual, bore it better than the Russians; and that, of the survivors, almost all were Italians or Frenchmen from the provinces to the south of the Loire. "The inhabitants," says Larrey, who was chief physician to Napoleon in the campaign, "of the southern countries of Europe bore the cold better than the natives of the northern and moister climates—such as the Hanoverians, the Dutch, the Prussians, and the other German people: the Russians themselves, from what I learned at Wilna, suffered more from the cold than the French. Three thousand men, being the best soldiers of the Guard, partly cavalry and partly

infantry, almost all natives of the southern provinces of France, were the only persons who really withstood the cruel vicissitudes of the retreat. They were the miserable remains of an army of four hundred thousand men, whom the inhabitants of the country had seen defiling over the bridge at Kowno, six months before, in all the pride of apparently irresistible strength."‡

The troops had hardly begun to taste the sweets of repose, and to refresh themselves from the immense magazines which Wilna contained, when they were roused by the cannon of the Russians, and compelled to hasten their retreat. A helpless crowd rushed out of the gates on the evening of the 10th of December, and speedily arrived at the foot of an ascent covered with ice, where the whole remaining carriages of the army required to be abandoned. The equipage of Napoleon, the treasure of the army, the baggage left at Wilna, the trophies of Moscow, the whole remaining artillery, were all left at the foot of that fatal ascent. In the confusion of leaving the city, the Old Guard itself was for a short time dispersed, and the feeble appearance of order hitherto preserved disappeared; but in this extremity, the wonted courage of Marshal Ney was not wanting. He voluntarily hastened to the rear, and out of the confused mass formed a small corps, chiefly composed of the troops recently come up with Loison, with which he arrested the efforts of the enemy. The Russians found in Wilna, besides immense magazines of every description, above fourteen thousand soldiers, and two hundred and fifty officers, who were incapable of marching farther, and preferred becoming prisoners of war to a longer continuance of their sufferings.§

At length, on the 12th of December, the French arrived at Kowno on the Niemen, ^{Passage of the bridge of Kowno.} when three thousand prisoners were taken by Platoff; and on the 13th they passed the bridge, in number about twenty thousand, of whom two thirds had never seen the Kremlin. Thus, not more than seven thousand of the vast host with which Napoleon passed Smolensko in the beginning of summer, left the Russian territory; and out of five hundred thousand combatants who had crossed the Niemen since June, twenty thousand alone escaped the disasters of the campaign. As the Imperial Guard defiled over the bridge, an old grenadier, extended on the ground, attracted the attention of his comrades. The crowd respected his undaunted air, his decoration, and his three insignia. With a placid eye he viewed the approach of death, which he felt to be fast approaching; and, disregarding the other passers and uttering no supplications, he waited till one of his comrades was near, and then, collecting all his strength, he raised himself on his elbow, and exclaimed to the soldier about to succour him, "Your assistance is in vain, my friend; the only favour which I have to request

* Larrey, iv., 111, 114.

† A similar fact has been observed regarding the British troops in India, who, in general, bear the fatigue of forced marches under the burning sun of that climate better than the native Hindoos, who have been habituated to it all their lives. The reason seems to be the same in both cases, viz., that the inhabitants of the temperate regions of the globe, having their constitutions ripened by a more genial climate, are able to bear the extremes both of heat and cold better than those whose constitutions have been weakened either by the severities of the arctic or the relaxations of the tropical regions.

‡ Lab., 416, 421. Ségur, ii., 418, 423. Bout., ii., 411, 412. Larrey, iv., 167.

* Ségur, ii., 403, 410. Lab., 406, 407. Bout., ii., 408. Chamb., iii., 149, 164.

† Bout., ii., 407, 408. Lab., 405, 409. Fain, ii. Chamb., iii.

is, that you will prevent the enemy from profaning the marks of distinction which I have gained in combating them. Carry to my captain this decoration, which was given to me on the field of Austerlitz, and this sabre, which I used in the battle of Friedland." With these words he expired; and the sabre and cross were carried to the Old Guard, now reduced to three hundred men, but still marching in serried groups, and preserving even unto death their martial and undaunted air.*

The heroic Ney still covered the rear when the Heroic conduct of Ney on this occasion. troops were defiling over the bridge. Four times the rear-guard had melted away under his command, and as often his example and activity had re-formed a band for the protection of the army. He arrived at Kowno destitute of troops; a few hundred of the Old Guard alone retained the use of their arms, and they were already defiling over the river. Instantly collecting seven hundred fresh troops, whom he found in the town, and planting twenty-four pieces of cannon remaining there on the redoubts, he made good the post during the whole day against the efforts of the enemy. On the following day he still continued the defence, but finding that his troops deserted him, he seized a musket, and, with difficulty, rallied thirty men to defend the gate of Wilna. At length, when the passage of the troops who could be persuaded to move was completed, he slowly retired through the streets and across the river, still facing the enemy, and was the LAST OF THE GRAND ARMY who left the Russian territory.†

The first place on the German side of the Niemen where any of the persons who had gone across could rest, was Gumbinnen; and General Mathieu Dumas, who had with great difficulty reached that place, in consequence of a malady under which he had laboured ever since leaving Moscow, had just entered the house of a French physician where he had lodged when passing there before on his entrance into Russia, when a man entered, wrapped up in a large cloak, with a long beard, his visage blackened with gunpowder, his whiskers half burned by fire, but his eyes still sparkling with undecayed lustre. "At last here I am. What! General Dumas, do you not know me?" "No. Who are you?" "I am the rear-guard of the Grand Army—Marshal Ney. I have fired the last musket-shot on the bridge of Kowno; I have thrown into the Niemen the last of our arms; and I have walked hither, as you see me, across the forests." With respectful solicitude, General Dumas received the hero of the retreat; the benevolent host relieved his immediate necessities; and he soon after set out with Dumas, in the calash of the latter, on the road for Königsberg.‡

When the troops, in leaving Kowno, arrived at the point where the passage had been effected five months before; when they beheld those heights, then crowded with splendid battalions, now covered by a miserable band of fugitives, and passed the remains of the bridges, now deserted, which then groaned under the march of glittering squadrons, the magnitude of the contrast, notwithstanding

their present sufferings, brought tears into the eyes even of the common soldiers. Casting a last look on the shores of her savage regions—then, so ardently desired; since, the scene of such grievous suffering—they plunged into the forest, and, abandoning every appearance of military order, dispersed like private travellers over the boundless plains of Poland.*

The only corps of the enemy which still remained in Russia was that of Marshal Macdonald, twenty-nine thousand strong, which was still in the environs of Riga, and that of Schwarzenberg and Regnier, which was in the southern provinces. The design of Kutusoff was to cut him off from the Niemen, and throw his corps back upon the peninsula of Courland, from whence escape, except by sea, was impossible. For this purpose, the corps of Wittgenstein was directed to descend the right bank of the Niemen to Kowno, and move upon Gumbinnen to cut him off from the Vistula; while the garrison of Riga, now considerably re-enforced, pressed upon his rear. On the 18th of December, Macdonald, who appears to have been totally forgotten during the confusion of the retreat, began to retire from Riga, while the Marquis Paulucci, governor of Riga, detached ten thousand men to harass his retreat. General Diebitch, who commanded the advanced guard of Wittgenstein, advanced so rapidly, that on the 25th he came up with the retreating army, and boldly threw himself, with only two thousand men, between the French troops of Macdonald and the Prussian auxiliaries in his corps, commanded by General D'York, who amounted to eighteen thousand men. The garrison of Riga, pressing him in rear, and the troops of Wittgenstein coming up to separate him from Macdonald, D'York conceived it no longer necessary to risk his army by an adherence to their forced alliance, and on the 30th of December signed a convention with General Diebitch, in virtue of which the Prussian troops, to the number of ten thousand, became neutral, and only awaited the commands of the King of Prussia to unite themselves to the victorious Russians. Deprived by this defection of one half of his troops, Macdonald lost no time in falling back to Königsberg, which he reached on the 3d of January, with the loss, in various skirmishes during his retreat, of fifteen hundred killed and wounded, and above one thousand prisoners. The slowness of Wittgenstein's advance alone preserved the remains of his corps from total destruction.†

On the other side, Prince Schwartzberg, learning of the disasters of the Grand Army, and finding that the corps of Sacken opposed to him was strongly re-enforced, fell back to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw, and finally evacuated the Russian territory on the 7th of January.‡

On the last day of the year, Alexander addressed from Wilna a noble proclamation to the soldiers, in which, without underrating their glorious exploits, he ascribed the success which had been attained mainly to the protection of Heaven. "Soldiers! The year is past—that glorious and ever memorable year, in which you have hurled to the dust

Operations against Macdonald near Riga.

Appearance of Ney at Gumbinnen after passing the Niemen.

Schwartzberg evacuates the Russian territory. Jan. 7, 1813.

Terrible contrast afforded to the passage of the same point five months before.

Noble proclamation of Alexander to his soldiers.

* Lab., 426, 427. Bout., ii., 413. Ségur, ii., 430. Chamb., iii., 164.

† Bout., ii., 414. Ségur, ii., 433, 434. Lab., 428. Chamb., iii., 172, 178.

‡ Dumas, Souv., iii., 485.

* Lab., 427. Ségur, ii., 429, 458.

† Bout., ii., 413, 415, 434, 436. Ségur, ii., 460.

‡ Bout., ii., 445. Ségur, ii., 464.

the pride of the insolent aggressor. It is past, but your heroic deeds will never pass: time will never efface their recollection; they are present in the hearts of your contemporaries; they will live in the gratitude of posterity. You have purchased with your blood the independence of your country against so many powers leagued together for its subjugation. You have acquired a title to the gratitude of Russia, and the admiration of the world. You have proved, by your fidelity, your valour, and your perseverance, that against the hearts filled with love to God and devotion to their country, the most formidable efforts of the enemy are like the furious waves of the ocean, which break in vain on the solid rocks, and leave nothing but scattered foam around them. Desirous to distinguish all those who have shared in the immortal exploits, I have caused medals to be struck from silver which has been blessed by our Holy Church. They bear the date of the memorable year 1812. Suspended by a blue riband, they will serve to decorate the warlike breasts which have served as a buckler to their country. You have all shared the same fatigues and dangers; you have but one heart and one will; you are all worthy to wear this honourable recompense; and you will all feel proud of the decoration. May your enemies tremble when they see it on your bosoms. May they know that under these medals beat hearts animated by an imperishable tie, because it is not founded on ambition or impiety, but on the immutable basis of patriotism and religion.*

The scattered troops of the Grand Army continued to retreat through the Polish territory, still pursued by the Russians, who continued to take numbers of prisoners. The town of Königsberg was speedily filled with sick and wounded men: above ten thousand were soon collected at Königsberg, almost all of whom fell into the hands of the Russians. The French generals made a vain attempt to rally the troops on the Vistula, but their diminished numbers precluded all hope of maintaining that position. Numbers who had escaped the horrors of the retreat, fell victims to the sudden change of temperature, and the return to the usages of civilized life which followed their return to Prussia. The shattered remains of the army were collected in Dantzic, to secure that important military position. Thirty-five thousand men, of seventeen different nations, were there assembled, and the remainder fell back to Posen on the Oder. The Russians stopped the march of their troops, already almost exhausted, at Kalisch, in the end of January, and thus terminated this memorable campaign.†

On the 22d of December, the Emperor Alexander arrived at Wilna, and hastened to award to the troops the rewards which their glorious services merited. He found the city overwhelmed with prisoners and wounded men; contagious diseases speedily appeared; and the mortality soon became excessive both among the victors and the vanquished. History has not preserved a more noble instance of fortitude and humanity than was exhibited by the Emperor Alexander on this occasion. The condition of the prisoners, till his arrival, was horrible be-

yond conception. Huddled together in hospitals, without either fire, water, medicines, beds, or straw, they lay on the hard floor, often in the last stage of exhaustion or disease. Hundreds, in consequence, died every day, whose bodies were thrown out of the windows into the streets by the soldiers in attendance; but their place was immediately supplied by multitudes of others, who crawled continually into these abodes of wretchedness, often only to draw their last breath within its walls. Hard biscuit was all they had for food; and their only drink the snow which the least injured among them brought in from the streets and courtyards of the buildings. The frightful accumulation of gangrene wounds and expiring sickness; the multitudes who crowded, not only the apartments, but even the stairs of the hospitals; and the putrid smell of above six thousand bodies, which lay unburied in their vicinity, had engendered a dreadful contagious fever, of which hundreds died every day, and which, for several succeeding years, spread its ravages through every country in Europe.*

Into these hidden dens of misery the Emperor Alexander and his brother Constantine immediately entered, on their arrival at Wielmar, on the 22d of December. Profoundly moved by the dreadful spectacle of human suffering which was there exhibited, the Czar immediately took the most efficacious measures to assuage the universal suffering. Without casting a thought upon the consideration that most of these unfortunate wretches had been his enemies, he, along with Constantine, distributed money largely among them. His own physicians, including the able and intrepid Dr. Wylie, who never left his person, were sent to make the necessary arrangements for putting a stop to these horrors: out of his own purse, the emperor discharged a large part of the arrears of pay due to the troops of his enemies, and established vast hospitals in the palaces of the city, where the French sick and wounded were placed beside, and equally well treated with the Russian. The dead bodies in the streets were collected and burned; they amounted to the astonishing number of seventeen thousand. The total number consumed there, and brought in from the vicinity, exceeded thirty thousand. The Grand-duke Constantine rivalled his brother in these acts of mercy. Several of the wounded were brought to his apartments, and tended there; and he, in consequence, caught the prevailing epidemic, though the strength of his constitution carried him safely through its dangers. Shortly after, all the sovereigns of Europe whose subjects were lying in the hospitals at Wilna, sent money to the emperor to relieve their distresses. Napoleon alone, engrossed with the cares of his situation, sent none. Alexander and Constantine, however, were indefatigable in their attentions to the prisoners during several weeks that they remained at Wilna; and the emperor, on the very Dec. 22. day of his arrival, published a general amnesty to the Polish nation for any part they might have taken in the insurrection against his government; terminating thus a campaign of unexampled dangers and glory by deeds of unprecedented mercy.†

Retreat of the remains of the Grand Army to Königsberg and Dantzic.

Arrival of Alexander at Wilna, and horrible state of the hospitals.

* Chamb., iii., 146, 147. Ségur, ii., 467. Oginski, iv., 99, 100.

† Chamb., iii., 145, 148. Oginski, iii., 99, 100. Bout., ii., 418. Ségur, ii., 467.

‡ The author is happy to be able to confirm the preceding account of the conduct of the Emperor Alexander and the Grand-duke Constantine on this occasion, which is given by

* Chamb., iii., 169.

† Ségur, ii., 471, 473. Bout., ii., 417, 420. Fain, ii., 280.

From the most moderate calculations, it appears that the losses of the French during the campaign were as follows:

Losses of the French during the campaign.	Slain in battle, soldiers	125,000
	Prisoners, generals	48
	— officers	3,000
	— soldiers	190,000
	Died of cold, fatigue, and famine	132,000
Total loss		450,048
Eagles and standards taken		75
Cannon		929*

The number of those who escaped from the campaign was about 80,000, of whom 25,000 were Austrians and 18,000 Prussians: so that the survivors of the proper French army were not above 37,000, out of above 500,000 who entered the Russian territory. The annals of the world afford no example of so complete an overthrow of so vast an armament.†

The losses of the Russians, especially during the advance from Moscow, owing to the severity of the weather, were very great, and almost equalled that of the French. Only 35,000 of Kutusoff's army reached Wilna, and of these 18,000 were soon laid up in the hospitals. At Kalisch, when the campaign was finished, not more than 30,000 men could be assembled around the headquarters of the Emperor Alexander; but the number rapidly increased by the junction of convalescents, and detachments from the interior.‡

The Russian campaign having been the chief cause of the overthrow of Napoleon's power, and having substituted the colossus of Russian ambition for the terrors of French predominance, has given rise to numerous reflections and much party spirit. The partisans of the French emperor have incessantly urged that the destruction of the armament was solely owing to the severity of the winter; that the Russians were beaten in every encounter, and displayed both less conduct and courage than on former occasions; and that, but for the occurrence of circumstances which human wisdom could neither foresee nor prevent, the triumph of the French arms would have been complete. On the other hand, the adherents of the Bourbons have maintained that the overthrow was mainly owing to the impetuosity and want of foresight of the emperor himself; that he made no provision for a retreat, and deviated from the fundamental principle of a base in military operations; and that, blindly trusting to his own good fortune, he rushed headlong on destruction, and precipitated his army into the horrors of winter, by obstinately clinging to Moscow when reason and experience should equally have convinced him that he could not maintain himself in that position.

An impartial review of the circumstances of the campaign will probably lead to the conclusion that there is some truth and much error in both these sets of opinions.

all the historians, both French and Russian, who have treated on the subject, by the account which he himself received in Paris, in May, 1814, from his esteemed friends, Sir James Wylie and Sir Alexander Crichton, physicians to the emperor, who were engaged with him in these heroic acts of mercy.

* Bout., ii., 446. Gourg., ii., 199. Chamb., iii., 134.

† "Was there ever anything like this exhibited in the world before; the remains of 500,000 men, who had crossed the Niemen in such splendid order in June, now recrossed it, pursued by a detachment of cavalry?"—CHAMBRAY, iii., 134.

‡ Gourg., ii., 214. Aperçu sur la Campagne de 1813, 37.

I. It seems the height of injustice to assert that the emperor did not display his Great ability of Napoleon generally in the campaign. wanted military talent, and the troops their accustomed bravery, in this expedition. The arrangements made for providing the army during its advance—the minute and almost incredible attention which he paid to details of every description, and in every department*—the admirable talent with which he extricated himself from his perilous situation on the Beresina—have never been surpassed, and have extorted the admiration and obtained the generous praise of his enemies.† In truth, if the expedition failed from anything imputable to the French, it was the immense extent of the preparations made to secure its success; it being so true, in Montesquieu's words, that "distant expeditions fail from the very magnitude of the measures taken to carry them into execution."

II. It is equally in vain for the French to deny that the courage and skill of their ad- Heroic con- versaries were deserving of the high- stancy of the est admiration. To have retreated Russians. five hundred miles in front of an army double their own strength, without a single battalion being broken or a single standard taken; to have rallied the divisions originally separated, and fought a doubtful battle with superior forces in the heart of Russia; to have enclosed the conqueror in an iron circle, and reduced him to the danger of starving in the centre of his conquests; to have driven him to a ruinous retreat in the beginning of winter, and gained to the Russian arms all the advantages of the most decisive success, without the dangers by which it is usually purchased; to have united forces from the extremities of Europe, and brought them to the critical point of the enemy's retreat, at the very moment when he was compelled to pass it—are achievements almost without a parallel in military enterprise, and certainly without an equal in military success.

III. The attempt so frequently made by the French to throw the disasters of the campaign entirely upon the severity of the climate is perfectly hopeless, and has, in fact, been abandoned by their ablest military writers.‡ The reasons of this are sufficiently obvious.

1st. Supposing it were true that the immediate cause of the destruction of great part of the French army was the winter of Russia, the question remains, *What compelled them to brave its severity?* to leave the comfortable winter-quarters of Twer, Novogorod, or Kaluga, containing ample cantonments for their whole forces, and a country, according to Napoleon's account, as rich as the most fertile parts of France or Germany,§ and fall back on the ruined and wasted line of the Smolensko road? If they had really conquered their enemies in every encounter, and vanquished Russia but for the severity of its climate, what prevented them from obtaining the mastery of its resources, and maintaining themselves in the centre of the country, as they had done at Berlin and Vienna in former campaigns, or as the allies subsequently did at Paris? It is obvious that the fact of their retreating implies the sense of an inferiority in the field, and an inability to maintain their ground before the growing forces of their enemies; and if this retreat

* Gourg., ii., App., p. 220, ad finem. † Bout., ii., 405.

‡ Jom., iv., 206. § 26th Bull., iv., 146.

was begun at a hazardous time, so much the greater must have been the pressure of that necessity which compelled them to embrace so grievous an alternative.

2d. The truth, therefore, being apparent, that it was the superiority of Russia in light troops that rendered any attempt on the part of the French to maintain themselves in the interior of the country hopeless and impracticable, the disasters of the retreat were the immediate consequence of the advantages gained by their enemies, and ought, in fairness, to be ascribed to their conduct. If a seventy-four sends its antagonist to the bottom by a broadside, no one thinks of ascribing the victory to the elements, although the unhappy victims of defeat are swallowed up by the waves, not mowed down by the fire of the enemy. When the Duke of Brunswick retreated before Dumourier, in Champagne, the French were not slow in claiming the credit of the success, though it was mainly owing to the autumnal rains and the dysentery, which paralyzed their invaders; when Pichegru conquered Flanders and Holland, in 1794, the world justly ascribed the triumph to the French arms, though the losses of the allies were mainly owing to the cold, which was more severe than that which assailed the French army until after the passage of the Beresina;* and Napoleon never thought of transferring to the elements the glory of Austerlitz, although, according to his own account, one half of the Russian loss was owing to the breaking of the ice on the lakes, over which their troops were driven by the fire of the French artillery.†

3d. The cold of the winter in 1812 was neither premature nor extraordinary till the close of the campaign. Napoleon repeatedly expressed his astonishment in the bulletins at the fineness of the weather in October at Moscow, which he compared to the autumn at Fontainebleau;‡ and the winter was unusually late of setting in. The Russians themselves were astonished at its tardy advance, and began to fear that Providence, out of favour to Napoleon, had deprived them of its powerful aid.§ The snow did not begin to fall till the 6th of November; and before that time Marshal Davoust's corps alone had lost ten thousand men, since leaving Malo-Jaroslavit, from the fatigues of the march;|| and the stragglers from the army already overwhelmed the rear-guard. The cold in Holland, in 1795, and in Poland, in 1807, was more severe than that of Russia in 1812, till the troops approached Wilna;¶ and yet no disorder prevailed in the French armies of Pichegru or Napoleon, who kept the field during both these seasons; whereas, the French, when they left the Beresina, had lost, since the opening of the campaign, three hundred and fifty thousand men, and seven hundred pieces of cannon; and on the road from Moscow, not less than one hundred thousand, of whom more than half were prisoners of war.

4th. The cold was as severe on the Russians as the French, and the diminution of their forces for present operations as great from this cause as that of their adversaries. The army of Kutusoff left behind thirty thousand between

Malo-Jaroslavit and Krasnoi, though they were hardly ever engaged with the enemy;* and the French themselves admit, that when it arrived at Wilna it was only thirty-five thousand strong,† though the loss in the battle of Krasnoi, the only serious action in which it was engaged on the road, was only two thousand men;‡ and it left Malo-Jaroslavit with at least one hundred thousand combatants.§ Nor is it difficult to account for so prodigious a loss, when it is considered that the highest medical authority has established the fact, that troops from the South of Europe bore the cold better than the Russians themselves, or the Poles, who had been inured to it from their infancy.|| It is in vain, therefore, to seek for an explanation of the French disasters in a cause which, pressing with equal severity upon both armies, left their relative strength the same as before. Nor can it be alleged that the Russians, by marching over an unexhausted country, suffered less than their adversaries, who moved on the wasted line of their former march; for, if the prisoners of war be deducted, the Russian loss during their march appears to have been greater than that of Napoleon himself; and if they did gain an advantage by that circumstance, they owed it to the courage of their armies or the skill of their generals, which threw their adversaries on that line ten days before the winter commenced.

IV. The conduct of Napoleon in lingering so long at Moscow has been generally considered as the immediate cause of the ruin of his armament; and, in a military point of view, it has been considered as hardly admitting of defence. It appears, from official documents, that, a month before the commencement of the cold weather—viz., on October 6—he felt the necessity of a retreat, if the Russians did not make peace, and was already giving orders for the evacuation of the hospitals and the movement of the parks of artillery towards Mojaïsk.¶ On the 5th, 6th, 10th, 13th, and 15th of October, orders to that effect were issued to his marshals.** Had the retreat commenced at that period, however, there seems no reasonable ground for supposing that its results would have been materially different from what it actually was. The approach of Tchichagoff and Wittgenstein's armies would have rendered his projected winter-quarters at Smolensko untenable; and the army must still have fallen back to the Niemen, harassed and surrounded by the superior light troops of the enemy. The evils of famine, so severely felt on the whole road, would certainly not have been diminished if double the number of mouths had remained to be fed. If the artillery had not been disabled by the perishing of its horses from cold, it would have been as seriously impeded by the impossibility of maintaining them; and if the night bivouacs had not thinned the ranks of the French army, they would not have weakened the force of the enemy who was to assail them. The French army lost one third of its numbers by the march through Lithuania in summer, when the resources of the country were still untouched, the army fresh, and in high spirits before the bloodshed began: what had it to expect in a retreat for double the distance in autumn, over a country perfectly exhausted, with

Napoleon's long stay at Moscow was not what ruined him.

* *Jom., iv., 181.* † *Ante, ii., 371.*
‡ 25th Bull., iv., 141. 26th Bull., iv., 146. 27th Bull., iv., 147. 28th Bull., iv., 157.
§ *Lab., 241.* *Sigur., ii., 171.* || *Ibid., ii., 170.*
¶ *Jom., iv., 118.*

* *Rout., ii., 235.* † *Gour., ii., 235.* *Chamb., iii., 141.*
‡ *Bour., ii., 231.* § *Jom., iv., 171.* *Bout., ii., 158.*
|| *Larrey, Memoirs, vol. iv., p. 111, 114.* *Bour., ix., 136.*
¶ *Gour., ii., 72.* ** *Ibid., ii., 72.* *Fain, ii., 147.*

pressed and wearied troops, and a victorious enemy pressing its rear?*

On the other hand, the French emperor had every ground for believing that the occupation of Moscow would terminate the war gloriously for his arms. He had uniformly found that the capture of a metropolis led, sooner or later, to the subjugation of a country; and his former experience of the character of Alexander gave him no reason to believe that he would be able to resist the force of circumstances which had so often brought Austria and Prussia to submission. It may reasonably be doubted, therefore, whether Napoleon would have judged wisely in commencing his retreat at an earlier period, and thereby throwing away at once the chance which he had, by a protracted stay in the capital, of vanquishing the firmness of the Russian government. By so doing, he would have certainly incurred the evils of a disastrous retreat, and of a general insurrection against him in Europe, and thrown away the probable chance of a submission which would, during his lifetime at least, place his power beyond the reach of attack.

V. The conflagration of Moscow, though a sublime example of patriotism by the Russians, cannot be considered as the cause of the ruin of the French. It may have rendered the continued residence of the army round the Kremlin inadvisable; though we have Napoleon's authority for asserting, that *after* the fire the greater part of the army were still cantoned in Moscow, and amply supplied with furs, provisions, and every species of necessaries, and that the neighbourhood contained two thousand villages and cha-teaux still in preservation.† But, unquestionably, if the French cavalry and light troops had preserved their ascendancy in the field, and been able to forage successfully for the army, they might have secured winter-quarters in Novogorod, Twer, or in Kaluga, the centre of one of the richest countries in the world.

VI. It results, from these considerations, that the real causes of the disasters of Napoleon were, 1st. His imprudence in advancing so far from the base of his operations, and thereby exposing himself to the hazard of having a temporary disaster converted into a lasting defeat; or, in plain language, in risking his army so far from its magazines, dépôts, and re-enforcements. 2d. His advance to Moscow after the bloody battle of Borodino, and when his cavalry had suffered so severely as to preclude it from taking an efficient part for the remainder of the campaign. 3d. The alarming and extraordinary increase in the Russian light horse from the junction of the Cossacks of the Don, and the approximation of the seat of war to the nomade tribes on the eastern frontier of the Empire, which immediately prevented the French from foraging, and threatened their vast army with destruction, from the very magnitude of its own numbers. 4th. The conducting of the retreat by separate corps, with an interval of miles between them, which enabled the Russian army, though not superior in number upon the whole to the accumulated strength of their enemies, to fall with an overwhelming force on their detached columns, and pass their long line over the sword's edge, without hardly any injury to themselves. If this method of retreating was un-

avoidable for the supply of the army,* it only demonstrates the more clearly the imprudence of advancing such a distance, when no better method of escape was practicable, and the strength of the feeling of inferiority which must have existed to compel so great a captain to hazard it.

Of these causes, the most important place, in a military point of view, undoubtedly must be assigned to the immense preponderance which, when the French arrived at Moscow, was obtained by the clouds of light horse who crowded to the Russian standards from the banks of the Don, and the other nomade provinces of the Empire. The more that the memorable campaign of 1812 is studied, the more clearly it will appear that this was the real cause of the destruction of the French army, and that it must have proved equally fatal to them, even though Moscow had not been burned, or the frosts of winter had never set in. If a European army advances in good order, forming magazines as it goes, it may doubtless be able to withstand the utmost attacks of the Asiatic cavalry; and it was because they took these precautions that the armies of Alexander and the Romans in ancient, and of the British and Russians in modern times, have so often prevailed over the innumerable swarms of the Eastern horse. But when an army rushes headlong into the middle of the Scythian cavalry without having the means, from resources of its own, of providing itself with subsistence and forage, it is certain to be destroyed. Alexander the Great wisely avoided such a danger, and, contenting himself with a barren victory over the Scythians on the banks of the Oxus, turned aside from their inhospitable territory. Darius, with all the forces of Persia, penetrated into it and perished. The legions of Marc Antony and Crassus sunk under the incessant attacks of the Parthian horse; the genius of Julian proved inadequate to the encounter; the heroism of Richard Cœur de Lion was shattered against the innumerable squadrons of Saladin. The very magnitude of the carriages with which a European army invades an Asiatic territory proves the immediate cause of its ruin, by augmenting its encumbrances, and accelerating the period when, from being surrounded by the light horse of the enemy, it must perish from want. The enterprise of Napoleon against Russia thus proved abortive, from the same cause which, in every age, has defeated the attempts of refined nations to penetrate the Eastern wilds; and it is a striking proof of the lasting influence of general causes on the greatest of human undertakings, that the overthrow of the mightiest armament which the power of civilized man ever hurled against the forces of the East, was, in reality, owing to the same causes which in every age have given victory to the arms of the shepherd kings.

Although, however, the great superiority of the Russians in light horse unquestionably was the cause of the inability of the French to remain in the neighbourhood of Moscow, yet the disasters of the retreat would not have been nearly what they were had it not been for the entire want of provisions, on Napoleon's part, for a retreat. He had no magazines whatever between Moscow and Smolensko, a distance of about two hundred miles; and, ac-

The Russian light horse was the great cause of his ruin.

Burning of Moscow did not occasion it.

Real causes, in a military point of view, of the disaster.

* Lab., 225.
† 22d Bull., iv., 111. 21st and 22d Bull., iv., 109, 110.
86th Bull., iv., 145. ‡ Bout., ii., 447.

* Gour., ii., 92.

cordingly, it has been shown that General Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was intrusted with keeping open that communication, was under the necessity of stopping the convoys on their road to Moscow, in order to subsist his troops.* Immense magazines, indeed, had been collected at Borissov, Minsk, and Wilna, but between them and Smolensko there were none; and of what avail were these great stores in Lithuania, when the army had nearly five hundred miles to march before they could reach them, and when the forces left to garrison the towns where they were placed were so insufficient, that they all fell into the hands of the enemy as soon as they were attacked? How was it possible that any troops, even if the weather had been as fine as possible, could have carried provisions with them for so great a distance, when marching over a country of which the resources had been entirely consumed by the passage of both armies over it in the early part of the campaign? Nay, so far had the emperor been from anticipating a retreat, that he had not provided anything for frosting the horses' shoes: a circumstance which was the immediate cause of the ruin of the cavalry, and the necessity for soon leaving so great a part of the artillery behind; and even the bridges, which had been broken down in the course of the advance, had not even been repaired when the troops came to them again during their retreat.† It is evident, therefore, that Napoleon, spoiled by the successes of twenty campaigns, had anticipated only a residence in the interior of Russia, and had made no provision whatever for a retreat; and to this cause, undoubtedly, great part of the unparalleled calamities in which he was involved is to be ascribed.

On the other hand, justice requires that due credit should be given to the Russian mode of pursuit by a parallel march, a measure which was unquestionably one of the greatest military achievements of the last age. Had Kutusoff pursued by the same road as the French, his army, moving on a line wasted by the triple course of three previous marches, would have melted away even more rapidly than his enemy's. Had he hazarded a serious engagement before the French were completely broken by their sufferings, his own loss would probably have been so severe as to have disabled him from taking advantage of them. Despair rapidly restores the courage of an army: a disorderly crowd of stragglers often resume the strictest military order, and are capable of the greatest efforts when the animation of a battle is at hand. The passage of the Beresina, the battle of Corunna, the victory of Hanau, are not required to demonstrate this important truth. Well knowing that a continued retreat would of itself weaken his enemies, the Russian general manœuvred in such a manner as, with hardly any loss to himself, to make prisoners of above half their army, and that at a time when the storms of winter were making as great ravages in his own troops as in those of his antagonists. Had he not pursued at all, Napoleon would have halted at Smolensko, and soon repaired his disasters; had he fought a pitched battle with him on the road, his army, already grievously weakened by the cold, would have probably been rendered incapable of pursuing him to the frontier. By acting a bolder part, he might have gained a more

brilliant, but he could not have secured such lasting success: he would have risked the fate of the Empire, which hung on the preservation of his army; he might have acquired the title of conqueror of Napoleon, but he would not have deserved that of saviour of his country.*

But it would have been in vain that all these advantages lay within the reach of Russia, had their constancy and firmness not enabled her people to grasp them. Justice has not hitherto been done to the heroism of their conduct. We admire the Athenians, who refused to treat with Xerxes after the sack of their city, and the Romans, who sent troops to Spain after the defeat of Cannæ: what, then, shall we say of the generals who, while their army was yet reeking with the slaughter of Borodino, formed the project of enveloping the invader in the capital which he had conquered? what of the citizens who fired their palaces and their temples lest they should furnish even a temporary refuge to the invader? and what of the sovereign who, undismayed by the fires of Moscow, announced to his people, in the moment of their greatest agony, his resolution never to submit, and foretold the approaching deliverance of his country and of the world? Time, the great sanctifier of events, has not yet lent its halo to these sacrifices: separate interests have arisen; the terror of Russia has come in place of the jealousy of Napoleon; and those who have gained most by the heroism of their allies, are too much influenced by momentary considerations to acknowledge it. But, when these fears and jealousies shall have passed away, and the pageant of Russian, like that of French ascendancy, shall have disappeared, the impartial voice of posterity will pronounce that the history of the world does not afford an example of equal moral grandeur.

But all the heroism of Alexander, and all the devotion of the Russians, great and memorable as they were, would have failed in producing the extraordinary revolution which was effected in this campaign, if they had not been aided by the moral laws of nature, which impel guilty ambition into a boundless career of aggression, and provide a condign punishment in the vehement and universal indignation which its violence occasions. Madame de Staël has said that Providence never appeared so near human affairs as in this memorable year; and the faithful throughout Europe, struck with the awful nature of the catastrophe, repeated, with feelings of awe, the words of the Psalm: "Efflavit Deus et dissipantur." Yet, while no reasonable mind will doubt the agency of Supreme power in this awful event, it is perhaps more consonant to our ideas of the Divine administration, and more descriptive of the established order of the universe, to behold in it the consequence of the fixed moral laws of our being, rather than any special outpouring of celestial wrath. It was the necessity of conquest to existence, which Napoleon throughout his whole career so strongly felt, and so often expressed, which was the real cause which precipitated him upon the snows of Russia; and we are not to regard the calamitous issue of the expedition as the punishment merely of his individual ambition, but as the inevitable result and just retribution of the innumerable crimes of the Revolution. The

Moral grandeur of the conduct of the emperor and people of Russia.

Moral causes to which the overthrow of Napoleon was owing.

* *Ante*, iii., 576.

† *Chamb.*, ii., 362, 395.

* *Bout.*, ii., 450.

steps which brought about this consummation now stand revealed in imperishable light: the unbounded passions let loose during the first fervour of that convulsion, impelled the nation, when the French throne was overturned, into the career of foreign conquest; the armed multitude would not submit to the cost which their armies required; the maxim that war must maintain war flowed from the impatience of taxation in the Parisian, as it had done in the Roman people; and the system was of necessity adopted of precipitating armies, without magazines or any other resources except warlike equipment, to seek for subsistence and victory in the heart of the enemy's territory. Thence the forced requisitions, the scourging contributions, the wasting of nations, and the universal exasperation of mankind. Nothing was wanting, in the end, but

VOL. III.—4 G

the constancy to resist the vehemence of the onset, for the spirit of universal hostility was roused; and this was found in the firm tenacity of Wellington at Torres Vedras, and the devoted heroism of Alexander in Russia. The faithful trembled and sunk in silence, and almost doubted, in the long-continued triumph of wickedness, the reality of the Divine administration of the universe; but the laws of Providence were incessantly acting, and preparing in silence the renovation of the world.

"Sæpe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem,
Curarent Superi terras, an nullus inesset
Rector, et incerto fluerent mortalia casu.

Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini pœna tumultum,
Absolvitque Deos. Jam non ad culmina rerum
Injustos crevisse queror; telluntur in altum,
Ut lapsu graviore ruant."



APPENDIX.

CHAPTER LI.

Note A, p. 112.

The company's territories consist of 514,000 square miles; including the protected states, it embraces 1,128,800 square miles.—*Parl. Return*, 1831, and MARTIN, ix., 2, *duodecimo edition*. Europe contains, to the westward of the Ural Mountains, 500,000 square leagues, or 3,500,000 square miles.—See MALTE BRUN, i., 4. France, 156,000 square miles.—*Ibid.*, viii., 273.

Note B, p. 112.

The exact numbers are,	
Bengal Presidency.....	39,957,561
Madras do.	15,090,084
Bombay do.	6,940,277
Other states in northern provinces....	40,000,000
Ava, Arracan, &c.....	101,987,922
Allied or protected states.....	100,000,000
Total under British sway.....	201,987,922

—See *Population Returns*, 1831, and MARTIN, viii., 256, 269.

Note C, p. 112.

The revenue in 1833 was £18,677,952; that for fifteen years, ending 1829, £309,151,920, or about £20,650,000 per annum. The charges in India are £17,583,132, leaving at present a surplus of £1,094,820. The public debt has stood, since 1792, as follows:

1792.....	£9,142,720
1809.....	30,812,441
1814.....	30,919,620
1829.....	47,255,374
1833.....	44,800,000

—See *Parl. Pap.*, May, 1833, and MARTIN, ix., 113.

Note D, p. 114.

As an example of the rapid diminution of crime in British India within the last twenty years, the convictions for serious crimes in the Court of Nizamut Adawlut, at Calcutta, may be quoted.

Year.	To Death.	Transportation.	Year.	To Death.	Transportation.
1816.....	115	282	1822.....	50	165
1817.....	114	268	1823.....	77	118
1818.....	64	261	1824.....	51	145
1819.....	94	345	1825.....	66	128
1820.....	55	324	1826.....	67	171
1821.....	58	278	1827.....	55	153

Circuit Court of Bengal.

	Burglary.	Cattle Stealing.	Embezzlement.	Larceny.
1816 to 1818....	2853	203	150	1516
1825 to 1827....	1036	31	49	223

Lower and Western Provinces of Bengal.

	Sentenced.		Gang Robberies.		Murders.
1826.....	13,869	1807.....	1481		406
1827.....	8,075	1824.....	234		30

—MARTIN, ix., 322, 329.

Note E, p. 114.

The following table exhibits the increase of committals in the British islands since the commencement of the present century.

	England.	Ireland.	Scotland.
1805.....	4,605	2,644	89
1807.....	4,446	2,690	114
1820.....	9,318	12,476	1486
1825.....	9,964	15,515	1876
1830.....	18,107	16,192	2063
1832.....	20,829	16,056	2451
1834.....	23,451	21,381	2711
1836.....	20,984	23,892	2852
1837.....		27,396	2922

—See MOREAU'S *Statist. de la Grande Bretagne*, ii., 289, 297; *Parl. Paper, Commons*, 1812, and *Parl. Returns of Crime in 1834-6*; PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i., 137, 143, 144.

Contrast the decrease of crime in different provinces of India during the same period, with the deplorable increase of offences of the same description in the British islands.

Cases of shooting, stabbing, and poisoning, in England and Wales.							
1826....	47	1828....	72	1830....	86	1832....	132
1827....	82	1829....	81	1831....	104	1833....	138

Western Provinces of India.

Affrays with loss of Life.		Homicides.		Violent Reprehensions.	
1821-23....	232	1818-20....	377	1818-20....	1000
1827-28....	118	1827-28....	185	1827-28....	512
Violent Affrays in Kish- enagur.		Gang Robberies in Do.		Bengal Circuit Court Sen- tenced.	
1807....	482	1808.....	329	1822-24....	2170
1824....	33	1824.....	10	1825-27....	1524

Table of crimes, persons apprehended, convicted, property stolen and recovered, in three years, ending 1832, in the Supreme Court at Calcutta.

	Offences.	Persons Com- mitted.	Convict- ed.	Property Stolen.	Recovered.
1830....	2330	3556	625	136,383	4,854
1831....	1304	1256	675	123,714	33,828
1832....	1329	2023	718	62,981	6,793

—ROBERTSON'S *Civil Government of India*, and MARTIN, ix., 326, 335.

State of sentences for crime in lower and western provinces of Bengal in two periods of two years each.

Lower Provinces.	Murder and Robbery.	Do. with Torture or Wounding.	With Vi- olence.	Murder.	Homi- cide.	Violent Assault.
1824 and 1826.	165	283	330	358	303	86
1827 and 1828.	96	194	221	196	248	47

Western Provinces.

1824 and 1826.	460	901	83	311	311	180
1827 and 1828.	271	512	34	252	185	118

—MARTIN'S *India*, ix., 326.

Contrast this with the increase of serious crime, tried by jury, in Glasgow during the last fifteen years, and in Ireland in the same period.

GLASGOW, 1822-37.

IRELAND, 1822-37.

	Tried by Jury.	Rate of serious Crime to whole Population in each year.	Committed.
1822.....	98	1 to 1540	15,251
1823.....	114	1366	14,632
1824.....	118	1361	15,258
1825.....	160	1037	15,515
1826.....	188	909	16,318
1827.....	170	1041	18,031
1828.....	212	873	14,683
1829.....	239	790	15,271
1830.....	271	719	15,794
1831.....	238	848	16,192
1832.....	272	768	16,036
1833.....	341	633	17,819
1834.....	267	838	21,381
1835.....	348	633	22,367
1836.....	329	741	23,891
1837.....	392	645	27,396
1838.....	454	556	

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i., 145; *Combination Committee Evidence*, 1838, 267.

Note F, p. 115.

In Holkar's country alone the number of villages rebuilt and repeopled were,

	Holkar's Country.	Dhar.	Dewar.	Bhopel.
1818.....	269	28	35	362
1819.....	343	68	106	249
1820.....	508	52	72	267

—MALCOLM'S *Central India, Appendix*.

Note G, p. 115.

The following is a statement of the wages of labour under the Peishwa's government in 1814, and the British in 1828:

	1814. PEISHWA'S.	1828. BRITISH.
	Rupces Monthly.	Rupces Monthly.
Carpenter.....	12-40	15-45
Sawyer.....	8	15-22
Smith.....	12-20	15-30
Tileman.....	12	15-18
Bricklayer.....	15-20	25-35

1814. PEISHWA'S	1828. BRITISH.
Rupees Monthly.	Rupees Monthly.
Tailor..... 6	9-11
Camel-man..... 5	7- 9
Palanquin-man..... 10	15-16

No change in the value of money during this period.—COLONEL SYKES'S *Bombay Statistics*, Lords' Committee, 1830, and MARTIN, ix., 352.

Note H, p. 115.

The following table shows the rapid increase in the export trade from Britain to India within the last twenty-five years, and illustrates both the advancing opulence and comfort of the inhabitants of Hindostan, and the incalculable importance of this branch of commerce, if established on equitable principles, both to the East and West, to the inhabitants of the British islands.

Years.	Exports.	Years.	Exports.
1814.....	£1,574,690	1826.....	£3,471,552
1815.....	2,565,761	1827.....	4,636,190
1816.....	2,589,453	1828.....	4,467,673
1817.....	3,388,715	1829.....	4,100,002
1818.....	3,572,164	1830.....	4,087,311
1819.....	2,347,083	1831.....	4,105,444
1820.....	3,037,911	1832.....	4,235,483
1821.....	3,544,395	1833.....	4,711,619
1822.....	3,444,443	1834.....	4,644,318
1823.....	3,416,575	1835.....	5,456,116
1824.....	3,476,213	1836.....	6,750,842
1825.....	3,173,213		

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i., 193, 195, and *Progress of the Nation*, ii., 102.

Note I, p. 118.

The following is the revenue of India in the year 1831-2:	
Land revenue.....	£11,671,188
Professions and ferries.....	213,072
Salt and licenses.....	2,314,982
Ci customs.....	1,380,099
Opium.....	1,442,570
Postoffice.....	103,501
Tobacco.....	63,048
Mint receipts.....	60,518
Stamps.....	328,300
Judicial fees and fines.....	70,469
Layer and Akbaw.....	764,759
Marine and pilotage.....	45,974
Calcutta excise.....	19,106
	£18,477,586

—*Parl. Pap.*, May, 1834, and MARTIN, ix., 113.

Note K, p. 123.

Hindostan, from the Himalaya Mountains to Cape Comorin, contains 514,000 square miles: including the protected states, 1,128,000. The population of the former is 102,000,000, being at the rate of about 200 to the square mile. This, under the tropical sun, and with the rich alluvial soil of a large part of India, capable, in general, of bearing two crops in the year, must be considered a very scanty population. France contains 32,000,000 of inhabitants, and 156,000 square miles, or 214 to the square mile: England, 13,500,000, and 38,500 square miles, or 330 to the square mile: Flanders, 3,762,000, and 7400 square miles, 507 to the square mile. Even in Bengal, the garden of Hindostan, out of 202,650 square miles, only 89,250 are actually under cultivation. The produce of the soil there varies from forty to a hundred fold: on an average about sixty fold, or at least four times that of the richest portion of Europe, which would, of course, maintain four times the number of persons on a square mile that can find subsistence in these northern climates.—MOREAU, *Stat. de la Grand Bretagne*, ii., 107-112; and MALTE BRUN, vi., 84; and *Stat. Journal*, i., 195. In the Madras presidency, the population is only 107 to the square mile: in the Bombay, 114; in Singapore and Malacca, 92; in Ceylon, 50: over the whole of India 144, which are hardly as much as a fourth of these respective numbers under the climate and soil of Europe.—MOREAU, ii., 113.

CHAPTER LIII.

Note A, p. 145.

"Tippoo Sulthan, having manifested," said Lord Wellesley, "the most hostile dispositions towards us, possesses an army of which a considerable portion is in a state of readiness; he has increased the number of his French officers; and he may receive farther assistance from the corps commanded by French officers in the service of the Nizam, of Scindiah, and many other native powers. He may be assisted by the invasion of Zemaun Schah, and by the direct co-operation of Scindiah. On the other hand, our protecting force on the coast of Coromandel cannot be put in motion within a shorter space than six months, even for the purpose of defending the Carnatic; our allies, meanwhile, are utterly unable to fulfil their defensive engagements towards

us; the Peishwa being depressed and kept in check by the invasion of Scindiah, and the Nizam by the vicinity of that chieftain's army, and the overbearing influence of an army commanded by French officers, and established in the centre of the Deccan. While we remain in this situation, without a soldier prepared to take the field in the Carnatic, or an ally to assist our operations, in the event of an attack from Tippoo, we leave the fate of the Carnatic to the discretion of Tippoo; we suffer the cause of France to acquire hourly accessions of strength in every quarter of India: we abandon our allies, the Nizam and the Peishwa, to the mercy of Scindiah and Tippoo, in conjunction with the French, and we leave to France the ready means of obtaining a large territorial revenue, and a permanent establishment in the Deccan, founded upon the destruction of our alliances."—*Minute of the Governor-general*, Aug., 1798, WELLESLEY'S *Despatch*, i., 191, 192.

Note B, p. 165.

"From the first hour of Colonel Monson's retreat," said Marquis Wellesley to Lord Lake, "I always augured the ruin of that detachment; if any part is saved, I deem it so much gain. Whatever may have been his fate, or whatever the result of his misfortunes to my own forces, I will endeavour to shield his character from obloquy, nor will I attempt the mean purpose of sacrificing his reputation to save mine. His former services and zeal entitle him to this indulgence; and, however I may lament or suffer from his errors, I will not reproach his memory if he be lost, or his bravery if he survives. We must endeavour rather to retrieve than to blame what is past; and, under your auspices, I entertain no doubt of success. Every hour, however, which shall be left to this plunderer will be marked with some calamity; we must expect a general defection of our allies, and even confusion in our own territories, unless we can attack Holkar's main force immediately with decisive success. I perfectly agree with you: the first object must be the defeat of Holkar's infantry in the field, and to take his guns. Holkar defeated, all alarm and danger will instantly vanish; even a doubtful battle would be perilous; we must therefore look steadfastly at that grand object, and if we accomplish it, every other will be easy."—LORD WELLESLEY to LORD LAKE, Sept. 11, 1804, WELLS. *Desp.*, iv., 205.

At the same time Lord Lake wrote to Lord Wellesley: "The first object, in my opinion, is to destroy Holkar; I shall therefore do everything in my power to bring him to action at an early period, which, by his bringing his guns, and having met with success, I think very probable may soon take place. The taking a large force with me will, of course, leave our provinces in a weak and defenceless state; but, as it appears the whole of India is at stake, some risk must be made to accomplish this, our principal object. Despondency is of no avail: we must therefore set to work and retrieve our misfortune as quickly as possible. Here, my dear lord, I must remark, that, whatever may be said upon the subject, you, surely, cannot be implicated in the business; for all blame ought to fall upon me for detaching the force in the first instance, when I thought I had selected a corps with an officer to command them, who would have accomplished all my wishes, and obtained the end proposed. This being the case, I certainly became responsible, in the first instance, and shall upon every occasion, both here and at home, declare publicly that you had nothing to do with the march of that detachment; and that all censure for that measure must be attributed to me, and me alone."—LORD LAKE to LORD WELLESLEY, Sept. 24, 1804, WELLS. *Desp.*, iv., 216. These are the principles by which empires are won and saved: here is, on the part of both these great men, the eye of Napoleon and the heart of Henry IV.

CHAPTER LIII.

Note A, p. 180.

The following is a detailed statement of the different corps of the French and Austrian armies taken from the accurate works of Pelet and Stutterheim.—*Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809*, par PELET; STUTTERHEIM, *Krieg von 1809*.

FRENCH. IN GERMANY.

	Effective.	Present.	Horse.
Army of the Rhine, Davoust,	108,458	93,114	26,933
Corps of observation on the Baltic, Bernadotte,	15,360	12,933	3,694
Reserve of Infantry, Oudinot,	28,861	26,480	2,646
Total French in Germany,	152,679	132,527	33,203

CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE.

Bavarians.....	30,800
Saxons.....	15,800
Wurtembergers.....	12,000
Westphalians.....	14,000
Lesser powers of the Confederation.....	29,240
Total German.....	101,840

IN POLAND.

Poles.....	19,200
Russians.....	15,000
	34,200

IN ITALY.

Five divisions of infantry, three of cavalry, under Eugene.....	60,000
---	--------

TOTAL EFFECTIVE.

French in Germany.....	152,679
Confederation of the Rhine.....	101,840
Poles and Russians.....	34,200
In Italy.....	60,000

Total..... 348,719
Of whom 300,000 might be present with the eagles, and 428 pieces of cannon with the Grand Army.—PELET, i., 172, 185.

AUSTRIANS.

IN GERMANY.

	Infantry.	Cavl.	Guns.
1st corps, Count Bellegarde in Bohemia.....	25,700	2100	—
2d — Count Kollowrath at Pilsen.....	23,300	2700	—
3d — Hohenzollern at Prague.....	23,913	1010	—
4th — Prince Rosenberg around Scharding.....	24,914	2894	—
5th — Archduke Louis at Braunau.....	24,383	2042	—
6th — General Hiller at Braunau.....	23,374	2139	—
1st reserve, Prince John of Lichtenstein at Newhaus.....	12,998	2564	—
2d — Kienmayer, Braunau.....	6,950	2460	—
Jellachich's division, Salzburg.....	9,962	1009	—
Artillerymen for 518 pieces, distributed between these corps.....	19,976	—	—
	188,470	18,918	518

IN ITALY.

8th corps, Marquis Chastellar at Klagenfurth.....	18,250	1942	—
9th — At Lapach, Count Giulay.....	24,348	2758	—
	42,598	4700	128

IN POLAND.

7th corps, Archduke Ferdinand at Croatia.....	30,200	5900	94
---	--------	------	----

IN TYROL.

Chastellar's division (separate from his corps).....	9672	260	—
--	------	-----	---

Total.

	Infantry.	Cavl.	Guns.
In Germany, under Archduke Charles.....	188,570	18,918	518
In Italy, under Archduke John.....	42,598	4,700	148
In Poland, under Archduke Ferdinand.....	30,200	5,900	94
In Tyrol.....	9,672	260	16

Grand total..... 271,040 29,078 776
Of whom 250,000 might be relied on for active operations.—STUTTERHEIM, 38, 46.

Note B, p. 180.

"When all endeavours to preserve independence from the insatiable ambition of a foreign conqueror prove fruitless; when nations are falling around us, and when lawful sovereigns are torn from the hearts of their subjects; when, in fine, the danger of universal subjugation threatens even the happy states of Austria, and their peaceable fortunate inhabitants, then does our country demand its deliverance from us, and we stand forth in its defence. On you, my brother soldiers, are fixed the eyes of the universe, and of all those who still feel for national honours and national prosperity. You shall not incur the disgrace of being made the instruments of oppression; you shall not carry on the endless wars of ambition under distant climes; your blood shall never flow for foreign fleets or insatiable covetousness, nor on you shall the curse alight of annihilating distant nations, and over the bodies of the slaughtered defenders of their country, paving the way for a foreigner to a usurped throne. A happier lot awaits you: the liberty of Europe has taken refuge under your banners. Your victories will loose its fetters, and your brothers in Germany, yet in the ranks of the enemy, long for their deliverance. On the fields of Ulm and Marengo, of which the enemy so often reminds us with ostentatious pride, shall we renew the glorious deeds of Wurtzburg and Ostrach, of Stockach and Zurich, of Verona, Trebia, and Novi. We will conquer a lasting peace for our country, but that great end is not to be attained without proportionate virtues. Unconditional subordination, strict discipline, persevering courage, unshaken steadiness in danger, are the companions of true fortitude. Nothing but a union of will, and joint co-operation of the whole, can lead to victory. I will be everywhere in the midst of you; you shall receive the first thanks of your country from your general on the field of battle. The patriotism of the Austrian nobility has anticipated your wants; this is a pledge of the national gratitude. Adorned with the marks

of the public esteem, will I present to our sovereign, so the world, those brave men who have deserved well of their country. Civil virtues must also accompany your arms out of the field of battle; the real soldier is moderate, compassionate, humane; he knows the evils of war, and strives to lighten them. It is not the intention of our monarch to oppress foreign nations, but to deliver them, and to form with their princes a lasting peace, and maintain the general welfare and security."—*Ann. Reg.*, 1809, 691; *App. to Chron.*

CHAPTER LIV.

Note A, p. 195.

The lakes and valleys in the vicinity of Salzburg, particularly the König See, the valley of Berchtholsraden, leading to it, the defile above Hallein, the Troon, Aber, and Alter sees, and the whole valley up to Gasteren, present the most magnificent scenery in Europe. It rivals the Grande Chartreuse in grandeur, and unites to its romantic character the sublimity of the Gasteren-thal and the Oeschinen-thal at the upper extremity of the valley of Kandersteg in Switzerland, the finest and most impressive scenery in the vast amphitheatre of the central Alps. No words, in particular, can do justice to the König See, a noble sheet of water, eight or ten miles in length, thirty miles to the south of Salzburg, shrouded amid stupendous mountains, whose summits, ten thousand feet high, wrapped in eternal snow, almost overhang the lake which nestles in their bosom. Vast forests of fir lie immediately below the region of rock and snow in these lofty piles; but the cliffs which shut in the lake, several thousand feet in perpendicular height, descend abrupt and sheer to the water's edge, varied at intervals by noble forests of beech and oak, whose tints, especially in autumn, add inexpressible beauty to the near points of this matchless landscape. The great superiority which the Alps in this quarter possess over those in the central cantons in Switzerland consists in this, that, from their not rising from so elevated a plateau, the pine and the fir do not occur so uniformly and early in the scene, but rich forests of walnut, sycamore, beech, and oak, surmount, in the first instance, the green and grassy vales where mountain freedom and laborious industry have spread a velvet carpet amid the shapeless piles of rock, which primordial earthquakes have detached from the overhanging mountains. The pine and larch occur in a more elevated region, forming a sable band between the brilliant tints of the foliage beneath, and the pure glitter of the snow, or the gray hue of the rocks above. The mountains are not of such height as to be overloaded, or have their ravines filled with snow; naked, or sprinkled only in the upper parts with a silvery mantle, they exhibit all their romantic forms to the eye, and the enormous strata are disposed with such regularity, that, at the distance even of twenty or thirty miles, every layer is distinctly visible, and the traveller feels as if he was approaching the ruined castles of the giants of the earth, some standing erect, some cast down and scattered in fragments around. Yet so steep and perpendicular are their sides, and so completely do they in many places overhang the lakes, that, in rowing along, you can see reflected in the mirror all the gradations, from the smooth-shaven meadow, on the margin of the water, through the inaccessible cliffs rising abruptly from their sides, to the dark forests of the middle zone, and bare rocks of the upper region—you can touch with your hand the snowy summits of the mountains. The author visited these incomparable scenes two-and-twenty years ago; but the assistance of numerous sketches then made is not requisite to recall the features of the scenery to his memory; they are indelibly imprinted there, and will remain engraven to the latest hour of his life.

Note B, p. 212

Several writers, and in particular one celebrated historian, whose temper and judgment are not equal to his talent (MONTGAILLARD, vi., 405), have represented the early retreat of Napoleon from the field of battle in the evening of the 22d into the island of Lobau, and thence at midnight across the main stream to Vienna, as a pusillanimous desertion of his troops, which brings both his courage and capacity seriously into question. There does not seem to be any ground for this opinion. Chiefs were not wanting to the French emperor, who would, with the utmost gallantry, head and stimulate the charges of the troops; but his own proper sphere of action was different, and one head only could sustain the weight of a hundred and fifty thousand men. Had Napoleon fallen at the head of his guards on the Marchfeld, no other courage would have been equal to sustaining the conflict; the army would have retreated to the Rhine, and the mighty fabric of the Empire was dissolved in a moment. The time had not yet arrived when it was the duty of its chief to conquer or die. The case was different with the Archduke Charles: when he put himself at the head of the regiment of Zach, and, with the standard in his hand, threw himself on the enemy, the last hour of the Austrian monarchy appeared to be striking; the conflict was that of Napoleon on the heights of Montmartre; vain would

be all the skill of the generalissimo, unless, in that decisive moment, the bravery of the colonel repaired the disorder, and arrested the dreadful irruption of Lannes's columns.

Note C, p. 213.

"On the two banks of the Danube," says Napoleon, "I had, at the time of the battle of Aspern, twenty thousand men more than the archduke. In the battle of the 21st, twenty-five thousand men combated a hundred thousand during three hours and a half, and preserved their positions."—*NAPOLEON IN MONTHOLON*, ii., 78, *Mélanges*. These numbers are grossly exaggerated, according to his usual practice; but the greater the disproportion is made, the worse for Napoleon; for how did a general at the head of a hundred and twenty thousand men come to expose twenty-five thousand to so grievous a chance as combating against such odds, with a river all but impassable in their rear? There are occasions in war when such a risk as this must be incurred, and when to hazard it is the first duty of a commander. Such was Wellington's situation on the Douro in 1809, and Napoleon's own at Lodi in 1796, and in Champagne in 1814; but in 1809 he lay under no such necessity; the capital, the resources, the arsenals of Austria were in his power; the great stroke which was to fascinate mankind had been struck; the archduke was in the predicament of being compelled to undertake perilous measures.

CHAPTER LV.

Note A, p. 222.

The Tyrolese are of a singularly mechanical turn. Necessity has driven them to the useful arts as a means of supplying the deficiencies of nature; and the numerous mountain streams and cascades with which the country abounds, afford ample opportunity of obtaining, at no expense, an external power capable of setting in motion their simple machinery. Conducted into the fields, the houses, and mills, by little wooden troughs, in the course of their precipitous descent, the mountain torrents perform the most important functions of domestic economy. The irrigation of the meadows, the grinding of corn, the fabrication of oil, the grinding of tools, are all performed by these streams, or the mills which they set in motion. In many places, each peasant has his mill, which is applied to almost every purpose of life—even the rocking of a cradle is sometimes performed by means of a water-wheel. Nor are the most minute arts overlooked by this industrious people; and numbers of families earn a not contemptible livelihood by rearing canary birds, which are sold in all the cities of Europe.

The following are some of the most remarkable statistical facts connected with the population of Tyrol, viz.:

		Acres.
Inhabitants.....	762,000	392,000
Cows.....	131,000	152,000
Sheep.....	137,000	1,700
Oxen.....	44,000	1,508,600
Goats.....	63,000	2,906,700
Elementary Schools	735	
Do. endowed		
by government...	15	
German race.....	598,500	
Italian race.....	163,420	

The people are all Catholic. The great proportion of the country in forest and rock is very remarkable, and sufficiently explains its romantic character.—See *MALTE BRUN*, vii., 549, 551.

Note B, p. 225.

The following proclamation was issued by the Archduke John: "Tyrolese! I am come to keep the promise which I made to you on the 4th of November, 1805, that the time would certainly come when I should have the joy of again finding myself among you. The peace of Presburg was the cause of all your subsequent disasters: it broke the tie which had connected Austria with Tyrol for 500 years; but even the father of your country recollected his beloved children. He stipulated that the Tyrol should remain undivided, retain all its rights and liberties; in a word, 'that, in the same manner, and with the same rights and titles with which the emperor had possessed it, it should be made over to Bavaria, and not otherwise.' The King of Bavaria solemnly promised to your deputies, 'that not an iota of the constitution should be changed; that he honoured the grief which the Tyrolese felt for their ancient masters; but that he hoped, by constant care and attention, to make himself equally regretted by them. By the royal proclamation, 14th of January, 1806, it was declared, 'that the Tyrolese should not only retain their ancient rights and liberties, but their welfare be promoted in every possible manner.' Where has been the promised attention to your interests; where the regard to the constitution you have so bravely defended! The clergy were their first object of attack: this was their plan, because they were the intrepid defenders of the throne and the altar. With bitter feelings, the Tyrolese beheld their abbeys and monasteries destroyed, the property of the churches stolen and carried away,

their bishops and priests exiled, their churches profaned, their chalices sold to the Jews. Your knights and nobles, who, before the institution of the tributary law, were all your equals, and never a burden to the country, are all destroyed—your cities and courts of justice are ruined—your sons or brothers hurried away by a cruel conscription to fight the battles of the oppressor against Austria, their lawful master, or Spain, or Russia. The Bavarians have refused the bank-bills of the Austrians in payment; and, when this occasioned to every man the loss of half his property, they overburdened the remainder with such oppressive taxes, that it has reduced many landholders to the rank of day-labourers. Even the name of your country is taken from you, and your valleys are called after the unmeaning name of rivers. To arms! Rise, Tyrolese! to arms, for your God, your emperor, your country! Why is the war a holy one! why is it necessary and general? Because so great a power cannot be opposed alone, and therefore every one should assist in the cause; because the restoration of rights and liberties is to be gained if attempted; because neither Germans nor Bohemians ought to be obliged to sell their blood as the blind instruments of an insatiable power—to be forced against their will to invade Russia or Spain, or oppress the less powerful kingdoms of the world. We have an enemy to oppose whom hitherto nothing has been able to oppose; but, with unanimity, ardour, and firm perseverance, nothing is impossible. We possess this firmness and courage; this unanimity warms every heart. Austria has gone through many dangers, and emerged from them victorious. The present is the greatest of them all, but there never was the same unanimity. In a moment of such consequence to our faithful country, in the midst of such ardour for the holiest cause for which sword was ever drawn, I plant the Austrian eagle on the earth of Tyrol. I know you—I recall you, as Duke Ferdinand did, 933 years ago—the prelates, the nobles, the citizens, the peasants, to the foot of the throne. Arms, and courage, to restore the rights you desire. Recollect the glorious days when you defeated Joubert at Spinger Jenis and Botzen. I am no stranger to your mountains and valleys. I am confident you will retain the hopes of your fathers, and our highest expectations.—*ARCHDUKE JOHN*.—See *GESCH. A. HOFER*, 64, 76.

Note C, p. 230.

"All the passages over the Inn, and especially the bridge of Hall, were vigilantly guarded by the Bavarian posts, who justly deemed it a matter of especial importance to prevent any joint measure being concerted on the opposite sides of the river. Spechbacher, however, undertook the perilous mission of opening up the communication between the northern and southern valleys. Accompanied by his trusty companions, George Zoppel, and Simon Lechner, and a young peasant girl, Zoppel's servant, he set out on the evening of Whitmonday. In the evening they encountered a body of a hundred Bavarian dragoons: Spechbacher and his companions concealed themselves behind some pines at the foot of a cliff, fired on the party from their ambush, and, immediately scaling the precipice, loaded and fired again. The Bavarians, conceiving they were attacked by a numerous body of sharp-shooters, fled, and left the passage open. Spechbacher met with Hofer accordingly, and a general assemblage around Innsbruck was arranged for the 28th of May. On his return, however, fresh difficulties were encountered: the bridge of Hall and all the points of transit were vigilantly guarded, and every person rigorously searched who attempted to pass from the one side to the other. In this perplexity he was relieved by the inventive genius of his trusty companion, George Zoppel, and his servant maid. The girl first crossed the bridge, and, as nothing suspicious was found upon her, she was allowed to pass. Then George Zoppel presented himself; after him came Spechbacher's great poodle dog, in whose woolly tail the despatches were concealed; and, while the sentinels were busily employed in searching Zoppel's pockets, the dog, obedient to the call of the servant maid, brushed past the soldiers, and ran up to her. Spechbacher came last, but being unknown, and nothing found upon him, he was allowed to pass."—*Bartholdy, Kreig*, 1809, 168, 172.

Note D, p. 236.

"Germans!" said the Duke of Brunswick, "will you continue to combat Germans! Will you, whose mothers, wives, and sisters have been outraged by the French, shed your blood in their defence! It is your brothers who now invoke you—come to break your fetters—to avenge the liberty of Germany! To arms! then, Hessians, Prussians, Brunswickers, Hanoverians! all who bear the honourable name of Germans, unite for the deliverance of your fatherland, to wipe away its shame and avenge its wrongs. Rise to deliver your country from a disgraceful yoke, under which it has so long groaned. The day of its emancipation has arrived: none more favourable can ever be desired." "Aspern," said General Radivojich, who had penetrated into Fraconia, and occupied Baurath, with five thousand

men from Egra, in Bohemia, "Aspern has destroyed the invincibility of Napoleon! Arm yourselves for the cause of liberty, of justice, of Austria, to deliver Europe and the human race." "You combat," said Noditz, one of the chiefs of the Tugendbund, to the Prussians of Bareuth, "in order to restore your country to your beloved king." The Duke of Brunswick's Volunteers wore a light blue uniform, with a death's-head and cross-bones on their cloaks, to indicate the mortal hostility in which they were engaged, from whence they acquired the name of the *Death's-Head Hussars*. The officers were distinguished from the privates, in a corps where all were respectable, only by a small cross on their arms. The duke himself was as simply dressed as any of his followers: he shared their fare—slept beside them on the ground—underwent their fatigues. These martial qualities, joined to the ascendancy of a noble figure and unconquerable intrepidity, so won the hearts of his followers, that they disdained to desert him even in the wreck of the fortunes of Germany, after the battle of Wagram; followed his standard with dauntless confidence across all Westphalia and Hanover, embarked in safety for England, and lived, as we shall see in the sequel, to flush their swords in the best blood of France on the field of Waterloo.—See HARDENBERG, x., 392, 394, and PELET, iv., 26, 27.

CHAPTER LVI.

Note A, p. 244.

Poniatowsky's complaints of the tardiness of the Russians throughout this campaign were, as might easily have been anticipated, both frequent and acrimonious. On the 27th of June, he thus wrote to the Emperor Napoleon: "Notwithstanding the positive promise of Prince Gallitzin to move two of his divisions across the San on the 21st instant, he did nothing of the kind. Under pretence of failure of provisions, that measure was not carried into effect till two days after, and then with the same tardiness which has characterized all the operations of the campaign. These delays have given the Austrian corps, which had been thrown forward on the right bank of the Vistula, the means of effecting its retreat without any molestation. The certain intelligence which, subsequent to that period, they had received, that Prince Gallitzin would not pass the Vistula, has encouraged the Archduke Ferdinand to move the greater part of his forces, or about twenty-five thousand men, to the Pilica, and thus menace the frontiers of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw. This has obliged me to move upon Pulawy. The arrival of the Russian army in Galicia having afforded them a pretext for spreading themselves over the province, has contributed materially to retard the formation of the new levies; for the Russian generals establish wherever they go Austrian authorities, who do all they can to torment the inhabitants, and to stifle every feeling which may eventually menace the interests of their sovereign."—SAVARY, iv., 95. In another report he stated, "The concert of the Russians with Austria is so clearly demonstrated, that, to speak plainly, it was the Polish troops whom they both regarded as enemies. It was the more difficult to prevent the effects of that intelligence, that the chiefs of the two armies acted entirely in concert, to give occasions for it to arise."—PELET, iv., 73.

Note B, p. 254.

"Orders were despatched by the Archduke Charles to the Archduke John, to hasten up to Enzersdorf on the evening of the 4th of July. On the same night, Prince Eugene's army, to which he was opposed, entered the island of Lobau. The Archduke John lay on the night of the 4th at Presburg, distant ten leagues from Wagram. He received the despatch at five in the morning of the 5th, and, instead of setting out, as he should have done, in a few hours, he did not move till midnight on the 5th, and, in consequence, had only reached Marchegg, five leagues on his road, at ten o'clock on the 6th, the very time when he should have been attacking the French right at Leopoldsdorf or Glinzdorf. The Archduke Charles, conceiving he had, in obedience to his instructions, arrived there on the night of the 5th, had sent an order to him, as already mentioned, to co-operate in the attack on the latter village in the morning, which he could easily have done had he arrived there the night before, as it is only four leagues distant from the extreme French right; whereas, he only appeared on the ground at half past three in the afternoon, when the general retreat was resolved on. Prince John marched from Presburg to near Glinzdorf, between midnight on the 5th and four o'clock P.M. on the 6th, that is, in sixteen hours, which was as expeditious as could have been expected. Had he set out seven hours after getting his orders, i. e., at noon on the 5th, he would, at the same rate, have been on his ground at four A.M. on the 6th, in time to have co-operated with Rosenberg in the attack on the French right, retained Napoleon and his guards in that quarter to make head against such formidable assailants, and altogether prevented the countermarch of those veter-

ans from right to left, which repaired the disaster of Massena and Bernadotte in the centre, and arrested the victorious advance of Kollowrath and Klenau on the right. But for the failure of the Archduke John to come up in time, therefore, the battle was irrevocably lost to Napoleon."—See PELET, iv., 162, 238.

Note C, p. 255.

"Bernadotte's proclamation to the Saxons was in these terms: Saxons! In the day of the 5th of July, seven or eight thousand of you pierced the centre of the enemy's army, and reached Deutch Wagram, despite all the efforts of forty thousand of the enemy, supported by sixty pieces of cannon; you continued the combat till midnight, and bivouacked in the middle of the Austrian lines. At daybreak on the 6th, you renewed the combat with the same perseverance, and, in the midst of the ravages of the enemy's artillery, your living columns have remained immovable like brass. The great Napoleon was a witness to your devotion; he has enrolled you among his bravest followers. Saxons! the fortune of a soldier consists in the performance of his duties; you have worthily performed yours."—*Bivouac of Leopoldsdorf, 7th July, 1809*. This order of the day was inserted in all the German papers at the time.—BOUR, vii., 280.

Note D, p. 255.

Napoleon's order of the day was conceived in the following terms: "Independent of the consideration that his majesty commands the army in person, and that to him it belongs to distribute the measure of praise or blame to every one, on this particular occasion success was owing to the French, and not to any foreign troops. The order of the day of the Prince of Pontecorvo, tending to inspire false pretensions in troops of the most ordinary description, is contrary to truth, to policy, to the national honour. The success of the day of the 5th is due to the Marshals the Dukes of Rivoli and Oudinot, who pierced the centre of the enemy at the same time that the corps of the Duke of Auerstadt turned their flank. The village of Deutch Wagram was not taken on the evening of the 5th: it was so only on the morning of the 6th, at six o'clock, by the corps of Marshal Oudinot. The corps of the Prince of Pontecorvo did not remain 'immovable as brass'; on the contrary, it was the first to beat a retreat. His majesty was obliged to cover the corps of the viceroy by the divisions Broussier and Lamarque, commanded by Marshal Macdonald, by the division of heavy cavalry commanded by General Nansouty, and a part of the cavalry of the guard. It is to that marshal and his troops that the eulogium is really due, which the Prince of Pontecorvo has attributed to himself. His majesty desires that this testimony of his displeasure may serve as an example to deter any marshal from arrogating to himself the glory which belongs to another. His majesty has, nevertheless, desired that this order of the day, which would doubtless distress the Saxon army, though its soldiers know well that they do not merit the eulogiums which have been bestowed upon them, shall remain secret, and only be sent to the marshals commanding the corps d'armée."—NAPOLEON.—See BOURRIENNE, viii., 281, 289; who seems, nevertheless, to admit that the leading facts stated in the severe order of the day by the emperor are well founded.

CHAPTER LVII.

Note A, p. 265.

"You are, upon the receipt of these our instructions, to repair with our said troops to the Scheldt, and carry into effect the following instructions, in conjunction with the commander of the naval forces. This conjoint expedition has for its object the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, either building or afloat at Antwerp or Flushing, or afloat in the Scheldt, the destruction of the arsenals and dockyards at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing, the reduction of the island of Walcheren, and rendering the Scheldt, if possible, no longer navigable for ships of war."—LORD CHATHAM'S *Instructions, 16th July, 1806, Parl. Deb., xv., App. No. 1*.

It appears, also, from Lord Chatham's evidence before the Parliamentary committee, that he was in possession of the more detailed government plan, which was to proceed across South Beveland immediately after landing, and land the troops at Sandvliet on the right bank of the Scheldt, opposite Bahtz, and thence push on direct to Antwerp. On the 5th of August, twenty thousand men, according to his statement, might have been collected there, a force amply sufficient for the complete success of the expedition. "I conceive," says Lord Chatham, "what was intended to be done was, by landing such part of the army as was not engaged in the siege of Flushing, or employed in the reduction of Walcheren, as soon as possible at Sandvliet, and to proceed against Antwerp according to circumstances, which could not be distinctly known till the arrival of the expedition. The expedition, under the most favourable circumstances, might have arrived at Sandvliet in four days from

leaving the Downs; on the 4th of August the infantry and cavalry might have been disembarked at that place, and the heavy stores and ordnance in two or three days more."—*LORD CHATHAM'S Evidence, Parl. Deb., xv., 350, 359, App.* Sandvliet is only ten miles from Antwerp, and the first considerable re-enforcement of the enemy arrived at that town on the 11th and 12th. It is evident, therefore, that the success of the expedition was certain, if the government plan of pushing up the Scheldt with the bulk of the army, leaving a division only to observe Flushing, had been complied with. But the cabinet at home appear to have not sufficiently impressed upon Lord Chatham the necessity of adhering energetically to this plan, and for not having interrupted the siege of Antwerp when once it was commenced.

Note B, p. 268.

The general policy of the expedition, according to the original instructions of government, was clearly established by the following documents. 1st. In Lord Castlereagh's secret instructions to Lord Chatham previous to sailing, it was stated: "The complete success of the operation would include the capture or destruction of the whole of the enemy's ships, whether building at Antwerp or afloat in the Scheldt, the entire destruction of their yards and arsenals at Antwerp, Terneuse, and Flushing, and the rendering the Scheldt, if possible, no longer navigable for ships of war. As the accomplishment of these objects, in their fullest extent, must, in a great measure, depend upon the rapidity with which the enterprise is carried into execution, it has been deemed advisable to appropriate such an amount of force to this service as may enable you, at the same time that you occupy Walcheren and South Beveland, to advance at once a considerable force against Antwerp, which may be re-enforced as soon as Flushing is invested, if not actually reduced. The expedition, therefore, must be considered as not, in the first instance, assuming any other character than a *coup-de-main*, combining with it a powerful diversion against the enemy."—*Secret Instructions, June, 1809; Parl. Deb., xv., 426, App. 2d.* It was proved by Colonel Fyers, the chief engineer of the army, and General M'Leod, the commander of artillery to the expedition, that, "supposing the army to have landed successively at Sandvliet on the 1st, 2d, and 3d of August, thirty mortars might have been ready in battery to begin the bombardment of the city of Antwerp and fleet on the evening of the 9th or morning of the 10th, and that both might have been destroyed if they did not surrender."—*Ibid., 553, 566, App. 3d.* The battering-train was immense, amounting to seventy battering guns, seventy-four mortars.—*Ibid., sec. 7, App., Evid., c. 138.* 4th. On the 9th of August, there were only a few thousand troops and national guards in Antwerp, all in a great state of alarm: the first re-enforcement of any amount which arrived were the King of Holland's guards and troops of the line, in number five thousand, who did not arrive till the 12th, and could not have entered the town if the English had been before it.—*JOMINI, Vie de NAPOLEON, iii., 302.* These facts and documents are a complete exculpation of ministers in every particular, except the choice of Lord Chatham, and the delay in sending out the expedition.

Note C, p. 273.

The losses of Austria by this treaty were:

	Inhabitants.
In Galicia, to the Grand-duchy of Warsaw.....	1,500,000
to Russia.....	400,000
In Germany, to Bavaria and kingdom of Italy....	1,124,680
In Italy, to France and the kingdom of Italy....	480,680
	3,505,360

The population of Austria, after these losses, was 20,738,541; her frontier was destroyed, both towards France and Italy; she was entirely cut off from all communication with the sea; and lost, besides all the harbours yielding customs, many of the most important mines of salt, silver, lead, and iron in her dominions.—*See BIGNON, viii., 377; and HARDENBERG, x., 48-479; and SCHOELL, Hist. des Traits, ix., 297, 298; and Congrès de Vienne, Rec. de Pièces Off., iii., 57, 66.*

CHAPTER LVIII.

Note A, p. 288.

Mr. Champagny stated in his answer to Mr. Canning's note, which announced the necessity of admitting the Spanish nation to the negotiation: "France and Russia can carry on the war, so long as the court of London shall not recur to just and equitable dispositions; and they are resolved to do so. How is it possible for the French government to entertain the proposal which has been made to it of admitting to negotiation the Spanish insurgents? What would the English government have said had it been proposed by them to admit the Catholic insurgents of Ireland? France, without having any treaties with them, has been in communication with them, has made them promises, and has frequently sent them succours. Could such a proposal

have found place in a note, the object of which ought to have been not to irritate, but to conciliate, and effect a good understanding. England will find herself under a strange mistake, if, contrary to the experience of the past, she still entertains the idea of contending successfully upon the Continent against the armies of France. What hope can she now have, especially as France is irrevocably united to Russia? The only admissible basis is to admit to the negotiation all the allies of the King of England, whether it be the king who reigns in the Brazils, the king who reigns in Sweden, the king who reigns in Sicily, and to take for the basis of the negotiation the *Ut possidetis*."—*CHAMPAGNY to Mr. Secretary CANNING, 28th Nov., 1808, Parl. Deb., xii., 101.*

Note B, p. 292.

The Budget of Great Britain and Ireland for 1809 stood as follows:

INCOME.	
Malt, Pensions, &c.....	£3,000,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund.....	4,000,000
Surplus Ways and Means, 1808.....	2,757,000
War-taxes.....	19,000,000
Lottery.....	300,000
Excess of Exchequer Bills.....	3,154,000
Excess of do.....	1,355,000
Vote of Credit.....	9,000,000
Loan.....	11,000,000
Irish Taxes and Loan.....	6,000,000
War Income.....	£53,566,000
Permanent Taxes.....	36,959,000
Nett payments.....	£90,525,000

EXPENDITURE.	
Navy.....	£18,986,000
Army.....	21,144,000
Ordnance.....	5,903,000
Miscellaneous.....	1,900,000
Vote of Credit.....	3,300,000
Swedish Subsidy.....	300,000
Sicilian do.....	400,000
Interest on Exchequer Bills.....	1,927,000
War Expenditure.....	£53,566,000
Interest of Debt.....	24,313,000
Sinking Fund.....	11,359,000
Total.....	£89,522,000

—*See Parl. Deb., xiv., App. No. 1, and p. 533; and Ann Reg., 1809, p. 81.*

CHAPTER LIX.

Note A, p. 341.

Income and expenditure of Great Britain for 1810:

I. INCOME.	
Ordinary Revenues.	
Customs.....	£9,909,735
Excise.....	18,495,178
Stamps.....	5,546,082
Land and Assessed Taxes.....	8,011,205
Postoffice.....	1,471,746
Crown Lands.....	110,273
Lesser sources.....	1,250,697
Total permanent.....	£44,794,916

Extraordinary.	
Customs.....	3,906,483
Excise.....	6,855,812
Property-tax.....	13,492,215
Lottery.....	471,250
Irish Loan.....	2,448,470
Surplus Fees of Officers.....	136,398
Loans, including £1,400,000 Irish.....	13,242,356
Grand total nett payments....	£85,350,900

II. EXPENDITURE.	
Interest of National Debt, and charges of management.....	£21,773,227
Sinking Fund.....	11,660,601
Interest of Exchequer Bills.....	1,815,105
Civil List.....	1,533,110
Civil Government of Scotland.....	118,186
Miscellaneous.....	775,399
Navy.....	20,058,412
Army.....	18,536,300
Ordnance.....	4,652,331
Loans to other countries, viz.,	
Sicily.....	£425,000
Portugal.....	1,247,898
Spain.....	387,294
	2,050,082
Miscellaneous.....	2,270,867
	£85,243,620

The total expenditure rose to £89,000,000.—*Parl. Deb., xx., 1-15, Appendix.*

Note B, p. 347.

The exact numbers were:

Etat major et gen-d'armes	229
2d corps, Régiment	19,232
6th do. Ney	35,067
8th do. Junot	2,643
Reserve of cavalry, Montbrun	5,117
Under Massena's immediate command	86,076
In reserve under Drouot at Valladolid	23,315
under Serras at Benevente	15,107
under Bonnet in Asturias	14,885
Total under Massena	200,671

—NAPIER, iii., 568, Table.

CHAPTER LX.

Note A, p. 379.

Table of the result of Criminal Commitments in Scotland, England, and Ireland, in the years 1832 and 1837.

1832.	Committed.	Convicted.	Acquitted.	Proportions of Convictions to Acquittals.
England	20,829	14,947	3,716	4 to 1
Ireland	16,056	9,759	2,449	4 to 1
Scotland	2,431	1,599	64	24 to 1
1837.				
England	23,612	17,096	4,388	4 to 1
Ireland	14,804	9,536	3,011	3½ to 1
Scotland	3,126	2,358	229	11 to 1

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables* for 1832, p. 80, 88, and 1837, 117, 118.

Note B, p. 379.

Table showing the amount of Bank-notes in circulation from 1792 to 1815, with the Commercial Paper under discount at the Bank during the same period, and the Gold and Silver annually coined at the Bank.

Years.	Total of Notes.	Commercial Paper rendered at Bank.	Bullion coined.
1792	£11,307,380	—	£1,171,863
1793	11,388,910	—	2,747,430
1794	10,744,020	—	2,558,895
1795	14,017,510	2,946,500	493,416
1796	16,729,520	3,505,000	464,680
1797	11,114,120	5,350,000	2,600,297
1798	13,095,830	4,490,600	2,967,565
1799	12,959,610	5,403,900	449,962
1800	16,854,800	6,401,900	189,937
1801	16,203,280	7,905,100	450,242
1802	15,186,880	7,523,100	437,019
1803	15,499,980	10,747,600	596,445
1804	17,077,830	9,982,400	718,397
1805	17,871,170	11,365,500	54,668
1806	17,730,120	12,380,100	405,106
1807	16,950,680	13,484,600	None.
1808	14,183,860	12,950,100	371,714
1809	16,542,860	15,475,700	298,946
1810	21,019,600	20,070,600	316,936
1811	23,360,220	14,355,400	312,263
1812	23,408,320	14,291,600	None.
1813	23,210,930	12,330,200	519,722
1814	24,801,080	13,285,800	None.
1815	27,261,650	14,917,100	None.
1816	27,013,620	11,416,400	None.

—MOREAU'S *Tables*, and PERRIN, 279 MARSHALL'S *Digest*, p. 97, 147, 236.

Note C, p. 384.

The following was the evidence given on the subject of the high price of bullion, by Mr. Chambers, before the committee of the House of Commons.

In the examination of Mr. Chambers, a gentleman who deservedly enjoys the reputation of great intelligence and extensive information in the commercial world, we find the following evidence: "At the mint price of standard gold in this country, how much gold does a Bank of England note for one pound represent? Five dwts. three grains." "At the present market price of £4 12s. per ounce, how much gold do you get for a bank-note of one pound? Four dwts. eight grains." "Do you consider a Bank of England note for one pound under these present circumstances as exchangeable in gold for what it represents of that metal? I do not conceive gold to be a fairer standard for Bank of England notes than indigo or broad-cloth." Question repeated. "If it represents twenty shillings of that metal at the coinage price, it is not." —HUSKISSON'S *Life*, i., 36. Mr. Huskisson adds, in these answers this leading doctrine is manifestly and ingeniously asserted and maintained; and all who stand up for the undepreciated value of bank paper, however disguised their language, must ultimately come to the same issue.—*Ibid*.

Note D, p. 385.

Table showing the progress of exports to, and shipping

with, the countries with which reciprocity treaties have been concluded, compared with those with whom there have been no such treaties, and the British colonies.

I indulged a sanguine hope that, before this volume went to the press, the valuable returns on this head moved for in the House of Commons in March last, by my esteemed friend, J. C. Colquhoun, of Killermont, would have been published, and which will throw the most important light upon the erroneous policy which has caused so much commercial distress in Great Britain for the last twenty years, and the simultaneous causes which have counteracted their effect, arising out of the unprecedented growth of its colonial empire. But the returns moved for have not yet been laid before Parliament; and, therefore, I am under the necessity of foregoing the pleasure of laying that valuable document before the public in this edition.

Note E, p. 393.

BUDGET OF 1811.

Income, Ordinary.	
Customs	£6,802,402
Excise	18,489,914
Stamps	5,090,478
Land and assessed	6,868,230
Postoffice	1,274,000
Small taxes	87,605
Total ordinary nett	£38,612,629
Hereditary revenue	65,814

War-taxes.

Customs	£2,633,919
Excise	6,410,139
Property-taxes	12,941,155
Arrears	14,336
Lottery	254,386
Proportion of Irish loan for England	2,752,796
Smaller sums	253,866

English loan	£63,965,990
Total, Britain	16,636,375
Irish loan and taxes	£81,602,365
	10,309,000
Grand total	£91,911,365

Expenditure.

Interest of debt	£20,749,828
Life annuities	1,540,257
Sinking fund	13,084,274
Total of debt funded	£34,374,359
Interest of Exchequer bills	1,556,753
Total charge of debts, funded and unfunded	£35,931,094
Civil list	1,472,403
Do. Scotland	109,693
Miscellaneous	596,549
Navy	19,540,678
Army	23,869,359
Ordnance	4,557,509
Loans to foreign states	7,410,039
Miscellaneous	1,962,636
For United Kingdom	£95,450,060
Deduct for Ireland	4,489,462
	£90,960,598

—*Finance Accounts, Ann. Reg.*, 1812, 398, 400, and *Parl. Deb.*, xxii., 1-34, App.

Note F, p. 394.

BUDGET OF 1812.

Income, Permanent.	
Customs	£8,296,289
Excise	17,800,248
Stamps	3,313,986
Land and assessed	7,373,157
Postoffice	1,534,608
Smaller duties	90,692
Permanent and annual taxes	£38,408,980
Hereditary revenue	106,630

War-taxes and Resources.

Customs	£2,948,330
Excise	5,204,754
Property-tax	13,368,606
Lottery	350,145
Proportion of Irish loan	2,793,313
Exchequer bills repaid	910,470
Smaller sources	352,931
Total, exclusive of loans	£64,446,159
Loans, including for Ireland	4,350,000
East India	2,500,000
Total	£93,714,745

Expenditure.

Interest of funded debt.....	£21,361,252
Life annuities.....	1,529,659
Management.....	233,705
	£23,124,616
Sinking fund.....	13,482,510
Total charge of debt funded.....	£36,607,126
Interest of Exchequer bills.....	1,835,369
Total charge of debt, funded and unfunded.....	£38,442,495
Civil list, &c.....	1,635,601
Do. Scotland.....	112,748
Bounties, pensions, drawbacks, &c.....	582,675
Navy.....	20,500,339
Army.....	24,957,362
Ordinance.....	4,252,469
Foreign loans.....	6,204,028
Miscellaneous.....	1,779,089
East India Company's loans.....	2,498,000
Advance on commercial Exchequer bills.....	1,375,141
Total.....	£104,369,857
Deduct for service of Ireland.....	6,848,516

Total expenditure of Great Britain. £97,521,371.
—*Finance Account for year ending 5th January, 1813; Parl. Deb., p. 2-23, 24; Ann. Reg., 1813, p. 328.*

Note G, p. 395.

Propositions submitted by Mr. Mackenzie, on behalf of the British government, to the French government, and rejected by them.

“Projet d’une convention pour l’échange des prisonniers de guerre, présenté par M. Mackenzie à M. de Moustier.”

“ART. I. Tous les Anglais, tous les Espagnols, Portugais, Siciliens, Hanovriens, et autres sujets de, ou au service de, la Grande Bretagne, ou des puissances en alliance avec elle, qui sont maintenant prisonniers de guerre en France, en Italie, à Naples, en Hollande, ou dans tout autre pays en alliance avec, ou dépendant, de la France, seront relâchés sans exception.

“ART. II. Tous les Français, Italiens, et autres personnes sujets de, ou au service de France, ou d’Italie, tous les Hollandais et Napolitains, et tous autres sujets, ou au service des puissances alliées de la France, qui sont maintenant prisonniers de guerre dans la Grande Bretagne, l’Espagne,

la Sicile, le Portugal, le Brésil, et dans tous autres pays en alliance avec la Grande Bretagne, ou occupés par des troupes Britanniques, seront relâchés sans exception.

“ART. IV. Sect. 1. Tous les prisonniers Britanniques, de quelque rang et qualité qu’ils soient, qui sont détenus en France, et en Italie, et dans les dépendances de la France, et de l’Italie, seront libérés. L’échange devra commencer immédiatement après la signature de cette convention, en envoyant à Deal ou à Portsmouth, ou à tout autre port d’Angleterre dans la Manche, dont on sera convenu, ou en remettant aux commissaires Britanniques, qui seront nommés pour les recevoir, mille prisonniers Britanniques pour mille Français, qui seront relâchés par le gouvernement Britannique de la manière stipulée ci-après.

“Sect. 2. Tous les prisonniers Français, de tout rang et qualité, maintenant détenus dans la Grande Bretagne, ou dans les possessions Britanniques, seront relâchés. L’échange commencera immédiatement après la signature de cette convention, et se fera en envoyant successivement à Morlaix, ou dans tout autre port Français de la Manche dont il pourra être convenu, ou en délivrant aux commissaires Français mille prisonniers Français pour mille prisonniers Anglais, aussi promptement et dans la même proportion que le gouvernement relâchera les derniers.

“Sect. 6. Lorsque tous les prisonniers Britanniques détenus en France, en Italie, et dans leurs dépendances, auront été échangés pour un nombre égal (à régler et fixer sur le principe établi dans la section précédente de cet article) de prisonniers Français détenus en Angleterre et dans ses possessions, la balance des prisonniers Français qui pourront rester dans les mains de la Grande Bretagne seront relâchés sans délai, et envoyés en France en échange d’un nombre égal de prisonniers de guerre Espagnols lesquels seront envoyés à tels ports ou à telles villes d’Espagne qui seront convenus, de la manière suivante.

“Sect. 13. Tous les Portugais et Siciliens prisonniers en France, ou dans les pays alliés ou dépendant de la France, et tous les prisonniers appartenant à la France, et à ses alliés, qui seront dans les mains des Portugais et des Siciliens, seront relâchés mutuellement, et de la même manière et aux mêmes conditions qui ont été stipulées ci dessus par rapport aux Français et aux Espagnols, avec telles modifications seulement que les circonstances et la situation particulière de ces pays pourront requérir.”—*Mémoires d’un Homme d’état*, ii., 438-464.

CHAPTER LXI.

Note A, p. 409.

General State of the French Armies in Spain.

January 15th, 1811.

Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.		Horses.	
Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.		Cavalry.	Draught.
295,227	52,462	17,780	4,714	48,831	361,838		41,189	15,987
April 15th, 1811.								
276,575	46,990	15,121	2,166	40,079	331,776		37,855	11,301
Army of Portugal.—April 1st, 1811.								
51,237	11,717	3,716		12,229	68,051		11,142	
Army of the South—Soult, Duke of Dalmatia, commanding.—May 15th.								
75,133	13,124	3,915	1,336	11,420	90,468		12,156	2,304
5th Corps.—January 15th.								
16,766	6,158	3,035	640					
1st Corps, before Cadiz.—February 15th, 1811.								
25,781	2,661	1,331	681	1,997	29,409		2,207	1,035
4th Corps.—February 15th.								
22,723	5,464	741	397	2,577	25,993		5,069	793
Army of the North—Bessières, Duke of Istria, commanding.—February 1st, 1811.								
58,516	8,574	1,992		6,860	67,787		7,979	1,073
April 15th, 1811.								
53,148	6,930	2,321		5,350	60,719		6,065	879

—NAPIER, iii., 576, 571.

CHAPTER LXII.

Note A, p. 433.

Summary of the Force of the Anglo-Portuguese Army, exclusive of Drummers and Artillerymen.—October 1st, 1811

CAVALRY.

	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Prisoners.	Total.
British.....	3,571	1,114	947	298	5,930
Portuguese.....	1,373	256	1,140	...	2,769
Total cavalry.....	4,944	1,370	2,087	298	8,699

INFANTRY.

	Present.	Sick.	Command.	Prisoners.	Total.
British.....	29,530	17,974	2,663	1,684	51,851
Portuguese.....	23,689	6,009	1,767	75	31,480
Total infantry.....	53,219	23,983	4,370	1,759	83,331

General total, including sergeants, 58,263 sabres and bayonets in the field.

Note B, p. 433.

Summary of the French Force in Spain at different periods, extracted from the Imperial Muster Rolls.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Absent.	Effective.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
August, 1811.....	279,637	41,598	50,583	10,869	42,433	372,841	52,467
January, 1812.....	258,156	41,049	22,805	5,434	42,056	324,933	42,348
April, 1812.....	244,692	36,747	12,260	3,849	34,369	291,379	40,653

August 1, 1811.

	Under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Effective.	
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.		Men.	Horses.
Armée du Midi.....	50,597	10,008	32,043	5,359	11,836	94,508	1,195 } 4,608
							3,413 }
" du Centre.....	16,540	3,729	391	64	1,781	18,712	3,236 }
							567 }
" de Portugal	38,392	5,826	7,901	3,100	10,424	56,733	6,692 }
							2,234 }
" d'Aragon.....	45,103	5,718	1,397	388	5,458	51,957	3,667 }
							2,439 }
" du Nord.....	88,092	11,020	7,617	1,805	6,654	102,413	3,531 }
							4,294 }
" de Catalogne ...	23,553	1,368	1,153	153	5,305	30,095	1,268 }
							253 }
Total.....	262,276	37,669	50,503	10,869	41,452	354,418	35,348 }
							13,100 }
Re-enforcements.....	17,361	3,929	81	—	981	18,428	3,929 }
							39,277 }
General total.....	279,637	41,598	50,583	10,869	42,433	372,841	52,467 }
							13,190 }

—NAPIER, iv., 588, 589.

Note C, p. 434.

The most perfect example of the wonderful effect of a skilful use made of an interior line of communication, by a force inferior upon the whole, but superior to either taken singly, is to be found in the march of the Consul Nero, from the ground which he occupied in front of Hannibal in Apulia, to the Metaurus in the plain of Lombardy, where he met and defeated the great Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal, and thereby turned the fate of Carthage in the ancient world. The account of it is given in Livy, lib. XXVII., cap. xliii., xlviii. The march and plan of the Consul Claudius Nero are admirably narrated in the following passages from Livy; and they are singularly instructive, as showing how exactly similar his plan of operations was to that which has justly acquired for Napoleon the admiration of the world:

"Inter hæc ab Hasdrubale, postquam a Placentina obsidione abscessit, quatuor Galli equites, duo Numidæ, cum literis ad Hannibalem missi, quam per medios hostes totam ferre longitudinem Italiae essent emissi, dum Metapontum cederent Hannibalem sequuntur, incertis itineribus Tarentum delati, a vagis per agros pabulatoribus Romanis ad Q. Claudium propere deducuntur. Eum primo incertis implicantes responsis, ut metus tormentorum admotus fateri vera cœgit, edocuerunt, literas se ab Hasdrubale ad Hannibalem ferre. Cum his literis, sicut erant, signatis, L. Virginio tribuno militum ducendi ad Claudium consulem traduntur duas simul turmas Samnitium presidii causâ missæ. Qui ubi ad consulem pervenerunt, literæque lectæ per interpreses sunt, et ex captivis percunctatio facta; tum Claudius, non id tempus esse reipublicæ ratus, quo consilii ordinariis provinciis suas quisque finibus per exercitus suos cum hoste destinato ab senatu bellum gereret audendum aliquid improvisum inopinatum, quod ceptum non minorem apud cives, quam hostes terrorem faceret, perpetratum in

magnam letitiam ex magno metu verteret; literis Hasdrubalis Romanæ ad senatum missis, simul et ipse Patres conscriptos quid pararet, edocet, ut, quum in Umbriâ se obscurum Hasdrubal fratri scribat, legionem a Capuâ Romanæ arcessant; delectum Romæ habeant; exercitum urbanum ad Narniam hosti obponant. Hæc senatui scripta. Præmissi item per agrum Larinatum, Marrucinum, Frentanum, Prættutianum, quæ exercitus ducturus erat, ut omnes ex agris urbibusque commotus paratos militi ad vescendum in viam deferrent, equos jumentaque alia producerent, ut vehiculorum fessis copia esset. Ipse de toto exercitu civium sociorumque, quod roboris erat, delegit sex milia peditum, mille equites; pronuntiavit, occupare se in Lucania proximam urbem Punicumque in eâ presidium velle; ut ad iter parati omnes essent. Profectus nocte flexit in Picenum. Et consul quidem, quantis maximis itineribus poterat a collegâ ducibat, relicto Q. Catio legato, qui castris præesset. Nero postquam jam tantum intervalli ab hoste fecerat, ut detegere consilium satis tutum esset, paucis militibus adloquitur. Negat ullius consilium imperatoris audacious, re ipsâ tutius fuisse quam suum. Ad certam eos se victoriam ducere. Quippe ad quod bellum collega non ante quam ad satiætatem ipsius peditum atque equitum datæ ab senatu copię fuissent majores instructioresque, quam si adversus ipsum Hannibalem iret, profectus sit, eo ipsos, quantumcumque virium momentum addiderint, rem omnem inclinaturos. Audium modo in acie (nam, ne ante audiretur, daturam operam) alterum consulem et alterum exercitum advenisse, hæc dubiam victoriam facturum. Famam bellum conficere, et parva momenta in spem metumque impellere animos. Gloriæ quidem ex re bene gestâ parte fructum prope omnem ipsos laturos. Semper, quod postremum adjectum sit id rem totam videri traxisse. Cernere ipsos, quo concursu, quâ admiratione, quo favore hominum iter suum celebretur.—LIV., lib. xxvii., cap. 43, 45.

CHAPTER LXIII.

Note A, p. 472.

General State of the French Army.—May 15, 1812.

	Present under arms.		Detached.		Hospital.	Men.	Total.	Cavalry.	Artillery.
	Men.	Horses.	Men.	Horses.					
Armée du Midi.....	56,031	12,101	2,787	660	4,652	63,470	7,311	4,340	
" du Centre.....	17,395	4,208	158	37	766	19,203	3,332	420	
" de Portugal	52,618	7,244	9,750	1,538	8,332	70,700	4,481	3,448	
" d'Aragon.....	27,218	4,768	4,458	605	3,701	35,377	2,976	1,980	
" de Catalogne.....	33,677	1,577	1,844	267	6,009	41,530	1,376	279	
" du Nord.....	33,771	6,031	2,560	271	7,767	49,098	4,443	1,163	
Total.....	225,710	35,929	21,557	3,378	31,227	279,378	23,919	11,630	
Old reserve at Bayonne..	3,894	221	1,642	—	964	6,500	207	—	
New reserve at Bayonne..	2,598	116	3,176	—	5	5,769	108	—	
General total....	232,202	36,266	26,375	3,378	32,196	291,647	24,229	11,630	

—NAPIER, vi., 618.

CHAPTER LXVI

Note A, p. 542.

Force of the French Army which entered Russia in 1812, from the Imperial Muster Rolls.

		INFANTRY.			
Generals.	General Staff.	Date of entering Russian territory.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Horses.
Berthier.....	1st Corps,	June 24, 1812,	3,075	908	1,748
Dayoust.....	2d do.	Idem.	66,627	3,424	11,417
Oudinot.....	2d do.	Idem.	34,299	2,840	7,331
Ney.....	3d do.	Idem.	35,755	3,587	6,039
Eugene.....	4th do.	June 30, 1812,	42,430	2,368	10,057
Poniatowsky.....	5th do.	June 24, 1812,	32,159	4,152	9,438
Gouvion St. Cyr.....	6th do.	July 1, 1812,	23,228	1,906	3,699
Reynier.....	7th do.	June 24, 1812,	15,003	2,186	5,582
Vandamme.....	8th do.	Idem.	15,885	2,050	2,477
Victor.....	9th do.	Sept. 3, 1812,	31,663	1,904	4,081
Macdonald.....	10th do.	June 24, 1812,	30,023	2,474	6,285
Schwartzenberg.....	Austrian do.	Idem.	26,830	7,318	13,126
Napoleon.....	Imperial Guard,	Idem.	41,094	6,279	16,322
CAVALRY.					
Nansouty.....	1st Corps,	Idem.	—	12,077	13,014
Montbrun.....	2d do.	Idem.	—	10,436	11,125
Grouchy.....	3d do.	Idem.	—	9,676	10,451
Latur-Maubourg.....	4th do.	Idem.	—	7,994	8,766
Durutte.....	Division Durutte,	Nov. 2, 1812,	13,592	—	76
Loison.....	Division Loison,	Nov. 18, 1812,	13,290	—	412
	{ Troops sent	{ different dates,	65,000	15,000	20,000
	{ during the campaign,				
Total.....			491,953	96,579	164,440

RECAPITULATION.

	Men.	Horses.
Infantry.....	491,953	164,446
Cavalry.....	96,579	
Add—Portions of the artillery, engineers, and military equipments.....	21,526	18,265
Total who entered the Russian territory.....	610,058	182,711
Add—Number of men and horses absent, but who rejoined the army during the campaign.....	37,100	4,400
Total effective force who entered the Russian territory.....	647,158	187,111
Total guns.....	1,372	

—Imperial Muster Rolls, given in CHAMBRAY, vol. i., App. No. 2.

Note B, p. 542.

Force of the Russian army opposed to Napoleon at the commencement of hostilities.

BARCLAY DE TOLLY, Commander of the First Army of the West.

Generals.	Infantry.	Caval.	Artill.	Cossacks.
Wittgenstein.....	20,664	2,416	2,940	1500
Bagawout.....	17,712	1,208	1,715	—
Toutchkoff.....	19,188	946	1,715	500
Schouwaloff.....	16,236	1,208	1,470	—
Grand-duke Constantine.....	19,682	3,084	1,715	—
Doctoroff.....	17,712	1,208	1,715	—
Ouwaroff.....	—	3,720	245	—
Korf.....	—	3,624	980	—
Pahlen.....	—	3,020	245	—
Platoff.....	—	—	245	7000
Total.....	111,194	20,434	12,985	9000

PRINCE BAGRATHION, Commander of the Second Army of the West.

Rajewskoi.....	17,712	1208	1715	—
Borodsin.....	16,236	3020	1225	—
Siewers.....	—	3694	980	—
Newerowskoi.....	8,856	—	—	—
Howaiskoi.....	—	—	245	4500
Total.....	42,804	7802	4165	4500

TORMASOFF, Commander of the Third Army of the West.

Kamenskoi.....	13,284	1208	980	—
Markoff.....	17,712	1208	980	—
Saken.....	4,000	2000	490	—
Lambert.....	—	5436	795	4500
Total.....	34,996	9852	3185	4500

RECAPITULATION OF THE WHOLE ARMY.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artill.	Cossacks.
First Army of the West..	111,194	20,434	12,985	9,000
Second Army of the West	42,804	7,852	4,165	4,500
Third Army of the West.	34,996	9,852	3,185	4,500
Grand total....	188,994	38,138	20,335	18,000

SUMMARY.

Infantry.....	188,994
Cavalry.....	38,138
Artillery.....	20,335
Cossacks.....	18,000
Total.....	265,467

Date Due

[illegible]

D308

06857

•A442

Allison, Sir Archibald.

History of Europe. v. 3.

06857

Allison, Sir Archibald.

AUTHOR

History of Europe. v. 3.

TITLE

DATE DUE

BORROWER'S NAME



